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> Home > Document Library > Mission Reports > 2004 > 1-4 MARCH 2004 - VISIT TO MOLDOVA by the SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE [CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY]
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1-4 MARCH 2004 - VISIT TO MOLDOVA by the SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE [CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY]
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Fourteen members of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance of the Committee on Civil Dimension of Security of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited Moldova (1-4 March 2004) to assess the overall situation in the country. Mr Niki Bettendorf (Luxembourg), Chairman of the Sub-Committee, led the delegation.
2. Of particular interest to the delegation were the issues of the conflict over Transdniestria and the fight against illegal trafficking. The delegation meet with various committees from the Parliament, political factions represented in the Parliament, representatives of the Moldovan civil society and from the International Community present in Chisinau.
3. The delegation is grateful to the Moldovan authorities and in particular to the Speaker of the Parliament, Mrs E. Ostapciuc and to the Moldovan delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly headed by Mr V. Panfilov, for their co-operation. It also wishes to thank the Head of the OSCE office, Ambassador William Hill as well as his entire staff, for their kind assistance during the visit.
II. POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY
Internal politics
4. Following the dissolution of the Parliament signed by former President Lucinshi, early elections were called in February 2001. These parliamentary elections - assessed by international observers as meeting international standards - resulted in a landslide victory for the Communist Party (50.07% of the votes), which now controls 71 out of 101 parliamentary seats.
5. The country went through several political crises at the beginning of 2002 - demonstrations organised by the Christian Democratic People's Party for three and a half months, challenges to reform affecting local self government, the status of Russian as an official language and the teaching of history, the lifting of parliamentary immunity of certain opposition leaders were enough to prompt fears amongst the international community for the country's democratic stability. A political conciliation led to the appeasement of the crisis, although major political dissentions remain.
6. The delegation was informed by the representatives of opposition parties that the government's approach to crucial issues for the country raises serious concerns. They denounced in particular the lack of independence of the judiciary, the poor educational policy, the numerous violations of human rights and, most recently, the continuation of pressures on opposition parties by the lifting of immunity of opposition deputies or the application of administrative sanctions. They also deplored the lack of freedom of speech and the tight governmental control exerted on the media and the use of censorship. Moderate opposition parties deplored the policies of the ruling party, claiming they raised popular support in the population for right wing extremist ideology.
7. The governing party noted that when the party came to the power, the country was already in a state of severe deterioration. The party was forced to initiate a number of unpopular reforms that the previous ruling party had not had the courage to undertake. Nevertheless the party has succeeded in reforming the country's infrastructure and has achieved significant progress towards implementing its international obligations and commitments.
The language issue
8. According to the 1989 census, the composition of minorities is: Ukrainians (13.8%), Russians (13%), Bulgarian (2%), Roma and Gagauz (3%). Minorities represent 30% of the Moldovan population of the right bank of the Dniestr River and around 35% in the entire Republic. Moldovan is the usual language for around 65% of the population.
9. Article 10 of the Moldovan constitution recognises Moldovan as the only official language. According to certain local interlocutors, this issue together with the change from the Cyrillic alphabet to Latin is one of the major motivations for Trandniestrian secession. In the first years of independence some part of the Russian-speaking minority denounced at the time a "Moldovan-Romanisation" policy of the ruling government. By contrast, some of the delegation's interlocutors, mostly those from opposition parties, denounced the current "Russification" process endorsed by the current Communist leadership. The 2002 demonstrations were organised by the opposition as a reaction to the ruling power's intention to introduce Russian as a second official language and as a compulsory language in schools. In order to diffuse the crisis, the government declared a moratorium on reforms concerning the teaching of the Russian language and set up a study group to address the issue.
10. In Transdniestria, severe restrictions were imposed on the use and teaching of the Moldovan-Romanian language and the use of the Latin script. Despite the local Constitution establishing "Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian as official languages", on this territory - where up to 40% of the population speaks Moldovan in certain districts - Russian and Cyrillic script are predominant. Seven Moldovan-Romanian schools are located in Transdniestrian-controlled territory although supported by the Ministry of Education in Chisinau. Despite the existing agreement reached in 20031 for the registration and unimpeded operation of these schools2, they face repeated difficulties, with threaths of closure, harassment and persecution by local authorities.
11. The delegation is convinced that this issue, which historically has had an emotional and geopolitical impact beyond the Moldovan borders, has been highly politicised and used by various political factions as a political argument. A country with approximately one third of its population composed of minority groups requires a mixed and flexible language system, yet one, which can still promote national identity. The delegation strongly recommends that all parties adopt a conciliatory approach to this question - especially during the forthcoming pre-election campaign- and avoid further division of the country on this issue.
