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> Home > Document Library > Committee Meeting Summaries > 2003 > 8 and 9 November 2003 - MINUTES of the meeting of the Political Committee,Orange County Convention Center, Orlando, Florida, United States
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8 and 9 November 2003 - MINUTES of the meeting of the Political Committee,Orange County Convention Center, Orlando, Florida, United States
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The impact of the Iraq war on NATO and possible ramifications for the international war against terrorism were at the top of the Political Committee’s agenda during the Assembly’s Annual Session in Orlando, 8-9 November 2003. Moreover, based on the reports presented by the Committee Rapporteurs, the current state of the transatlantic relationship, and NATO’s enlargement and partnerships were discussed by the members. After the formal opening of the meeting and adoption of the Draft Agenda and Minutes of the Prague meeting, Chairman Peter Viggers (UK) explained the procedures for putting forward amendments to the Draft Resolution presented by Bert Koenders (NL).
I. Presentation by Gregory Treverton, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, on Beyond Iraq: US European Co-operation in the War on Terrorism
Reminding us of the changes after the Cold War, Dr Treverton considered current US relations with its Allies at their lowest point since World War II. Europe’s geometry had been “upset” by the enlargement of the EU and NATO. Other important changes included the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the changing constitutional foundations of Europe. Europe is now more focused on Brussels than on the US, Dr Treverton suggested. More generally, changes in the transatlantic partnership were most visible in the asymmetry in power between the US and its Allies and the different ‘mindsets’ described by Robert Kagan. Controversies over the death penalty, Iraq or Kyoto reflected a ‘drifting apart’ of US and European societies, Dr Treverton suggested. Moreover, Europe still held a ‘regional view of international affairs’ whereas the US was globally involved. The defining moment for Europe was 1991, while it was 2001 for the US. Europe learned its lesson that freedom cannot be achieved with a gun; the US continued to prefer bilateral rather than multilateral co-operation. Dr Treverton believed that Iraq represented ‘the peak of the US unilateral military muscle’ and the most difficult transatlantic differences were behind us. He offered three recommendations: firstly, the US needed to rebuild the focus on efforts in the international combat against terrorism. The American public would not understand how good co-operation actually was, he added. Secondly, the US should “stand up for its values”, in particular concerning democracy, but it must at the same time acknowledge that crusades – imposing those values with a gun – would fail. Finally, he believed that Europeans must understand and accept that we cannot afford to fail in Iraq, and the US is in great need of help from Europe in Iraq.
Ruprecht Polenz (D) pointed to Europe’s contributions in Afghanistan, noting that a broad coalition against terror was even more needed than in 2001. Michael Hancock (UK) stressed that having different views on how to handle terrorism did not mean being the enemy. Urban Ahlin (S) considered that the ‘greater Middle East’, Central Asia and the ‘new Near East’, i.e. Moldova and the Caucasus, could become a breeding ground for terrorism and need to be addressed. Donald Anderson (UK) warned that the ‘obsession’ with terrorism led to the disregard of the abuse of human rights in countries like Uzbekistan. Pavel Bourdukov (RUS) believed that terrorism had been simplified and that states were behind attacks, but questioned who was to determine which countries were to belong to the axis of evil. The speaker remarked that tackling the root causes of terrorism was important, but that it would take generations to solve. Dr Treverton was also impressed by the intelligence co-operation that had taken place in this field. Mr Hancock said he was “disappointed” by a lack of credibility in this field. Markus Meckel (D) stressed that the true liberators who ended the Cold War were the people of Central and Eastern Europe who shook off their regimes. Rui Gomes da Silva (P) inquired about the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in international security and Longin Pastusiak (PL) agreed and added that the end of the Cold War had not brought peace as expected. Messrs. Meckel and Anderson highlighted the fact that Iran’s agreement to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was a European success. Loïc Bouvard (F) stressed the media’s responsibility for transatlantic misunderstandings. He and Lamberto Dini (I) considered transatlantic security of vital importance. Mr Bouvard stressed the important roles of France and Germany, while Mr Dini, who considered NATO the primary security institution, said it would be contradictory to complain about European weakness and hamper its efforts to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the same time. Mr Anderson reiterated that if the US accepted nation building as an important aspect of security it needed to compromise with its Allies. The speaker agreed that failed states posed serious security threats, but whether the US had sufficient vision to accept that was unclear, however.
