HomeDOCUMENTSARCHIVE: Russia and Ukraine2002 - 200327-28 MARCH 2003: A SUMMARY OF THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT MONITORING GROUP ON THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT
27-28 MARCH 2003: A SUMMARY OF THE MEETINGS OF THE JOINT MONITORING GROUP ON THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT
"Developing well but could do better" was the overall summation of the state of relations between NATO and Russia following briefings at SHAPE and NATO to members of the NATO-Russia parliamentary Joint Monitoring Group (JMG).
The briefings took place against the background of the recently started military operation in Iraq and references to the operation, its origins and its likely consequences, surfaced persistently during the questions to NATO officials and discussions among the Group themselves. The prevailing sentiment among the Group ranged from unease to outright opposition to the military action; members were particularly concerned at the consequences of the operation for the future functioning of the international system and for the transatlantic relationship. The Group agreed a letter to the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) requesting that the situation in Iraq be placed on the agenda at the Spring Session in Prague in May.
With regard to the status of NATO-Russia relations, the general impression was that the new NATO - Russia Council (NRC) had produced a qualitative improvement. A solid work program had been put in place with cooperation over a wide range of areas. Freed of the straitjacket of Alliance consensus, the new Council at 20 had seen the emergence of a different way of working and a new culture of joint-ness. Success had already been recorded in agreeing a joint threat assessment for the Balkans and a concept for Peacekeeping.
However, all was not sweetness and light. The downside to the current status of cooperation was that in the words of several Ambassadors "we discuss areas where we agree rather than areas where we are divided". As the Russian Duma member, General Nikolaev noted, it was now important to discuss "areas where we disagree". Members expressed surprise that the NRC had not been used for consultations over Iraq. It was later explained that in view of the intense discussions in the UN Security Council, no member of the NATO-Russia Council had thought it worth calling for further discussions in the NRC.
Two specific concerns permeated the discussions. First, that Russia was still not being treated as a full equal and consulted in a timely fashion. Russian members continue to express dissatisfaction with their non-participation in decision-making, particularly at SHAPE, for the Balkans operations. However, Alliance officials refuted this criticism which, they insisted, was based on a misunderstanding of SHAPE's role and the relationship between NATO and SHAPE. Equality in decision making, it was agreed, would probably have to await a new joint action commenced together on an equal basis.
The second major concern was the lack of progress in interoperability. There was good military cooperation at the tactical level in the field in the Balkans. However, this had not produced any significant progress in inter-operability which is indispensable for future joint actions. An ambitious work program had been put in place. Nevertheless Alliance officials noted the continued reluctance of the Russian military to exploit the potential of partnership. Exchanges on defence reform had now begun - an area where the Alliance clearly has much to offer.
The future of Russian involvement in the Balkans was questioned and appeared very uncertain. A substantial reduction in the numbers of Russian troops in SFOR and KFOR had already taken place; whether this was due to a recalculation of interest or was more a question of resources was not clear.
Russian representatives emphasized their concerns over NATO enlargement and the non-adherence to the CFE Treaty of four of the seven countries invited to join the Alliance, particularly the three Baltic States. It was agreed that adherence depended on ratification of the adopted Treaty. However, Russian representatives argued that ratification itself was being made dependent on what they described as "irrelevant issues" - stockpiles of arms in Moldova and military bases in Georgia "so ratification is in the hands of the government of Georgia". Russian representatives emphasised that a situation where Alliance members had different levels of commitment would produce a situation of unpredictability for military planners.
Alliance officials took issue with these assertions. All four countries had made political declarations of their willingness to adhere to the Treaty. What more they could do? Moreover, it was difficult to see any of these countries posing a serious threat to Russian security.
The Group interaction was friendly and positive with far less of the mutual criticism and suspicion that marked previous meetings. This was partly due to the agreement over the Iraq operation but also reflected a recognition that the relationship was now on a much more equal footing with real areas of common concern that offered genuine cooperation.
The Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) met in Brussels to discuss the developments in relations between NATO and Russia and the military, defence and political aspects of NATO-Russia cooperation. The first day the participants attended briefings and discussions at SHAPE, and on the second day, were briefed by high-ranking NATO officials at NATO HQ.
