Saturday 8 and Sunday 9 October 2011 - Summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee

Saturday 8 October 2011

I.  Opening remarks by the Chairman, Joseph A. Day (Canada)

1.  The Chairman opened the meeting of the Committee, thanking the Romanian Senate for the use of their plenary hall and celebrating the fact that the Palace of Parliament, built as a testament of a totalitarian regime, was now a house of democracy and open debate.  He praised Romania’s contributions to NATO, including hosting the 2008 NATO summit. Romania joined NATO in 2004 and is an active contributor to the Alliance, with a particularly active role on NATO enlargement, Black Sea regional security, and missile defence, he stated.

II.  Adoption of the draft Agenda [174 DSC 11 E rev. 1]

2.  The draft agenda [174 DSC 11 E rev. 1] was adopted.

III.  Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Varna, Bulgaria, on 29 May 2011 [146 DSC 11 E]

3.  The summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Varna, Bulgaria [146 DSC 11 E] was adopted.

IV.  Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolution on Supporting the Libyan people [194 DSC 11 E] presented by Sven Mikser (Estonia), General Rapporteur.

4.  The Chairman explained the procedures in place for proposing changes to the draft Committee resolution on Supporting the Libyan people.  A member called for a delay to the deadline for amendments, but the Chairman regretfully declined the proposal as administratively impossible given the time constraints of the Session.

V.  Presentation by Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania on Missile Defence Co-operation in the Euro-Atlantic Area: The Romanian Approach.

5.  Bogdan Aurescu served as chief negotiator for the agreement between Romania and the United States on ballistic missile defence (BMD), the Chairman noted, further suggesting that the Romanian Parliament was expected to ratify the agreement in the coming weeks.

6.  Surveying Romanian-US relations, Mr Aurescu highlighted the visit of President Traian Basescu to Washington in September as confirming the ever deeper strategic partnership between the two countries. A Joint Declaration of the Strategic Partnership for the 21st century was a concrete result of the presidential meeting. Pillars of relations include political dialogue, security, the economy, people to people contacts, science and technology, research, education and culture, Mr Aurescu stated.

7.  The agreement for Romania to host US missile defence interceptors was signed on September 13 in Washington, Mr Aurescu noted.  Recent studies showed that Romania and its neighbours, as well as the larger Euro-Atlantic area, were increasingly exposed to threats posed by short and medium range ballistic missiles.  Romania shares a common vision on how to deal with this threat with other Allies, he stated. Mr Aurescu called for an allied BMD system with strong defensive and dissuasive roles which will reassure each and every ally that its security concerns have been properly addressed.

8.  The missile defence agreement is also important for building NATO’s capacity for missile defence, with the installation of interceptors at the Romanian airbase at Deveselu.  While the United States will have command and control of the system there, Romania retains sovereign jurisdiction over the base.  Fewer than 500 US troops will be stationed there. Romanian citizens, including the local Deveselu community, welcomed the news of the missile defence system, Mr Aurescu stated.  They were able to visit the Aegis-equipped USS Monterey, which is already deployed in the Mediterranean as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).

9.  Missile defence is purely defensive, Mr Aurescu stressed, both technically (by the limits of its capabilities and design) and legally, as its defensive nature is laid out in the language of the agreement between the United States and Romania. The system was purely non-nuclear, he underlined. Mr Aurescu emphasised that the system is not aimed at any state. He hoped that Russia would drop its concerns related to later phases of EPAA, and suggested that the NATORussia Council would be the best framework in which to address missile defence with Russia, further suggesting that BMD should not be the only avenue of co-operation with Russia and other partners.

10.  In a spirited discussion following the presentation, a member questioned the need for a missile defence system with questionable reliability in a time of tight budgets; others supported the system as one element of European defence. Mr Aurescu made the case for missile defence co-operation with Russia and noted discussions between Ukraine and Russia on missile defence. He said that the small number of US troops to be deployed in Romania was no threat to geopolitical stability, noting that there are larger numbers of foreign forces in other states in the region, alluding to the Russian naval base in Crimea.

VI.  Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities Missile Defence: the Way Ahead for NATO [176 DSCFC 11 E] by Raymond Knops (Netherlands), Rapporteur
 
11.  Raymond Knops presented his draft report, noting that at NATO’s Lisbon Summit, leaders decided to make missile defence a core NATO collective defence mission because they recognised the growing threat posed by missile proliferation.  In response to feedback from Committee members, his draft report now included a new section on NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR). His remarks focused on how NATO is progressing in developing the BMD system, where we stand in discussions with Russia on co-operation, and where we go from here.

