Science and Technology Committee SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE PROLIFERATIONOF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE THREAT OF THE NEW CENTURY? Draft Interim Report MR. MICHAEL MATES (UNITED KINGDOM) Rapporteur* 05 October 1999 * Until this document has been approved by the Science and Technology Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, A NEW PROBLEM ? DEFINITIONS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST TREATIES EVOLUTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONCERN III. RISKS OF PROLIFERATION AND BIOTERRORISM THE POOR MAN'S BOMB? THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION An overview of the proliferation problem The Iraqi case THE THREAT OF BIO-TERRORISM IV. RESPONSES TO THE THREAT STRENGTHENING THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION THE MILITARY AND NATO'S RESPONSE RESPONDING TO THE TERRORIST THREAT V. CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION In 1996, the Committee of Science and Technology addressed the issue of chemical and biological weapons in a specific report. At that time, the Rapporteur acknowledged the growing risks linked to the proliferation of such weapons. Biological and chemical agents have many similarities; they are potentially dangerous, relatively cheap, readily available and easy to conceal because of their dual-use nature. However, the ability of most living biological agents to reproduce and sometimes to spread from person to person renders them much more potentially dangerous if used as a weapon. The purpose of this Report is to analyse the evidence of the proliferation of biological weapons, to assess the threat related to them, both in the context of a war and with regard to terrorism, and to try to outline the different responses put forward by Western countries and the international community at large. Your Rapporteur will also try to give some policy recommendations for the future. The acquisition and development of biological agents for offensive military purposes has been forbidden since the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC does not provide for any verification measures. However, the number of countries suspected of conducting germ warfare programmes has more than tripled since 1972. Moreover, the revolution in technology has increased greatly the opportunities for military use of biological agents. Western proliferation concerns tend to focus mainly on countries either critical of or in direct confrontation with the West. Over the last decade, revelations on the development of biological warfare programmes in Iraq and in the Soviet Union have raised public consciousness about the threat. Another growing source of concern is the possible use of biological agents for terrorist purposes. In 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released a chemical agent in the Tokyo underground, killing twelve and injuring thousands of people. It was the first time that a terrorist group had resorted to weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population on a large scale. As it subsequently became known that the Aum Shinrikyo had also been working on biological agents, the attack made a huge impact on public opinion and policy makers, who realised the extreme vulnerability of our societies to bio-terrorism. To respond to this threat, the international community is currently engaged in the negotiations of a legally binding Protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention. Other measures include, on the military side, the development of better detection systems and training and, on the civilian side, a combination of preventive and civil defence measures.

II. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, A NEW PROBLEM ? A. DEFINITIONS A biological weapon could be defined as the provision of any infectious agent or toxin by any means of delivery (artillery shells, bombs, missiles, aerosolsÉ) in order to cause harm to humans, animals or plants. Warfare agents fall into two categories: living micro-organisms, and toxins. The living biological warfare agents include: bacteria, causing anthrax, the plague or tularaemia; viruses, responsible for diseases such as smallpox, yellow fever or Ebola; rickettsiae causing Q fever; and fungi, acting primarily on crops and responsible for potato blights for example. Toxins are the non-living products of plants or micro-organisms and include for example ricin and botulinum toxin. They can also be produced by chemical synthesis. Biotechnological techniques can be used to produce biological warfare agents in large quantities, and it is said that genetic engineering could improve their stability and resistance to vaccines and existing treatments. Some scientists even argue that, in the near future, genetically modified agents could attack specific ethnic groups only. Unlike chemical agents, living biological agents infect the host and multiply within it causing disease. Some can be passed from person to person. However, toxins are like chemical agents and cannot spread beyond the population directly attacked, and tend to be less lethal than bacteria or viruses. The precise effect of biological agents on a target population remains unclear because of the importance of external factors such as the weather conditions, the density of the population, the means of delivery chosen, and the survivability of the agent. Essentially, lethality depends on the agent itself and the purposes it is serving. The plague is said to be lethal in 90% of cases, anthrax in 80%, but some other agents serving incapacitating purposes can also be lethal to a small percentage of the target population - the sick, the elderly and the special susceptible. The US Office of Technology Assessment, which studied the possible effects of weapons of mass destruction, concluded that in principle, pound for pound, biological weapons could kill more people than a nuclear or chemical attack. According to US Defence Secretary William Cohen, "a quantity the size of a bag of sugar" of anthrax, distributed in ideal conditions, would be sufficient to kill half the population of Washington DC. Biological agents have an indiscriminate and often delayed effect, they are highly infectious, and some can even resist antibiotics and vaccines. However, any discussion on casualties remains quite theoretical since biological weapons were hardly used in the past, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back into century. B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST TREATIES Historians have traced back the use of biological weapons to the Roman Empire, where, reportedly, dead animals were used to spoil the water supply of enemies. Other examples include the Tartars who catapulted bodies infected with bubonic plague over besieged cities, or the Native Americans who received blankets infected with smallpox. France, Japan and the United Kingdom started research on biological warfare programmes prior to the Second World War. The Japanese programme was based on human experimentation in occupied China in the 1930's, and it is reported that biological warfare agents were released on several occasions against Chinese soldiers and villages. In 1941, the United States and Canada, who feared that Germany and Japan had an advantage in that area started to conduct their own research which led them to produce large quantities of bacterial, viral and toxin agents. