MOTTO
- "Belonging to a local or regional ethnic group (or to a religious denomination) is something that the uni-vectorial sway of the powers that be had long confined to the realm of sentimentalism. The advent of the information revolution altered its nature in almost every sphere, shifting it from sentiment through self-awareness to open assertions of identity that more and more small groups chose to assume. The process was all the more rapid, and sometimes violent, as it had been stalled by the Second World War and the Cold War, when the state of "combat" thickened (the already constituted) national identities and the identities of "camps" or "blocks" by virtue of violent stimuli, sometimes also reinforced by military discipline."
(Robert Escarpit, Théorie générale de l'information et de la communication, Hachette, 1976)
I. PERCEPTIONS OF THE BALKANS
- "The Balkans are the gun-powder barrel of Europe". How convenient and self-exonerating this mantra originating from "civilised Europe" is. Recently, the Western community has been repeating another, more positive mantra, on the need for the Balkan countries to co-operate with each other and adopt strategies for regional and economic integration. Although this approach is certainly commendable, it should be recognised that there are limits to the extent to which these small and inadequately deregulated economies can benefit from such regional co-operation. In defence of the Balkans, it must be said that this is a region where co-operation and confidence are not historically inherent attributes, as its own "sins" have been exponentially compounded by divisive manipulation and/or intervention.
- Increasingly, national prepossessions stand accused of being at the root of the conflicts and intolerance in South-East Europe (SEE). Nations are products of history, but they are also products of themselves and of their geopolitical environment. A nation will remain a great solidarity. Its only basic postulate is its will to exist. It cannot be imagined in the absence of a cement, be that a language or an ethnicity. A language is the primary criterion, one that makes the difference. But although the language helps, it obviously cannot bind. The Serbs and the Croats discovered at the beginning of the 19th century that they were speaking almost the same language: Serbo-Croatian. The Yugoslav nation was thus virtually born. Once the Yugoslav state was dismantled, the language followed in the same path: Serbian and Croatian were once again proclaimed to be distinct languages.
- As a cement, religion can sometimes be equally important, or even more important than language. Even though they speak the same language, the Serbs and the Croats remain divided by religion. In addition there are symptoms that point out to a certain disjunction between a Catholic and Protestant Europe and an Orthodox Europe. Any kind of superiority on any side means sows the seeds of divisiveness and invites to intolerance and conflict.
- A common territory also can weld cultures that are different from each other. Central and South-East Europe are a telling example in this respect. After a century of relatively steady homogenization, in some geographical areas identified by a majority, minorities that feel culturally attached to a motherland are as manifest a reality as is the sense of competition between nations. Ironically the myth of a Europe fragmented to the extreme has led to its actual fragmentation, mainly in its Central and South Eastern parts.
- From a national perspective the continuity of history is a key concept. The latest proof was the Kosovo crisis, in whose emergence the quarrel of continuity had its fair share of responsibility. "It is the cradle of the Serb nation", Serbs will tell you. "We were here before you" - Albanians will reply - "since we are the descendants of the Illyrians". Every people is a synthesis, in perpetual formation and transformation. Wherever you read the nationalist discourse, you feel overwhelmed by the hyperinflation of history. History thus used became a formidable tool in the antagonisms between nations in the Balkans. People of today nevertheless have their specific problems, different from those of previous generations.
- The turning point in the nation's ascent or descent is its fusion with the state. Individual freedom ends where the national interest comes into play. Exchanging, expelling or unilaterally reclaiming populations were widespread practices in the last century, particularly in Central and South-East Europe. In the Balkans, where they were more mixed than in any other areas, the colours eventually separated. The nation found itself in competition with the political principle of a European equilibrium. While in the past there were self-proclaimed anchors for such an "equilibrium", today the EU and NATO are the real pillars of security and stability.
- The recent outbursts in the Balkans reflect a degeneration of the concept of nation. A world ever more shattered and more conflictual: this is the culmination of the present logic of nationalism. The Balkans are still overpowered by discord. Nationalism is not good or bad in itself, as often signified by the antithesis between patriotism and nationalism. No nation proved itself immune to the nationalist temptation in these two centuries of national history. Every one had its bouts of fever. In the Balkans, separation is the actual logic of nationalism, predisposing it to confrontation rather than reconciliation. Yugoslavia is the ultimate European expression of the tragic consequences of national ideologies and also of discreet, but very effective, prodding from afar.
