HomeDOCUMENTSCommittee Reports2002 Annual SessionAV 195 PC/TR(02)4 - Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations. 'Arms control and the Transatlantic Partnership after September 11, 2001'
Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations. 'Arms control and the Transatlantic Partnership after September 11, 2001'
Rapporteur : Karl A. LAMERS (Germany - Allemagne)
I. BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM 1
II. DIPLOMACY AND THE "WAR ON TERRORISM" 3
III. TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 5
IV. THE "AXIS OF EVIL" 5
V. TACKLING THE CHALLENGE OF PROLIFERATION OF WMD 8
VI. BEYOND THE ABM TREATY 10
VII. ARMS CONTROL AND THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION TO TERRORISTS: LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES 14
VIII. CHALLENGES TO TRANSATLANTIC UNITY - TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS? 17
IX. CONCLUSIONS 18
1.The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the USA marked a watershed for international security. Indeed, these terrible events have caused a paradigm shift for the security of the Alliance and the world, making the fight against terrorism a top priority on the international security agenda.
2.This report provides a short overview of the diplomatic efforts in the international combat against terrorism and addresses an urgent task for the international community: the prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of terrorists. In this context, the paper briefly evaluates programmes and agreements that limit WMD proliferation, giving special emphasis to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme (CTR). Moreover, your Rapporteur looks more broadly at recent arms control developments and briefly addresses agreements that contribute directly or indirectly to limiting WMD proliferation. Finally, the report concludes by identifying some of the challenges that transatlantic partners need to tackle in the area of non-proliferation
I.BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM
3.Prior to 11 September, European and American views differed on the primary security threats to the member countries of the Alliance. Europeans were likely to view ethnic conflict and instability in the Balkans as most threatening, while Americans considered terrorist attacks against US military installations abroad, the rise of China, a North Korean attack on South Korea or a "rogue" state firing a missile at the United States as potential menaces. The September 2001 terror attacks made the "war on terrorism" the top priority in international security. President Bush declared to a joint session of Congress on September 20 that "the United States will direct every resource at its command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network."
4.On September 12, 2001, one day after the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, for the first time in its history. But NATO has also contributed militarily to the international fight against terrorism: At the outset of the crisis, the United States asked for a range of specific measures, such as enhanced intelligence support; blanket overflight rights for US and other Allied aircraft and access to ports and airfields. This was quickly granted. Moreover, elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces were deployed to the eastern Mediterranean, and some US assets in the Balkans were replaced by European capabilities. Most significant was the move of seven NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft from their base in Europe across the Atlantic to replace US aircraft that were transferred to Asia. In operation Noble Eagle, NATO AWACS planes have been patrolling US airspace from October 2001 to summer 2002. In addition, NATO Allies deployed troops in Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as committing naval forces to the Arabian Sea. NATO is looking at how to adapt its capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat and "asymmetric" threats such as cyber warfare, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
5.In the wake of the September 11 attacks NATO-Russia cooperation has greatly intensified. Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, offered the US broad support for anti-terrorist operations on September 24, 2001. When the Foreign Ministers of NATO and Russia gathered in Brussels in December, they "condemned terrorism in all its manifestations" and agreed "to spare no efforts in bringing to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of such acts and in defeating the scourge of terrorism". The urgent need to increase the scope and depth of NATO-Russia consultations has allowed for dramatic progress on the political level, leading to the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on May 28, agreed upon by Heads of State and Government from NATO member countries and the Russian Federation. The NRC replaces the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and represents a qualitatively higher level of cooperation by providing "a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region". Among these, the NRC provides for regular and frank exchanges on the entire spectrum of the terrorist threat, including the risks of nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation. The Council will take decisions by consensus, all working "as equal partners" and meeting on a regular basis to raise levels of understanding and trust.
6.The US has knit together a broad international coalition to combat terrorism. After September 11, the Bush administration has not "gone it alone", but has opted to take the issue of terrorism to the UN This was a crucial step in gaining international legitimacy. Diplomatic, legal, financial and humanitarian actions in the war on global terrorism taken by the US and the international coalition since September 11, 2001 include:
7.Legislation and Diplomatic Actions: The US has received 46 multilateral declarations of support. In addition to NATO's invocation of Article 5, the Organisation of American States (OAS) invoked the Rio Treaty, while the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) allies invoked their treaty obligations to support the United States. As a consequence, 20 nations have deployed to the US Central Command's area of responsibility with over 16,500 troops. Until today, 136 countries have offered some kind of military assistance. As to joint diplomatic efforts, the UN General Assembly and Security Council condemned the attacks. UN Security Council Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, requires UN member states to take effective measures against those who commit terrorist acts and their supporters by improving law enforcement and by promoting international cooperation. The resolution also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) from representatives of member states of the Council to monitor implementation of the resolution. By early autumn of 2002, the CTC has received detailed reports on implementation of counter-terrorism measures from 174 out of all 189 UN member states. As a next step, the CTC will identify the gaps in each nation's programmes and coordinate assistance where necessary. Each nation is obliged to take the necessary steps to carry out the requirements of the resolution as well as any of the 12 terrorism conventions it ratifies. International diplomatic cooperation has also increased on the regional level. For example, Parliamentarians from 19 NATO Member States and 17 Associate Parliaments passed a declaration on the fight against terrorism at the 47th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Ottawa in October 2001. Moreover, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) passed a comprehensive Action Plan on Combating Terrorism in December 2001. In addition, the US and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a "Joint Declaration for Cooperation To Combat International Terrorism" on August 1, 2002. The declaration calls for expanded intelligence-sharing and more effective counter-terrorism policies and calls on all the ASEAN members to become parties to all 12 of the United Nations conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
8.Financial actions: The US and other governments have taken action to freeze terrorist bank accounts and disrupt fund-raising and recruitment. The US has now designated 189 individuals, organisations and financial supporters of terrorism; $112 million have been blocked by the US alone. Moreover, international cooperation to disrupt the flows of money to terrorist groups has significantly improved. The UN published a list of 293 individuals and entities whose financial assets must be frozen, and the European Union issued three lists of designated terrorists and terrorist groups for blocking orders. One hundred and sixty countries have issued orders freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist organisations. The abuse of charities such as the "Afghan Support Committee" or "Al Haramain Islamic Foundation" by terrorist groups has been denounced while everything is being done to track them. In September 2002, leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreed on a scheme to tackle movements of illicit money outside the formal banking system and to combat financial crimes by speeding up the fight against money laundering. Many countries fully support the eight Special Recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on terrorist financing agreed in October 2001. The 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism came into force on April 10, 2002. However, despite international efforts to freeze al-Qaeda's assets, the organisation still has access to "considerable and other economic resources", according to a draft United Nations report issued in late August 2002.