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, some countries gave up their programmes on biological weapons which were dangerous to possess in peacetime and somewhat redundant to the nuclear capability, offering little importance in terms of in-kind-deterrence. The United Kingdom was one of the first to do so, followed in 1969 by the decision of the US government to renounce unilaterally "the use of biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare". The United States was to confine its research to "defensive measures, such as immunisation and safety measures". France dismantled its programme in 1972. The first action of the international community to limit the threat of biological warfare was the signature of the 1925 Geneva Convention. This Convention banned the use of poison gas in war, and the provision was extended to include bacteriological agents as well. However, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention signed on 10 April 1972, was the first comprehensive document dealing exclusively with this threat. The Convention entered into force in 1975 and to date has been ratified by 143 countries, among which Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and China, and signed by another 18. Significant cases of nations that have signed but not ratified are Egypt and Syria, while a significant non-signatory state is Israel. The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological agents or toxins that "have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" (Article 2), as well as any weapons or means of delivery for such agents or toxins. According to the treaty, member states were required to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery within nine months of the treaty's entry into force (Article 3). C. EVOLUTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONCERN Because it was negotiated in the context of the Cold War, the 1972 Convention did not provide for any co-operative verification provisions. At that time, it would have been politically unacceptable to allow intrusive inspections at national military bases and laboratories. In cases of proven or suspected non-compliance, member states were supposed to make complaints to the United Nations Security Council. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that many countries have violated the Convention and that biological warfare techniques have proliferated. Several US sources have estimated that more than 10 countries have developed offensive biological warfare programmes over the last two decades. Suspicions about Soviet non-compliance were reinforced in 1979 when 68 people died following an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk. At the time, Soviet officials blamed the consumption of contaminated meat, but many started having doubts about USSR compliance with the Convention. In 1992, President Yeltsin finally admitted that the outbreak of anthrax was due to an accident at a military facility and that the USSR had been conducting covert biological weapons programmes for decades. Unlike the United States, the USSR adopted a strategic approach based on the ground that biological weapons could play a central military role. The Soviets funded a massive programme with military and civilian branches. Biopreparat was nominally a civilian complex which reportedly employed as many as 40,000 people at 18 major facilities. According to some defectors such as Vladimir Pasechnik and Ken Alibek, Russian scientists had developed the most sophisticated and powerful offensive biological weapons programme in the world and it is suspected that they had created, among others, genetically modified strains of plague and anthrax. President Yeltsin officially renounced Russia's biological weapons programme in April 1992. Some months later, in September 1992, Russia agreed to take part in a trilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States to initiate data exchanges and site visits at military and private sector biological facilities to build confidence that the previous biological weapons programme had indeed ceased. In spite of this, the US intelligence community fears that the programme would be still running. Washington is worried about the present location of the biological agents stockpiled in the past, and demands in particular why so many facilities remain off-limits for the verification teams. Over the last 25 years, perceptions regarding biological weapons have changed significantly. Policy makers now consider biological weapons to be a realistic threat to security. Scientific technical advances in biotechnology and genetics could be used for biological warfare purposes. DNA techniques might be used to change the genetic structure of a micro-organism, thus allowing it to overcome human immunity, or to make a micro-organism resistant to antibiotics and even easier to produce or store. Biotechnology has thus given biological weapons a greater potential utility. Moreover, the numerous allegations of violations of the 1972 Convention have demonstrated the limits of an agreement which contains no provisions to monitor compliance. Iraq, Iran, Syria, India and China are reported to possess some sort of biological arsenal. It is feared that biological weapons, which are easier to make and more destructive than nuclear or chemical weapons, could become the weapon of choice for "rogue" governments or terrorist groups. To conclude, it could be argued that, although biological weapons have been developed in the past, they now represent virtually a new problem. In summary, biological weapons have been with us for a long time. In the context of the Cold War they were largely intended as a deterrent. Since the end of the Cold War, because of the factors listed above, they are more of a menace because of their attraction as relatively cheap and easy-to-produce offensive weapons, either in a local war or in the hands of terrorists.