- Instead of "death to the Albanians" or "death to the Serbs" and so on, instead of "death to the mafia", instead of "state of war" among different ethnic or religious communities and countries: "No mercy for the nationalistic instigators", be they locals or outsiders, those who eventually appear to make up an important part of the mafia networks in the Balkan region, subsystems of European or world-wide mafias. We have to recognize that mobs and extremists are certainly on the same side - if not the same people.
- We have seen too many times before in the Balkans the dangers of "too little too late". Preventive measures might require difficult political decisions but they are certainly easier and less costly in terms of lives and resources than crisis management, war or post-conflict rehabilitation. The consequences of continued instability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will bear down on the whole region. There is a window of opportunity if all parties are prepared to compromise, with help from the international community to implement the Plan for settling peace.
- Quick action is needed, but immediate measures are often the wrong solutions. What we need is quick action along the lines of a long-term strategy capable of turning the Balkans into a place that is healthy and prosperous. We need to transform the Balkans into a region impervious to nationalism and extremism.
II. NEW AND OLD IN THE BALKANS
- In Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe nobody wants to be a minority! Instead, history is overloaded with symbolism: Greater Croatia, or Serbia, or Hungary, or Albania, or Bulgaria, or Romania, or Russia. So many "Greater", will obviously be at the expense of others. Every project of the kind "A GreaterÉ" has brought and will always bring nothing but trouble, and probably war. This is the key to understanding some of the most critical and sensitive questions in the Balkans.
- The problem of the viability of the newborn states in the Balkans tends to be similar to the ethical problem of cardio-pulmonary resuscitation: they will live under the rule of law and a functioning market economy, or they will not live at all. This goes for the countries in transition as well: small states or big states, but first of all states. The process of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is a reality. What is the appropriate approach to this new reality? Moreover, is our reference to a "new reality" already an approach? The Rapporteur thinks it is. Is it better to tackle the old conflicts and threats along the lines originating in the former reality, or to address such painful issues through a new understanding of the Balkans? Why a new understanding? Because the old, routinely pervasive, images have not brought working solutions, but only wrong actions.
- Ordinary citizens will care less about the existence of a state and much more about their safety and prosperity within a new state. If the system works in this new state, people will understand why that state is a good thing. The opposite does not mean that these states will be reconfigured in some way, but certainly tensions and conflicts will dominate the life of the region and of each of these states.
- We have to tackle the response of reactionary forces faced with the new reality of democratic conduct. Will these forces accept democratic rules, especially when it comes to recognising electoral results? In the absence of democratic instruments, dissolution and conflict will continue to prevail. It is interesting to note that the pro-sovereignty forces were, as a general rule, not the pro-reformist forces (but with one exception: Montenegro). The determined recognition that not borders but openness, not isolation but flows of goods and free (and controlled) movement of people ensure a stable future for every region of the Balkans. Distrust of oneself and uncertainty about one's own identity necessarily generate a distrust of others, imputation of evil intentions to the rest of the world and, eventually, an aggressiveness that may result in the invasion of other people's territories, or at the least in forcing one's own domination upon those who do not desire it.
- The key factor is that the West deepens and propagates fundamental political principles such as the rule of law, respect for human liberties, for inalienable rights and for human dignity, a democratic political system, political pluralism, civil society and market economy. Post-communist countries in Central and South Eastern Europe truly belong to the West - geographically, historically and culturally as well as in terms of their values. Thus they have the right to stress that they were torn out of the Western community after World War II by force and that their natural place is within that community. As President Havel recently stated "no single geographical and cultural territory must be considered a priori better than any other once and for all, or as a matter of principle".
III. RECONCILIATION
- As Milan Kundera pointed out in his essay The Tragedy of Central Europe, one of the functions of Central Europe has been to offer warning signs to Europe. The events of 19-20 March 1990 in the Romanian town of Târgu Mure_ were such a warning sign, a moment when Romania avoided the fate that was to befall post-communist Bosnia.
- One vital area where Central Europe, together with South Eastern Europe, has proved its capacity both to internalize European norms and to find new solutions for common historical European problems along the lines of these norms, is that of ethnic relations. This success is not complete, as there are sections of this region's elites and societies that continue to define politics in terms of ethnicity. Cultural, political and intellectual antecedents notwithstanding, a healthy awareness is gradually taking root in the body politic that cultural hegemony as a principle of state life is an anachronism. It is therefore essential for the EU to welcome our region as a partner for a shared vision, and not let European integration be mistaken for something akin to the (forced) "modernization" that communism had once purported to bring about in Central and South Eastern Europe.