The participants from both the NATO and Russian delegations expressed satisfaction with the constructive and open character of the discussions during the meetings. The nature of the exchanges appeared to parallel the new course and the qualitatively new level of NATO-Russia relations following the Rome declaration. The participants identified a number of areas for future discussions. The situation in Iraq figured prominently as the prime subject for future discussion. It was also proposed to focus on practical military cooperation such as interoperability, logistics, and exercises.
The Military perspectives of NATO-Russia cooperation were discussed at SHAPE in a briefing chaired by Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, Chief of Staff. Major General Thomas L. Baptiste, US AF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, provided an overview of Alliance operations in the Balkans noting that SFOR now had 12,000 military deployed, KFOR, 26,000 and Allied Harmony, 470. The European Union was set to take over responsibility for the latter on 31 March. Noting the substantial draw down in Russian forces, he said that they had established excellent cooperation at the tactical level through joint training, patrols, check point and convoys. However, much work was needed to improve interoperability. Russia, he said, had still not institutionalised interoperability with NATO. Progress in this key area would depend upon implementation of the 2003 NATO-Russia Council Work Program which outlined various ways to improve interoperability through, for example, holding joint seminars.
General Lt. Loginov, Military Representative of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation at SHAPE, provided a Russian perspective of the status of military-to-military cooperation between Russia and NATO. He emphasized that Russian forces in KFOR and SFOR remained under direct Russian military and political control. He said that positive and productive cooperation took place at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and in the possibility for Russian representatives to discuss various topics at the expert level. At the same time he was concerned that Russian commanders did not have a legitimate role in operational planning at SHAPE, for example in the KFOR peacekeeping operation. He proposed that they should be given regular access to operational documents. They had had the possibility to study the Kosovo plan of operation in 2000 and had made forty proposals, half of which had been accepted. This insistence on being involved in decision making was a recurring theme during the discussions.
These presentations triggered a discussion between the delegations and SHAPE representatives regarding NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The Russian delegation voiced their doubts as to whether the Russian Federation should continue to contribute its forces to these operations. They listed a number of issues:
overall unhappiness that NATO had started the operation in the first place;
whether military forces are the appropriate means for the kind of tasks in the Balkans and suggested that police forces might provide a better option;
discontent with the lack of Russia's involvement in the consultation process and strategic planning, which would be the only way to have joint responsibility and equality between NATO and Russia. Russia was not consulted when NATO started the "aggression" against Yugoslavia. The Russian delegation questioned whether the situation would now change after the Rome declaration and the creation of the NRC.
Pierre Lellouche observed that the Balkan operation was an act of liberation from an oppressive and brutal regime rather than act of aggression, while Alice Mahon stressed that NATO and Russia should focus together on the serious consequences that had flowed from the military action in Yugoslavia, such as crime, drug and human trafficking.
SHAPE representatives noted that the work of the NRC would not alter the command and control of KFOR and SFOR as these are NATO-led and not joint NATO-Russia-led operations. Russia's preference had been to maintain an independent status within the peacekeeping force. This had been achieved through a unique set of command and control arrangements both in SFOR and KFOR. What political participation was Russia looking for?
On the question of greater participation in decision making, criticism of lack of involvement at SHAPE was based on a misunderstanding of how SHAPE works and the relationship between NATO and SHAPE. SHAPE was concerned with operational planning under the overall political direction of NATO. Russia could not ask for greater involvement at SHAPE than was enjoyed by other members of the Alliance. The general conclusion was that true "jointness" in all aspects of an operation would only be achieved through a new NATO-Russia operation.
The Russian delegation stressed that both sides needed to work on finding joint solutions and assessments of the situation. Russia was not willing to accept a secondary role but sought equality. Similar concerns were raised in regards to the development of the crisis around Iraq. The Russian delegation distributed a list of issues and questions regarding Iraq.
The delegations were briefed by General Izydorczyk, Director of Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), on Russia's role in Partnership for Peace programme. NATO representatives observed that Russia's very limited military participation in PfP was not in harmony with the spirit of the new NATO-Russia Council. Russia was not a signatory to the Status of Forces (SOFA) agreement, had no permanent presence in the PCC, and had only limited participation in military exercises. Russia had participated only in approximately 30 PfP activities. This was a small number compared to a total of 2,300 activities; therefore practical cooperation was very restricted. PfP is an effective mechanism to improve cooperation, increase interoperability and enhance information exchange. As interoperability is a prerequisite to NATO-Russia Joint Tasking, Russia's participation in PfP is desirable. Also, it would be difficult to build confidence without cooperative actions. Harry Cohen (UK) was concerned that such steps were too low-level and incremental in nature. He wondered whether political influence and direction from the highest level was now necessary. The Russian delegation proposed cooperation in practical areas. For example, could anything be done to stop trafficking in the Balkans?
