Speech by Mr. Javier RUPEREZ President NATO Parliamentary Assembly NATO Defense College 21 May 1999 Dear... It is a pleasure and an honour for me, as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to be with you here today. The Assembly and the NATO Defense College have a long history of fruitful contacts and cooperation. I intend to maintain the same quality of relations during my term as President. Now, some of you may have been surprised that I introduced myself as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. You may know us as the North Atlantic Assembly. This is still our name for another week, but it will change next week, at our Spring session in Warsaw where the new name will be made public. This decision to rebaptize the Assembly is the result of extensive discussions. It reflects a political choice and sustained efforts, in the past two years or so, to enhance our ties with NATO. Indeed, as the democratically elected representatives of the countries forming the Alliance, we have the determination and ambition to take part in the debates that will shape its future. For many years, the Assembly has provided a forum where parliamentarians from NATO member states can exchange views on security issues of common concern, inform one another on national perspectives, refine their analyses with a view, step-by-step, to reaching a common assessment and formulating common recommendations on the course to be followed by the Alliance. Like NATO, after the sudden collapse of the Soviet empire, the Assembly has found itself confronted with the task of redefining its role and building relations of cooperation and partnership with Parliaments schooled in a different system and harboring different values. I must say that we have acquitted ourselves of this task quite successfully. Thanks to the foresight of my predecessors, Congressman Charlie Rose and Senator Roth, who both held the presidency of the Assembly, we were able to launch very early what we call our "Rose-Roth initiative", a series of outreach programs through seminars and staff training which helped us not only to "break the ice" with our new partners from Central and Eastern Europe, but also to build a community of politicians across the European continent committed to the same values of democracy, dialogue and cooperation. Our Rose-Roth seminars are perhaps a forum for "parliamentary diplomacy" but they are also and above all a true educational enterprise where parliamentarians from the new democracies can learn from their peers the requirements and essential components of democratic control of their armed forces. The NATO Secretary General has acknowledged the value of this work, writing to me recently that "the NATO PA's reaching out to Partner countries has been particularly helpful in NATO's efforts to promote democracy and project stability throughout all of the Europe." I must say also that we were very encouraged that a similar acknowledgment was included in the NATO summit communiqué last month in Washington - a summit at which I had the honour to represent the Assembly. This recognition by NATO, and its parallel commitment to enhance relations with the Assembly in areas of common concern are a powerful incentive for us to continue on the same track. Indeed, perhaps more than at any other moment in the history of the Alliance, parliamentary support for NATO is essential today. For almost two months, the Alliance has been engaged in its first military operation against a sovereign country. What is at stake is, obviously, first of all, whether NATO will achieve its goal of defeating the policies of ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav regime. But beyond this particular operation, the key question is whether NATO will have succeeded in its ambition, proclaimed in the Strategic Concept in 1991, and reaffirmed last month in Washington, to act the guarantor for the security of the European continent as a whole, in other words, to repeal conflict when the interest of a NATO member or its territorial integrity are not directly threatened. The summit last month in Washington gave a demonstration of the Alliance's resolve. There was no dissent among the NATO governments that the Alliance had to pursue its military operations until President Milosevic was ready to abide by the five conditions set by the international community: the cessation of repression by Serb military and police forces in Kosovo; the withdrawal of those forces; the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; the return of refugees and access to them by humanitarian organizations; and finally, a demonstrated willingness to sit again at the negotiating table. During my brief address to the heads of states and governments in Washington, I was very pleased to be able to report to them that the vast majority of the parliamentarians of the Assembly approved NATO's decision to use force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And today, on the basis of a discussion we had two weeks ago in Brussels, I can assure you that this support stands. But Kosovo, at the same time, cast a shadow on the Summit. It did because, as we were celebrating 50 years of Alliance's success in maintaining peace in Europe, we could not but think of the hundreds of thousands driven from their homes, separated from their loved ones, or purely and simply slaughtered by a regime whose sole obsession seems to be to cling to power. But it did also because the uncertainty about the outcome in Kosovo could not but raise questions as to whether and how the Alliance would be able, after Kosovo, to pursue the goals and purposes proclaimed in the Strategic Concept. Therefore, what I would like to do in the rest of my time with you, is to go over a number of challenges that have been on NATO's agenda for some time, which were duly taken into account in the new Strategic Concept, but which will most likely