Political Committee Sub-Committee on Transatlantic and European Relations NATO ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY Draft Final Report MR. MARKUS MECKEL (GERMANY) General Rapporteur* 20 October 1999 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. NATO'S ADJUSTMENT PHASE AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR III. THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT IV. NATO AS A SECURITY PARTNER FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE V. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY VI. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY VII. THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE VIII. DISARMAMENT AND PROLIFERATION IX. THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO X. CONCLUSIONS NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION Since its founding fifty years ago, NATO has been the cornerstone for the security of the democratic West and the Euro-Atlantic region. The Alliance has been a community based on shared values, advocating the freedom, common legacy, and civilisation of its peoples. Its principles were then, as they are today, democracy, personal freedom, and the rule of law. Against the backdrop of the framework conditions guaranteed by NATO, countless courageous people in the communist countries of the former Eastern bloc, also striving to achieve freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, succeeded in bringing about the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in 1989/90. This victory for freedom not only constituted the basis for German unification and the founding of the young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, it also set the course for the future of Europe and the entire Euro-Atlantic region. The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" adopted by all the CSCE countries in 1990 reflected this political change and the end of the bloc confrontation which had taken place in Europe.

II. NATO'S ADJUSTMENT PHASE AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR The dramatic developments from 1989 to 1991 changed the security situation in Europe completely. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Central Europe fundamentally altered NATO's strategic position. When the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the most immediate security challenge disappeared and the Alliance was faced with the need to adjust to new circumstances. NATO was confronted with a number of crucial questions: What should the tasks of a "new NATO" be in the framework of a changed security system in Europe? What role can and should it assume in relation to other international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, EU, WEU and the Council of Europe ? How can co-operation be facilitated between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries, particularly Russia, a major power? How can the disarmament efforts be continued? There was a consensus among all member states that the Alliance needed to be maintained. Dissolving the Alliance would have led to a re-nationalisation of foreign and security policy in Europe - a development that none of the sixteen member countries could have wanted. For the Allies it was of particular importance that as members of a community based on shared values they no longer guaranteed their security at the national level, but rather jointly, in integrated military structures. The Alliance saw itself confronted with the challenge of a double opening, both in a geographical and in a functional sense. On the one hand, there was a need to open up to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe -- adversaries for 40 years -- to overcome the division of Europe together with them. On the other hand, there was a need to adjust the North Atlantic Alliance to the new situation by widening the range of its missions. Future European security was to be guaranteed on the basis of concrete, institutionalised NATO co-operation with Russia and Ukraine as well as gradual integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the Alliance. The process of developing a sound balance between co-operation and integration required the Alliance partners several years. The 1999 Washington Summit provided nine Central and Eastern European countries with the prospect of NATO membership. What is still missing is a timetable for the accession process which NATO should approve in the near future. At the Madrid Summit meeting in 1997 NATO made a concrete offer of membership only to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The admission of Slovenia and Romania, for which there was express support from a number of European Alliance partners and the North Atlantic Assembly, failed in the face of resistance from, among others, the United States. After ratification of the accession protocols by the parliaments of NATO member countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance on 12 March 1999. Thus, NATO has accomplished a major step forward towards adjusting to the new security landscape in Europe. The Alliance's commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be regarded as an example of new tasks and functions NATO had to take on. After EU mediation had failed, it was US initiative which led to the Dayton peace agreement. Only NATO had the structures and capacities needed to implement the agreement. However, it is important to note that troop contingents from non-NATO countries, in particular from Russia and Ukraine, were also integrated in the IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina to safeguard the United Nations peace effort. NATO has succeeded in addressing the challenges which arose after the end of the Cold War. Beyond the core function of collective defence the Alliance has turned its attention to new tasks, i.e. crisis management and conflict prevention as well as partnership and co-operation. With this double opening the Alliance has taken an important step forward in preparation for the coming years. It has become virtually irreplaceable in dealing with conflict management in Bosnia and more recently in Kosovo. However, questions and problems remain which the Alliance will have to address. The 1999 Washington Summit meeting not only looked back at the achievements of NATO's 50 year history but also produced a number of initiatives which are designed to prepare the Alliance for the 21st century.

III. THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT One of the main purposes of NATO's Strategic Concept is to survey the strategic environment and assess foreseeable security challenges and risks. Immediately after the Cold War, the Alliance had adjusted its Strategic Concept in 1991. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the building of partner relationships with Russia and Ukraine, the decision to enlarge the Alliance, the use of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, and the crisis in Kosovo required further adjustments and at the 1997 Madrid Summit, the Alliance heads of state commissioned another update of the Strategic Concept which was approved at the 1999 Washington Summit meeting. Discussion on the new concept focused on important issues, among which: What geographic range should NATO have? What importance should be attributed to the new tasks of conflict prevention and crisis management and how can they be carried out operatively and in co-operation with other international organisations? What demands will be placed on the armed forces of the Alliance as a result of its future tasks? On what basis in international law will crisis response missions be carried out by the Alliance? In what cases and under what conditions will it be considered necessary to intervene militarily in crises without a mandate from the UN Security Council? How can NATO address the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? The Alliance's three "core functions" formulated in 1991 remain largely unchanged: "Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force. Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty." The new tasks, namely conflict prevention, crisis management, as well as partnership and co-operation, were added at the Washington Summit "in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area". It is agreed, however, that the defence of the treaty area continues to be the most important function of NATO. The document identifies the tasks as follows: "Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, co-operation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance." The discussion within the Alliance about geography and interests is still in process. With its global commitments and in view of its national military strategy "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now," the United States has an interest in being supported by its Allies in as many regions as possible.(1) For the European member countries, on the other hand, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area have clear priority. Calls by United States officials for a "globalised NATO" have failed to garner stronger support from the Europeans. However, the Alliance's focus on security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic region strengthens Alliance consensus and capacity to undertake joint action. Strengthening co-operative security structures has become more important. This includes involving Russia and Ukraine in discussing issues of fundamental importance. Moreover, unlike the Cold War, when security was primarily discussed in military terms, NATO now has to develop a comprehensive approach to conflict management and prevention. The record of the Dayton Agreement's implementation is a good case in point: while implementation of the military aspects of the accord has been rather successful, fulfilling the civilian part of the agreement has proven to be much more difficult and cumbersome. NATO is faced with the task of expanding its civilian means for dealing with regional conflicts beyond the usual diplomatic instruments. The importance of "civil-military co-operation" (CIMIC) is now formally recognised. There are practical conclusions to be drawn from this. Available CIMIC personnel (e.g. international armed police forces) should be increased considerably, first and foremost on the part of the European Allies, since the United States already has large contingents of this kind. In addition, specially trained personnel under civilian control are needed for the verification of arms control agreements, cease-fire agreements, compliance with human rights standards, and support of humanitarian relief activities. These personnel could also be made available on short notice for UN or OSCE missions. To guarantee smooth co-operation within these multinational units such operations will require the Alliance to develop joint concepts as well as common training standards. Particularly to foster crisis prevention, further improving (respectively developing) co-operation with other international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, EU, World Bank, IMF or with NGO's is another task which lies ahead. For example, the Stability Pact for the South-Eastern Region might, if successful, serve as a role model for concerted efforts of how to defuse future challenges. However, the feasibility and the degree of co-operation with international organisations would have to be developed in a case-by-case approach, depending on the specific security threats and the necessary - and available - means to cope with them. An early warning system to obtain indications as to when preventive or de-escalating measures are necessary will have to be part of the concept. The following functions must be fulfilled in this context: (1) evaluation of suitable information and definition of criteria to indicate when there is a need to take action; (2) selection of suitable co-operation partners, including individuals or NGOs in a crisis region; (3) definition of a common strategy; (4) definition of the mission and qualification of the necessary personnel; (5) a comprehensive exchange of information with partners. It is both one of NATO's objectives and an important element of its system of shared values to respect the legitimacy of international law in general and of the United Nations in particular. Article 1 of the Washington Treaty of 1949 obliges member countries "to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". In Article 7 NATO recognises "the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security". The UN Charter allows for the use of military means only in two instances: (collective) self-defence under Article 51 as well as coercive measures authorised under Article 42 by a mandate from the UN Security Council. As such, there are many who feel that "Peace Support Operations" by NATO are permissible only on the basis of a mandate from the UN Security Council or a regional organisation such as the OSCE. That made sense in light of historical experience and the Cold War but it is open to question as to whether it is still appropriate today. If UN Security Council resolutions cannot be passed, because Permanent Members block them out of national interests, it can still be imperative to take action. Genocide, expulsions, and mass human rights violations cannot be tolerated by the international community. In emergency situations, such as in Kosovo, NATO should act in conformity with international law. However, in future developments the Alliance may be forced to act without a UN Security Council mandate. The inability of the international community to prevent the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (as well as in other regions of the world) and to agree on appropriate measures to respond needs to be addressed. In particular, the Alliance's role in future peacemaking missions when there is no clear basis provided by international law will have to be discussed by NATO and its members. These will be important issues not only for the Alliance, but for individual member states and for other organisations as well, as the violent conflict in East Timor has demonstrated most recently. A reform of the UN Security Council will be of great importance so that the UN will be better able to live up to its claim to be the supreme body for the maintenance of peace and for the legitimisation of military force. If the Security Council wants to complete this task to the full extent, then what is connected with it is not just the right to legitimate a military intervention but also the duty and responsibility to respond to a serious violation of international law and to put a stop to it. The principles of the UN Charter - sovereignty and renunciation of force, on the one hand, and protection of human rights, on the other - can come into conflict with one another. These factors will need to be weighed in each specific instance. In this regard UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in April 1999: "Although the UN is an organisation of member states, the rights and ideals we help to protect belong to the people. For this reason we should place the human individual in the centre of all of our actions. (...) I have also said that international law is developing in such a way that governments will no longer be able to hide behind national borders when they violate the human rights of their citizens and think the world will look on silently."(2)