III.RISKS OF PROLIFERATION AND BIOTERRORISM A. THE POOR MAN'S BOMB? In the post-Cold War era, the threat represented by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in bringing about changes in the strategic approaches of many countries. The danger of a massive nuclear war seems to be over but, as Richard K. Betts points out, "the probability that some smaller number of weapons of mass destruction will be used is growing." Nuclear weapons are no longer the only source of concern, and biological weapons are likely to become the most serious threat. Compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, they are even more lethal and easier to acquire, two major factors for countries seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. Biological weapons are often referred to as the poor man's bombs since they are quite cheap and do not require that much technical capability and expertise to produce. The advances of biotechnology have facilitated their production and the costs of a funding programme have been reduced significantly. It can be viewed by some less developed countries as a cheap way to develop some weapons of mass destruction and compensate for their weakness in the field of conventional or nuclear capabilities. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the comparative cost of civilian casualties is "$2,000 per square kilometre with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons and $1 with biological weapons". Furthermore, detecting a biological warfare programme is quite challenging since most of the equipment can have civilian uses as well. Because of the dual-use problem, detection is even more complicated: it is often difficult to draw a line between peaceful and military research. Hospitals, laboratories and even breweries could easily produce clandestinely some biological agents and conceal offensive biological programmes. In just 30-60 minutes, a laboratory could be cleared of any suspicious material and made to look like any medical or pharmaceutical laboratory. For these reasons, the perception of the biological threat has significantly changed: it is now viewed as a major concern to intelligence agencies and policy makers. To assess the seriousness of the threat, it is necessary to address the questions of both proliferation and bio-terrorism. B. THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION 1. An overview of the proliferation problem According to many sources, the number of countries conducting offensive biological research has tripled since the signature of the 1972 Convention. It is estimated that up to 10 countries now possess offensive biological programmes despite the existence of the Convention. Suspected proliferators are not only concentrated in areas of conflict such as the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel), but in Asian countries such as Taiwan and North Korea. Some of these countries are openly opposed to Western policies and culture and, due to the nature of the arms concerned, are reluctant to supply any information. Hard evidence is, therefore, difficult to come by. An obvious source of concern is the attempt by some countries to approach and recruit Russian scientists who have worked for the Russian germ warfare programme. Iran, which has powerful reasons to want such weapons, is said to be one of them. Some Iranians believed that Iraq used not only chemical but also biological weapons against them in the 1980s, and neighbouring countries such as Syria and Israel are suspected of possessing germ arsenals. According to some sources, Iraq was helping Libya to develop a covert germ programme under the guise of a medical facility. However, UN sanctions have crippled Colonel Qaddafi's efforts to develop his biological weapons programme. Strong doubts still persist about China, which is believed to have maintained a biological programme in the 1980s, even though Presidents Clinton and Jiang reaffirmed their strong support for the complete elimination of biological weapons in June 1998. 2. The Iraqi case An insight into the recent Iraqi crisis might prove useful to understand the proliferation concerns of the international community. After the Gulf War, UN Security Council Resolution 687 created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)) to oversee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. For years, Iraq denied having carried out a biological weapons programme even though UNSCOM had compelling evidence that Iraq had been engaged in biological weapons. In July 1995 Iraq at last admitted to having produced biological agents but continued to deny that it had weaponised them. Following the defection of General Hussein Kamal, who had overseen the Iraqi biological weapons programme, Iraq admitted having weaponised biological agents and operationally deployed these during the Gulf War. In particular, Iraq declared the production of 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin and 8,500 litres of anthrax. Baghdad also claimed to have destroyed its arsenal in 1991 but failed to provide UNSCOM with credible and sufficient evidence. Under Resolution 687, Iraq was required to provide UNSCOM with complete disclosures of military programmes and allow "unconditional and unrestricted access to all areas". However, the UN mission has been constantly confronted with Iraq's lack of co-operation, the delivery of false or incomplete information, the disappearance of equipment which the mission had to inspect and even the denial of access to certain sites. Under these conditions, as Mr. Richard Butler, Chairman of UNSCOM, pointed out in his report to the UN Secretary General in December 1998, "it has not been possible to verify Iraq's claims with respect to the nature and magnitude of its proscribed weapons programmes and their current disposition". The fear is that the country might retain some stock of biological agents, and restart production of anthrax within weeks. From the Iraqi experience, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the threat of biological weapons proliferation. The