The day at NATO HQ was opened by Rafael Estrella, Chairman of the NATO PA delegation. He assessed positively the progress made in cooperation at the parliamentary level: noting the active participation of Russian parliamentarians in the wide array of Assembly activities, the annual Committee meetings with the Russian Federal Assembly, the Joint Monitoring Groups, and recently the Russia-NATO Parliamentary Standing Committee at 20. He recognised that attention would quite naturally focus on Iraq and the potential consequences of the conflict. However, he suggested that the group should not lose sight of their raison d'ętre, enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia and should look to consolidating the progress already made.
In his introductory remarks, former General Andrei Nikolaev, Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee, suggested that Iraq crisis had revealed the shortcomings of the NRC. It was difficult to understand why the Council had not been employed. At the same time, he said, compliance with the international law was fundamental to the development of the NRC. Victor Ozerov, Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Defence Committee, stressed that the work of the monitoring group had been successful. The cooperation had become much livelier after May 2002. However, he also stressed that Russia was not satisfied with its lack of involvement in the assessments and decision-making on key issues.
Ambassador Günther Altenburg, Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs, briefed the group on the achievements and perspectives of the NRC. He underscored that the long-term goal of the NRC was to engage Russia and bring it in the European Security Policy as a trustworthy partner. The partners no longer kept an eye on each other, but worked together to address the common challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, crisis management, civil emergency, and defence reforms. He noted that several disagreements still existed - for example, the CFE Treaty, NATO enlargement and the Russian military campaign in Chechnya. However, on the whole, discussions on were very constructive. There were currently seven standing working groups, including peacekeeping, missile defence, civil emergency, defence reforms, and terrorism; and the overall progress since May 2002 was impressive. Some agreements had been achieved, such as the Framework Agreement on Search and Rescue at Sea. NATO hoped for more intensive military cooperation in addition to agreements in the political arena.
Questioned by the Russian Federal Assembly delegation on the Iraq issue, he stressed that the Defence Planning Committee was now dealing with Iraq. No member of the NRC had asked that if it was used for consultation on Iraq. There was sufficient consultation in other fora. Russia had approached NATO to discuss humanitarian assistance at the expert level, and such consultations had started. The delegations also touched upon the question of planning for Afghanistan peacekeeping operations and Russia's possible involvement.
Former General Valeriy Manilov from the Russian delegation commented on the current crisis over Iraq. He pointed out that the crisis was a consequence of the deterioration of the system of international relations because of the dominance of a unilateral vector. As a result, not only was the UN devalued, but also NATO was loosing its credibility. He noted that the Russian State Duma had postponed the ratification of the nuclear weapons reduction treaty. Russian parliamentarians were now concerned that any given state could find itself in a situation similar to that one of Iraq.
Following a lengthy exchange of views among the JMG on the Iraq crisis, members of the Group agreed to a draft recommendation calling for the inclusion of the issue of Iraq into the agenda of the Spring Session of the NATO PA.
During a roundtable discussion on NATO-Russia cooperation the delegations were briefed by five selected Permanent Representatives: Ambassador Benoďt d'Aboville (France), Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke (Germany), Ambassador János Herman (Hungary), Ambassador Serguey Kislyak (Russian Federation), Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones-Parry (United Kingdom).
Ambassador Kislyak opened the discussion on a very positive note, stressing the fundamentally different atmosphere and dialogue at the NATO-Russia Council compared to the previous forum, the Joint Permanent Council (JPC). It was no longer fixed and unchangeable positions as in the JPC but informative exchanges. He assured the Group that the "20" could become an effective mechanism if developed gradually and consistently. The "20" could formulate responses to the new common threats. The joint assessment of threats was now taking place, although at times complicated by the different points of view. The next step was to find opportunities for joint actions. This was work in progress; one positive example being border security in the Balkans. Peacekeeping operations in the Balkans were also a good example of joint operations. At the same time neither of the two Balkans operations provided Russia equal status in command and decision-making, which was their objective. For that reason, there was a search for new concepts of cooperation. Other areas of possible cooperation include:
Interoperability in tactical ABM to cover peacekeeping forces;
joint means of command and control over the air space;
joint staff exercises to test concepts;
There could also be discussion of military reform, not as a teaching exercise, but using the expertise of individual nations.