IV. NATO AS A SECURITY PARTNER FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE After the end of the Cold War all the CSCE member states pledged their commitment to the shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights in the 1990 "Charter of Paris". As the current century draws to a close Russia and NATO countries have a common responsibility to shape "a new era of democracy, peace and unity". Security in Europe is not possible without Russia, i.e. co-operative structures need to be developed and improved to strengthen this security and make it binding. Further developments in Russia will be accompanied by risks, particularly as to whether this geographically enormous country will succeed in finding the internal stability it needs. It is only by strengthening its democratic structures and creating an awareness of democracy in the minds of its people as well as by carrying out a parallel consolidation of its economy that Russia will be able to establish itself as a strong and reliable partner in Europe. It should be the task of the European Union and the G-7 to support Russia by strengthening political and economic co-operation and assistance. An important institutional foundation was laid for co-operation with the signing of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" in Paris on 27 May 1997 and the concomitant creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). This Council is a forum in which the two sides regularly discuss questions of common interest as well as their problems and grievances. This contributes towards confidence-building and stability of relations. Accordingly, NATO informed Russia in the Permanent Joint Council of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept in advance of the Washington Summit. The fact that Russia has rejoined the PJC after it suspended its co-operation during the Kosovo war is a positive signal. Despite this positive development the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation is not free of tensions. Russia is working towards a clear subordination of NATO with regard to the OSCE, while the North Atlantic Alliance insists on having an independent role and views the OSCE as a partner. Russia takes a negative view of the enlargement NATO has undertaken and threatens consequences if former Soviet Republics are admitted. In the case of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic NATO has shown that it is sensitive to Russian security concerns. Troops from NATO partners will not be stationed permanently in the new member states. The question of disarmament is of key importance in Russia's relationship with NATO. Despite major reductions, both the United States and Russia still have substantial nuclear potentials. It is necessary to continue the disarmament process. This is even more important as the Russian Duma has still not ratified the START II Treaty, as the Russian government has promised on numerous occasions. Thereafter, it will be possible to move from informal discussions to the conclusion of formal negotiations on a START-III agreement which would replace its predecessor. The initiation of a "nuclear weapons" dialogue in the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is another step in the right direction. Further steps should be undertaken jointly to put a stop to proliferation and weapons trafficking. The IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia are an example of successful co-operation between NATO and Russia at the military level. It is noteworthy in this context that the first military operation by the North Atlantic Alliance took place with the involvement of non-NATO countries, Russia in particular. Despite current tensions as a result of the Kosovo crisis the Russian Federation has not abandoned this co-operation. It can only be hoped that Russia will involve itself in a multinational peacekeeping force to ensure the safe return of the Kosovo refugees and to stabilise a future peace in this region. Even though Ukraine had not originally received the attention - and the support - it deserved from the Alliance, relations between NATO and Ukraine have developed very positively ever since Ukrainian independence in 1991. Ukraine immediately became involved in the NACC and since then has been an active partner in further co-operation. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace programme directly and in May 1997 was among the founding members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Ukraine has never seen the opening of NATO in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe as a threat but rather as an opportunity to achieve greater stability in the region. It is an important objective of the Alliance to provide strong support for Ukraine's political democratisation process and to continue to expand co-operation. It is to be hoped that the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential elections will further strengthen the democratisation process. At the Madrid Summit meeting in 1997 the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine was signed, creating a solid basis for further co-operation between the two partners. In this Charter the Alliance expressly affirmed its support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic development and economic prosperity of the country as well as for the status of Ukraine as a non-nuclear weapon country. The opening of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kiev in May 1997 is an expression of the Alliance's strong interest to deepen the existing relationship. In the context of the Washington 5Oth Anniversary Summit meeting the NATO-Ukraine Commission met for the first time at the level of the Heads of State and Government to discuss the institution's future role. The good-neighbourly relations between Ukraine and the new NATO members, Poland and Hungary, are an enriching factor for co-operation between the Alliance and Ukraine and will contribute towards Ukraine assuming a firm place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. It is of utmost importance that the NATO enlargement process does not create a new dividing line in Europe. The situation in Belarus gives reason for concern. We are strongly interested in a democratic and independent development of Belarus enabling its people to fully participate in Euro-Atlantic cooperation.

V. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY On 12 March 1999 three countries were admitted to NATO who were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, a unique occurrence in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. This first and successful round of Alliance enlargement expanded the area of NATO stability in Europe. Since 1990 many of the young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have requested membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Thus far the Alliance has found it difficult to make a clear distinction between integration and co-operation. Waiting too long to provide a clear prospect of future membership entails the danger of provoking a re-nationalisation of the security and defence policy in these countries which, in turn, could lead to arms races and instability in the region. As countries which have a common border with the Russian Federation the Baltic States face a particularly difficult situation. Russia continues to define the region of these former Soviet Republics as part of its direct sphere of interest and announced massive resistance in the case of accession negotiations between the Baltic Republics and the Alliance. Given its fundamental positions it will be difficult for NATO to continue to refuse the recurrently expressed wish of the Baltic States for membership out of consideration for Moscow, particularly if these countries should at some point in time be able to satisfy in full the criteria laid down in the NATO Enlargement Study. In this context the enlargement of the European Union needs to be taken into account as well, given that it has an important effect on security and stability in this region. The decision on the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary was not without controversy and took place in Madrid after a long process of discussion. There were differing views among the Alliance partners as to which countries should be in the first enlargement round. The northern NATO members Denmark, Germany and Norway spoke out in favour of the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, while France and Italy strongly favoured Romania and Slovenia. The concern that there might not be the necessary majority in the US Senate to approve the three candidate countries proved to be unfounded. But along with its approval of these three countries on 30 April 1998 the Senate laid down specific conditions for further enlargement rounds. They include, among other things, that enlargement must not be connected with additional costs. This decision will have considerable consequences for the open door policy. At the Washington Summit meeting the open door policy was strongly reaffirmed. Even though no further invitations to join NATO were issued at the Washington 50th Anniversary Summit, it is welcomed that the final communiqué specifically mentioned Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania in this context. Though this does not guarantee a concrete invitation, it does provide a clear prospect for the future. For these countries the PfP programme will be supplemented by adding a "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) with a view to strengthening the process of drawing them closer to the Alliance.