II. Presentation by George Perkovich, Vice-President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on Tackling Rogue States
Containing threats by “rogue states” required a clear definition of the term and the strategic and political challenges posed by these actors, according to Mr Perkovich. He stressed that each case was different and required a unique strategy, and that concepts like the “axis of evil” were therefore not helpful. Joint international action was crucial to contain, punish or defeat threats to international peace and security, the speaker stressed. The US felt free, indeed obligated, to seize the initiative in combating Iraq, Iran, and North Korea partly because it considered that otherwise threats would be allowed to mount. However, other capable actors, too, bore responsibility for exercising leadership in recognising threats and acting upon them. A ‘moral and political hazard’ was created by those states which did little to stop threats emerging, because they relied implicitly or explicitly on the US to bear the costs of removing or containing the threat. Iran and North Korea were not the only states that exhibited ‘roguish tendencies’ and NATO countries should exercise leadership in devising strategies to contain or reverse possible future threats from Libya, Saudi Arabia and, most acutely, Pakistan, Dr Perkovich suggested. The Pakistan challenge was so enormous and portentous that NATO, including the US, should plan for possible scenarios and ways to respond to them. The international community, and NATO in particular, needed to develop clearer standards to legitimise and guide the pre-emptive, respectively preventive use of force to remove large-scale threats that might be posed by “rogue states” with nuclear or biological weapons.
The discussion following Dr Perkovich’s presentation focused on whether pre-emption had replaced deterrence as a doctrine (Peter Viggers) . Members agreed that the term “rogue states” was imprecise (Mr Polenz, Mr Pastusiak, and Jozef Banas of Slovakia) and that Iran, a “strategically important country” according to Mr Anderson, must not become a nuclear power as this might cause Saudi Arabia to follow. Mr Polenz acknowledged that US pressure on Iran was crucial for the success of the EU (France, Germany and the UK) in persuading Iran to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Cheryl Gillan (UK) agreed with the speaker’s assessment on Pakistan and emphasised that Kashmir presented one of the most dangerous threats to global security. Dr Perkovich agreed, adding that solving the Kashmir conflict was next to impossible in the short term because a possible solution of the conflict would reduce the role of the Pakistani army, the country’s main bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism. The speaker was sceptical that the UN could take on a more active role in dealing with “rogue states” as raised by Peter Viggers and Mr Bourdukov, because the UN could only achieve what its leading states wanted it to achieve.