9.Law Enforcement Actions: Since September 11, 2001, law enforcement agencies have arrested more than 2,400 people (some 1,300 of whom have proven or suspected ties to al-Qaeda) in more than 90 countries affiliated to terrorist networks. Transatlantic cooperation has been strengthened by a December 2001 Europol-US agreement to increase intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation. Within the European Union, the creation of a special Europol Terrorism Unit and of Eurojust, a coordinating body between member-states' law-enforcement agencies, will permit the establishment of joint investigative teams including police and law enforcers of another state and practical steps to increase the cooperation between Europe's intelligence and law-enforcement agencies to combat terrorism. Exchanges of police intelligence and the terror intelligence network have expanded, thanks to bilateral agreements between the United States and non-NATO countries such as Sudan, Malaysia and Yemen in the Asia-Pacific Region and Switzerland in Europe. In France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Morocco special commissions have been set up to coordinate investigations and information-sharing with the US. According to Richard Armitage, a US Deputy Secretary of State, "dramatic improvements in bilateral intelligence collection and sharing" have been made since 9-11.
10.Assistance to Afghanistan: The international community has pledged $1.8 billion in aid this year and $4.5 billion over the next five years. Since October 2001, the US and coalition partners have delivered over 500,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan. However, implementation of reconstruction aid has been sluggish. The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) led by President Hamid Karzai has placed security, education, health care and road improvements at the top of its reconstruction agenda. To support the Afghan police, the international community has deployed a 20-nation, 5,000-strong peacekeeping force in Kabul (International Security Assistance Force - ISAF, currently led by Turkey). On May 23 the UN Security Council extended ISAF's mandate until December 20, but has not expanded its area of operation beyond Kabul, the capital, as repeatedly requested by Hamid Karzai, the Afghan President. Afghanistan also receives assistance in building up, inter alia, an Afghan National Army (ANA) and police force.
II.DIPLOMACY AND THE "WAR ON TERRORISM"
11.Senior US officials have repeatedly stressed that a large part of the "war on terrorism" is not a military campaign. As Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of defense, said in a March 27 interview with the Wall Street Journal Asia, "an awful lot of it is law enforcement, intelligence work, tracking down bank accounts, a whole range of activities". Diplomacy can generate multilateral cooperation that offers the best hope of defeating the scourge of international terrorism. According to Ambassador Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department, "multilateral cooperation is essential to success on the three major fronts in the campaign against terrorism".
12.The first phase of the "war on terrorism", i.e. the military campaign in Afghanistan, has been successful in destroying the Taliban. US forces, assisted by troops from the international coalition, continue to locate and engage the remaining pockets of terrorists and their supporters. However, as Shahram Chubin, the director of research at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, told the Sub-Committee in early March, Afghanistan cannot be considered a "blueprint" for the international fight against terrorism. Instead, it was a campaign with fairly traditional aims, namely to destroy a regime - the Taliban - that gave safe harbour to a terrorist group that had directly attacked the US.
13.The second phase of the "war on terrorism" will be more diffuse and more sensitive diplomatically. Senior Pentagon officials have said that al-Qaeda alone has operatives in 68 countries. The US is turning to rooting out al-Qaeda cells in countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Georgia, and especially Yemen. Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, declared that "it is not the coalition that defines the mission", rather that the mission defines the coalition. Thus, the international coalition that the United States has managed to put together embraces a diverse group of countries, including some with poor human rights records including, for example, Uzbekistan and the Afghan Northern Alliance. Moreover, maintaining the cohesion of the alliance in an area as divided and conflict-torn as the Middle East is going to be critical to its success. The continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the challenge of how to deal with the regime of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad are factors that further complicate the task. Some Arab and Muslim states are already reluctant to cooperate with the US, given their fears of domestic instability and the popular belief that the US is insensitive to Arab and Muslim concerns.
14.There are also some serious rifts between some of the putative allies of the US, most obviously in the simmering conflict between India and Pakistan. Thus, your Rapporteur would caution that alliances of convenience may be necessary, but could come with the potential of great risk. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security advisor, has warned in a September 4 article in the International Herald Tribune: "The risk is that America's non-politically defined war on terrorism may thus be hijacked and diverted to other ends. The consequences would be dangerous. If America comes to be viewed by its key democratic allies in Europe and Asia as morally obtuse and politically naïve in failing to address terrorism in its broader and deeper dimensions - and if it is also seen by them as uncritically embracing intolerant suppression of ethnic or national aspirations - global support for America's policies will surely decline. America's ability to maintain a broadly democratic anti-terrorist coalition will suffer gravely."
15.America's NATO Allies can play a significant role in the fight against terrorism and in making this world a safer place through a wide array of political, diplomatic, military, and other tools. In Afghanistan, Europeans are providing more than 95% of the ISAF and almost 50% of civil reconstruction aid. The EU provides 55% of international assistance world-wide and as much as two-thirds of the world's grant aid. It is important not to neglect the underlying causes of terrorism: religious fanaticism, mass poverty, illiteracy, despair, and frustration. The challenge ahead is not only how to prevail in the next military confrontation, but how to help transform societies so that they do not produce terrorists. We may win wars with the combined strength of our military forces, but we will win the peace only if we address these problems in a sustained and credible manner. This requires an ongoing, concerted U.S.-European effort and renewed emphasis on nation building, crisis prevention, and foreign aid. That the UN, too, can play a prominent role in the diplomatic efforts to combat terrorism was demonstrated by its role in mandating sanctions against Libya for the latter's responsibility in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing. This was significant as the first instance when the world community imposed sanctions against a country in response to its complicity in an act of terrorism.
III.TERRORISM AND WMD
16.The critical focus of the second phase in the anti-terror struggle is on preventing terrorist groups from obtaining WMD. Senior US policy-makers have identified terrorism that uses WMD as the most dangerous threat to the US. As, for example, Senator Joseph Biden, the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and head of the Senate delegation to the NATO PA, said at a February 4 speech at the Centerre for Strategic and International Studies: "In my book, not to mention that of the (military) Joint Chiefs and the National Intelligence Estimate, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (…) is the greatest threat we face". President Bush said on December 11, 2001 in a speech at The Citadel, a military college in Charleston, South Carolina, that stopping terrorists from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction was America's next priority in the war on terrorism. Indeed, terrorists have already shown an increased interest in obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. Bin Laden has publicly pronounced that he considers it his religious duty to obtain them.
17.Evidence of terrorists' intentions -- uncovered in their training camps, safe houses, caves and tunnels in Afghanistan -- has included instructions for making chemical weapons, diagrams of US nuclear power plants and public water facilities, descriptions of key American historic landmarks, and maps of U.S. cities. George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stressed in testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 6, 2002 that terrorist groups world-wide have ready access to information on chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons via the Internet, and that "we know that al-Qaeda was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins". In August this year, CNN broadcast videos made by al-Qaeda showing poisonous gas tests. According to Tenet, documents recovered from al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan showed that Bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research programme and that the US believed that he was seeking to acquire or develop a nuclear device. Moreover, he added "al-Qaeda may be pursuing a radioactive dispersal device -what some call a 'dirty bomb'".
