HomeDOCUMENTSMission Reports20037-11 JULY 2003 - VISIT TO WASHINGTON D. C AND NEW YORK
7-11 JULY 2003 - VISIT TO WASHINGTON D. C AND NEW YORK
SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
III. US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
V. WAR ON TERRORISM
VI. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
1. The Political Committee visited Washington, DC and New York from 7 to 11 July 2003 to discuss key issues of transatlantic security, including the situation after the war in Iraq. In Washington, meetings with representatives of the US government and Congress, as well as leading security experts from think tanks covered a broad range of issues including the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the war against terrorism, including NATO's role in this fight. In New York, the delegation, led by Senator Longin Pastusiak (PL), the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, and Peter Viggers (UK), the Chairman of the Political Committee, also met with UN representatives to learn about the role of the UN for international security.
2. The transatlantic relationship, and NATO in particular, remained "an absolute key to US security", US government officials, including Under Secretary of State Marc Grossmann, reassured the delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Ian Brzezinski's statement that "no institution was more important than NATO" for the transatlantic relationship captured the general view expressed by US officials. In this context, he referred to the importance of shared values and NATO nations' economic, political, as well as military weight. The 2002 Prague Summit was an "enormous success", according to Kurt Volker, Director for Western European and NATO Affairs at the National Security Council, and other administration officials. They added that the enlargement of the Alliance, its new relationship with Russia and its role in combating terrorism proved NATO's adaptability to the changing post-Cold War security landscape. The 2001 terror attacks had led to a "fundamental shift in the mindset of the Alliance" which was now active "anywhere in the world", Undersecretary Grossman and Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski emphasised. That NATO was not in crisis, but in one of its most dynamic periods in history and that Allies made active contributions was reflected by NATO's invocation of Article V, operations "Noble Eagle" over US airspace and "Active Endeavour" in the Mediterranean. Mr Brzezinski also reminded members of NATO's decision to take over ISAF in mid-August and of its support for the Polish-led contingent in Iraq.
3. The dispute over Iraq raised some questions in the US whether NATO member countries still shared the same values, conceded Senator Gordon Smith, head of the US Senate delegation to the NATO-PA. However, an enlarged, invigorated NATO remaining central to tackling newly emerging security challenges was the strong consensus among US administration officials and lawmakers, including Senators Joseph Biden, Richard Lugar and Congressman Doug Bereuter, head of the US House delegation to the NATO-PA and President of the NATO-PA. NATO Enlargement would continue, asserted Mr Brzezinksi, who anticipated that future members would include the Ohrid-Adriatic Charter countries, as well as Ukraine. Even Russian NATO membership was not excluded, though only in the longer term, he added. Paul Gallis, Section Head for Europe and Eurasia at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), identified four important issues NATO needed to address, namely how it could legitimise "out-of-area operations" (which are not article V and not article 51 of the UN charter), how far its area of responsibility extended, whether how to tackle the capabilities gap (and possible changes in decision making as a result, i. e. the issue of "coalitions of the willing"), and when pre-emptive attack was justified.
4. Adapting to new tasks and challenges required further improvements and transformation of NATO capabilities, US officials repeatedly underlined in the discussions. Mr Brzezinski reminded participants of the need to increase capabilities. Of the approximately 238 brigades under NATO, America's 17 NATO allies could deploy a total of 18 brigades, or roughly 70,000 soldiers, at one time. This was insufficient to fulfil its tasks in the future, the defense official stressed. Implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was both a manifestation of NATO's political will to further adapt to the changing security environment and a litmus test whether European allies were serious about defence, according to US administration officials. Moreover, successful establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) made NATO more relevant and would be considered proof that the "Europeans could deliver and that the US was committed to the Alliance", Mr Brzezinski explained. But failure to deliver on the part of the Allies would generate profound disillusionment about the Alliance in the US, he added.
5. Thus, transatlantic security largely depended on the European allies, US officials argued. Europeans needed to increase their investments in defence, build European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the Alliance, and strengthen capabilities, was the message sent by Kori Schake, Director for Defense Strategy, and Kurt Volker at the NSC, among others. Under Secretary Grossmann added that if the European defence budget increases appeared unlikely in the short term, European allies should "spend smarter". The US continued to support ESDP, provided it would add to NATO. Improving capabilities, not building additional institutions was the goal, US officials stressed. Unfortunately, the Brussels summit of four of the EU's member states had raised some concern in the US. General Philippe Morillon commented that the Brussels summit was "not intended to 'torpedo' the Berlin-plus" agreements.
