I.  THE OPENING SESSION 

II.  THE RELATIONS WITH NATO AND THE EU 

III.  PANEL ON NAGORNO KARABAKH 

IV.  PANEL ON TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS 

V.  GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA 

VI.  THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS 

VII.  ENERGY SECURITY 

VIII. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE REGION 

IX.  CLOSING REMARKS 
 

I.  THE OPENING SESSION

1. Karen Avagyan, Head of the Armenian Delegation to the NATO PA, opened the seminar and gave the floor to Hovik Abrahamyan, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia. The Speaker stressed that Armenia is committed to universal standards of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Its key foreign policy priorities include European integration and productive cooperation with NATO. The parliament of Armenia has adopted a number of key legislation, including on defence reform, democratic control of armed forces and, more broadly, on harmonising the legal system of Armenia with the European standards.  Among other foreign policy priorities, the Speaker emphasised Armenia’s determination to ensure the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination and to normalise relations with Turkey. 

2. Artur Baghdasaryan, Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council, outlined the numerous problems in the South Caucasus region.  The conflict over Nagorno-Karbakh remains central to Armenia’s security but other issues such as the relationship with Turkey are significant and intertwined. He also stressed that Armenia intensely co-operates with the EU and NATO and is contributing to wider security by participating in international missions.

3. The keynote presentation of the seminar was delivered by Goran Lennmarker, Swedish parliamentarian and OSCE PA Special Rapporteur on Nagorno-Karabakh and Special Envoy on Georgia. He pointed out that the independence of the three South Caucasus countries and the fact that they are now the masters of their own destiny, is a major game changer that must be taken into account.

4. Mr Lennmarker stressed that it is possible to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He believed that the term “frozen” should not be applied to this conflict as it is continually evolving. The solution must come from inside the region, although the outside actors (the Minsk Group) can help the process. He insisted that the Minsk process is the place to forge a solution. Using other international organizations or fora would be nothing but a detour that would delay the negotiations.

5. Mr Lennmarker cautioned both countries to avoid aggressive rhetoric and to prepare their societies to accept a compromise solution. He also urged the population and politicians to support their leadership when it is making difficult steps towards reconciliation. He believed that the political will is emerging on the Armenian side to accept a compromise and hoped that this would occur in Azerbaijan as well. Finally, he stressed that a solution must come soon and decisions cannot be postponed as people continue to suffer.

6. Regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Mr Lennmarker noted that the international community must address two immediate challenges: 1) protecting the right of internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes, and 2) reaching an agreement on the presence of international observers in the region.

7. Mr Lennmarker strongly urged the speaker of the Armenian parliament as well as members of the Turkish parliament that were present to swiftly ratify the agreement between their countries without looking for procedural excuses to delay the process. He also pointed out that closer relations with the EU should not be considered as a zero-sum game by Russia. Armenia is a sovereign country and it has the right to maintain close relations with the EU or any other partner.

II.   RELATIONS WITH NATO AND THE EU

8. The session, moderated by Simon Lunn, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), included high-level speakers, representing Armenia, NATO and the EU.

9. Seyran Ohanyan, Minister of Defence of Armenia, noted that Armenia seeks friendly relations with its neighbours and the peaceful resolution of existing conflicts. Stronger relations with the EU are a priority for Armenia. Cooperation with Europe helps to build civil society and the market economy in Armenia. European integration is important not only in terms of practical gains but also in a broader sense of being seen as a part of Europe with common values and priorities.

10. Mr Ohanyan noted that while NATO membership is not on Yerevan’s agenda, NATO is considered as an important partner that enhances regional security. NATO’s assistance is particularly important in defence sector reform, military education and training and development of defence doctrines. Armenia wants to make the most of this pragmatic cooperation. It also contributes to international missions, including NATO-led operations. The co-operation helps Armenia to achieve partial interoperability with NATO forces

11. Zbigniew Rybacki, NATO/PFP Liaison Officer in the South Caucasus, discussed a number of instruments employed to enhance co-operation between the Alliance and the countries of South Caucasus. These instruments include Partnership for Peace Programme (one of the most successful NATO programmes), Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (the main forum for consultations with Partners), Individual Partnership Action Plans and Annual National Programmes (the main mechanisms of cooperation with South Caucasus countries). Also, through the Planning and Review Process, NATO helps enhancing interoperability of units deployable in international missions. The speaker noted that all three South Caucasus countries have a political will to deepen their relationship with the Alliance.