III. Consideration of the draft General Report Tackling Iraq – Questions and Implications for the Alliance by Bert Koenders (Netherlands), General Rapporteur [152 PC 03 E ]
Presenting the Committee’s General Report, Mr Koenders (remove bold) addressed the impact of the Iraq war on the fight against terrorism, arms control, the UN, as well as on NATO. Military action in Iraq had divided the Allies, but they agreed that the success of the US-led coalition in Iraq was crucial, Mr Koenders stated. The lack of any compelling evidence of Saddam Hussein storing or producing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) questioned the credibility of intelligence, the General Rapporteur argued. Differences also remained over the UN’s role in post-war Iraq. On the controversial issue of pre-emption, Mr Koenders stressed that the real issue was how the international community could deal with “states of concern” and at what point the use of military force was permissible. NATO Allies were divided on this, the General Rapporteur said, adding that US government officials acknowledged the UN’s important humanitarian role, but rejected a relevant UN role in international security. While a UNSC reform was urgently needed, winning the peace in post-war Iraq and in Afghanistan required UN involvement as well as increased attention and assistance from the international community. Iraq and Afghanistan must not become “failed states”, Mr Koenders underlined. He welcomed the extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul and the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as important first steps to help to stabilise the regions. Democratisation of the Middle East could not be achieved in the short term, but was a long term project which demanded close co-operation between the US and the Allies. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was important in this regard. Iraq has become the “central front” in the war on terror. Despite good progress, the fight against terrorism would last for a longer period and intelligence officials believe that part of the al Qaeda network remained at least partially intact. NATO should get involved in post-Iraq peacekeeping, together with forces from the region. In conclusion, Mr Koenders said that NATO should focus on a number of measures to overcome earlier differences and to rebuild transatlantic confidence. More specifically, he stressed the need for continued implementation of the decisions taken at the 2002 Prague Summit, including further streamlining NATO’s decision-making structures. Implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) and the NATO Response Force (NRF) were litmus tests of NATO’s political will to further adapt to the changing security environment. If America’s European and Canadian allies did not increase their capabilities, they risked a growing gap between the capabilities of the US and the rest of the Alliance, which would in turn exacerbate political differences, he warned. The Euro-Atlantic dialogue must also be improved and EU defence efforts were most welcome but must not counter NATO. NATO should further develop its co-operation with partners in the war on terrorism but it should not overlook serious concerns about the human rights situation in some countries, he maintained. Moreover, as the proliferation of WMD had become a primary security concern, the Allies should evaluate whether NATO should have a more prominent role in WMD intelligence. Strengthening international co-operation on non-proliferation was also important. Measures could include, for example, expanding the G8 Global Partnership beyond the Russian Federation.
Commenting on the report, Mr Meckel suggested that the final chapter should emphasise the issue of Afghanistan more strongly. Citing the example of Afghanistan, Mr Koenders stressed that failed states posed grave security problems. In that sense, combating terrorism demanded striking a balance between military, economic and political means. The Rapporteur considers that Africa should be dealt with not only for humanitarian reasons but because it is a breeding ground for terrorism.
Discussions were necessary about the security concepts of the US and the one being drafted by the EU, Mr Meckel suggested. Bart van Winsen (NL) proposed to contemplate a new strategic concept for NATO, which could also refer to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Tom Tancredo (USA) was disappointed that the insights into the regime of Saddam Hussein gained after the war had not healed the wounds of being misled by WMD. Mr Meckel underlined the relevance of international treaties to prevent WMD proliferation and maintained that the behaviour of NATO states instigated countries to seek acquisition of WMD. Some members were critical of the UN, reiterating the UN’s earlier inaction over Kosovo (Mr Tancredo) and that as in, for example, Rwanda, the UNSC did not always follow international law (Göran Lennmarker, Sweden). The General Rapporteur responded by saying that the UN was not a democratic institution, and was not a “holy” one, and that NATO could not be prisoner of the UN. He denounced a “pick and choose” approach towards the UN by member states and warned against using the UNSC in an ‘opportunistic’ way. NATO was “threatened” by ESDP, according to Mr Tancredo, adding that criteria were needed for delimiting when and how to use resources so that NATO would not be negatively affected, as in the case of the Congo. However, Marco Minniti (I) considered that ESDP would strengthen NATO. Mr Bouvard said that terrorism had become a more diffused threat after the war in Iraq. Other comments (Messrs. Meckel and Minniti) stressed that the tools in the fight against terrorism were primarily non-military ones. Dimitrios Apostolakis (GR) considered that terrorism did not originate in Muslim countries. Mr Lennmarker raised concerns about America’s ‘inaction’ in the Middle East and suggested the creation of a free-trade area in the Mediterranean as a positive step towards the creation of a security order, which could lead to eventual democracy and stability. Mr Apostolakis said that the conflict in the Middle East and Iraq were linked and that poverty needed to be addressed. Messrs Polenz and Bouvard agreed that the US and the West must not fail in Iraq and that the transfer of power to the Iraqis must be sped up. The German member ???Mr Polenz indicated that it took Germany four years after WWII to organise elections and ten years for Germany to fully regain power.