12.  Mr Knops welcomed recent announcements regarding the system’s developing architecture, including Turkey’s decision to host a radar, Spain’s to host US Aegis warships for operations in the Mediterranean, Poland’s to host interceptors, and the Netherlands’ to purchase radars for air defence and frigates which could also take part in the NATO system. He highlighted Romania’s participation in allowing for the deployment of interceptors at the air base at Deveselu. Mr Knops also noted the successful EPAA test in late August.

13.  Co-operation with Russia is worthwhile both because of the benefits to the missile defence system’s effectiveness, but also because it could unlock co-operation in a number of other important areas, especially nuclear arms control, according to Mr Knops.  Therefore, political assurances to Russia regarding the limitations of the missile defence system were worth discussing.  NATO’s standing invitation to Russia to join in creating two joint centres for data exchange and threat assessments could be one such form of transparency and reassurance.  Mr Knops stressed the near-universal goal of global zero, a world without nuclear weapons, and his concern that conventional defence cuts are increasing the Alliance’s reliance on nuclear weapons.

VII.  Presentation by Dr Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear and Missile Defence Policy, United States Department of Defence, on NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

14.  Dr Bradley Roberts drew on his experience as the lead official on recent US nuclear posture and missile defence reviews to outline the Obama Administration’s positions on these critical questions.  After praising Raymond Knops’ draft report on missile defence, he stressed that the current security environment had changed and was changing – good news and bad news from a deterrence perspective: good because there is no existential threat from a great power, bad because new threats are difficult to deter.  Deep debate within the Alliance on nuclear weapons issues was natural, although he emphasized that disagreements were within countries as much as between countries.

15.  NATO’s Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) was being held in three phases, according to Dr Roberts. The exploratory phase, with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) discussing relevant issues including the security environment, strategic military tools and terrorism, had just concluded. The second phase began several weeks ago with taskings from the NAC to three expert committees. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee covers conventional and missile defence capabilities. The Weapons Control and Disarmament Committee supports discussions on a path forward for reducing US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NNSWs) in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The High Level Group was asked for advice on options for NATO’s nuclear posture and ensuring nuclear deterrence remains safe, secure and effective. All will provide inputs to the NAC and to foreign ministers in December 2011 and to defence ministers in February 2012. In the third phase the NAC will consider the technical advice of the committees and the political advice of the ministers and write conclusions to be ready for discussion by heads of state and government in Chicago in May 2012. Dr Roberts expected that this process would likely settle many questions, but not all of them.

16.  The role of US NNSWs in Europe in NATO’s deterrence posture is one of the topics the DDPR is focused upon. The new Strategic Concept set out a marker that Allies rejected unilateral change on this issue by the United States or any NATO member.  The Concept also called for reciprocal steps by Russia – not because Russia is an enemy, which is it not, but because its large stockpile of weapons is a source of concern and instability.  US NNSWs will not be withdrawn from Europe before negotiations with Russia. Some in the Alliance believe a fundamental change by Russia would still not be sufficient cause for NATO to relinquish forward-deployed US weapons because of broader WMD proliferation, Dr Roberts stated.  He saw missile defence as an important opportunity for co-operation with Russia that he hoped would be taken up by Moscow.

17.  NATO has also reaffirmed its commitment to effective nuclear deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. The DDPR seeks to explore what the appropriate deterrence ‘mix’ is for current strategic circumstances.  Some have suggested that a new commitment to strengthened conventional capabilities and missile defence could possibly allow the withdrawal of forward deployed NNSWs, although Dr Roberts emphasised that the relationship between missile defence and nuclear weapons was not direct or mathematical. The Obama Administration sees a strong need to strengthen extended deterrence against states like Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; it is a long term bipartisan policy to have a strong posture against these countries.  In the absence of missile defence, we must currently rely on nuclear deterrence, even for conventional weapons, Dr Roberts underlined.
18.  In the following joint discussion on Mr Knops’ draft report as well as Dr Roberts’ presentation, Dr Roberts underlined that indeed, what was formerly a US approach could now be termed a ‘NATO system.’  He noted that the United States and France share the view that a missile defence system is a complement for the nuclear deterrent, not a replacement.  Addressing Russian concerns, he emphasised that the planned radars would look at one particular geographical zone (enabled by locating the radars in southeastern Europe) and could not see all of Russia’s vast territory.  He also stated that the planned interceptors were not technically capable of countering the much faster ICBMs in the Russian arsenal. Mr Knops reminded members that the NATO-Russia Founding Act already constituted a political commitment that the sides were not enemies and would not attack each other.  Responding to an intervention by a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Dr Roberts reminded members from NATO countries that decisions by the Alliance could impact the security environment in northeast Asia, which faced much more immediate deterrence concerns.  Mr Knops related his direct experience with these concerns during a 2010 Committee visit to Seoul, during which North Korea had attacked South Korean territory.  A new paragraph proposed by the head of the US delegation was supported by the Rapporteur. 

