Political Committee Sub-Committee on Transatlantic and European Relations A BETTER PEACE : THE CO-OPERATIVE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY FUSION OF OSCE AND NATO IN THE NEW EUROPE Draft Interim Report MR. BRUCE GEORGE (UNITED KINGDOM) Rapporteur* 4 October 1999 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. OSCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE KOSOVO : FROM DRENICA TO RAMBOUILLET DOCUMENT-CHARTER ON EUROPEAN SECURITY III. PFP/EAPC IV. CONCLUSION NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION At their July 1997 Madrid Summit the NATO Allies reaffirmed their policy declared on 17-18 December 1990 that "Security and co-operation in the Europe of tomorrow can best be achieved by a framework of interlocking institutions in which the interests of all European states can be accommodated": "A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and co-operation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process". Likewise, at the December 1998 OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Oslo, the Declaration affirmed that the spirit of solidarity and partnership to promote respect for OSCE principles and commitments is not only inter-governmental but extends to "co-operation among the different organisations and institutions to which those States belong" in a "pragmatic flexible and non-hierarchical" manner. Of course, a security architecture depends on political attention and the political will to support it. More specifically, we know that in a major security challenge for the Euro-Atlantic area nothing happens without the active and sustained engagement of one country and one country alone - the United States. And, despite talk of a seamless OSCE security space, it is Russia that carries the burden of (self-interested) peacekeeping in the CIS. Moreover, as missions as diverse as operations Alba and Desert Fox have shown, ad hockery also has its place. Nevertheless, today we can say with confidence that the 1990s witnessed the development of a wide range of instruments suitable for co-operation in crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO, while still retaining its "core function" of collective defence as an insurance policy, has increasingly taken on peace support missions outside the Treaty area that - more than UN Security Council or Contact Group declarations - have played the decisive role in bringing warring parties to the negotiating table. The Alliance has also progressively developed links with the WEU to enable a viable European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) to sprout roots, with the WEU in turn seen as a bridge between NATO and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam established the legal basis for all EU member States - aligned and non-aligned alike - to partake of "Petersberg Tasks", which could well be supported, despite governments' persistent attachment to ambiguity on this score, by both NATO and WEU. The Alliance has likewise enhanced its co-operative security dimension through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) political consultative forum and the military-oriented strengthened Partnership for Peace (PfP), while at the same time welcoming and encouraging Partner participation in the "non-Article 5" operations IFOR, SFOR, Eagle Eye, and now KFOR. The WEU meets routinely with its ten associate Partners who have a specific vocation of joining the EU, as well as in a "28" format with associate Members, Partners, and Observers. At the Cologne European Council in June it was decided that the aim was for the necessary decisions for the "inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities" to be taken by the end of 2000, and that by then the "WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose".(1) Both NATO and WEU since 1992 stand ready to consider peacekeeping missions under UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate or OSCE authority, although NATO has adopted the position that operations conducted "in the spirit" of the UN Charter would be possible (to avoid a Russian or Chinese veto). Significantly, NATO participation in OSCE missions was not opposed by Russia at 1992's Helsinki Summit, although naturally the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remains the primary recourse of the OSCE in those areas Russia considers its 'near-abroad'. As such, the OSCE is proving an organisation through which NATO member-states can interact with Russia in a less confrontational way than through NATO, where at least from the Russians' point of view any gain by the Alliance is a blow to Russia. All of this, taken together with the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the NATO-Ukraine "Distinctive Partnership", and the proliferation of multinational military formations, demonstrates that co-operative security is becoming increasingly entrenched between institutions, between institutions and governments, and between governments at both the Euro-Atlantic and the sub-regional level. At the April 1999 NATO Summit, "crisis management", including conflict prevention as well as crisis response, and "partnership" were approved as new tasks under the adapted Strategic Concept, even though they were not raised to the level of "fundamental security tasks", as some prominent leaders called for ahead of the Washington Summit. The focus here is on the co-operative and collective security dimensions of two indispensable "pillars" or "instruments of choice" in the emerging European security architecture, the OSCE and NATO/EAPC/PfP. While the development of the former will be refined at the November OSCE Istanbul meeting, NATO/EAPC/Pfp received a make-over at the NATO Washington Summit in April. Both developments will help inform the security horizons for the new millennium. As always, NATO parliamentarians must examine these developments with the closest scrutiny and with maximum transparency from the Alliance in search of a better peace.