III. US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
6. Speakers repeatedly stressed the profound impact of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US security policy. Karen Donfried, Director of the German Marshall Fund's Foreign Policy Programs, and Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, suggested that the US had been a "status quo power" until the Cold War and that 9-11 had initiated new security thinking, including the need for 'regime change'. Donfried, Asmus and Volker at the NSC stressed that "Europe was no longer the issue", and that the transatlantic security focus must be "beyond Europe". A similar view was given by Paul Gallis who suggested that the current US administration's foreign and security policy was based on three premises, namely that the Mid-East was the new "strategic centre of gravity", that the international status quo was dangerous, and that, as phrased by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the "mission defines the coalition".
7. A controversial transatlantic issue, the International Criminal Court (ICC), was raised by Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker. He acknowledged that there appeared 'tensions' between the US and many allies over the ICC. This was, however, not a transatlantic dispute, rather the real issue was a profound mistrust about the institution. In this context he elaborated by saying that China had not signed and that Russia was unlikely to ratify the ICC. Mr Rademaker iterated that US sovereignty was at risk and that the ICC invited false accusations against US forces. European members of the delegation disagreed with this view and criticised the US administration for its decision to "disengage" from the ICC as counterproductive. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, Senator Pastusiak reminded us that only 7 of 160 countries had voted against the Rome statute and that the ICC became active only if national law enforcement did not prosecute war crimes.
8. The term "coalitions of the willing" was repeatedly addressed during the discussions. Many Allies had criticised this phrase as potentially damaging to NATO. Members raised concerns about possible ramifications of military intervention in Iraq and asked whether the US would take account of Allies' opinions. Some also referred to the recent US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the issue of pre-emptive self defence, which both drew critical comments from some of America's allies. Whether the current US administration's rhetoric reflected a real transatlantic "rift" or was merely a "stylistic issue" generated some debate among participants. Chairman Viggers provocatively asked if the US was undergoing a "military phase" in its foreign relations or if it was in a "post-humble era"? Jan Marinus Wiersma raised the question whether there was a "unilateral" trend across the US political spectrum or whether this was only the current administration.
9. A strong majority of US speakers rejected the notion of "US unilateralism". Under Secretary Grossman stressed that the US had not drastically changed its security strategy. Only a small part of the NSS raised military pre-emption as a last possibility to counter a threat when all other measures had failed. The draft EU security strategy, the so-called "Solana Paper", was rather similar in the assessment of security threats and possible countermeasures, independent US experts Karen Donfried and Ron Asmus, agreed. A much more critical response was offered by Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), who argued that Europe 'had romanticised our past to condemn its present'. 'Coalitions of the willing were already formed over Korea, Vietnam, and Kosovo', he added, 'but Europe had redefined what was acceptable in transatlantic relations'.
10. From the US point of view, Europe needed to "thatcherise" its economies, increase defence spending to 2-3 percent of GDP, accept Turkey as a EU member, increase its birth rate, and must learn to assimilate its immigrants, Mr Meade suggested. But, as Europe "offered too little and demanded too much" it was likely that India surpassed Europe in importance, Mr Meade predicted, as it could "balance China" and serve as a "bulwark against Islamic fundamentalists", he emphasised.
11. Moreover, unilateralism was not possible, and even if the US could go it alone, joint action was always preferable, he added. Mr Asmus said that Americans preferred a multi-lateral approach. Representatives of the US administration stressed that the US remained committed to the Alliance. Andrew Goodman argued that the Iraq war was proof thereof. A possible explanation was offered by Ms Donfried who suggested that the US and Europe had different views of sovereignty: In contrast to many Europeans the US did not share the view that giving up sovereignty produced a higher degree of security.
12. A speaker suggested that multilateralism had become an "element of choice" for the current US administration. Other US foreign policy analysts considered the changed US approach towards Allies as a result of structural changes in the transatlantic relationship, argued Ms Donfried.
13. A more academic perspective was provided by Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), who suggested that proponents of the "Jeffersonian" (the "Stalinists" of US foreign policy, who favoured an "expansive" foreign policy) and "Jacksonian" (traditionally more inward-looking) 'schools of thought' - currently dominated US foreign policy. The more traditionally more Europe-oriented "Wilsonians" and "Hamiltonians" had lost influence, he explained. This had led to a combination of an "active, aggressive foreign policy linked with a rejection of international organizations", the speaker maintained.