12. Mr Rybacki also stressed that the co-operation patterns are flexible and do not follow one single model. The scope and speed of co-operation depends on partner countries. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia all contribute to NATO led-missions. NATO’s major priority in the region is assisting its nations in defence and security sector reform. In addition to purely military objectives, IPAP programmes also cover issues related to human rights, building democratic institutions, the fight against corruption, combating terrorism, border security, emergency planning, environmental security and scientific co-operation. Although a number of challenges remain, the speaker’s overall assessment of co-operation was positive: mutual relations have become more mature and progress is constantly being made.

13. Onno Simons, Chargé d'affaires a.i., Delegation of the EU in Armenia, discussed the role of the EU in the region. In line with the growing geo-political importance of the South Caucasus region, both opportunities and challenges present themselves for the EU. The increased need for the EU to diversify its energy sources and routes and to expand trade with its partners enhances the strategic importance of the South Caucasus as a critical links in a chain. In a way, the region is a meeting place for many important EU partners and international actors.

14. Support for reform and stability is therefore the logical policy objective in the EU’s relations with the South Caucasus. This includes democratisation, the rule of law, promotion of and respect for human rights, economic development, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. The EU's soft power, its transformative experience in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and the EU's attractive model are our key assets. All three countries of the South Caucasus have agreed European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans which prioritise and concretise the policies to pursue the much needed reforms.

15. While proximity has made the region more important for the EU, it has also made risks and challenges such as organised crime and illegal immigration more tangible for the EU.  A problem of a different kind is that many of the borders in the region remain closed, hampering the development of the region's full potential. Opening of borders would contribute to the overall prosperity and stability of the region.

16. In terms of next steps, Mr Simons suggested focusing on three broad categories of changes that would be needed to achieve the status of a prosperous and secure region: 1) return of stability (the EU supports the Minsk Group process; it has also offered political and technical support to the process of normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia), 2) delivering tangible benefits to its citizens, and 3) implementing institutional reforms. The latter two categories go hand in hand: reforms, be they in the system of pensions or public transport, need to generate benefits.

17. Having heard the official perspectives of Armenia, NATO and the EU, the discussion on Euro Atlantic integration of the South Caucasus region continued with a panel of three independent experts from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The panel was moderated by Artur Aghabekyan, Former Head of the Armenian Delegation to the NATO PA.

18. Gayane Novikova, Director, Centre for Strategic Analysis SPECTRUM, Yerevan, underlined that the qualitatively new status quo, established in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia, is defined by a series of new developments, including: 1) a demonstration by Russia of a readiness to defend its strategic interests, 2) some activation of the EU in the region within soft security frameworks; 3) a temporary decrease of NATO activity in the South Caucasus; 4) the emergence of two partly recognized states – Abkhazia and South Ossetia; 5) increased militarization of Azerbaijan and enlarged claims for a role as a regional power; and 6) growing militarization in the entire region of the South Caucasus.

19. All of the above noted factors have contributed to the very fragile stability in the South Caucasus. However, there is no prospect that the current status quo in the South Caucasus can be considered as a final resolution of the conflicts. Even in the West, there is a growing concern related to the high probability of a resumption of war in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh. Nonetheless, this status quo will last quite a long time, Ms. Novikova predicted, as long as there is a visible balance of interests and powers among the main non-regional actors. Armenia is quite satisfied with the established status quo in the region.

20. The speaker characterized relations between Armenia and NATO as being based on a pragmatic approach. It is obvious that Armenia tries to avoid any step which could be considered by Russia as unfriendly. Unlike Georgia, Armenia does not consider NATO as a guarantor of its security. Secondly, NATO has no intention to become involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement. Thirdly, restrained behaviour of NATO during the August 2008 war was a clear indication of NATO limited options in the region where Russian strategic interests are clear.

21. As for the European integration, the situation in general is favourable for a more active EU engagement as all three states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – consider it as an alternative to Russian and U.S. influence. The EU programs offer Armenia opportunities to strengthen its democratic structures and to develop economically. However, although the EU also attaches significant importance to regional cooperation, it is not evident at all how Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will implement cooperation, given an array of disagreements, especially in their approaches to the settlement of the conflicts.

22. The second panellist, Ilgar Mammadov, Co-Founder of the Republican Alternative Civic union, Azerbaijan, pointed out that the overall importance of Euro-Atlantic dimension has shrunk in the South Caucasus. Instead, Russia’s attempts to regain influence tend to succeed more in the region. The speaker disapproved of the drift of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy towards Russia and stressed that Azerbaijan should align itself with the long-standing community of western democracies in tackling global and regional challenges. He also underlined that Azerbaijan’s genuine interest is to live in peace side-by-side with independent, prosperous, secure Republic of Armenia.