The draft General Report [152 PC 03 E] was adopted.
IV. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations Transatlantic Security Perceptions and Europe’s Contribution to the Alliance by Karl A. Lamers (Germany), Rapporteur [154 PCTR 03 E]
Presenting his report to the Committee, Mr Lamers stressed that the US and its Allies continue to share vital common interests, including combating terrorism and preventing WMD proliferation. Although the US and its Allies may differ on how best to tackle such concerns, only by working together can the threats by these challenges be minimised. Its vast military superiority notwithstanding, the US still needed the Allies to help manage new security challenges in an increasingly interconnected global environment. Mr Lamers also said that Europe remained the most likely partner for the US; NATO and EU member states have made significant contributions as peacekeepers in the Balkans and Afghanistan; and Europeans were key financial supporters of post-conflict reconstruction efforts worldwide, and co-operated closely with US law enforcement officials against terrorism. US and European policy perceptions of each other had become polarised, the German member suggested. Existing differences in policy preferences toward a range of issues had been exaggerated by the media. For example, the Bush administration recognised that “soft” power had a valuable role to play in international relations; for example it has increased US foreign aid and launched a US$35 billion AIDS programme. At the same time the Europeans were not given enough credit for understanding the value of military force. Nonetheless, European capabilities must be improved, the Rapporteur said. Although the EU has made progress in developing ESDP as part of its broader effort to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), much work remained to transform these policies from rhetoric into reality. Although the EU declared its European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) operational this year, serious shortfalls still existed in strategic lift, command and control, intelligence, and other force multipliers. EU governments needed to spend more, and more wisely, on defence.
In the brief discussion that followed Mr Lamers’ presentation Ilkka Kanerva (FIN) said that “Berlin Plus” was a good basis to renew the transatlantic partnership, and that the European Allies could not afford duplication in military capacity building. The UN remained important for international security and should be strengthened. Raynell Andreychuk (CDN) welcomed the fact that the report acknowledged Canada, and stressed that the US contributions to collective security were not always fully recognised adding that transatlantic relations went beyond US-European relations. Referring to the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Command, she added that the US-Canadian defence relationship had subtly changed. Karl von Wogau (European Parliament) said that better co-ordination on capabilities was crucial. He recalled Javier Solana’s notion of “expanded Europe” which refers to areas adjacent to Europe which are important and reminded that Europe is a much larger investor in development aid than the US. Mr van Winsen declared that the Allies shared similar opinions on how to meet the security threats. However, initiatives such as the “Praline summit” were counterproductive.
The draft Report [154 PCTR 03 E] was adopted.
V. Presentation by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, on NATO Transformation
Beginning the second day of deliberations, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns, described 2003 as a ‘tough year for transatlantic relations’. But NATO had overcome differences and was now undergoing five fundamental changes, namely in its mission, defence transformation, membership, partnerships as well as its relationship with the EU. He particularly stressed the expansion of NATO’s geographical focus, which now included not only Europe, but also the Middle East, Central Asia, Iraq, North Africa, and Afghanistan. Challenges that needed to be overcome included the huge gaps in capability and defence spending between the USA and its Allies; the limitations of European military forces in terms of deployable numbers and flexibility; the open door policy of the Alliance towards former Warsaw Pact Countries; and discussions on new independent EU military headquarters. The NATO presence in Afghanistan through the command of ISAF and PRTs showed its success in peacekeeping missions, and it should undertake the same responsibility in Iraq. He also underlined that countries must act together in fighting the new security challenges such as global terrorism, international crime, and trafficking, and that the USA has needed Europe as partner, friend and ally since 1946.
Ambassador Burns repeatedly stressed the need for NATO and the EU to work together. In this context, he reminded participants of the planned handover of the Bosnia operations from NATO to the EU in 2004. With regard to the transatlantic relationship, the speaker said that the US was committed to multilateralism and was obliged to dedicate itself more to NATO and to Europe. The US needed NATO and the EU, he stated, adding that the EU had the obligation to reject ‘reflexive anti-Americanism’, which could be found in the European media. Europe should not build the EU against the US, nor should it seek to compete with the US in the world. The US wished a strong, independent and autonomous Europe, he concluded.