18.The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that more than 100 countries may have inadequate control programmes to prevent the theft of radioactive materials that could be used to make a "dirty bomb". One known attempt to terrorise using radioactive material was a 1996 case when Chechen rebels placed a container with caesium-137 in a Moscow park. Fortunately, the material was not dispersed. A recent CNN report referred to a 25-page document about nuclear weapons and design found abandoned in Afghanistan. Two Pakistani scientists are also thought to have shared their knowledge with the al-Qaeda network, according to the account. In addition, a former member of al-Qaeda provided testimony in a New York federal court in 2001 that he had set up meetings in Khartoum in the 1990s to help the network try to acquire uranium. Radio Free Europe also reported last year on a failed al-Qaeda attempt to acquire nuclear warheads from Chechen rebels in Russia in 1998. Although as yet very few terrorist incidents involving WMD have really occurred, according to Jason Pate, a senior research associate at the Monterey Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, they appear to be increasing and, after the 2001 anthrax letters, a threshold has been crossed. Although the source of the October 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States remains undetermined, they have served as a graphic example of the havoc - material and psychological - that such an attack can wreak.
IV.THE "AXIS OF EVIL"
19.However, despite the recent emphasis on non-state actors, state actors or state-sponsored actors deserve continued attention, as they can pose a threat and share information, technologies and capabilities with non-state actors, especially terrorist groups. This is particularly important, as the development of these weapons generally requires greater resources. A recent report on biological weapons by the US National Intelligence Council stated that more than a dozen states are known to possess, or are actively pursuing, offensive biological capabilities. Approximately 20 countries are believed to be actively seeking chemical warfare capabilities, according to Amy Sands, the deputy director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the so-called "states of concern" feature on this list. According to Mr Tenet, the director of the CIA, WMD programmes are becoming more advanced and effective as they mature while states of concern become more aggressive in pursuing them. Moreover, the diffusion of technology over time enables proliferators to draw on the experience of others and to develop more advanced weapons more quickly than they otherwise could. Proliferators are also becoming more self-sufficient, and are taking advantage of the dual-use nature of WMD -- and missile-related technologies to establish advanced production capabilities and to conduct WMD -- and missile-related research under the guise of legitimate commercial or scientific activity.
20.In a March 18 speech in O'Fallon, Missouri, President Bush promised that the United States would work to prevent dangerous regimes from acquiring WMD. He said: "There's more to the war on terror than one single individual or one single network. The nightmare scenario is for our nation to tire and weary, and allow an al-Qaeda organisation or an al-Qaeda type organisation to mate up with a nation which has developed WMD, a nation which has got a history of treating her people poorly, a dictatorial nation. We cannot allow the world's worst regimes to develop the world's worst weapons, and therefore hold the United States and our allies hostage."
21.Earlier, in his State of the Union address on January 29, Bush warned that countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and their terrorist allies, constitute "an axis of evil" posing "a grave and growing danger" for their pursuit of WMD. He said that the United States "will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver" WMD. However, President Bush's putting North Korea and Iran in the same category as Iraq raised concerns about military action against all three and re-ignited fears of a more aggressive brand of U.S. unilateralism.
22.North Korea's nuclear weapons programme has raised serious concerns for many years. According to John Bolton, the US Under-Secretary of State for arms control and international security, North Korea "has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two nuclear weapons." The regime has thus far been unwilling to submit its nuclear programme and sites to full inspection by the IAEA. North Korea has a minimum of 2,500 tons of lethal chemicals and is "exerting its utmost efforts to produce chemical weapons" said a recent Defence White Paper published by the South Korean government. Moreover, the CIA says that North Korea "has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many programmes". North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities. The CIA has concluded that North Korean customers include such countries as Iran, Libya, and Syria. Nevertheless, the United States, with the Republic of Korea and Japan, is prepared to "take big steps to help the North transform itself and move our relations toward normalcy," said Bolton in a speech on August 29. Accordingly James Kelley, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited Pyongyang in early October and held "frank, but useful" discussions on WMD, missile development programmes and missile exports.
23.There has been an increasingly intense international discussion over Iraq in the last few months. Saddam Hussein has been seeking to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. He used chemical weapons against Iran and his own people, and both invaded his neighbours and launched ballistic missiles against them. The Iraqi leader has repeatedly refused to comply with UN resolutions. When UN weapons inspectors left Iraq four years ago, they concluded that Saddam had the design and the ability to build a nuclear bomb but lacked weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. However, the precise nature of Iraq's arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is unclear. Hans Blix, the executive chairman of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC), recently said that the commission did not have solid evidence that Iraq has WMD, but that many questions were left unanswered when UN weapons inspectors were expelled from Iraq in 1998. New satellite photographs also make it "imperative" that international weapons inspectors be allowed into the country, he said.
24.Senior US officials, notably President Bush, Vice-President Cheney and Mr Rumsfeld, the defense Secretary, stressed that Saddam Hussein poses a deep and growing threat to the international community. Signals from US officials had raised concerns among allies that the US might launch military action against the Iraqi regime even without international support. For example, Vice-President Cheney had argued that it would be a useless, if not a dangerous delay, to seek a United Nations resolution requiring that Iraq submit to weapons inspectors. President Bush said that "doing nothing about that serious threat is not an option." When the Sub-Committee met with, among others, Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar this July, the former encouraged European colleagues to come up with "new ideas" on Iraq. The European contribution was important, he stressed, not only in deciding the best strategy to tackle the threat, but in helping to rebuild the nation after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
25.The great majority of NATO allies prefers to avoid military action in Iraq, because they fear that the US might be gearing up for conflict at a time of great tension in the Middle East. A war has the potential to undermine the anti-terror coalition and alienate moderate Arab countries. However, they agree that the Iraqi regime represents the most dangerous security challenge, and that collective military action might eventually be necessary to make the regime comply with UN resolutions.
26.Therefore, President Bush's September 12 declaration to the United Nations General Assembly that the United States would work with the Security Council in a multilateral effort to press Iraq to meet disarmament and other commitments to the United Nations was welcomed by the international community. As a consequence of President Bush's powerful speech, Iraq agreed to allow the return of weapons inspectors. However, the agreement reached by Hans Blix was considered insufficient by the US because it is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which exempts so-called "presidential sites" - militarised compounds sprawling over 12 square miles - from surprise inspections. In addition, the resolution requires the UN to uncover, rather than Baghdad to declare, Iraq's weapons inventory. The US, supported by the United Kingdom, is pushing for a tough new UN resolution allowing the use of force if Iraq fails to cooperate with intrusive inspections. France, like Russia and China, opposes a single resolution to authorise military action, and has proposed that military action could be authorised in a second UN resolution. At the time of writing, intricate negotiations were under way at the United Nations.