II.OSCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE A. KOSOVO: FROM DRENICA TO RAMBOUILLET "The future of the whole OSCE hangs in the balance. If this organisation fails in Kosovo, its role in Europe will be reduced to a minimum".(2) Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeyev 20 January 1999 "If we fail this organisation [OSCE] in Kosovo, how can I go about talking about how to solve the problems in Nagorno-Karabakh? ... This is a challenge and, I have to admit, a problem for the organisation."(3) OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Volleb¾k, 14 January 1999 These comments sum up the general assessment of the future of the OSCE before the Kosovo crisis. Minister Avdeyev's comments were no doubt intended to convey not only Russia's repeated insistence on a peaceful (UNSC/OSCE) solution to the Kosovo crisis but to signal Milosevic that the influence Russia desperately seeks to exert in Europe, let alone in the CIS, can in the final analysis only be channelled institutionally through the OSCE (and the UNSC). Unlike the NATO-Russia PJC or the EAPC, it is only in the OSCE and the UNSC that Russia wields a veto. In the apparent Russian view, a failure by the OSCE to solve the crisis in Kosovo, either because of OSCE ineptitude, lack of resources, or decisions of other fora regarding military options, entails that Russia's purported aim of endowing OSCE with a primus inter pares role to "co-ordinate" other organisations on a legally and not only "politically" binding basis, would become even further out of reach. This boils down to another means apart from the UNSC and informal Contact Group to check NATO as well as US notions about NATO being able to act without an explicit UNSC mandate (a position supported by the NAA at the 1998 Edinburgh Annual Session). However, as the comment by the present OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) highlights, the OSCE itself also viewed the Kosovo crisis, and the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in particular, as an important test case for the organisation. Then Chairman-in-Office (CiO) Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek stated on 2 December 1998 in Oslo that 1999 "may prove crucial for the credibility of the OSCE in the public eye."(4) It is, of course, true that Kosovo did indeed confront the OSCE (operating on a 1999 budget of 104 million Euro excluding the KVM, the latter which was anticipated to amount to more than one-third beyond the entire OSCE budget) with a formidable challenge. It is also true that OSCE KVM monitors were harassed and threatened. But it would be short-sighted to elevate the KVM as a "make or break" test case for OSCE. Three reasons argue for this tempering view. First, the KVM was compelled to evacuate on 19 March 1999 because of the deteriorating situation between the parties, not because of shortcomings of the Mission. In addition it must be remembered that the KVM was only one mission among a plethora of OSCE missions. Who is to judge that its future tasks in Kosovo are more important than OSCE's role in, e.g., reducing the potential for inter-ethnic tensions in Estonia and Latvia, playing "honest broker" in war-torn Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Georgia, or attempting to instil OSCE precepts among the Central Asian participating States? OSCE operates on the concept of "comprehensive security", and its efforts in pursuit of that concept must be measured on an OSCE-wide geographic basis, not on any one regional situation, even taking into account the importance attached to Kosovo in the West. "Comprehensive Security" obviously does not arrive in one neat package. Second, the OSCE is unable to exercise Chapter VII enforcement powers, despite its agreed role as a "regional arrangement" of the UN under Chapter VIII. Ultimately it cannot facilitate peaceful settlement or even cease-fires unless the conflicting parties are willing or can be credibly compelled to co-operate in relative good faith. Furthermore, if a co-operative attitude is extant, organisations may prove superfluous. In general, the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy is difficult to ascertain. Whereas it is easy to see when crisis management fails, proving that a successful conflict prevention by the OSCE was, in fact, due to the intervention by the OSCE is very difficult, and needs to be taken into account. In a similar vein, no one has suggested deconstructing the UN because of the experiences with or disengagement from UNPROFOR, Somalia, Rwanda, the Western Sahara, Congo, Cyprus, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Abkhazia, or Tajikistan. Moreover, while then CiO Foreign Minister Geremek acknowledged "a disenchantment with its [OSCE's] weaknesses, frequent ineffectiveness and excessive verbiage", these alleged drawbacks have not prevented the participating States from "regarding the OSCE as a useful organisation capable of organising an unprecedented mission in Kosovo" or inter alia arranging elections in Bosnia, taking over UN police monitoring functions in Eastern Slavonia and co-ordinating civilian assistance in Albania.