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Assemblée parlementaire de l'OTAN
HomeDOCUMENTSPolicy Recommendations2003RESOLUTION 327 on NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
RESOLUTION 327 on NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
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presented by the Science and Technology Committee |
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The Assembly, 1. Recognising that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a grave threat to international security in the 21st century; 2. Alarmed by the potential nexus between the emergence of a new type of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD; 3. Convinced that the events of September 11, 2001 generated international resolve to fight the proliferation of expertise, technologies and materials that can be used by states as well as terrorists to develop WMD; 4. Aware that rapid advances in science and technology, as well as their rapid diffusion in a globally networked world, promote economic and cultural development but also create new vulnerabilities; 5. Extremely concerned that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are actively attempting to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons for use in terrorist attacks; 6. Particularly worried that North Korea is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons and is also believed to possess chemical weapons and an infrastructure that could be used to produce biological weapons; 7. Alarmed by the risks of proliferation presented by Iran’s nuclear power programme, and persuaded that Iran must implement the actions specified in the resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on 12 September 2003 and the commitments contained in the agreed statement of 21 October 2003 upon the visit of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to Iran; 8. Recognising the contribution to nuclear non-proliferation of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, that eliminated nuclear weapons from their soil; 9. Convinced that a wide range of instruments may be employed to counter WMD proliferation: universalisation of multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally co ordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers; interdiction of illegal procurement activities on the basis of international and national law; and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 10. Strongly persuaded that to maximise effectiveness in reducing the scope of the threat of WMD, an effective international response requires a co-ordinated transatlantic approach; 11. Welcoming the initiatives adopted by NATO at its 2002 Prague Summit to deter, prevent, counter, and respond to the threat and potential use of WMD; 12. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by implementing the conclusions of the 1995 NPT Conference as well as the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference and by making the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory for members of the NPT; b. to press the de facto nuclear weapon states that remain outside the NPT India, Israel and Pakistan to sign both the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; c. to support the Six Party Talks in seeking a diplomatic solution to completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminate the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, placing all North Korean installations and activities under IAEA safeguards, abandoning the North Korean uranium enrichment programme, and suspending all plutonium extraction at the Yongbyon facility; d. to press Iran to continue to co-operate with the IAEA by providing complete information about its nuclear activities, in accordance with the actions specified in the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 12 September 2003 and the commitments contained in the agreed statement of 21 October 2003 upon the visit of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom; e. to encourage the governments of Russia and the United States to implement the Moscow Treaty and to work to ensure the security of their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons; refrain from expanding their existing arsenals; work towards an agreement regarding further reductions of such weapons; and work together to discourage or prevent the acquisition of such weapons by other nations; f. to amend existing international conventions to also include a ban on the possession and use of radiological weapons; g. to strengthen the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by maintaining the principle of independent, transparent and sound management, by promoting universal adherence and effective national implementation and by increasing emphasis on verification of non-compliance, which should include the use of challenge inspections; h. to widen the membership of the Biological Weapons Convention and strengthen its obligations – including mechanisms for compliance and verification – national implementation measures, including penal legislation, and control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins within the frameworks of the Convention; i. to strengthen export control regimes by controlling the transfer of classified information that could be used to manufacture chemical and biological weapons; by restricting access to genetic information on dangerous pathogens while remaining sensitive to legitimate scientific, medical, or other research; j. to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an initiative to develop political commitments and practical co-operation to help impede and stop the flow of WMD, their systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of concern; k. to implement the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and to expand co-operative threat reduction initiatives to other countries outside Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), for instance by providing assistance to India and Pakistan in protecting their nuclear material; helping China in its WMD interdiction and anti-smuggling efforts; and helping Iraq to secure WMD-related materials; l. to expand the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to cover nuclear material used in civilian programmes, storage and transport, and civil nuclear facilities; m. to provide all the necessary capabilities and resources for NATO’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical defence initiatives, including the deployable NBC analytical laboratory, the NBC response cell, the training and education centre, the NATO vaccine stockpile co-ordination, the disease surveillance team, as well as the multinational NATO NBC Defence Battalion and the NATO WMD Centre. |