need rethinking in the wake of the experience in Kosovo. These challenges are the following: How should NATO redefine its new roles and missions in the absence of an immediate threat of aggression to one of its members? In other words, what are the functional, geographic, and political limits of its operations as a crisis management tool and as a "collective security" instrument? How can the Alliance establish with Russia a relationship of cooperation and mutual confidence that will withstand the test of time and the winds of crises? What should be the next steps of NATO's outreach and enlargement strategy, taking into account that Kosovo has demonstrated, once more, that threats to the stability of Europe are likely to come from the South and Southeastern parts of the continent? To what extent are the Europeans ready, politically and in financial terms, to take up the primary responsibility for the security of their continent by building a solid Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, but on the basis of existing cooperation in the European Union and the WEU?

NATO'S ROLES AND MISSIONS There is no dispute among NATO members that the Alliance remains primarily a body for their common defense against external aggression. This was restated in no ambiguous terms in Washington. But since such an aggression, for the foreseeable future, seems rather unlikely, the challenge for the members is to find a consensus for action in crisis situations such as ethnic conflict, massive human rights violations, terrorist attacks or the other types of "asymetric threats" which are much more likely in the world of today. At this point, there is no consensus among NATO members on whether and how the Alliance should confront those threats. Clearly, the trend over the past ten years has been in the sense of a geographic and functional expansion of NATO missions. However, there is strong resistance among some European countries, but also among the isolationist fringe of the American political class, against an expansion of NATO's operations beyond Europe, and against NATO taking up challenges that do not jeopardize the common interests of its members. Indeed, it is often forgotten by those who suspect NATO of seeking to transform itself into a "world policeman" that the Alliance is an organization of 19 sovereign countries, acting on the basis of consensus. The difficulties of building that consensus prior to the launching of the air strikes against Yugoslavia, and the recurrent doubts about the sustainability of the operation signal clearly enough that a NATO engagement, say, in the Middle East, or in Southeast Asia is not on the agenda for the foreseeable future. What seems, rather, to meet the agreement of the members, is that any security issue in Europe - and the definition of Europe is left open - should be of concern to NATO. Thus the allies agree in the new Strategic Concept that "ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability" in the Euro-Atlantic area, which "could affect the security in the Alliance" [article 20]. They logically conclude that the Alliance's strategy must be based on a broad concept of security, and must include an ability for "conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations" [article 29]. This, however, does not necessarily mean that there is agreement about what to do in particular circumstances. Article 4 of the Washington Treaty provides for consultation among the Allies whenever they feel that their security is at risk. This is rather uncontroversial. But difficulties often arise when these consultations lead NATO members to the conclusion that action is needed. In that respect, Kosovo was a novelty on two accounts. First of all, it was the first time that NATO intervened without a mandate from the UN Security Council. In Bosnia, NATO always operated under a UN mandate, whether it was in the context of UNPROFOR, when NATO assisted and, to some extent substituted for, the UN forces, or in the case of IFOR and SFOR, which were formally authorized by the Security Council. NATO's decision to intervene against Yugoslavia without a UN mandate has left many European Alliance nations uncomfortable. President Chirac of France, Chancellor Schröder of Germany, or Prime Minister D'Alema of Italy, among others, have made it repeatedly clear that, for them, that decision was in no way to be seen as a precedent. What they, and the other NATO leaders agreed, is that there was a situation of such gravity in Kosovo that the Alliance could not sit back and wait. And there lays the second novelty : NATO intervened against Yugoslavia not to defend the interests or the territory of one the members - none of them was directly threatened - ; it intervened in the name of values, to prevent the slaughtering of a people and to defend, at the same time, these principles of democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights which are enshrined in the preamble of the Washington Treaty as the founding values of the Alliance. NATO's operation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia belongs in the category of "non-Article 5" operations. But it is of a totally different nature from, say, IFOR and SFOR. There is a world of difference between intervening in the framework of a multinational agreement, endorsed by the UN Security Council, to enforce the military component of a comprehensive settlement, and intervening coercively against a country to protect a people against genocide. But there can also be a continuum: should a political agreement soon to be found on the principles of a military deployment in Kosovo, allowing for the adoption of a Security Council resolution, NATO could quickly transform its military potential into the core of a strong body of peace-keepers to accompany a long-term settlement in Kosovo. The many-sided character of "non-Article 5" operations may be the reason why the