HomeDOCUMENTSCommittee Reports2002 Annual SessionAV 180 DSC(02)14 - General Report. 'Defending Democracies: Homeland Defence, Non-proliferation and Euro-Atlantic Security'
General Report. Draft General Report. 'Defending Democracies: Homeland Defence, Non-proliferation and Euro-Atlantic Security'
General Rapporteur - Rapporteur général : Pierre LELLOUCHE (France)
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Page)
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. EVOLVING THREATS TO THE ALLIANCE 2
A. TERRORISM 2
B. BALLISTIC MISSILES 3
C. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS 4
III. DEFENDING THE ALLIANCE 8
A. OVERVIEW 8
B. DETERRENCE 8
C. ARMS CONTROL AND DIPLOMACY 10
D. MISSILE DEFENCE 13
E. HOMELAND SECURITY 15
F. TRANSFORMING CONVENTIONAL FORCES 16
IV. CONCLUSION 19
1. On September 11, 2001, in an unprecedented mass terrorist attack, a small group of terrorists belonging to the al-Qaeda network hijacked four jetliners and crashed three of them into the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, killing thousands of people from the United States and dozens of other countries. Within a few hours, existing notions of how to defend the people and territories of our democracies were shattered. A day later, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, through which all Alliance members have pledged to regard an attack on one ally as an attack on them all. When military action in Afghanistan commenced on October 7, NATO countries found themselves involved in the first collective-defence operation in Alliance history. One year later, NATO and the world are still grappling with the consequences of 9/11, as conflict looms over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes.
2. September 11 represented a sea change in geopolitics. In a sense, it was the first day of a new era that has yet to be named. For more than a decade after the Cold War ended, the international scene was in transition, from a nuclear standoff between the superpowers, which in effect prevented war from reaching NATO and European territories, to a much more confused era, where far-away conflicts and wars could actually reach the very heart of our democracies. And we learned that a much more real and direct threat to our security is not Moscow's nuclear arsenal or even instability in South-eastern Europe, but a shadowy global terrorist group named al-Qaeda, operating from the sanctuary of a failed Afghan state that had been left alone to wallow in its own poverty, misgoverned by a backward, illegitimate regime known as the Taliban.
3. September 11 is particularly troubling because it revealed a new form of mass terrorism, with little or no reference at all to previous forms of terrorist activity. Classically, terrorism, as we had known it before, is paradoxically a form of negotiation between the terrorist organisation and the state, using terrorism as leverage. Terrorist acts were aimed at specific targets in order to achieve a specific local, not global, political objective. One need only regard organisations like the Kurdish PKK in Turkey, the Basque group ETA in Spain, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, or the Corsican separatists in France, among others, to comprehend the difference. Those groups have specific political goals, usually related to political autonomy or independence for a territory or ethnic group. Generally, their terrorist acts are aimed at specific institutions of the ruling government they hope to force to accept their demands, and they often seek to intimidate rather than destroy.
4. By contrast, al-Qaeda's goal is no less than global war --- war with Western civilisation, embodied by the United States and its allies, war also against the "moderate" Arab or Muslim regimes that do not follow, in al-Qaeda's eyes, Islamic law. Like it or not, therefore, 9/11 may well be the founding act of deliberate, global war of religions, a war of civilizations between the now-dominant Western model of societies and those who reject features of western "modernity" from the liberation of women to the separation between church and state. This will be a long-drawn-out war, whose outcome will be determined by these main factors:
* the ability of Western nations to stand united in the face of such threats;
* the possibility that further large-scale terrorist attacks could employ weapons of mass destruction, claiming large numbers of civilian casualties;
* the capacity of Muslim and Arab nations to resist the tide of Islamic fundamentalism and find their own path to economic growth and democracy.
5. This report does not attempt to cover every one of these three key items. the crucial question of whether Islam and its 1.2 billion adherents will choose to reconcile itself with modernity, or whether it will slide into a "fuite en arrière" toward obscurantism and war, will clearly be one of the key parameters for world security in the first half of the twenty-first century. As such, it will deserve much research and work on the part of relevant bodies at NATO and in this Assembly.
6. In the meantime, what this report tries to do is to point out the new challenges to NATO's forces and doctrine, the need for our nations to adjust to these new security dilemmas brought about by mass terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to do it jointly. On both counts the picture is rather bleak, not only as many of our nations still lag far behind in their effort, but most gravely of all, never has the alliance been as profoundly divided on both the analysis of the threats and the necessary responses. Iraq and the controversy over the new American "preventive doctrine" are cases in point.
7. Your Rapporteur, a long-time observer of the North Atlantic Alliance, has never seen such a fundamental split in NATO. There were crises before, but the common threat of the Cold War remained our focus. Today, with a fundamental disagreement on the very nature of the threat, we also find disagreement on how to address the threat. For the first time in its history, the Alliance is faced with a new kind of war, about which there is no common understanding among its member states.
II. EVOLVING THREATS TO THE ALLIANCE
8. When the Cold War ended, it appeared that the main role of the Alliance would be to put out brushfires on the periphery of Europe, in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, and to deal with dictators like Slobodan Milosevic, who undermined European security but did not threaten NATO countries directly. Instead, we learned in September 2001 that we laboured under a false sense of security. Instead of our security being threatened by another state, we learned that the threat could at any point be actually located on our own territory, while directed from abroad. The September 11 attacks may have taken place in the United States, but evidence of al-Qaeda's operations through Europe shows that none of our countries is immune from this threat. The terrorist organisation relied on university students in Hamburg and Islamic radicals in London and several French cities, and it stored explosives in Brussels intended for bombings in Paris and Strasbourg.
9. Ironically, the rise of the terrorist threat is the product of NATO's very success. The overwhelming technical superiority of our militaries means that no adversary can fight a successful conventional war against us. The extent of Western military superiority is such that no state can even begin to design a successful war plan to defeat any major Western nation, let alone NATO as a whole. The overwhelming success of our technology in the Gulf War a decade ago, the campaigns in the Balkans in the 1990s, and the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan showed that the only way for an adversary to wage war against the West today is asymmetrically, especially through terrorism - attacking our command centres or our populations by unconventional means. One of the greatest ironies of our age may be that the very success of our technology has produced a new form of warfare for which we are not prepared. The possible combination of Islamic mass terrorism with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially deadly for our societies and world peace.
10. According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman of RAND, trends in terrorism over the last 15 years suggest that mass terrorism is now conducted by a growing number of groups that are largely religious or fundamentalist in nature. Such groups are not motivated by a specific political objective - unlike ETA or the IRA - but by their objection to the core values or ideologies of secular, democratic societies. These groups are transnational and their loose organisation makes them more resistant to conventional intelligence and surveillance techniques. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports a general decline in the number of state-funded terrorist organisations. Terrorists are more frequently independently funded, often with close links to organised-crime networks. New communications technologies allow such groups to share information and co-ordinate their activities from a distance.
