



The Assembly's Contribution to the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance

*Presented By Sven MIKSER (Estonia), Vice-President of the NATO PA
and Special Rapporteur on the Assembly's Contribution to the
New NATO Strategic Concept*

to

H.E. Mr. Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Secretary General of NATO

NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium
13 April 2010



Contents

	Page
<i>Foreword by the President of the NATO PA</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>iii</i>
NATO PA Proposals and Recommendations for a New NATO Strategic Concept	1
<i>Appendix 1</i>	
Background Information on the Recommendations	9
<i>Appendix 2</i>	
Chronology of the Assembly's contribution to a new Strategic Concept	14
<i>Appendix 3</i>	
The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949	16

Foreword by the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Hon. John Tanner (United States)



At the NATO Summit in April 2009 in Strasbourg/Kehl, Alliance leaders tasked NATO's Secretary General with developing a new draft Strategic Concept to be completed in time for the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal planned to take place at the end of 2010.

However, almost two years earlier - at its Spring Session in Madeira, Portugal, in May 2007 - the Assembly not only recognized the need to replace the existing Strategic Concept which had been adopted by the Alliance in 1999, but also agreed that the Assembly should develop and contribute its own ideas and views to a new NATO Strategic Concept.

As then Assembly President, José Lello (Portugal), said, the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept *"would allow member governments to consolidate the considerable progress already made in transforming the shape and scope of NATO but also to define further the role the Alliance should play in confronting the threats of the 21st Century."*

The Standing Committee appointed former Vice-President Jan Petersen (Norway) as the initiative's Rapporteur responsible for stimulating, collecting, and co-ordinating our members' proposals and views. When he left the Assembly to take up a diplomatic posting, this task was then assigned to Vice-President Sven Mikser (Estonia) who has most ably built upon the foundation laid by his predecessor.

Our goal was to produce a short document containing worthwhile proposals for the formulation of a new Strategic Concept. I feel that we have achieved that goal. This document contains the culmination of the recommendations of parliamentarians from across the Euro-Atlantic region. The ideas it sets forth are forward-thinking and would help to renew and reinvigorate this Alliance.

During the course of our work, we have been pleased to be closely involved in NATO's own consultation process, centred on the Group of Experts appointed by Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Our intention was that the Assembly's contribution would complement the work of the Group of Experts and gave particular emphasis to parliamentary perspectives.

On behalf of all the Assembly's members I would like to thank Jan Petersen and Sven Mikser for the commitment and expertise they have brought to this project. I would also like to express appreciation to David Hobbs, Zachary Selden, Simon Lunn and Susan Millar for their invaluable assistance.

Finally, I would like to thank all the Assembly's members who participated in our many discussions on this project. We did not find unanimous agreement on all the points, but we did agree that these proposals merited formal consideration and that they provide a solid basis for NATO to move forward with its new Strategic Concept.

Introduction

i. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly supported calls for NATO to prepare a new Strategic Concept well before the April 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl when NATO leaders formally decided to produce one. The previous Strategic Concept was adopted in 1999 and the security environment has altered profoundly since that time. NATO - as a political and military alliance - has remained a vital institution precisely because it has adapted to changing circumstances. That process of continual adaptation cannot take place in the context of a static Strategic Concept. As the strategic environment and NATO evolve and adapt, the Strategic Concept must be revised periodically and renewed.

ii. The new Strategic Concept will be the first one to be adopted after the terror acts of 11 September 2001 which transformed our understanding of the new security challenges posed by international terrorism. It will also be the first Strategic Concept to incorporate the perspectives of the new Allies - many having been formerly under Soviet rule - which have acceded to the Alliance over the last decade. It must therefore, combine more perspectives on how to address both traditional and new threats to mutual security.

iii. The Allies also represent different points of view on a broad range of issues that affect the future of the Transatlantic relationship. There are, for instance, competing "visions" of the relationship between NATO and the European Union. There are also concerns among NATO members about inequitable divisions of labour and levels of commitment to NATO operations. Such problems further complicate the task of maintaining public support for NATO and its operations.

iv. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is well placed to make recommendations about a new - or at least, revised - Strategic Concept. Its members are drawn from the national legislatures of all of the member states of the Alliance. It is a product - and a symbol - of the democratic nature of the Alliance and represents a direct link to the citizens of the member states. As such it is a two-way channel of communication that affords NATO officials the opportunity to speak directly to the representatives of the citizens of the Alliance as well as a venue for parliamentarians to communicate their constituents' concerns to NATO's leadership. As such, the contribution of the Assembly represents many of the concerns of the people this Alliance was created to defend.

v. This document is the product of extensive consultation within the Assembly involving all five of its Committees. Although Assembly members represent very diverse political perspectives, consensus emerged on certain key themes in debates on the new Strategic Concept, including:

- *the enduring importance of collective defence Article 5;*
- *the need to prepare the Alliance to take on a limited range of new tasks;*
- *the central role of NATO's partnerships;*
- *the need for NATO to become a forum for discussion and co-ordination on the comprehensive approach;*
- *the critical need to develop the proper capabilities for NATO's missions and provide the necessary resources;*
- *the importance of NATO's public communication strategy;*
- *the growing significance of Article 2 in the current environment;*
- *the need for NATO to remain the main forum for transatlantic dialogue.*

vi. This document begins by presenting the main recommendations which emerged from the Assembly's deliberations. This is followed by Appendix 1 which provides some background on the issues and discussions that underpin the recommendations. Appendix 2 outlines the process adopted by the Assembly in drafting its text. Finally, the text of the North Atlantic Treaty itself is reproduced as Appendix 3.