23. However, the continuing occupation of Azerbaijan’s territory by Armenia prevents the former from sharing its growing wealth with the neighbour. The long-term forecast of economic developments of Armenia and Azerbaijan indicates that the gap between the two countries will significantly increase in favour of Azerbaijan, thereby further exacerbating the regional imbalance and increasing the possibility of a renewed conflict.

24. Kaha Imnadze, Program Director of the Georgian Institute for Russian Studies, noted that NATO has become the very embodiment of the entire “western idea” for Georgia. The nationwide plebiscite in 2008 that showed 77% support for NATO membership, which had only been reinforced by Russo-Georgian war of August 2008.

25. He note that with nearly 1000 troops in Afghanistan, Georgia is one of the largest per capita troop contributors to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Georgia also contributes to the regional and European security as a transit country and hub for supply shipments to Afghanistan. That said, Georgia had not consumed much at all in terms of its own security and remains highly vulnerable to any outside military threat.

26. Mr Imnadze believed that the main obstacles on Georgia’s path to the EU and NATO membership are not related to meeting adequate standards of political, economic and social development. Although not perfect, Georgia’s current record in these areas is better than that of some EU and NATO members. According to the speaker, the factor that had always clouded the integration process was Russia. In practical terms, Russia managed to exercise her veto right over NATO’s decision at the Bucharest summit. Unfortunately Russia tends to view its security challenges through a distorted prism of perceptions. However, along with fragile economy and unfavorable demographic and social patterns, the biggest threat that Russia is faced with is not the advance of NATO or EU to Russia’s borders, but the centrifugal tendencies in the Northern Caucasus, coupled with the advance of radical Islam and terrorism.

27. Mr Imnadze concluded that it is possible to craft a workable Russia-Georgia relationship but this should happen in the context of Georgia’s integration into western institutions. Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures would contribute to security in the Caucasus and would even help Russia to overcome its imperial legacy.

III.  PANEL ON NAGORNO KARABAKH

28. The next session of the seminar, moderated by Styopa Safaryan, Member of the Armenian Delegation to the NATO PA, was dedicated to the most acute problem of the South Caucasus – the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh.

29. The participants had the opportunity to discuss this issue with Ambassador Bernard FASSIER, Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. The Ambassador said that despite a number of armed incidents and victims, the fragile cease-fire agreement negotiated in 1994 so far managed to prevent resumption of a full-scale war. The Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, has been pursuing different strategies trying to find a solution to the conflict. In the late 1990s, the international mediators explored ways to affirm the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous part of Azerbaijan. In the early 2000, the Group focused on the question of whether Baku could be persuaded to accept Karabakh as a separate entity. Neither of these two strategies succeeded.

30. The year 2005 marks the beginning of a new strategy which focuses on more immediate problems facing the people of the region affected by the conflict, leaving the question of final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be settled by the highest political leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 2007 Madrid principles for the resolution of this conflict were developed, including restrain from use of military force, the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. More specifically, the Co-Chairs announced a six-point proposal for the Karabakh conflict resolution, including granting Nagorno Karabakh an interim status, gradually returning land in the zone outside of Karabakh held by Armenian forces to Azerbaijani control, creating a corridor for liaison between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, engaging people who lived in the region before the war into the process of determining the final status, providing international security guaranties to the parties of the conflict, and protecting the rights of refugees and other displaced persons. The Ambassador concluded by urging Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities to redouble their efforts and expressing hope that the current intensification of negotiations would result in a more robust arrangement.

31. Tabib Huseynov of the International Crisis Group pointed out that there are two major factors which distinguish this stage of the peace talks from the past and provide grounds for optimism: 1) the Karabakh peace process enjoys perhaps the most favourable international environment yet for achieving a breakthrough in the talks; and 2) although no formal agreement exists, both Armenian and Azerbaijani sides have largely accepted the basic principles as frameworks for negotiations, which make it harder and politically more risky than before for either party to the conflict to reject it.

32. In terms of favourable international environment two major regional developments – the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement – have increased international attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and sense of urgency to achieve a breakthrough in the stalemated talks. In the face of deep disagreements over Georgia, the Karabakh conflict has turned into a small platform for co-operation that both Russia and the US/EU are interested in using to “reset” their relations. Also, there is an understanding both among the regional players and international mediators that reopening of Turkish-Armenian border will require some sort of a parallel “tangible progress” in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, because Turkey is not going to improve relations with Armenia at the expense of its relations with Azerbaijan.

33. The domestic circumstances in both Armenian and Azerbaijani societies remain the biggest obstacle to the resolution of the conflict. The elites in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have used public fears and encouraged them to some extent to justify hard-line positions.  But this is a vicious circle- by perpetuating high expectations in their publics, the elites push themselves into a corner where they become hostage to their own rhetoric.