Ambassador Kisilyak noted that the work at 20 focused on the tasks that unite NATO and Russia and on which cooperation was possible - they did not touch on the internal affairs of either NATO or Russia. There were, however, exchanges on issues where there was uncertainty. The previous day, Russia had raised the question of the CFE Treaty in the context of the forthcoming NATO enlargement. In Russia's view, the 7 should make a political declaration before NATO membership that they will consider acceding to the CFE Treaty. This accession was now being linked to ratification of the amended Treaty and ratification was, in turn, being linked to bases in Moldova and Georgia, "so ratification is in the hands of the government in Georgia". The two issues were irrelevant. He concluded that the situation where NATO members have different levels of commitment was a cause for concern because it signalled unpredictability to military planners.
Ambassador d'Aboville, commenting on the recent disagreement over Alliance assistance to Turkey said that Article 4 had no automaticity, it was about consultation which had, indeed, taken place. Some nations believed that military preparations at this stage were premature. Ambassador von Moltke also stressed the positive results of cooperation. However, he noted the reluctance of the Russian military to be involved in joint exercises which targeted interoperability. Interoperability was indispensable for joint actions. On the issue of the CFE he noted that the new members had all said they were ready to join the Treaty as soon as they could. On the Iraq crisis, it was very important that Turkey remain within its current limits; any change would require a re-evaluation of the situation. On Afghanistan, they were not against a NATO lead. A NATO role in Iraq was not yet foreseeable. The Hungarian Ambassador also assessed the progress positively and suggested that NATO and Russia needed to maintain a pragmatic dialogue, improve military cooperation and concentrate on what united them in order to gradually enlarge step-by-step the common terrain. The British Ambassador agreed that the NRC had made good progress; an end of term report would read "doing well, could do better", as, until recently, the political dialogue had not done well. There had been a thorough discussion of the situation in Serbia and Montenegro. Iraq was not a topic for discussion because it had been thoroughly discussed in other fora, notably the Security Council. He was sure the coalition would prevail. He noted that Iraq had fired missiles at ranges of 40km's beyond what they had been allowed by UN resolutions.
The discussion period focussed primarily on the Balkans. A number of participants regretted the draw down of Russian forces. The Russian Ambassador replied that the Russian presence in the Balkans was currently under review in Moscow. Replying to a question from Alice Mahon, the British Ambassador reiterated Iraq's long track record of ignoring or not responding adequately to UN resolutions. There was general agreement that the UN must play a role in the reconstruction of Iraq and that the international community must find the staying power to stay the course in Afghanistan. General Nikolaev concluded the discussions by noting that while the progress being made in the NRC was welcome, "it is important not to close our eyes to the issues that divide us". The Russian delegation again raised the question of the shortcomings of the international security institutions after the end of the Cold War and uncertainty for the future following the actions undermining the UN Security Council.
The delegations were also briefed on NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation and defence-related aspects, presented by Vice Admiral Malcolm I. Fages, Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee, Vice-admiral Valentin Kuznetsov, Senior Military Representative, Delegation of the Russian Federation to NATO, and Dr Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary General, Defence and Operations Division. The military briefers expressed satisfaction with the extensive work on interoperability seminars, joint operations in peacekeeping at the tactical level and rules of engagement. NATO and Russia were currently working on such issues as Theatre Missile Defence and air transport for oversize strategic lift. There had been considerable work on combating terrorism including two high-level conferences. Vice-Admiral Kuznetsov emphasized that both sides had "learned to work together," and that the directives identified by the governments were on track. He outlined some additional areas of cooperation: re-training of the demobilized military personnel; conferences on combating terrorism; exercises in headquarter command for peacekeeping. Funding, he said, was a big problem.