11. Experts suggest that fundamentalist terrorism does not restrict its activities to traditional acts of violence against political targets. In contrast to the logic of traditional terrorism ("to have many people watching, not many people dead"), mass terrorism aims at inflicting substantial civilian casualties. Bruce Hoffman of RAND and Anthony Cordesman of CSIS suggest that conventional deterrence, assuming identifiable and rational actors as opponents, is ineffective against modern terrorists, who appear irrationally risk-prone. Al-Qaeda is not alone in its tendency towards mass murder - groups such as Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, which perpetrated the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) -- appear equally willing to engage in mass terrorist activities. Palestinian terrorists are now targeting Israeli civilians, and in the month of March 2002 alone Israel lost a greater percentage of its population to terrorism than the United States lost on September 11.
12. With Alliance homelands as the new theatres of operations, threat assessments must re-evaluate the scope of new potential targets. Terrorists are now likely to target information and communications systems, banking and finance sectors, water, food and energy supplies, transportation networks and emergency services. The report of Lothar Ibrügger, "Technology and Terrorism," for the Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, offers more details on terrorism targeting and the use of information technology by terrorist groups.
B. BALLISTIC MISSILES
13. The actual number of ballistic missiles world-wide continues to remain well below the levels of the Cold War. However, possession of ballistic missiles is no longer confined to the great powers. Ballistic missiles are now widespread across the globe, with 28 countries possessing ballistic missiles, according to the British Ministry of Defence. According to the unclassified summary of a US National Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, published in January 2002, emerging ballistic missile states continue to rapidly increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of their missile systems, placing larger numbers of targets at risk. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities are no longer likely to be restricted to major powers. CIA intelligence reports express concern over developments in missile technology primarily in three countries: Iran, Iraq and North Korea, while a number of analysts add China, Libya, and Syria to that list.
14. Both Russia and China maintain comprehensive ballistic missile forces with precision-guided, deep-strike capabilities, capable of reaching both Europe and North America. However, intelligence estimates indicate that the threat posed to the Alliance by Russia and China remains minimal given the current diplomatic climate. Russia's rapidly ageing missile arsenal is in decline, due to lack of funds. Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic and theatre forces, the Russian arsenal is expected to decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015, despite efforts to prolong the life of its Soviet-era missiles. China's ballistic missile forces, by contrast, are expected to increase several-fold by 2015, bringing the country's ICBM force to around 75-100 ICBMs, according to the estimates of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC). So far, however, China's ICBM force is small, counting no more than 20 missiles in its arsenal.
15. According to the NIC's National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq has maintained the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop missile systems, despite UN prohibitions limiting the range of its missiles to 150 km. The country is thought to have maintained a small number of Scud-variant missiles in violation of the UN sanctions regime. Iraq is thought likely to pursue further short- and medium-range ballistic missile capabilities if sanctions were eliminated or significantly reduced. Under such circumstances, the country could flight-test a missile with a range of 900 km by 2010, and even sooner if it were to receive foreign assistance. The September 2002 net assessment by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) states that Iraq has probably retained a small force of 650 km range al-Hussein missiles, able to strike Israel and Turkey, but that it does not possess facilities to produce long-range missiles and that it would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to construct such facilities.
16. Iran continues to pursue both short- and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. The country's missile inventory is at present among the largest in the Middle East. Iran has Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles developed with North Korean No Dong technology, in addition to the Shahab-1 (300 km) and Shahab-2 (500 km) short-range ballistic missiles. Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani declared on May 26 that Iran successfully completed its fourth test of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile in mid-May. With a range of 1,300 km with a 700 kg payload, the Shahab-3 can potentially target Israel and Turkey. The missile is largely derived from the North Korean Nodong-1 and was built with significant technological assistance from Russia, according to U.S. intelligence agencies. US sources claim that Iran is likely to flight-test Shahab-4, with a range of more than 2,000 km, able to reach Central Europe, by 2005, but Iran has denied these allegations.
17. North Korea's multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2 may now be ready for flight testing. That missile would have a range up to 10,000 km - capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, western Canada and parts of the north-western contiguous United States. However, the country retains its voluntary moratorium on long-range missile flight-testing, putting off tests until 2003 provided that negotiations with the United States continue. North Korea remains active as a primary provider of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials and expertise. According to a report by the Korean Institute for Defence Analysis, North Korea has exported at least 540 missiles, along with spare parts and expertise, to Libya, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries since 1985.
18. Libya continues to cooperate with Iran on the development of missile technology and already possesses SCUD-B missiles. Press reports that Libya has procured 50 No Dong-1 missiles from North Korea have not been confirmed. It was thought until recently that the imposition of UN sanctions has impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-range missile programmes. However, intelligence sources recently reported that the Libyan missile programme has already reached an advanced stage, after having reached an agreement with China to build a hypersonic wind tunnel in Libya, which could be used for missile design and flight.
19. Syria also maintains a ballistic missile force, comprised mainly of Soviet-engineered short-range FROG-7, Scud-Bs, and solid-fuelled Scarab SS-21 missiles. US intelligence estimates suggest that regional concerns may prompt the country to seek a longer-range ballistic missile capability. However, the US National Intelligence Council judges that Syria does not now have and is unlikely to gain an ICBM capability before 2015.
C. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
20. Since the Cold War ended, the focus of concern regarding WMD has shifted from strategic concerns about deterrence theory and superpower nuclear strike capabilities to strategies for coping with the increased proliferation of WMD across the globe. With several countries outside of the five traditional nuclear powers developing nuclear capabilities, defence experts are now concerned with WMD as an asymmetric means by which an adversary might attack Alliance homelands.
21. Iran, Iraq and North Korea are all known to have active WMD programmes. In addition, their willingness to pass on materials and expertise to others raises fears about the likelihood of such states providing terrorist organisations with NBC capabilities. For example, the Iranian Republican Guards, a key source of Iranian aid to extremists, operate many of Iran's chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Similarly, the theft or diversion of nuclear materials from the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union is recognised by NATO's WMD Centre as its most pressing proliferation threat. Protecting, securing and disposing of weapons and weapons-grade fissile material in the countries of the former Soviet Union remains a difficult task.
22. Traditionally, defence analysis has focused upon the delivery of WMD via a missile fired from overseas. As a result, defensive measures have focused almost exclusively on missile defence systems. However, WMD delivered by boat, truck or plane would be equally devastating. The NIC's NIE 2002 argues that, in fact, homelands are just as likely to suffer an attack by a terrorist organisation using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons as from a state using ballistic missiles.
23. As yet, no terrorist organisation is known to have acquired nuclear weapons. However, according to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material and 201 cases of trafficking in medical and industrial radioactive sources since 1993. However, according to the Defence Science Board's 2000 general report and a RAND report, the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack remains low, due to the difficulty in successfully developing and delivering a nuclear weapon.
