NATO Parliamentary Assembly


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     A.  OVERVIEW 

     A.  OVERVIEW 






1.  After an extremely turbulent political season in Afghanistan in 2009, the Alliance, led by the United States, re-committed itself fundamentally to re-focused objectives in Afghanistan.  Prompted by a strategic review by former ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) Commander General Stanley McChrystal, NATO unambiguously endorsed the techniques of counterinsurgency as those most likely to lead to a positive outcome in this nine-year-old conflict. 

2.  The doctrine of counter-insurgency stipulates that many hundreds of thousands of troops would be necessary to stabilise Afghanistan.  And yet international troop commitments, which are currently at their highest level to date, do not exceed roughly 125,000.  Working from its own assumptions, the ISAF strategy now being pursued by current ISAF Commander General David Petraeus will therefore have to rely on Afghan forces to fill the gap between what is required and what troop-contributing nations are willing and able to provide. 

3.  Indeed, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the ISAF contributing countries had it right in their 4 December 2009 Ministerial Declaration:  “Our mission will be accomplished when Afghan forces can secure their own country.”  This leads to what may be the central question determining the outcome of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan:  what are the prospects of these forces being trained, equipped, motivated and responsive to the needs of the Afghan people, on a timeline that troop-contributing nations can abide?

4.  The question does not only pose itself for the international community. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, in his November 2009 inauguration speech, laid out his ambition to have Afghan security provided entirely by Afghans by the end of his term in 2014.  He has also decreed that private security companies operating in Afghanistan must disband by the end of 2010.

5.  To preview the conclusions of this report: the acting Rapporteur agrees with the previous Rapporteur’s view that deep and troubling shortcomings remain as regards Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)’s aptitude to provide basic security for the Afghan people.  While somewhat different for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), they share basic problems, to include leadership deficiencies, attrition, corruption, drug abuse, illiteracy, and equipment shortages, to name only a few.  These difficulties are laid out in sections II through V of this report.

6.  However, as further described in section VI, a significant upturn in the effort to address ANSF’s shortcomings has become evident since the original drafting of this report in early 2010.  At that time, the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A), launched in November 2009 with the explicit purpose of stepping up Allied efforts to train and equip Afghan security forces, was only beginning to implement its promising programs.  Since then, thanks to increased funding and focus, the mission has been able to report measured progress in both the quantity and quality of Afghan security forces.  This progress has been assisted by a new, more consequential approach towards embedded partnering to provide mentorship and leadership in the operational environment.

7.  Several figures provided by the mission’s leadership in September 2010 demonstrate some significant achievements.  Since November 2009,

* the ANSF has grown by 33%, from roughly 200,000 to about 256,000, doubling the average growth for previous years and achieving ANP and ANA force goals for October 2010 three months ahead of schedule;
* Daily training capacity is greater: for the ANA from less than 6,000 seats to 20,000, and for the ANP from 7,740 to 10,661; the instructor-trainee ratio has fallen from 1:79 to 1:29;
* Quality is increasing: 97% rifle marksmanship qualification, up from 35%; 27,105 enrolled in now-mandatory literacy training.

8.  This progress has been made possible by the increased resources devoted to the task as well as specific, targeted initiatives such as a making the ANP a priority and raising its pay, and instituting mandatory literacy training across the ANSF.

9.  Despite these achievements, the endemic problems afflicting the ANSF laid out in the original draft of this report were never going to be solved quickly or easily.  The challenges to NTMA’s mission remain significant; its Commander, Lieutenant General William Caldwell, in September 2010 stated that the three greatest challenges to his goal of ANSF professionalization were leadership deficiencies, illiteracy, and attrition.

10.  It remains true that, without the proper resources, NTM-A will struggle to fully prepare ANSF to take on lead security responsibilities within a politically acceptable timeframe – the key objective captured by the often-used term “transition”.  It is also clear that the development of the ANSF, although fundamental to a successful transition strategy, is only one of the elements required for the broader effort to bear fruit.

11.  This report has been prepared for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as background information for the Committee’s discussions on this crucial element of the campaign in Afghanistan.  It summarizes the structure and function of the ANSF, principally the ANA and ANP, but also the Afghan Air Force (AAF).1 It also describes the current state of international efforts to establish the ANSF as capable security providers for the Afghan people. 

12.  The report is informed by the Rapporteur’s repeated travels to Afghanistan (most recently on a visit organized by the Assembly in April 2010) as well as by discussions across a range of Allied countries and military commands, including a January 2010 visit to U.S. Central Command (then under the leadership of General David Petraeus).  This version of the report also reflects the feedback received from members of the Defence and Security Committee on this subject at the Assembly’s spring session in Riga, Latvia, in May 2010.2


13.  Initial efforts to develop an Afghan National Army began, haphazardly, immediately after the overthrow of the Taliban, with a U.S. Special Forces effort to train the first Afghan army battalion.3  As of early 2002, development of the Army was a U.S. “lead nation” responsibility. The role and significance of the ANA has taken on greater importance in recent years as the insurgency has grown and the security situation has worsened, and as troop-contributing nations have underlined that their commitments cannot be open-ended.  It is widely recognized that the continued development and eventual selfsufficiency of the ANA is central to any eventual withdrawal of international forces. 

14.  The Afghan National Army, reporting to the Ministry of Defence, is currently among the most respected and most identifiably “national” institutions of Afghanistan.  It is engaged in combat operations across Afghanistan, largely in partnership with and supported by international forces and occasionally independently.  It is also simultaneously growing in size and capability.

15.  The strategy for the ANA’s development in the post-Taliban era has been revised several times; the most recent and significant shift having occurred subsequent to former ISAF Commander McChrystal’s “Initial Assessment” in August 2009, when a decision was taken to accelerate the growth of the ANA and focus on the production of infantry in order to provide units ready to fight against the insurgency.  The decision entailed deliberately postponing the “balancing” of the force with its own enablers that would allow the force self-sufficiency. 