- In many historical circumstances the people of the Balkans "were" motivated by a will to believe what is unbelievable when exposed to rigorous analysis. The problem today is to embark on a common project capable of settling the disagreements among communities and countries, i.e. to find ways to further co-operation and its underlying common goals. When the outcome is worse for everyone there must be a way to free people from the imprisonment of their own distrust. A vision for the Balkans should start with establishing a unanimous pattern of dialogue in which everyone will have his say. "Liberty can be sacrificed only for the sake of liberty" - arguably a liberty carrying qualities like the peaceful and tolerant pursuit of projects.
- What kind of consent is obtainable? One based on: 1) the rule of law; 2) functional markets. There is a strong reason to believe that these choices are capable of delivering something that people would consent to, once it comes into being.
- The problem is how, in the present situation, knowing the weaknesses and disadvantages, can we take the right path (with the strengths and advantages of the solution proposed) and override the competing claims of those who continue to believe, or profess to believe, what is obviously irrational. We certainly do not discount ethnic or religious values, but we need to move ahead with proven conceptions "of the good". People who claim that their rights derive from historical arguments disregard a very important set of individual rights which laid the foundations for social cooperation, which alone can produce a positive sum product in a society. Individual rights here refer to the safety provided by the rule of law and the prosperity brought by functional markets.
- The intricate reality of ethnic maps in SEE should energise our efforts to ensure an increased, more visible participation of all ethnic groups in economic development. This is a regional litmus test in building healthy democratic societies. Since the poor integration of ethnic minority groups is a major source of political and social tensions, a regional approach in this extremely sensitive field is imperative. Special efforts are needed to address the problems of Roma communities, in which poverty and poor access to education and health care have broken all regional records.
- Can this picture be made persuasive? The choice we would like our peoples to embrace is to be made visible and clear by an institution of a special kind: a network of people strongly motivated by their pragmatic rationality, based on the two pillars of safety and prosperity.
IV. AN INTEGRATIONIST APPROACH
- "The right for everyone to be another one, different from the others but among the others, equally equipped, with equal chances for the affirmation of its difference, and to offer to all, when the moment will come, the chance of a more productive understanding." (Robert Escarpit)
- A peaceful Balkans is an integrated Balkans. Europeanisation entails first and foremost ensuring that European rules and institutions prevail in the Balkans. The ultimate, fundamental goal is that men and women become key players in a new state of normality in the Balkans: integration through transparent and accountable markets, which presupposes the existence of rules within a general state of rule of law.
- Transition and the conflicts of the last years leave the Western Balkans with a burden of meagre economic growth and stagnant living standards. Some countries in South-East Europe have barely recovered 75% of their pre-transition GDP. Progress in macroeconomic stabilisation remains precarious, as structural reforms and institutional development still lag behind, especially when compared to Central Europe and the Baltic countries.
- The Rapporteur believes that the reshaping and re-founding of the European Union requires not the dissolution of national identities, but the creation of a European democracy, however complex this task might prove. However, those of us who feel that they are wavering between the spirit of identity and the imperative of integration cannot opt for the risky path of differentiation. This is not a matter of opposing principles, but of complementing principles. It is not a matter of "European, not national", but one of "European, and national". Remember that the Pax romana: "tolerance plus law", was a successful form of European integration before the term had been coined, commonly based on the preservation of local identities. We need an organic integration. We need to guarantee that national identities are properly acknowledged and turned to good account. What we do not need is to view integration in terms of statistics, to level identities down and sacrifice them in the process. Natural integration is the "European dream" come true. Decentralisation and integration should thus be de facto the two sides of a coin, or the two pans of a pair of scales, balancing each other.
- The major challenge is finally to accept South Eastern Europe as a true partner, one that has the inspiration, the motivation and the moral determination to participate on an equal footing in the construction of Europe. The duty of the Balkan countries will then be to internalise the set of norms that they can share with its Western partners. The problem is not how westernised the European Union will be, but rather how democratic and strong it will be. The emerging project of a United Europe should not take into account how great the European Union should be, but rather how much better.
- That people in South Eastern Europe are very enthusiastic about their countries' EU membership is due only in part to their sometimes ambiguous understanding of the functioning of European institutions. It is nevertheless vital for us to distinguish between the EU reality as an administrative, bureaucratic process, and the image of the EU in the eyes of our people. The latter is a highly symbolic one, a largely cultural concept, derived from their (too often disappointed) expectations and their understanding of the past. If we believe in a European future, the chance is for all of us to be prepared to embrace the idea that the Balkans have the genuine potential for offering Europe a new vision.
