SEMINAR REPORT: CHANGES IN THE HIGH NORTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND BEYOND

I.   INTRODUCTION

1.  The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s 77th Rose-Roth Seminar in the Arctic Circle city of Tromsø, Norway from 21-24 June 2011, assembled some 50 members of parliament from 19 member and partner nations as well as a large number of senior government officials including the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre and leading scientists, academics and representatives of civil society.  The Seminar, organised in co-operation with the Parliament of Norway, and supported by the Norwegian Polar Institute, focused on “Changes in the High North:  Implications for NATO and Beyond.” 

2.  Climate change is occurring more rapidly and profoundly in the Arctic than anywhere else in the world, presenting both dramatic challenges and opportunities for its coastal states as well as for the wider international community. While on the one hand, tensions remain low in the region and an institutional and legal framework is in place to manage potential areas of contention (as demonstrated by the border demarcation agreement recently reached between Norway and Russia), actors such as NATO, the EU, and non-coastal states have legitimate interests and may be useful contributors to a peaceful and responsible evolution of the region.
3.  Renewed international interest in the Arctic region in recent years stems from its large energy reserves, which are becoming more accessible because of climate change and technological developments, and the increasing demand for oil and gas, the participants were told.   Retreating ice is opening channels for navigation that could create both cost and emissions savings for shipping companies, as well as allowing increased tourism in the region.
4.  However, increased activity in the Arctic presents significant challenges as well, including the difficulties of responding to accidents requiring search and rescue, as well as the potential damage to local ecology from commercial use and the danger of pollution.   The unique climatic and geographic, and demographic conditions of the Arctic severely complicate responses to such events.
5.  While the possibility of a geopolitical race to the Arctic has found purchase in media reporting on the region, the reality is that few new investments are being made in Arctic capabilities, and that those underway should not be cause for alarm to any interested party.
6.  Finally, NATO’s role should be the subject of continued discussion, many participants agreed, particularly given that several Arctic coastal states are NATO members and therefore NATO had never ‘left’ the region.   These discussions should, however, begin with the clear and unambiguous understanding that no militarisation of the Arctic is under consideration, and that the Alliance’s role would be only in support of the functioning regional arrangements already in place. 

II.   EVOLVING ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC TRENDS IN THE HIGH NORTH

Climate science and negotiations:  The state of play

7.  Climate change is occurring more rapidly and profoundly in the Arctic than anywhere else in the world, presenting both dramatic challenges and opportunities for its coastal states as well as for the wider international community.  Volker Rachold, Executive Secretary, International Arctic Science Committee, reminded seminar participants that the profound changes that the Arctic region is undergoing will have a global impact.  He informed that the temperature increase over the Arctic since 1980 is twice as high as the global average and that the negative ice trend is continuing.  As a result, permafrost temperatures have risen by 2° C, the southern limit of the area affected by permafrost is moving northward.  This development is likely to generate additional greenhouse gas emissions, he explained.  Moreover, glaciers, ice caps and the Greenland ice sheet are declining faster since 2000, contributing 40% to global sea level rise.  It is expected that the sea level will rise by between 0.9 and 1.6 metres by 2100.  Moreover, by about 2040 or 2050 the Arctic Ocean is expected to be ice free, which in turn will lead to increased absorption of the sun’s energy and possible changes in large-scale ocean currents. 

8.  While the real impact of climate change remains under discussion, there is agreement that it is happening and that the international community will have to react. Although science, i.e. available scientific data, provides the basis for climate change negotiations progress in this field depends on numerous other factors Henrik Harboe, Norwegian Chief Negotiator to the Climate negotiations, reminded participants.  Unfortunately, the pursuit of national interests, such as development, poverty reduction and fundamental economic interests can slow down, or sometimes even prevent, progress on an issue which has global implications.  What is more, financing climate change policies remains a major problem, Mr Harboe pointed out.  Bård Lahn, Climate Advisor of the Norwegian chapter of Friends of the Earth, elaborated on this by saying that the gap between the estimated financial assistance necessary for developing countries and the pledges made by developed countries remains huge.  During the 16th session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of the Parties in Cancun at the end of 2010 pledges made amounted to $ 100 billion for mitigation and adaptation together, coming from ”a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral”.  In practice, however, there is very little or virtually no money on the table, Mr Lahn added, suggesting that developed countries should respect the call from Cancun to increase ambition.  In Cancun, participating nations could neither agree on national emissions targets that accumulate to an adequate response to the 2°C goal, nor was there agreement on a global, legally binding commitment.  However, the Cancun-agreement confirmed the Copenhagen Accord and restored confidence in the UN-process as political basis necessary for reaching an overarching agreement that includes all parties. 