16.  As a result of this acceleration, official estimates suggest that the strength of the ANA reached 134,000 soldiers in August 2010, meeting its target for October 2010 three months ahead of schedule.  Mid-range plans call for 171,600 trained ANA troops by October 2011, while longer term estimates suggest a possible target of 240,000 total troops by 2014.4 

17.   The ANA is organized into five corps in five regional commands (RCs) with headquarters in five cities: RC Central (Kabul), RC East (Gardez), RC South (Kandahar), RC West (Herat) and RC North (Mazar-e-Sharif).  Each corps consists of several brigades, which are, in turn, made up of five battalions (called kandaks): three infantry kandaks, one support kandak and one combat support kandak.  Kandaks consist of three or four companies and are authorized to include a maximum of 658 soldiers.  In addition, every RC hosts at least one commando kandak. Currently, seven of a planned nine commando kandaks are fielded, according to Lieutenant General William Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan.5

18.  While the ANA had until recently been equipped with former Warsaw Pact materiel, it is now increasingly being provided U.S. materiel instead. For example, AK-47 “Kalashnikov” rifles are being replaced with M-16.  While the AK-47 has been used in Afghanistan for 30 years, advocates of the U.S.-made M-16 rifles suggest they are lighter, more accurate, and offer the additional benefit of discouraging the sale of ammunition by ANA soldiers to Taliban rifles.6  However, some experts suggest that the M-16 is not well suited for Afghanistan, as it is more expensive, difficult to maintain and possibly more vulnerable to the ubiquitous mud and dust.7

19.  Most analysts suggest that the ANA has achieved a measure of success.  Independent experts agree with official assessments of good news on many levels, including the fact that the ANA is largely respected by the population; broadly multi-ethnic; and increasingly taking the lead in operations with success.”8  Anecdotal evidence from NATO soldiers suggests that the ANA can be modestly effective at the squad level, that many individual ANA soldiers have demonstrated courage and willingness to fight and that they are far better than foreigners at searching Afghan homes and identifying potential Taliban fighters.9

20.  Officials report that progress has been made in the areas of ANSF doctrine, training, leader development, material/logistics, and international co-operation.  There is a better rapport between ANA personnel and their mentors and trainers; an increased percentage of Afghan-led combat operations; Non-Commissioned Officer schools have been established; as has an Integrated CivilMilitary Assistance Group, which co-ordinates interagency actions in support of ANA and ANP development.10

21.   It is also significant that the ANA took lead security responsibility for the city of Kabul in August 2008 and the province as a whole in early 2009.  The ANA also deployed outside Afghanistan to support victims of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

22.  On a personal level, the acting Rapporteur was impressed in September 2009, when, with an Assembly delegation, he visited the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, the “crown jewel” of college-level military education and leadership development in Afghanistan.  Working with a team of mentors and trainers from ten contributing nations, it offers a bachelor degree and commissions 300-400 new lieutenants annually, who are intended to lead the Army with the highest professional standards.  The delegation observed complex urban operations training by cadets at the colocated Kabul Military Training Centre and had the opportunity to interact with them directly.  Members of the delegation were impressed by the dedication and professionalism of the soldiers they encountered as well as by their Afghan leaders. 

23.  In sum, there is some good news to report regarding the ANA, and by one estimate, the ANA is proceeding on a track that will allow it to participate in a security transition in mid2011.11  However, the force is far from ready to replace international forces, and fundamental shortcomings described in the next section could still derail the progress made thus far.


24.  Despite the signs of progress described above, it is widely recognized that the ANA continues to face significant problems, such as insufficient quality of leadership; high illiteracy and attrition rates; limited facilities and forward operating bases; incomplete ability to provide combat or maintenance support; a lack of developed institutions within the ANSF; inadequate logistics capabilities; a lack of accountability for funds, equipment and personnel actions; contracting problems, and a historical under-resourcing of the training mission.12  

25.  Afghan officials suggest inadequate equipping is a general problem.  Defence Minister Abdul Wahim Wardak told Assembly members in April 2010 that the ANA faced shortcomings in firepower, mobility, and air transport and reconnaissance.  Counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) technology was also a priority, as IEDs caused the largest percentage of ANSF casualties. 

26.  Despite remarkable progress in raising the numbers of ANA personnel, reenlistment rates are still far too low and attrition too high, resulting in a situation in which tens of thousands must be recruited just to maintain the status quo.13

27.  As a result of these deficiencies and the simultaneous strain of operations, only 23% of the ANA (22 kandaks) were able to operate independently as of March 2010, according to the Pentagon.  This number had not changed since May 2009. 

28.  Indeed, press reporting and anecdotal evidence of botched operations suggests that even routine missions are difficult for the ANA to carry out independently.14  A vignette recently described by senior NATO military officials recounts an operation in which an ANA company, operating independently in Herat province, was ambushed and needed air support.  Unfortunately, no one in the company could read a map.  This significantly delayed the incoming aircraft and several wounded ANA soldiers died of their wounds as they waited for the medevac to arrive.

29.  The short term problems preventing operational independence are compounded by longer term concerns:  the institutions necessary to support the continued growth and self-sustainment of the ANA are absent or incomplete. This includes an Afghan-run military education system, facilities in which to train the forces and the ability to construct bases in the areas where the insurgency is active. These capabilities are more difficult to develop and will take longer to stand up than combat or police battalions.15


30.  The vast and rugged terrain of Afghanistan makes air transport an especially crucial capability.  If the ANA is to eventually operate independently, it will need to have at its disposal capable air assets and the personnel to fly them. 

31.  The main responsibilities of the nascent Afghan Air Force (AAF) are to transport Afghan personnel, fly humanitarian assistance missions and provide medical evacuation for the ANA.17  The task of rendering the AAF  fully operational in order to ensure that it can support these missions has not been without challenges.  As a previous commanding general of the international training element for the air force stated, “[b]uilding an air force in the middle of a war is sort of like building an airplane in the middle of flight. But we've got to do it.”18 

32.  While much of the existing air infrastructure and planes were destroyed during the 2001 war, a small number of air force pilots and personnel from previous regimes remained in Afghanistan.  As a result, a significant cultural and linguistic gap emerged due to the fact that the AAF has formed a new cadre of pilots by calling up mainly Russian-speaking Afghan pilots (average age: 48) who were trained during the Soviet occupation and continued flying for the Najibullah government.  These pilots face the challenge of learning English and NATO standards simultaneously. 

33.  Plans to potentially phase out the MI-17 helicopter, which the Afghan pilots have been flying for 30 years, worry a recent commander of the training element, who told a defence trade publication in April 2010 that such a “move would cripple the U.S. training and assistance mission in Afghanistan,” and that it could cost the U.S. two years of training.19

34.  Despite these challenges, efforts to develop this Afghan capability have yielded demonstrable results:  about 3,900 airmen currently serve in the Air Force, a number set to grow to about 8,000 by 2016. The AAF, with air wings currently in Kabul and Kandahar and smaller units across the country, operates 50 aircraft – mainly MI-17 transport helicopters, MI-35 (“Hind”) helicopter gunships, AN-32 and C-27 transport aircraft.  Current plans are for the AAF to operate a maximum of between 130 and 140 aircraft by 2016.20

35.  Official figures suggest significant progress: NATO reports that in early 2008, member states flew 90% of the missions in support of Afghan forces; by 2009, the AAF flew 90% of their own missions.21  About 75% of the infrastructure required to support an air force has already been established.22

36.  Several of the Afghan Air Force’s recent operational engagements are worthy of note:  NTMA reports that the AAF rescued 2,100 citizens from flooding in August 2010.  The AAF also supported the September 2010 parliamentary elections, conducting 33 missions moving 336 passengers and 55 tons of elections materials and equipment throughout Afghanistan (by comparison, for last year’s presidential election, Afghan air support was limited to certain areas).  The AAF has also operated beyond its borders: without NATO advisor presence, it provided assistance to Pakistan after its major earthquake, moving 963 aid workers, assisting 120 flood victims, and delivering 120 tons of aid.23 


37.  A professional Afghan police force that can “assume progressively greater responsibility” is an essential part of the strategy laid out by former ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal and pursued by current Commander General Petraeus.