crisis has proved how difficult it is to stop a determined proliferator and how easy it is to retain information or to conceal illegal biological or chemical agents. Despite its efforts, the UN mission has been unable to determine if all agents or munitions have been destroyed. However, collected information suggests that the "programmes were either much more advanced or far wider in scope than previously thought". C. THE THREAT OF BIO-TERRORISM For the US Administration, bio-terrorism has become a serious concern and a real threat to national security. The Centre of Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute has just released a study listing 52 minor cases of terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological or radiological materials in the United States from 1960 to 1998. Some experts even believe that it is only a matter of time before it occurs on a large scale. This concern was expressed by President Clinton who publicly declared in January 1999 that it was highly likely that a terrorist group would launch or threaten a germ or chemical attack within the next few years. Biological weapons are attractive for terrorists for a variety of reasons. They are extremely toxic, highly lethal and destructive. Sheer terror associated with these weapons could easily lead to scenes of panic and social upheaval. The time lag between the attack and the appearance of disease reduces the chances of the offenders being apprehended. Furthermore, biological agents can be produced quite easily and cheaply. A 1996 US Defence report claimed that "terrorist groups do not have the financial and technical resources to acquire nuclear weapons but could gather material to make some biological and chemical agents". The access to technology could be facilitated by "rogue" states and the dispersion of Russian know-how. It could even be argued that the biotechnological revolution has made it easier to create a sophisticated offensive programme since more and more people are studying or possess the basic biological knowledge needed to carry out the research. In short, the range of "free-lance" terrorists that possess the potential technical capacity is growing. Another element, which might be relevant to assess the bio-terrorism threat, is the changing nature of terrorism. According to Brad Roberts from the US Institute for Defence Analyses, new forms of terrorism co-exist with more traditional groups. It seems that "modern" groups would be more willing to use violence as a matter of principle and randomly looking for mass casualties. Some experts have identified three groups likely to use weapons of mass destruction: religious cults and sects; racist and anti-governmental groups; fundamentalist and extremist organisations. What makes them so dangerous is their lack of rational constraints and their willingness to take physical risks while manipulating biological material. They also have no concern with being responsible for mass casualties and with the effects of public opinion. The taboo associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction was broken in 1995 by the Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo. It was the first large-scale use of a lethal chemical agent by a terrorist group on a civilian population. The group released sarin gas in the Tokyo underground killing 12 people and injuring more than 5,000. The impurity of the gas and the poor system of dispersion saved thousands of people, but one could just imagine the consequences if the attack had been better planned. It was later proved that the sect had been working on biological agents as well, and it even claimed to have poured a slurry of anthrax spores from the roof of a building in a residential area in 1993. In addition, an attempt to release a lethal toxin in the underground was also reported. On both occasions, the attacks went unnoticed and apparently failed to harm anyone for technical reasons. The 1995 terrorist attack served as a wake-up call for policy makers, city disaster planners, intelligence and defence agencies. It revealed the lack of preparation existing in urban areas should they be confronted with a biological terrorist attack and, in general, the lack of knowledge and preparedness of medical and first-aid staff. More generally, it highlighted the chemical and biological terrorism threat. In the process of objectively assessing the threat, it is possible to identify two schools of thought among analysts, which can be defined as the "alarmist" and the "complacent". The alarmist view considers that a biological attack is very likely to happen in the near future, and the complacent view insists that many elements inhibit states or terrorist groups from using such weapons. According to the latter position, there are technological barriers and drawbacks related to such weapons, such as the fragility of the biological agent, the high level of uncertainty due to external temperature or weather conditions, moral and psychological inhibitions, physical risks for the manipulator. The lack of success of the Japanese sect in carrying out biological attacks might suggest just that. The truth about this perceived threat probably lies somewhere in between these two extreme positions. The risks linked to proliferation and bio-terrorism are indeed real, but should not be overestimated. We should bear in mind also that, even if biological agents are easily available, delivering them still requires a high degree of technical competence. An expert on the question concluded that "few countries and even fewer terrorist organisations would be able to carry out an open air attack that would lead to mass casualties" and many other analysts agree. The perceptions of the threat of biological weapons are also different at the state level. In general, the United States, with the United Kingdom and Canada, tend to give more relevance to this threat than most European countries. Moreover, as your Rapporteur will explain in the next chapter, analysts disagree about measures that can be undertaken to respond to such a threat.