27.The discussions about Iraq have revealed major disputes over important questions, namely about alternatives to war and timing, as well as possible consequences. Among the questions raised are whether the Iraqi regime can be "contained" and "deterred" or if disarmament is possible without "regime change"? There is no clear evidence that Saddam is cooperating with al-Qaeda and some American critics have voiced concern that a military campaign to disarm the Iraqi leader would detract from the war against terrorism. However, President Bush stressed that "confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror." Although analysts do not doubt that a US-led military campaign would be successful, there are differing assessments of how the Iraqi people would react during and after a war. Moreover, the possible impact of military action against the Iraqi regime on Middle East security is far from certain. Last, but not least, a number of analysts and diplomats have raised the question whether military action in Iraq would be possible without authorisation by a UN Security Council resolution.
28. Iran is another country that featured on President Bush's list of "states of concern". It strongly opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan and provided limited support to the American-led military campaign last year, but US officials have said that Iran's intelligence apparatus, controlled by hard-line clerics, may be giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda members. Iran appears split between a pro-reform population and elected government on the one hand and irredeemably anti-American mullahs who hold the power. The country's WMD and missile programmes require the international community's attention and action. Iran has publicly declared its desire to acquire nuclear weapons and its acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles poses a threat not only to NATO Allies but also to Russia. In contrast, the EU is prepared to forge a trade and cooperation agreement with Teheran just as the US government has deemed it an "evil" sponsor of terror.
29.Chris Patten, an EU commissioner, has argued that the European policy of "constructive engagement" with Iranian moderates and North Korea appears much more likely to bring results than a US policy which so far consists of "more rhetoric than substance". However, Senator Joseph Biden told the Sub-Committee in July that he encouraged any effort by the US to support the reformers in that country, and assured his European colleagues that Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor, shared this view. Even though Robert Simmons, the deputy director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs at the Department of State, said that the State Department held the view that even if the reformers in Iran were to have the upper hand in their struggle with the conservative clerics, Teheran would still try to develop WMD and missile capabilities. In this context, the US government has repeatedly voiced serious concerns about Russia's assistance to the Iranian nuclear energy programme.
30.Russia will be a crucial partner in reining in dangers emanating from "states of concern". It has traditionally strong economic and diplomatic ties with Iraq and would pose the biggest obstacle in the UN Security Council to any US-led military action against Mr Hussein. Moscow also has good relations with Iran and North Korea. In addition, Russian and Chinese firms continue to sell dual-use materials as well as missile technology to "states of concern", thereby enabling those nations to overcome developmental hurdles and to build more sophisticated longer-range missile systems. Russia has been, and continues to be, the key to an improved inspections and sanctions regime. The new NRC can make an important contribution to intensifying efforts in the struggle against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, as well as arms control and confidence-building measures.
V.TACKLING THE CHALLENGE OF PROLIFERATION OF WMD
31.US officials describe the threat posed today by the proliferation of WMD as diverse, unpredictable and dangerous. But while there is ample reason for concern, proliferation is not out of control and the risk of proliferation is not in itself greater now than before 9/11, Joseph Cirincione, the director of the non-proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told members of the Sub-Committee this July. Nonetheless, with regard to the primary categories of WMD proliferation, the threat by chemical and biological weapons continues to grow, for a variety of reasons. The dual-use nature of many chemical and biological weapons (CBW) agents make the assessment of offensive programmes very complicated. Many chemical and biological production capabilities are hidden in plants that are virtually indistinguishable from genuine commercial facilities. Furthermore, the technology behind CW and BW agents is spreading. In the next several years, the continuing revolution in technology is likely to accentuate the dual-use problem related to biotech breakthroughs in biomedical engineering, genomic profiling, genetic modification and drug development. What is more, the proliferation of CBW continues to change in ways that make it more difficult to monitor and control, according to senior US officials.
32.Multilateral export control arrangements related to WMD that were strengthened after the 1991 Gulf War form an important part in a set of policy tools for addressing the CBW proliferation threat. The four major export control arrangements are the Australia Group (for chemical and biological items), the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA- for advanced conventional weapons). No system is perfect, and export controls cannot prevent WMD proliferation, but they can buy time for other policies to work. The US is right to call on the rest of the world, particularly Europe, to take the threat of proliferation more seriously. NATO Defence Ministers stated at a meeting in Brussels on December 18, 2001 that the forces of most Allies still have significant shortfalls in their ability to deal with the risks of a proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means.
33.Though there has been tremendous concern about unconventional weapons materials or know-how proliferating to terrorists or states that support terrorism since the break-up of the Soviet Union, little international effort has been undertaken to deal with this problem. According to the National Intelligence Council's 2002 "Report on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces", weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes. Among the Allies, it has been primarily the United States that addressed this challenge. To increase security at weapon storage and production facilities, destroy weapons, convert military facilities and keep scientists from selling their expertise to states or sub-national groups, the US Congress initiated the Nunn-Lugar programme, referred to as the CTR programme in 1991. Between 1992 and 2002 the CTR programme, which is run through the US Departments of Defense, State and Energy, provided approximately $7 billion for projects in the former Soviet Union. Of that amount, over $4.9 billion was spent on assistance to Russia. For FY 2002, United States Government security-related assistance for Russia totals over $870 million. Except for minor necessary adjustments, the programmes are effective and well run, according to a December 2001 US administration review of non-proliferation assistance to Russia. As The Economist reported recently, the US has helped Russia improve security at about half the sites that store nuclear materials. Therefore, a substantial amount of work still needs to be done in the nuclear field alone. With 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, most of which is weaponised, Russia has declared the world's largest stockpile of chemical agents.
34.Russia also had the world's largest biological weapons programme and, according to Carl Ford, the assistant Secretary of state for Intelligence and Research, still has offensive BW capability. Given the heightened concern over the threat of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to terrorists, more emphasis needs to be placed on destroying and safeguarding the former Soviet Union's chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Although programmes exist to address these dangers, they receive a small fraction of the overall funding. Senator Joseph Biden estimated that a multi-pronged strategy aimed at securing Russia's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and technology -- including a write-off of some Soviet-era debt -- would cost some $45 billion.
35.In addition to US activities, a few other countries have provided a modest amount of funding for similar programmes. For example, Germany contributed DM 63 million, or approximately €32 million, between 1998 and 2001 and approximately €7.2 million in 2002. The UK government announced in 2000 that it would contribute up to £12 million between 2001 and 2004 towards high-priority chemical demilitarisation and biological non-proliferation projects in Russia. The EU established a "Cooperation Programme for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation" in December 1999. Concentrating on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium released through the bilateral US-Russia disarmament process, and on supporting the building of chemical warfare agent destruction facilities, it provided €8.9 million in both 1999 and 2000 and approximately €6.1 million in 2001. The current programme is in force until June 2003, and additional projects may be defined in the course of 2002.
36.A big step forward to strengthen non-proliferation is the G-8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction that was agreed upon at the G-8 Summit in Canada in late June 2002. The Partnership foresees spending up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to help Russia and other former Soviet states to secure and destroy their nuclear, chemical and biological weapon stockpiles and materials. Under the initiative, known as "10 plus 10 over 10", the United States will supply half of the funding, while Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom will contribute the rest. Other countries, aside from these G-7 nations, were also invited to contribute toward meeting the $20 billion goal. In essence, the G-8 agreement provides that the US will continue its current level of threat reduction expenditure for the next 10 years, while the other G-8 countries will match the U.S. commitment. It is important to note that the G-8 said that it would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other countries that are prepared to adopt the programme guidelines.