The discussion that followed focused primarily on EU defence efforts and their relationship to NATO. Algirdas Gricius (LT) and Mr Anderson raised questions about the EU-NATO relationship, the EU’s mutual defence clause and the desire of some Europeans to create a separate EU Headquarters in Tervuren, as well as the possibility of US forces leaving Europe. The US diplomat affirmed that the US considered itself part of Europe and fulfilled its duties as a NATO member, such as in Bosnia and –Herzegovina, and that it did not intend to leave Europe. Jaime Gama (P), Mr Meckel, Mr Lamers, Kurt Rossmanith (D), Mr Bouvard and Mr von Wogau commented on intensified European defence co-operation which they (to different degrees) considered necessary and which would strengthen NATO. Developing European capacities was important, they agreed, as was the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe. Ambassador Burns replied that the US fully support ESDP within the Berlin Plus agreement, which had clarified that ESDP would not oppose nor duplicate NATO. The issue of anti-American propaganda in the European media was raised by Mr Ahlin, while Mr Lennmarker inquired about NATO’s likely role in the Israel-Palestine conflict and the further enlargement of the Alliance. Ambassador Burns stressed that the US was a “remarkably benign country” and that politicians needed to act against anti Americanism and that enlargement will continue, although it was unlikely that new members would join already in 2004. Responding to Ms Andreychuk’s inquiry about NATO’s southern flank, the US NATO representative said that NATO considered the possibility of offering the Partnership for Peace programme to Mediterranean countries as an option. Mr Lamers stressed the crucial challenge of WMD proliferation, while referring to defence transformation, and Helge Adam Møller (DK) informed us about Denmark’s transformation of the conscript system. Mr Hancock warned against the US pressuring European countries, while Mr Dini was “reassured” of the US commitment to NATO. In conclusion, Ambassador Burns stressed the need to specialise NATO forces. He also said that “who weakened NATO would weaken the US commitment to Europe”. A primary problem of EU defence efforts was the lack of communication and information, he added.
VI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe on Alliance Partnerships: Projecting Stability beyond NATO’s Central and Eastern Borders by Marco Minniti (Italy), Rapporteur [153 PCCEE 03 E]
Introducing his report, Mr Minniti underlined the stabilising role of partnerships beyond the boundaries of the Alliance. NATO Partnerships were influenced by the ongoing enlargement of the Alliance, the “war on terrorism” and especially the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as NATO’s evolving new tasks and missions, Mr Minniti said.
NATO’s Partner countries, as well as NATO invitees albeit to different degrees, face similar key challenges, namely organised crime, corruption and poverty. NATO countries not only have a self interest, but also a moral obligation to assist Partners in developing and strengthening democratic and market structures, the Rapporteur said. NATO, which provided expertise in defence reform, and the EU, which could help in the civilian and economic spheres, must work together, the Italian parliamentarian repeatedly stressed.
He praised NATO for having significantly increased peace and stability in South-East Europe, but added that NATO and the EU would have to stay for a long period. The remaining fragile peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* was a case in point, the Rapporteur reminded the Committee. In the Caucasus and Central Asia poverty, political instability, ethnic rivalry, authoritarianism, corruption, the lack of openness, and geographical isolation had gravely complicated a transition process that was still in its early phases. A recognition of the security risks that emanate from “failed states”, and the region’s proximity to the volatile Mid-East and Central Asian countries like Afghanistan, had contributed to NATO’s stronger attention to these countries. Continued and even improved co-operation with these countries was necessary, but especially towards Central Asian countries. Western governments must balance serious concerns about the human rights situation against important strategic interests that make ongoing engagement with these republics a key priority.