24. By contrast, chemical materials are relatively inexpensive and widely available, with many precursor ingredients used commercially in food processing and pharmaceuticals. In addition, a number of Internet sites and handbooks provide descriptions of how to produce nerve agents and toxic compounds. Although biological agents have been harder to procure in the past, they have become increasingly available after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disorderly dismantling of Soviet bioresearch facilities dispersed throughout former Soviet republics.
25. According to CSIS, biological weapons pose the most pressing threat to Alliance homelands because of their potent destructive capabilities. It is estimated that 100 kg of a powerful biological agent, such as the Ebola virus, could kill 1 to 3 million people - twice the number of fatalities that would result from a 1-megaton nuclear weapon. Chemical poisoning agents, in contrast, are in practice only marginally more lethal than conventional weapons. The most recent anthrax attacks in the United States -- which killed five people, shut down Congress and the Supreme Court, severely disrupted postal services, and cost a total of $20 million in clean-up costs - demonstrate the ease with which even small quantities of biological agents can be disseminated over a broad part of the population to achieve maximum disruptive effect.
26. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union possessed the world's largest biological weapons programme, and it is uncertain whether that programme has been completely dismantled. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the former Soviet Union's biological weapons institutes continue to pose a security threat because the scientists and researchers who work there are underpaid and the institutes still have "large collections of dangerous biological pathogens." GAO notes that a hostile regime or terrorist group could either hire these scientists or purchase deadly biological agents. The status of the former Soviet biological weapons programme and eliminating the proliferation risk should be part of the agenda for the new NATO-Russia Council.
27. Since WMD can be used in ways that present radically different challenges for defence response, there is broad consensus among governments and intelligence agencies world-wide that pre-emptive measures remain the best means by which to protect Allied homelands. According to GAO, the threat of WMD is significantly reduced in countries where there exists tight security at laboratories and storage facilities, border controls and facilities that could be used to disseminate chemical or biological agents such as food and water supplies.
28. Although weaponisation of biological agents, especially genetically altered ones, is a difficult process that requires a high level of technological sophistication, it is suspected that weaponised biological and chemical agents exist in several rogue states' arsenals, posing a threat to Allied homelands. States with adequately funded military programmes and a high level of technological know-how can deliver chemical and biological weapons via artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, and spraying devices, as well as missiles. According to NATO's WMD Centre, more than 25 countries currently possess or are developing chemical or biological weapons.
29. It should be noted however, that delivery of chemical and biological agents by ballistic missiles is far from simple. Mounting biological dispersal systems onto cruise missiles may overcome these disadvantages. An aerosol dispersal system mounted on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or cruise missile, creating, in effect, a remotely piloted crop duster, would be an effective way of deploying biological agents over a determined target area. Likewise, cruise missiles fitted with spray tanks would serve as particularly effective delivery vehicles for chemical agents. According to a recent RAND study, the US army should invest more money in developing better defences against cruise missiles, since these are likely to pose a greater threat than ballistic missiles. Compared with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are expected to be much more accurate (by a factor of at least 10), less costly (by at least half) and substantially more effective in delivering chemical or biological payloads. Recent reports from the US Department of Defence maintain that a programme to bolster the defence of the US against cruise missile attacks is under way. Such a cruise missile defence would be an integral element of homeland defence against aerial threats.
30. Previous instances of the use of chemical agents among the so-called rogue states are alarming, as they are indicative of these states' willingness to use WMD. With respect to the use of chemical weapons, according to the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS), Iraq employed mustard gas against Iran between 1984-1988 and Iran used mustard and nerve gas against Iraqi forces in the same period; Iraq used mustard and nerve gas against its own Kurdish population in 1988; and Libya used mustard gas against Chadian forces in 1987.
31. According to the British government, Iran has indicated that its Ministry of Defence owns two chemical production facilities. The country made limited use of chemical weapons at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, began to create stockpiles of cyanide, phosgene and mustard gas in the mid-1980s and currently holds nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. Although Iran's biological capabilities are uncertain, the research effort was reportedly initiated in 1980s during the war with Iraq, and there is a suspected research laboratory at Damghan. Various intelligence sources report that Iran has conducted extensive bioresearch and may currently be involved in active weapons production. Iran also has a large nuclear development programme based on the construction of power reactors for civilian energy generation, reliant on Russian assistance. US and Israeli officials believe Iran seeks to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons. Declarations by Iranian representatives, such as top arms control official Hassan Mashadi, that Iran is always "keeping its nuclear options open", serve as a reminder that Iran is always a potential threat to the West. Iran has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but has not submitted an initial declaration. Iran is also a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).
32. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq maintained stockpiles of mustard gas and the nerve agents Sarin, Tabun, and VX, and flight-tested long range missiles with chemical warheads. Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least seven principal biological agents before 1991 and has to date failed to account for some 17 tonnes of growth medium for biological weapons. Each ton can be used to produce 10 tonnes of bacteriological weapons. IISS stated that Iraq has probably retained substantial growth media and BW agent (perhaps thousands of litres of anthrax) from pre-1991 stocks, and that the regime is capable of resuming BW agent production within weeks from existing civilian facilities. IISS experts also allege that Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard gas and precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks, and is capable of resuming CW production within a few months from existing civilian facilities. Iraq is not a signatory of the CWC, but has signed the BWC.
33. On-site inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials could not reveal the magnitude of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme because, according to IAEA officials, Iraq followed "a course of denial, concealment and obstruction" rather than meeting its obligation to submit to IAEA a declaration of the locations, amounts and items related to nuclear research and development, following UN Security Council resolution 687. Iraq appears determined to prevent the implementation of Security Council resolutions mandating verification of its disarmament.
34. According to Israeli military experts, Syria has the largest and most advanced chemical weapons capability in the Middle East. Syria is reported to have chemical warheads for Scud missiles, and chemical gravity bombs for delivery by aircraft. Syria's chemical weapons stockpile is estimated in hundreds of tons. Agents are believed to include Sarin, VX, and mustard gas. Major production facilities are located near Damascus and Homs, with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually. The Syrian chemical weapons' programme remains dependent on foreign chemicals and equipment. Syria has not signed either the CWC or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has not ratified BWC.
35. According to intelligence sources, Libya produced more than 100 metric tons of nerve and blister agents at the Rabta facility in the 1980s, and continues to maintain an underground chemical agent production facility at Tarhunah. Libya is not a signatory of the CWC and is suspected of having resumed its clandestine efforts toward chemical weapons production. Libya has signed the BWC, but not the CWC.
36. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), North Korea's chemical warfare programme is believed to be mature and includes the capability, since 1989, to produce indigenously bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents as well as a variety of different filled munitions systems. North Korea has yet to sign the CWC, and maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing chemical precursors, agents, and weapons. The country has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents. North Korea has the capability to produce nerve gas, blood agents, and the mustard-gas family of chemical weapons. In the assessment of US intelligence services, North Korean reserves, accommodated in perhaps half a dozen major storage sites and as many as 170 mountain tunnels, are at least 180 to 250 tons, with some estimates of chemical stockpiles as high as 5,000 tons. According to FAS, North Korea has been pursuing research and development related to biological warfare since the 1960s. The country possesses the capability to produce only limited quantities of toxins, as well as weaponised viral and bacterial biological warfare agents. In addition, the Pentagon believes that North Korea has produced and diverted enough plutonium for one nuclear weapon.
37. North Korea's willingness to sell WMD technology remains a major proliferation concern. North Korea has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but has not complied with its obligations, hindering the implementation of the non-proliferation regime with its efforts at clandestine nuclear development and its determination to block inspections. In the 1994 inspection crisis, North Korea violated its obligations and announced that it was withdrawing from NPT, reversing its decision only after it was promised two nuclear power reactors and shipments of fuel oil. Former CIA Director James Woolsey and former US Secretary of Defense William Perry have warned that North Korea might still have enough plutonium for two nuclear devices. North Korea is a signatory of the BWC, but not of the CWC.
III. DEFENDING THE ALLIANCE
38. In the light of these threats, a new approach to the defence of the Alliance is needed, one that draws upon strategies and approaches that have proved successful and combines them with effective defence capabilities. With regard to most states in the international system, diplomatic and political initiatives can greatly reduce the risk that they might pose to the security of the NATO countries. Other Assembly committees are active in examining how historical trends like democratisation, economic liberalisation, and political cooperation are expanding the community of prosperous democracies that seek good relations with their neighbours. In the field of defence and security, strategic and diplomatic initiatives can help make the Euro-Atlantic region a safer place.
39. The overwhelming military capabilities of NATO mean that most states will not consider direct military action against any Alliance member. Diplomatic efforts, including multilateral regimes, bilateral treaties and other international agreements, can help reduce the risk that missiles or weapons of mass destruction will fall into the hands of terrorists or unfriendly states, but in the end, there remains a need for active defence capabilities. While an invasion of NATO territory is a remote possibility, the campaign in Afghanistan shows that military force is still needed to move against those who attack the territory of a NATO member, and against the main threats that we face, we will need missile defences to protect ourselves if missiles should be launched against us and homeland defence capabilities if we fail to prevent an attack on our territories.
40. In the 40 years that NATO confronted the Soviet threat, the Alliance never had to fight a war. In this regard, the Alliance fulfilled the intention of its founders. Rather than an Alliance formed to fight a war, NATO was founded on the principle that it could " 'deter' a war which had not yet become inevitable," in the words of UCLA professor Richard Rosecrance. In order to be effective, deterrence must contain a credible threat of force against a potential aggressor that is sufficient to persuade the aggressor that certain actions are too risky to undertake. It is most likely to be successful when the potential aggressor believes success is unlikely and can foresee that the costs will be higher than expected gains. For deterrence to be convincing, the intent and will to respond in case of aggression must be clearly communicated, and the adversary must perceive that there is adequate military capability to back up the threat.
41. Where rogue or unstable states are concerned, however, it is debatable whether deterrence as we have known it will continue to operate according to its traditional logic. Many countries, including several nuclear powers, have trouble accepting this new reality. The idea that deterrence may not work against all states, however, is a centrepiece of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy, which was sent to Congress in September 2002. This document, which outlines American strategic thinking, notes that "In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defence. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations."
42. The US document states that "our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice ... as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States." As a result, the Bush administration document raises the possibility of pre-emptive attacks on adversaries, stating: "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively."
43. This document appears to signal a significant shift in the American definition of pre-emption. Traditionally, the term is reserved for action against "forces that present an imminent danger of attack." The US strategy extends the term to what traditionally has been known as a "preventive" attack; that is, an attack on an adversary before the adversary can build up its capabilities to pose a threat. The distinction can be illustrated by two cases from the Middle East. In 1967, when Israel attacked Arab armies that had massed on its borders, it carried out a legitimate pre-emptive attack. By contrast, the 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq was a preventive attack, launched to prevent Iraq from obtaining a nuclear capability that it could later use against Israel. The Osirak attack was roundly condemned at the time as a violation of international law, though in retrospect it may have helped deny Saddam Hussein a nuclear weapons capability before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
44. The Bush administration has attempted to reassure the international community that this new strategy does not signal open season on any country that displeases the United States, stating "The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression. ... The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."
45. Still, such a determination would be made in Washington, not in the North Atlantic Council or the United Nations Security Council, which raises concerns for countries who believe that such decisions should be made in a multilateral setting and would violate international law if made unilaterally. Critics note that a doctrine of unilateral pre-emption could lead other countries to assume the same right for themselves, and they warn that in unstable regions, particularly South Asia, such thinking could cause a crisis to escalate quickly, increasing pressure on one side to act pre-emptively against the other side's nuclear capability.
46. The French president, Jacques Chirac, is critical of the new US doctrine, calling it "extraordinarily dangerous." Mr Chirac said, "As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other countries will naturally do the same. What would you say in the entirely hypothetical event that China wanted to take pre-emptive action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? How would the Americans, the Europeans, and others react? Or what if India decided to take preventive action against Pakistan, or vice versa?"
47. Deterrence remains enshrined in NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept. As the US strategy was being drafted in June, Secretary General George Robertson said that deterrence "is the fundamental policy of NATO. We have to have a range of possibilities that are out there, but fundamentally we need to and we should rely on deterrence."
48. As regards US nuclear doctrine, the Pentagon in January 2002 sent Congress its Nuclear Posture Review, which sets out the requirements for the US nuclear force. The review was driven by the fact that the United States faces multiple threats, rather than the single threat of the Cold War, and must focus on its own capabilities rather than matching a single adversary. According to reports in the Los Angeles Times about the classified sections of the nuclear review, the Bush administration directed the military to prepare contingency plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons against Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria, in addition to declared nuclear powers Russia and China. According to the New York Times, the report states that nuclear weapons might be employed in response to "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbours, or a North Korean attack on South Korea." The Los Angeles Times report states that nuclear weapons might be used "against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; or 'in the event of surprising military developments.' "
49. This evolution of American strategic thinking is not shared by the European allies, for the most part. Among the Alliance's two European nuclear powers, the UK government has stated that there is no change in British policy that use of nuclear weapons is still a deterrent of last resort and would be used only in extreme circumstances of self-defense. As for France, it has restated its pledge that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state unless that country attacked it or its allies in alliance with a nuclear power.