III.   OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

9.  For the Arctic, climate change also opens opportunities for new levels of commercial activities that will impact trade, energy production and fisheries globally. 

Resources

10.  Øivind A. Dahl-Stamnes, Vice-President, North Area Initiative, Development and Production Norway, Statoil emphasised that the Arctic holds a huge oil and gas potential which, according to a report published by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008, could comprise of up to 25% of “yet to find” hydrocarbon resources, the speaker pointed out.  The oil and gas potential in the Arctic will become increasingly important as production of existing European gas fields by is expected to decline by 50% by 2030.  The growing interest of the energy industry in Arctic resources are linked to the region’s energy potential, the increasing oil and gas demand, the fact that access to other resources is becoming more difficult and because technology is becoming available. 

11.  Mr Dahl-Stamnes emphasised that 40 years of experience on the continental shelf have demonstrated the capability of industry to explore available natural resources in an environmentally responsible manner.  Although the Arctic poses significant challenges with regard to climate, ice and winter darkness, climate change and the resulting melting of ice will make it easier for companies to operate in the region, the speaker said.  Moreover, technological advance is facilitating the extraction of available natural resources.  In contrast, while admitting that there are potentially very rich resources such as petroleum, minerals and rare earth elements in the Arctic, Paal Hilde, Associate Professor, Head of Department, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, cautioned that the technological challenges and the cost of extracting Arctic resources will be very high in the foreseeable future. 

New Shipping Routes

12.  It is widely anticipated that the melting of the ice is also opening up new opportunities for international shipping.  Several speakers, including Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, stressed the possible important commercial implications.  To illustrate his point, he compared the journey from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northern Sea Route, which runs along the coast of Russia, is 6 400 kilometres shorter than the route via the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal.  Thus, travelling via the Northern Sea Route could save almost 40% of the time and up to 20% of the fuel.  Minister Støre and other speakers agreed, though, that establishing commercial, cost-efficient logistics will be difficult and will be a longterm development, partly because the open sailing season will be short and unlikely to reach half a year even by the end of the century, as Mr Hilde anticipated.  Moreover, the seas are stormy and navigation is difficult due to fog, ice forming on the deck, and the need to pass through narrow, shallow straits, particularly along the “inner” Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast.

13.  Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre also pointed out that some of the world’s richest fisheries lie in the Arctic. They must be preserved and enhanced as one of the world’s most important sources of food.  This underscores the importance of integrated management of resources based on an understanding of the links between the oil and gas activities, new transport routes and fisheries. 

IV.  CHALLENGES EMANATING FROM INCREASED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

14.  Several speakers expressed concern that activity levels in the Arctic is expected to increase, including new, less professional “user groups”.  While the increased access for ships to the Arctic is seen as a boom for local economies, there are increased concerns for the safety of such vessels seminar participants learned.  Frode Iversen, Rescue Controller, Joint Rescue Coordination Center North Norway, said that, if the need were to arise, there is a lack of capacity for the quick rescue of hundreds, or even thousands, of people in the vast expanse of Arctic waters.  He referred to that possibility as “the closest to a nightmare as possible”.  Unfortunately, boat crews and shipping companies do not necessarily take the necessary precautionary measures before they are venturing into Arctic waters.  Mr Iversen and other speakers agreed that it is especially important to maintain effective Search and Rescue (SAR) services in such a large sea area.  The Norwegian SAR Service is organised under the Ministry of Justice and the Police is responsible for sparsely populated land masses with long coastal lines.  SAR in the Arctic is a challenging task in itself, he said, even though new agreements among Arctic littoral states on better SAR cooperation present a step forward.  In this context, seminar participants learned that the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers signed a legally binding agreement on cooperation on and coordination of search and rescue services at the meeting in Nuuk in May 2011.  The Arctic Council is also developing new regulations and standards for the design and equipment of ships operating in the Arctic, as well as clear guidelines for the training of personnel.  Minister Støre mentioned that Norway is working actively through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop a mandatory polar code for ships operating in the Arctic region. 

15.  Ole Kristian Bjerkemo of the Norwegian Coastal Administration noted that there is an increased risk for oil spills in the Arctic due to the growing economic activities taking place.  Risks for acute pollution in the Arctic stem primarily from shipping, oil and gas activities, landbased activities and natural disasters.  In response to the increased environmental risks, the Arctic Council established a working group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) whose mandate includes the prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic.  Members of the working group exchange information on best practices and conducts projects, such as the development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, training and so on.  The EPPR is not a response agency, its work has focused mainly on oil and gas transportation and extraction, and on radiological and other hazards.  In 2004, the EPPR was directed by the Arctic Ministers to expand its mandate to include natural disasters.  The Arctic Council’s Nuuk Ministerial of May 2011 tasked the EPPR and other relevant working groups to develop recommendations and or best practices in the prevention of marine oil pollution.  Concrete proposals are expected to be presented at the next Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in 2013. 