NATO PA Proposals and Recommendations for a New NATO Strategic Concept

a.

The commitment to collective defence, as defined in Article 5, must be reaffirmed as the cornerstone of Alliance security. This reaffirmation should be underlined visibly by measures such as planning and exercises

1. A defining characteristic of the Alliance is the commitment of each member to the defence of the others. This profound undertaking is the foundation upon which the Alliance is built. The nature of the threats to Alliance security has, of course, changed profoundly since that foundation was laid. The Alliance does not face a wholesale, existential threat as it did during the Cold War but conversely the challenge of non-traditional threats has grown. Against this background, the Alliance should reconfirm the commitment embodied in Article 5, but it must constantly review how to fulfil that commitment by separately and jointly developing the necessary capabilities as envisaged in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.
2. Deterrence and the concept of extended deterrence also play a fundamental role in ensuring stability and preventing conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region. Much of this is embodied in the conventional capabilities of the Allied militaries, but nuclear weapons feature as part of extended deterrence. Members of the Alliance, however, should continue to evaluate the disposition of those weapons and the overall number with a focus on reducing the potential dangers posed by nuclear weapons.
3. Territorial defence remains a vital, if unlikely, function of the Alliance. NATO should reassess its requirements for territorial defence - including planning, bases, infrastructure and reinforcement - to ensure that the Alliance continues to provide the required reassurance to its members and deter aggression.

b.

The Alliance must emphasise its willingness and readiness to respond to threats to its security that do not fall under the definition of the collective defence commitment as contained in Article 5

4. In today's world, threats to the security of the Alliance can originate almost anywhere. In some cases, the use of military forces may be necessary so the Alliance must be able to counter such threats wherever they arise.

C.

In terms of capabilities, there is no need to make a false choice between the capabilities necessary to perform Article 5 missions and the capabilities needed to perform operations outside NATO's geographical borders

“THE CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO DELIVER MILITARY SUPPORT TO AN ALLY IN NEED ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE NEEDED FOR STABILIZATION MISSIONS THAT PREVENT DISTANT SECURITY CHALLENGES FROM BECOMING PROXIMATE THREATS”

5. Under the terms of Article 5, all Alliance members must be prepared and able to provide assistance to any member that suffers an armed attack. The threat is not against everywhere at the same time, but it could be against anywhere at any time. Regardless of whether that means sending military units and assets 300 or 3,000 kilometres from their bases, from one corner of the Alliance to another, or from within the Alliance to beyond its borders, the Alliance members need

“THE THREAT IS NOT AGAINST EVERYWHERE AT THE SAME TIME, BUT IT COULD BE AGAINST ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME”

flexible and deployable armed forces. The imperative is to make NATO militaries more deployable, capable, and integrated. The capabilities needed to deliver military support to an ally in need are compatible with those needed for stabilization missions that prevent distant security challenges from becoming proximate threats.

d.

Members must make available the capabilities to match their aspirations and improve the efficient use of scarce resources

6. Although the current economic downturn will pass, longer term demographic trends mean that increasingly older populations will need to be supported by relatively fewer taxpayers. Additional financial resources for military procurement are not likely to be forthcoming as this demographic shift and its financial obligations intensify. This means renewed emphasis on spending more wisely. The success of efforts to do so will depend in part on improved defence co-operation and the reduction of barriers to defence-related trade in the transatlantic community.

- i. The Alliance should intensify and increase its common funding of procurement, maintenance, logistics and training that will give more capability for the same level of investment. It is critical, however, that the savings produced from those efforts be reinvested in our national militaries and NATO, not returned to the general budget.

“THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INTENSIFY AND INCREASE ITS COMMON FUNDING OF PROCUREMENT, MAINTENANCE, LOGISTICS AND TRAINING THAT WILL GIVE MORE CAPABILITY FOR THE SAME LEVEL OF INVESTMENT.”