Dr. Buckley said his group was responsible for the staff work for the NRC. This preparatory work was coordinated with Moscow. There were frequently more complications from the NATO members. A balance was always needed between the input by the International Staff (IS) and that by the nations. Addressing the issue of defence reform, which, he said, was "a natural" area for NATO, he noted that former communist countries were, paradoxically, normally very weak in planning and particularly in resource-based planning. This made the wholesale reorganisation and restructuring of defence establishments and armed forces a difficult task. But defence reform was an imperative. Within the NATO-Russia relationship exchanges in defence reform were at an early stage, they were still scratching the surface. He noted that when defence reform was raised with Russia, they normally sought to discuss armaments cooperation. The funding of projects was generally seen as a problem to further progress. He noted that in terms of interoperability, they had not advanced much, they were still scratching the surface.
Admiral Fages noted that commonly funded aspects were used for NATO-Russia activities. But greater clarity was needed on the NATO side concerning priorities. Some countries were not willing to increase resources available. On the funding question, Vice Admiral Kuznetsov suggested that it might be worthwhile to create a fund to finance actions at 20. There was no system in place, only voluntarily contributions by the nations. The Russian parliamentarians suggested that this funding might come as an item in the national budget. On a separate issue relating to the arms trade, Vice Admiral Kuznetsov proposed that a representative should attend the working groups on standardisation, who could monitor the political side of the modernisation of armaments.
Admiral Fages noted that one area of potential cooperation concerned the provision of heavy lift air transport, where there were several levels of activity. Within the Prague Capabilities Commitment, Germany was looking at the question of strategic lift where one option was to lease Russian aircraft. Admiral Kuznetsov said that this would have to be done through the Ministry of Defence. Edgar Buckley noted that the US had more than 200 wide-bodied aircraft, the rest of the Alliance had 4. There were several options to close the gap: a commercial arrangement with Russia or Ukraine; an arrangement of "assured availability", which was more difficult; direct leasing or direct purchase. For NATO, the most likely was either leasing or assured access although the ideal would be the purchase of a fleet that would be under its own direct control. NATO was looking at leasing with an eye to a future purchase of the A-400.
In conclusion, Victor Ozerov stated that this meeting of the JMG had been the most productive and lively since the joint activity had started in 1998. He identified areas for future discussions such as: military cooperation in interoperability, logistics, and exercises, and, inevitably, the situation around Iraq. Mr. Nikolaev concurred but added that while focusing cooperation in areas that unite NATO and Russia, it was also important to maintain an open dialogue on issues where they had disagreements.
THURSDAY 27 MARCH
10.30 Welcome remarks by Admiral Sir Ian GARNETT, UK N, Chief of Staff
10.40 Briefing on "Military Perspectives of NATO-Russia Cooperation" with a focus on Military cooperation in the Balkans, hosted by Admiral Sir Ian GARNETT, and presented by Major General Thomas L. BAPTISTE, US AF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division
Major General Martial D. VANDAMME, Belgium, Executive Assistant to the COFS for Cooperation
Major General Boleslaw IZYDORCZYK, Poland, Director, Partnership Coordination Cell
Major General Pedro PITARCH, Spain, Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics Division
Major General Thomas BAPTISTE, US AF
General Lt. Vladimir LOGINOV, Russia, Military Representative of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation at SHAPE
Mr. Stephen COVINGTON, US, Special Assistant for Strategic Affairs
Brigadier General Jörg SCHWEINSTEIGER, Germany, Chief of the Policy Branch
Colonel Igor SOKORENKO, Russia, Deputy to General Lt. Loginov
Major Mark KARAS, US, Military Assistant to General Lt. Loginov
11.10 Briefing by General Lt. LOGINOV, Russian Federation, Military Representative of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation at SHAPE