No “race for the Arctic”

16.  The huge potential for resources and existing territorial disputes between the littoral states of the Arctic have led many media reports that there is a “race for the Arctic” is underway with possibly serious negative security implications.  However, speakers generally dismissed the notion of a possible conflict, including a military one, between two or more nations. 

17.  However, only few of the resources in the Arctic are in contested areas, as Paal Hilde, pointed out.  He identified four actual or likely unresolved maritime border issues in the Arctic:  the Russian-US border in Bering and Chukchi seas – an agreement signed in 1990 exists but is not ratified by the Russian Duma, the Canadian-US border in Beaufort Sea, the only actually disputed maritime border in the Arctic, and two potential or likely overlapping claims between Denmark and Canada on the one hand and Russia on the other around the geographic North Pole.  He added, however, that these overlaps are not actual because neither Denmark nor Canada have yet submitted their claims to the UN body that deals with such claims.  In addition to these border issues, there are three other issues which could be contentious.  These include whether the passages between the Canadian islands that make up the North West passage are national waters or international straits. This issue exists, to a lesser extent, also on the Russian side.  Finally, there are the issues of Svalbard and Hans Island.
 
18.  Only two of the four geostrategic locations also are likely to feature petroleum reserves and even if there were resources there, they would be inaccessible for a very long time with today’s technology.  Thus, the speaker suggested that there is no, or only very small probability that a mix of disputed border and rich resources could be a cause for conflict.  In contrast, Ragnheidur Árnadóttir, Rapporteur of the NATO PA’s Defence and Security Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation 2010 report, expressed concerns that a military build up in the High North may already be underway.  In this context she pointed out that since the U.S. ended its military presence in Iceland in 2006, there have been 72 accounts of Russian military aircraft flying through Iceland’s airspace without prior notification, which presents a number of potential risks.

Increased interest of Arctic littoral states

19.  Jonas Gahr Støre and other speakers pointed out that the increased interest in the region is also reflected by national strategies for the Arctic which several states and organisations (Iceland, Russia and the EU, among others) have developed.  The strategies that have been developed are quite similar in their outlook and share more or less the same view on the geographical, political and legal realities in the Arctic. 

20.  According to Mr Hilde, of the five Arctic littoral states, the focus of Denmark and the United States on the Arctic has been limited, as have been their actions in terms of capability and presence.  Denmark is modernizing its Faeroe Islands and Greenland commands into an Arctic command, it is taking stock of its Arctic capability in an Arctic force register and it is modernizing its coast guard.  The US has put considerable effort into studying the effects of climate change in the Arctic, resulting in the US Navy Arctic Road Map, and US Northern Command has gained responsibility for looking into capability needs in general for the US military.

21.  Canada, Norway and Russia, have put much higher focus on the Arctic and have generally taken some concrete steps.  Canada has been the “rhetorically most forward leaning” of the Arctic states in the last years and has taken a tough line on Canadian sovereignty in the North, Mr Hilde said.  It has, however, done relatively little in terms of actual investments.  The number of Rangers – reservists recruited among the indigenous population in the north – has been increased and there are plans to build six new Arctic patrol vessels (now put on ice), a few new installations in the North and increase the number of exercises.

22.  As to Norway, the government in Oslo has deliberately been modernizing of its Navy and Coast Guard, and Air force, it has concentrated its operational command in Northern Norway and is modernizing surveillance and intelligence.  While the rationale for making these investments has not only been the Arctic, it has been key – and a long standing priority for Norway, the speaker explained.  While Norway has taken a softer approach to Arctic affairs, it has done much more concrete in terms of military investments than Canada.

23.  Russia, the biggest Arctic state and the biggest military actor in the Arctic, has clearly increased the activity of its navy and air force, and put a great effort into modernizing its armed forces.  While Russia has been rhetorically strong on Arctic issues, it is important to remember that the presence of the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula is a result of the ice free conditions there and of history.