- ii. NATO should press further ahead with “usability” targets for the percentage of members’ armed forces which are deployable and sustainable. To this end, members of parliament and national governments should push ahead on reducing personnel costs in national defence budgets and shifting more of those scarce resources towards operations, maintenance and procurement. In addition, the Allies should strive to minimize the use of national caveats to ensure that those resources can be deployed in the most effective manner.
- iii. NATO should maintain an inventory of member capabilities actually available for operations. This inventory should be made available to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Assembly - as a forum for national parliamentarians - can play a key part in ensuring that Alliance members make every effort to meet their capabilities commitments and obligations to the Alliance.
- iv. NATO should streamline its decision-making structure. Consensus must remain at the heart of the Alliance’s decision-making structure, but many of the committees that have evolved over the years should be consolidated to form a leaner and more effective headquarters.

“NATO SHOULD
STREAMLINE ITS
DECISION-MAKING
STRUCTURE”

e.

An evolving approach to collective defence requires that the Alliance consider broader threats to security

“AN ALLIANCE WHICH ATTEMPTS TO DO EVERYTHING FACES THE POTENTIAL THAT IT WILL DILUTE ITS CORE STRENGTHS AND DIMINISH ITS RELEVANCE”

7. There are many potential security challenges facing the members of the Alliance, but NATO and its unique military capabilities are not necessarily suited to all of them. In a globalising world, the public perception of security is influenced by a number of non-military factors such as external political and economic pressure. While many of these areas should not and indeed could not be governed by a common policy of the Alliance, lack of co-ordination and bilateral approaches to issues that have a multilateral impact risk undermining the Alliance’s credibility among Allied

populations. In order to enhance political solidarity among Allies, more emphasis should be put on possibilities emanating from consultations foreseen in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.

8. Article 4 calls for consultation when any member feels a threat to its “territorial integrity, political independence, or security”. An Alliance which attempts to do everything faces the potential that it will dilute its core strengths and diminish its relevance. Some issues, however, stand out as areas where NATO can and should play a more active role in the context of Article 4:

- i. **Cyber-Security.** All of our societies are increasingly dependent on information systems, which generates profound and widespread vulnerability. In addition, an attack on the information systems of one NATO member country could have cascading effects on many other Allies. It is of vital importance to take additional steps to coordinate defences against cyber attacks, share information and develop contingency strategies. Clearly this is not purely a NATO function, but NATO has sixty years of experience in co-ordinating and developing plans across the Alliance. NATO has already taken a number of steps to assist member states in the defence against information systems attacks, **but the Alliance should devote more attention to what can only become a growing**

vulnerability to common security as reliance on information technology grows. In particular, NATO should consider if, and under what circumstances, a cyber-attack should prompt an Alliance response and how that response could be co-ordinated with other international organizations.

- ii. Maritime Security.* Sea lanes of communication are a critical component of the global economy, moving the vast majority of the world's goods from producer to consumer. Disruptions in this communication represent a threat to the overall economic well-being of the members of the Alliance. No one state has the ability to patrol the world's oceans, but the Alliance has considerable experience in co-ordination and standardization that can be brought to bear on this problem.

NATO should bring its collective national expertise on maritime security together in a manner that can share information and best practices. It should also coordinate with other international organizations to conduct naval operations and patrols as needed.

- iii. Energy Security.* Energy supplies are vital to the functioning of society and interruptions can cause systemic difficulties. Although energy security cannot be seen as a core function of NATO, the Alliance should consider how the NATO framework and assets could be used to secure energy supplies. This could include setting up a centre of excellence dedicated to promoting and co-ordinating best practices on critical infrastructure protection including the energy distribution infrastructure.

- iv. Protection against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).* The Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006 cites the spread of WMD and their potential use by terrorists as one of the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years. The Alliance must do more to prevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against potential attacks using WMD, and be prepared to respond to their use. Missile defence of both deployed forces and population centres is an important part of adapting to evolving threats and, if possible, should be developed in co-ordination with the Russian Federation.

“MISSILE DEFENCE OF BOTH DEPLOYED FORCES AND POPULATION CENTRES IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ADAPTING TO EVOLVING THREATS AND, IF POSSIBLE, SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN CO-ORDINATION WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION”

NATO should increase its programmes to provide technical assistance and training to better secure WMD stockpiles. It should also be used as a forum for the exchange of timely intelligence that can reduce the risks posed by WMD. Finally, the Alliance should use its Civil Emergency Planning assets to train first-responders for WMD contingencies and augment rapid reaction units that could assist those first responders if requested by a national authority.

f.

Partnerships and co-operation with nations and other international organizations should be broadened and deepened

9. NATO's partnerships are an increasingly important part of its approach to complex challenges in regions on the periphery of Europe and beyond. The partners which aspire to NATO membership should be given all possible encouragement and assistance to pursue their chosen course of meeting the qualifications for membership. NATO's "open door" policy regarding enlargement contributes to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region.

