1.     Following the opening remarks by the Chairman, Karl A. Lamers (DE), the draft agenda [129 PC 09 E rev.1] and the Summary of the Meeting of the Political Committee held in Oslo, Norway [138 PC 09 E], on Sunday 24 May 2009, were adopted. The Chairman then explained the procedure for amendments to the Committee draft resolutions.

I.                CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON NATO PARTNERSHIPS GEORGIA AND NATO [180 PCNP 09 E] BY RUI GOMES DA SILVA (PORTUGAL ), RAPPORTEUR

2.     In his introductory remarks on the    draft report of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships Georgia and NATO Sub-Committee   Chairman Rainer Stinner (DE)   thanked the Rapporteur, Rui Gomes Da Silva, for preparing a concise and stimulating report.  The discussion that followed focused on the implications of the August war for Georgia, including the ongoing reform process, and its relations with Russia.   A number of delegates voiced strong support for Georgia and its NATO accession and made reference to the progress that it has made in securing formal entry.  Throughout the discussion, delegates emphasised that no third country has a right to interfere in the decisions of a NATO or candidate country.  It was reinforced on several occasions, however, that Georgia should continue to make good use of the NATO-Georgia Council and advance necessary reforms.  To this end, it was stated that parliament and civil society has a greater role to play in Georgia. 

3.     In light of this discussion, a Georgian delegate emphasised that Georgia shares the values of the Alliance.  Underlining that democratic reforms are continuing he pointed to the transformation of a second channel of public television into a C-SPAN channel similar to that of BBC Parliament channel, increasing institutional safeguards for the independence of public broadcasting.  He also mentioned the recently adopted criminal procedure code as an example for judicial reform.  The Georgian delegate also referred to Tbilisi ’s decision to deploy Georgian troops to Afghanistan who could operate without caveats.  He stressed that this decision is supported by a broad majority in his country and that no major political force questioned the deployment.  This was remarkable for a country where 20% of its territory is under occupation, he added.  He also stressed that the EU fact-finding mission concluded that overall responsibility could not be assigned to either side.  In contrast, a Russian delegate emphasised that the EU fact-finding mission had rejected the conclusion that Russia had started the war and that the use of force against Russian peacekeepers was unjustified.  The Russian member also claimed that NATO countries were aware of the equipment that was entering Georgia prior to the war and its increase in defence expenses. 

4.     The significance of the involvement of the international community in Georgia was mentioned on several occasions. One delegate reminded the Committee that it was the EU which, under French Presidency, achieved a ceasefire and that it was the first time in its history that all European Union countries aligned to produce a report into the causes of a war.  It was also noted that in aid the EU provides approximately €3.5 billion to Georgia, and that this fact should be more prominently emphasised in the report.  Other members emphasised that the deepening of relations between Georgia and EU acts as a powerful incentive for the political and economic reform process in Georgia.  Several commentators expressed concern about the ongoing stalemate in Russian-Georgian relations, with one delegate questioning how NATO could help remove roadblocks.  There was a general view that all parties should try and prevent the region from turning into a zone of tension.

The draft Report of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships Georgia and NATO [180 PCNP 09 E] was adopted with minor changes.

II.              CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT GENERAL REPORT RESETTING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA  [179 PC 09 E] BY RAYNELL ANDREYCHUK (CANADA ) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR

5.     Following the introductory remarks on the Committee’s General Report, titled Resetting Relations with Russia, by Senator Raynell Andreychuk (CA)   delegates emphasised the importance of maintaining a constructive dialogue with Russia.  The proper functioning of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was considered of paramount importance to this end.  A Russian delegate argued that Russia, too, was interested in good relations.  He referred to presidential commissions that were being set up, and that Russian parliamentarians interact with a number of international parliamentary assemblies and national parliaments.  Moreover, the recent visit by the UK Foreign Secretary to Russia was also considered to have contributed to a warming of relations.  However, another Russian delegate suggested that NATO-Russia relations needed a new impulse.  This view was shared by a delegate from a NATO member state who remarked that resetting relations with Russia would be a difficult task since NATO-Russia relations continue to be multiple and complicated.  The point was made on several occasions that resetting relations with Russia should not be put in front of common shared values, democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the requirements to fulfil international commitments and agreements. 