The institutional and legal framework is already in place

24.  All seminar participants agreed that existing international law provides a predictable framework for dealing with present and foreseeable challenges in the Arctic Ocean.  Paul Berkman, Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme at Cambridge University, United Kingdom summarised the general view expressed by the speakers by stressing that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) forms the legal basis for all activities in the Arctic Ocean.  Moreover, the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration of the Arctic Council is important because it is a binding expression of these coastal states’ recognition of their duties and responsibilities pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including the duty to resolve any overlapping claims in an orderly manner.  Minister Støre added that all the Arctic coastal states abide by the convention’s provisions, including the United States (although it has yet to become party to the convention). The Convention establishes legal clarity and predictability in the Arctic Ocean, he concluded. 

25.  Speakers also agreed that the Arctic Council, “one of the world’s most successful forums for multilateral cooperation” according to Minister Støre, is becoming increasingly important.  The Council includes Canada, Denmark (Greenland, Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States; moreover, six indigenous people’s organisations have the status of Permanent Participants.  Tatiana Saskina, Arctic Governance Officer of the WWF Arctic Programme emphasised the unique the role the Arctic Council gives to the region’s Indigenous peoples.  The Council defines them as ‘Permanent Participants’ ? a distinct category of membership between Members proper and Observers.  The Arctic Council Members must consult the Permanent Participants prior to any consensus decision-making. 

26.  The Council has a good track record in developing guidelines and best practices and producing knowledge – in particular about pollution and the climate changes taking place in the Arctic and how to face these changes.  Speakers pointed out that Arctic Council co-operation has been consolidated and updated in recent years, and there is now agreement between the Arctic states to strengthen this work further.  Ms Sasksina commented that the Arctic Council has recently become increasingly ambitious in its work agenda.  As an example, she mentioned the adoption of the Search and Rescue agreement in May 2011 which was developed by the Council and negotiated only in two years.  The Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland in May 2011 established a permanent secretariat in Tromsø.  The Arctic Council will develop its structures further.  Minister Støre stressed that Norway supports the applications of China, South Korea, Japan, Italy and the EU Commission for permanent observer status.  However, there is a need for a clear definition of what it means to be a member and what it means to be an observer, also in terms of what kind of contribution each state is ready to make to the developments in the Arctic, he added.

27.  In addition to co-operation taking place in the Arctic Council, there is also a broader web of sub-regional co-operation patterns in the North Jonas Gahr Støre noted.  In this context he mentioned the Baltic Sea Cooperation and the Northern Dimension, which covers the EU member states, Russia, Iceland and Norway – and of course the well established and traditional Nordic cooperation between the five Nordic states within “the Nordic Council family”.

28.  In sum, the discussions revealed a broad understanding that although the rich resources in the Arctic will generate increased economic interest in the area, they are unlikely to become a source of conflict.  As far as they exist, the border issues appear to be manageable, while the issue of new shipping lanes in and across the Arctic will be a more long term potential.  Current and planned military capabilities and presence in the Arctic indicate that while there is, generally speaking, a limited modernisation and increased presence of military assets in the region, there is no arms race.  Speakers agreed that the policies and mechanisms that have been established in the region will ensure that close co-operation will continue.  These policies and mechanisms include, among others, the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic co-operation, bilateral arrangements, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

V.  THE LEGAL/INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ARCTIC AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NORWAY-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

29.  In his key note address to seminar participants, Jonas Gahr Støre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised that the High North is the Norwegian Government’s number one foreign policy priority.  He explained that Norway’s goal is to ensure peaceful, sustainable and prosperous development in this region through increased activity, presence and knowledge.  Norway enjoys good, sound and stable bilateral relations with Russia, which has one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals.  In bilateral terms Oslo has managed the region in a spirit of “High North – low tension”, he underlined.  The Minister elaborated on this by referring to the recent exchange, on 7 June 2011, of the ratification documents for the delimitation treaty which delineates a disputed area of 175 000km2 in the Barents Sea between Russia and Norway into two parts of approximately the same size.  The treaty will enter into force on 7 July 2011 – after 40 years of negotiations.  The treaty will establish the necessary legal clarity for exploitation of natural resources in the area.  Moreover, the agreement also establishes a framework for cooperation between the environmental authorities of both countries, with the aim of developing general management plans for the whole of the Barents Sea.  Other speakers shared these views with Professor Alexander Vylegzhanin, Director of the Legal Department of the Council for the Study of Productive Resources at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Department, International Law, Moscow State Institute of International Relations stressing that the treaty is an important component of the existing legal regime in the Arctic.  Rolf Einar Fife, Director General of the Legal Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that 1976 and 1977 key agreements between Norway and Russia allowed for very good co-operation on fisheries. 

30.  Bilateral relations with Russia also include regular military contacts, the Minister explained.  The military co-operation plan for 2011 is more expansive than ever, including more than 20 visits on different levels, including that of the Russian Chief of the General Staff to Norway and the Norwegian Chief of Defence to Russia.  For the third time the Russian-Norwegian exercise “Pomor” was successfully carried out in May 2011 in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, with the participation of a Norwegian and a Russian ship, as well as Norwegian and Russian fighter jets and maritime patrol aircraft. 