VI.THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY The efforts being undertaken to develop a "European Security and Defence Identity" (ESDI) within NATO are intended to make it possible for the European member countries to address security policy challenges independently. By creating additional capacities the European partners want to assume greater responsibility for maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic area as well as the burdens that are associated with this. Unnecessary structural redundancies are to be avoided. If the interests of EU member states are affected at a time when the United States does not want to be involved in certain regional conflicts then the European Union must be able carry out its own crisis management operations in co-operation with the WEU. Independent action in the framework of the EU's "European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP) will require certain military capabilities. They include: A change in armed forces structure that will strengthen the operational capability of national and multinational "rapid reaction forces" and do justice to the modern requirements of interoperability, mobility, combat readiness, survivability and sustainability. This makes large demands on logistics in particular and makes it necessary to build up air and sea transport capabilities. Advanced information technology, satellite-based command, control and communications structures, as well as reconnaissance and monitoring systems. A military-policy analysis and planning staff. NATO has indicated its willingness to make Alliance resources available to the EU for operations carried out under its own aegis. The question regarding the structure of the decision-making procedure is of crucial importance. Thus far a decision made by the North Atlantic Council has been the basis on which NATO resources are provided. The decision-making structures must ensure that if EU member states want to undertake joint action they will be in a position to do so. Veto rights for other NATO partners would be problematic. European access to NATO planning capabilities was agreed on at the Washington Summit meeting as an initial step towards independent action. Since the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, efforts to determine the contents, objectives, and means of ESDP have taken on a new dynamic quality. After initial hints in August 1998 that the British Labour Government would now be willing to discuss defence questions in the EU framework, Prime Minister Blair declared before the North Atlantic Assembly in Edinburgh on 13 November 1998: "Europe needs genuine military operational capability - not least forces able to act quickly and to work together effectively - and the genuine political will. Without these, we will always be talking about an empty shell." The United Kingdom proposed integration of the WEU as a "fourth pillar" of the EU, but military operations were to be carried out by NATO. The WEU would act in a complementary manner. This initiative was followed by a joint declaration at the Anglo-French Summit meeting in St. Malo on 3 and 4 December 1998, in which it was also noted that the EU needed "access to appropriate military means". Gradual integration of the WEU in the EU is pursued in the draft of an action plan that was approved by the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU on 16 March 1999. With a view to providing appropriate military resources, the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was decided at the Brussels NATO Summit meeting in January 1994. These multinational, combined-service forces were to be deployable independently of NATO main forces: (1) for NATO-led out-of-area peace support operations and (2) for European, WEU-led operations. In June 1996 the Berlin decisions were taken which established a procedure for the release of NATO resources (including headquarters and command positions) to the WEU. This provided for authorisation on the basis of a decision taken by the North Atlantic Council. The identification of required resources and structural links between NATO and the WEU has largely been completed. In 1997 and 1998 the first two exercises were held with CJTF.(3) The conclusion of appropriate command agreements between NATO and WEU followed soon afterwards. Inter-institutional co-operation will be subjected to its first test in connection with the CRISEX 2000 exercise planned for next spring. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, the EU took fundamental decisions on the evolution of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne Summit 3 - 4 June 1999. The EU decided that it needs to develop the capacitity for independent military action. The WEU shall continue to exist, but the EU will take over military responsibilities and assets trying to integrate them by the end of the year 2000. As a first step Javier Solana shall combine the offices of EU and WEU secretary general. His nomination as the new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy promises enhanced co-operation between the EU/WEU and NATO. It is a positive move that Solana will be invited to meetings of NATO's Foreign and Defence Ministers. But a formal working relationship between the EU and NATO should also be established. EU action will be limited to the "Petersberg tasks", operations of crisis prevention, and conflict management. The EU will take advantage of existing diplomatic and economic means in addition to military ones. Collective defence will remain NATO's task. It will take years for the EU to develop some of the military capabilities necessary for conflict management. As it is not intended to duplicate NATO resources unnecessarily the EU will take recourse to NATO assets as envisaged by the Communiqué of the Washington Summit. Existing arrangements between the WEU and NATO will facilitate the use of NATO assets by the EU. Thus, the rights of WEU members will be preserved, a sufficient consultation process assured and any compromising of independent decision-making by EU bodies avoided. The developments confront us with a number of key questions: How can associate members of the WEU who are not members of the EU, in particular Turkey, be involved in ESDP? How can the role of the (Secretary General of the EU Council of Ministers) be defined in the context of the four EU commissioners and their president claiming responsibility for different aspects of foreign policy? How can decision-making processes be designed to provide EU security and defence policy with a coherent sense of direction? And how can democratic control be ensured in the process, by national parliaments or by the European Parliament? Will EU member states muster not only the political will for joint action but also the financial means which are needed to develop new military and dual-use capabilities as demanded by US partners? And will the build-up be funded by national budgets or the EU budget? ESDP will require enhanced co-operation by EU members on defence procurement, but does it require going beyond the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty in setting up an integrated procurement agency of EU states or even a merger of European defence companies? Will the EU be capable of using NATO resources for its operations, even if the United States or other partners are not concerned about a certain regional conflict? Will NATO partners be interested in using EU resources in the future, and under what conditions? The conflicts that have been provoked by efforts to develop the role of the EU as a player on the strategic stage indicate that renewed efforts will need to be undertaken in the future with a view to placing transatlantic relations on a stronger basis of partnership. The threat posed by a common enemy during the Cold War ensured the cohesion of the Alliance, and divergent interests in individual questions were subordinated to higher Alliance interests; today, by contrast, conflicts are expressed much more openly.(4) As a consequence of globalisation and the advanced state of EU integration accompanying the introduction of the euro, economic tensions are increasing between the major trading powers (EU banana market regulations, US sanction laws with "extraterritorial" effect). In order not to weaken the cohesion of our community based on shared values as a result of everyday conflicts there is a need for new initiatives, such as the "Transatlantic Economic Partnership" of 1998, which focus on a common interest in resolving problems.