6.     One member stated that Russia had breached its 1999 Istanbul Summit commitments and that Russia ’s decision to consider NATO a threat in its new security strategy requires further evaluation.  Another delegate questioned the seriousness of President Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security architecture, and suggested that it might be an attempt to produce division amongst the Allies.  The discussion revealed a consensus that the NRC was not the appropriate forum for discussions on a new European architecture and that the OSCE would be a better format for discussing this issue further.

7.     In contrast, a Russian delegate considered the proposal for a new European security architecture to be a concrete proposal and explained that, like any other country, Russia does not have ready-made answers to problems.  The delegate outlined four principles to serve as a starting point to strengthen security: 1) a bilateral and binding commitment not to use force, or threat of force, in addressing various conflicts or disputes; 2) single mechanisms, and no double standards in negotiations to approaching frozen conflicts; 3) military forces should be reduced close to borders; 4) a new qualitative level of cooperation and response to current threats to security should be advanced including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, drug-trafficking, piracy, natural and man-made catastrophes.

8.     The issue of energy security was also raised and it was suggested that NATO-EU co‑operation in this area required further consideration.  One delegate pointed to the High North as an area that could advance closer relations between the Alliance and Russia.  However, another delegate questioned the extent to which NATO could contribute in areas such as nuclear proliferation where the United States and Russia jointly possess some 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons, making it essentially a bilateral issue.  Members considered Iran and Afghanistan among the areas which would benefit from closer NATO-Russia co-operation.  However, one delegate felt though that the Allies needed to further investigate exactly how Russia can help in this regard. 

The draft General Report Resetting Relations with Russia  [179 PC 09 E] was adopted with minor changes.

III.            PRESENTATION BY ALI ANSARI, PROFESSOR OF IRANIAN HISTORY AT SAINT ANDREWS  UNIVERSITY, A CRISIS OF AUTHORITY: THE 2009 IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

9.     In his presentation to the Committee Professor Ali Ansari highlighted three factors as important when considering Iranian politics.  Firstly, the profound influence of history on the way in which Iranian politicians, including President Ahmadinejad, viewed the world around them.  Secondly, the influence of nationalism, a very distinctive Persian nationalism, on Iranian politics.  Thirdly, the element of theatricality, the “bluster of rhetoric”, of which Mr. Ahmadinejad is a star‑performer.

10.     Professor Ansari considered the Iranian election of 12 June 2009 to have been marred by serious fraud, perpetrated on the Iranian public, and that there was an enormous amount of empirical proof that this had taken place.  In this context the speaker also referred to the importance of the use of the internet, which had experienced a “revolution” before and after the election.  For example, the Iranian government had devoted time to pinpointing members of the opposition through creating lists online, and the opposition retaliated by producing their own virtual lists.

11.     Professor Ansari suggested that Iran is effectively a “paranoid state”, a security state which is very anxious about its survivability and is concocting narratives in order to justify its actions.  The international community need to keep this in mind when conducting nuclear negotiations, he said.  At the same time, the Iranian regime desires to maintain an aura of normality and to encourage the perception that its opposition is fading away.  However, this was not the case, he remarked.  Rather, the election fraud had resulted in a self-inflicted wound which represented the most serious crisis to face the Islamic Republic in its 30-year history.

12.    Iran ’s stability is dependent upon the elites, and it was the mistakes made by the elites that are currently breaking down the state’s cohesion, the speaker argued.  In this context he pointed to one of the most striking events since the election was that most senior Ayatollahs had come out against these developments.  Indeed, there have only been three times in the last century when a senior Ayatollah declared a state illegitimate: in 1906, 1978 and the summer of 2009.  Professor Ansari viewed this to be of great significance.  The military were not a unified force but were divided both within ranks, within the regular military and the revolutionary guard.  Social discontent is considered to be rife and people feel duped by the election. 

