SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: CREATING NEW MOMENTUM [Report]

2. Welcoming participants, Talat Xhaferi, Head of the Macedonian delegation to the NATO PA, explained that the fragile security, economic and social situation in the Western Balkans, and the slow process of transition, have been exploited by the negative criminal and nationalistic forces. Therefore, he suggested that all countries in the region must strive to become part of the collective system of security and democratic governance. He regretted that his country had been unable to “join the club” of Alliance members in Bucharest together with its partners of the Adriatic Charter, Albania and Croatia, but he was confident that these new members would support his country’s path to NATO membership.

3. Trajko Veljanoski, Speaker of the Macedonian Parliament, emphasized his country’s contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and echoed Mr Xhaferi’s regrets about the missed opportunity in Bucharest. In his view, the process of Euro-Atlantic integration helps his country deal with such challenges as the fight against corruption and organized crime, consolidate a safe and more secure environment, and build broad trust in the region. Mr Veljanovski stressed the importance of parliamentary diplomacy on all these issues.

4. The Rapporteur of the NATO PA’s Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance, Marc Angel (Luxembourg), stressed the timeliness of the seminar and relevance of the issues on its agenda. He urged the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue with the progress towards building a sustainable multi-ethnic society through the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and expressed hopes that a mutually acceptable agreement over the long-standing name dispute with Greece would soon be reached, which would allow the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join the Alliance.

5. H.E. Mrs Nicole Wyrch, Ambassador of the Swiss Confederation in Skopje, in her welcoming words reconfirmed Switzerland’s long-term commitment to the region, as evidenced by its continued support to NATO’s Partnership for Peace and to the NATO PA’s Rose-Roth Seminar programme. Through this support, Switzerland solidly confirms that it fully shares the values on which both institutions are based, and the goals they pursue in the region.

6. In his keynote address, Ambassador James W. Pardew, emphasized some of the major accomplishments in the region since 1989: the consolidation of democratic governance; the overhaul of political institutions, the economy, the education system, and security and other institutions; the progressive integration into NATO and the EU; the creation of new states; and, most importantly, the end of the Balkan Wars of the 20th Century and the establishment of general peace.

7. Key priority areas to consolidate the progress achieved so far include economic development and the resolution of the carry-over issues remaining from the break-up of Yugoslavia, i.e. the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the name dispute between Athens and Skopje. Ambassador Pardew stressed that “serious and continuous economic assistance to the region as a priority is a strategic imperative for the EU and the US”. He deplored the persistence of divisive nationalistic politics in Sarajevo, and called on the Office of the High Representative, backed firmly by the United States and key European allies, to be more assertive in using the Bonn powers to block attempts by nationalist leaders to dismantle Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, he called ideas of partition or change of border to reduce ethnic tensions a “folly”, warning that “nothing [could be] more dangerous to stability and progress in the region than to reopen the question of current borders”. He urged the United States and Europe to make it clear that sovereignty issues and border changes are not on the table. In Ambassador Pardew’s view, Serbia is a key factor, and Belgrade needs to be aware of the negative repercussions it would face from interference or destabilization. He also added that talks between Belgrade and Pristina should only go forward when a set of practical agenda topics can be agreed. Lastly, Ambassador Pardew called for immediate high level international attention for finding a way out of the impasse in the name dispute between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece.

8. Concluding his presentation, Ambassador Pardew was confident that the four key strategic players in the region – the US, the EU, Russia and Turkey - have the potential to be a constructive force for change in the region. Ultimately, however, he argued that a determining factor for the future of the region is the success or failure of the current “experiment” in defining national identity and citizenship, and creating a sense of equal opportunity, in multi-ethnic states.

II. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: FROM OHRID TO BRUSSELS

9. Speakers and participants recognized the major progress achieved by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in building multiethnic institutions and implementing the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the brief conflict between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians.