VII. THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE The Mediterranean Dialogue constitutes an important addition to the partnerships that exist with the EU countries. Potential challenges to security and stability lie on the NATO's periphery in the Mediterranean region and in the Middle East. This includes build-ups of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and a variety of regional conflicts. As a result of economic differentials as well as political and social instability there is first and foremost the threat of large-scale population flows. The Mediterranean Dialogue took on a new dynamic quality as a result of the decision taken at the Madrid Summit meeting in July 1997 to create the Mediterranean Co-operation Group with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Even though the dialogue was intended to help reduce misperceptions in the Alliance on the basis of bilateral meetings and multilateral seminars, it offers the potential of developing into a co-operation programme similar in nature to the PfP programme. The Dialogue with the Mediterranean countries places greater demands on both sides than contacts in EAPC. In addition to the usual language barriers there are intercultural and inter-religious hurdles to be overcome here. The cultural approximation between Western societies, shaped by Christianity and the Age of Enlightenment, and Islamic societies is a sensitive task in the age of globalisation and in view of the differences in historical background and the developmental differentials. NATO is a community based on shared values. As such, it cannot close its eyes to differences of this kind. There is a need to counteract the simplistic tendency to equate Islam with fundamentalism. Similarly, NATO cannot accept a cultural relativisation of human rights, since they are core elements of the Alliance's shared values. There is a need to conduct a comprehensive dialogue on the different traditions and perspectives. It is only then that it will be possible to promote recognition of the universality of human rights. Access to the group of participants in the Mediterranean Dialogue must be open. Countries considered problematic from the standpoint of the Alliance, e.g. Algeria or Libya, should not be excluded from the Dialogue. There is an opportunity here to help reduce tensions and fears caused by a sense of threat. Exchange should be promoted among the countries of the region. The Mediterranean Dialogue could also be used as a forum for necessary arms control and disarmament measures, particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction. NATO provides impetus for initiating regional negotiations and offers to provide help in setting up a verification regime. A Dialogue of this kind is attractive for the Mediterranean countries primarily because of its economic interest. For this reason close co-operation between NATO and the EU's MEDA programme would be an obvious option; under this programme the EU has provided the countries of the region financial and technical assistance in the amount of 9.5 billion Euros in the period 1995-1999. At the Barcelona Summit meeting in 1995 preferential agreements were approved which are to lead to the creation of a free trade zone by the year 2010. Since trade among the countries in the region is very weak, the general interest in increasing co-operation with the EU could serve as a catalyst for stronger intra-regional integration. Libya attended the 3rd Euro-Med Conference in Stuttgart on 15-16 April, the first such appearance since the Lockerbie bombers were extradited. The security policy dialogue is already so far advanced that the decision has been taken to formulate a "Euro-Mediterranean Charter", patterned after the OSCE, by the year 2001. Concerning the Middle East peace process we are encouraged by recent improvements, but it is clear that the negotiations will be difficult. It is important that Europe, in co-operation - not in competition - with the United States, plays an active part in finding a lasting peace settlement in the region.

VIII. DISARMAMENT AND PROLIFERATION Since the end of the Cold War the danger of a large-scale military conflict in Europe has been greatly reduced. As a consequence conventional forces have been reduced beyond the limits established in the CFE Treaty of 1989. With regard to disarmament of strategic nuclear weapons little has happened since 1993 due to the problems with the ratification of the START II Treaty. NATO has unilaterally withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons from Europe except for about 200 systems. Not least because of the breakdown of the former Soviet Union a different threat has come to the fore in recent years, i.e. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with which ambitious regional powers or terrorists can threaten the security of the population in the Alliance area. How to respond to threats connected with proliferation is a subject of controversy in the Alliance. In the US Congress people are inclined to counteract the threats of proliferation not only by political means but also by protecting the population against these threats with military means. For this purpose the US Senate on 17 March 1999 approved the creation of a "Nuclear Missile Defence" "as soon as this is technically possible" and allocated 10.5 billion dollars for research and development work on a defence system of this kind. However, the value of a functional system needs to be weighed against the possible negative effects deployment of the system in the year 2005 could have on the relationship with Russia if this were to require changes in the Russian-American ABM Treaty of 1972. Critics point to the "ice age" in bilateral relations that was ushered in by the SDI programme in the early 1980s; they note that the ABM Treaty was a key reason for Russia's agreement to destroy thousands of nuclear warheads. The Alliance should agree on a new and comprehensive disarmament and arms control concept that provides for stability-oriented measures both in the area of weapons of mass destruction, i.e. nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as in the area of conventional systems. In addition to heavy weapons, the latter should include small arms, which have been largely ignored in arms control efforts thus far. Small arms constitute the main instrument used in the waging of domestic conflicts; uncontrolled supplies of such weapons can aggravate these conflicts. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stands at the centre of the efforts undertaken thus far to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 constituted a major success for the united efforts of NATO member countries. The basis for the willingness of the non-nuclear signatories of the NTP to renounce possession of nuclear weapons is formed by the agreement of the five recognised nuclear powers under Article VI to work rapidly towards "general and complete disarmament" with regard to this weapon category. Since there has been no tangible progress in this area since 1993, the political and moral effect of the NPT is weakening - as shown by tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan. Former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament, Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., expressed this view in a letter to the Heads of State and Government dated 2 November 1998 as follows: "I believe that the NPT regime will be in great jeopardy if significant progress is not made toward the Article VI disarmament obligations by the five nuclear weapons states parties by the year 2000 Review Conference." A first step in this direction is the decision taken at the Washington Summit meeting to review the role of nuclear weapons as well as to formulate measures for disarmament, verification and non-proliferation. A report is to be compiled for this purpose. Contacts should be sought with Russia in this connection. In the existing working group on "Nuclear Weapons" the following items are on the agenda: (1) strategic nuclear weapons, (2) tactical nuclear weapons, (3) a proposal by President Yeltsin for a gradual reduction of the state of readiness. The West would have an