(5) In essence, the OSCE participating States have knowingly assumed the risk of "credibility tests" on behalf of the Organisation. Furthermore, the eight-month period between the flare-up of violence by the UCK, Yugoslav army (VJ), and Serbian special police (MUP) and the Holbrooke-Milosevic accord, suggests an enhancement of attention to "early action" relative to the 1992-95 arduous road to Dayton. And the evacuation itself could be seen as a demonstration of how OSCE, in conjunction with NATO, could play a signalling role beyond "co-operative security". Third and lastly, the notion of interlocking or mutually-reinforcing institutions is inherently a double-edged sword. The UK Prime Minister rightly said the "international community cannot walk away from Kosovo", but the various organisations offer both interlocking assets and liabilities. The very fact that "comprehensive security" for Kosovo spans over diverse issues such as possible peacekeeping, peace enforcement, an impartial and effective judicial system, and a wider geopolitical approach to the Balkans as a whole means that the efforts of any one organisation can succeed or fail depending on the performance of any other organisation. The OSCE's absence from Kosovo during the NATO Allied Force operation was short-lived, and the Organisation has returned to Kosovo stronger and better equipped. Building on its experience in Bosnia, the OSCE is bringing its valuable expertise on police training, media affairs, democratisation and, eventually, election-monitoring to the UN Mission in Kosovo. Today, it continues to develop and refine this expertise in the niche it has carved out for itself in the post-Cold War world. The experience of the KVM, compared with that of UNMIK, show that in many cases the process of rebuilding or creating democratic institutions is a difficult one to carry out without 'peace support' backup. In Kosovo, the OSCE is showing that it can successfully work with KFOR as well as the UN and provide a lasting and valuable service. If in the future similar operations were to take place, it would be useful for the two organisations to have an understanding of each other which would permit them to collaborate more efficiently. However, NATO and the OSCE have different roles and, more importantly, different member states: that they have the capability to work together efficiently on some issues is one (desirable) thing, while automatic collaboration is quite another. Combining the non-enforcement co-operative security culture of the OSCE with NATO's willingness to conduct robust "peace support" is no more than the hardly novel strategy of backing diplomacy with force and need not lead to abstract debate about institutional interaction. But could more be done to embed working relations between these two security growth industries, such as the NATO Kosovo Verification Centre information "fusion centre" which linked the Alliance to the OSCE? Would this risk, as it has for several years, giving grounds for the amorphous CIS to claim a like, recognised role vis-à-vis OSCE? In fact, such linkages were already envisaged in the 1992 OSCE Helsinki Summit with both NATO and the CIS, as well as the WEU. Should NATO be worried about OSCE-CIS enhanced co-operation? It may not be within the scope of this report to answer such a question, but one may venture to argue that a stable and useful CIS mechanism may be a better tool of regional stability in such areas as the Caucasus or Central Asia than NATO. The development of the CIS as an instrument of stability (and not Russian hegemony) in the region is of course dependent on Russian goodwill, but not necessarily a threat to NATO. Indeed, one could imagine that better OSCE-CIS relations would enable NATO member-states (who are often also OSCE member-states) to engage security issues in this area in a novel way. However, this does not imply that the OSCE as an organisation does not have its shortcomings. More detailed questions should be asked concerning its role in the run-up to the crisis last winter. For example, should the deployment of the KVM, despite its prompt assistance in returning thousands of displaced persons, have been made dependent on a firm interim agreement between the parties to avoid both hostage scenarios and the crisis instability possibly inherent in their subsequent extraction? Ambassador William Walker, KVM head, has noted that "What we are attempting is unprecedented in scope and effect. We are designing as we proceed".(6) Both OSCE and NATO have taken upon them enormous tasks, many of which are outside the 'traditional' sphere of security operations. A much more positive view of the OSCE's achievements with the KVM have emerged recently. In the words of the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE's Review Conference in Vienna this September, "the Kosovo Verification Mission was, in several key respects, a ground-breaking mission that showed the OSCE at its finest."