10. Similarly, the broadening and deepening of NATO's partnerships promotes co-operation, confidence and stability, as well as enlarging the capacities of members and partners to address new security challenges. Not all partners aspire to NATO membership, but they often make significant contributions to NATO missions. **NATO should further develop its mechanisms for consultation and co-operation with partners who choose to contribute to NATO-led operations.**

"NATO AND RUSSIA SHOULD SEEK TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND TO FORGE A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP ON SPECIFIC ISSUES WHERE MUTUAL INTERESTS CAN BE IDENTIFIED"

11. NATO's partnership with the Russian Federation merits special emphasis. The relationship is troubled by fundamentally different perspectives on many issues, including the role and nature of NATO in the current international environment. These should not, however, overshadow the fact that NATO and Russia share many common strategic concerns, including the proliferation of WMD, the threat of terrorism, and the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. An area of particular emphasis could be the Arctic region. NATO member countries and Russia compose all but two of the countries in the Arctic region and the NATO-Russia Council could be a venue for discussion of issues affecting this increasingly important region. **NATO and Russia should seek to improve transparency and to forge a co-operative relationship on specific issues where mutual interests can be identified.**

12. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly's partnership activities complement NATO's programmes by engaging partners at the parliamentary level, by promoting the values and principles upon which the Alliance is founded, and, when requested, by providing assistance and training in the field of parliamentary oversight of defence and security matters. The NATO PA could offer particular assistance to states attempting to reduce the prevalence of corruption in their defence institutions. Corruption in the security sector poses considerable challenges to the efficiency of the defence establishment and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces while undermining public confidence in democratic institutions. Helping NATO partners to address this problem through improved parliamentary oversight could be a significant role for the Assembly.

13. Regarding international organizations, the United Nations is an important partner of NATO and NATO should continue to deepen and broaden its relationship with the UN, particularly regarding the mission in Afghanistan. The European Union (EU) should be a key partner but, for too long, the relationship has been hindered by a number of political roadblocks. This has created an absurd position where two organizations with broadly overlapping memberships and founded on the same principles and values are effectively blocked from forging the deeper co-operation that holds such enormous potential. Parliamentarians with responsibility for budgetary oversight are deeply concerned that scarce resources can be wasted through duplication and lack of co-ordination. It is often noted in discussions about EU-NATO relations that the member states of both organizations only have one set of armed forces. They also have one set of taxpayers. As parliamentarians, it is our obligation to ensure that the resources provided to the EU and NATO are used to maximum effect. **NATO and the EU should find a mechanism that allows closer co-operation, even if that means resorting to *ad hoc* procedures until an institutional arrangement can be finalized.**

"IT IS OFTEN NOTED IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT EU-NATO RELATIONS THAT THE MEMBER STATES OF BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ONLY HAVE ONE SET OF ARMED FORCES. THEY ALSO HAVE ONE SET OF TAXPAYERS."

g.

A new Strategic Concept should confirm the geographic limits of the Alliance contained in Article 10

“NATO MUST QUELL UNFOUNDED FEARS THAT IT ASPIRES TO BE A “GLOBAL POLICEMAN” OR SEEKS MEMBERS REGARDLESS OF LOCATION”

14. NATO must quell unfounded fears that it aspires to be a “global policeman” or seeks members regardless of location. Article 10 makes clear that membership is open to qualified European states and this limitation should be reaffirmed.

h.

NATO should be the forum for transatlantic discussion on a comprehensive approach to security

15. The focus of NATO’s operations continues to be stabilization missions. Such missions are more than purely military efforts and require close co-ordination between security forces and political and economic development agencies. NATO cannot and should not attempt to “do it all”. Yet, NATO is a long-standing body for political and military co-operation between most of the world’s industrialized democracies that bear the bulk of the burden of the political and economic aspects of post-conflict stabilization. The Alliance can serve as a unique forum for consultation and co-ordination. With its wealth of experience co-ordinating transatlantic military assets, it could become a natural nexus for co-ordinating some non-military aspects of stabilization missions such as security sector reform, and training of police and border guards. **The Alliance framework should be a forum for consultation and co-ordination on issues which have a direct impact on security such as development efforts in post-conflict stabilization missions.** The operative word should be ‘collaboration’ and not ‘subordination’. Different organizations bring different skills to the table and a truly comprehensive approach depends on the ability of the agencies and organizations in question to organize themselves in a manner that uses their relative strengths to full effect.

“NATO SHOULD NOT SIMPLY BE A MILITARY “TOOLKIT” TO BE CALLED UPON AS NECESSARY BY OTHER “PLAYERS” IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT SHOULD HAVE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ORCHESTRATING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH”

16. Lasting stability, however, requires that good governance principles and mechanisms be implemented. Here again the NATO PA plays a role by helping to build integrity, increase transparency in defence and improve the accountability of defence officials in fragile states.

17. Security means far more than “defence”. The comprehensive approach acknowledges that the building of security depends upon the use of economic, financial, political, legal, and defence resources. International organizations each have their own unique competences and comparative advantages in bringing these resources to bear in preventing crises and building stability. NATO’s members must decide what role NATO should play in developing and implementing comprehensive approaches to international security challenges. In that context, NATO should not simply be a military “toolkit” to be called upon as necessary by other “players” in the international community. It should have an active role in orchestrating a comprehensive approach, and this again reinforces the need for mechanisms for closer co-operation among international organizations.