13.     Professor Ansari stated that the current dispute in Iran concerns the nature of the election in addition to the post-election violence that shocked Iranians which included those who were sympathetic to the regime as a whole.  The violence was not systematic but involved plain-clothed shock-troops which terrorised the population.  In reviewing the Iranian government’s strategies, Professor Ansari argued that there will be an attempt internally to maintain state cohesion and externally to emphasise the aura of normality which includes attending as many foreign meetings and negotiations as possible, and engaging with countries with which they perceive fermented unrest during the election.

14.     In reviewing Iran ’s opposition, or Green movement as it is now called, Professor Ansari considered it to be essentially a social movement.  He argued that while it was not leaderless, it was not being directed and was being instead organised from the ground up.  Given that it lacks central direction, it is going to be a slow, gestating movement however it would be difficult to suppress altogether.  The biggest fear of those supporting a more democratic structure in Iran is that the West will abandon them in favour of signing a nuclear deal with the authorities in power at the moment, he said.  Professor Ansari argued that this political context must be factored into any discussion and analysis when considering Iran.

15.     The questions that followed Professor Ansari’s presentation focused on: how the West should proceed in its engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue while not sidelining the opposition movement; the impact of oil on the stability of the Iranian regime and the influence of the Saudi government in this respect; Russia’s role in Iran; and, the likelihood of an Israeli military strike against Iran.

16.     In response to a delegate’s question on how negotiations over Tehran ’s nuclear programme should proceed, Professor Ansari asserted that negotiations needed to be defined in a more robust and clear way.  In particular, deadlines should be respected.  More generally, the West tends to give the benefit of the doubt to people who are not interested in reaching agreement, he suggested.  The Iranian government is not taking the West seriously and often acts with an understanding that both Russia and China possessed the veto in the Security Council, the speaker argued.  In this context Ansari suggested that Russia needs to be enticed to be of greater help to the West in regard to Iran.  He added that Russia plays the “Iran card” well and that, if the Iranian nuclear issue were to be resolved, it would result in Russia losing some of its leverage.  As such, the Iranian government assumes that the Russians will continue to support it.  However, it was stated that while Russia did possess some lucrative contracts in its dealings with Iran, the extent of these should not be exaggerated.

17.     He also suggested that the West should change track slightly, and be prepared to incorporate human rights issues into their negotiations with Iran.  However, any deal with Iran had to be predicated on the fact that negotiations had to take place in a situation of political stability, and that negotiations with an unstable government would be meaningless.

18.     Professor Ansari suggested that it was unfortunate that the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the US President, Barack Obama, congratulated the Hamid Karzai on his electoral win in Afghanistan. It was noted that this is unlikely to be taken well in Iran, where it is viewed as a sign that the West does not really support democracy and the election events in Afghanistan will be taken as evidence of this.

19.     It was also suggested that Saudi Arabia and Iran are moving from a cold war into an almost proxy war situation as seen in Yemen and Balujistan.  This is, according to Professor Ansari, at least how the Iranian government currently consider the situation.  Within this emerging conflict, oil price plays a part.

20.     Iran ’s main weakness and vulnerability was the economy, Ansari said, adding that a continued decrease in oil prices would put the country in serious difficulties.  If one wants to increase pressure on Iran it would be most effective to exploit President Ahmadinejad’s mistakes, the speaker said.  However, this would make for a slightly awkward approach to engaging Iran, he added.  Moreover, Professor Ansari remarked that if the West were to support the leading Iranian opposition this might strengthen Iran, but that it might not make the country any softer or amenable to the West on the nuclear issue.  However, it was noted that, at the very least, the West would be dealing with people with whom they can do business.

21.     Following a question on Israel ’s relations with Iran, Professor Ansari stated that Israel had toned down its more belligerent rhetoric of the summer, possibly because Israel assessed that Iran is in trouble and that any surgical military strike would only give President Ahmadinejad the crisis that he desires.  The speaker ended with the statement that “one should never interrupt your opponent when he is making a mistake”.