Strategic Concept adopted last month in Washington could not but be variously interpreted by the allies. While President Chirac read article 31 of the Concept as a requirement for a UN Security Council resolution prior to any "non-Article 5 crisis" response operation, and therefore saw it as triumph for French diplomacy, US officials chose to take the reference to the Charter simply as a general recognition that the Alliance had to act within the framework of international law. The Alliance could not afford to remain paralyzed in instances - such as Kosovo - in which the Charter system is made ineffective by the lack of agreement in the Security Council. NATO's future relationship with the United Nations is a delicate issue. The Assembly itself has not yet developed a doctrine on the matter, but we will discuss it extensively on the basis of several reports at the Spring session next week. In practice, because of the political sensitivity of the subject, it is likely that each crisis situation will be looked on its own merits. This being so, my assumption is that the outcome of the operation in Kosovo will strongly influence the willingness of the Allies to take up any future similar contingency. And let me explain why I believe that this will be so: no one doubts the capacity of NATO as a war-fighting machinery for the defense of the Alliance. Should the territorial integrity of the one of the Allies be at stake, there is little doubt that all means would be used to protect it. But when it comes to defending interests and, even more, values, political constraints interfere, as we are seeing in Kosovo. Military means constantly have to be adjusted in terms of their size, type, form of engagement, and choice of targets, to take into account political demands. Moreover these political demands vary over time, and they are not necessarily the same for all the Allies. Maintaining the Alliance's cohesion is a challenge. So far, that cohesion has been kept and I do believe that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has contributed to sustaining NATO's unity of purpose. We will continue to do so, and I hope that we will be able to adopt a strongly worded resolution next week in Warsaw reiterating our support for the Alliance's action in Kosovo.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA The crisis in Kosovo will have profound consequences on another component of the European security system, which is NATO's relations with Russia. From the very beginning of the systemic change in Europe, NATO has sought to work cooperatively with Russia. This was done through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, then through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. These efforts culminated, as far as Russia is concerned, in the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997. In that Act, NATO and Russia commit themselves to "build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security." To give substance to that commitment, they established a Permanent Joint Council charged with consultations, the elaboration of joint initiatives and, eventually, joint actions on a wide range of security issues. Unfortunately, Kosovo demonstrated that the relationship was not solid enough to withstand the test of a severe security crisis in Europe. As the members of the Assembly were able to witness in the course of many meetings with Russian parliamentarians, there is still too much resentment at the loss of their great power status, too much misunderstanding of how NATO operates as a body of 19 democratic nations, too much suspicion as to the real purpose of enlargement, for Russians to be able to work constructively with NATO. And, of course, the fact that the Kosovo crisis erupted in the middle of a tense electoral year in Russia did not lead to moderation. Russia's decision to suspend its cooperation with NATO - which also affects us at the Assembly - is to be regretted. But we should not tire from telling the Russians that we are ready to resume consultations and co-operation as soon as they wish, as the Allies confirmed in the Washington summit communiqué. In this respect, diplomatic efforts underway to try and rally the support of the Allies and of Russia on a common response to the Kosovo crisis are very welcome. And I would like in particular to single out the declaration of the G-8 two weeks ago, which, in my eyes, signals a very significant move of Russia towards the demands long formulated by the Allies. The Assembly, like the NATO Governments, is ready to resume work with the Russian Parliament as soon as it is willing. Over the past six months or so, the Assembly had succeeded in building a very productive dialogue with members of the Duma and Council of the Federation, with whom we had created a Joint Monitoring Group to accompany and oversee the work of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. That Monitoring Group had held two very promising meetings, one in Brussels in October 1998, and one in Moscow in early March of this year. These meetings had enabled us to begin moving in the direction of a common understanding of major European security issues. More importantly, they had made it possible to create trust among a small group of MPs on both sides who were determined to argue over differences with a genuine desire to understand one another's position and to build cooperation despite these differences. Even though our cooperation with Russia is momentarily cut off, I believe that our Joint Monitoring Group keeps a tremendous potential for the future. Our delegates in the Joint Monitoring Group have developed personal relations with their Russian counterparts. This basis of trust, I am sure, will withstand the test of time and be more than useful when we re-establish formal contacts. We will do all we can in the coming months to reinvigorate these relations because we believe that it is