18. To that end, **members of the Alliance should strive to co-ordinate their positions on relevant issues in other international organizations in which they participate.**

19. NATO should also consider how to enhance its own intelligence capability and promote greater sharing of intelligence among member states. The comprehensive approach relies on co-ordination between civil and military authorities, but all activities are informed by intelligence assessments. A truly comprehensive approach requires an ability to share relevant intelligence in a timely manner. NATO should consider convening conferences of national intelligence directors in the same way it routinely brings together national armaments directors and chiefs of defence.

i.

NATO should take a completely fresh look at Article 2 of the Washington Treaty and fully explore the scope for Alliance co-operation that this would allow

20. Article 2 represents among other things, an undertaking by members to promote “conditions of stability and well-being”, “strengthen their free institutions by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded”, “eliminate conflict in their international economic policies”, and “encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has always placed great emphasis on Article 2 and it has long since considered issues beyond the military defence of the Alliance.

21. Article 2 underlines the notion of the Alliance as a values-based community and certainly gives scope in the economic sphere for some or all Allies to act in concert. The promotion of conditions of stability and well-being further implies a mandate to adopt a broader concept of security in line with the comprehensive approach, and it supports the notion of the Alliance as an active promoter of security. **Allies should explore the opportunities that a fresh examination of Article 2 might provide.**

j.

NATO must improve its public communication and build support for its missions

22. Public support for the Alliance is essential. The problem that NATO faces, however, is that for many in the general public in North America and Europe, NATO is a legacy of a previous time rather than an organization that plays an important role in ensuring their security. The benefits of that security are often taken for granted while the costs - particularly in terms of NATO troop casualties as well as local civilian casualties caused by NATO operations - are all too obvious. Public support in Allied countries for NATO operations will also be increasingly difficult to sustain if burden sharing is perceived as being inequitable. The public has a right to expect clear explanations of the reason(s) for their nation’s commitment to NATO and its operations. Their concerns are easier to address when the wider political aims of an out-of-area engagement are clearly defined and are seen as being consistent with the national security interests of each Allied nation. NATO must also strive to make its values, role and missions understood in nations far beyond its borders where there are all too many misconceptions and misunderstandings about NATO.

“NATO MUST ALSO STRIVE TO MAKE ITS VALUES, ROLE AND MISSIONS UNDERSTOOD IN NATIONS FAR BEYOND ITS BORDERS WHERE THERE ARE ALL TOO MANY MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT NATO”

23. NATO should ensure that its roles and activities are publicised as widely as possible, paying particular attention to those aspects which have a direct effect on people's lives such as NATO's important but little known role in co-ordinating and delivering disaster relief assets both within the Alliance and beyond.

“THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO EXPECT CLEAR EXPLANATIONS OF THE REASON(S) FOR THEIR NATION'S COMMITMENT TO NATO AND ITS OPERATIONS”

24. Parliamentary support is also vital for NATO. Governments answer to parliaments, parliaments approve budgets and treaties, and parliaments are often central to whether and how their nation's armed forces are employed in - and withdrawn from - missions. Furthermore, parliamentarians are directly exposed to the public's concerns about NATO's roles and missions.

“PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT IS ALSO VITAL FOR NATO... PARLIAMENTS ARE OFTEN CENTRAL TO WHETHER AND HOW THEIR NATION'S ARMED FORCES ARE EMPLOYED IN - AND WITHDRAWN FROM — MISSIONS”

25. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly plays a significant role in linking NATO with the public and in bringing its experience into national parliamentary debates. **NATO and the NATO PA should therefore continue to deepen their co-operation to better communicate with the general public to enhance their understanding of the Alliance's policies and missions.**

* * * * *

Appendix 1: Background Information on the Recommendations

1. *This section elaborates on the arguments and reasoning leading to the recommendations and proposals being put forward in Section I above. It includes the basic principles that provided the structure of the debates as well as many of the questions discussed by the members of the Assembly during the course of their deliberations in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Although it is not a comprehensive summary, it aims to provide the intellectual context from which the preceding proposals and recommendations were drawn.*

A. *The Nature and Purpose of the Alliance*

2. *NATO is an Alliance of sovereign nations who subscribe to the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and who believe that their security is best guaranteed through a commitment to collective defence. The Alliance embodies the indispensable link between the democratic nations of North America and Europe. This transatlantic partnership has successfully safeguarded the liberty and values of its people over six decades and continues to do so. The end of the Cold War removed the ideologically based threat to the security of the member states. But it did not remove the need for an Alliance based on the defence of values and committed to spreading democracy, peace and freedom. The role of the Alliance has become all the more important in view of the rise of extremism, as shown by the terrorist attacks against Alliance nations. NATO's raison d'être, preserving the security and liberty of its citizens, remains as vital as ever.*