IV. RESPONSES TO THE THREAT A. STRENGTHENING THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in general is a major concern for the international community. During the Cold War, attention focused on nuclear weapons, and the response to this threat was primarily viewed in terms of deterrence. Due to the nature of biological weapons, traditional responses may not prove useful. Many organisations not under the control of national governments are involved and, in the case of a biological attack, it might be difficult to identify the perpetrators. In these conditions, the 1972 Convention still represents the main tool available to the international community to deal with the risks of proliferation. Since the inadequacies of the BWC Convention are partly responsible for the proliferation of biological weapons, an international consensus has now been reached on the necessity to reform and strengthen it. Certainly, the Gulf War's experience contributed to reach such a consensus. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin released a joint statement urging the successful conclusion of the negotiations to strengthen the Convention by the adoption of a legally binding protocol at the earliest possible date. States are currently engaged in talks on the adoption of this additional protocol, which would respond to some of the past inadequacies. Under the 1972 Convention, member states had to participate every five years in review conferences in order to review the operation of the Convention. Over the last twenty years, the absence of compliance and verification measures has received increasing attention. At the second review conference in September 1986, BWC members agreed on a number of modest confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as the exchange of data related to biological activities permitted under the treaty. The 1991 review conference, which also adopted some additional CBMs, appointed an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, the so-called VEREX, to study verification possibilities from a scientific standpoint. By doing so, member states reacted to growing concerns over the risks of proliferation and acknowledged the inadequacy of the 1972 Convention. VEREX concluded that the best way to monitor the BWC would be to combine off-site measures, including the declaration of vaccine production facilities and laboratories and the description of biological weapons defence programmes with on-site measures, including inspections of facilities. The group identified 21 potential verification measures that could make the BWC a more efficient instrument. At the Special Conference of State Parties held in 1994 to consider the report of VEREX, it was agreed to establish a new Ad Hoc Group whose task would be to draft verification measures which would be incorporated into a legally binding protocol to the BWC. The Ad Hoc Group began its work in 1995 when it held three rounds of meetings. It has since held two rounds in 1996, three in 1997 and four in 1998, with nine rounds planned in 1999. It successfully transitioned in July 1997 to the consideration of a draft Protocol, known as the "rolling text", which contains 23 articles together with Annexes and Appendices. It is currently clear that 18 of those 23 articles are essentially complete and good progress is being made on the outstanding key articles - one on Compliance Measures and the other on International Co-operation for peaceful purposes. As usual in multilateral negotiations, a number of key points will not be resolved until the end-game. Debating points include requirements for declarations, procedures for visits to facilities and laboratories, the extent of the verification regime and provisions for investigations in case of non-compliance. According to the current version of the draft, signatory countries would have to declare past offensive and defensive programmes, current defensive programmes, vaccine production facilities, work with listed agents, and non-vaccine production facilities. There is a widely accepted objective that the negotiations should be completed before the next BCW Review Conference in 2001. The early part of 1999 has seen significant progress in provisions for technical co-operation for peaceful purposes, a requirement that is very important to developing countries. The September-October meeting saw a significant step forward in the acceptance by the Non-Aligned Movement of the concept of a package of visits to ensure that declarations made under the protocol are accurate and complete, a requirement that is very important to the Western Group. Although the text still contains numerous square brackets indicating alternative language, it contains all the measures required for an effective and efficient regime and negotiations can be completed within the next 12 months, given political will. Countries disagree on the verification measures that should be adopted. Most European countries are in favour of allowing random or "non-challenge" inspections, namely to allow inspectors to make visits, at short notice, to any factory or laboratory in the signatory countries. Worried that it will expose its biotechnology industry, the United States rejects this idea categorically and only agrees to allow "challenge" inspections. Countries could call for an inspection only if there was evidence of a violation of the Convention. It is a controversial position if one considers the lessons learned from the Iraqi experience. UNSCOM has claimed that random visits were crucial to its work, and the United States has constantly put pressure on Iraq to allow the UN mission to carry out its work. In January 1998, President Clinton announced that he would support limited non-challenge inspections to clarify unclear declarations, but he categorically rejected random inspections. The negotiations on a legally binding Protocol have also benefited from the experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into force in April 1997. The CWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and includes a strong verification regime and provisions for routine inspections. However, the Convention provides provisions in order to protect sensitive commercial information and avoid any negative impact on industry, which have already been incorporated into the draft BWC Protocol. To implement the provisions of the Convention, the CWC established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Its work includes conducting verification operations and monitoring implementation measures taken by member states. At the end of 1998, after just over 18 months of activity, the organisation had already proceeded with more than 200 inspections. The negotiations on the protocol to the 1972 Biological Convention are also focusing on the creation of a small, cost-effective organisation that would deal with the implementation work. During the Ad Hoc Group negotiations in 1999, both Switzerland and the Netherlands have made proposals that the BWC Protocol organisation should be located in Geneva and The Hague respectively, arguing that benefits would accrue from its location in the proximity of existing international organisations. The adoption of a legally binding document that would strengthen the 1972 Convention is seen as the main tool to limit proliferation and deal with the threat of biological weapons. Since the threat falls upon military and civilian sectors alike, the Rapporteur proposes considering the responses adopted by both sectors. B. THE MILITARY AND NATO'S RESPONSE As already mentioned, the perceptions of the biological threat have changed significantly over the last few years. In preparation for the Gulf War, military planners feared Iraq might resort to chemical or biological weapons against the coalition forces. Since then, NATO countries, especially the United Kingdom and the United States, have dedicated their efforts to improving protection against biological attacks. NATO countries have long recognised the risks to international security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Following the Brussels Summit in January 1994, the organisation created two working groups: the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP). The DGP, whose task was to concentrate on the Alliance's defence response, required countries to treat biological weapons independently from other weapons of mass destruction. The group produced a Risk Assessment which served as a baseline for the second phase of the programme: the analysis of the implications for NATO operations and the capabilities required to protect NATO forces and territory. In a third stage, the DGP proposed a number of recommendations to improve the Alliance's response; the experts identified a number of priorities for NATO in the field of biological agents' detection, identification and warning, as well as in the field of air and missile defences and individual protection for the deployed forces. The DGP's conclusions are a central part of the adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment. In December 1998, the Alliance Defence Ministers reaffirmed the importance of improving the Alliance's defence posture against biological weapons and encouraged nations to expand NATO's efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat. At the Washington Summit in April 1999, the Alliance launched a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative to improve political and military efforts in this area. The Initiative is aimed to expand the Allies' understanding of proliferation issues, to focus appropriate attention on WMD risks, and to co-ordinate the activities of the various NATO bodies involved in proliferation matters. The Washington Communiqué states that the Initiative will ensure a more vigorous and structured debate at NATO; improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; support the development of a public information strategy by Allies; enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment; and enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks. The Initiative also provides for the creation of a specific WMD Centre to improve co-ordination of all WMD related activities at NATO. At national level as well, countries are now investigating a set of defence measures and response capabilities to maintain the operational effectiveness of an armed force after biological attacks. Active and passive measures are the two main components of a biological defence. An active defence consists in using missiles in order to prevent aircraft or missiles carrying biological weapons from reaching the target area, whereas a passive defence consists in being able to assess the threat, detect, warn, protect, decontaminate and carry out medical countermeasures. Since the evolution of the threat is perceived differently by Western countries, it is not surprising to note a great discrepancy between countries at the time of allocating resources and setting priorities. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada are taking more initiatives than any other country, have even signed a trilateral research agreement and are pursuing their collaborative efforts. They focus on detecting the presence of biological agents in the battlefield. The UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) has just released a vehicle-mounted Prototype Biological Detection System, which is to be part of a more advanced biological detection system. During the Gulf War, the United Kingdom was considered to be the leader in the field of deploying detection systems. Other countries, like France, are also currently trying to develop their own detection systems. The French Integrated System of Biological Agents Detection (Système intégré de détection des agents biologiques) should enter into service by the year 2005. Other defence measures include, among others, better training and preparation of armed forces, the development of reliable protective equipment, and a better medical response. In the medical field, most of the work has concentrated on developing vaccines. The United Kingdom for example is said to be conducting research on bubonic plague, anthrax, botulinum toxin and pneumonia. In December 1997, the United States announced that they would undertake an extensive anthrax vaccination programme for all US military personnel. According to the US Department of Defence, 14 other vaccines are in preparation and could be approved by the Food and Drug Administration in the near future. The vaccination programme is highly controversial and about two hundred soldiers concerned with the long term health effects of the vaccine have refused the shots leading to disciplinary military sanctions. In fact, many experts point out that the vaccine would only protect against one particular strain of the biological agent, and could therefore be totally ineffective on all the others. Other countries, like France, have decided to concentrate their efforts on prevention, research, and preparation of antidotes. Even if single NATO members and the organisation itself have recognised the threat and tried to respond by developing active and defence measures, countries remain quite vulnerable to the risks linked to the proliferation of biological weapons. Vulnerability is even more acute in the case of a terrorist attack targeting the civilian population. C. RESPONDING TO THE TERRORIST THREAT In March 1999, a US expert on biological warfare gave another clear indication of the degree of vulnerability faced by public institutions and cities at large. He managed to smuggle powdered anthrax into the Pentagon and the State Department without being detected, which must have been most embarrassing for the US authorities as a major lapse in security. In general, experts are quite pessimistic about finding really efficient measures that would reduce the risks to the minimum. The lack of preparation of countries to respond to this particular risk is now being addressed seriously, especially in the United States where it is considered as a matter of high priority. The best solution would be to combine a number of measures. When dealing with counter-terrorism strategy, the first priority should be to work on pre-emption, that is to say the ability to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur. Intelligence agencies would need to monitor closely the activities of potentially dangerous groups; greater exchange of information and co-operation policies between countries would be needed. Co-operation should include countries which do not belong to the Western sphere but whose help would be vital to create an efficient information network. Attention should also focus on keeping track of exports of biological agents and toxins. Even if most of the products are dual-use, a clear control over imports, exports or any exchange of material could make their acquisition by terrorist groups more difficult. The Australia Group set up by Australia in 1984 is currently the main tool designed to harmonise controls of both material and dual purpose equipment that might be misused for warfare purposes Thirty countries have joined this informal and voluntary group whose goal is the limitation of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. The issue of the dispersion of Russian know-how should be seriously addressed as well. The Americans have already developed some forms of exchange between scientists, joint research projects and sponsored programmes in order to tackle the "brain-drain" problem and convert laboratories and institutes which used to work for the Russian germ warfare programme to civilian use. To make pre-emption work, participating states should be able to rely on their own domestic laws too. The production, development or possession of biological agents should be recognised as a major crime by most nations: the 1972 Convention already stated that the countries should take all necessary measures to make the treaty prohibitions binding on its citizens. The United States waited until 1989 to pass the Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act. Before it was enacted, it was not illegal for any citizen to possess or produce biological agents as long as it was not serving criminal purposes. Some countries also believe in the necessity to develop civil defence strategies, among them Sweden, Switzerland or Israel. Both the UK and France are also updating old processes to deal with new perceived risks. One could look at the Israeli experience regarding the protection of civilians: in 1991, before the Gulf War, the state distributed gas masks and antidote kits. However, this approach has its limits: logistically, the distribution of material was possible because of the size of the country and because they had enough time available. Since it is not possible to predict if and when an attack will occur, particular attention should be given to medical and post exposure treatment. Because of the delayed effects of a covert biological weapon attack, developing purely defensive measures might prove difficult. The terrorist attack in the Tokyo underground really served as a wake-up call for city disaster planners. In 1996, the US Department of Defence created the Domestic Preparedness Programme, which decided to spend more than $40 million to train and evaluate emergency personnel in 120 cities. The first conclusions of the simulation programme confirmed the lack of preparedness of first-aid rescuers, and medical personnel in general. They concluded that the first step should be to develop effective disease surveillance in order to be able to identify the epidemic as early as possible and that efforts should focus on training, stockpiling vaccines and drugs, and providing rapid reaction.