38.  Under the current counterinsurgency strategy, the ANP is therefore intended to play a key role in the “hold”-phase, in which police officers control an area after it has been “cleared” by coalition and Afghan soldiers.  Their task is to prevent the return of insurgents, provide a stable rule of law, and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.  Since ANP officers interact most with the Afghan population, they are, in many senses, the face of the Afghan government.


39.  The development the Afghan National Police, under the command of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), was initially a German “lead nation” responsibility, but later devolved to the EU’s Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL).  It was also paralleled by a substantial bilateral U.S. program whose principal aim was to produce as many patrolling police as possible.  NTM-A has incorporated much of the U.S. bilateral effort and has sought to reinforce NATO’s efforts and improve co-ordination with other multilateral and bilateral training programs.

40.  By the end of August 2010, NTM-A’s General Caldwell estimated the total strength of the ANP at more than 109,000, exceeding their 2010 growth goals three months ahead of schedule.  Long term force goals call for continued growth, with a target strength of 134,000 by the end of October 2011 and a final goal promoted by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior of 160,000 by the end of 2014.

41.  Then-Minister of the Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar told a visiting Assembly delegation in April 2010 that the ANP was progressing both in terms of the quantity of trained personnel and their quality.  Atmar cited recent polling which showed that, for the first time in decades, more than 40% of the Afghan population trust the police force.  He suggested that press reporting on the deficiencies of the police has lagged behind the reality on the ground.

42.  The ANP currently consists of six distinct entities, under the civilian leadership of the MoI.  The largest police element is the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), with more than 80,000 officers.  It is responsible for general law enforcement, public safety, and internal security in the Afghan provinces and districts. 
43.  The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is a 4,900 men-strong “elite” quick reaction force with a relatively positive reputation, both with international observers and local populations.  ANCOP recruits receive 16 weeks of training, are deployed in high-threat areas and temporarily replace the AUP in the framework of the Focused District Development Program (FDD) (see Assessing ANP Challenges below).  However, the relatively strong performance and skills of this small force has led to a problem of “overuse”; when combined with long-time under-payment.  ANCOP is plagued by a staggering attrition rate that is by far the highest among police entities.24
44.  Smaller units include the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Counter Terrorism Police.
45.  The ANP is provided with former Warsaw Pact AK-47 rifles, as well as trucks, all-terrain vehicles and radios purchased by international donors.  Afghan authorities pay the police forces with funds provided by the international community through the UN Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOFTA), which is administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).  Recurrent expenditures, such as salaries, infrastructure projects, and non-lethal equipment, are paid out of this fund. 


46.  The ideal ANP would, according to U.S. criteria, be “professional, literate, ethnically diverse, tactically competent, and capable of providing security throughout Afghanistan.”25  Unfortunately, these aspirations are far from being met.  The ANP is regularly assessed as lagging far behind efforts to develop the Afghan National Army.

47.  ISAF figures suggest that only 12 of the 365 Afghan districts had police forces “capable of basic law and order operations and leadership tasks appropriate to local circumstances without external assistance” as of the end of March 2010.26 
48.  Training efforts, to date, have involved a number of organizations and Allied nations in various bilateral and multilateral configurations.  The International Police Co-ordination Board was established in order to set priorities and ensure co-ordination among these sometimes disparate contributions.  Even so, some analysts suggest that the proper role of the ANP remains undefined and that there is no clear agreement between elements of the Afghan security apparatus and members of the international community on what this role should be. This potentially endangers the overall effort. 

49.  The ANP is unable to provide even for its own survival in the face of the insurgency; indeed, problems such as inadequate equipment, facilities and training have meant that, since January 2007, the rate of ANP members killed on duty has been twice that of the Afghan National Army.  The average monthly death rates for ANP officers, non-commissioned officers, and patrolmen have increased steadily over the last several years.27  The most recent figures have almost 2,000 Afghan police officers killed or injured by insurgents between March and September 2010 alone.28
50.  Illiteracy is pervasive within the ANP, with an estimated 75% of recruits lacking basic literacy, which hampers not only training but also basic policing techniques. The use of narcotics is also prevalent, with up to 40% of potential recruits to the country's police force failing drug tests.29 
51.  A lack of leadership in the ranks is likely related to the corruption endemic in the ANP, which also undermines the force’s relations with the public.  A UN poll published in October 2009 found that more than half of Afghan respondents considered the ANP corrupt.  Accusations of extortion, assault, and rape were also common.30 
52.  Most observers agree that the ANP is insufficiently equipped (especially with ammunition and vehicles) to challenge concerted attacks by insurgents.  This problem is worsened by poor accounting: reports suggest that up to 40% of equipment cannot currently be accounted for.
53.  Accountability is also a concern in basic personnel systems.  It remains extremely difficult to prevent the appearance of “ghost recruits” or non-existent personnel reported on staff rolls by local officials in order to gain centrally disbursed resources.  Some have suggested these could account for as much as 25% of reported ANP strength, which, according to the International Crisis Group, “not only means the police are missing, but also that there are thousands of weapons that are unaccounted for as well.” 31

54.  In an effort to address the shortcomings of the ANP at the district level, in 2007 the U.S. training command launched an initiative called Focused District Development (FDD).  The programme removes all AUP in a single district to conduct two weeks of training at an external training centre as a unit.  They are temporarily replaced with ANCOP forces until the training programme has been completed.  The training force is also monitored over a period of months in a continuous programme of assessment and partnering with international trainers. 

55.  It remains unclear whether sufficient resources are being devoted to development of the police, or perhaps more critically, whether they will be complemented by a functioning system of justice, without which citizens have no access to meaningful governance.32


56.  Given the challenges facing the national-level security forces detailed above, ISAF Commander General Petraeus has emphasized the potential of local security forces as a potential “game-changer.”  Advocates of such an approach often cite the “Sons of Iraq” movement as a model that has been credited with contributing to turning the tide of that conflict. 