50. However, the potential use of biological or chemical weapons by a non-nuclear country raises certain concerns. All NATO countries have renounced biological and chemical weapons and are destroying whatever stocks remain, leaving nuclear weapons as the only WMD the Alliance possesses. As a result, the US State Department has declared that "if a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of response." Some analysts believe that this threat dissuaded Iraq from using WMD in the Gulf War.
51. A terrorist attack poses an even more difficult challenge for deterrence, as shown by the fact that the first collective-defence operation in NATO's history is in response to a terrorist attack. Potential terrorists must be persuaded that an attack on allies will result in substantial reprisal, thus dissuading them from initiating an attack. As the US National Security Strategy states: "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness."
52. The US strategy suggests that deterrence must also function alongside effective homeland defences, noting that: "Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends." As US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said, "The terrorists who struck us on September 11 were clearly not deterred from doing so from the massive US nuclear arsenal." One consequence is that the US nuclear review also considers the development of small, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to attack targets buried deep underground, such as the caves used by al-Qaeda. Earth-penetrating nuclear weapons could also be used to destroy an underground facility that a hostile state is using to develop WMD. Critics charge that developing such weapons would lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons by making them easier to use; others argue that by enhancing the credibility of US threats against deeply buried targets, they might actually strengthen deterrence.
53. Development of such nuclear weapons would drive another wedge between the United States and its allies, as it both lowers the threshold for using nuclear weapons, in contravention of the NPT, and would require nuclear testing. While the US Senate has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear tests, all other NATO allies have ratified the accord. At the same time, European opposition to American missile defence programmes reflects a refusal to recognise that some potential threats, such as accidental or unauthorised launches of ballistic missiles, cannot be deterred by their very nature. As the US State Department notes, ballistic missile defence "enhances the traditional deterrence value of offensive capabilities by denying rogue states the ability to reliably inflict mass destruction on other nations. By complicating his calculations of success, missile defence adds to a potential aggressor's uncertainty and weakens his confidence."
C. ARMS CONTROL AND DIPLOMACY
54. Disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export regimes continue to provide a means by which Allied nations can contribute to halting the development and spread of WMD, complementing the need for active defences to protect our nations in those cases where non-proliferation may fail. The seeming indifference of the United States toward arms control and non-proliferation regimes is yet another source of strain in the Alliance. The American refusal to ratify the CTBT, refusal to sign a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, among others, have greatly concerned the European and Canadian allies, who remain committed to the idea that international treaties and regimes are an effective and integral tool of security policy.
55. The 1972 BWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, but has no enforcement mechanism. To date, 163 states have signed the convention and 143 have ratified it. While the convention has been in force since 1975, the lack of a formal verification regime that would monitor the parties' compliance has been a key limitation to its effective implementation.
56. The main problem in policing the compliance is the 'dual use' nature of biotechnology, in particular the fact that the facilities used for the production of legitimate substances, i.e. vaccines, closely resemble those used for the production of biological agents. Since 1991, attempts have been made to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention, and also to improve its implementation; however, in 2001 the United States refused to adopt the draft verification and compliance protocol, stating that the protocol "would not improve our ability to verify BWC compliance" and would "put national security and confidential business information at risk."
57. Negotiators suspended the discussions and planned to argue on new verification measures at the review conference scheduled for November 2002. However, the United States announced in September 2002 that it wants to delay further discussions until 2006 because negotiators remain far from agreement. US officials concluded that the proposed regime would subject US biotechnology firms to intrusive inspections and that US government defence programmes would be at risk of foreign espionage by hostile countries seeking to circumvent US defences. The United States also argued that the BWC protocol would be ineffective in stopping would-be proliferators from acquiring biological weapons.
58. With the State Department having identified countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, Syria, as pursuing bio-weapons programmes, the United States' decision has been denounced as counter-productive in the context of war against terrorism. Proponents of a verification protocol argue that a pact establishing strong mandatory standards backed by penalties and inspections may deter some countries from developing biological weapons programmes while helping to build norms of international behaviour.
59. Chemical weapons are banned by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the development, acquisition, transfer, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It also requires states parties to destroy chemical weapons production facilities and the chemical weapons they possess. Today, there are 145 states parties to the treaty, and a further 29 states have signed but not yet ratified it. The CWC is the most intrusive of the international arms control agreements, since the verification provisions of the convention affect the civilian chemical industry.
60. Following the September 11 attacks on the United States, relations between Moscow and Washington warmed, and there was a renewed impetus for improving NATO-Russian relations. The May 2002 Rome Summit laid the foundations for a stronger NATO-Russia relationship with the official establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. The Council has been designed as a mechanism for consultation and joint decision to intensify practical cooperation on shared issues of concern, such as terrorism, missile defence, nuclear non-proliferation, civil emergencies and search and rescue operations. In September, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) reached agreement on basic rules that will enable Russia and the Alliance to stage joint peacekeeping operations in the future, which gave Russia a permanent place at alliance headquarters. The "new era in NATO-Russia cooperation" might be also the opportunity for NATO to revise its nuclear policy inherited from the Cold War. In addition, your Rapporteur believes that this council must address the problem of the former Soviet biological weapons programme, including how to dismantle its remnants and to ensure that countries and terrorist groups do not gain access to biological weapons technology or materials.
61. Another sign of the shift in the relationship between Russia and the United States lies in the complete reversal of mindset concerning anti-missile programmes. In December 2001, The United States announced its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) with Russia. The treaty barred both superpowers from deploying national defences against long-range ballistic missiles, which allowed both sides to achieve deterrence with fewer missiles because they could be certain that their missiles would reach their targets, enabling further arms reductions. In response to the US withdrawal, Russia pulled out of the START II Treaty, which had never entered into force. However, rather than increasing its nuclear arsenal, Russia pressed for a binding treaty that would codify the reductions in nuclear weapons that each side had already announced.
62. The Treaty of Moscow has been not so much a step forward to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as a move to a new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States. With both sides in 2001 having reached the START I Treaty levels of 6,000 warheads each, the Treaty of Moscow requires each country to reduce its arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. But the parties have not reached a compromise in the definition of "strategic nuclear warhead" and there is no binding timetable for reductions or defined procedures for the destruction of weapons reduced. The United States maintains that this agreement allows it to store decommissioned warheads in case they should be needed again, which has led some analysts to argue that the actual number of American warheads deployed or decommissioned will be 3,000 to 3,500, the levels that had been agreed in the START II Treaty. In the end, the reductions on both sides may be driven more by economic considerations than the treaty.
63. International concern regarding the potential access by terrorists and states regarded as potential agents of proliferation to weapons-usable nuclear material could lead to new efforts to improve global control over such material. Given the potential uses of atomic energy for both peaceful and military purposes, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) aims at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and equal access to this technology for all states parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.