V. CONCLUSIONS Assessing the risks linked to the potential use of biological weapons is not an easy task. Both "alarmist" and "complacent" views are not contributing to the clarity of the debate. These competing views are also expressed within NATO where allies disagree on a number of issues related to this threat. Your Rapporteur has tried to focus on risks linked to proliferation and terrorism. Since proliferation is mainly related to areas of potential conflict, the concern of the international community has been growing increasingly in recent years. While some experts point out that Iraq renounced their use during the Gulf War because of moral barriers, others believe that Saddam Hussein was planning to resort to biological weapons should allies have marched over Baghdad. Nonetheless, uncertainty remains about their possible use in the future by Iraq or other "rogue" states and the risk should not be underestimated. Non-proliferation efforts will have a better chance to succeed if mutually reinforcing approaches are undertaken. This so-called "web of deterrence" includes strong prohibition through arms control, export controls of both pathogens and dual-use equipment, the harmonisation of these laws through the multilateral Australia Group, protective measures, information sharing about procurement trends and determined national and international responses to non-compliance. At the international level, the adoption of a legally-binding Protocol in addition to the 1972 Convention is the "world's front line defence against the proliferation of biological weapons." National interests should not prevent the negotiators from creating such an indispensable security tool. And any objections about commercial confidentiality that are raised need to be critically examined to ensure that they are not simply excuses for inaction. Negotiations should benefit as well from the experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the protection of commercial secrets and has elaborated a binding set of verification measures. The creation of a small organisation to implement and monitor the provisions of the Biological Convention could give some teeth to the Protocol and enhance its efficiency. The level of uncertainty is the same with regard to terrorist activities. So far, the attack in the Japanese subway has been the only example of a large-scale use of chemical agents (see p.6). This report has pointed out the possible different military and civil responses currently being considered to face the threat. The United States are also calling for the development of an international rapid response capability to minimise injury and the loss of life during the critical hours following an accident. However, it seems that no disposal can provide absolute protection and that there is no substitute for concerted and active action against terrorist groups. Intelligence and exchange of information form the cornerstone of an efficient counter-terrorism strategy. In conclusion, understanding the real nature of the threat of biological weapons as well as committing out appropriate resources to counter them requires greater attention to the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. The dominant defence priority that has been applied to nuclear and chemical weapons leaves us ill-equipped conceptually and practically to assess and therefore prevent the potentially devastating effects of bio-terrorism. Defence measures need to be adapted to respond adequately to the threat.

APPENDIX BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS TYPES OF AGENT NAME OF AGENT RATE OF ACTION EFFECTIVE DOSAGE SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS BACTERIA Bacillus anthracis (causes anthrax) Incubation:1 to 6 days 10,000 spores or less Fever and fatigue, often followed by a slight improvement, then abrupt onset of severe respiratory problems, shock, pneumonia and death within 2-3 days   Yersinia Pestis (causes bubonic plague) Incubation: 2 to 10 days Length of illness: 1 to 2 days 100 to 20,000 organisms Malaise, high fever, tender lymphnodes, can lead to haemorrhage, circulatory failure and death   Brucella suis (causes brucellosis) Incubation: 1 to 3 weeks Length of illness: several days 1,300 organisms Fever and chills, headache, loss of appetite, mental depression, extreme fatigue, aching joints and sweating   Pastullera tularensis (cause tularemia) Incubation: 3 to 5 days Length of illness: 30-60% of victims die within 30 days 10 to 50 organisms General pain, an irritant cough, feeling of general illness RICKETTSIAE Coxiella burnetti (causes Q-fever) Incubation: 10 to 20 days Length of illness: days to weeks 10 or less organisms Pneumonia, cough, chest pain VIRUSES Venezuelan equine encephalitis Incubation: 1 to 5 days Length of illness: days to weeks 25 infectious units Fever, chills, gastrointestinal haemorrhage, severe headache, nausea, vomiting, delirium; can lead to coma, shock and death TOXINS Saxitoxin Time to effect: minutes to hours Length of illness: fatal after inhalation of lethal dose 150 microgramS Dizziness, paralysis of respiratory muscles, death within minutes   Botulinum toxin Time to effect: hours to days Length of illness: 24 to 72 hours 70 micrograms Weakness, dizziness, dry throat and mouth, blurred vision, progressive weakness of muscles; abrupt respiratory failure may cause death   Ricin Time to effect: hours Length of illness: days 200 micrograms Rapid onset of nausea, vomiting, severe cramps, vascular collapse; can start with non-specific symptoms of weakness, fever cough   Staphylococcus enterotoxin B Time to effect: a few hours Length illness: 4 days 2,000 micrograms Severe nausea, diarrhoea and vomiting