57.   During the summer of 2010, General Petraeus received President Karzai’s consent to launch an initiative which would involve establishing an Afghan Local Police (ALP) under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.  The ALP would enrol 10,000 Afghan villagers with the support of district councils and tribal elders in an effort akin to neighbourhood watch groups.  The locally-run ALP would theoretically help secure, protect, and develop their communities, as well as providing ground-level intelligence on potential security problems and serving as a warning system to call in help from other security forces.

58.  Members of the ALP would receive a salary equivalent to 60% of that of a uniformed Afghan police officer.  New recruits would be supplied with trucks and light weapons and receive three weeks of training.  The units would be authorized to detain people temporarily, but would then turn them over to established security or law-enforcement forces. 

59.  The ALP initiative is intended to continue for two years, after which some members could be provided with further training and integrated into the ANSF.  Afghan officials assert that measures are in place to prevent Taliban sympathizers or those with allegiances to local warlords from becoming members of the Local Police Initiative.  These include guarantees by local elders and councils, as well as a registration process to track individuals.

60.  The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a moderately successful pilot project in community-based security in Wardak province, will be folded into the new Afghan Local Police initiative. 

61.  Committee members have heard conflicting views on whether such an approach would be successful or productive in Afghanistan.  Critics cite the failure of an initiative to field an Afghan National Auxiliary Police Force in 2008 due to high attrition rates, widespread corruption, partisanship and a fundamental lack of professionalism.  They also point to the repeated periods of violence in recent Afghan history between armed local groups, and the prospect of questionable loyalty, lack of accountability, and incomplete control of these armed groups by the Afghan government.  The effectiveness and utility of local security forces in the context of the larger national-level campaign remains in question; in any case, the adoption of a single approach for the vastly different communities of Afghanistan is unlikely to succeed. 


62.   The following section details only some of the many mutually reinforcing challenges shared by all elements of the ANSF.  Any successful approach to achieving permanently effective Afghan security forces will have to take them all into consideration.


63.  Most observers agree that a central problem for both the ANA and ANP is strengthening leadership within each force.  An absence of leadership creates a culture in which discipline is poor and corruption, factionalism, and unaccountability can thrive.  Leadership involves creating an ethos of service and loyalty to the Afghan people rising above personal, tribal, and regional alliances.  The current officer corps is a combination of members of the Shah’s Army, others who served in the highly centralized Soviet-backed Army, and still others who fought with the ad-hoc, informal mujahadeen.  Additionally, many leadership positions were gained, not on merit, but through corruption or patronage.  This results in widely differing levels of expertise, knowledge or experience, and multiple, potentially conflicting allegiances. 

64.  For the ANA, the dearth of leadership is especially acute at the levels of junior officers and non-commissioned officers, personnel whose development often takes years of training and experience.  The detrimental effect of poor leadership extends beyond battlefield performance, as it hinders the development of the ANSF’s capacity to protect and police the population day-to-day and to be a self-sustaining institution.


65.  Illiteracy in the ANSF is also an immense problem.  Only about 14% of entry level ANSF are literate, as General Caldwell acknowledged as recently as August 2010. This often obliges trainers to operate on a “show and tell” basis.33   While it may not be an absolute requirement that an army demonstrate an extremely high rate of literacy to function as an effective counterinsurgent force, illiteracy at anything approaching these levels creates sustained dependence on international forces as well as presenting a number of fundamental challenges to basic security provision tasks, including logistics, supply and administration, as well as evidence gathering. 
66.  Corruption is a problem in all of the Afghan government institutions, and the security forces are no exception.  The disappearance of fuel, weapons, equipment and pay as well as the smuggling of drugs and other illegal activities, are considerable challenges and they exacerbate other difficulties. 

67.  Evidence suggests that a high number of ANA soldiers are narcotics users.  In December 2009, a German commander reported that about 15% of the Afghan armed forces were drug addicts.34   According to one report of the Marja offense, hashish use by Afghan soldiers “was so prevalent that the Marines adopted a ‘don't ask, don't tell’ policy unless they were directly confronted with the problem.”35  NTM-A administered a drug test across the entirety of the ANP in the first half of 2010, finding a drug use rate of 9% across the force.36

68.  A mutual lack of trust still appears to impact relations between U.S./NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces, even though the international forces have begun to partner with ANA troops at all levels.  For example, a U.S. soldier told the Washington Times that, “I don't think American troops will ever fully trust them or that they will ever fully trust us. That's been a major problem."37  These relationships are further strained by friendly-fire incidents as well as infiltration and deliberate use of ANSF uniforms by insurgents.
69.  A persistent lack of trust and co-operation between the various parts of the ANSF are also major concerns.  A clear and agreed division of labour between the ANA and ANP has not been established, and independent analysts suggest significant rivalries and tensions between the forces.  A hopeful but still budding development that bears watching is the establishment of Operations Co-ordination Centres (OCCR).  In September 2009, an Assembly delegation visited the nascent OCCR for the Northern Region.  The Balkh province OCCR was jointly manned by representatives from the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, the National Directorate for Security, and ISAF.  Its purpose was to co-ordinate command and control aspects of operations between Afghan National Security Forces and between them and ISAF.

70.   A more tangible problem regarding ANA/ANP co-operation is the fact that each respective force is provided with incompatible equipment.  The Army, as reported above, is in the midst of converting to M-16 assault rifles;  the police forces, for their part, continue to use former Warsaw Pact weapons – in particular the AMD-65 assault rifle, a variant of the Kalashnikov that was distributed to the Afghan forces in 2007 by the U.S..  This also means their ammunition is incompatible.  This approach indubitably complicates co-operation between the forces in the field as well as overall acquisition and supply of weapons.38


71.  The ANSF logistics systems are too small and inefficient to adequately supply ANSF personnel, according to experts, an assertion backed by the U.S. Defense Department Inspector General.39  Lack of experience in logistics, corruption and illiteracy hamper the proper functioning of a supply system.  The construction of supporting infrastructure is also a recurring problem; for example, press reports suggest that many recruits are living in tents, with no improvement in sight, as there are too few engineers to produce adequate housing.40