(7) Today, collaborating with UNMIK as well as NATO, the OSCE continues to prove that it can provide a valuable and unique service to the international community. B. DOCUMENT-CHARTER ON EUROPEAN SECURITY While events on the ground are propelling OSCE into fresh and even more ambitious directions, the OSCE continues to proceed with work, launched in 1995, on a "Document" or "Charter" on European Security to be the basis of a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st century. As such it is not unlike the "vision statement" and adapted Strategic Concept the Alliance adopted at the April 1999 NATO Washington Summit. With drafting finally initiated in the beginning of this year, the Document/Charter is expected to be adopted at the November 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. Then CiO Foreign Minister Geremek stated on 12 November 1998 that "we must avoid wishful thinking divorced from reality. The notion of establishing collective security, in its classic form [automatic response to aggression by one member against another] on the basis of the OSCE is simply not realistic".(8) The process has been influenced by the long-standing divergence of views, most notably between Russia and the United States. The latter never saw much point to another paper exercise and has vied with the EU caucus over where "security" issues should be co-ordinated, already discussed in the 1998 Interim Report.(9) Russia, on the other hand, has seen this as another opportunity to further their goal: to strengthen the OSCE vis-à-vis other security organisations. For instance, in his address on 2 December 1998 to the OSCE Ministerial, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov proposed anew that to become a full-fledged regional organisation under Chapter VIII (meaning having the ability to undertake enforcement if requested by the UNSC), it should have a legal basis and be able to conduct peacekeeping. This is opposed by the United States, which prefers to limit the OSCE to police monitoring functions, already carried out by the UN and the WEU. Ivanov rejected enforcement action "by certain countries and their alliances" without UNSC authorisation, which he said would prove a "fatal mistake", and called for providing "answers" to the degree of acceptable international involvement in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, and to the correlation between territorial integrity and self-determination.(10) In contrast, the US intervention at the Oslo OSCE Ministerial pointed to the experience whereby "some countries, including my own, have expressed concern in the past that the security model exercise was too theoretical and focused too much on issues to either elevate or constrain the OSCE's scope of activities", stressing instead the reality of OSCE operations such as the KVM.(11) On 1 December 1998 the CiO issued a progress report on the work on the Document-Charter. It noted that while "significant differences of opinion" still existed, considerable progress was achieved on a number of issues. Keeping in mind that the main aims of the preparatory work were to delineate areas of emerging common understanding and to identify the most difficult problems, the process seems so far to have fulfilled its purpose. It was agreed that the continuing process should focus on practical efforts. Highlighting the new role of the OSCE as "the organiser of an integrative and flexible framework for co-operation among different organisations and institutions" the Report emphasised the need for providing the Organisation with new tools to perform this role effectively. This would remain a priority in the continuing work on the Document-Charter. The main points of the Report were as follows: An all-inclusive definition of "new risks and challenges to security is probably neither possible nor desirable". It was also emphasised that other organisations were already dealing with many of the issues relating to new risks and challenges, that this could give rise to unnecessary duplication, so that the question of the added-value of the OSCE needs "further examination"(!(. Proposals had been put forward, without having gained consensus, for nuclear-free zones in the OSCE region and for security guarantees for participating States not members of a military alliance. A common understanding was reached that the OSCE should develop police assistance capabilities, and that this could contribute to the "uniqueness" of the Organisation. There were also suggestions that the OSCE take on "more robust operations" in policing (e.g., OSCE police monitors in Eastern Slavonia are unarmed unlike their UN predecessors). Two views exist regarding OSCE action in the case of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations of OSCE principles. One is that the OSCE should be able to use punitive measures, such as suspension of political and economic co-operation and denial of a voice in OSCE decision-making, the other view is that the Organisation should use exclusively co-operative measures. There is no agreement on a long-standing proposal for the OSCE to be able to refer a matter to the UNSC in the absence of the consent of the parties to the dispute. This seems rather irrelevant in real terms since any UN member State can do so, but has been seen as a means to link OSCE closer to the UN (the measure is opposed only by Armenia). "Considerable differences" persist on questions relating to persons belonging to national minorities. Two views exist on the issue of OSCE peacekeeping (decided in principle at the 1992 Helsinki Summit). One is that the OSCE should play only a civilian role, another is that the OSCE should be able to undertake its own peacekeeping or UN-mandated operations. There is no agreement to earmarking military units for OSCE peacekeeping and to set up an OSCE military command (a Russian proposal). It may well be that the highlight of the Istanbul Summit will not be "problem-solving" OSCE adaptations but rather the signing on the