37.The key priorities of the programme include assisting with the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons agents, dismantling Russia's decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, employing former Russian weapons scientists, and securing Russian fissile materials, which are estimated to total more than 1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and at least 150 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.
38.Any participating country will decide for itself what activities it wants to fund and will have to negotiate implementation details with Russia. Moscow pledged that it would grant such contributors the same rights and protections as it grants the United States, such as exemption from taxation and liability. In the past, Russian reluctance to provide other G-8 states with the same level of site access, tax exemptions and liability protection as that provided to Nunn-Lugar has been a major stumbling-block.
39.The G-8 countries and Russia pledged to review programmes under the initiative annually, and established nine general guidelines for their projects, including the need for the creation of milestones to measure implementation. In addition to the initiative, the G-8 adopted six principles to deny terrorists and the countries that support them access to WMD. These principles include broad political commitments to bolster border controls and to account for, protect, and destroy weapons-usable materials. The G-8 leaders also called on other countries to do the same.
VI.BEYOND THE ABM TREATY
40.US plans to develop a comprehensive missile defence (MD) system continue unabated, as the September 11 attacks led the Democrats in Congress to abandon efforts to limit the Bush administration's ballistic missile defence plans. In 2002, US$8.3 billion will be spent on missile defence. Two successful intercepts of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), on December 3, 2001, and on March 15, 2002, were conducted. To recognise the "national priority and mission emphasis on missile defence", according to the Department of Defense, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation was elevated to agency status, as the Missile Defense Agency, in early 2002.
41.Following an announcement on 13 December 2001 by President Bush, the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on June 13, 2002. In his speech President Bush argued that "the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks. The 1972 ABM Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. (…) Today, as the events of Sept. 11 made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction".
42.Russian reactions to the ABM withdrawal were relatively restrained. Lawmakers and the media voiced considerable criticism. Alexei Arbatov, a member of the Duma's Defence Committee, cautioned that the Bush administration's withdrawal from the treaty would strengthen those who are sceptical of the West, and of the US in particular. According to Arbatov, this might eventually force President Putin to slow down or perhaps even freeze the cooperation with the US on the issue of Afghanistan and Central Asia, but also on the "war on terrorism" and against the proliferation of WMD. Senior government officials, though they criticised the announcement to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in joint meetings with the NATO PA's Political, Defence and Security Committees and the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security in late March, were more optimistic about the bilateral and international consequences. While depicting the decision to scrap the ABM treaty as a "mistake", President Vladimir Putin said that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty "could not influence" Russian-American relations as this did not threaten Russia's national security. Russian Defence Ministry officials declared that the US MD system will not threaten Russia's security in the next 10-15 years, as it is set to modernise its nuclear forces.
43.President George W. Bush has said that he wants to overcome Cold War thinking and to replace the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). He has argued that traditional arms control treaties - especially the ABM Treaty - were relics of the Cold War, needing to be replaced by more flexible and informal arrangements. At their Moscow summit in late May, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed on a "New Strategic Framework" that involves "reducing offensive nuclear weapons, creating defensive systems that protect against missile attacks, strengthening non-proliferation and counter-proliferation measures, and cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism. President Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" - or "Moscow Treaty", which requires the United States and Russia to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 each by December 31, 2012 - a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own terms, START will remain in force until midnight December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.
44.In contrast to the START I Treaty which is 700 pages long and took 9 years to negotiate, the Moscow Treaty was concluded after only 6 months of negotiations and is merely three pages long. This treaty also differs from previous arms control treaties, as it does not call for exact equality in numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. Moreover, it does not limit the total number of strategic delivery vehicles or contain any sub-limits or bans on categories of strategic forces. Therefore, it allows Russia and the United States to store as many warheads as they want and to keep those bombers, missiles and submarines that will be removed from nuclear service. The treaty also does not contain verification provisions and neither side will have to meet the ceiling of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads until the last day of the treaty, Dec. 31, 2012.
45.The treaty indeed marks a new era in the relationship between the US and Russia and brings important benefits to both sides. Russia can scrap thousands of ageing nuclear weapons that it can ill afford and replace them with smaller numbers of a new intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, contrary to the Bush administration's original intentions, Russia also gets a legally binding agreement that will help to assuage hard-liners in its military and parliament who are critical towards the United States to keep its end of the bargain.
46.The US will retain the minimum number of warheads it considers necessary to deploy to deter a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on the United States or its Allies. It also can develop its nuclear force structure without requirements to meet detailed treaty limitations. Moreover, there is no longer any link between strategic reductions and constraints on missile defence, as there would have been with the agreements linked to START II's entry into force.
47.Accordingly, in their testimonies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 2002, Colin Powell, the secretary of state, and Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense, stressed the agreement's simplicity and high flexibility. Senator John Warner, the chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, praised the treaty, noting that it allowed the US and Russia to deploy their warheads in a manner "consistent with each nation's security requirements and to adapt to changes in the international security environment". It must be noted here that those who were sceptical of the US administration's decision to terminate the ABM Treaty were wrong: the abrogation of the ABM Treaty has not led to an arms race; instead Russia has asked for an agreement to reduce the number of nuclear missiles by approximately two-thirds.
48.However, some independent experts and arms-control advocates have raised concern about the retention of warheads and delivery systems, and argued that the treaty could perpetuate the U.S.-Russian nuclear rivalry and could encourage nuclear proliferation. Critics point out that treaty's structure encourages no reduction in the Russian strategic arsenal and that the new treaty sets aside some arms control gains in START II which would have eliminated all remaining land-based missiles with multiple warheads. Moreover, because the new treaty gives Washington and Moscow until 2012 to get down to the 1,700-2,200 warhead range, the number of warheads deployed in the interim is likely to be higher than it would have been under START II.
49.If the United States maintains substantial warhead reserves, as currently planned, Russia is likely to do the same. However, Russia's nuclear complex is far less secure than the United States', so stockpiled weapons and weapons components, including fissile material, pose a substantial, long-term proliferation threat. There is great concern that terrorists or rogue states could steal or buy nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials from Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex, which reportedly has enough nuclear material available for building another 40,000 nuclear weapons. Hence, as Senator Richard Lugar noted, the Moscow Treaty could possibly increase the long-term burden of safeguarding Russia's vast and insecure nuclear weapon complex and require additional US and European financial and technical aid.
50.As the Moscow Treaty does not impose limitations on the size of US and Russian nuclear forces after 2012, some critics have also expressed concern that it might negatively influence the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT entered into force in 1970 and officially recognises only five countries - the US, Russia, France, the UK and China - as possessing nuclear weapons and prohibits all other parties to the treaty from acquiring or developing them. The NPT's Article 6 commits nuclear-weapon states to aim for full nuclear disarmament in the future. Thus, non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) see the NPT as a bargain under which they agree to forego nuclear weapons entirely and the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) agree to negotiate the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. A significant number of NNWS have become dissatisfied with the lack of progress that the NWS are making towards fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations.