64. There is growing international interest in moving forward to dismantle the WMD infrastructure in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and to ensure the secure storage and disposal of excess dangerous materials inherited from the Cold War. In June 2002, the G8 group of seven industrialised countries plus Russia committed to raise up to $20 billion (€20.4 billion) over the next 10 years to help Russia and other former Soviet states secure and destroy their nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles and materials. The G8 "global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction" builds on and expands a decade of cooperation between the United States and former Soviet States to reduce and prevent the proliferation of WMD, starting with the Co-operative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) programme in 1992. Initial projects will focus on destroying Russia's 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agents and on securing Russian fissile materials, which are estimated to total more than 1.000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and at least 150 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium. In August 2002 the United States increased financial support to the Nunn-Lugar programmes, which provide money to prevent the theft of tens of thousands of WMD and fissile material diversion.
65. To deal with the issues posed by the several small reactors that the Soviet Union had exported to its allies during the Cold War, the United States carried out operations to transport and secure nuclear materials from former Soviet reactors to safe countries, from Georgia to Britain in 1998 and from Kazakhstan to Tennessee in 1994. The latest operation took place in former Yugoslavia, where more than 100 pounds of nuclear material considered at risk of being stolen or sold for use in producing nuclear weapons was secretly flown from Serbia to Russia in August 2002. There is a clear need for additional multilateral regimes, in particular with regard to the safeguarding of nuclear materials.
66. Given the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, missile development and WMD have become intertwined challenges. The most recent development in the attempt to curb the spread of ballistic missiles is the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was initiated by France and other Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members in 1999. The Code is intended to address some of the shortcomings of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by introducing demand-side controls on the acquisition of ballistic missile technology. The MTCR, created in 1987 to buttress the NPT by restricting the export of missiles and related technologies, is a policy-co-ordination agreement that does not focus on a specific class of weapon. The MTCR has been the only multilateral instrument for missile control so far.
67. In June 2002, 100 countries met in Madrid to continue the negotiations on the drafting of the ICOC, which is intended to discourage states from developing or acquiring ballistic missile technology. Despite growing support, the ICOC may suffer from the absence of countries whose ballistic missile programmes have raised concerns such as Syria, North Korea and Iran, which chose not to attend the meeting. Denmark, the current EU president, has assumed responsibility for hosting negotiations on the Code and hopes to launch the code for signature at The Hague at the end of 2002.
68. Despite the difficulty of devising norms for a demand-side missile regime, the Code would set up confidence-building measures such as annual declaration on ballistic missile policies and on Space-Launch Vehicles (SLV) activities and policies. By setting out general voluntary political commitments, the ICOC calls on states to restrain their development and deployment of ballistic missiles and to curb missile assistance to states illegally developing weapons of mass destruction. Critics point out the lack of tangible and economical incentives to join the Code, which contains no legally binding commitments, while developing countries denounce it as a potential device to monitor their ballistic missile development.
D. MISSILE DEFENCE
69. The subject of missile defence, perhaps the most divisive issue in transatlantic relations over the previous few years, has faded somewhat as a source of tension in the Alliance. The enhanced co-operation with Russia after September 11, 2001, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, and the mild Russian reaction that followed have muted the criticisms of those who believed that the US missile defence programme would lead to a new arms race. At the same time, the Bush Administration in its first year in office has revised the American approach to missile defence, replacing the former division between theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) with delineations based on where intercept takes place, rather than on the range of the missile being intercepted.
70. The Bush Administration has embarked on an intensive research and development programme that will explore all options for effective missile defence. Procurement of a missile defence system will not occur until a system is proved ready; however, there would be an ability by about 2005 to deploy testing systems as an interim missile defence system if the need suddenly arose. Ultimately the programme seeks to develop a missile defence system to intercept missiles in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases. In June 2002, the Congress approved the sum of $7.7 billion (€7.8 billion) for missile defence for the fiscal year 2003, an increase of around $2.5 billion or 55% from fiscal year 2001.
71. US experts claim that, a few years from now, US ballistic missile defence will be a three-tiered, state-of-the-art system. Interception of enemy ballistic missiles in their boostphase, shortly after being launched, is to be accomplished by an Airborne Laser. Incoming missiles is to be destroyed in the mid-course phase of their trajectory by a the combined capabilities of a Theatre High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) and a Sea-based Midcourse Defence component. The system's lower tier, covering the terminal phase of enemy missiles, is to comprise a Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) TMD system, able to intercept advanced tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hostile aircraft, including UAVs. PAC-3 is to be complemented by a mobile surface-to-air missile system (MEADS), a co-operative project by NATO partners US, Germany and Italy.
72. The projected year of deployment of the mid-course defence segment is 2006 and of the boost-phase segment in 2009. As for terminal phase, PAC-3 production and deployment is already taking place, despite problems experienced in operational tests conducted between February and May 2002. The other components of missile defence are expected to become available in the next five years. Although this missile defence is a high-end system by today's standards, it is far from being perfect. Experts argues that this missile defence is unlikely to seal US skies against all types of ballistic missile attack.
73. US plans to develop expanded testing grounds in Alaska and in the Pacific Ocean are already under way. These plans aim at allowing a broader range of testing than currently permitted by facilities in California and the Marshall Islands. Notably, there are plans to build a target and interceptor facility at Fort Greely, Alaska, and a sensor array at Cobra Dane, in the Aleutian Islands. This upgraded test-bed would allow testing of ground and sea-based elements attempting intercepts in all three phases of flight. There would also be additional intercept areas, allowing multiple engagements in a single test.
74. In addition, discussions are under way between NATO allies for the development of a layered TMD system using the alliance's Air Command and Control System's (ACCS) Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (BMC3I) capabilities that could protect NATO military forces in a future conflict with an adversary possessing short- or theatre-range ballistic missiles. According to Bob Bell, the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support, NATO should be in a position by 2004 to decide whether to field the planned missile defence system by 2010. Two groups - one led by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the other by Lockheed Martin - are to complete 18-month feasibility studies by the end of 2002, examining all potential components of an integrated and fielded TMD systemand assessing its economic viability.
75. After the feasibility studies are completed, the Alliance is to define its TMD requirements and proceed to the TMD project development phase. NATO TMD is to be a modular system that combines efforts already under way by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. These include PAC-3 deployment and development of the MEADS and Aster missile defence programmes. In addition, tactical/operational TMD exercises, such as the Dutch/US exercise Joint Project Optic Windmill, were to take place in September 2002.
E. HOMELAND SECURITY
76. In addition, a new effort is needed toward protecting our territories and our populations against terrorist attack. A new approach toward civil defence, reserves and "homeland defence" has to be urgently defined if we are to avoid mass casualties in the future. Since September 11 2001, NATO members and partners have been forced to reassess the threats posed to their homelands by WMD terrorism. According to these reassessments there are serious inadequacies in health-care provisions and security systems. Hospitals in North America and Europe continue to operate at around 90% capacity and would be unable to deal with more than 50 patients requiring quarantine. National health-care authorities have no strategy for rationing the limited medical treatment available in the event of an attack. Emergency personnel and health-care workers need to be fully trained in symptom recognition and response.