margins of the event of an adapted CFE Treaty, including restraining measures in Central and Eastern Europe, and a revised Vienna CSBM Document that enhances transparency about military infrastructure - all obviously related to the enlargement of NATO. Both will prove new elements of the emerging European "security architecture", but will not by themselves fully address outstanding questions before all organisations of how they are making a real difference vis-à-vis human suffering in the "new Europe". Consequently, what value added a Document-Charter will bring remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the exercise has provided another channel for the diverse participating States to make their concerns known and exchange views, the value of which should not be underestimated. However, a Document-Charter that is nothing more than the smallest common denominator could contribute to the sense of failure that has surrounded the OSCE since the evacuation of KVM in March, and might reduce the resources invested in an otherwise useful organisation. But again it must be remembered that the purpose of this exercise was not to "solve" problems in Euro-Atlantic security, but rather to highlight where consensus can be found and where differences of opinion persist. Evaluations on whether the Document-Charter is a "success" or a "failure", however useful such an evaluation might be, needs to take into account that its purpose is to be found as much in the process, as in the agreed upon text in Istanbul.

III. PFP/EAPC A key component of the emerging security "architecture" in Europe has been the development of NATO outreach to its former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The main elements, beyond enlargement of the Alliance, are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which acts as the overarching forum for political dialogue and consultation, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which constitutes the more practical sides of defence-related co-operation between NATO and Partner countries. Although this work is valuable as it stands, a number of issues persist that merit the closest attention because of their possible far-reaching consequences for NATO's own future and modus operandi. Decision-making is one such issue. The practice has been that policy issues are "consulted" with Partners but only after the Allies reach broad agreement among themselves. Partners could only contribute to decisions, apart from on their Individual Partnership Programmes with NATO, on matters at committee level such as setting the agenda. This led to a view, also shared by the "neutral" participants, that a sense of strategic community required more than Partners simply accepting NATO decisions as if they were merely guests or observers and that Partners should be drawn closer to the heart of the Alliance (with the exception of Article 5). Partners also sought some input or chance to be heard regarding "internal" NATO questions but of pan-European consequences, namely the adoption of the New Strategic Concept. As a result, the Alliance initiated work to enhance Partnership for Peace and intensify the political dialogue that since late 1991 had been conducted in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). This led to the establishment of the EAPC and new initiatives for an enhanced PfP, to be completed by the time of the Washington Summit. Since then, the EAPC has mainly functioned as a useful forum for political consultations on a wide range of issues, including conflict prevention, confidence-building measures, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defence related environmental issues, and a wide range of political and security-related issues, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, SFOR and regional security co-operation in areas such as South-East Europe and the Caucasus. As a symbolic expression of the increased significance of EAPC/PfP to the Partners, almost all have upgraded their "liaison" offices at NATO headquarters to diplomatic missions. More tangible evidence of the growing role of co-operation under the aegis of the EAPC can be found in initiatives that have been launched in new areas, such as the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) in June 1998 to help co-ordinate disaster relief efforts. In addition, the EAPC has provided the framework for co-operation on humanitarian demining and an ad hoc group working on control of transfer of small arms has also been created. NATO has always felt strongly that the need to strengthen Partner involvement had to be balanced with the need to preserve the right of the Alliance to take decisions at 19 as necessary. But if Partner involvement is going to be a permanent or very frequent feature of the most likely NATO operations in future, Partners will invariably wish to be even more closely involved from the outset. A principal difference between the OSCE and EAPC is that the former requires consensus before action (the advocacy since 1994 by the OSCE PA of adopting "approximate consensus" in OSCE decision-making has not yet borne fruit), while PfP/EAPC has self-selection as a guiding principle. This gives the latter more flexibility with NATO-led PfP operations being formed by "coalitions of the willing", and prevents inaction due to a few recalcitrant states. However, the latter modus operandum, combined with a reluctance to view a UNSC mandate as an absolute requirement for action, is one of the major reasons for Russian opposition towards