IV.             PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR WILKINSON, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE ADVISORY BOARD OF THE CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE (CSTPV) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAINT ANDREWS, THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

22.     In his introductory remarks, Professor Wilkinson explained that terrorism often complemented insurgency.  The use of terror to fight terrorism is ill suggested as the outcome is uncertain and not morally desirable, while the use of the rule of law can be much more efficient especially in clarifying the narratives between victims and martyrs.  In addition, the engagement in a war on terror is by its embedded nature difficult to end.  As to the achievements and the failures in the “war on terrorism” Professor Wilkinson stressed the need for a strategy that united all allied countries, particularly with regard to Afghanistan.  As it is not possible to count completely on intelligence warnings, trans-national terrorism needs an international effort.  Terrorism today is not the worst security threat but it certainly is important.

23.     Focusing on Al Qaeda’s, Wilkinson suggested that its ideology was driven by religion and politics, with particular elements such as mass fatality attacks and suicide attacks as a hallmark and with a truly global reach.  Despite its setbacks in Iraq, Al Qaeda is still alive and recruiting, consolidating its position in Pakistan and reinforcing its presence in the Horn of Africa and its alliance with Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

24.     During the discussion following the presentation, Professor Wilkinson underlined that international terrorism has been effective in developing its tactics and capabilities.  Questioned on Iran ’s possible links with terrorist groups, the speaker commented that Tehran apparently considered terrorism as a useful weapon and warned upon unleashing international terrorism in case of an Israeli attack.

25.     Professor Wilkinson reaffirmed that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the weak points and the international community should continue its efforts in the region to prevent South East Asia from being taken over by terrorism.  Professor Wilkinson expressed his preference for the European term “struggle against terrorism” rather than “war on terrorism” as only through a truly holistically approach combining police, judicial, intelligence, politics and economic policies, terrorism can be seriously challenged.

26.     European based terrorism was then discussed and Professor Wilkinson suggested that support has been growing in some Diaspora communities. In addition Professor Wilkinson commented on the alienation feeling and indoctrination. Finally Professor Wilkinson commented on the judicial system and its effectiveness to challenge terrorism.

V.              DISCUSSION ON THE ASSEMBLY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT (PROCEDURE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY’S CONTRIBUTION TO A NEW NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT [200 SC 09 E] AND A DRAFT TEXT OF THE ASSEMBLY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF THE ALLIANCE [201 SC 09 E]

27.     Following the presentation by the British terrorism expert, Sven Mikser (EE), Vice President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, provided a short overview of the Assembly’s contribution to the updating of NATO’s Strategic Concept.  The NATO Parliamentary Assembly is drafting a series of recommendations on the subject of the new Strategic Concept for consideration by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  The member stressed that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence will remain the cornerstone of the Alliance, but the revision needs to take into account the evolution of the broader global security landscape, particularly new threats and challenges such as cyber warfare, maritime security and energy security.  He added that the new Strategic Concept should underline the solidarity of the Alliance; stress the importance of more deployable, integrated and capable NATO military; strengthen co‑operation with other international organisations, particularly the EU; and enhance public communications, especially to their respective populations and the role of the Alliance as central forum for transatlantic discussions on security matters.

28.     During the discussion, the comments focused on the reaffirmation of the importance of the Article 5 as cornerstone of the Alliance; whether or not the Military Committee should be dissolved; the role that NATO should play to achieve a nuclear free world and NATO’s role in post-conflict situations.  Discussions revealed a general consensus that the new Strategic Concept should relate to new security concerns including new security challenges such as climate change and the changing scenario in the High North.  Members also raised the issue of available resources for future operations.  Some members favoured more commonly funded projects as the global financial crisis and other factors had a strong impact on the evolution of national defence budgets.  Other contributions by Committee members emphasised that increased co-operation with the EU on defence matters, better civil-military collaboration, and the continuation of the “Open Door Policy” should be included in the Assembly’s text to be submitted to the NATO Secretary General.  The delegates also stressed the increased relevance of public diplomacy and underlined that NATO should remain the main forum to address transatlantic security issues.

VI.            CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS PAKISTAN  : A TEST OF TRANSATLANTIC CO‑OPERATION” [181 PCTR 09 E] PRESENTED BY RAPPORTEUR MIKE ROSS (US)

29.     Following the introductory remarks by the Rapporteur, Mike Ross (US ), Committee members emphasised the importance of Pakistan for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and for regional security. 