77. Security is inadequate around critical sites and facilities that could be used to disseminate chemical or biological attacks, such as food and water supplies. The improvement of research and development programmes is also central: enhanced military capabilities, equipment and adequate civil defences are possible only once research teams have gathered full toxicology data and have identified possible means of protection and treatment. The US is also developing a portal shield site to protect fixed sites, such as water supplies, against biological attack.
78. Civil emergency planning is primarily a national responsibility. However, at the NATO level national intentions and capabilities are harmonised to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are available. The Civil Emergency Planning Directorate at NATO aims to co-ordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in emergency situations such as war, crises and disasters. In response to the threats posed by international terrorism and WMD, the main goals of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) are to decrease the vulnerability of civilian populations, minimise the threats to critical infrastructure and co-ordinate responses in the event of an attack.
79. The North Atlantic Council has identified four main areas for the improvement of civil emergency preparedness: civil-military cooperation; mass movement of civilian populations; medical preparations and the development of an inventory of national capabilities. Cooperation between civil and military authorities will necessitate additional military support for essentially civilian operations in the event of a terrorist attack. Mass movement of civilian populations calls for the development of arrangements to facilitate rapid transit and border crossings. Medical preparations are broadly concerned with minimising the health risks associated with biological and chemical attacks; among other activities this includes disease surveillance, the creation of mobile laboratories for diagnosis and treatment for contamination. The development of an inventory of national response capabilities will create a database of the international resources that might be available to a stricken country.
80. In order to provide defence against weapons of mass destruction, NATO has five concrete initiatives under way: a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) analytical laboratory; an NBC event response team; a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence; a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile; and a disease surveillance system.
81. At the same time, military intelligence capabilities must be improved to effectively track potential attackers, weapons-manufacturing sites and intended transport routes for chemical or biological agents. According to the UK MoD, a premium must also be placed on the ability to generate and identify smart new civil-use technologies than can be quickly integrated into military platforms, weapons systems and force structures. This requires effective research and development programmes. The US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US Army's Medical Research and Material Command laboratories are both engaged in identifying novel therapies against threat agents.
82. With respect to Homeland Defence, in August 2002 the Pentagon initiated a new programme to support homeland security, aiming for early detection and characterisation of a biological-related incident in urban areas in order to reduce casualties, to minimise disruption to infrastructures and to support consequence management efforts. However, effective detection and reliable early warning remain an underdeveloped area of homeland defence in most Western countries.
83. US Homeland Security merits special attention because, uniquely, the US government has embarked on an overhaul of the system since September 11, 2001. In response to the perceived need for a singl, , e, federal agency to deal with domestic security, the president created the US Office of Homeland Security as an advisory bureau in the White House. However, because this office had no budgetary authority over the federal agencies it sought to co-ordinate, critics called for the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, with wider powers. Proposed by the president in June 2002, the Department of Homeland Security would mark a significant reorganisation of the US domestic security system. By absorbing federal agencies dealing with domestic defence, the Department of Homeland Security would directly co-ordinate a broad range of security issues. The new department would focus on four areas: border and transport security; emergency preparedness and response; countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; and intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection. According to the President's original proposal it would co-ordinate 22 different federal agencies and programmes.
84. The Department of Homeland Security has bi-partisan support, and the legislation creating it is expected to pass through Congress largely intact, save for a dispute over union representation for its employees. However, a Brookings Institute study has warned that a bureaucratic reorganisation of this scale could divert attention and resources from counter-terrorism. Instead of incorporating the FBI and the CIA, the plan would establish a new intelligence analysis division, reliant on raw intelligence from the older agencies. The new division could exacerbate rather than solve the problem of intelligence co-ordination, leading to competition instead of cooperation between the various bodies.
F. TRANSFORMING CONVENTIONAL FORCES
85. Military forces will continue to play an important role in defending and responding to those states and terrorist groups that pose a threat to Alliance homelands. Conventional military capabilities are needed against states like Afghanistan that harbour and support terrorist groups. In the fight against terrorists themselves, special forces and counter-terrorism units are likely to play a leading role in the battle. Rapid deployment capabilities are critical to the swift response to a threat and the timely projection of Allied forces. Precision-guided munitions, advanced sensors and the development of counter-terrorist intelligence are other capabilities currently being integrated into NATO forces that have contributed to the success of the Afghanistan campaign. The special report by John Shimkus, "The War on Terrorism," discusses the military campaign in Afghanistan and NATO capabilities for fighting terrorism more thoroughly, including proposals for a standing NATO response force.
86. However, the growing gap in defence spending, itself driven by differing perceptions of the security threats facing our countries, now constitutes a major fault line between the United States and its NATO Allies. The reluctance of the Europeans and Canadians to spend more money on developing the capabilities needed to fight against these new threats may lead to the unwelcome prospect of their being unable to operate alongside US forces. Already in Afghanistan, with the exception of a small contingent of French and British forces, the Europeans found themselves scrambling to find sufficient airlift to transport their forces to take part in NATO's first Article 5 operation, a result of failure to spend on strategic lift capabilities. At the root of the problem lies the fact that the Europeans are not yet convinced that they face a significant threat.
87. NATO confronted this problem in 1999, when its heads of state and government approved the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit. While the DCI initially succeeded in drawing attention to the main shortcomings of allied forces, the initiative lost momentum quickly. While much of the DCI has been integrated into NATO Force Goals, a set of capabilities that each ally agrees to provide to the Alliance, many analysts have criticised the large number of action items, which drew attention away from rectifying the main shortcomings.
88. In order to overcome this lack of focus, NATO defence ministers in June 2002 called for a "new capabilities initiative" that would "focus on a small number of capabilities essential to the full range of Alliance missions." This new capabilities initiative will focus on four main areas: 1. Defence against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; 2. Ensuring secure command, control, communications and information; 3. Improving interoperability and effectiveness of deployed forces; 4. Ensuring rapid deployment and sustainability of combat forces.
89. As part of the new capabilities initiative, NATO member countries are to make firm national commitments in these four areas prior to the Prague Summit. There are to be firm deadlines by which countries will fulfil their commitments. Already, five countries have asked NATO to cut the number of forces that they pledge to the Alliance so that they may spend the money on upgrading capabilities of the remaining forces. The new capabilities initiative was to be discussed by NATO defence ministers at their meeting in Warsaw in September, when they were to examine each nation's proposals for overcoming its shortfalls.