34. A solution to the endless disputes over whether the talks should proceed in bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral format could be adoption of a new approach based on multi-layered issue-based formats. Under this arrangement, there may be several formats, including direct Baku-Stepanakert bilateral contacts, a Karabakh Armenian and Azeri dialogue and all-inclusive format bringing Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert and Karabakh Azeri representatives together.

35. Stepan Grigoryan, Director of the Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, focused his presentation on five key issues that are now determining the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution process.

36. First, The OSCE Minsk Group remains the main framework of conflict resolution. Notwithstanding the often repeated criticism towards the Minsk Group, it actually performed remarkably well, preventing the resumption of fighting and having developed several options for conflict resolution. That said, the international framework can be further enhanced, for instance, by engaging the elected de facto authority as well as the Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh.

37. Second, the lack of mutual trust is the principal obstacle impeding the peace process. Mutual distrust permeates both the elites and societies of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Deeper interaction between civil society institutions of the two countries is an important part of the solution.

38. Third, the speaker argued in favour of concluding an interim framework agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such an agreement could be based on the Madrid principles that include all elements important for the conflicting parties: territorial integrity, nations’ right for self-determination and solution of the conflict without use of force.

39. Fourth, the Kosovo precedent has seriously influenced the conflicts in the post-Soviet area. Apparently, after recognition of independence of Kosovo and partial recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, the aspirations of Nagorno-Karabakh have been substantiated by arguments from recent international practice.

40. And fifth, the role of external actors is very important. Mr Grigoryan believed that the U.S. and Russia reached a consensus on the issue, as both seem to understand that efforts to artificially speed up the resolution might be counterproductive.

IV.  PANEL ON TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

41. The participants then moved to another highly debated topic – the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. The session was moderated by Dennis Sammut, Executive Director, The London Information Network on Conflicts and State-building.

42. Sabine Freizer, Europe Programme Director of the International Crisis Group, said that the preparation of the Turkish-Armenian protocols on the establishment and development of relations was the result of a gradual confidence building process by official and civil society actors. The protocols are beneficial to both parties. For Turkey, it means recognition of the existing eastern border as well as a concrete success of Ankara’s “peace in the neighbourhood” foreign policy. For Armenia, it means opening of the Turkish-Armenian border without preconditions. Also, although few in Armenia would admit it, this was also an opportunity for Yerevan to mark a foreign policy victory of its own, independent from the Diaspora’s interests.

43. Nevertheless, many in Turkey and Armenia preferred to see what these texts denied them, rather than what they offered. But the real problem was not internal – it was Baku’s reaction. It threatened Turkey that it would not agree on a preferential gas price. In January this year, for the first time ever, Azerbaijan began providing significant amounts of gas to Russia. In many ways Turkey’s foreign policy was taken hostage by Azerbaijani blackmail, Ms Freizer said. To deal with this, Turkey began to make the link between border opening and progress on Karabakh resolution stronger. It called on the Minsk Group to intensify their work and for Russia and the US leadership to intervene.

44. The decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court on the protocols represents yet another point of contention: Turkey believes that the inclusion of references to the Armenian genocide as well as to possible territorial claims is counterproductive. Conversely, Yerevan denies that the decision implied any conditionality for ratification of the protocols.

45. In conclusion, Ms. Freizer pointed out that if progress on Nagorno-Karabakh is achieved, protocol ratification will become virtually automatic. But in the absence of this, Turkey and Armenia need to be encouraged to demonstrate the political will and seize the historical opportunity to move forward. The two countries have a mounting number of bilateral issues that need to be resolved, including establishing effective counsellor services to assist their citizens living or travelling on the other side of the Turkish-Armenian border.

46. Alexander Iskandaryan, Director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, believed that the prospects of the normalisation process were unclear. There are many voices in both Turkey and Armenia that oppose it or raise unacceptable preconditions. The Armenian political leadership is prepared to move forward without preconditions, but it has to deal with domestic antagonism to the rapprochement expressed by some opposition forces, intellectuals, journalists and other non governmental actors. In Turkey, opposition to the normalisation also comes from within the administration itself.

47. Mr Iskandaryan stressed that Turkey’s insistence on making a link between the rapprochement and the resolution of the Karabakh problem leads to a deadlock. He believed that the two processes have to be decoupled; and the zero-sum-game thinking in the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan triangle has to be abandoned if any progress was to be achieved.

48. On a positive side, the speaker highlighted the fact that the external powers are beginning to play an increasingly constructive role: not only the US and the EU, but also the Russian Federation is strongly supporting the process of reconciliation.