3. *The goal of the Alliance is to protect the peace, liberty and security of its citizens and to do so in a manner that promotes a more secure and stable international order. The political and military means that have underpinned its success for 60 years remain in place. These enduring elements include - the transatlantic solidarity and cohesion of purpose, the indivisibility of security, the sharing of risks and burdens, the spirit of collectivity, the common approach to policy formulation and implementation, the harmonisation of defence planning and operations and the habits of co-operation born of years of working together. They were essential to NATO's successful transformation following the end of the Cold War and will provide the basis for its further adaptation.*

4. *The transformation of the Alliance has been most visible in the deployment of its forces in support of peace and stabilisation operations mandated by the United Nations (UN), in the opening of its doors to new members and in the creation of a wide range of relationships fostering partnership and co-operation. These developments represent a determination by Alliance members to reach beyond the reactive stance of the Cold War, to confront risks at their source and to actively promote the spread of Alliance values. They constitute the foundations on which the Alliance must build its future role and enlarge the zone of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.*

5. *NATO's principal field of competence and comparative advantage lies in the realm of defence - harmonisation of national plans and policies for collective defence; effective and timely deployment and sustainment of armed forces for overseas missions, and provision of assistance to partner countries to organize appropriate and affordable armed forces under democratic control.*

6. *The new strategic environment has meant a focus on the development of capabilities and assets suitable for out-of-area deployments. In view of existing commitments in Afghanistan, Kosovo and potential operations elsewhere, this emphasis will continue. However, the Alliance must retain the capacity for territorial defence, as defined in Article 5.*

B. Adapting to a New Security Environment

7. The international situation is marked by uncertainty and unpredictability. The vulnerability of our societies to disruptions to computer networks or the flow of energy, the rise of new regional powers, or natural disasters and environmental degradation creates new variables that should be accounted for in a new Strategic Concept. In particular, member states and their societies today confront a wide range of challenges stemming from crises and conflicts in weak or failed states, ethnic tensions, religious extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and competition for resources.

8. Instability in distant regions could generate asymmetric threats and terrorism in the Euro-Atlantic area. These are best addressed through a comprehensive approach to security combining the military, political and economic tools available through co-operation with other international organizations.

9. NATO's task is to identify and address which of these new risks fall within its scope and competence. The Alliance provides a unique framework for transatlantic consultation on all issues pertaining to the security of Alliance members, and there is a range of potential issues, including WMD proliferation, cyber-security, energy security and maritime security, that could be considered. On each of those issues, the Alliance has to decide upon its own role and upon the appropriate divisions of labour with other international organizations. The Alliance has already begun to adapt to the new challenges; the question is what further changes are needed. It is also clear that the Alliance cannot be 'all things to all people' without losing its focus and unique attributes. Therefore, it is important to define limits and prevent overreach.

10. Existing and emerging security challenges demand capabilities and resources. Despite the current emphasis and the planning targets agreed to by member states, alarming shortfalls remain in the capabilities needed by the Alliance to fulfil its commitments. Moreover, some members continue to impose political constraints on the employment of their forces that impact adversely on operational effectiveness. Pursuing current efforts to mainstream gender issues in NATO activities could also contribute to operational effectiveness.

11. Involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan has represented a steep learning curve for the Alliance in terms of the requirements of peace support and stabilisation missions. NATO's involvement in Afghanistan has become the symbol of its willingness to play a more active role beyond its boundaries and the need to implement a comprehensive approach to security. In this case, NATO's primary responsibilities lie in the provision of the crucial security umbrella essential to development and reconstruction efforts provided - for the most part - by other international organizations. That said, NATO's role is not confined to the battlefield. It is providing assistance through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, military training and help with security sector reform.

12. NATO's various missions all have a unique character but all have highlighted the close link between military, diplomatic and civil efforts. The provision of a security framework which includes armed forces, police and border guards, and institutions to ensure the rule of law and fundamental freedoms is essential for economic and social development. NATO has acquired considerable experience in helping countries develop effective and affordable armed forces, and appropriate sets of civil-military relations. Member governments should examine the other areas of security sector reform for which the Alliance could take responsibility. Defence, security and development are interdependent.

13. In fact, the concept of security itself is broadening and becoming more complex. For instance, many citizens might well feel that the most direct threats to their security are neither military nor national in character. Examples include the consequences of climate change such as environmental degradation, greater competition for resources, and mass

migration; the potential of cyber attacks; and the threat of ideologically-based terrorism. In that context, it is worth recalling that the Alliance's founding fathers did not envisage NATO as being purely military in nature. The preamble of the Washington Treaty states that the Parties "are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." Article 2 also refers to promoting conditions of "stability and well-being", and goes on to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of [the Parties]". This combination of the preamble and Article 2 is the basis for describing the Alliance as a community of values. During the Cold War, this aspect was understandably overshadowed by other aspects of the Treaty. However, in today's strategic environment, it is time to take a fresh look at the preamble and Article 2 without preconceptions. At the very least, they appear to lend support to the idea of the Alliance as an active promoter of security rather than just a narrow defender of territory.