90. Officials at NATO headquarters and many analysts pointed to a lack of defence spending as the main obstacle to fulfilling many of the 59 action items in the DCI. In addition, one senior NATO official pointed to the conservatism of many senior military officers, who choose to spend money on forces for traditional territorial defence, rather than on forces capable of performing the new missions called for by the Alliance. Even where defence ministries have recognised the need for additional resources, finance ministries refuse to approve larger defence budgets. Regardless of the cause, the failure by most European countries and Canada to spend more money on defence is leading to a larger gap between them and the United States, which is increasing its defence spending in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
91. After September 11 the Bush administration requested that Congress increase the 2003 defence budget by $48 billion (€48.8 billion) to $396 billion (€403 billion), out of which $379 billion (€385 billion) would go to the Department of Defense, with the rest going to other defence programmes, mostly in the Department of Energy. This constitutes a 14% increase over 2002. At the time of writing, the House of Representatives and the Senate were reconciling their different defence authorisation bills, but both versions were close to the President's request. In the longer term, the White House requested an increase in defence spending of $120 billion (€122 billion) over the next five years, which would bring the US defence budget to $451 billion (€458 billion) in 2007. Included in the request is funding for transformation goals identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review.
92. This budget request, the largest increase in military spending since the Reagan era, will further exacerbate the disparity in defence spending between the United States and its NATO allies. This $48 billion increase alone would exceed the defence budget of any other country, with the exception of Russia. Particularly striking is the $54 billion (€54.9 billion) budget being requested for research and development, which would leave the United States spending seven times more on research per soldier than the Europeans.
93. George Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, is rightly concerned that the growing gap might decrease Alliance cohesion, and he has repeatedly urged NATO nations to raise their defence budgets. According to NATO, the European and Canadian allies spent $167 billion (€169.7 billion) on defence in 2001, compared to $306 billion (€311 billion) by the United States. The European allies spent on average less than 2% of their GDP on defence, compared to 2.9% in the United States, a gap that might widen with this year's budgets. Lord Robertson, who has described Europe as a "military pygmy", has warned NATO members that they have to spend more if they want to operate alongside the American military.
94. The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, warned NATO members that "without dramatic action to close the capability gap, we face the real prospect of future two-tiered alliance," and Mr Rumsfeld warned the Congress in February that unless the allies increase their defence spending, "we're going to find it very, very difficult to continue to work with some of these countries." With the exception of Greece and Turkey, whose defence spending exceeds 5% of their GDP, the other European allies spend less than 3% of their GDP in defence, with seven of them spending less than 2%.
95. The United Kingdom is one of the few NATO allies with a defence budget that comes close to meeting its needs. The UK recently declared an increase of £3.5 billion (€5.5 billion, or $5.4 billion) over the 2001 defence budget between now and 2005-06, providing 1.2 per cent annual average real growth - the largest planned increase in defence spending in the UK in 20 years.
96. Since the Cold War, and particularly over the past five years, France has fallen far short of the British example, spending €29.3 billion ($28.8 billion) on defence in 2002, only 1.89% of GDP. Combined with the introduction of a more costly, fully professional military, as rightly decided by President Chirac in 1995, this has resulted in a drastic decline in funding for procurement and readiness. Particularly problematic has been the continual erosion of the procurement budget to fund either other parts of the national budget, particularly social expenditures, or defence personnel costs and operations abroad. As a result, the procurement budget has been cut below €10.7 billion ($10.5 billion), to levels your Rapporteur believes are insufficient to equip French forces to carry out the substantial missions entrusted to them in recent years. It would be desirable for France to reach British levels at a minimum, at 2.4% of GDP The new defence programming law for 2003-08, introduced by the new Raffarin government in September 2002, marks a clear political will to move in this direction at last.
97. Some other allies are taking some small steps to increase defence spending after years of decline. Former German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping called for an €800 million ($784 million) annual increase in defence spending, still short of the €1.5 billion ($1.47 billion) that military and defence industry leaders claim is needed. According to standardised NATO figures, the German defence budget in 2001 stood at €30.6 billion ($30.1 billion), only 1.5% of GDP. Likewise, Italy increased its defence budget by 6.6% in 2002, but from a level far below that of the United Kingdom, which has a similar population. The 2001 Italian defence budget was €23.8 billion ($23.4 billion), 1.9% of GDP.
98. The anaemic state of European defence budgets leaves the Alliance on the verge of a veritable strategic divorce. That would lead inevitably to a rethinking of the relationship within NATO, if the United States were the only nation to have recourse to the military option. Without a greater financial commitment on the part of Europeans and Canadians, we will be confronted with a situation in which the United States would be expected to fight the Alliance's wars, while the other allies would handle peacekeeping and humanitarian crises. In the kitchen of NATO it would be the Americans who do the cooking, with the Europeans and Canadians left doing the dishes, so that they simply would have no diplomatic or political voice of their own in future crisis situations. Such a new and disastrous "division of labour" would mean the end of the dream of an independent European defence and of an independent European voice in world affairs.
99. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have forced us to undertake a fundamental rethinking of how to defend the people and the territories of the 19 democracies of the North Atlantic Alliance. Mass terrorism and ballistic missiles are the two most likely ways that our adversaries possess to bring death and destruction to our countries, thereby bypassing our conventional military superiority by using asymmetric means. If terrorists and adversarial states were to gain the ability to use weapons of mass destruction against us, the death toll of September 11 would be magnified to truly horrific proportions.
100. Faced with such threats, we must develop new capabilities to defend our homelands. The notions of deterrence, upon which the Alliance was founded, are irrelevant to suicide terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives in order to take ours. We must increase our defence budgets to acquire a greater ability for our armed forces to deploy far from our shores to combat terrorist organisations and to depose the regimes that give them shelter and support. We must increase our capabilities to defend our people and our armed forces against weapons of mass destruction that might be used in a theatre of military operations or in a terrorist attack. We must continue efforts to build missile defences that might be able to shoot down a ballistic missile fired at one of our countries. And we must work diplomatically to strengthen arms control treaties and regimes, take action when they are violated, and develop new treaties and regimes to further control the spread of the most dangerous weapons the world has seen.
101. Despite the show of unity demonstrated right after the 9/11 attack last year, the fact of the matter is the gulf is widening between the two sides of the Atlantic on this entire issue. The defence budget gap is becoming a precipice, which will soon make a joint military action between the United States and its allies impossible. Public perceptions are drifting more and more, as exemplified by the Iraqi crisis. As for the European Union, it still shows few signs of developing into a strong political and military partner of the United States. The threats are changing. They are now real and tangible, as 9/11 demonstrated. They may become much worse if WMD are used against population centres. They are also long-term, like the historical trends within the Arab-Muslim world. As yet we stand divided, mostly powerless, leaving the burden of this highly unstable geopolitical situation to the United States alone. This is not a wise policy.
102. Let us start at least by building a common understanding of the issues at hand. The time has come indeed for a "wise-men committee" - a handful of retired statesmen with knowledge of NATO and security policy - to ponder the challenges and the necessary responses. By invoking Article 5, NATO has declared that the war on terrorism is one that will be fought collectively. We must ensure that it is a war that we win.