49. That said, possible delays in protocol ratification can undermine the process of rapprochement, augmenting frustration on both sides as well as revitalising historical fears. This would lead to further growth of mutual distrust and additional preconditions in negotiations. As a result, the relations between Armenia and Turkey might end up being worse than before the reconciliation process began.

50. He pointed out that one should not be naïve and hope that the opening of the border will eliminate all the problems between Turkey and Armenia. In fact, when Armenians get the opportunity to travel to Turkey, they might be disappointed seeing the appalling state of the Armenian heritage in Turkey. That, in turn, could fuel nationalist sentiments in Armenia. Ironically, some potential problems between the two countries are currently absent simply because these nations do not interact much.

51. Arman Kirakosyan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, emphasised that the process of reconciliation with Turkey was initiated by the President of Armenia in 2008, inviting his Turkish colleague to observe a football match in Yerevan, which led to a series of meetings between the Turkish and Armenian officials on various levels.

52. The Deputy Minister stressed that the fundamental position of Armenia was to re-establish relations without preconditions. The issue of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire is a very sensitive one for Armenia, but Yerevan chose not to raise it in the negotiations in order not to create stumbling blocks. He also noted that the ruling of the Armenian Constitutional Court clearly endorsed the legality of this approach.

53. Having signed the protocols, the Armenian side is hoping for consequent ratification within a reasonable time frame. Unfortunately, once the protocols were signed, the language of preconditions resurfaced again in statements of some Turkish politicians. Linking Nagorno Karabakh with the rapprochement would negatively influence both these processes, the deputy minister said. The resolution of the two processes is progressing at different paces, they have different causes, and therefore it would be naïve to deal with them in a one-package approach. The resolution of the Karabakh problem should be entrusted to the Minsk Group.

54. Suat KINIKLIOGLU, member of the Turkish delegation to the NATO PA, presented the Turkish view on the reconciliation process with Armenia. He stressed that the rapprochement was a result of the Turkey’s new neighbourhood policy, launched in 2002. This new policy was based on a premise that Turkey was not a country on the edge of Europe, but rather at the centre of intersection of 5 regions – the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s goal is to support peace and stability in all these regions and to establish better relations with all countries in those regions.

55. He underlined that Turkey wants a normalisation of relations with Armenia. Yet, Ankara takes a broader regional approach. The bilateral normalisation cannot overlook the situation in Nagorno Karabakh. This linkage should not be seen as a precondition. The resolution of the Karabakh conflict and the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement are two parallel processes that are mutually reinforcing.

56. He argued that the ruling of the Constitutional court of Armenia is undermining the spirit and the letter of the protocols, essentially introducing preconditions to the ratification process. It is possible that this ruling was just a domestic political move to ensure that the protocols are easier to ratify in the Armenian parliament and they will have no legal repercussions to the signed protocols. However, until the legal meaning of this decision is not clarified by an objective third party, there will not be any appetite in the Turkish parliament to approve the protocols.

57. The speaker concluded by noting that some very important progress was made in the last two years. However, he agreed with Mr Iskandaryan that if the process is delayed, Turkey Armenian relation can deteriorate to the extent that would be worse than before the process began. He stressed that the Turkish parliamentarians would be happy to ratify the protocols first, but they cannot do so without some progress on the abnormal situation with Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey would like to see at least some roadmap of how to proceed forward in order to resolve this conflict.

V.  GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA

58. The seminar continued with a discussion on another unresolved conflict in South Caucasus, which reached its culmination at the August 2008 military conflict between Russia and Georgia.

59. Marian Staszewski, Former Deputy Head of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and Former Deputy Head of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), stressed that the history of the Caucasus plays a particularly significant role in local thinking and politics. Mutually exclusive histories by the Georgians, the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, including on the issue of ancestral rights on the respective territories, have undoubtedly contributed to existing tensions and conflicts. For example, in the early 1990s, the Abkhaz constituted only 18% of Abkhazia’s populations but they demanded special rights based on historical arguments.

60. The speaker distinguished internal and external aspects of the conflict. Internally, there was a conflict within Abkhazia and South Ossetia over the rights of national communities. The gradual process of tightening relations of the separatist entities with Russia creates a strong perception in Tbilisi that the time was not on the Georgian side.

61. External factors are powerful as well. Moscow’s relations with Tbilisi worsened as Georgia made it clear it wanted to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. Certain disagreement with NATO itself, the decisions of the Bucharest Summit as well as the wide recognition of Kosovo’s independence were among factors that noticeably influenced the situation in Georgia’s conflict zones.