10. Abdilaqim Ademi, Vice Prime Minister for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, emphasized that the Ohrid Agreement had provided the basis for building a multi-ethnic society. It not only put an end to the conflict, but also helped stabilize the country and set it on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The country was more functional and stable today and relations between ethnic groups were greatly improved. Dimitar Bechev, Senior Policy Fellow and Head of the Sofia Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, also explained that, while some elements of power-sharing existed before Ohrid, the Agreement laid the bases for systemic change.

11. Mr Ademi informed participants of the significant progress achieved in key areas of the Agreement, such as equitable representation in public administration, the use of the Albanian language in dealings with the state and the use of symbols, education, and decentralization. The new decision-making processes allowed for all communities to not only be involved but to take actual ownership of decisions. On equal representation, a lot remained to be done, however, to increase the citizens’ trust in the institutions, and encourage them to take responsibility. Promoting integrated education for Albanian and Macedonian children also remained a difficult challenge. Amnesty for all those who took part in the 2001 conflict was mentioned as a key outstanding issue. However, Mr Ademi rejected fears about possible demands for territorial autonomy, assuring participants that the priority was implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.

12. Other speakers pointed to a more fundamental shortcoming in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Simone Filippini, Ambassador of the Netherlands in Skopje, insisted that, while the letter of Ohrid has been implemented, “the spirit of Ohrid” is still missing, a spirit that “involves widespread and sincere acceptance among all ethnicities and their leaders of reconciliation between ethnicities, as well as an understanding that Ohrid was meant not to divide but to reunite”. This assessment was echoed by Stevo Pendarovski, Assistant Professor at the University American College Skopje. In his view, on a normative level, the Ohrid Agreement has been almost fully implemented. However, the philosophy behind the agreement, has largely failed: ethnic Macedonians are not fully ready to accept the power-sharing mechanisms, unless pushed by the international community, and Albanians are still not ready to say that they have no other demands beyond Ohrid.

13. In Ambassador Filippini’s view, “true and inclusive leadership” is essential to finish the process of reconciliation and peace building initiated in 2001, and ensure that “the ownership of the letter and the spirit [of Ohrid] is […] embraced by all communities”. There should be no doubt that the future of the country and its integration into the EU lies in the full implementation of Ohrid, she stressed. Mr Bechev acknowledged that the power-sharing model, also known as consociationalism, as established by the Ohrid Agreement, can have negative effects: it tends to institutionalize the separation between ethnic communities, and benefit radical politicians. However, in a country as diverse as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, there can be no other way forward, he argued.

14. All speakers emphasised the importance of the external factor in stabilising the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and combating ethnic nationalist tendencies. The process of EU integration in particular had been essential in changing the perception of the Ohrid Agreement as a tool to promote exclusively the rights of the Albanian community. Maintaining momentum towards integration was therefore seen as essential.

15. However, “the attractiveness of the EU model is lost today”, Mr Pendarovski argued, and it is unlikely that the international community is willing to come back to the region with the same level of engagement as in the past.

16. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s path to the EU and to NATO continues to be hampered by its dispute with Greece over the name issue, a dispute that, according to Mr Pendarovski also resonates internally and has created new divides both within the ethnic Macedonian political class, and between Macedonian and Albanian leaders in the country. A large share of the ethnic Macedonians believes that agreeing to concessions over the name, identity and language of the country in exchange for the unblocking of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes by Greece, is too high a price to pay. Certain Macedonian leaders continue to claim that the country can join NATO and the EU with its current name, despite clear messages to the contrary by both institutions, Mr Pendarovski regretted. Ethnic Albanians, on the contrary, stand firmly behind Euro-Atlantic integration at whatever cost. The lack of a firm consensus in Skopje makes progress on resolving the name issue unlikely in the short term, Mr Pendarovski argued.

17. As one speaker put it, “negotiations about the name are not really about the name”; other issues include the scope of the use of the name and, most importantly, underlying identity issues. While one speaker insisted that the UN mandate for the negotiations only referred to “the name of the country”, and not the name of the nation or of ethnic groups, others argued that no agreement on the name could be found without guarantees on the other issues.