a new European security institution centred around NATO. One might ask whether it is possible in the long run to have a so-called "strategic community", a concept which to some degree prompted the enhanced PfP, that does not entail an implicit security guarantee. Secretary General Solana's characterisation of PfP exercises in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia regarding Kosovo suggests that PfP can indeed imply or even denote such a guarantee. Why were these PfP exercises when the fly-by over those countries in June was a NATO exercise? What say the European "neutrals"? And, returning to Russia, the tremendous sensitivity surrounding such an interpretation of PfP activity must be taken very seriously: there has always been an element within the Russian power ministries (silaviki) and the Duma arguing that the United States and NATO are using peacekeeping as a pretext to interfere in the CIS, and even to forward deploy forces to eventually grab Russian natural resources. Particularly given another phase of uncertainty in Russia of unknown duration and destiny, and, again, out of the sheer self-interest in securing an equitable but secure flow of energy from the Caspian Sea region, we should be careful with the politics of PfP. Another issue is whether NATO and its Partners within the overall EAPC framework will come to be something closely linked to, but possibly distinct from, NATO in the form of a new European security institution. However, a similar institution already exists, namely the OSCE. The EAPC and the OSCE have more or less the same membership, the former with 44 member states, while the latter has, at present, 54(12). The new proposal on a consultative forum including countries in south-east Europe in the framework of the EAPC further reduces the difference between the two institutions in terms of membership. In addition to having more or less the same members, the OSCE and the EAPC have increasingly overlapping agendas, as both expand their scope of activities. This raises the issue of duplication among supposedly complementary institutions and organisations. NATO's co-operation budgets are hardly unlimited, and the Alliance is also engaged in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Mediterranean Co-operation Group. In addition, NATO members take part in many other organisations and institutions that are concerned with security issues, such as the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe and regional organisations. Such budgetary restraints are even more pronounced for Partners in economic transition. These concerns raise the question of priorities and focus of the different institutions, based on their comparative advantage. On the one hand, it has been asserted that the EAPC is better placed for consultation and co-operation on military aspects of security issues, and that it should take a leading role in future peacekeeping operations and develop into "an effective instrument of crisis management". This is supported by its close links to NATO, the only organisation with the operational capacity to perform these tasks, as seen in Kosovo. The role of the OSCE in crisis management in the former Yugoslavia could indicate a need for new institutional designs. However, the proximity to NATO is, politically, a double-edged sword for PfP/EAPC, especially considering Russia's opposition to anything that relates to the Alliance. But similarly, political problems apply also to the OSCE, with NATO countries, in particular the United States, being unwilling to let the Organisation take on peacekeeping missions, although decided in principle as early as in 1992. The reluctance to let the OSCE play a decisive role in crisis management was evident during the Kosovo crisis. The pan-European character of the OSCE is usually touted as one of its strengths vis-à-vis other security organisations. This does not really apply in relation to the EAPC, even though one might ask whether the latter would provide an appropriate forum for issues relating to former Yugoslav republics, of which only Slovenia participates in EAPC/PfP. But the OSCE does have other virtues compared to the EAPC. One is that it can address "internal" questions directly, through Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act, a role that has often been considered its main contribution to the ending of the Cold War. Of more direct concern to the NATO PA is that parliamentarians have a more prominent role within the OSCE through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, than they do in PfP/EAPC.42. It is necessary to differentiate between the OSCE and the EAPC as consultative forums, and as "operational" organisations performing specific tasks. Distributing competencies between the two institutions according to their comparative advantages might unnecessarily constrain them as forums for political dialogue. It is on the operational side that the issue applies, where one should ask, given political and financial constraints, which organisation should perform what task. The growth of the OSCE as an organisation has created a veritable "alphabet soup" of institutions and offices and has begun to suffer the problems of institutional infighting and lack of cohesion often seen in national bureaucracies. Similar problems could easily arise should the PfP/EAPC evolve into a new security organisation. The establishment of EADRCC, EADRU, and TEEP entities could be signs of this. The issue of co-operation between the OSCE and the EAPC must also be