72.  Inadequate accountability for both equipment and personnel can also result in dangerous consequences.  On the equipment side, officials concede that some portion of the material provided to the ANSF is being lost or sold.  While the magnitude of the problem is difficult to assess, the danger it represents is critical: for example, lost or stolen uniforms can pose – and have posed – a dire threat to ISAF troops and the ANSF, if used by insurgents to infiltrate otherwise secure areas. 
73.  Official reports confirm that weapons accountability has been a major problem in Afghanistan.  For example, the U.S. Defense Department’s Inspector General concluded in May 2009 that “DoD had no assurance that weapons purchased for the ANA were received or that ANA units received the correct quantity or type of weapon.”  It cited a broken chain of custody in Afghanistan and improper registration and safeguards for weapons and sensitive equipment.41  
74.  Anecdotal evidence provided by a New York Times investigation found troubling evidence:  a sample of captured insurgent weaponry in May 2009 showed that more than half of them contained ammunition identical to the cartridges issued by the U.S. to the ANSF, which, according to the Times, “strongly implied that the United States was indirectly arming the Taliban.”  The newspaper further indicates that distinctive Hungarian rifles of a type issued to the ANP by the U.S. in recent years were now sold in Pakistani bazaars.42  More recent news stories suggest that the problem has not abated.43


75.  The composition of the ANA is roughly equivalent to that of the population as a whole, at roughly 43% Pashtun, 32% Tajik, 12% Hazara and 10% Uzbek, with the rest made up of smaller ethnic groups.44  Experts suggest, however, that Tajiks are still overrepresented in the higher ranks and Hazaras feel that they “face a glass ceiling.”45 
76.  A major priority has been to recruit Pashtuns into the ANSF, particularly for operations in the Pashtun-dominated south of Afghanistan.  Unfortunately only 2 or 3% of the ANA are from the south, a situation that leaves NTM-A’s commander General Caldwell “very, very concerned.”46

77.  Other fault lines within the ANSF also present challenges.  Observers suggest that powerful patronage systems continue to influence everything from operations to promotions.  These networks break down not only along ethnic lines, but also between personnel who fought with the mujahedeen, those who served in the Soviet-backed army, and the new recruits.


78.  The development of the ANA and ANP is currently funded through the NATO-administered ANA Trust Fund and the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA), respectively.

79.  The ANA Trust Fund contributes to costs associated with donated equipment, equipment purchases and infrastructure projects, training and, since March 2009, the recurring costs of ANA expansion.  Since its inception in 2007, close to U.S.$ 130 million have been contributed, and another U.S.$ 232 million have been pledged so far.

80.  For the ANP, the LOFTA had a budget of over U.S.$ 630 million for the years 2008-2010 and, as of June 2010, has spent over U.S.$ 566 million.  The program was scheduled to end in September 2010, but is likely to be extended.47

81.  By contrast with the above sums, U.S. led efforts to finance the ANA, independent of the two trust funds, amounted to U.S.$ 7 billion in 2009. 
82.  In the context of these extraordinary sums -- maintaining the ANSF will cost U.S.$ 6 billion a year, the delegation was told at Camp Eggers in April -- most observers suggest that the Afghan state may not be able to sustain the overall cost of maintaining the ANSF until 2040 or later. 


83.  Recognizing many of the shortfalls described above, and the failure of previous efforts to resolve them in an acceptably rapid manner, NATO countries decided at their April 2009 Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl to substantially step up their collective efforts to train the ANSF. 
84.  These efforts resulted in two closely linked but separate initiatives: at the request of the Afghan government, Allied leaders pledged to provide more trainers to serve as “embedded partners” alongside and within Afghan units; and to establish the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in order to clarify or co-ordinate what were demonstrably complex and overlapping lines of authority in various training efforts. 

85.  A fundamental shift in the concept of partnering took place in parallel with the creation of NTM-A in 2009.  While the previous concept had training teams meeting with their Afghan counterparts in the field to jointly conduct an operation, and then go their separate ways, the new concept of embedded partnering aims to bring international and Afghan personnel together to live, train, plan and execute missions together.  The concept applies not only to mentoring and training in the field, but to all levels of operations, from the Ministries of Defence and Interior down to combat troops on the battlefield. 

86.  Beyond providing advice and instruction, this more integrated concept of mentoring is also intended to fill the leadership vacuum exacerbated by the rapid growth of the ANSF, which has focused largely on infantry, rather than the development of the critical leadership level of officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO).  It also links the Afghan units with essential enabling capabilities such as close air support and medical evacuation by ISAF forces.

87.   An organizational shift placed operational control for ISAF’s fielded training teams with the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), which was created in 2009 to reduce the burden on the ISAF Commander as regards day-to-day operations.  The IJC now has control over both the trainers in the field and ISAF manoeuvre troops, which should improve the co-ordination of emergency assistance for training teams and their ANSF partners.  Thus, NTM-A has only a limited role to play in the coordination and preparation of training teams in the field; it is “not an item that we have daily oversight of,” according to General Caldwell.48  

88.   Partnering in the field is delivered to the Afghan Army through Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs).  OMLTs provide training and mentoring to the ANA.  They also serve as a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that the ANA units receive necessary enabling support. 

89.  OMLTs usually consist of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the ANA unit with which they are partnered) from one or several countries.  Each OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months. 

90.   As of mid-July 2010, roughly 85 % of the Afghan National Army was partnered with coalition forces, which according to IJC commander Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, will “keep building capacity of the Afghan national security forces and increasingly allow the police and army to take the lead.”49  NATO figures from August 2010 suggested 143 training teams (including 76 U.S. Embedded Training Teams) were operating in all six regions of Afghanistan, with 88 additional OMLTs expected in the coming months.  Approximately 12 more OMLTs were required to complete fielding of the 134,000 strong ANA by October 2010.

91.  The Afghan Police, for its part, is partnered through Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs).  Composed of 15-20 personnel from one or several countries, each POMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months.  POMLTs coach, teach, mentor, provide the conduit for liaison, and when necessary, support the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit.  

92. As of August 2010, NATO fielded 41 POMLTs, alongside other nationally-led teams, which perform similar duties.  At that time, the U.S. fielded 279 teams; Germany 11, with up to 13 planned. An additional 143 POMLTs were required by October 2010.

93.  NTM-A was officially activated in November 2009 “to oversee and streamline the capacity development” of the ANSF.  The mission’s mandate is to carry out ANSF institutional training, education and professional development activities.  Prior to the mission’s activation, NATO efforts to build up the ANSF centred on developing Afghan forces in the field.  The responsibility for the initial training or “offthe-battlefield” development of the ANSF was mostly in the hands of U.S. commands.  Thus, with the creation of NTM-A, NATO’s role was considerably strengthened in this area.

94.   Twenty NATO member states and another 26 non-NATO contributing nations participate directly in NTM-A or contribute monetary assistance, donations of equipment or other assets.  Primarily focused on instructing and advising, the mission’s goal is helping build the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes not only the army, the police, and the army air corps, but also medical and logistics facilities and infrastructure development, and finally systems inside the Ministries of Interior and Defence.