62. During negotiations between 2006 and 2008, both Tbilisi and the separatist entities assumed inflexible positions. As for the August conflict itself, Mr Staszewski said that there might have been some miscalculations in Tbilisi, probably based on wrong conclusions drawn from the events in Adjaria in 2004.

63. The speaker argued in favour of greater involvement of international actors, such as special mission of the UN, OSCE or the EU, that are instrumental both in keeping stability and in working out workable long-term-solutions.

64. The next speaker of this session, Ambassador David Smith, Director of the Georgian Security Analysis Center, emphasised that the conflict did not start in 2008. The Russian invasion was long and well planned. Russia’s preparation included issuing Russian passports to the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, launching propaganda campaign against the “Georgian terrorism”, authorising major weapon transfers to these two entities, building rail lines to move troops and materiel to the region and conducting military exercises in the area. The pattern of the invasion itself leaves no doubt that Moscow was fully prepared and was waiting for an opportune moment. There might have been some mistakes made by the Georgian leadership, but Russia maintained a consistent policy for years to provoke and win a military conflict.

65. Ambassador Smith also noted that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not primary objects of invasion; rather it was directed against Georgia and the West in general. He also argued that the outcome of the war was harmful to the credibility of the international community because Russia continually violates the EU-brokered cease fire agreement.

VI.  THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

66. The developments in the North Caucasus, a part of the Russian Federation, are increasingly worrying and drawing the attention of the international community. The session on the problems of the region was moderated Wladyslaw Sidorowicz, Member of the Polish Delegation to the NATO PA.

67. The First Speaker, Wojciech GORECKI, Expert, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, said that the North Caucasus is of vital significance for Moscow as a frontier area and as a region hosting several key pipelines. Yet, it is also the poorest region of Russia, suffering from structural unemployment, underfunding and overpopulation. Residents of the North Caucasian republics feel as if they are second-class citizens in Russia, marginalised and deprived of any prospects. Corruption and nepotism are also extremely serious problems in the region. The republics are governed by clans and criminal organizations that are alienated from their societies. These groups are tolerated by the central authorities because they successfully create the impression that they are the only guarantors of stability in those republics.

68. The security situation in the region dramatically worsened in 2009. Radical Islamist militants are active in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. Their attacks are aimed at representatives of law enforcement agencies, state officials and the official Muslim clergy.

69. Realizing that the previous policy towards the region is not working, President Medvedev reorganized the North Caucasian Federal District and appointed Mr Aleksandr Khloponin as the presidential envoy for the region. Mr Khloponin has a reputation of a skillful manager and economist. The new tactics focuses on the region’s socioeconomic development and anti-corruption policies. In other words, Moscow now focuses on ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’. However, attempts to sabotage the new policy might be expected from those circles that are satisfied with the status quo. Mr Gorecki believed that the success of the new policy largely depends on the central authorities’ readiness to open up to those circles that have hitherto been excluded, namely NGO activists, moderate Islamists and human right defenders. In many ways, these are natural allies for Moscow because they support the principles of the rule of law and secularism. Unfortunately, Moscow seems to be under the impression that local ruling groups are its only reliable partners in the republics.

70. Aleksey Malashenko, from the Carnegie Moscow Center, said that Federal law is virtually non-existent in the region. North Caucasus is marred by overwhelming corruption and unemployment that sometimes reaches 50-70% of workforce. The region is moving backwards, becoming less modernisation. Radical Islamists are successfully making the case that a society based on Sharia law would be an improvement on the current situation.   Radical Islamist thinking is particularly prevalent among the youth in the region.

71. Leaders of the North Caucasus republics are pessimistic about the prospects of the Moscow’s approach. Mr Malashenko also noted that the crisis with Georgia and the resulting talks about the unification of North and South Ossetia are counterproductive for the stability in the region. He said that if no tangible improvement is achieved within a year, the situation in the North Caucasus could explode.

VII.  ENERGY SECURITY

72. The session on energy security was moderated by Kursat Atilgan, Member of the Turkish Delegation to the NATO PA.

73. Areg Galstyan, Deputy Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Armenia, discussed regional energy projects in which Armenia is involved. In terms of electricity, new high-voltage lines will be installed to connect Armenia with Iran as well as Georgia. It is possible that electricity line will also be constructed between Armenia and Turkey. These projects, when implemented, would allow countries of the region to capitalise on the advantages that each country has. Georgia, for instance, has a strong hydro power capacity but it is seasonal. Armenia has excess capacity in electricity produced in thermal plants. Armenia, Georgia, Iran and perhaps even Turkey would benefit from conclusion of an energy swap agreement to mitigate seasonal or geographical factors. Armenia is developing two hydroelectric projects with Iran along the river border between the two countries.