interest in placing a comprehensive programme on the agenda aimed at reducing the Russian nuclear arsenal, involving the dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons and the disposal of nuclear waste, as well as providing support for this process. The EU would need to initiate a programme of this kind. The task of NATO would be to co-ordinate the American and European programmes. Taking account of the fundamental change in the security environment and the significant reduction in nuclear arsenals, NATO's updated Strategic Concept describes the potential use of nuclear weapons as "extremely remote". Upon German and Canadian initiative, a comprehensive review of nuclear disarmament, strategy and proliferation was commissioned. As part of this review some difficult questions have to be addressed. Most strategists would argue that NATO needs to reserve the right to strike pre-emptively against an imminent attack as it is a prudent measure of warfare. During the Persian Gulf War it was argued that Saddam Hussein could only be prevented from using chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against Allied Forces by the threatened use of nuclear weapons by the United States. Thus, a strategy of "calculated ambiguity" shall deter rogue states and terrorist organisations from even contemplating CBW attacks, by leaving it open whether the United States might react with a devastating strike by nuclear weapons. But many analysts would dispute that there is a military rationale for "first use" at all, for example former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara or retired General Lee Butler. The only potential adversary in Europe is Russia, and even in this context NATO commands a substantial conventional superiority, whereas the constant nuclear threat puts a strain on its relations with Russia. Secondly, NATO's most likely missions are "out-of-area" operations in crisis management. Kosovo has shown that NATO strives to minimize casualities of its own troops as well as the number of civilian victims of the adversary. Furthermore, the humanitarian justification of such operations is not credible, if the goal of protecting human rights and spreading democracy is backed-up by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice found that the use of nuclear weapons is only admissible if the very existence of the state is at stake. Thirdly, "first use" endangers the most important instrument against the proliferation of WMD: the NPT. In the context of the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 NATO's three nuclear powers gave "negative assurances" to all non-nuclear states that they would not use nuclear weapons against them, unless the latter were attacking the former in alliance with a nuclear power. No formal exceptions with regards to CBW were made at the time but in April 1996, were articulated by Robert Bell at the signing of a Protocol to the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone ("Treaty of Pelindaba").(5) Thus, in conclusion, a thorough review is imperative and it should be carried out speedily in order not to loose the chance of countering the trend towards acquiring nuclear weapons as exemplified by India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. In a welcome move the United States and Russia started discussing the content of a START III Treaty in August 1999. When it was first considered at the Russian-American Summit in Helsinki in 1997 cuts to a limit of 2.000-2.500 warheads were suggested. In August 1999 Russia proposed an even more far-reaching reduction to 1.000-1.500 warheads. This initiative would for the first time constrain the storage and disposition of warheads instead of deployment systems. Given the considerable problems involved with a verification regime that is separate for strategic and substrategic weapons systems, a common ceiling would have to be defined. This would be an attractive procedure - and not just for NATO - which would contribute towards reduction of the proliferation risk emanating from Russia's 6,000 to 14,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian partners, too, ought to be interested in orderly reductions for cost reasons and be aware of the rapidity of technological obsolescence. Acccording to Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defence Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council START III would also address "the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in a meaningful way".(6) If the United States, as a result of negotiations, had to remove the remaining 200 tactical nuclear weapons from European soil or to dismantle them this measure would be welcomed. An initiative to begin negotiations on the conclusion of a START III Treaty such as was considered at the Russian-American Summit meeting in Helsinki in 1997 would be a very positive prospect. For the first time the intention would be to register warheads instead of delivery systems. If it should prove necessary in the course of negotiations of this kind with Russia to move the 200 tactical weapons remaining in Europe to US sovereign territory or to dismantle them, there would not be anything that would stand in the way of this. The proposals put forward by the US Administration to address the challenge constituted by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with regard to biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles are highly welcome. The creation of a co-ordination office will accelerate the exchange of monitoring data. This will enable the Alliance to gain a comprehensive overview of existing arsenals, transfer connections, etc. Above all, NATO should insist that strict verification regimes be created for the two conventions on biological and chemical weapons (BWC and CWC) and that the commitments to renounce the development, production, stockpiling - and in the case of CWC also the use - be fully implemented. In this context, it is most regrettable that the US Senate voted against the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in October. The realisation of the CTBT, the disarmament regime with the most intrusive verification system, would be a major step forward in the attempt to reduce the danger of proliferation. As the United States is the most important of the 44 countries with nuclear capabilities, the CTBT can not enter into force without ratification by the US Senate. The OSCE plays a leading role in the limitation of conventional weapons systems. An important breakthrough was achieved in March 1999 in connection with the adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the changed situation after the end of the Cold War. The original objective of creating a balance of forces and military stability on the continent was supplemented by the new principle of flexibility in the deployment of forces. In the process of revising the treaty, NATO member countries responded constructively to Russian demands for a reduction of ceilings, in particular for new NATO members. At the OSCE Summit meeting in Istanbul in November 1999 the objective will be to approve not only the updated CFE Treaty but also the new "European Charter on Security". The Alliance should also put forward new proposals on the reduction of heavy weapons systems (e.g. the definition of existing arsenals as new ceilings) and on the limitation of small arms. A strong verification regime needs to be worked towards in both areas. In this connection NATO is also to address a further challenge: the monitoring or control of conventional weapons transfers. In 1998 the EU drew up a Code of Conduct for this purpose which NATO could adopt or use as a basis for drawing up its own code of conduct. The key instrument in this area, however, would be a systematic exchange of information. Close co-operation with the UN Register (established in 1992) should be worked towards. Since the OSCE has many years of experience and refined procedures in the area of conventional arms control, the Alliance should seek to extend all new measures in this area beyond the framework of its members to include the OSCE countries and to entrust the OSCE with the task of monitoring compliance with the agreements in question.