30.     In the debate on the report, the head of the Pakistani delegation refuted the questioning of Islamabad ’s resolve against the Afghan Taliban.  “We have sacrificed a lot” in the fight against the insurgents, he said and went on to underline the achievements and progress of the military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.  He an also underlined Pakistani efforts of combatting the terrorist basis at the border with Afghanistan with 1,000 posts and recalled for support from the international community.  However, a Member of the European Parliament delegation was more critical of Pakistan ’s policy. He welcomed however the possibility of “more co‑operation” with Afghanistan, including the sharing of intelligence.

31.     Other comments focused on Pakistan ’s historically difficult relationship with India, particularly with regard to the disputed area of Kashmir.  There was agreement that Kashmir continued to pose a serious problem.  The delegates suggested the importance of using the influence that both the United States and the EU have in the region to play as facilitators.  The delegates also commented on the A.Q. Khan issue, Indian influence on the region and its role in Afghanistan, and the correlation between terrorism and poverty in the region. Finally, the delegates commented on the influence that NATO has in building democracy in Pakistan.

The draft Report Pakistan: A Test of Transatlantic Co-operation [181 PCTR 09 E] was adopted.

VII.          PRESENTATION BY GENERAL (RET.) KLAUS NAUMANN, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE, TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS

32.    In his introductory remarks, the former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, identified issues currently complicating the transatlantic relationship as well as those crucial for the mid- to long-term evolution of the Alliance  .  He started off by suggesting that the Pax Americana in Europe broke down after the United States began the “War on Terror” in September 2001.  America cannot automatically be counted on for support by Europe in the way that was possible during the Cold War, he stressed.  In particular, European reluctance to act in solidarity with the United States led to the Europeans being portrayed as “selfish and inward-looking partners on whom the United States cannot really rely” he said.  Europe needs to show more solidarity with the United States in Afghanistan but also in areas closer to home, the speaker said.  Europeans need to work to repair the relationship, notwithstanding the change of administration.  NATO allies need to speak with a more united voice if they wish to maintain the balance of transatlantic relations, he suggested.   The former chairman of NATO’s military committee warned that internal divisions within the Alliance “risk eroding the very basis of NATO which is and will remain collective defence”.    

33.    Russia will be on of the key issues shaping the transatlantic security relations and will have an important impact on the new Strategic Concept, currently under discussion.  Although it may be militarily weakened, and economically dependent on European trade, American support is still necessary to ensure a secure Europe, according to the German general.  “One of the abiding problems of European security” remains to have a credible American commitment to Europe while seeking a co-operative relationship with Russia.  To that end, NATO must remain firm in continuing its “Open Door Policy”, while taking legitimate Russian security interests into account, he argued.  NATO’s rapprochement with several ex-Soviet states is seen as expansionist by Russians, the General recognised, adding that he felt that “Moscow ’s thinking does not understand US strategy or NATO policy in this area.  If Europe and the United States acted in unison and avoided taking unilateral decisions which Russia subjectively perceives as humiliating and as detrimental to its strategic interests then there might be a chance for a new beginning in NATO-Russia relations”, he said.  He also called for the United States and Russia to take the lead in the decommissioning of global nuclear weapons.  Without a US-Russian initiative there is “not the slightest chance of reducing” the world’s stockpiles he said, as these countries have between them 90% of global nuclear weapons. 

34.     On Afghanistan, he said that NATO itself should be more proactive in developing and advocating an Afghan strategy, said retired German general Klaus Naumann.  He went on to underline that NATO should aim to find “an Afghan solution” to establish a functioning state in the country.  “Simply sending in more NATO troops cannot be the solution” he said.  “A viable strategy should build on past successes and, coupled together with a counterinsurgency strategy, should be oriented fundamentally around reconstruction”.  This would include “working jointly with moderate elements” of the talibans, of whom he estimated “no more than 10%” were irreconcilable radicals.