18. Given the sensitivity of the identity issues involved, speakers and participants were generally sceptical that a resolution of this dispute was forthcoming. Dalibor Jovanovski, Professor of Balkan History at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University Skopje, warned that any hasty solution could hold serious consequences for the country. Although Athens is a needed economic and political partner for Skopje, its insistence on red lines does not open much space for negotiations, he regretted. Therefore, he suggested that the establishment of a committee of experts would be beneficial for all sides.

19. Evangelos Kofos, Senior Advisor for the Balkan Area at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) explained that the core of the controversy over the names of “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” lies in the conflicting claims as to which territory, population, and historical and cultural heritage, these titles refer to. Thus, “Macedonia” is used to designate many different territories. Similarly the word “Macedonian” is used simultaneously to describe the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the self-identified Slav or ethnic Macedonians (wherever they are from), the regional identity of the ethnic Bulgarians originating from a Macedonian region, the regional identity of the inhabitants of the Greek administrative region ‘Makedonia’ in Northern Greece, or the Greek-speaking people of the ancient Macedonian kingdom. From a Greek perspective, this confusion over the use of the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” as well as the use of the ancient Macedonian symbols, are perceived as appropriation of the historical and cultural heritage of a past that is seen to be unambiguously Hellenic. Furthermore, they can also be interpreted as indirect claims over foreign territory.

20. Mr Kofos suggested the contours of a possible settlement. First, both sides should put aside all direct or indirect tactics aiming at the exclusive use of the names “Macedonia” and “Macedonians”. The principle of “non-monopolization” should be guaranteed by a binding agreement. Second, negotiations should aim at achieving a final agreement. Third, the new constitutional name should include the designation “Macedonia” but identify clearly the region over which the state exercises legal jurisdiction (for instance North, Gorna or Vardarska Macedonia), and this new name would apply for all internal, bilateral and international uses. Fourth, the legal derivatives, such as the designation of citizenship, should follow the state name. However, the corresponding ethnic or regional Macedonian identities in neighbouring countries should be mutually respected. Lastly, the parties would commit to respect each other’s bona fide cultural heritage.

21. With no breakthrough in sight for resolving the dispute, speakers argued that the only way forward for the EU is “frontloading” the accession process, i.e. taking Skopje as far down the path towards membership as possible, so that when the name issue is finally resolved, accession would be a mere formality. 

III. ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

22. Turning to the question of international strategies in the region, speakers generally agreed that there was no need for radically new approaches. Putting into question current strategies would send a wrong signal to countries of the region, which need to see integration as a credible prospect. However, there was broad agreement that the shortcomings of current policies need to be addressed.

A. ADJUSTING EU STRATEGIES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

23. With the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, which affirmed the perspective of membership for all countries of the Balkans, the EU positioned itself as the lead actor in the Western Balkans. However, while speakers acknowledged that the enlargement policy had been successful in parts of the region, there was broad agreement that the EU’s adoption of enlargement as a stand-alone foreign policy in the Western Balkans had now reached its limits. This was true particularly in relation to those countries confronted with unresolved border and status issues, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia/Kosovo, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

24. The combined impact of enlargement fatigue, the global financial and economic crisis and the debate over the Union’s absorption capacity had led to a “carrot crisis in the EU”, as put by Dusan Reljic, Senior Researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs. Jovan Teokarevic, Professor at Belgrade University, explained that the reference to the EU’s absorption capacity had shifted the paradigm of accession from “you will get in once you are ready for us”, to “you will get in when you are ready for us, but also when we are ready for you”. The EU’s approach was also hampered by a disconnect between goals and instruments.

25. One speaker noted that these shortcomings of EU policies in the region have created a vacuum for new players, mainly Russia and Turkey, to fill the space. The reemergence of these two traditional players has offered possible alternatives for future scenarios and alliances that potentially exclude the EU and/or NATO. There are also signs of a more active US policy in the region, as evidenced by the recent visit of State Secretary Hillary Clinton to the region. This could be interpreted as evidence that the United States is questioning its previously wholehearted reliance on EU policy, it was argued.