The draft report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities Missile Defence:  the Way Ahead for NATO” [176 DSCFC 11 E], as amended, was adopted.

VIII.  Presentation by Lieutenant General Dr Stefan Danila, Chief of Staff, Romania, on Romania’s Contribution to NATO Operations and the Reform of the Romanian Armed Forces

19.  General Danila addressed Romania’s defence transformation in becoming a NATO member in a changed international security environment. An initial post cold-war period of major reforms in the mid to late 1990s had given way to reforms enacted under the provisions of the NATO Membership Action Plan from 2000 to 2004.  Since Romania’s accession to NATO in 2004, the transformation of the Romanian armed forces has gone hand in hand with the transformation of the Alliance itself.

20.  Reviewing Romania’s contributions to NATO, the General underlined that Romania participates actively in the NATO Response Force, as well as deploying to NATO operations in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.  General Danila also outlined Romania’s deployment of over 1,800 troops to Afghanistan, out of the approximately 2,000 total deployed worldwide. Romania’s operational contributions are at about the maximum level the country can sustain, General Danila stated, while underlining that Romania is not just a defence customer but a real defence provider.  He stressed that Romania was committed to the concept of “Smart Defence,” and that the reforms of the Romanian Armed Forces would be aligned with Alliance reforms; that Romania sought to maximize the alignment between its national interests and those of the Alliance; and that it stood ready to defend these interests.

IX.  Remaining Activities for 2011 and Preliminary Agenda for 2012 of the Defence and Security Committee.

21.  Committee members reviewed recent Committee activities, including a successful visit to China, which focused on issues such as the common fight against piracy, Afghanistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and relations with NATO.  The Chairman gave the floor to Sir John Stanley, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation, to detail an upcoming visit to the United Kingdom in late November.

22.  Turning to activities for 2012, the Chairman related ongoing discussions with the US delegation about dates for the annual Defence and Security Committee visit to the United States.  Sir John Stanley (UK) outlined his proposed 2012 programme for the SubCommittee on Transatlantic Security and Defence Co-operation, which may include a visit to France and one to Djibouti, the US Fifth Fleet at Bahrain, and Diego Garcia. The Committee was informed that the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities has tentative plans to visit Germany and Russia in 2012.

X.  Presentation by Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, on The Impact of Operation Unified Protector on the Future of the Alliance

23.  Operation Unified Protector showed that “NATO works,” according to Admiral Di Paola.  Reflecting on the operation, the first time the Alliance had engaged in the region of the Mediterranean Dialogue, he stated that only NATO could have conducted this operation.  The Operation, supported by a UN mandate, had shown the speed of Alliance decision making,  and the effective use of air power (plus maritime power for an arms embargo), while avoiding civilian casualties. He insisted the situation on the ground in Libya was irreversible despite pockets of resistance which still threaten the population.

24.  Admiral Di Paola also stressed the importance the participation of Arab partner countries Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Jordan in the operation, as well as the political support of the majority of Arab countries and the Arab League.  The importance of NATO’s political access to a network of global partnerships was affirmed by the operation, he said.

25.  Lessons learned from the operation include the challenges posed by reliance on the capacities of a single ally, the United States, given the global responsibilities of the United States.  These included air refuelling; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and precision munitions.  Admiral Di Paola called for investments in the right capabilities in order for the Alliance to remain ready to respond to future calls to action.

26.  In extensive discussion following the Admiral’s presentation, members debated the lessons from the operation.  The themes of the discussion included the limits of European military capabilities, whether NATO was the right choice for the mission, and whether precedents had been set or Libya was a unique case. Admiral Di Paola argued that NATO did not overreach the mandate it was provided by the UN Security Council, and flatly rejected suggestions that any intervention in Syria was under consideration by the Alliance or any of its member states.

Sunday 9 October 2011

XI.  Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution on Supporting the Libyan People [194 DSC 11 E] presented by Sven Mikser (Estonia), General Rapporteur

27.  Sven Mikser presented his draft resolution, which fundamentally affirmed support for the Libyan people’s continued efforts to construct their future, as well as clearly pointing out some of the lessons the Alliance must learn from the conflict.   He noted the unusually high number of amendments presented to the draft resolution, and he further appreciated the political sensitivity of the issues raised in the draft.  He considered it only natural that this important discussion took place in the Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee.  

