NATO Parliamentary Assembly
HomeDOCUMENTSPolicy Recommendations200515 November 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark - RESOLUTION on SECURITY OF WMD-RELATED MATERIAL IN RUSSIA


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* presented by the Science and Technology Committee

The Assembly,

1. Concerned by the possibility of terrorist attacks using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

2. Mindful that Russia's WMD-related arsenals and stocks are one of the largest in the world, and that security upgrades of these stocks are yet to be completed, thus posing a potential proliferation and environmental threat;

3. Conscious that the Russian Federation is not the only country posing the threat of proliferation of WMD-related material;

4. Welcoming the achievements of the Russian Federation and the international community in securing WMD and related material, especially through the US-led Co-operative Threat Reduction programme, and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction;

5. Praising the recent decision of the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude an agreement on liability protection for US personnel working on threat reduction programmes in Russia;

6. Regretting nonetheless that the co-operation is still hindered by bureaucratic inertia, the unresolved question of access of international officials to sensitive sites, and the lack of mutual trust that derives from the remaining Cold War perceptions;

7. Concerned about the slow pace of chemical weapons destruction, which endangers the deadlines established by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW);

8. Mindful that Russia's decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines present serious proliferation-related and environmental threats, and that Russia is far from having the means to handle these threats without foreign assistance;

9. Deeply concerned that the Russian biodefence sector remains virtually excluded from co operative threat reduction programmes;

10. Recalling Assembly Resolution 313 adopted in 2001, addressing the issue of safeguarding the Nuclear Complex in Russia and other Newly Independent States;

11. CALLS UPON member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to increase efforts to assist Russia in securing its stocks of WMD and related materials by expanding and reinforcing bilateral and G8 Global Partnership programmes;

b. to emphasize the commonality of the security challenges of the 21st century by promoting the benefits of co-operation and the equality of all involved parties;

c. to meet the commitments under the G8 Global Partnership, particularly with respect to chemical weapons destruction and dismantlement of Russian nuclear submarines and related environmental problems;

d. to help Russia complete the process of securing nuclear material storage sites by 2009;

e. to develop a reliable account mechanism and eventually negotiate with Russia a verifiable agreement on the control and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons;

f. to encourage the Russian government to expand co-operation with its partners in the international community to safeguard better the Russian biodefence sector;

g. to expand co-operation in the international community in order to ensure full implementation and reliable control of Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;

h. to seek an agreement with the Russian government for the removal of unnecessary technical or bureaucratic pre-conditions that hamper the pace of chemical weapons destruction;

i. to increase efforts to assist Russia in improving living conditions of former weapons scientists and in further promoting their redirection to peaceful activities to avoid their being tempted to take their knowledge elsewhere;

j. to support the expansion of co-operative threat reduction initiatives to other countries by using the experience gained in Russia;

k. to encourage Russian authorities:

i. to maintain favourable conditions for international assistance and access to WMD related material storage sites that require security upgrades;

ii. to sustain Russia's increased financial contribution in accordance with its economic possibilities;

iii. to remove remaining bureaucratic obstacles and to facilitate international assistance;

iv. to introduce an officially approved plan for chemical weapons destruction in accordance with international agreements.