IX. THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO The conflict in Kosovo proved to be one of the toughest challenges for NATO. In this conflict NATO stood up to its values, principles, and its credibility. After the failure of numerous political and diplomatic attempts to achieve a peaceful solution NATO felt it had no other choice but to militarily intervene in order to put an end to the repression and expulsion of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Hence, on 24 March NATO began its air-strike campaign after President Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stubbornly refused the offer to conclude the Rambouillet Accords, continuing his policy of "ethnic cleansing". The sole purpose of the use of military force was to make it possible to achieve a political solution in the long term. During the air-strike campaign the transatlantic community continued to search for diplomatic solutions on the political level. On the initiative of then EU Council President and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer NATO managed to engage Russia in a process of mediation as well as in an attempt to obtain a UN Security Council mandate. Furthermore, the European Union put forward the idea of a "Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe", providing the framework for regional arms control and integration efforts as well as for an international reconstruction programme. Following the G-8 peace proposal, outlined on 6 May at a conference of the G-8 foreign ministers, NATO put an end to the military intervention on 9 June, after Milosevic finally had backed down to the Alliance's conditions. Based on UN-resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement signed between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in Kumanovo the NATO-led Kosovo-Force (KFOR) moved into Kosovo. Although the air-strike campaign forced the army of the FRY Serbian army to retreat from Kosovo - and thus was a success - NATO's military mission was obstructed by Alliance-internal disputes and frictions over the relation between the political and military decision-making authority. The impression arose that NATO's military staff tended to by-pass political decision-makers by okaying the targets which were to be bombed. NATO has to make sure that its military actions are under civilian control. NATO has to decide whether military efficiency imposes restrictions on interventions by political authorities or whether politicians are entitled to intercede at every stage of such a mission. Some military lessons have already emerged from a first analysis of the military action. Especially the selection of targets is open to dispute. Firstly, the FRY's army remained largely intact and was able to operate until the end of the campaign. Secondly, the severe bombing of several non-military targets, like for example in Novi Sad, appear to be counterproductive. Novi Sad, the FRY's second largest city, is governed by the opposition and its population does not understand why it has to suffer from the bombing so heavily. To a wider public - both within the West as well as in the FRY - it is not clear on the basis of which military calculations civilian targets were chosen. Finally, NATO's highest priority was given to the protection of its own soldiers and therefore, ground troops were ruled out right from the beginning. Decision makers have to take into account that with such a strategy the mission might take longer to be accomplished and increase other suffering. A further problem concerns the relationship between national and integrated chains of command. When Russian military forces occupied the airport of Prizren, there seemed to exist different perspectives about the chain of command of KFOR. While General Wesley Clark as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) instructed British and French forces to enter the airport, General Jackson, British commander of KFOR, though disapproving, passed the order on to the subordinate Briritsh commander and let him check with his home governement before executing it. After discussions between the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, General Clark was, reportedly, ordered to reconsider / back down via his national chain of command. The North Atlantic Council has so far failed to discuss this problem. The basic tasks of the NATO-led international peacekeeping force are to monitor, verify, and, where necessary, enforce compliance with the Military Technical Agreement. KFOR will remain in Kosovo to maintain the peace and will work closely with the UN-led international civil presence. It will assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in getting refugees home and providing a basic level of law and order so that all ethnic groups can live in a secure environment. All NATO nations are taking every opportunity to reassure the Serbs in Kosovo that KFOR will defend them along with all other ethnic groups. But what does it mean for the credibility of NATO's commitment to maintaining a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, that it could not stop the expulsion of almost 200.000 Serbs and many Roma? That could possibly have been prevented if KFOR had had a mandate and a contingent for policing. Now, a civilian police has to be build up as quickly as possible in order to assist KFOR. UN resolution 1244 calls for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other Kosovo Albanian groups to end all offensive actions immediately and to demilitarise. The KLA has confirmed its commitment at Rambouillet and in an agreement with General Jackson on 21 June. However, it appears to be the case that the KLA is not fully complying to this agreement and has not handed in all weapons yet. Over the long term, it is also unclear which political status the KLA will assume. The international community is making a great and continuing effort to reconstruct Kosovo. The work of the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has already begun. The civilian administration, now being established under UN leadership, will, among other things, arrange elections and supervise reconstruction and humanitarian aid. The civilian administration is being assisted and supported by many international agencies including the UNHCR, the OSCE, the EU, and many non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The EU will play a major role in economic reconstruction, and the US will continue its military and economic commitment in this region. The OSCE will take responsibility for civil society building and election arrangements. The civil presence will help to establish substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo. Does the separation of the military (KFOR) and civilian command structures (UNMIK) render peace-keeping operations ineffective or are there ways of producing synergetic effects? The creation of a lasting and stable peaceful order not only in Kosovo, but in the whole South-East European region is on the agenda. The EU and other participating States have launched the Stability Pact on 10 June, following the Royaumont-Approach. The Pact provides a mechanism for discussing and co-ordinating policy in key areas, with Working Tables on democratisation, and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and co-operation; and security issues. Its main objective is to bring the whole region closer to the EU over the long term. This goal needs the persistent and strong commitment of all nations and international agencies engaged, both in terms of human resources as well as economic aid. Still unresolved is the question which role the Special Coordinator of the Pact will play and how his relations to both the European Commission as well as the member states of the Pact and other international organisations will be defined. The Pact makes clear that Montenegro will be a beneficiary. The FRY will be welcome to participate when it demonstrates respect for the principles and objectives of the Pact. So far the West has not agreed over the question to which degree the FRY will profit from the reconstruction measures. While some governments envisage to offer humanitarian aid to the population, other states prefer to isolate the FRY. The West's duty is to make clear to the people of the FRY that its action is not directed against them, but only against Milosevic and his government. Therefore, democratically governed cities or local communities should receive aid such as the 40 Mio. Euro envisaged by the EU's "Energy for Democracy Programme". Their representatives should be allowed to travel abroad in order to participate in international discussions as well as being supported in setting-up independent media in the country. The Serbian people, on the other hand, must understand that their country cannot become a full and respected member of the international community while it is led by a man indicted for war crimes. Only those countries which embrace acceptable standards of democracy and the respect for human rights can be considered for membership of organisations such as the OSCE. The wider European community would welcome a democratic FRY into its ranks. But there must be a change. Milosevic and five of his senior supporters were indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, in May 1999, for direct responsibility for the savage "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. This means that all UN Member States are obliged to deliver the indictees to the Tribunal if they appear on their territory. The actions taken by NATO in Kosovo have been a success. NATO remained credible, did not sit back and simply accept a continuation of the repression, killing, and "ethnic cleansing". Eventually, the military intervention, seen as the last possible option, forced Milosevic to give in. As in Bosnia, the Alliance acted in accordance with its new Strategic Concept. But there are other places in the world, where the gross violation of human rights takes place day after day. NATO now has to elaborate on the question on which grounds and according to which criteria it is willing to stand up for its values in the future.