51.The Moscow Treaty allows the retention of thousands of weapons and does not impose limits on strategic nuclear weapons after 2012. It could therefore be questioned by those NNWS countries which accuse the US of cherry-picking which of the NPT obligations it wants to honour. They could, in the long term, consider how serious they should be about the NPT, the CBW conventions, and other measures that constrain them. In the same vein, NNWS have relied on assurances received in 1978 and 1995 that nuclear weapons would not be used against them unless, essentially, they attacked a nuclear country in alliance with another nuclear-weapon state.
52.Some critics maintained that the Bush administration's classified but leaked 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would undercut those assurances. According to newspaper reports, the NPR discusses future roles of nuclear weapons, allegedly stressing the role of dissuasion and the defeat (of adversaries) alongside deterrence, specifically justifying the threat or use of nuclear weapons against an adversary's "high value targets", deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities, or in response to an opponent's "surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities". Nevertheless, the fundamental problem facing the NPT remains that three states with nuclear capabilities - India, Pakistan, and Israel - are not parties to the treaty, while North Korea and Iraq, which are parties to the NPT as NNWS, have covertly been attempting to develop nuclear weapons capabilities in direct violation of the NPT.
53.The Moscow Treaty is an important first step in the right direction. As Secretary Powell said, the treaty represents an important element of a strategic framework that involved a broad array of cooperative US-Russian efforts in political, economic and security areas. The treaty cannot be the answer to all challenges we face, and a number of important issues need to be addressed. For example, neither the Moscow Treaty, nor any other existing arms control treaty, addresses the thousands of short-range nuclear arms that still exist. These tactical nuclear weapons no longer serve any military purpose, but are especially vulnerable to theft or misuse. They are precisely the kind of weapons that terrorist groups like al-Qaeda would love to obtain. Russia has an unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons, with estimates ranging from 2,000 to 18,000.
54.With regard to international reactions to the ABM Treaty abrogation, China deplored the US decision, arguing that it is "worried about the negative impact of the US retreating from the ABM treaty" according to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue. China continues to oppose to US missile defence plans, fearing that a US MD system would render its deterrent force of two dozen ICBMs obsolete. Moreover, China is concerned that the US would deploy a protective shield over Taiwan or that it might transfer ballistic missile defence technology to the island.
55.Most European Allies of the US have been sceptical of missile defence and have opposed the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty. In recent months, however, indications that abrogation of the ABM treaty will not drastically alter US-Russian relations, and growing appreciation of the threat posed by WMD, have led to an apparent softening of the European position. In July 2002 US officials visited 12 NATO capitals to discuss the ways in which European Allies might participate in, and benefit from, the MD programme. The US has proposed a flexible plan in which each country could design its own level of participation, providing basing facilities, industrial cooperation, financial contributions or political support. The exact nature of any future missile defence system is unclear; the potential benefits or risks to European security cannot therefore be accurately quantified at this stage.
56.On one hand, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty could enhance European security by providing scope for greater allied international cooperation on missile defence. Shedding the 1972 agreement frees the US and Russia to pass technologies or components for systems capable of destroying long-range ballistic missiles to other countries. Moreover, the US can now transfer complete BMD systems and base defensive assets to counter these missiles in other countries. The end of the ABM Treaty and the 1997 demarcation agreements restricting sea-based missile defences and prohibiting weapons in space allow for the development of advanced space technologies.
57.A different perspective was given by experts at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), who told members of the Sub-Committee in early March this year that the ABM Treaty abrogation could, in the long term, spur missile proliferation. In their view, exports of missile defence systems might also raise interest in buying missiles, particularly those that can be equipped with warheads carrying WMD, thus countering efforts by the MTCR. Most European governments have avoided making overt endorsements of the MD system, also due, in part, to the fact that financial resources allocated to military investments are already scarce. As a British defence expert has recognised, as long as the nature of the MD system remains unclear, "early decisions are not needed, and future options should not be foreclosed".
VII.ARMS CONTROL AND THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION TO TERRORISTS: LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES
58.The central limitation of using the current arms control regime to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD is that treaties proscribe and prohibit the activities of states, not sub-national groups. They focus on thwarting proliferation between states and provide only limited value for preventing proliferation of weapons and weapons materials to terrorists and other sub-state entities. The most effective treaties are those that require signatories to pass national implementing legislation, but even those agreements are hampered by the variances across countries in such legislation and states' failures to provide the financial and political support to law enforcement authorities that is critical for effective implementation.
59.Nevertheless, non-proliferation measures, cooperative threat reduction and other arms control initiatives can help limit the opportunities for terrorists to acquire or develop WMD. The fewer governments that maintain CBW programmes, the fewer places terrorists will have to turn for technical assistance in the form of weapons materials, cookbooks, or human expertise. No regime provides perfect protection and progress is often incremental, but it is worth the effort of NATO Allies.
60.Although the ability of arms-control measures to help in the fight against terrorism should not be oversold, it must not be ignored either. As outlined above, the CTR, though focusing on countering proliferation to states, is the arms control initiative that has most visibly helped and will continue to help combat terrorism. In addition, agreements such as the BWC and the CWC can not only deprive other states of WMD but can significantly contribute to prevent those weapons from being transferred to terrorist groups. According to Mr Bolton, a US Under-Secretary of State, stopping the spread of missile and nuclear technology through non-proliferation efforts is a critical element of the new strategic framework.
61.Pointing out that Presidents Bush and Putin have agreed to step up cooperation on preventing the spread of WMD, Mr Bolton said that "we and the Russians have reaffirmed our support for important global treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the United States will continue to insist upon full compliance among their respective members. In addition to these global treaties, multilateral regimes such as the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement also play a critical role in controlling the export of sensitive or dual-use technology."
62.A number of international arms control agreements contribute directly or indirectly to reigning in the threat of proliferation. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of June this year, 165 states have signed and 93 have ratified the treaty. The CTBT will formally enter into force after 44 designated "nuclear capable states", i.e. the five declared nuclear powers, India, Israel, Pakistan, and 36 other states have ratified. Of the 44 nations, all except India, Pakistan and North Korea have signed, but only 31 have ratified the treaty. The US Senate voted against ratification in 1999 because of technical concerns about the treaty's verification mechanism and questions about the safety and reliability of US nuclear weapons. However, according to senior government officials, the US has no plans to end its voluntary moratorium.
63.The CTBT would create a world-wide system, including sensors in closed societies such as China and Iran, for monitoring clandestine nuclear explosions. This would reduce the nuclear proliferation threat. A January 2001 report by John Shalikashvili, a former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, concluded that the CTBT "is compatible with keeping a safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent and is an important part of global non-proliferation efforts." Shalikashvili argued that "perhaps more than any other nation, the United States would be negatively affected by an erosion of the international consensus on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation, by the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries or terrorist groups, or by a perception that nuclear weapons are instruments that could be readily used in regional conflicts."