14. State Department speakers attributed transatlantic (mis-) perceptions, particularly that the US displayed tendencies of "unilateralist" behaviour, to some degree to media reporting, especially in the run-up to the Iraq war. The fact that a lack of quality reporting posed a problem for international relations was also the view of Rick MacArthur, publisher of Harper's Magazine. However, he maintained that US media tended to uncritically relay US government views without really offering independent analysis. Mr Grossman identified the main challenge for US foreign policy was to be perceived by its Allies that it wished to play by the rules. He also pointed to successes of the Bush administrations foreign policy approach in areas that had been viewed critically, if not outright hostile, by (some) of the Allies, but which had turned out to be very positive. In this context he cited the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty which did not destroy the international arms control regime as many Allies had feared. On the contrary, the ABM abrogation led to the NATO-Russia Council and a much better and closer bi-lateral US-Russian relationship.
15. Different solutions were proposed to reinvigorate the partnership. While Jean-Guy Branger (F) and others stressed that it was necessary to agree on (formal) rules to guide the transatlantic partnership Mr Grossman emphasised that the Alliance would "never be able to get away from improvising".
16. The immediate issue to solve was "how to get Iraq right", Mr Asmus said, adding that it would be necessary to "NATO-ise" Iraq. Future issues included security challenges that emanated from Palestine, Iran, but also from countries like Saudi-Arabia and Egypt which were partners of the West but which face fundamental domestic problems linked to Islamic fundamentalism. In this regard, the Alliance should consider to establish a "new Partnership for Peace" (PfP) for the Arab world. These issues represented a huge strategic shift in the US foreign and security thinking and there was a growing realisation that the job was too big for the US alone. While it would be impossible to provide complete answers at this point it was clear that the response must be more than managing the status quo, Mr Asmus emphasised, adding that the big question for Americans was whether Europe could be a partner. The US was currently in a fundamental foreign policy debate, Mr Asmus said, adding that America wanted the Europeans to participate in this debate. However, the latter had been preoccupied with themselves and Ms Donfried reminded participants that the Europeans remained divided over Iraq. Mr Asmus remarked that the US and allies had "lost each other somewhere between Afghanistan and Baghdad" and did not agree on the framework for post-war Iraq. Another question was whether the US had a strategy over Iraq and Iran, he added.
17. Members of the delegation unanimously agreed that Allies shared a strong common interest in Iraq, though differences remained between the US-UK war coalition and some Allies about practical steps, including the involvement of the UN, the speed of devolution of power to the Iraqis and control over oil accounts. Some Members of the delegation also voiced unease about the concept of "pre-emption" and provocatively asked "who is next"? Philo Dibble, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs in the US Department of State, emphatically stressed that it was not US policy to move from Iraq to Iran. Elaborating on the US policy towards Iran, Mr Dibble said that Iran must respect the territorial integrity of Iraq. Moreover, the US was concerned about the country's WMD development, especially its nuclear weapons programme. Touching briefly on Iran's internal developments, he said that it was clear that the Iranian leadership was unable to meet the demands of the Iranian people. But this was first and foremost an internal Iranian problem, a possible role of the international community in Iran was unclear. In the discussion with participants Mr Dibble added that the economic flexibility of the Iranian regime were very limited, due to high unemployment, huge corruption. The US was also very conscious that a greater opening of the society could backfire. Therefore, the US had also no interest to encourage a crackdown on the students
18. The situation in post-war Iraq was of great interest to the delegation and during the meetings US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld informed the Congress that monthly US occupation costs in Iraq had increased to approximately $3. 9 billion. Mr Dibble described security as "relatively stable", although the lack of intelligence hampered efforts to secure the country after the war. US knowledge about "hardliners" (supporters of the Baath regime) and relationships among the different Iraqi groups was limited, Mr Dibble admitted. Many Iraqis did not believe that the old regime was gone. Whether or not it was necessary to increase the number of troops was unclear, but the US was in contact with allies and countries willing to contribute.