74. In terms of natural gas, construction of a gas pipeline between Armenia and Iran would greatly boost Armenia’s energy security. The territory of Armenia could be used more for natural gas transit; it would be beneficial for stakeholders of gas pipeline projects, including for the European taxpayers. As with electricity, deputy minister called for a creation of a common regional market.

75. In her presentation, Tracey German, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London, focused on the South Caucasus energy potential from the European perspective. She stressed that Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on energy imports. While currently the EU produces around 20% of its oil and 40% of its gas needs, it is estimated that by 2030 the EU will have to import over 80% of its energy needs. Due to rising global interdependence and consumption, oil and gas are increasingly seen as more than just economic commodities. The region of South Caucasus with its abundant hydrocarbon resources is one of the principle avenues to enhance Europe’s energy security. The EU recognises the development of the Southern energy corridor as a strategic priority.

76. The Nabucco project has been on a drawing board for a while and is now gathering momentum. It seems the political will is there to drive this very ambitious project forward. A number of obstacles remain, including the instability of the region, which makes it harder to attract investment. Also, there is a question of gas quantities available to Nabucco.  The potential for the Caspian countries to export their oil and gas to the East – particularly to China – has to be considered. However, if all these uncertainties are overcome, the South Caucasus-European energy partnership will greatly enhance benefit both sides and will enhance their energy security.

77. Haroutiun Khachatrian, Editor and Analyst with the Armenian Noyan Tapan, news agency, discussed the energy situation in the region from the “Caucasus-centric” rather than the “Eurocentric” perspective. The South Caucasus is more than just a land where oil wells and pipelines are located; it is home to nations that need to develop their economies and attract investments.

78. He noted that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan (BTC) oil pipeline connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey should ideally run through Armenia, rather than through Georgia. However, due to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku “punished” Yerevan by concluding an agreement with Georgia and circumventing Armenia. In fact, Armenia did not lose much as oil transit though its small territory would have brought this country only several dozens million dollars a year. Instead, the BTC stakeholders had to pay around 2.5 billion dollars (adjusted) more to construct a longer pipeline circumventing Armenia. Mr Khachatryan also argued that including Armenia into pipeline projects would actually benefit regional stability by forcing Armenia to bear more responsibility to a larger international community.

79. As for the future of the Nabucco gas pipeline, the speaker noted that its fate depend little on the wishes of great powers. Instead, the success of the project depends predominantly on the decisions of the Caspian nations to send a large share of their gas production to Europe. Therefore, the resolution of the regional problems is the real factor to consider.

80. Discussing situation with electricity supply in the region, Mr Khachatryan noted that Armenia, the smallest country of the region with no hydrocarbon reserves, has significant electricity export capacity. In an ideal world, Armenia could receive gas from Azerbaijan and export excess electricity to all neighbouring countries, including the Azerbaijani enclave the Nakhichevan district, which suffers from a lack of energy. In reality, however, Azerbaijan refuses to supply Armenia with gas, although that would not require additional pipeline infrastructure. Instead, this potential market for Azerbaijan is taken by Iran and Russia and Armenia exports its excess electricity to Iran.

VIII.  POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE REGION

81. The final session of the seminar, moderated by Philipp Fluri, Deputy Director of Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), was dedicated to internal political developments and functioning of civil society in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

82. Bakur Kvashilava, Dean of the School of Law and Politics, Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, pinpointed several key developments shaping the political future of Georgia. He noted that Georgia has dramatically reduced the scope of corruption, reformed the police, reduced tax evasion, modernized the infrastructure and improved its energy supply.  Mr Kvashilava argued that progress in the abovementioned areas is more important than superficial enforcement of electoral procedures.

83. Although the government has succeeded in creating a modern and more efficient state, various reports produced by key watchdog NGOs and other entities have downgraded Georgia in terms of political freedoms. The current government implicitly adheres to the model of democratization that assumes liberalization first and democratization next. Interestingly, that is how most old democracies came into being; the model has also been used by some new democracies in Southeast Asia and South America. However, Mr Kvashilava noted, it unclear whether this path as an acceptable option in the 21st century. In the Information Age of today it is extremely difficult to sell such an approach to the public and international community.

84. On a positive side, the civil society in Georgia is without a doubt vibrant, visible and active. The problem is that the political society is extremely weak, and the civil society has invaded and absorbed political society. Like many Eastern European nations, Georgia came out of the Soviet period with traditions based on the fight against that region that required unity and a single voice of the people. In such a fight compromise was not acceptable and dissent was considered treason. Yet compromise and dissent are essential parts of democratic process. In Georgia the political fight still adheres to those rules used by freedom fighters against the Soviet regime – unity over diversity, firmness against compromise, truth against lie. This explains why the opposition parties and groups attempt to unite against the government despite vast differences in ideology and worldviews, and why the changes that have occurred have rarely been incremental in Georgia.