addressed. NATO's support for the KVM provided them, according to the communiqué from the Washington Summit, with the bridges "between our two organisations to work together". The OSCE has, since the 1997 Copenhagen Ministerial, been concerned with this issue, denoted the Common Concept for the Development of Mutually-Reinforcing Institutions. The possible operational institutional direction for the EAPC, although de facto at work in Bosnia and Kosovo albeit in a "NATO-led" context, obviously raises the further issue of geographical reach. When we consider the security risks that may plague plans for the Euro-Asian energy corridor it is not too early to contemplate these possibilities, including revisiting the 1997 US proposal for a NATO-Russia brigade as a concrete expression of the relationship. Nevertheless, the EAPC priority area on the subject of crisis management refers only to a "possible role" for EAPC. It may also be questioned whether EAPC membership is too value-free if compared with the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. True, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey experienced non-democratic phases while remaining NATO members for the sake of solidarity during the Cold War. In the "new Europe", however, obviously not every EAPC participant can be said to subscribe or want to subscribe, as stated in the PfP Framework Document (the Charter), "to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law".

IV. CONCLUSION "NATO and its partners, the OSCE, and the EU form the core of a broader system for protecting vital interests and promoting shared values.... NATO's ability to use or credibly threaten to use force can be essential in countering threats to stability. But the efforts of other institutions and organisations are required to prevent such dangers from recurring."(13) US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 24 February 1999 This report has outlined recent developments of the OSCE and PfP/EAPC and shown two institutions with expanding agendas and a growing number of functional entities, an evolution that deserves attention by the NATO PA. There seems to be a pattern whereby new challenges and former "failures" are met by delegating new tasks to international organisations and institutions, which then establish new offices and other entities to handle these new activities. The broad question of whether this is in fact desirable needs to be addressed. Concerning the "failure" of the OSCE in Kosovo, the question should be raised whether this was a failure due to shortcomings of the organisation itself, or if it was a result of excessive expectations of what it could do in a situation such as in Kosovo. Both possible answers lead to another question concerning the growing number of tasks performed by the OSCE and EAPC/PfP: Whether this growth has been met by the financial resources and the political support necessary to perform adequately both the old and the new tasks. Indeed, one may argue that since June the OSCE has shown what it is capable of doing in the proper circumstances. The role it plays in Kosovo, alongside KFOR's peace-keeping role and the UN's administrative role, is an essential complement to the activities of the latter. OSCE strengths have so far most clearly been demonstrated in 'democracy-building', media affairs, police training, juridical and legal issues, and human rights monitoring. The same cannot be said of NATO, whose function remains more strictly military. Therefore one may see the OSCE as a complementary rather than competing organisation. The Kosovo crisis, the last in a long line of challenges for NATO and the OSCE among others, is defining the agendas of regional and international organisations more than it is testing their credibility. Nevertheless, the institutional growth of the OSCE and PfP/EAPC also raise the possibility of duplication, which, given the limited resources available in most countries for international security co-operation, should be avoided. Are supposedly interlocking and mutually-reinforcing institutions in fact becoming overlapping institutions? In terms of the issues discussed in the fora, this is certainly so, but this report has argued that that is not necessarily a problem. Furthermore, the institutional growth has in general been focused around their "core competencies", where, for example, the strengthening of the EAPC/PfP has centred around the enhanced and more operational PfP. And while there are several issues outstanding concerning the OSCE, such as its role in peacekeeping operations and in cases of violations of OSCE principles, at least a consensus seems to be forming that OSCE police assistance capabilities should be a priority. However, there seems to be a need for an effort to concentrate the scope of activities of the different organisations to avoid the duplication problem. Each organisation has its own strengths (as well as weaknesses), which should be the basis for a more focused approach. Giving an organisation responsibility for a task that it is not suited for runs the risk, in addition to not achieving the goal, of discrediting an organisation that performs necessary tasks in other fields. This report has argued that the "failure" of the KVM must be seen in this light. On the other hand, would a more focused approach necessarily entail "theoretical models" that artificially constrain or elevate the scope of activities of the different organisations? The advantages of the improvisational nature of both NATO and OSCE field activities