C. Capabilities and Resources

14. In looking at the future security agenda, NATO must decide how much more it can contribute, both in terms of its geographic scope and the depth of its engagement. The Alliance could be involved in more regions and in more security-related areas. However, current commitments mean that the Alliance is already considerably stretched. The degree, therefore, to which NATO can assume responsibilities in new areas depends on the agreement of the member states and the assets and competences they are prepared to make available to the Alliance.

15. The determination by Alliance members that NATO should assume a more global approach and additional responsibilities, must be accompanied by an acceptance of the obligations involved and a realisation that these must be shared fairly and supported by the necessary resources.

16. In the days of the Cold War, NATO's armed forces were structured to defend Alliance territory against a widespread onslaught. Assets intended for that purpose - heavy and relatively static - contrast sharply with those required to implement stabilization missions outside the territory of Alliance members. But the choice today is not between yesterday's forces and those needed tomorrow. The Cold War is over and the Alliance no longer faces a wholesale simultaneous assault. Any conceivable threat to Alliance territory would be much narrower in geographical scope. Supporting an Ally would inevitably mean moving Alliance forces to the field of operations which - even within the Alliance - could be hundreds or even thousands of kilometres distant. In other words, the capabilities required to support an Article 5 operation overlap considerably with those needed for expeditionary purposes.

17. Deterrence - both conventional and nuclear - will continue to play a central role in Alliance strategy. Just as conventional capabilities must evolve to a changing environment, so must nuclear capabilities.

18. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons played a central role in NATO's strategy of flexible response. They continue to play a role as NATO member states reduce the number of nuclear weapons they hold to the minimum necessary to support NATO's strategy of preserving peace and preventing war.

19. Among the new threats facing the Alliance is the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.

20. While there is an Alliance consensus on the need for the development and deployment of missile defence systems to defend NATO forces in the field, there is increased interest in an Alliance-wide system to defend Alliance territory and populations. The precise architecture of

this system is open to debate but the need for it is not. A missile defence system should be developed, if possible, in co-operation with NATO partners, including Russia.

D. Partnerships and Co-operation with Other International Organizations

21. NATO's contribution must involve the closest possible co-operation and co-ordination with other international organisations, in particular the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).

22. UN relations and co-operation with NATO have steadily improved over the years. NATO derives the legitimacy from its adherence to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as underlined in the Washington Treaty. Yet, NATO is an independent actor and it has unique capabilities. As we move forward in the development of a comprehensive approach to security, close co-operation with the UN will be important, as will establishing clear responsibilities for different aspects of security.

23. Relations between NATO and the EU represent a mixed picture - limited at the political level but constructive on the ground at the practical level of co-operation. However, their co-operation and collaboration falls far short of what is required by the high degree of commonality that exists between the two organizations - in terms of membership and resources - and by the demands of the international situation.

24. The Alliance provides a unique framework for transatlantic consultation on all issues pertaining to the security of Alliance members. Its members are also members of many other international organizations. Recognizing the broad nature of security challenges and comprehensive approach needed to address them, it is beyond doubt that international organizations must cooperate and have mechanisms in place to enable them to do so. The absence of such co-ordination and mechanisms is an affront to the taxpayer. The members of the Alliance should therefore consider using its framework to formulate common positions on relevant issues in other international fora.

25. NATO has also begun developing relations with countries contributing forces in Afghanistan, the so-called "contact countries". Those countries are well outside the bounds of the potential enlargement of the Alliance as defined in Article 10, and are not involved in NATO's formal partnership programmes, but formal mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that their voice is heard in NATO's political deliberations on operations involving contact countries' forces.

26. There can be no lasting stability in Europe without a true partnership with the Russian Federation. The relationship should focus upon common interests and concerns, but cannot ignore areas of difference. Alliance members have differing views on this matter and they should develop a realistic strategy for engagement to which they can all subscribe.

27. NATO enlargement has broadened the range of perspectives brought to bear in Alliance discussions and consultations. This breadth of experience will continue to grow as the Alliance admits more European countries that seek to join and satisfy NATO standards and requirements. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Alliance leaders extended the promise of membership to Georgia and Ukraine. The prospect of NATO - and EU - membership is also particularly significant for promoting stability in Southeast Europe.

28. The broad network of relationships developed by NATO and representing different degrees of partnership is a sign of the growing political role of the Alliance and its ability to promote stability and security through co-operation and the spread of democratic practices. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative all represent valuable frameworks for the exchange of views and practical

co-operation on security-related issues. These still have potential for further development, the benefits of which would far outweigh the necessary commitment of extra resources.