26. Speakers put forward several recommendations for giving EU policies in the region a new impetus. First, all emphasised that EU membership needs to remain a clear perspective, and that EU member states need to speak with one voice in their relations with countries of the region. Ambassador Vladimir Churov, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the North Atlantic Council, urged the EU to reassure Western Balkan countries that the doors are open, and that membership is a realistic possibility. Failing to do this, he warned, might weaken the credibility of the accession process and the motivation of Western Balkan governments to seek membership.

27. Seminar participants also called on the EU to augment its overarching enlargement strategy with policies that would be tailor-made to the specific challenges faced by each country. In this regard, Marie-Janine Calic, Professor of East and South East European History at the LudwigMaximilian University in Munich, regretted that the EU’s conditions for accession are generic, and do not take into account the specific history and context of the Balkans, particularly with regards to nation-building and identity. “The lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina”, she stressed, “is that the European perspective in itself does not guarantee institution-building and democratisation”.

28. The promise of membership without a clear roadmap and specific benchmarks was therefore seen as insufficient and counterproductive. The requirement to fulfil accession criteria as a precondition for membership should continue to be pursued strictly. As Ambassador Churov put it, “accession negotiations cannot be about the substance of membership as such”. However, there was broad agreement that these requirements need to be defined more clearly and sustained, so as to “prevent turning membership into a constantly moving target for aspirant countries”.

29. Promoting local ownership of reforms, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, was also considered essential. Speakers noted that the mechanisms of international supervision had prevented local politicians in Sarajevo and Pristina from taking responsibility, and given them an easy way out by “hiding behind” international decisions.

30. One speaker, however, called on the EU to make greater use of punitive methods, such as aid conditionality, visa bans and asset seizures, which would target politicians, private individuals and political parties whose actions run counter to stated EU goals.

31. A greater focus on economic development rather than mere assistance aimed at preserving stability was mentioned as another important priority. This could also include opening the EU’s doors more widely to labour migrants from the region, Mr Reljic suggested.

B. NATO’S ROLE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: EXPECTATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

32. Speakers also called on the EU and NATO to seek greater synergies both at the strategic level and in specific practical areas, such as security sector reform. Ambassador Churov cited the many points of convergence between NATO and EU enlargement strategies:
* the imperative of fulfilling membership criteria and conditions;
* the requirement of good neighborly relations and regional co-operation, which includes the resolution of all outstanding bilateral questions, including border issues;
* the country tailored approach or self-differentiation principle, which means that each country will progress towards the goal of accession on the basis of its own ambitions and achievements, irrespective of how other countries in the region are progressing;
* and the importance of public support for future accession.
A key difference, however, was that the issue of integration or absorption capacity, is specific to the EU and has not affected NATO’s Open Door policy.

33. There was broad consensus that in NATO’s specific area of responsibility – defence reform –, impressive progress had been achieved. The accession of Albania and Croatia and the contribution of armed forces of the region to NATO operations demonstrated that the Western Balkans countries had become contributors of security.

34. Ambassador Artur Kuko, Permanent Representative of Albania to the North Atlantic Council, presented some of the key ingredients for Albania’s successful integration to NATO: an unwavering political will; full and constant public support; a restructuring of the defence budget; participation in NATO operations; an in-depth transformation of the armed forces; a recognition of the need to promote reforms in other sectors as well, particularly the justice sector, the market economy, and the fight of corruption and organized crime; an active contribution to regional initiatives such as the South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, and the Adriatic Charter; and more effective structures to co-ordinate reforms.