X. CONCLUSIONS Strategic Concept: Collective defence of the NATO area remains the central function of the Alliance. However, today's threats to member countries' security emanate much less from direct attack than from political instabilities and regional conflicts on the Alliance's periphery. To cope with the changing security environment, the Alliance has initiated new programmes focusing on partnership, co-operation, crisis management, and conflict prevention. At the end of the 20th century massive human rights violations, expulsion and genocide can no longer be tolerated. As the experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have shown NATO is the only international organisation capable of carrying out peace enforcement operations. And Kosovo has also exemplified that a UN mandate is crucial for gaining the necessary support by the international community to conclude its mission successfully. Enlargement of NATO: The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO constitutes a major step towards the creation of a "united and free Europe". The Washington Summit meeting reaffirmed that the door to the Alliance continues to be open. At present, nine countries have applied for NATO membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. To strengthen the "open door" policy, the Alliance approved the Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP is available to all declared aspirants. It will be necessary to introduce a specific timetable to offer an incentive for the sometimes pain-staking reforms by the applicants. Co-operation with Russia and Ukraine: Security in Europe is not possible without Russia and Ukraine. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission are institutions that were created for the express purpose of engaging in co-operation. The tensions between Russia and NATO during the military intervention in Kosovo have demonstrated that it is important to strengthen this instrument. Despite some difficulties and misunderstandings especially during the initial phase, Russian forces are now co-operating in the peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and form an important part in KFOR. However, even though the political signals from Russia have been encouraging after the end of the Kosovo War, the intensity of co-operation has not reached its pre-war level yet. Mediterranean Dialogue: The dialogue that has been conducted since 1997 with the Mediterranean Co-operation Group is important, particularly because strong potential threats originate from this region on the periphery of the Alliance area. To promote stability and to ease tensions in this region, the Alliance should include initiatives on arms control and difficult partners in the Dialogue. Close co-operation with the European Union is desirable, as it is pivotal for supporting economic development in the Mediterranean region. Disarmament: The successful adaptation of the CFE Treaty is a welcome achievement. It should be an incentive for the Alliance to undertake new and comprehensive initiatives on arms control and disarmament concerning conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction. Such activities reflect the co-operative approach inherent in Alliance security policy. In addition, this is the most effective way to counteract the trend towards proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Strengthening verification regimes for existing agreements stands prominent alongside efforts to achieve further stability-oriented reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons. START III talks are conducted under extreme time pressure. Substantial progress needs to be made by the time of the NPT review conference in April 2000 in order to maintain support for the regime by non-nuclear powers. Lessons from Kosovo: NATO needs to review it's Kosovo mission in detail in order to draw lessons for possible future operations. Firstly, pivotal seems to be a discussion on the question on which grounds and according to which criteria NATO is willing to contemplate its next missions. For which political goals will military means be taken into consideration, and to what extent? Secondly, although each conflict requires a certain degree of flexibility and pragmatism, the relationship between military and political decision-making authorities needs to be specified and put on a firm basis. Finally, the discrepancy between the EU's aspirations to play a major role in international security affairs and its lacking military and political capabilities to realise this objective was evident.(7) European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI): The Amsterdam Treaty and the Washington decisions are milestones on the road to a European security and defence identity. The European Alliance partners want to assume greater responsibility for security in Europe, making use of NATO resources and creating additional capabilities. The EU needs to be capable of acting autonomously in crisis management situations in Europe. It will be of extreme importance to develop the joint political will to do this. Progress achieved has been encouraging, but building a European Security and Defence Identity will be a process that will require time. While ESDI will probably lead to a more efficient use of financial resources and generate savings, a stronger European role in the Alliance may also require an increase in defence spending. This is particularly important if the European NATO members want to cooperate with the United States on an equal footing. NOTES AND REFERENCES John E. Rielley points out the low level of inclination towards intervention on the part of the US population, particularly with regard to the use of ground troops, for which the highest level of support is 46% (for Saudi Arabia) -- not counting operations against terrorists (57-58% for opinion leaders). Rielley, John E. (ed.) 1999, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, p. 26. Radio interview on Deutschlandfunk, 22 April 1999. Lt. General Mario da Silva, Chief of Staff of NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff, Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, NATO Review, Winter 1998, pp. 16-19. According to polls 42% of the US population still considers Europe a more important partner than Asia (28%), but over the past four years there has been a decline in the first figure and an increase in the second of 7% in each case. Rielley, John E. (ed.) 1999, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, p. 29. Jack Mendelsohn, NATO's nuclear weapon: The rational for "no first use", in: Arms Control Today, July/August 1999, p. 7. Jane`s Defence Weekly, 18 August 1999, p. 40. For further discussion of the Kosovo war see the General Report of Jan Hoekema on "NATO Policy and NATO Strategy in Light of the Kosovo Conflict" [AS 252 DSC (99) 7] presented to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Defence and Security Committee during the Amsterdam Session, November 1999.