E. Public Support for the Alliance

29. Cold War stereotypes and misperceptions are still far too persistent both within Alliance nations and beyond. Furthermore, NATO operations understandably challenge public support not least because they entail tragic casualties. A new Strategic Concept should help to counter misperceptions by stating clearly the roles and purposes of the Alliance. It should also seek to contend with certain issues which erode public support such as inequitable sharing of risks and burdens.

30. NATO should also be proactive in publicising the many ways in which it is directly relevant to the security concerns of its citizens. One example is NATO's role in Civil Emergency Planning which should be more effectively publicised. Since its inception in 1998, for instance, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre has been involved in over 30 relief efforts all over the world but few members of the public are aware of this aspect of NATO's work. Equally, NATO plays a special role in enhancing capabilities to mitigate the effects of the use of WMD through, for instance, its Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force. Such efforts should receive greater emphasis and public attention.

Appendix 2: Chronology of the Assembly's contribution to a new Strategic Concept

	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Milestone</i>
2007	May	Spring Session, Madeira	The Standing Committee agreed to develop a plan for the Assembly to formulate ideas for a new NATO Strategic Concept
	October	Annual Session, Reykjavik	The Standing Committee appointed former Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen (Norway) as Rapporteur to oversee the development of the Assembly's contribution to a new Strategic Concept
	10-11 December	Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum, Washington DC	Several sessions were devoted to ideas for possible inclusion in a new Strategic Concept
2008	February-April	-	A framework for developing the Assembly's input to the Strategic Concept was elaborated by the Rapporteur
	28 March	Standing Committee, The Hague	The Standing Committee approved the plan for preparing the Assembly's contribution, involving all five Assembly Committees
	29 April	Brussels	The Rapporteur met with Assembly policy staff to prepare a list of themes to be considered by each of the Committees during the Spring Session in Berlin
	24 -25 May	Spring Session, Berlin	During their meetings, in the presence of the Rapporteur, each Committee considered the Rapporteur's list of questions about the Alliances' values, possible future threats and responses, and the future scope and scale of the Alliance
	June-October	-	The Rapporteur developed a draft report taking into account the discussions which took place during the Berlin Committee meetings
	21-22 October	Brussels	The Rapporteur visited Brussels to review and update the draft report with Assembly policy staff
	15-16 November	Annual Session, Valencia	Each Committee was asked to appraise the draft and recommend possible improvements
2009	24-25 May	Spring Session, Oslo	Each Committee invited a speaker to address aspects of a Strategic Concept relevant to the Committee's interests
	26 May	Standing Committee, Oslo	The Standing Committee appointed Assembly Vice-President Sven Mikser (Estonia) as Rapporteur for the project following Jan Petersen's departure from the Assembly
	7 July	NATO Conference launching consultation on the new Strategic Concept	Mr Mikser appeared on the opening panel and several other senior Assembly members participated in the conference
	16 October	NATO Conference on the New Strategic Concept, Luxembourg	Three Assembly members participated including the Rapporteur
	13 November	NATO Conference on the New Strategic Concept, Ljubljana, Slovenia	Because of the overlap with the Annual Session, no members participated but the Assembly was represented by the Deputy Secretary General for Policy
	14-15 November	Annual Session, Edinburgh	Mr. Mikser presented the new draft text to each Committee. The Committees were invited to make any recommendations they felt appropriate
	End November	-	The draft text was updated to reflect the recommendations made by the Committees during the Edinburgh Session

	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Milestone</i>
<i>2010</i>	<i>14 January</i>	<i>NATO Conference on the New Strategic Concept, Oslo, Norway</i>	<i>Three Assembly members participated including the Rapporteur</i>
	<i>22 February</i>	<i>Washington DC United States</i>	<i>Working Dinner of the Assembly's Bureau with the NATO Group of Experts including the Rapporteur</i>
	<i>22-23 February</i>	<i>NATO Conference on the New Strategic Concept, Washington DC, United States</i>	<i>Six members of the Assembly's Bureau participated including the Rapporteur</i>
	<i>4 March</i>	<i>Conference on the New Strategic Concept, Helsinki, Finland; hosted by Finland and Sweden</i>	<i>Three members of the Assembly participated including the Rapporteur</i>
	<i>Early March</i>		<i>The draft text was updated by the Rapporteur based on the deliberations of NATO seminars involving the Group of Experts from January to March</i>
	<i>Early March</i>	-	<i>The revised Rapporteur's draft text was circulated to Member delegations for their consideration</i>
	<i>28 March</i>	<i>Standing Committee meeting, Memphis, United States</i>	<i>The final draft text was discussed and adopted following the incorporation of revisions arising from the Standing Committee's deliberations</i>
	<i>13 April</i>	<i>Brussels</i>	<i>The final version of the approved Assembly contribution was formally presented by the Rapporteur to the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen</i>

Appendix 3: The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington Dc, 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- *on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;*
- *on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.*

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