28.  Thirty-seven amendments to the resolution were considered, addressing issues such as the role of women during the conflict and afterwards; whether the tone of the resolution was too triumphal or unnecessarily divisive; the principle of the Responsibility to Protect; human rights violations committed by the parties to the conflict; and the need to prioritise military spending, taking into account the lessons of the operation. 

The draft Resolution on Supporting the Libyan People [194 DSC 11 E], as amended, was adopted.

XII.  Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation NATO Operations Under A New Strategic Concept and the EU as an Operational Partner [177 DSCTC 11 E] by Nicole Ameline (France), Rapporteur

29.  Nicole Ameline outlined her draft report, which sought to analyse the different operations in which NATO is involved, at the same time as the Alliance’s new strategic concept is being implemented.  The question of the limits to NATO’s capabilities naturally arose as the number of operations increased, she suggested. The war in Afghanistan remained the Alliance’s priority, she stated, although after ten years of NATO involvement there, a political solution to the conflict remained elusive.

30.  According to the Rapporteur, the new tools developed in the strategic concept should increase the Alliance’s capacity to end conflicts by political means, to improve co-operation between civilians and militaries, and to prevent the emergence of crises as well as improving postconflict reconstruction.  In many of these areas, she suggested, the EU’s capabilities and expertise could contribute to the goals it shares with NATO. However, Europe’s capabilities remain limited, she stated, and just as for NATO, face limited defence budgets.

31.  The Rapporteur concurred with the previous day’s presentation by the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, who stated that Operation Unified Protector in Libya was a military success for NATO and a way to show our commitment to sustain democratic values towards our allies and neighbours.  It also showed the importance of NATO’s partnerships, in particular with MENA countries, she stated, as well as revealing a new American doctrine of “leading from behind”: Washington provided the means for the operations but let France and United Kingdom take the political responsibilities, as the intervention came from their initiative.

32.  After extensive discussion on NATO operations and their implications, especially in antipiracy and in the Balkans, the draft Report NATO Operations Under a New Strategic Concept and the EU as an Operational Partner [177 DSCTC 11 E], as amended, was adopted.

XIII.  Consideration of the draft General Report Transition in Afghanistan: Assessing the Security Effort [175 DSC 11 E] by Sven Mikser (Estonia), General Rapporteur

33.  Sven Mikser introduced his draft report by drawing an overall personal assessment of the current NATO operation in Afghanistan.  There were hopeful signs, to include gains in the quality and number of the Afghan National Security Forces, largely thanks to the NATO Training Mission; success in targeting insurgent leadership; the growth of local Afghan governance in secure areas; and important improvements in health care, education, and media since the overthrow of the Taliban government.

34.  A realistic assessment of the security situation, the Rapporteur noted, also had to take into account real concerns about the ethnic make-up and sustainability of Afghan security forces, rising civilian casualties, corruption, and the fact that progress, insofar as it was measurable, remained “fragile and reversible.”  He warned it was too early to judge some additional critical factors in the evolution of the conflict, to include for example efforts at reconciliation between the warring parties.  The Rapporteur pointed to a lack of clarity in some capitals about the ultimate goal in Afghanistan:  would it be sufficient to eliminate the core of al-Qaeda, or should the goal be to make it impossible for any terror network to ever take hold of or seek refuge in Afghanistan?

35.  Discussion on the report, included contributions from the Afghan delegation, which pointed out that reconciliation efforts had shifted to direct discussions with Pakistan rather than the Taliban; and that the Haqqani Network remained a formidable challenge. Members raised concerns regarding governance, the rights of women, and the need for clear statements of purpose. 

36.  Following a technical amendment, the draft General Report Transition in Afghanistan: Assessing the Security Effort [175 DSC 11 E], as amended, was adopted.

XIV.  Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers.

37.  All re-eligible Committee and Sub-Committee Officers were re-elected, as well as those serving on the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council.  The Committee elected the following new officers:

Defence and Security Committee (DSC)

Vice-Chairperson  Michael Turner (United States)
Vice-Chairperson  Francesco Bosi (Italy)

Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC)

Vice-Chairperson  Angelien Eijsink (Netherlands)

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Security and Defence Co-operation (DSCTC)

Vice-Chairperson  Carolyn McCarthy (United States)

XV.  Any other business

38.  No other business was raised.

XVI.  Date and place of next meeting

39.  The Chairman looked forward to seeing the Committee members at the next meeting of the Committee, which would be its annual visit to Washington DC in early 2012.

XVII.  Closing Remarks

40.  The Chairman thanked the meeting participants and adjourned the meeting.

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*   Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.