64.Another report by the National Academy of Sciences, released on July 31 2002, came to similar findings, concluding that "the main technological concerns raised about the CTBT when the Senate refused to ratify it in 1999 are all manageable". The unanimous conclusion was that the collapse of the CTBT would pose a greater challenge to US security than if the treaty came into force. However, according to John Bolton, an Under-Secretary of State, the US administration is opposed to the CTBT and President Bush has no intention to ask the Senate to reconsider approving ratification.
65.The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has been signed by 145 countries and prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons as well as weapons and means of delivery. A major shortcoming of the BWC is its lack of a mechanism to conduct inspections to verify compliance. One party to the convention, the former Soviet Union, was able to conduct a massive covert BW programme during the 1970s and 1980s. To establish a mechanism for compliance, state parties negotiated on a legally binding protocol to enhance transparency and promote compliance between 1995 and July 2001.
66.However, the Bush Administration rejected the draft BWC Protocol in July because, as John Bolton, the Under-Secretary of State for arms control and international security, said, the US "found it to be a least common denominator compromise that, in our view, was worse than nothing." The US rejected the draft protocol because it was "based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons"; second, because the US felt that it would have compromised its national security and confidential business information; and third, because it feared that it would have been used by proliferators to undermine other effective international export control regimes. The December 2001 Review Conference was adjourned because of major disagreements on several issues, including "the way forward" for strengthening the Convention and on how to reflect compliance concerns. The Review conference was scheduled to reconvene in November 2002; however, this appears unlikely now, as the US, according to newspaper reports published in late September, has advised its Allies that it wants to delay further discussions until 2006.
67.Meanwhile the United States has promoted other ways to combat the threat of biological weapons through means that it considers "far more effective than the draft Protocol". Mr Bolton explained that the US measures primarily focus on two new U.S. laws -- the USA Patriot Act and the Public Health Security and Bio-terrorist Preparedness and Response Act - that would improve the US ability to combat the threat. Nevertheless, according to Mr Bolton, the United States has "placed great emphasis on working multilaterally and with like-minded groups" to combat the biological weapons threat. Another instrument to help control BW proliferation could be an international bio-security convention aiming at preventing unauthorised access to pathogens and regulating germ commerce. As experts at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey told the Sub-Committee in July, such a convention would produce a set of basic obligations and guidelines, which would be implemented in detail by each member state through its national legislation. This would strengthen the BWC, as it would hold individuals or groups accountable for violations of the BWC. Other measures to bolster non-p, roliferation of BW could include establishing government-industry relationships and the creation of an international association of biotech and drug companies to promote safe and ethical business practices. Nevertheless, although the BWC Protocol prepared for the 2001 Review Conference fell short of its goal to establish a comprehensive verification mechanism, the failure of state parties to agree on a protocol to enforce compliance is regrettable.
68.The CWC entered into force in April 1997 and has been signed by 169 countries. The convention bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons. It also prohibits the use or preparation for use of CW and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of anyone else to engage in activities prohibited by the CWC.
69.The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established in The Hague, Netherlands, administers the CWC for all nations that ratify or accede to the Treaty. Countries are required to report annually to the OPCW on their chemical production activities. In turn, the OPCW has the right to conduct inspections to verify the accuracy of state declarations, ensure that no prohibited activities are occurring, and to verify the destruction of any existing chemical weapons and related facilities. The CWC also imposes restrictions on the transfer of certain chemicals to countries not party to the Treaty.
70.The CWC obligates countries to destroy any chemical weapons and related production facility they possess by 2007. Because of a severe lack of funds, bureaucratic infighting and public concerns about environmental contamination, the Russian Federation delayed destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile it inherited from the Soviet Union, thus missing the required deadline to destroy 1% of the stockpiles by 2000. Moreover, due to a 10% budgetary shortfall at the OPCW in 2001 verification activities were drastically reduced, from 197 to 293 planned inspections. Refusal of several known and suspected chemical proliferators to join the treaty, including North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria pose serious problems.
71.As briefly outlined above, arms control agreements can, despite existing shortcomings, contribute to rein in, or at least limit, proliferation. Sub-Committee members were informed that multilateral efforts, especially the Conference on Disarmament (CD), could play an important role in non-proliferation because it included India, Pakistan, and Israel, i.e. non-NPT countries that have declared or are suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. One of the most difficult issues is how to deal with non-compliance, that is, how the international community could deal with countries that do not abide by treaty obligations. Clearly, ignoring violations will undermine existing treaties but also damage the trust in the arms control regime.
72.The issue of non-compliance has not been solved satisfactorily, and is a chief reason why arms control appears "in crisis", experts at the UNIDIR told the Sub-Committee during a visit to Geneva this spring. Though US officials have argued that the existing international arms control system must be strengthened, to "prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists or into the hands of states that support terrorism", a number of initiatives by the Bush administration have been perceived as confusing, according to UNIDIR experts in Geneva. The experts added that the Bush administration had mobilised existing concerns and had been prepared to put its concerns into effect. In fact, key members of the current Bush administration remain sceptical about arms control treaties as a matter of principle because they assume them to be incompatible with the flexibility that U.S. planning and forces require. It is argued that such arrangements are unnecessary, since friendly states do not need legally binding anti-proliferation agreements, whereas adversaries are likely to cheat on their commitments, thus undermining rather than increasing security. Thus, the US has decided to put aside improvements to the BWC, as the issue of "dual use" remains an area that made an agreement on biological weapons difficult.
73.Arms-control experts and US government officials told Members of the Sub-Committee during a visit to Washington and Monterey in July 2002 that they anticipated US non-proliferation efforts to be more and more based on a combination of military action, bilateral agreements and diplomatic efforts rather than on multilateral accords. While this approach may actually prove more efficient on a case-by-case basis, it comes at a cost. A stronger focus on bilateral solutions could, in the long run, make international agreements more difficult and even damage multilateral security regimes.
VIII.CHALLENGES TO TRANSATLANTIC UNITY - TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS?
74.Unfortunately, though close transatlantic cooperation is a crucial prerequisite for advancing international security, and arms control in particular, lately the partners have not always agreed on the aims or the means. Although 9/11 provided a strong momentum for greater cooperation, transatlantic solidarity and unity that sparked immediately after the terror attacks seemed to fade in the months that followed. US-European differences over threat perceptions, the means to apply to tackle security challenges and the role of international institutions (re-)emerged. The US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the global land-mine ban, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and other international agreements are being perceived by America's Allies as signs of a dismissive US attitude toward international treaties. The US is critical that NATO Allies, with few exceptions, do not follow up on their promise to improve military capabilities. Relatively little progress has been made to date in achieving the goals of the Defence Capabilities Initiative that was adopted by NATO at the 1999 Washington Summit, and your Rapporteur agrees that America's partners must do more to increase their military contributions.