35. Given these successes, NATO, it was argued, did not need a new strategy for the region. Jaroslaw Skonieczka, director of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate at NATO Headquarters, noted that, while the Western Balkans will not be a key topic for the upcoming Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government in Lisbon in November, several signals could be expected from the Summit. Generally, the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept in Lisbon could be expected to create a new momentum for the Alliance, which would also reinvigorate nations’ efforts to qualify for membership. Mr Skonieczka expected Montenegro’s remarkably fast progress towards NATO integration to be recognized and assured participants that there would be no artificial obstacles or break in this process. In contrast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the failure to resolve the immovable defence property issue meant further delays in activating the country’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). Mr Skonieczka reiterated the Alliance’s readiness to develop co-operation with Serbia, as much untapped potential remained. Commitment to membership was not a condition, he stressed. Mr Skonieczka made it clear that NATO integration for Kosovo was not on the table at all, as four NATO Allies do not recognize the independence of Kosovo.

36. Mr Skonieczka expected the contribution of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to NATO operations, particularly in Afghanistan, to be recognized. However, with reference to the name issue, he insisted that the Alliance itself lacks the instruments to resolve bilateral disputes. NATO therefore expected steps from Skopje and Athens. He reminded participants that NATO does not have a set list of criteria, but that membership is based on a political evaluation. It is therefore a mistake to consider that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia already fulfils all criteria for membership and that the resolution of the name issue is a separate issue, he insisted.

37. Oliver Krliu, Director for Political Security Cooperation and Multilateral Relations in the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recognized NATO’s success in adopting new strategies on enlargement and partnerships, and adapting to the new security environment. However, NATO left the Balkan chapter unfinished. Despite the successful completion of an unprecedented 11 cycles of Membership Action Plans, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia remains at NATO’s doorstep. In spite of the palpable yet understandable disappointments, Mr Krliu assured participants that Skopje remains a constructive and reliable partner, will continue with an agenda of comprehensive reforms and an enlarged contribution to NATO missions, and remains committed to remove the last obstacles to membership.

C. THE WAY AHEAD FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

38. The seminar’s discussions made it clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina provided a particularly difficult test for international strategies. The general elections held on 3 October 2010, while bringing new actors to power, did not fundamentally change underlying dynamics. Political blockages along ethnic lines have delayed the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration and created obstacles even in those areas of clear success, such as defence reform. Thus, the failure to resolve the issue of immovable defence property has prevented the activation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s MAP with NATO. Mr Skonieczka made it clear that this was not a technical condition, but a political test of the ability of local leaders to act as a unified state, and that this test had failed so far.

39. Speakers also deplored the lack of an EU policy on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the inability of EU member states to speak with one voice. Florian Bieber, Professor for Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, challenged the widespread belief that constitutional reform will solve political blockages and that a package deal on the constitution, a “big bang approach”, would be the best solution. Instead, he called for a gradual progressive approach, focusing on those areas where consensus and progress is achievable. In particular, addressing the problems identified in the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the eligibility of individuals not belonging to any of the three constituent peoples should be a priority.

40. According to Mr Bieber, the EU also needs to address the current gap between the requirements currently set for the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and what the EU policy will be after the OHR’s closure.

IV. CREATING NEW MOMENTUM FOR RECONCILIATION AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS

41. Speakers agreed that regional co-operation provided a key source of new momentum in the Western Balkans. A new wave of normalisation and reconciliation, the mushrooming of practical initiatives and a growing regional ownership of co-operation mechanisms, had brought about positive dynamics which could help complete the transformation of the region.

42. Mr Teokarevic argued that positive developments outnumbered negative ones. The region has achieved a state of self-sustaining stability, with the possible exception of Kosovo. Borders have been relaxed. Practical co-operation has intensified in many areas, including, remarkably, in the field of justice and home affairs. Economic co-operation is increasing. Cultural ties are being restored. Sectoral integration with the EU in areas such as energy, transport or research and development, is expanding. Regional initiatives are multiplying and increasingly regionally owned.

43. The recent steps towards reconciliation and normalization were kicked off from Belgrade with the imperfect but very much needed resolution on Srebrenica, and with the radical and fast improvement of bilateral relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. Renewed talks between Belgrade and Pristina could also pave the way for a final historic reconciliation, Mr Teokarevic hoped.