 35.     Turning to the changing international security landscape, General Naumann stressed that the scarcity of natural resources will be a significant source of conflict in the future.  Water, oil and gas shortages, combined with radical demographic shifts and the consequences of global warming, are drastically changing the global security landscape, he elaborated.  In addition, the shrinking, aging European population will put “tremendous pressure” on their societies, compounded by migration trends, the former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee said.  Russia, too, will be affected by these changes and he pointed to Russia ’s continuing demographic decline to “perhaps less than 100 million” which could pose serious problems for the country, particularly in the resource rich parts of Siberia.  “The twenty-first century will be an unsettled century” said the general, also briefly referred to cyber war and other emerging threats.  Therefore, the Alliance “must be refashioned in accordance with a duly expanded concept of security”, to incorporate “all the instruments of crisis management, including non-military components, and which seeks cooperation with other organisations.”

36.     In the discussion that followed delegates raised issues concerning the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the European pillar in the Alliance.  The speaker stressed that merely iterating rhetoric by America ’s allies has meant that they are often not taken seriously.  The little progress made with the ESDP was considered a case in point.  Rather, Europe should be directing its focus and add value in areas where US capabilities were limited.  Europe needs to develop tomorrow’s capabilities, which are closely linked to winning and maintaining informational security.  The speaker suggested that to improve transatlantic relations Europe should launch programs on equal footing with the United States, such as medium-to-heavy lift helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

37.     One delegate commented that the United States can find no better partner than Europe, particularly as both shared the same values.  The speaker concurred with this view, but added that it is the interests that ultimately matter, and that values are an additional factor.  Though they share the same values, the emotional ties between Europe and the United States may change as a result of the changing demography in the United States.  He suggested that Europe should build upon and contribute to the transatlantic alliance.   If the United States is the indispensable nation, Europe should strive to be its indispensable partner, he said.

38.     In line with this point, one delegate argued that European NATO allies’ inability to find a single policy on the issue of recognising Kosovo illustrated the lack of unity in relations. In response, the speaker commented that he would not judge the individual decisions of EU nations but suggested that their reservations may involve issues of precedence. In addressing comments made by a Serbian delegate, the speaker suggested all Europeans should find ways to overcome historical legacies and work together.

39.     Although Europe is, in economic terms, a global power, it needs to overcome its differences, General Naumann stressed and added that it will have no place in the world if it does not achieve unity and speak with one voice.  In light of the likely conflicts and challenges of the future the European Union can be considered “superior” to NATO because it disposed of all political, economic, financial and other instruments.  However, the majority of European nations are producing armed forces for yesterday’s wars by spending tomorrow’s money, he added.

40.     Responding to a question on NATO’s role in Afghanistan, the speaker said that NATO should not wait for a US Strategy for Afghanistan but rather develop a NATO one and suggest how the United States could contribute.  He argued that there is a tendency within Europe to wait for a US initiative, and then to criticise it.  The speaker also underlined the need for a truly comprehensive strategy.  He raised the question if it was a mistake to attempt installing a central government and to impose the governing rules of a 21^st century democracy on a tribal society.  Referring to the McCrystal report, the speaker noted that it does not rely purely on a military solution, but that it does not address the question of how to overcome the Afghan government’s shortcomings.  Without a modified strategy, the Alliance does run the risk of being seen to support a government that the Afghan people do not respect, he concluded.

41.     One delegate asked the speaker his view on how the transatlantic alliance could contribute to a world free of nuclear weapons and whether it was a credible goal when nuclear disarmament appeared to be very much a bilateral issue.  The speaker responded that as long as we do not live in a world free of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons will remain an instrument to deter the use of nuclear weapons, and that there was no way out of this situation. The speaker stated that it is clear that the first steps must be taken by the United States and Russia since they possess approximately 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons and that unless courageous steps were taken there was no chance of convincing other countries to forego nuclear weapons or even to reduce them.

42.     When questioned by a Russian delegate about his views on resetting relations, the speaker stated that he believed that the future of Europe ultimately depended upon peaceful cooperation between Europe, Russia and the United States. He stated that some policymakers in Russia continued to think in outdated categories such as 19^th century “zones of influence” and that the West, in particular NATO, should continue to reaffirm that every European country should be able to decide which organisation it belongs to. The speaker suggested that the relationship should be fully transparent.  A Georgian delegate suggested that Russia does not perceive NATO or its military power a threat but that in actual fact it feared the political and economic system that NATO advances through its scrutiny of reform in inspiring countries.  He went on to argue that policymakers considered democracy an existential threat and that this was demonstrated in its adamant opposition to Ukraine ’s EU membership and its involvement in the Eastern Partnership.  He maintained that Russia appears to pursue a policy of increasing EU dependence on Russian gas and oil supplies.  In response, the speaker said that it is in Europe’s interests to diversify its energy supplies, but that Russia also needs Europe as a customer. 