85. Dennis Sammut, Executive Director, The London Information Network on Conflicts and State-building, analysed internal developments in Azerbaijan. Mr Sammut stressed that one has to bear in mind the geographical location of Azerbaijan: it is close to the oriental world and therefore has an alternative to the European path of development. Indeed, when discussing human rights situation, why should one compare Azerbaijan to Belgium, when one could compare it to Bahrain?

86. If seen from the Western perspective, domestic political developments are not encouraging: elections systematically fail to meet OSCE standards, and the freedom of speech is limited. Baku failed to implement comprehensive reforms in the 1990s or to build foundations for a competitive economic system and an independent judiciary, although the constitution of 1995 includes all principles of liberal democracy. Political culture remains weak, opposition splintered and many political parties exist to serve the personal ambitions of individual politicians.

87. On the other hand, Mr Sammut also noted some positive developments that are encouraging. He praised the “decision of the century” by the President Heydar Aliyev to strike an energy deal with the West, to reform the oil sector and make it more transparent.  This was an important signal for Western investors.

88. Mr Sammut also discussed the role of Islam in Azerbaijan. Religion plays a role in Azerbaijani society and even politics. Radical and violent Islamic groups remain marginal and do not enjoy broader support. However, the role of moderate Suni Islamism, connected with the influence of Turkey, is likely to have a much bigger impact on internal developments in the future.

89. In conclusion, Mr Sammut said that further development of civil society in Azerbaijan requires more committed involvement of the EU.

90. Tevan J. poghosyan, Executive Director of the International Center for Human Development, Armenia, emphasised the key role played by civil society institutions in conflict prevention and resolution. For politicians of conflicting countries is it often more difficult to find common ground; they are constrained by the official positions. Civil society representatives, on the other hand, can afford to be more candid and have an honest discussion on sensitive issues such as the events in the Ottoman Empire in 1915.

91. Mr Poghosyan said that Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society representatives had regular and fruitful joint events on a weekly basis over the period of 1995-2001. These events contributed to reduction of tensions between the two countries. The speaker regretted that in 2001 the President of Azerbaijan announced that he saw no value in such events. As a result, these contacts gradually vanished. It is also no coincidence that reduction of civil society contacts marked the growth of tensions in the region. Mr Poghosyan urged the international community, including NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to do more to facilitate re-establishment of civil society links in the region.

92. Artak ZAKARYAN, Member of the Armenian National Assembly, discussed the history of political and civil developments in Armenia. He said that from the beginning there was a full understanding in the Armenian political leadership that a strong civil society is a key prerequisite for a functioning democracy. However, there is no single formula how to rapidly build civil society. It took hundreds of years for Western nations to achieve their present level of civil activity. The challenge facing Armenia in this regard was further aggravated by the long period of Soviet rule, which created a sense of obedience among the people. Ordinary Armenians did not have a feeling that they were now the masters of their country and that their rights and liberties are inalienable.

93. The Armenian political leadership introduced legislation in the field of human rights, democratic norms, media freedom, market economy and transparency in administration. The EU, the OSCE and the Venice Commission provided invaluable assistance to Armenia in this endeavour.  A number of challenges remain to be addressed, including the insufficient effort by the authorities to reach out to the public during the decision-making process. However, Mr Zakaryan noted that main prerequisites are there to ensure emergence of strong civil society in the future.

IX.  CLOSING REMARKS

94. Simon Lunn, Senior Fellow of DCAF, made some concluding remarks, focusing on how NATO through its new Strategic Concept could contribute to peaceful development of the South Caucasus region. As the Alliance is redefining its role in the new security environment, it is expected to address the issue of partnerships, looking for ways to do more with partners and to do better. The new Strategic Concept should take into account the geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus region for the Alliance and vice versa.  While the Allies have been preoccupied with stabilisation of Afghanistan, the situation in South Caucasus is a sober reminder that the European security first and foremost depends on solving problems closer to home. Improving coordination of efforts between NATO and the EU in regions such as the South Caucasus is a task of paramount importance.

95. Mr Lunn also noted that the Alliance relationship with Russia will be the single most serious challenge to be addressed by the new Strategic Concept. Getting this relation right will be difficult in the context of division within the Alliance on this issue. The August 2008 war and the use of force added a new negative dimension to the European security equation. On the one hand, NATO needs to engage Russia, but on the other it need to reassure those Allies that consider Russia to be a threat to their security. NATO will need to get this balance right and to decide on the principles and depth of engagement with Russia.

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