essential that Russia does not isolate itself but remains a full partner in Europe's co-operative management of its security. NATO's OUTREACH AND ENLARGEMENT The Kosovo crisis will, no doubt, have consequences on how the Alliance targets its future outreach programs and conceives its enlargement. Indeed, Southeastern Europe has concentrated a large part of NATO's attention and resources much before the situation unraveled in Kosovo. With UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR, NATO has carried out its first military operations, after some 45 years of its existence. In Bosnia, experience on the ground will have contributed to the elaboration of new operational concepts such as the Combined Joint Task Forces. The operations in Bosnia has also gave concrete form to NATO's political goals of building European security on cooperation with partners and brought them a long way in the transformation of their armed forces. Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been the object of particular care from the Alliance, which has targeted special assistance programs to them through Enhanced PfP. The crisis in Kosovo has, once more, demonstrated the potential for instability of the region and the need for the Alliance to nurture it with particular attention. The heads of states and governments gathered in Washington have understood as much in deciding the creation of a consultative forum of the NATO members and the states of the region to promote and better coordinate assistance programs in the field of security. But they have also stressed, rightly, that long term security in Southeastern Europe can only result from a comprehensive approach enlisting the efforts of NATO, the WEU, the European Union, the OSCE, the United Nations, and international financial institutions. The Standing Committee of the Assembly, for its part, has also endorsed such an approach in a statement two weeks ago, while it emphasized that NATO must play a leading role in the military deployment which will be essential to the long-term stabilization of Kosovo and the return of refugees. The Assembly, I am proud to say, did not wait for the eruption of the crisis in Kosovo to pay attention to the region. Summer seminars in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been a regular feature of our activities since 1997. This year, we have planned three Rose-Roth seminars in the area: one which took place in Bulgaria in March; the now traditional one at Lake Ohrid in early July, and a third one in Albania in October. These seminars are an ideal opportunity for our members to familiarize themselves with the region, its security problems and the particular perspective of each state. They are also a vehicle for the gradual integration of the parliaments of the region in a democratic forum of dialogue with counterparts from all corners of Europe, and for their education to the norms of political accountability in a state based on the rule of law. Looking beyond Kosovo itself, there are strong arguments for including several of the states of the region into the NATO fold without delay. Indeed, if NATO is serious about its claim to be the pillar of Europe's security and stability, it should focus on that part of the continent from which the risks are most likely to emanate. Southeastern Europe no doubt qualifies: not only are several countries of the region torn by ethnic and political strife but the stability of countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which have been striving to reform themselves for several years, has been constantly threatened by their location at the confluence of three zones of crisis: the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans. These countries not only suffer from the political risk of conflict spill-over, but they are deeply penalized economically as long-lasting sanctions on Yugoslavia have severely disrupted their trade routes and the war in Kosovo has created a further disincentive for foreign investors. Economic weakness can easily transform into political unrest, especially when governments are reaching that key transition phase in which economic reform requires painful sacrifices from the population. By accelerating membership prospects for Romania and Bulgaria - as well as Slovenia and Slovakia which, in my view, are unproblematic - NATO would close the strategic void between its current members in Western and Northern Europe, and its Southeastern European members, Greece and Turkey. It would build an arch of stability going from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea. In addition, clear NATO membership prospects could have positive anticipatory effects, as it did in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. This is because NATO admission is linked to the fulfillment of certain conditions such as commitment to democratic reform and a free market economy, the resolution of border disputes and ethnic conflict, civilian control of the military, and a demonstrated readiness to contribute to common defense and security. Just the prospect of being admitted has caused, and will cause, good behavior in all these fields and in foreign relations. In turn, accelerating membership for Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia would create an incentive for those countries such as Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Croatia, that are still remote from NATO membership, to speed up their own reform process. In total, NATO would form a belt of security around the two remaining problematic states of the region, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia which would be stabilized by a strong international presence and would hopefully soon be caught by the democratic reform spirit. The Assembly is ready to continue engaging the parliamentarians of the region, not only those with which it has long-lasting relations, but also and in particular those who most direly need the democratic exposure that it can provide. Thus Croat, Bosnian and Montenegrin MPs will be our guests at the seminar in Ohrid - the latter pending the establishment of a democratic regime in Yugoslavia as a whole. We will also, as we have constantly over the past three or four years, continue to assert that enlargement must be a continuous process, encompassing all European states who want to become members and have the ability to do so. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY I would like to finish this exposé by discussing a topic which is very dear to me, as a committed European - at the same time as I am a convinced Atlanticist - : it is the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Again, let us begin with the Kosovo crisis: What strikes me in this crisis is the unity of purpose of the Allies. Unlike many other international crises where the Allies do not see eye to eye and where a common position is hard to come by, in the case of Kosovo, what we have seen since the beginning of last year is a real common management of this issue by the Americans and the Europeans - working hand-in-hand with the Russians until the air strikes. The principal arena for this joint management has been the Group of Contact which, in a way, made the link between the various institutions concerned, the United Nations, NATO and the EU. In the first Yugoslav crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, the Europeans quickly receded into the background and the United States took over both the control of the military operations and of the political negotiations. Not so in the current crisis. First of all, the Europeans have held a prominent place in the diplomatic process, offering the framework for the negotiations in Rambouillet earlier this year. Now, through the German presidency of the EU, they are playing a very active role in the diplomatic efforts to reconcile the Western and Russian positions. The Europeans have also demonstrated their readiness to take responsibility in the military field: before the collapse of the talks in Rambouillet, they had committed themselves to providing about 25.000 of the 28.000 troops or so foreseen for a peace-keeping force in Kosovo (of course, the size of this force will now have to be reviewed). You will also have noticed that the command of the Extraction Force for the protection of the OSCE monitors in Kosovo had been entrusted to a French general, working under the SACEUR. This confirms the precedent set in Bosnia and the willingness of the French to work within the Alliance, despite their position outside the integrated military structures. The performance of the Europeans in the military operations, unfortunately, has been less convincing. 13 countries are involved in the air-strikes - and this is quite a major feat, especially if one considers that the Germans are full participants. 13 countries are there, but almost 70% of the fire power has been American. Most of the cruise missiles and strategic bombers are provided by the Pentagon, and the operations rely mainly on US strategic reconnaissance, satellite intelligence and high tech communications. In effect, Europe is playing an active supporting role, but everybody has realized how much it depends on the United States for the conduct of military operations. This real-life demonstration of Europe's military weakness is, in my view, a wake-up call. A number of initiatives have been underway for some time to shape a European Security and Defense Identity. It is high time to speed them up and to bring them to fruition. Even if the Europeans have a long way to go, there has been several fairly auspicious developments in the past few months, both at the institutional and the operational level. Let me run through them quickly. First of all, there is a marked change of attitude on the part of some European countries, to which I have already alluded: the willingness of France to work within NATO; Germany's readiness to participate in military action outside its territory, even if that action is coercive. And then something I have not yet mentioned but which is key for the development of a European defense: the change of attitude in the UK. The Franco-British declaration of Saint Malo, last December, in my view, hailed a new departure. By agreeing to give a defense dimension to the European Union, the British Government has made it possible to bridge the gap between the construction of Europe as a civil power and its accomplishment into a full-fledged international actor. In institutional terms, the British change of attitude should make it possible to speed up the process of merger of the WEU into the EU, to which a number of our countries are already committed. For this, we can build on the Amsterdam Treaty, which just entered into force at the beginning of this month. That Treaty in itself marks quite an evolution on the part of yet another set of countries, the traditionally "neutral" members of the EU. By agreeing to include the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty - and I remind you that the Petersberg task include peace-enforcement - the neutrals have conceded that the EU can now take real security responsibilities. What is remarkable in the current situation is that this change of attitude does not happen only on this side of the Atlantic; it is also occurring among our American friends. We are all familiar with the old debate on burden-sharing, whereby the Americans kept pressing the Europeans to increase their contribution to the Alliance, while they demonstrated great reluctance to see the same Europeans take more responsibility. This is no longer true. Today, our American friends keep nudging us to do more for our own defense - with good reasons - but they are also much more ready to devolve responsibility. I was very pleased, indeed, to see our heads of states and governments in