31.  What is more, last year Norway and Russia also signed an agreement on local border traffic under the Schengen regime. Once it is ratified, the agreement will provide for freer movement across the border for citizens living within 30km on both sides. 

VI.  NATO IN THE ARCTIC

32.  The seminar also addressed the issue whether NATO should have an increased role in the Arctic.  Norwegian officials stressed the important role that the Alliance is playing for security and stability of the region.  Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre stated that NATO has an inherent role in the High North as a defence alliance for Norway, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and the United States, based on the principle that all parts of NATO territory enjoy equal security.  He added that NATO needs a knowledgeable, updated understanding of the High North and highlighted the importance that the Alliance performs its role as a security provider in a transparent manner.  Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary, Ministry of the Norwegian Defence Ministry, emphasised that NATO’s role remains fundamentally important for Norway.  He expressed concern that the global economic and financial crisis has a negative impact on defence capabilities of NATO Allies.  Moreover, decreasing defence expenditures make long-term military planning difficult, he cautioned.  The State Secretary also expressed concern that the imbalance in military capabilities between the U.S. and the Allies has further shifted towards the U.S. which now provides 75% of defence expenditures of Allies.  Ten years ago, the U.S. share of the collective defence expenditures of NATO’s was about 50%.  The speaker advocated a strong and visible NATO in the High North.  The speaker also elaborated on the Nordic defence co-operation (NORDEFCO), which he described as a supplement to NATO.  Nordic dimension of security is important, a primary objective of NORDEFCO is to preserve and further develop the countries’ military capabilities and operational capacity through cost-effective collaboration. The co-operation covers the entire spectrum of security and defence policy to capability development and international operations.

33.  Several seminar participants did not anticipate the need for an increased role of the Alliance in the High North.  In this context they referred to the established institutional and legal framework and the established mechanisms for co-operation, most notably the Arctic Council.  However, Paul Berkman suggested that military and security issues still present difficulties for shared Arctic dialogues.  In this context he referred to the “common arctic issues” in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration reflect an understanding of shared interests among the Arctic states, indigenous peoples and other stakeholders regarding the Arctic Ocean.   To date, these “common arctic issues” include sustainable development and environmental protection, but the explicit use of the term “peace” as a common interest in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration was specifically excluded.  Mr Berkman therefore suggested that a dialogue has yet to emerge that would enable all of the Arctic coastal states including Russia to openly and continuously share security perspectives and to build on their common interests.   

34.  He continued by arguing that, considering changes in the High North and implications for NATO and beyond, the NATO-Russia Council may be a unique forum to explore common interests among those states with central responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean, namely all Arctic coastal states including Russia, to effectively address the risks of political, economic and cultural instabilities associated with the environmental state-change in the Arctic Ocean. 

35.  In a similar vein, Ragnheidur E. Arnadottir, Deputy Head of the Icelandic Delegation to the NATO PA, noted that five members of the Alliance have territory in the Arctic region and that NATO therefore has role in the High North.  NATO has a role to play which is beneficial for the Arctic.  She elaborated by saying that NATO is already home to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which was created based on a Russian proposal.  The EADRCC could prove an invaluable resource in times of emergency in the Arctic, especially because the Centre already works with Russia and other partners in disaster relief, she proposed.  NATO could thus provide an extremely useful co-ordinating role for rapid search and rescue operations.  Seminar participants agreed that NATO’s role should be the subject of continued discussion.  They also agreed that closer NATO-Russia cooperation, including also in the region, is highly desirable. 

36.  Professor (emeritus) Clive Archer, associated individual researcher of the Geopolitics in the High North programme Manchester Metropolitan University, informed seminar participants that the EU, too, is increasingly interested in the Arctic.  The EU’s involvement has grown over time, both on the level of the Commission and the European Parliament.  Current issues of interest include primarily resources, primarily oil, gas and fisheries, “hard security” issues emanating from the revival of the Russian Northern Fleet, as well as “soft security” issues related to SAR, environmental and societal security.  Moreover, the EU is also becoming more active in the Arctic because of the environmental changes as a result of the Arctic melt.  The 2007 Commission Integrated Maritime Strategy mentions Arctic Ocean in context of global warming.  The EU’s interest in and engagement with the region is likely to increase, the speaker said, adding that the EU, which currently holds an ad-hoc observer status, is striving to get a status of permanent observer at the Arctic Council.

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