Both NATO’s special partnerships, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the NATO-Ukraine Charter (NUC) opened a new era in relations with the former Soviet Union’s two biggest successor states, and provided opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and joint action. With regard to the NRC, significant progress was achieved on issues such as defence reform, terrorism, WMD proliferation and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). Ukraine, on the other hand, announced its intention to seek full NATO membership in May 2002, though a number of problems still hamper full membership, such as weak democratic structures, a lack of good governance, a weak economy, corruption and organised crime. An update of progress achieved in the non military realms by the NATO applicant countries concluded Mr Minniti’s introductory remarks. He identified two crucial tasks that NATO applicant countries needed to advance, namely public support in candidate countries and the continuation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) cycle. NATO’s door remained open, the Italian parliamentarian asserted.
In the debate that followed Mr Minniti’s presentation, a number of delegates, including Andrej Vizjak (SLO) and Zlatko Matesa (CR), provided information about recent developments in their countries. Mr Banas noted that in Slovakia public support for NATO membership has recently increased to 53% and the problem concerning Hungarian national minority will be solved through a newly established committee. Demetrio Volcic (European Parliament) regretted the conduct of the recent elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia, adding that the South Caucasus, after having been neglected for too long, now received attention. "Frozen" conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia threatened Euro-Atlantic security, he stated. Mr Meckel stressed that criteria on democracy and the rule of law must be fulfilled before joining NATO. With regard to South-East Europe Slobodan Casule (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) informed the members about the latest developments in his country and announced he will provide additional information to the Rapporteur. Alessandro Forlani (I) stressed the dangers for overall European security originating from illegal immigration, political asylums and lack of institutional definition of Kosovo. Oleg Zarubinskiy (UA) stressed the positive developments in Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the increased support for membership in his country. Mr Bourdukov welcomed closer NATO Russian co-operation but stressed that Russia was worried about the enlargement of the Alliance. Concluding the discussion of the Sub Committee report, Mr Minniti said he would agree to include minor updates provided by the Ukrainian and Macedonian delegations.
The draft Report [153 PCCEE 03 E] was adopted.
VII. Presentation by John C. Hulsman, Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, on How to Repair the Transatlantic Rift: The Cherry-Picking of Issues
A speaker from a conservative American institution offered a provocative view of US-European partnership. Reminding members of US-European policy differences over a range of issues such as trade, the death penalty, handling “states of concern” and Iraq, Dr Hulsman, considered the transatlantic relationship increasingly in crisis since the 1990s. He maintained that “a significant portion of the European political elite viewed the United States as part of the problem in international politics, rather than as part of the solution to global problems”. What is more, the speaker suggested that Europeans would increasingly define themselves through their differences with Americans.
US-European policy differences resulted from a ‘structural difference’ that was unlikely to change in even the medium to long term, Dr Hulsman said: whilst the US remained the sole superpower, Europe failed to emerge as a coherent power in its own right and European states were regional powers. Europe was militarily weak, economically stagnant and politically disunited and therefore not likely to challenge American primacy. With regard to the Alliance, the US could at best expect a multi-tiered NATO, where individual European member states would fill niche roles in the overall American strategic conception.
The Heritage Foundation analyst predicted a continuation of Europe’s military decline. He therefore suggested a “general US transatlantic foreign policy based on cherry-picking”, namely engaging coalitions of willing European allies on a case-by-case basis, as necessary and desirable. A weak and disunited Europe suited America’s long-term strategic interests, because its member states are capable of assisting the US when their interests coincide with America, yet it is feeble enough that it cannot easily block America over fundamental issues of national security, Dr Hulsman maintained. Cherry-picking would allow the US to prevent the emergence of a “Gaullist, centralised, European rival” and generated more benefits than problems for Europeans and Americans. Such a “realist” US policy toward Europe called for more diplomatic and political engagement at a national level, Dr Hulsman suggested. He continued by saying that America should be constantly engaged in evaluating differences within Europe to build coalitions of the willing on any given policy initiative. As the Committee was already behind schedule, the discussion following the presentation was rather short. Mr Ahlin and Mr Meckel commended the speaker for his “refreshing” approach which had signalled that, different opinions about issues as the International Criminal Court (ICC) notwithstanding, the ‘US and Europe belonged to each other’.