11.30 Question and Answer Session chaired by Admiral Sir Ian GARNETT
12.45Lunch hosted by Admiral GARNETT attended by:
Major General VANDAMME, Major General IZYDORCZYK, Major General PITARCH, Major General BAPTISTE, General Lt. LOGINOV, Mr. COVINGTON, Brigadier General Jörg SCHWEINSTEIGER, Brigadier General STEINLE, Colonel SOKORENKO, Major KARAS, Lt. Colonel SCHRUMPH
14.15Briefing "Russia and Partnership for Peace" by Lt. Colonel Svein BESSERUDHAGEN, Norway, Staff Officer Interoperability, PCC
14.30 Round Table Discussion, chaired by Admiral GARNETT attended by:
Major General VANDAMME, Major General IZYDORCZYK, Major General PITARCH, Major General BAPTISTE, General Lt. LOGINOV, Mr. COVINGTON, Brigadier General Jörg SCHWEINSTEIGER, Colonel SOKORENKO, Major KARAS
19.30 Official Dinner hosted by NATO PA at L'Atelier, rue Franklin 28, 1000 Bruxelles
FRIDAY 28 MARCH
9.00 Introductory remarks by Mr Rafael ESTRELLA, Chairman of the NATO PA Delegation, Mr. Andrei NIKOLAYEV, Deputy Head of the Russian State Duma delegation and Mr. Victor OZEROV, Head of the Russian Federation Council Delegation
9.30 Opening speech on "NATO-Russia Council: achievements and prospects" by the Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs, Ambassador Günther ALTENBURG
11.00 Roundtable discussion of "NATO-Russia cooperation" with selected Permanent Representatives: Ambassador Benoďt d'ABOVILLE (France), Ambassador Gebhardt von MOLTKE (Germany), Ambassador János HERMAN (Hungary), Ambassador Serguey KISLYAK (Russian Federation), Ambassador Sir Emyr JONES-PARRY (United Kingdom) and Ambassador R. Nicholas BURNS (United States)
13.00 Official lunch hosted by the Lord George ROBERTSON of Port Ellen, Secretary General
15.00 Discussion of "NATO-Russia Military-to-Military Cooperation" with General H. KUJAT, Chairman of the Military Committee (tbc) and Vice-admiral Valentin KUZNETSOV, Senior Military Representative, Delegation of the Russian Federation to NATO
16.00 Discussion of "Defence-related aspects of NATO-Russia cooperation" with Dr Edgar BUCKLEY, Assistant Secretary General, Defence and Operations Division
17.00 Closing remarks
17.30 End of programme
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
NATO PA MEMBERS
CHAIRMAN: Mr Rafael ESTRELLA (Spain, Socialist)
COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY
Alice MAHON (United Kingdom, Labour), Chairperson
Lucio MALAN (Italy, Forza Italia), Vice-chairman
DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
Pierre LELLOUCHE (France, UMP), General Rapporteur of the committee, Vice-President of the NATO PA Assembly
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
Harry COHEN (United Kingdom, Labour), Rapporteur, Sub-Committee on East-West Economic Co-operation and Convergence
Monika HEUBAUM (Germany, SPD) Vice-President of the Committee
Donald ANDERSON (United Kingdom, Labour), Vice-Chairman, Sub-committee on Transatlantic Relations
Rui GOMES DA SILVA (Portugal, Social Democratic Party), Vice-Chairman of the committee
Loic BOUVARD, (France, UMP)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE
Lothar IBRÜGGER (Germany, SPD), Treasurer of the Assembly and Rapporteur, Sub-committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology
DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Rt. Gen. Andrei NIKOLAEV, Chairman of the Committee on Defence
Rt. Gen. Vadim ORLOV, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Arkady BASKAEV, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security
Victor OZEROV, Chairman of the Committee on Security and Defence
Vasiliy KLIUCHENOK, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
Rt Gen. Valeriy MANILOV, Member of the Committee on Security and Defence
Valentin BAKULIN, Member of the Committee on Security and Defence
STATE DUMA STAFF
Oleg MELNIKOV, Secretary of Delegation
Svetlana ORLOVA, Assistant to Mr Orlov
Andrey KRUTKO, Expert from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
FEDERATION COUNCIL SECRETARY OF DELEGATION
Viacheslav KOLOTVIN, Secretary of Delegation
NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY STAFF
Simon LUNN, Secretary General
Andrea CELLINO, Deputy for Policy Coordination to the Secretary General
Svitlana SVYETOVA, Coordinator for Central and Eastern European Activities
Valerie BRION, Director, Committee on Civil Dimension of Security
Anna PEEL, Office of the Secretary General
Olga KNIAZEVA, Research Assistant
Elena KUDRYAVTSEVA, Interpreter
Valentina TRIBUNSKAYA, Interpreter
Robert NURICK, Director, Carnegie Foundation, Moscow