Washington declare their readiness to "define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance" [communiqué, par. 10]. Of course, a number of difficult operational issues remain to be settled: which capabilities and common assets will the non-EU NATO members, and in particular the Americans, be willing to earmark for EU-led operations? by which process will these capabilities and assets be devolved? what will be the exact terms of reference for the European Deputy to SACEUR, who will be entrusted with the command of European-led operations? how will the EU have access to NATO planning capabilities, and how will NATO's defense planning system be adapted to take the European component into account? People often say that the devil is in the details. Perhaps. But I am convinced that "if there is a will, there is a way." And this will today is present, on both sides of the Atlantic. The ambitious joint WEU-NATO crisis management exercise planned for 2000 will be an important step to help us identify exactly where we are, and what remains to be done. A number of us, at the Assembly, are convinced that the year 2000 will be a key year for ESDI. This is why I have decided to devote part of my presidency to a long-term study on ESDI. This study will be the result of the collective thinking of the leading members of the Assembly, building on the work of our various committees. I want it to focus our energies and attention for an entire year, beginning next month, so that the Assembly can fulfill its role as a major forum where the key questions of European security are debated and future orientations spelled out. Then, it is up to each of our members, armed with new insights and ideas, and more aware of constraints, to play his or her role in the national debate and shape the decision of his or her government. One of the issues to which I will be particularly attentive in my study is how to make sure that those members of NATO that are not in the EU do not find themselves isolated by the development of a European Defense Identity. And here I am thinking not only of Turkey and Norway, but also of the Alliance's new members, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It would be a sad irony, indeed, if the adhesion of the three to NATO was to coincide with their marginalization because the Alliance is now moved by a new dynamic! I am sure this will not happen. In effect, in Washington the Allies have reiterated how much they care to ensure "the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations". This call was answered appropriately by the WEU Defense and Foreign ministers meeting in Bremen two weeks ago. The Ministers took steps to fully integrate the WEU Associate members - including the new Associates, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - in the process of redefining the WEU's relationship with NATO. At the Assembly, we have very active delegations from Turkey, Norway, and the three new members. I am counting very much on their input to help us identify the parameters of their involvement in a way that would be satisfactory to them and yet not unduly constrain EU action. Finally, let me address one more issue: the Europeans will not be able to take a major responsibility in the management of crises on the continent if they are not ready to step up their defense effort. Today, the combined defense budgets of all the European allies is only 60% of that of the United States, and the technological gap is increasing. Now, one could argue that the US has much broader world-wide responsibilities than the Europeans. It also has requirements that are not perceived as vital by the Europeans - for example missile defense. One can also ask whether the sophistication of some weapons systems is really necessary. But Kosovo has again shown the overwhelming technological superiority of the American military, whether in the ability to fight at night, to target weapons with precision, to collect and process data and information in real time, and to deploy the range of military assets capable to operate across a wide spectrum of engagement scenarios. These means, I would argue, are not superfluous; they even become indispensable in a situation like Kosovo where political constraints require constant fine-tuning in the conduct of the war. The Europeans will probably never maintain the same capabilities as the Americans. But they have to make a major effort, in the years to come, to build up their strategic lift capability, develop their reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering assets, modernize their command and control systems, and complete the ongoing reform of their armed forces to make them more flexible and quickly deployable. The Alliance Defense Capabilities Initiative launched in Washington can provide a road map. But in the end, it is up to each NATO member to decide whether is it ready to make the effort and commit the necessary resources. Obviously, parliamentarians have a major responsibility here and I will make sure that our Defense Committee in the Assembly addresses the matter seriously. CONCLUSION At the end of this broad-brush overview of the Alliance from a parliamentary perspective, let me reassert a conviction and a commitment: the conviction: the Alliance's ability to serve as the major anchor for the stability of Europe as a whole in the future largely depends on the outcome of the operation in Kosovo. Milosevic must not be allowed to succeed in his murderous enterprise. This is a matter of the values in which we believe, and on which our Alliance is founded. It is also a matter of credibility for NATO. the commitment: I will do everything in my power, as president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, so that the consensus of our parliamentarians and behind them, of public opinion, to back NATO's action, is maintained.

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