95.   NTM-A’s budget, as of March 2010, was just under U.S.$1 billion per month.  Its manning represented less than 2 % of the military forces in Afghanistan.50

96.    Since its inception in November 2009, NTM-A has reported remarkable successes, as initially mentioned in the introduction of this report.  Most impressively, it met ANA and ANP growth targets for October 2010 three months ahead of schedule.  It has also made significant strides in improving the quality of ANSF personnel and creating the infrastructure necessary to maintain its numbers and training base. 

97.   The Mission’s Commander, Lieutenant General Caldwell, credits the resources nations have provided with much of the training successes, including, in particular, the tripling of the number of NTM-A trainers in the previous ten months, to 3,500 personnel.  This increase had “permitted a reversal of a persisting inconsistency in overall Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police growth trends.”51

98.  General Caldwell has also praised what he sees as a “new sense of urgency” at relevant Afghan ministries, which have “taken complete ownership to increase recruiting, reduce attrition, and improve retention over the last nine months. This includes the creation of Recruiting Commands to oversee efforts across Afghanistan and measures to better tailor recruitment to the needs of the Afghan people.”52 

99.  Indeed, recruitment has also met with success:  over 58,000 recruits entered the ANSF in the first eight months of 2010, doubling the number recruited in 2009.  Recruitment was eased by, among other measures, increasing pay:  a basic ANA or ANP recruit now earns roughly U.S.$ 250 month – up from U.S.$ 50 in 2003 – and can also claim reenlistment, hazard and longevity premiums, bringing salaries up to or higher than the level that the Taliban are offering their fighters.53  Initiatives such as a new program to provide flights for approved home leave for deployed Afghan personnel are likely to aid retention.

100.  Several efforts have also been initiated to increase accountability, particularly in personnel.  In co-operation with NTM-A, the MoI has established an inventory process that includes registration, drug testing, re-vetting, and obtaining of biometric data for all ANP personnel.  To date, the Afghan Government has reportedly accounted for 248,768 ANSF personnel.  The goal is to enrol 1.65 million in the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) by the end of May 2011.  Fingerprints, irises, and faces are routinely scanned and stored.  Along with regularly conducted drug tests, AABIS “helps create an environment where the Afghans can hold personnel accountable for their actions,” General Caldwell says.

101.  Together with a database run by NATO forces to gather information on detainees, AABIS is part of a broader effort to collect biometric dossiers on hundreds of thousands of police officers, soldiers, ordinary citizens, criminals, and insurgents in order to hinder militant movement around the country, to keep infiltrators out of the security forces, and to identify weapons collected on the battlefield.54 
102.  Crucially, NTM-A has included basic literacy instruction for all new recruits in basic training, which should facilitate all staffing aspects of the ANSF from operational planning to logistics to intelligence sharing to accountability, as well as potentially reducing corruption and attracting additional recruits. 
103.  As the numerical objectives of ANSF personnel strength have largely been met, the training mission is now shifting its focus to professionalising the force and developing its self-sufficiency and reliability.  The principal challenges upon which it now seeks to focus are leader development, literacy and attrition. 

104.    Efforts to develop more effective leadership within the ANSF have already made some headway:  Between 21 March and 21 July 2010 alone, the number of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in the ANA increased by 28%.  The National Military Academy of Afghanistan has begun to turn out classes of officers, doubling its capacity in 2010 to an annual rate of 2,520 per year.  NTMA expects to be able to deliver over 15,000 NCO’s annually by November 2010. 

105.    NTM-A is also continuing to establish training and educational facilities throughout Afghanistan to allow the development of such basic military necessities as a common military education and a single tactical doctrine.  This will be complemented by plans for a professional National Security Education System for ANSF leader development.

106.  Despite the recruitment successes mentioned above, an attrition rate estimated at a monthly 3% across the force remains a major challenge for the ANSF.  Indeed, this problem is especially acute in the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP, described in paragraph 43), which has suffered an average 5.39% attrition rate per month over the past 12 months. 

107.    Such attrition rates mean that in order to reach the agreed goal of 305,000 ANSF personnel by 2011 (thus adding 50,000 to the current force), it is estimated that 133,000 new soldiers and police will need to be recruited, trained, and assigned.  This number is the equivalent of the current ANA as a whole. 


108.  Since the previous draft of this report was compiled in early 2010, it appears that much progress in standing up the Afghan National Security Forces has been made, thanks to the new recruiting and training initiatives delivered by the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and its Afghan partners, coupled with the embedded partnering approach that stiffens Afghan units in the field.  The progress appears especially significant when one recalls that the strategic shift that created NTM-A and devoted commensurate resources and focus to the buildup of the ANSF only took place roughly one year ago.

109.  This report has sought to provide general information on the current state of the Afghan National Security Forces and that of efforts to train and equip them.  A critical eye is, of course, in order when evaluating official figures demonstrating the ANSF’s progress. This is not only because of the rudimentary state of the Afghan system of administration, but also because of overly optimistic assessments by previously used official metrics. 

110.  Indeed, independent analysts suggest that the political pressures to meet agreed force development deadlines could result in a lack of transparency and overly sanguine assessments of progress.  For example, until recently, “in-lead” status was a measure of progress widely cited by officials, who regularly stated that the percentage of combat operations carried out with Afghans in the lead was growing steadily.  Critics point out that most of these Afghan-led operations were rather small-scale (50-60 soldiers) and very often simple patrol missions.55  Similarly, in the operation in Marja, official sources insisted that the Afghans were in the lead, but independent observers were less positive:  as the New York Times reported, “in every engagement between the Taliban and one front-line American Marine unit, the operation has been led in almost every significant sense by American officers and troops.”56 

111.   Another potentially slippery statistic relates to measures of combat proficiency, an essential tool to monitor progress towards ANSF’s ability to operate independently.  Until April 2010, ISAF relied on the Capability Milestone rating system, which, according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Inspector General overstated ANSF’s capabilities, used improper indicators, and included outdated information.57  ISAF Joint Command has since replaced this system with the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool; one expert suggests that, while the new rating system is imperfect, it is a notable improvement as relies on more accurate indicators and provides some useful flexibility.58

112.  However, even if official figures are taken at face value, the establishment of self-sufficient, professional military and police forces that serve the needs of the Afghan people is far from complete. 

113.   Beyond the problems outlined in previous sections, major additional challenges are on the horizon, including the need for the ANSF to take on some of the functions currently provided by private security companies, which President Karzai has decreed must disband by the end of December 2010.  Should this decree stand, it will have significant implications for the ANSF, including the need to take over the functions currently performed by the private companies, such as protecting supply lines.  In addition, the estimated 50,000 personnel employed by these companies would have to either be absorbed into the ANSF or find alternative employment.