44. Looking back at the past 20 years, Mr Teokarevic concluded that after a decade of conflict and another decade of normalization, it was now time to move to “a decade of consolidation of positive changes, which should end with the accession of the entire region to Euro-Atlantic institutions”. This would complete the region’s path “from war to stabilisation to the European mainstream”.

45. Nevertheless, a number of difficult challenges remained: the status of Kosovo; the reform deadlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the name dispute between Skopje and Athens; unresolved border demarcation issues; unfinished business connected with the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia such as property, refugees and internally displaced people, war crimes, etc. The newly established free trade area was also showing some limits.

46. Of all these issues, those connected with identity or status undoubtedly posed the greatest challenge, Mr Teokarevic argued. In his view, these disputes should be depoliticized as much as possible, decoupled from EU and NATO accession processes, and referred to mediators. He suggested that accession treaties could include a clause committing new members to taking bilateral disputes to arbitration. Additionally, member states could commit never to veto the opening or closing of any accession chapters purely on the basis of unresolved bilateral issues.

47. Ambassador Erwan Fouéré, EU Special Representative and Head of the EU Delegation in Skopje, recognized that much progress has been achieved on regional co-operation as countries of the Western Balkans have moved closer to the EU. However, in a region that has seen many conflicts and divisions, regional co-operation will only be successful if there is a reconciliation of the different ethnic communities, he warned. In this process of reconciliation, confronting the past was essential on many accounts: as a way to recognize the dignity of those victimized by abuses of the past; as a way of upholding the rule of law; and as a means of deterrence. Ambassador Fouéré also reiterated that, for any reconciliation to be successful, it must emerge from the region itself, and involve all sectors of society in an inclusive process. He recognized that there had recently been a number of albeit for some timid, but nevertheless courageous, steps towards reconciliation. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was itself a project aimed to promote reconciliation, and much had already been achieved. Ambassador Fouéré called on Macedonians to recognize that the multi-ethnic character of the country was one of its greatest assets.

48. Mr Jovanovski assessed the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s relations with its neighbours as generally good, with the exception of Greece. Relations with Pristina had improved following Skopje’s recognition of Kosovo and the successful demarcation of the border. In a similar vein, relations with Albania had gradually improved, and close economic ties had been established in the past years. Bilateral relations with Bulgaria were also assessed as fairly good, notwithstanding issues relating to the rights of the Macedonian population in Bulgaria and other historical claims, which occasionally affected relations between Skopje and Sofia. Relations with Serbia were changeable, dependent in particular upon Skopje-Pristina relations. The dispute over the name created a serious obstacle for Skopje and Athens to develop friendly relations, although Greece was one of the biggest foreign investors in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

49. Sule Kut, Rector of the Okan University in Istanbul, discussed the increasing economic and political presence of Turkey in the Western Balkans, and its role in fostering reconciliation and regional co-operation. She challenged the widespread assumption that Turkey’s foreign policy has only become active with the coming to power of the current government, emphasizing instead that the groundwork had already been laid under the previous government. Nevertheless, she recognized that while in the mid-1990s, Turkey’s approach was more restrained, Ankara was today acting with self-confidence. However, this increased activity by Turkey in the region should not be seen as a threat, she argued.

50. Ms Kut rejected fears of a Turkish grand design in the Balkans as unfounded. Turkey’s main interest in the region was not nostalgia or history, but human links, she argued. Turkey was not an outsider in the Balkans; all events in this region directly affect and concern Turkey, she insisted. As any other country, Turkey was also striving to broaden its zone of interest and influence, not through domination, hegemony or control, but rather through soft power. Turkey was now using this soft power in the Balkans, as well as in other surrounding regions, as positive leverage, she argued. The perception of Turkey as an EU rival was also wrong, she insisted, noting that this view drew on the fact that Turkey is not an EU member, ignoring that Turkey is an active NATO Ally.