19. Estimates of the possible length of the US presence in Iraq diverge, the Political Committee learned during its visit. Mr Dibble anticipated that US military presence was probably required for the next two to three years, while Senator Joseph Biden considered it "a success if the US and its allies had succeeded in building a stable society with secure borders within 10 years". Mr Asmus predicted that the US would be in the Mid-East 'for decades to come'. US speakers generally dismissed concerns that the growing number of US casualties in Iraq diminished public support for the US stationed troops in Iraq. Mr Asmus said that there was an "enormous willingness" in the US to sacrifice. A recent poll had indicated that 75 percent of Americans agreed that the US paid $20 billion over ten years to pacify and help rebuild Iraq, he added.
20. Participants agreed that 'solving Iraq' was linked to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Congressman Doug Bereuter, Chairman of the House of Representatives' Sub-Committee on Europe and President of the NATO-PA, welcomed the "Quartet" (consisting of the US, the EU, Russia and the UN) and particularly Europe's assistance. But he also reminded the delegation that the US and Europe held different views about the best approach towards the Middle East peace process. In this context Congressman Robert Wexler criticised that "a parade of EU Foreign Ministers" courted Arafat, which had not been helpful. While the "road map" did not make progress, Mr Bereuter said one "had to be optimistic about the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan". He suggested that NATO "should consider taking on a role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process".
21. US legislators acknowledged that rebuilding Iraq was a "gigantic undertaking", as Senator Biden phrased it. US policymakers generally agreed on the need to overcome earlier differences over Iraq and work together to mend the transatlantic fence. Congressman Joel Hefley, Chairman of the NATO-PA's Defence and Security Committee, stressed the need to "internationalise" Iraq to build a lasting, solid peace. Congressman Bereuter also said that NATO should take on a role in Iraq, a view shared by other US legislators including Senator Biden, who added that the UN, also had to be engaged. However, there was no firm consensus over what exactly the role of the UN should be. Responding to questions by Sub-Committee Rapporteur Karl A. Lamers, State Department officials pointed out that the UN "already had a role in Iraq" and that, as Mr Dibble added, it was not necessary to increase its presence. The US "always wanted to bring the international community into Iraq" as Andrew Goodman, Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfer in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, seconded. Other speakers did not completely share the view of US administration officials. For example, the German Ambassador to the UN, Gunter Pleuger, said that participation of the international community was an open question and that the "occupying powers somehow closed the door to the international community".
22. Senator Gordon Smith stressed the UN's significant role in the realm of humanitarian issues. But US and European views about the UN differed profoundly about the UN's role for international security, the Senator added. Unlike Europeans, many in the US did not consider that the UN should play a role for US security. Disagreements over Iraq had done 'much damage to the UN' and its reform was necessary, he said. That the war in Iraq severely undermined the UN's credibility in the area of peace and security, and that of the Security Council in particular, was also the view of Simon Chesterman, an expert at the International Peace Academy (IPA). However, if the UNSC had authorised war on the basis of partial, selective, or fraudulent intelligence, the only thing that the UNSC has of worth - its legitimacy - would have been squandered, he cautioned. The German UN Ambassador, Mr Pleuger reminded the Sub-Committee of the UN's activities before - and after - the war, including weapons inspections and asserted that the Iraq war was not a "failure of diplomacy". The UN just passed two resolutions on Iraq, one on re-instating the "oil for food programme", the other one on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In slight contrast to the views expressed by US officials, the German diplomat considered the UN's contribution to other key security concerns much more positive and important. The UN charter already addressed the crucial issues of proliferation of WMD and international terrorism, he said. A difficult question, however, was whether pre-emptive self-defence was sanctioned by international law as a means of last resort. Only the UN could set international rules and Ambassador Pleuger called for a "strategic dialogue" between the US and the UN, as well as among UN member states to come to an agreement.
23. Mr Chesterman suggested that the UN needed a strategic analysis capacity, as suggested by the Brahimi report. For the international community, the most important lesson of the Iraq war was to take the UN Security Council more seriously as a diplomatic forum, he noted and added that the fragile security situation demonstrated the importance of using the UN as a forum for collective action, which included a significant, possibly vital, role in reconstructing Iraq. In the view of Ambassador Pleuger the Iraq war had emphasised the need for the UN to address new international security challenges, particularly failing states and the issue of "humanitarian intervention".