114.  The speed with which new forces are being trained and deployed also continues to be a potential concern.  Until now, the need to produce “trained and equipped” forces quickly for infantry operational purposes has taken priority over producing well-balanced and self-sufficient forces; in other words, the need for quantity has been de-emphasised in favour of quality.  As Major General Richard Formica, former commander of the U.S. training command in Afghanistan, told Assembly members in September 2009, ANA units going through the compressed training would no longer be “balanced” with enablers but rather would be infantry-centred and would remain dependent on coalition-enablers in the field. 

115.  It is indisputable that decisions to bring forward deadlines for major force development goals have had significant implications on training schedules.  For example, to accelerate training to meet the target of 109,000 ANP personnel by the end of October 2011, the basic training for ANP recruits has shrunk from eight weeks to six.59  As for the ANA, until mid-2007 recruits went through a 15-week training programme before they were sent into the field; at that point, however, the programme was reduced to ten weeks; and despite some critics describing it as inadequate, it has now been further reduced to eight weeks.60
116.  Although to some extent compensated by longer days of training and fewer rest days, these shorter training periods have required the elimination of training in non-essential tasks, such as drill and map reading for illiterate soldiers, according to Major General Richard Formica.  Clearly, time spent in training is not the only indication of its quality or the quality of the forces the training produces.  However, some fielded units have reportedly had to conduct additional training in the field for newly trained and deployed recruits, hampering the units’ overall readiness.

* * * * *

117.   Unfortunately, there is no simple solution that will rapidly allow Afghans to independently provide for their own security in the short term. 

118.  Several ideas for accelerating the process have been advanced; one such proposal is the establishment of community-based security groups, as described in section IV.  Another is the suggestion by President Karzai that a national system of conscription into the security forces could be a way to combat attrition and other weaknesses evident in today’s ANSF.  Proponents of a draft suggest it could help create a national identity, increase identification with the state, and create shared experience and education among draftees, thus potentially easing ethnic tensions.  However, conscription would likely be extremely difficult to organize and enforce, as well as being widely unpopular with individuals, families and tribes, who have historically resisted such measures.  This was true during the Soviet occupation, when desertion rates were extremely high and former soldiers provided intelligence and weapons to insurgents.61
119.   Ultimately, the course of action most likely to accomplish the Alliance’s goals in Afghanistan is the ongoing effort to establish professional, capable and competent ANSF that are responsive to the needs of the people of Afghanistan.  If NATO is to succeed in this critical and challenging endeavour, contributing nations will have to be steadfast in demonstrating both strategic patience and proper resourcing.
120.   Strategic patience implies allowing the good plans currently in place the time and space necessary to succeed in their task.  It also means committing, over time, to seeing the task through, in order to prevent the insurgents from simply adopting a ‘wait-them-out’ strategy.
121.   Proper resourcing has always been and will continue to be a challenge for this mission.  However, at this stage, it is critical that the proper investment be made to produce trainers and resources to accelerate and consolidate ANSF training. 

122.  The case for additional training teams is persuasively made by NTM-A’s leadership.  Indeed, the needs in this area are both immediate and long-term.  NTM-A suggested in September 2010 that it required an additional 900 institutional trainers in the short run.  General Caldwell has called for trainers with special skill sets that would allow them to train Afghan logisticians, maintainers, communicators, intelligence analysts, and leaders.  In the somewhat longer term, the need for additional trainers will increase steeply over the next eight months as the size of the ANSF grows. 

123.  A shortage of personnel, coupled with an imperative to accelerate progress in training, the ANSF, has required ISAF and NTM-A to partially fill gaps by using contractors; upwards of 3,000 contractors are currently providing ANSF training, principally under contracts from the U.S.  However, as Anthony Cordesman from CSIS points out, “it is far from clear that the U.S. military has yet developed anything like adequate tools to manage, audit, and control contract support.”62  Indeed, legal disputes erupted in the largest training contracts for the ANSF, with complaints about how the contracts were awarded and whether proper oversight was being exercised.

124.  General Caldwell has also made clear his preference for the deployment of NATO military personnel or paramilitary police units, such as the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), rather than contractors, due to their coherent and disciplined chain of command and performance.  The EGF’s performance has been praised by NATO officials and more contributions of this type are sorely needed.

125.  In addition to providing the necessary resources to accelerate the institutional training provided by NTM-A, all nations participating in the training effort must fully embrace the new concept of embedded partnering that gained prominence in 2009.  While the concept may involve accepting greater risk and investment in the short term, it is fundamental to achieving the accelerated progress necessary to then be able to draw down successfully.  Nations should underst, , , , and that they will also have to provide additional trainers for these ‘in-the-field’ partnering teams:  as the ANSF numbers grow in 2011, the need for embedded OMLT/POMLT training teams to mentor them will also increase. 

126.  The effectiveness of embedded partners continues to be hampered by operational caveats which restrict the Commanders flexibility in theatre.  The Rapporteur again calls on nations to reduce these caveats to the absolute minimum possible. 

127.  Questions about the longer-term sustainability of the ANSF, as currently conceived, are legitimate and deserve further exploration.  In the short term, however, we must also ensure that resources be used as effectively as possible.  This includes matching NTM-A’s redoubled focus on ANP training with resources.  One possibility worthy of consideration is increasing the flexibility of the ANA Trust Fund to permit ANP-related support.

128.  The Rapporteur is encouraged by the renewed efforts to ensure accountability in personnel and equipment, such as biometric tracking and the use of databases to address the problems of ‘ghost recruits’ or infiltration of the ANSF by insurgents.  These efforts must be demonstrably successful in order to ensure that contributing nations and their publics can believe that the sacrifices they are making are not going to waste.
129.  Despite the challenges outlined in the above paragraphs, there are bright notes in the performance of the ANSF.  Some of these are evident in the personal commitments of the recruits the Rapporteur met in September 2009 at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and at the Kabul Military Training Centre.  The recruits demonstrated patriotism, steadfastness, and courage.  The maturation of the ANSF is halting but evident in episodes, such as the response to the attacks of 18 January 2010, in Kabul, in which a series of complex co-ordinated strikes against a number of targets, including ministries and shopping centres, was brought under control relatively quickly by the ANSF.

130.  The progress made possible by the Allies’ relatively small investment in NTM-A must be accelerated and consolidated in order to enable the Afghan forces to provide security for their own country.  This remains the prerequisite for accomplishing a mission that is critical to the security of the Alliance.