have been noted in this report. Consequently, it has been argued that one should not put too much stock in the final Document-Charter on European Security, but that its value lies more in the process leading up to the final document. Its significance should be seen more as a process of clarification concerning security issues in the future, rather than as the blueprint for the emerging security architecture. Another partial solution to the problem of duplication can be found in improving co-ordination between the OSCE and NATO/EAPC/PfP. This has become a priority area in the work of the OSCE leading up to the Document-Charter on European Security, and should be supported. Co-operation has also been enhanced by NATO's support of the KVM. However, it does not solve the problem encountered in Bosnia on the co-ordination of efforts there. It seems likely that non-Article 5 missions will constitute an increasing share of NATO and Partners activity in the future, and that it also seems probable that these operations will be comprehensive, including economic reconstruction and development, the establishment of political institutions, etc., rather than purely military in scope. This means that the experiences from Bosnia and Kosovo merit scrutiny. The lessons learned from the interaction between the UN, NATO and the OSCE among others under the UNMIK umbrella in Kosovo will be of particular importance to defining the respective roles of these organisations. Some measure of duplication is of course inevitable, but a flexible common approach to civil emergency situations such as Kosovo is desirable for future cooperation between international organisations. In Kosovo, KFOR arrived first and had to undertake many of the tasks normally assigned to organisations such as the OSCE. But once the personnel of other organisations arrived, more experienced people were able to take over. In order to facilitate the transition of responsibilities from one organisation to the other, a common approach is desirable. 55. The growth of the agenda and the activity of the EAPC raises many questions: Should it be involved in conflict prevention and conflict management, or are these tasks better performed by the OSCE? Should the EAPC move into co-operation in areas such as small arms transfer and disaster relief, or are such issues better taken care of by other institutions and organisations? Furthermore, If PfP/EAPC does take on a decision-making role, the same issues before NATO will arise about peace support operations. Should they always have a UN or OSCE mandate (as stated in the 11 June 1993 Report of the "NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping")? Like NATO itself, EAPC will also have to consider how it can meaningfully address other "new" risks such as counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Would NATO be willing to jointly develop ballistic missile defences with Partners and share intelligence? In terms of EAPC membership, is the better course to seek to continue to engage those who seem to demonstrate slim interest in adhering to OSCE principles for whatever political or geostrategic reasons, or should their participation be subject to monitored conditions? Should membership be extended to former Yugoslav republics such as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? At the very least, should EAPC be able, like OSCE, to delve into the "internal affairs" of participating States? What would be the argument against, given that NATO with its actions in Kosovo seems to have set this as a new standard? Finally, and of more direct interest to the NATO PA, what would be the role of the parliamentarians if the EAPC were to develop into a new security institution? The OSCE remains a pivotal part of the European security architecture, and is likely to do so for some time to come. It has the ability to play a role in situations where NATO, for geopolitical considerations, is unable or unwilling to act. Like NATO, it is still learning about the problems and opportunities the post-Cold War world presents to the 'Greater European' region. Its strengths and weaknesses are different than NATO's, and this is something to capitalise upon. In addition to being able to reach areas of Europe on NATO's periphery, the experience it has in certain security issues - particularly the promotion of democratic institutions - are the very 'non-traditional' issues that NATO is increasingly concerning itself with. Special debt is owed to Captain Heinz Dieter Jopp, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OSCE. NOTES AND REFERENCES Cologne European Council 4 June 1999- Presidency Conclusions, Annex III, paragraph 5. Reuters, 21 January 1999. USIS Security Issues Digest, 20 January 1999. OSCE Document MC. DEL/3/98, 2 December 1998. OSCE Review (6:3/98). William Walker, "Improvisational Peace", Newsweek, 1 February 1999. Transcript of U.S. Reply on lessons learned from OSCE field activities, 1999 OSCE Review Conference in Vienna. United States Information Agency, 1 October 1999. OSCE Newsletter (November 1998). See also Column, Helsinki Monitor (9:4/1998). OSCE Document MC.DEL/15/1998, 2 December 1998. OSCE Document MC.DEL/41/1998, 2 December 1998. The 10 OSCE-members that are not in the EAPC are Ireland, Cyprus, six "mini-states" (Andorra, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino, two states from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia). Moreover, the FRY's membership in the OSCE has been suspended. USIA Washington File, 25 February 1999.