24. The fact that the UN did have an important role for international security was a point made by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Deputy Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations. He highlighted that the UN was indispensable for international peacekeeping. The UN had learned fundamental lessons in the 1990s, i. e. to not send UN peacekeepers if the actual challenge and the available resources didn't match. NATO-UN cooperation was very successful, as Kosovo reflected in an exemplary manner. But the disasters in ex-Yugoslavia and Ruanda had led to a significant decrease in industrialised countries' willingness to furnish soldiers for peacekeeping missions. Thus, further improvements could be made by providing more peacekeepers from NATO countries, especially as peacekeepers predominantly came from countries of the third world. Financing of UN peace mission had improved, but targeted assistance from industrialised countries would also enhance UN peacekeeping capabilities. A important challenge was to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities. African troops lacked especially command and control assets and NATO's assistance would be welcome.
V. WAR ON TERRORISM
25. The exchanges also addressed the international fight against terrorism. Providing a general overview of the major restructuring of US defence after 9-11, Bill Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, explained that the national US strategy to combating terrorism was build upon anti-terrorist measures (i. e. , defensive measures of a country), counter-terrorism, i. e. offensive measures of a country, including possibly pre-emption, and consequence management. According to him and James Roberts, Principal Director for Combating Terrorism, Department of Defense, the US opted for a comprehensive approach of the fight against international terrorism, consisting of "four Ds" identified by Mr Pope, namely Defeat global terror networks, using intelligence, military actions, and law enforcement; Deny terrorists state assistance or sponsorship; Defend the homeland and its infrastructure; and Diminish the root causes of terrorism.
26. To achieve these "four Ds" the US government devised new policies in five major areas, namely diplomacy, financial, intelligence sharing, law enforcement measures, and military operations. Although the military operations attracted most attention, the most important contributions to combat terrorism occurred in the diplomatic realm. A crucial change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which combined 22 agencies with some 180,000 employees. Pope said that the "global war on terror" required efforts over a long time, although progress in combating terrorism had been achieved in all areas. Especially noteworthy were improvements in curbing terrorists' financial transactions - approximately US$120 million had been frozen worldwide - and in intelligence sharing, where US co-operation with the Allies and other partners was good. Moreover, co-operation on the working level of law enforcement and exchange of information would be "excellent" Pope said. At the same time, the task of combating terrorism and protecting individual rights raised difficult questions. Members of the delegation agreed with this, adding that the treatment of suspected Taliban fighters in the Guantanamo prison raised serious concerns among Allies about human rights infringements by the US administration.
27. Another issue that received attention in the context with the fight against terrorism was Afghanistan. Members of the delegation were concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Goodman stated that the security situation had deteriorated and had become more violent. Because peace keeping troops were absent an "operational compromise" to increase security was made be the establishment of so-called "Provincial Reconstruction Teams" (PRTs). The US and the allies were stretched too thin to not use "regional teams". Mr Guéhenno welcomed the establishment of PRTs which he considered "helpful". However, he said that their role could only be limited, adding that the report of Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative to the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, had demonstrated that it was impossible to anticipate improvements of the security situation in Afghanistan unless ISAF was extended beyond Kabul.
VI. PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
28. Threats emanating by the proliferation of WMD featured prominently on agenda during the visit of the delegation. That NATO was increasingly active in efforts to combat WMD proliferation was highlighted by David Stephens, Director for Counter-Proliferation Policy at the Department of Defense. He praised the initiatives in Prague November 2002 agreed upon by NATO Heads of State and Government which included: development of a prototype analytical laboratory; establishment of a response team to provide advice to NATO commanders; disease surveillance; the stockpiling of chemical and biological stockpile of medicine; and the inauguration of the new NBC training centre. Moreover, a NBC defence battalion as element of the NRF anticipated to reach operational ready by the end of 2003, Stephens pointed out.