1   While other armed groups indubitably operate in Afghanistan – such as a recently reported CIA-run 3,000 man Afghan paramilitary force – the focus of this report will remain the main elements of the ANSF.
2   Detailed reports on these visits and Committee meetings are available on the NATO-PA website.
3   Obaid Younoussi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Solinger and Brian Grady, “The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army,” RAND Monograph Series, 2009, p. 29.
4       Target numbers for the ANSF are set by the joint UN-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB).
5   Press briefing by LtGen William Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), 3 March 2010, p. 5.
6     C. J. Chivers, “Reading (Rifle) Magazines,” New York Times At War Blog, 1 February 2010.
7   Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope?”, RUSI Journal, December 2009, p. 37; Pamela Constable, “'You Have to Learn This Now'; To Battle Taliban, Afghan Army Steps Up Recruiting, Training,” Washington Post, 2 August 2009.
8   Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping Host Country Forces as Part of Armed Nation Building, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 2009, p. 24.
9   C. J. Chivers, “Marines Do Heavy Lifting as Afghan Army Lags in Battle,” New York Times, 21 February 2010.
10   U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, 30 September 2009, p. If.
11   Anthony H. Cordesman, “Slouching Toward 2011,” Foreign Policy, 1 October 2010.
12    William Caldwell, Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense Transcript, 23 August 2010.
13   Thom Shanker and John H. Cushman Jr., “Reviews Raise Doubt on Training of Afghan Forces“, New York Times, 6 November 2009.
14    See, for example, “Afghan Army Offensive Goes Disastrously Wrong,” BBC Online, 13 August 2010. In a “routine” mission in Laghman province planned independently by Afghan authorities, an ANA battalion sought to flush out the Taliban in a contested area and was ambushed and suffered severe casualties. The ANA battalion was not able to disengage and was forced to belatedly call in NATO support.
15   William Caldwell, Press Briefing, U.S. Department of Defense Transcript, 23 August 2010.
16    The Afghan Air Force was formerly known as the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC).
17   Paul McLeary, “High and Hot,” Defense Technology International, 1 October 2009.
18   Aviation Week & Space Technology, “New Aircraft on the Way for Afghans,” 28 September 2009.
19   Inside Defense, “Boera: Termination of Mi-17 Would Delay Afghan Training Mission By Years,” 9 April 2010.
20   U.S. Department of Defense, “Bloggers Roundtable with U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Michael R. Boera, Commanding General, Combined Air Power Transition Force, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing,” 25 March 2010.
21   NATO, “ISAF’s support to the Afghan National Army Air Corps,” April 2009.
22   U.S. Department of Defense, “Bloggers Roundtable with U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Michael R. Boera, Commanding General, Combined Air Power Transition Force, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, and Commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul,” 25 March 2010.
23   NATO Training Mission Afghanistan: “Afghan Airforce Delivers, Collects Ballots All Over Afghanistan,” 25 September 2010.
24   The ANCOP attrition rate described by NTM-A in March 2010 was 67%.
25   U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police,” 9 February 2010, p. 1.
26   NATO Facts and Figures, “Afghan National Police”, June 2010.
27   U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police,” 9 February 2010, p. 5.
28   “Violence kills 100 Afghan police every month: govt,” AFP, 26 September 2010.
29   “Nearly half of recruits for Afghan Police fail drugs test,” Daily Mail, 14 March 2010.
30   UNDP, “Police Perception Survey 2009: The Afghan Perspective,” October 2009.
31   Mark Schneider, "Testimony to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan," International Crisis Group, 5 February 2010.
32   Anthony H. Cordesman, “Slouching Toward 2011,” Foreign Policy, 1 October 2010.
33   Press briefing by LtGen William Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), 3 March 2010.
34   Lynne O’Donnell, “Better Pay Boosts Morale in Afghan Army,” AFP, 28 December 2009.
35   Dion Nissenbaum, “Afghan soldiers way below standard, exasperated Marines say,” McClatchy Newspapers, 24 March 2010.
36    Press briefing by LtGen William Caldwell, Commander of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), 23 August 2010.
37   Sara A. Carter, “U.S. troops skeptical of Afghan abilities,” Washington Times, 2 December 2009.
38   C.J. Chivers, “Afghan Gun Lockers, Revisited,” New York Times At War Blog, 30 September 2010.
39   Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping Host Country Forces as Part of Armed Nation Building, CSIS, p. 19; U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, 30 September 2009, p. 25.
40   Thom Shanker and John H. Cushman Jr., “Reviews Raise Doubt on Training of Afghan Forces,“ New York Times, 6 November 2009.
41   DoD IG, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Phase III-Accountability for Equipment Purchased for the Afghanistan National Army, 12 August 2009, p. 8.
42   C. J. Chivers, “Arms Sent by U.S. May Be Falling Into Taliban Hands,” New York Times, 20 May 2009.
43   See, for example, Seth Robson, “U.S. trying to track missing weapons issued to Afghan police,” Stars and Stripes, 11 September 2010.
44   Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. makes small strides in getting Afghan army fighting fit, but hurdles remain,” Washington Post, 1 February 2010.
45   Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope?”, RUSI Journal, December 2009, p. 38.
46   William Caldwell, Press briefing, 3 March 2010.  A 36-member delegation led by Pashtun General Officers conducted a recruiting trip in four southern provinces in September in the hopes of offering inducements to attract more southern Pashtun to the ANSF.
47   United Nations Development Programme, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Phase V.”
48   William Caldwell, Press briefing, 3 March 2010.
49   Special Defense Department Briefing with Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command. Subject: Security operations in Afghanistan, 7 July 2010.
50   William Caldwell, Speech to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 3 March 2010.
51   “NATO to sustain training momentum, says NATO Commander,” NATO Press Briefing, 28 September 2010.
52   William Caldwell, Pentagon Press Corps Opening Statement, 23 August 2010.
53   William Caldwell, Press briefing, 3 March 2010.
54   Noah Shachtman: "Army Reveals Afghan Biometric ID Plan; Millions Scanned, Carded by May," Wired, 24 September 2010.
55   Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope?”, RUSI Journal, December 2009, p. 40.
56   C. J. Chivers, “Marines Do Heavy Lifting as Afghan Army Lags in Battle,” New York Times, 21 February 2010.
57   Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” 29 June 2010, p. ii.
58    Adam Mauser, “Reforming ANSF Metrics. Improving the CUAT system,” CSIS, 9 August 2010.
59   Greg Jaffe, “Program aims to rebuild Afghan police force, repair its image,” The Washington Post, 12 March 2010.
60   Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jery M. Solinger and Brian Grady, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army, RAND Monograph Series, 2009, p. 31.
61   Lee O. Coldren, “Afghanistan in 1985: The Sixth Year of the Russo-Afghan War,” Asian Survey, February 1986.
62   Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghan National Security Forces: Shaping Host Country Forces as Part of Armed Nation Building, CSIS, p. 66.