51. Lastly, Ms Kut dispelled misconceptions regarding Turkey’s alleged ethno-religious policies. She explained that, in a context of rising identity politics and anti-Muslim attitudes after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Turkey had taken a more active stance against religious intolerance in the Balkans and beyond. However, starting with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continuing with Kosovo, Turkey had adopted an even-handed approach towards all parties, thereby demonstrating that its only objective was to contribute to the resolution of those conflicts. With the stabilization of the situation in the region, the focus of Turkey’s policy in the Balkans had now shifted to facilitating regional co-operation, and mediating disputes, a role it pursued through mostly silent efforts.

V. KOSOVO AFTER THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE’S (ICJ) ADVISORY OPINION: WHAT NEXT?

52. In Kosovo, the security situation was assessed as calm in most areas. However, all speakers stressed that the situation in the North, where Pristina’s authority is extremely limited, remained the key problem. The prospect of new talks between Belgrade and Pristina was seen as the only way out of the current conundrum, but what these talks could be expected to achieve was unclear. The political crisis in Kosovo and the prospect of elections added another layer of complication. Speakers all noted that failure of the dialogue risked fostering nationalistic projects of redrawing borders, be it through a partition of the North of Kosovo, a land swap between Northern Kosovo and the Albanian-majority parts of South Serbia, or even the creation of a Greater Albania. However, speakers and participants generally dismissed such calls to reopen the question of current borders as extremely dangerous strategies.

A. ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

53. General Erhard Buehler, Commander of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), assessed the overall security situation in Kosovo as calm and quiet in most areas, with a declining crime rate. Problems were concentrated in the North, with occasional outbreaks of violence, such as the recent clashes in Mitrovica on 11 September 2010 following Serbia’s defeat at the basketball world championship. This positive trend was making it possible for the North Atlantic Council to agree a further reduction of KFOR troops from a little less than 10,000 currently to 5,500, thereby moving KFOR to gate 2 of its transition towards a deterrence presence. This reduction of troops was accompanied by a reorganization of KFOR’s presence on the ground towards 4 regional Liaison and Monitoring Teams and 2 battlegroups, responsible respectively for Eastern and Western Kosovo. Key remaining issues included:
- completing the transfer of the responsibility for securing the seven cultural and religious sites still under KFOR control to the Kosovo police, while taking into account the concerns of the Serb community and the Orthodox Church;
- demarcating the borders and the administrative border line;
- maintaining KFOR’s capability to react to major riots;
- completing the stand-up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF); the force was expected to reach full operational capability between 2011 and 2014;
- keeping the challenging security situation in the North under control; in this regard, new talks between Belgrade and Pristina could be the driving factor for a safe and secure environment in the North;
- and managing the ambitions of the Kosovar authorities following the ICJ’s advisory opinion.
General Buehler also admitted that maintaining KFOR’s neutrality and impartiality was becoming increasingly difficult as KFOR had to rely increasingly on, and even foster, local institutions.

54. General Buehler’s objective for KFOR in the coming year was to set the conditions for a transition to gate 3 of the deterrent presence, complete the transfer of responsibility for cultural and religious sites, maintain a safe and secure environment and the freedom of movement, and keep other challenges under control.

55. Silvio Bonfigli, Head of EULEX’s Justice Component, insisted that EULEX had already achieved a lot after just a year and a half of activity, and that figures showed that justice was being delivered throughout Kosovo. EULEX had collocated judges and prosecutors across Kosovo’s justice system. This included mixed panels at municipal, district and Supreme Court levels.

56. However, Mr Bonfigli agreed with General Buehler that the North of Kosovo remained the weakest and most fragile part. There, EULEX was delivering justice, but it had so far been unable to re-establish the Mitrovica district court with both Serb and Albanian judges. He was nevertheless optimistic that this problem would be resolved in the foreseeable future.