- An example of Kundera's prophetic intuition is related to the future of the European Union. The concept of "Europe as a vision" has been gradually replaced in the West by "Europe as a process". There are widespread apprehensions in public opinion - and not only there - that a significant expansion of the EU will reinforce its bureaucratic drift and thus compound the risk of a lack of legitimacy of European institutions. This can only be averted by acknowledging that "Europe as a process" is not enough. We need to find a new impulse, to imagine a new design for Europe. South Eastern Europe is according to the Rapporteur best placed to nurture such a new vision. This could be the most substantial contribution of our region to the future of Europe.
- SEE societies will be capable of taking advantage of the opportunities offered by economic integration only if they offer solid property rights, encouragement to entrepreneurship, an honest and de-bureaucratized civil service, personal security and basic education. The appropriate legal framework is a prerequisite of the web of potentially rewarding investments and contracts. An integrationist approach for the Balkans should imply a collective identity plus stability.
- We are at a historic juncture, when we need to take advantage of our general consensus on European integration. An approach centred on reform and intra-regional integration is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient for building a peaceful, stable and prosperous South Eastern Europe. The success of this process is essentially dependent on the capacity to project a credible, predictable and not too distant perspective for integration into European and global structures, first and foremost the EU. Substantive regional co-operation should be an incentive, not an obstacle to EU and NATO accession. The prospect for accession is capable of energising national efforts and the political consensus for reform as well as containing the extremist, nationalist forces. It should become crystal clear to every citizen of the region that the nationalist temptation effectively closes the door to prosperity and freedom from fear and abuse. However, nothing can replace the tremendous political wisdom and ability of selfless leaders required to conquer the sense of defeat and make confidence prevail.
- There are three regional risks affecting current prospects of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures:
- The first is that some countries perceive themselves as remaining for some time de facto excluded, possibly leading to more, instead of less, fragmentation of the region.
- The second risk is that for some countries the prospect of joining the EU would appear to require a timeframe so long that it would discourage their adding to the momentum of regional co-operation.
- A third risk derives from a highly differentiated path to EU accession, that could well fuel a polarisation between the arrogance of the front runners and the frustration of the countries which feel left behind. Hence, the prospect of integration for SEE countries needs to be a "real prospect", one that has a convincing relevance for today's political leaders and populations, not only for their grandchildren. Such a prospect should also be "inclusive" as far as possible, not involving successive "curtains".
- Further enlargement of NATO is necessary now more than ever if we want to consolidate democracy and free market economies in South Eastern Europe, and implicitly bring the region closer to mainstream Europe. Aspirant states from the region seek a reliable timeframe for their entry in the Atlantic Alliance. They want to know if they can expect an invitation in 2002 to begin admission when they have done all the "right" things required. They are willing to prepare themselves to the best of their capabilities and means through the detailed activities of the Membership Action Plan. There should be no "deals" above their heads, however smart.
- As the European Union both integrates and expands, NATO is increasingly becoming in effect an Alliance between America and Europe. NATO can play that role because it is simultaneously a military alliance as well as an interdependent security system. By eliminating areas of geopolitical ambiguity, the very expansion of the alliance represents an enhancement of Europe's security as a whole. Since NATO is a military alliance and not a unilateral guarantee of protection, every new member must be credibly committed to self-defence in order to earn collective security and also be prepared to make a tangible contribution to that collective security even if it itself is not directly threatened. Failure to do so by Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic will certainly be exploited by the opponents of further expansion. For the sake of political confidence among aspiring countries, the process of admission should be made more objective, more predictable, and more credible - even if ultimately it is still guided by political and strategic considerations. A virtual border-line must be crossed now, before it becomes legitimate.
- This is the very moment when the artificial division of Europe has to cease. Was communism the choice for the countries in Central, Eastern or South Eastern Europe? The higher a state's degree of error when choosing communism, the sooner that state is prepared to join the Alliance, and vice versa. In the case of Russia the degree of error seems to have been the lowest, should Russia's aim have been to become a superpower. If not, the ambiguity of Russian policy toward the principles on which international relations should be built needs to be properly addressed.
- Each government nevertheless has the ultimate responsibility for domestic economic reforms, the rule of law, respect of democratic norms, good neighbourliness. Policies aimed at intra-regional economic integration, strengthening the rule of law and building good neighbourly relations are critical for the overall progress of the region.