VIII.        CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENTS AND VOTE  ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ENGAGING PAKISTAN [207 PC 09 E] AND REAFFIRMING NATO’S OPEN DOOR POLICY [222 PC 09 E REV.1] BY RAYNELL ANDREYCHUK (CANADA ), GENERAL RAPPORTEUR

43.     Following the introductory remarks by the General Rapporteur, the Committee discussed and voted on the two draft resolutions Engaging Pakistan [207 PC 09 E] and Re-Affirming NATO's Open Door Policy [222 PC 09 E rev 1]. 

44.     There were eight amendments for the draft Resolution on Engaging Pakistan [207 PC 09 E] of which three were withdrawn or not moved.  The following amendments were adopted:  Amendment 2 (Mr. Erdem, Mr. Alaboyun, Mr.Ceylan, Mr. Bastopcu); Amendment 6 (Mrs. Sliska, Mr. Ozerov); Amendment 8 (Mr. MacShane, Mr. Bouvard, Mr. Meckel, Mr. Agov, Mr. MacAulay, Mrs. Zakrzewska, Mr. Kofod, Mrs. Paegle, Mr. Campbell, Mrs. Adam, Mr. Dziedziczak, Mr. Conway).  The following amendments were withdrawn: Amendment 3 and 4 (Mrs. Zakrzewska) and Amendment 1 (Mr. Erdem, Mr. Alaboyun, Mr. Ceylan, Mr. Bastopcu).  The following amendments were rejected: Amendment 5 (Mrs. Zakrzewska) and Amendment 7 (Mrs. Sliska, Mr. Ozerov). 

The draft Resolution Engaging Pakistan   [207 PC 09 E] was adopted as amended.

45.     Eleven amendments were proposed to the draft Resolution Re-Affirming NATO's Open Door Policy [222 PC 09 E rev 1], of which six fell or were rejected.  The following amendments were adopted: Amendment 4, 5, and 6 (Mr. Lamers); Amendment 1 (Mr. Frunzulica, Mr. Arnaut, Ms. Rodriguez-Salmones, Mr. Ceylan, Mr. George, Mr. Bouvard, Ms. Nybakk and Ms. Solberg and Mr. Paulsen) and Amendment 7 (Mr. Lamers). Amendment 10 (Mr. Cabras) fell.  The following amendments were not adopted: Amendment 8 (Mr. Cabras); Amendment 2 (Ms. Sliska, Mr. Ozerov); Amendment 3 (Mr. Lamers); Amendments 9 and 11 (Mr. Cabras). 

The draft Resolution Re-Affirming NATO's Open Door Policy [222 PC 09 E rev 1] was adopted as amended.

IX.           ELECTION OF COMMITTEE OFFICERS

46.          The Chairmanannounced the procedure for election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers. The following candidates were elected by acclamation

Political Committee
Vice-Chairmen  : Wladyslaw Sidorowicz (Poland) and  Denis MacShane (United Kingdom )

General Rapporteur :  Audronius Azubalis (Lithuania)

Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships
Vice-Chairman :  Celestino Suarez (Spain)

Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC)

Members :  Raynell Andreychuk (Canada) and Loïc Bouvard (France )             

Alternate Member : Ali Riza Alaboyun (Turkey )            

All re-eligible Committee and Sub-Committee Officers were re-elected.

X.             ACTIVITIES IN 2009 AND IN 2010

47.     Finally, Mr. Stinner (DE), Chairman of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships, informed the Committee members of the planned visits to Azerbaijan and Japan in 2010.  Mr. Ross (US), Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, announced that the Sub-Committee will visit Albania and the United States next year.  At the end of the meeting, Chairman Karl A. Lamers announced the date of the next meeting of the Political Committee and thanked the UK Delegation for their hospitality and excellent organisation.

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