After the presentation by Dr Hulsman, the Committee moved to the presentation and discussion of amendments to the draft Resolution on “Rebuilding Transatlantic Confidence after the War in Iraq” [182 PC 03 E]. In his brief introductory remarks, the General Rapporteur Mr Koenders focused on the impact of military action in Iraq on NATO, stressing that all member states of the Alliance remained fully committed to the goals of south-east European security and stability; strengthening non-proliferation; improving Allies’ military capabilities and streamlining NATO’s decision-making process. Moreover, the Rapporteur called upon the international community to strengthen the effectiveness of the UNSC on international security challenges.
24 amendments were submitted to the draft Resolution by several delegations. Of these, the following amendments were
accepted: Amendment 14 (Mr Ozerov); amendment 4 (Mr Banas, Mr Tancredo, Mr Udall, Mr Anderson, and Mr Pastusiak); amendment 9 (Mr Meckel, Mr Pastusiak, Mr Minniti); amendment 5 (Mr Banas, Mr Tancredo, Mr Udall, Mr Anderson, and Mr Pastusiak); amendment 19 (Mr Ozerov); amendment 6 (Mr Banas, Mr Tancredo, Mr Udall, and Mr Pastusiak) orally amended by Ms Andreychuk to substitute the word “commending” by “noting”; amendment 8 (Ms Brisepierre).
defeated: Amendments 16 and 17 (Mr Ozerov) ; amendment 18 (Mr Ozerov); amendment 12 (Mr Meckel, Mr Pastusiak, Mr Minniti); amendment 7 (Mr Erdem); amendment 13 (Mr Meckel, Mr Minniti).
withdrawn: Amendment 15 (Mr Ozverov); amendment 10 (Mr Meckel, Mr Pastusiak, Mr Minniti); amendment 11 (Mr Meckel, Mr Pastusiak, Mr Minniti); amendment 20 (Mr Ozerov); amendments 1 and 2 (Mr Pastusiak); amendments 21, 22, 23 and 24 (Mr Ozerov).
Moreover, amendment 3 (Mr Banas, Mr Tancredo, Mr Udall, and Mr Anderson) was not carried, but the Rapporteur accepted an oral amendment by Mr Tancredo to replace the first word in paragraph 3, “lamenting”, by “concerned about”. Following the votes on individual amendments, the Committee unanimously adopted the draft Resolution, thus amended, on Rebuilding Transatlantic Confidence after the War in Iraq [182 PC 03 E].
VIII. Election of Committee officers
Turning to the election of Committee and Sub-Committee officers, the Committee members unanimously followed Chairman Peter Viggers’ suggestion to re-elect the officers who were eligible for re-election. Mr Polenz was elected as Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations, succeeding Mr Lamers. Subject to approval by the Standing Committee, Chairman Peter Viggers suggested electing Mr Lamers as third Vice-Chairman of the full Committee and Jan Tore Sanner (N) as third Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations.
IX. Sub-Committee activities in 2004
Towards the end of the meeting of the Political Committee, Mr Pastusiak and Mr Meckel sketched out the activities of the Sub-Committees in 2004. As Mr Pastusiak pointed out, the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations will work on transatlantic relations after the Iraq war, NATO-EU security relations, and the role of the UN in international security. Visits are planned to the United States and to Germany.
Mr Meckel described the Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe’s 2003 agenda and announced that the Sub-Committee will focus on security in Central and Eastern Europe and NATO Partnerships in 2004, putting a special emphasis on the South Caucasus and South East Europe. To that end, the Sub-Committee plans to visit Serbia and Montenegro as well as Armenia.
Before adjourning the meeting, Mr Viggers announced that the next meeting of the NATO PA Political Committee will take place in Brussels, in February 2004.
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* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
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