- The focus should be on setting clear priorities and directing resources to reforming the core state institutions, including effective law enforcement structures, a functioning central bank with a stable monetary policy and competent and firm supervision of the banks, as well as enlightened, non-predatory, fair fiscality and tax and customs administrations capable of collecting - reasonably free of corruption - revenue for the state budget. Functional, transparent institutions are needed to stimulate development in the private sector and increase the investors' trust in the domestic and regional business environment.
- Corruption causes huge malfunctions in the economy and the state administration, wastes public and private resources, and destroys constituencies' trust in the public authorities. It undermines the belief in the normality of a democratic society and awakens nostalgic feelings for former authoritarian regimes, where "all were equal" and "order" reigned. Corruption is felt like an atmosphere, a fluid moving freely within our societies, unless people and institutions engaged in law enforcement are deeply convinced that the common future we want is achievable and worth it only if corruption is continuously eliminated, beginning with the top.
- As a recent World Bank report shows, regional trade agreements can serve as a useful purpose, above and beyond direct gains brought about by the liberalisation of trade, as they help to mitigate uncertainties about national policies and to enhance mutual credibility. This is one major element that makes the case for an urgent, substantial opening of the EU common market to the products of SEE countries, as well as for unilateral trade preferences in sensitive fields. That would have a negligible impact on the EU market, considering that imports from those countries are a mere 1% of total EU imports. Free trade should precede other steps for intra-regional integration. Removing trade barriers in the relations between SEE countries is a critical incentive for investment and growth.
- Sound energy policies are central to the security of South Eastern Europe and to its prospects for medium-term prosperity. Lacking regional co-operation in the supply and distribution of energy entails not only increased individual costs for SEE countries but also very real security risks caused by geopolitically generated energy dependencies. It is increasingly difficult to conduct self-reliant national energy policies, implemented in isolation from one's neighbours.
- Education is the foremost factor in creating a new generation of leaders, changing mentalities and developing the human capital, as well as in attracting Western investors. Wider access to education and employment for the younger generation should be the starting point in this effort. The educational capital is an essential priority of our project for a United Europe; to invest in it is in fact to finance, at very low cost, stability in Europe. This is how we can set the course for an educated capitalism, a capitalism of information, based on modern means of communication. Ensuring wider access to IT education for the youth through e-learning programmes is another major priority. We are passively witnessing an ongoing brain-drain. This process is socially stimulating, and useful to Western Europe in the short term. However it will invite serious social fragmentation in, and developmental gaps between, the source countries, as well as apprehensions and xenophobia in the destination countries. The emigration of young specialised professionals will never be a solution. The alternative is sustained investment in their chances for professional achievement at home and in cross-border exchange of IT products - not people.
V. A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY
- To avoid the risks of all-out war and lay the foundations for lasting peace in the Balkans, the international community should make a major investment in preventive diplomacy, and formulate a visionary approach for an enduring solution for stability, underpinned by effective encouragement of Western capital investment in the region; real politics beyond arguments. There is a need for international support oriented towards the real Balkans, not the schematic Balkans.
- From a regional perspective a strategic path could be:
- Re-ordering the Regional Agenda, so as to place citizen values at the core of all national and regional efforts. Regional cohesion can be reinforced through increased social cohesion in each country and throughout SEE. The welfare of the citizen should become the main goal in the emancipation of the region in the European sense.
- Improved law enforcement throughout the region is not only a national or regional issue. It is increasingly a European issue and will require a concerted European response. Fighting against trafficking in human beings and drugs should be one of the foremost priorities in 2001 and beyond, as part of the wider effort to curb organised crime and corruption.
- Countries in SEE will be building on shifting sands unless we can first prepare the ground for a secure, stable and trustworthy business environment. This can only work with a strengthened institutional capacity, professional public administration and an independent, effective judiciary system, based on a stable legislative foundation.
- Social and identity exclusion is another powerful enemy that must be tackled more resolutely through curing economic and social fractures throughout the region. Access to communication, media and e-education, roads for access and transportation and access to electricity and clean water for every community should be consistently addressed and improved. Direct linking between local business communities, in the Euro-regional spirit, should become common practice. Centralism and political control from the capitals need no longer censor such relations.
- A new spirit and a culture of genuine desire for reconciliation and dialogue must take root throughout the region. We must leave the ghosts to the past and embark on the journey to a United Europe.