B. ASSESSING PROSPECTS FOR NEW TALKS BETWEEN PRISTINA AND BELGRADE

57. Mr Reljic expressed doubts as to whether, given the political crisis in Pristina and prospects of elections in Pristina and Belgrade, either party would be ready to accept necessary compromises. Yet, in his view, only a settlement between Belgrade and Pristina can enable the long term stability of Kosovo. Any decision to take over control of the North of Kosovo, whether incrementally or through a big push would have a destabilizing effect and prevent Serbia from fully engaging in negotiations.

58. While Mr Reljic did not see the prospect of a resumption of violence as realistic, he warned that conditionality and compliance were losing grip in the region. This “carrot crisis” of the EU risked feeding frustrations and nationalistic agendas, including plans to redraw borders. In this regard, he noted that polls showed increasing support for “Greater Albania” in Kosovo and among the Albanian population of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

59. Naim Rashiti, analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), insisted that the ICJ’s advisory opinion had created a new possibility of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which should be seized before Serbia’s leadership enters into an election campaign in 2012. In his view, this dialogue should not be limited to technical talks, but will need to lay the bases for future relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and thereby open the door for their integration into the EU. Mr Rashiti argued that a deal could be reached over little more than the Ahtisaari Plan, i.e. a higher degree of autonomy for the North and of self-administration for Serb orthodox sites, in exchange for recognition. This could help put the North back under Kosovo’s constitutional order.

60. As Mr Reljic, Mr Rashiti warned that failure to reach an agreement would risk boosting support for radical alternative options, such as partition of Northern Kosovo or a land swap between Northern Kosovo and the Albanian-majority areas of South Serbia. The latter option already has substantial support in Kosovo, he warned, although not within the current leadership.

61. Srdjan Djeric, also analyst with the ICG, described Belgrade’s stance towards Kosovo as both proactive and reactive. The proactive camp, currently in power, focused its efforts on the North. The North had indeed seen substantial investments in education, health and other sectors, making it an attractive pole for Serb communities. In contrast, many Serbs living south of Ibar River were slowly migrating to the North or to Serbia proper, and remaining communities faced the choice of “either disappearing or integrating”.

62. Mr Djeric suggested that Serbia’s strategy had always been to force the international community to recognize its de facto control over the North. He argued that autonomy for the North was the best possible solution, but whether Pristina would agree to this without a formal recognition by Belgrade in return was unclear.

C. THE WAY FORWARD

63. Krenar Gashi, Research Director at the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, called on the international community to change its approach in Kosovo on several key aspects. The rule of law should be the main priority. Yet, Mr Gashi regretted that neither the international community nor the Kosovar authorities had done enough to address this issue, thereby allowing parallel structures supported by Belgrade to operate in Kosovo. The most worrying aspect of this was the presence of intelligence and security services with alleged links to organized crime and only loosely controlled by Belgrade. Mr Gashi doubted that EULEX had the proper structure to address these challenges.

64. The reconciliation of ethnic groups in Kosovo was a second key challenge. Mr. Gashi argued that this could not be conducted only through integration, i.e. guaranteeing minority rights and implementing legislation, but required accommodation, which also entailed representation of ethnic groups in policy and decision-making, as well as a perceived feeling of safety. Mr Gashi was confident that the Kosovar government’s Strategy for the North was one the best policies developed in this regard.

65. Economic development was also essential for the future of Kosovo. Yet, Mr Gashi regretted that non-recognition by Serbia prevents Kosovo from exporting its products, and that the political situation also keeps investors away.

66. Mr Reljic also suggested that only an economic solution could help break the deadlock over Kosovo. He supported opening the doors of European markets to labour migration from the Balkans. Kosovo itself is unable to absorb the 30,000 new workers coming on its job market each year. Meanwhile 15 to 30 % of the GDP of countries of the region already comes from labour migrants. Labour migration has already had a positive impact in some countries. For instance, the fact that Greece has absorbed half a million seasonal workers from Albania has greatly contributed to the stabilization of Albania, Mr Reljic argued.