29. US administration under President Bush argued that proliferation is growing and that non-proliferation regimes have failed. Independent security experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said that the US administration moved from a threat-based assessment to a capabilities-based assessment and that, parts of the US administration concluded that preventive war, even unilaterally, was a valid and sometimes necessary response. Although WMD proliferation was a serious security problem, it was not out of control suggested Joseph Cirincione at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Rather, he said, the threats were now different. Mr Cirincione provocatively suggested that the current administration had changed priorities from 'removing weapons to removing regimes' and introduced a policy of 'picking and choosing' which risked creating a "policy of double standards". Another problem was which countries were the "good guys" and which ones were the "bad guys". For example, Iran and Iraq were "good guys" once. Despite their shortcomings, non-proliferation agreements had reduced the threat, concluded Mr Cirincione and Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
30. Mr Spector argued that combating WMD proliferation was currently undergoing a "revolutionary change". The analyst suggested that until the early 1990s, the majority key supplier states for WMD technology were not US adversaries. The main goal of non-proliferation was thus limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD to enhance global and regional stability. The Clinton administration's "counter proliferation initiative" thus focused on the use of chemical and biological weapons against US forces, Spector added. A turning point came in the mid-1990s, with the 1994 North Korea crisis, the exposure of Iraq's extensive NBC programme, and the development of Iranian longer-range missiles capable of reaching Israel. Most proliferant states were now US adversaries that made important progress on biological and chemical weapons as well as on missile technology. As a consequence, a new Republican doctrine was developed which said that determined proliferants could not be stopped, and "rogue" leaders could not be deterred.
31. This changing threat had led to a new, "militarised" approach to non-proliferation, Mr Spector suggested. According to the speaker, the Bush administration's new approach was eroding existing non-proliferation regimes. Other activities, or non-activities, of the administration's also raised concern among the arms control community, such as the initial dismissal of direct negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear programme, the rejection of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) verification protocol and of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the push to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defence against "rogue" states. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the US administration had identified "regime change" as a non-proliferation tool and the inclusion of the possibility of pre-emption against an imminent threat. Although the Bush administration still recognised non-proliferation regimes as useful, it perceived them as insufficient to protect the US.
32. However, Mr Spector suggested non-proliferation regimes could sustain global norms against WMD by strengthening domestic, "pro-renunciation constituencies" in potential problem countries as well as helping to legitimise multi-lateral action (embargoes, interdiction, preventive military action), if needed. Furthermore, non-proliferation regimes could contribute to detection of cheating, slow the advance of WMD through export controls, and provide a structure/starting point for renunciation, slowdown or freeze arrangements.
33. Members raised concern that the possibility of US development of a new generation of small nuclear weapons indicated a moving away from the final goal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Participants also inquired about the impact of the Iraq war on the non-proliferation debate in the US, NATO's role in non-WMD and whether the Allies have an input on the US government. Mr Spector responded by saying that the spread of WMD was a failure of all Allies and that they remained highly influential in the US debate. Although he welcomed that WMD proliferation was now a priority for Allies and Partners, he warned that the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) to the G-8 Non-Proliferation Initiative could risk a loosing focus. Commenting on Iraq, he said that the war might tempt problem states to think more in terms of persevering, i. e. acquiring nuclear weapons. Sharon Squassoni, a CRS specialist on non-proliferation, suggested that Iraq had demonstrated limitations of US intelligence tools, e. g. , remote sensors, and that there was no substitute for on-site inspections. She put forward three hypotheses: intelligence, not military action, was the best tool for combating proliferation; the threat posed by terrorists using WMD was evolving slowly, but information technology made terrorists more dangerous; and finally, North Korea was a bigger WMD threat than Iraq.
34. That dangers emanating from proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were underestimated was the message delivered by Dennis Gormley, Senior Consultant of the CNS at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. UAVs could easily be converted into land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and "rogue states" (or "rogue government" as Senator Pastusiak suggested as a more appropriate term) or terrorists could obtain LACMs in three ways: firstly by directly acquiring LACMs from one of the 12 supplier nations worldwide, and secondly, by converting UAVs into LACMs, which was relatively easy and cost effective. Approximately 40 countries produced UAVs, about half of the supplier countries are not member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). According to a recent US study, approximately 80 per cent of the UAVs currently in production had a range of over 300 kilometres, the limit set by the MTCR.
35. Even more cost effective was converting very light manned aircraft into LACMs. This was the cheapest and simplest way of obtaining LACMs. Very light aircraft could fly up to and beyond 1,000 kilometres and half a payload of 150 kilograms. Building a LACM with a 150 kilogram payload would cost no more than $50,000. The international community must address the proliferation of UAVs, Mr Gormley concluded his presentation.
Concluding the visit of the Sub-Committee to the United States, Mr Pastusiak stressed the invaluable insights the delegation had received from official and independent experts. The Chairman's suggestion that the Sub-Committee continues to follow the developments of the transatlantic security relationship in these areas was welcomed and approved by the members.