- Giving priority to projects based on solid participation by local private business in the reconstruction process, in order to give them a sense of regional self-respect and responsibility. Unfortunately, until now, the access of bona fide local investors to the reconstruction contracts of the Stability Pact has not been satisfactory and the matter requires urgent intervention.
- What is the right approach to military identities in the new Balkans? From an integrationist perspective, it should consist of open participation and commitment for PfP, interoperability and national defence doctrines oriented towards the stability of states within a stable Balkans.
- NATO's long-term effort to build partnerships with the military in the region is another vital component of regional economic stability. Assistance in shaping smaller, more professional and civilian-controlled forces throughout South Eastern Europe has been of tremendous utility. Efforts should continue to be intensified to rid the region of the paramilitary forces that have been a source of so much destruction and violence over the last decade. We should extend the implementation of the World Bank-funded project on Vocational Training of Unemployed Military Officers, to include programmes for the social reintegration of former combatants in the area. Another major priority is negotiating and agreeing on verifiable regional measures for designing transparent military budgets. IFIs' assistance to the SEE countries should be made conditional on meeting such criteria.
- The international financial institutions, especially the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have both the authority and capability to exercise critical leverage over the Balkan states' economies especially in the area of foreign private investments. Their actions could determine not only direct access to concessionary funds, but also increase Balkans' capacity to mobilise supplementary financial resources, their ability to manage economic reform and their credibility in attracting private investment.
VI. AN ANSWER FOR THE FUTURE: A NEW GENERATION OF BALKAN LEADERS
- In sharing our ideals, and in the quest for partners in such a complex and disturbed region as the Balkans, we look to people who ultimately care about their homeland and we see that there is a rewarding challenge there to be met. There is a need for a broader process of reconciliation conducted by personalities in the Balkans who could have the ear and also the respect of the people when trying to dislodge emotional prejudices from the past, generally based on half -, or quarter - truths.
- Collecting detailed information and debating every contentious aspect of the Balkans could be the purpose of a dedicated international institution, for instance, a Centre for the Balkans, established in Thessaloniki and aimed at promoting co-operation, the rule of law and functional markets throughout the region.
- Mutual mistrust is the permanent danger in the Balkans. Reducing this danger is possible. Men and women whose roots at least are in the countries of the region are able to do that, on condition that they are brought together and supported. This means economic skills together with political skills.
- The goal is to begin the difficult endeavour of leaving behind the old syndromes of hatred, religious as well as ethnical prejudices, and the permanent temptation to live in mutual isolation. The means lie in building functional and transparent markets which will, step by step, firmly replace the markets dominated by organized crime, the mafia and by informal cronies of private monopolies, and to put up a barricade and draw the dividing line between patriots and profiteers. The rule of law exists only where every act, including the acts of the sovereign who abuses his power, are constrained by the law. It endeavours to restore equilibrium when someone, anyone, "breaks the rules".
- We have to bring together people of courage and determination who will understand that the leadership of the Balkan countries need not be overwhelmingly nationalistic. They should be democrats. The new generation of Balkan leaders (both businessmen and politicians) could feel strongly motivated to establish such an area of confidence for real business and for real politics (in the general interest). If properly supported by the West at the right time, their own personal powers of persuasion and influence with their fellow countrymen will be decisively enhanced.
- The network of leaders will be a network of "agents", capable of committing themselves to their future, and taking responsibility for their nations' past. There is also a variety of interpersonal responses through which the project can be conducted. Their conceptions, their rationale and real resolve are of paramount importance to all. Indeed they are engaged in a long process of persuasion, bearing in mind that no other solution is effective. They are the means, not the end.
VII. CONCLUSION
- We are all tired of too many regional conflicts. In the Balkans, historically, most of the time it was divisive interference by outside powers through selfish national goals and not the intrinsic evil nature of the region that generated and exacerbated conflicts. Today, merely to abstain from such meddling, just to sit and wait, is no longer enough. If we do that, we might well be faced in the Balkans with a different kind of Europe. Regional responsibility in Europeanising the Balkans can therefore be the key to an enduring solution in the area. In order to do that, we need an integrating vision, as opposed to a dividing one. We need, in other words, European emancipation of the SEE region.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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- Vaclav Havel: Address to the Conference "Europe's New Democracies: Leadership and Responsibility", Bratislava, 11 May 2001.
- Petre Roman: Der Entwurf eines vereinten Europas: ein Blick aus dem Osten, in "Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung", 20 September 2000.
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