75.Most recently, the decision of President Bush to "disengage" from the International Criminal Court (ICC) has generate a transatlantic controversy. The Bush administration is strongly opposed to the court, citing concerns that Americans would be unfairly singled out for politically motivated prosecutions abroad. The US administration seeks bilateral agreements with countries not to extradite Americans to the court, and even announced that it would oppose the renewal of UN Security Council mandates for all peacekeeping operations until US peacekeeping personnel were granted immunity from prosecution by the ICC.
76.A preliminary compromise was reached when UN Security Council Resolution 1422 was passed, stating that personnel of UN missions, including American peacekeepers, are exempted from court jurisdiction for one year. At present, the US administration is urging countries to sign separate agreements with the United States "as soon as possible" under Article 98 of the treaty that created the court, which the United States says allows countries to negotiate for immunity for their forces on a bilateral basis. Diplomats and human rights experts said that the ICC would be undermined by bilateral agreements with the US. Though not directly related to the "war on terror", the diplomatic sparring has come at an inopportune time in the effort against terrorism.
77.One of the reasons for the different views may be that the US considers itself as a global power, while Europeans regard themselves as a regional one. Moreover, as Sub-Committee members were repeatedly reminded in discussions with US interlocutors during the visit to the Washington, Americans find themselves at "war", while Europeans may not share this view. In European eyes, combating terrorism is first and foremost done by law enforcement agencies and the police, while Americans see a greater role for the military than their partners across the Atlantic. The US therefore tends to see the world through a "military prism", while Europeans would not. In a recent essay, political scientist Robert Kagan argues that transatlantic differences originated from a European behaviour that was "Kantian" - i.e., aiming at rights, balance and peace - while Americans see themselves in an anarchic world moulded by the Hobbesian idea of power.
78.During a joint visit with the Science and Technology's Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology in early July this year, members of the Sub-Committee had an opportunity to discuss different transatlantic views on the anti-terror campaign. While they agreed that the US and its Allies did not always see eye to eye on a number of issues, senior government officials and Congressional leaders in Washington rated media reports and commentaries that depicted the transatlantic partnership in "crisis" or that spotted a deep "cultural divide" between the US and its European Allies, as "overdone". Daniel Fried, the senior director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Security Council, stressed that the transatlantic relationship was in much better shape than depicted in newspaper articles. Nonetheless, though there is much progress on law enforcement cooperation in the "war on terrorism", different approaches remain.
79.Preventing terrorists from obtaining access to WMD is a key challenge for international security. In the global war on terrorism, President George W. Bush has succeeded in putting together a global alliance to counter the threat of terrorism by military, financial and economic, as well as diplomatic, means. The effort to find and root out the networks of terrorists involved in the attacks will require international cooperation in a wide variety of areas, namely diplomacy, intelligence gathering and sharing, military cooperation, etc.
80.International treaties, multilateral export control arrangements and security assistance contribute to reducing the dangers of WMD weapons falling into terrorists' hands. Of course, arms-control agreements do not target terrorist groups. Terrorists do not join these regimes, nor do they respect international agreements, but to the extent that existing regimes are weakened or undercut and the atmosphere is permissive, it will be easier for terrorists to gain access to WMD. Therefore the Allies, under US leadership, should cooperate closely in order to strengthen existing norms and to make greater efforts to implement them.
81.With regard to non-proliferation, significant progress has been made. For example, the G-8 decision to expand the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme by providing US-$ 10 billion over 10 years in matching funds deserves much praise. It is crucial that the G-8 partners muster the political will to come up with the promised financing, even in times of tight budgets. Moreover, the G-8 must begin coordinating efforts to expand non-proliferation programmes in the former Soviet Union and beyond.
82.However, a lot of work remains to be done. The question is whether the commitment to effective action is adequate to the task. Many unresolved compliance issues remain. Failure to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes as well as multilateral export control arrangements will increase the likelihood that terrorists or states that support terrorism will obtain new, or increase existing, WMD capabilities. Fostering the non-proliferation regime will require US leadership - leadership that involves working within the CWC and BWC contexts to ensure compliance, to secure access to sensitive and dangerous materials and to strengthen existing international norms. It also requires close cooperation among allies and the sustained political will, including substantial funding, to make these efforts a long-term priority.
83.To that end, concrete steps necessary to tackle existing and changing security challenges include, among others, the continuation of multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC. The US should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002 meeting on a process that will allow both the US and other proposals for strengthening the BWC to be explored. With regard to the CWC, signatories to the convention should do their utmost to meet the established deadlines for destruction of all chemical weapons. For the CWC to be effective, signatory states must provide adequate financial and political support.
84.But whatever the NPT, the CTBT, the CBW and CWC or the CTR will accomplish, their impact on the demand side of the equation will only be marginal. Thus treaty-based and cooperative activities need to be complemented by other means. On the level of international diplomacy, these include sustained attempts to resolve conflicts - in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula - that give rise to the demand for WMD. With regard to the challenge posed by terrorism, close allied cooperation is absolutely essential to bring about international cooperation to address the manifold roots of the problem. While we lack a commonly agreed definition of what constitutes terrorism and we may disagree on the primary causes that generate terrorism, we acknowledge that there is a link between "failed states" and terrorism.
85.Afghanistan, the current focus of the war against terrorism, is a case in point. While the US-led military campaign has freed the country from the yoke of the Taliban, the security situation is far from satisfactory. Factional fighting among warlords and lawlessness are continuing. Like Afghanistan, all five of the Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - need serious "nation-building". The economic situation in all Central Asian countries is desperate, and warnings of a social explosion must be taken seriously. Authoritarian government policies lead to radicalisation and growing disgruntlement among broad segments of the impoverished populace. Internal tensions in the republics of Central Asia could one day discharge themselves in an explosion of violence.
86.On this "front", too, improvements have been achieved: A consequence of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks was the increase in US foreign aid, also and especially to contribute to the pre-emption of terrorism. US as well as EU programmes focus more strongly on fostering political stability in several hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is clear that the United States, with all its resources, will have a leadership role in international security, especially in the war against terrorism. The US$ 48 billion defence budget increase after September 11 in itself is bigger than the defence budget of any other NATO country. Therefore European NATO Allies should understand that the USA expects them to increase efforts to increase military capabilities in key strategic areas such as air transport, control and reconnaissance, among others. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is an example of commitments that Europeans have promised, but not yet sufficiently implemented. Military assets remain absolutely indispensable to guarantee peace and stability.
87.In an increasingly interdependent world, no single country can overcome existing security challenges alone. Close cooperation between the Allies will be indispensable. Members of the Alliance need to have a continued dialogue on goals, priorities, resources and means. While building international consensus may be cumbersome and time-consuming, it is vitally important in defeating the scourge of terrorism.
1 This report was compiled and prepared in September 2002. Therefore, some recent developments, including the passage of Resolution 1441 by the United Nations Security Council, could not be included in the text.