Defence policy
12. Under Article 11 of the Constitution, Moldava is a neutral state. Moldova is not part of military blocs and alliances. Although Moldova was one of the co-founders of the GUUAM3, the authorities in Chisinau view this organisation as "not being fully activated and having only an economic aims and goals". It goes without saying that the first condition for respect of this principle is the unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces and equipment.
13. Since 1991 Moldova has been closely cooperating with NATO on various initiatives and has been actively involved in the PfP programme (1994). Following the visit of former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to Chisinau in 2000, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed, outlining various projects in the fields of science, research, international peacekeeping, de-mining operations, destruction of ammunitions and pesticides.
14. The Moldovan army (composed in 1991 of 960 000 military personnel) has already been decreased to 680 000. The main priorities of the national defence reform strategy are the following:
- Reduction of the size of the army including progressive decrease in military and civilian staff;
- Reform of the army (as per the "National Security Paper, 2002-2014");
- Establishment of a small, professional, efficient and highly qualified army that would mainly be
trained in civil protection and peacekeeping operations inside and outside the country.
15. The delegation was also informed of the dramatic economic problems faced by the Ministry of Defence. While 2% of the GDP is often recommended as a benchmark for countries joining NATO, Moldova could only reach 0.4% in 2003. This is inadequate to modernise the army and frequently does not cover all expenses for the care and maintenance of the current military infrastructures. Since 2002, Moldova has established its own training academy for border guards, Carabinieri, and low-level military personnel. Officers usually receive higher education in Russian institutions, though some attend schools in Bucharest as well as other places.
Relations with the European Union (EU)
16. The Members of the Committee on External Relations of the Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the development of relations with the EU is a priority for Moldova. Moldova has stressed its interest in joining the EU on several occasions. However membership is not on the agenda at the moment. The "Wider Europe -Neighbourhood- initiative"4 is to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship, which in the medium term would not include a perspective of membership but will offer the prospect of participation in the EU's internal market.
17. It is expected that a draft EU-Moldova action plan will be presented by the Commission in May 2004 and will be adopted before the end of the current term. The cooperation Council between EU and Moldova has underlined necessary reforms and improvements in the following areas: home affairs and justice, border management and customs control, effective measures to fight trafficking and organised crime and settlement of the conflict in Transdniestria. The EU is one of the largest single donors to Moldova with a total contribution from 1991 to 2003 of 238 millions euros.
18. Since 2002, it appears that the EU and other European Institutions have adopted a more proactive political discourse on the conflict in Transdniestria. In February 2004, the EU said it stood ready to employ the "full range of its instruments and policy tools to support Moldova in achieving the settlement within the framework of the OSCE-led mediation". Similarly it urged the government of Romania, Russia and Ukraine to refrain from any unilateral interference in Moldova's internal affairs, and called on Russia to take all the necessary steps to comply with the Istanbul/Porto commitment to withdraw Russian forces from Moldova5. In addition, the travel ban and sanctions imposed on 17 Transdniestrian leaders (including the President and his two sons) "considered to be primarily responsible for the lack of cooperation to promote a political settlement of the conflict"6 were renewed in February 2004
19. Nevertheless the Moldovan interlocutors stressed to the delegation that they wished the EU would take more steps in order to promote a settlement of this conflict. The Moldovan authorities not only sought the opening of an EU Delegation in Chisinau (currently in Kyiv) but also hoped that the EU would take a leading role in the establishment of an International Peacekeeping Force. To date, there have been no public statements regarding an EU peacekeeping operation in the region.
III. THE CONFLICT IN TRANSNISTRIA
Background history
20. This region once known as Bessarabia, came under Russian occupation in 1812. Alternating with periods of Romanian domination, the land east of the Dniestr had nearly never shared the same administrative structure with the right (western) bank until it was incorporated as a Moldovan entity within the Soviet Union after war.
21. Alarm at closer relations between Moldova and Romania prompted the people of Transdniestria to unilaterally declare the region's independence in 1990. Armed conflict erupted between separatist paramilitaries supported by the Russian 14th Army and Moldovan forces in the following year, during which an estimated 1000 people lost their lives. A cease-fire in -July 1992- provided for the presence of 2500 Russian peacekeepers who remained after the partial withdrawal of the Russian 14th army.
22. Although the conflict has ethnic and linguistic elements, it is not rooted in these divisions and therefore there is hope for a lasting settlement. An important economic question stands at the centre of the conflict. After the war, when Moldova was restored to its 1940's boundaries, Transdniestria became the industrial centre of the country, dominated by heavy industry and enterprises for the Soviet military complex. As a result, together with the fact that about 500,000 Moldovans were deported to Central Asia and 300,000 Russian speakers were settled in the region, Transdniestria became more urban, industrialised and Russified than the rest of the country and a local Russian or Russified elite soon dominated state and party structures.
23. With the division of the country and the consolidation of the Transdniestrian secessionist power, Moldova is deprived from the financial income of strategic enterprises (metallurgical, small and light weapons factories, a power station...). It has also partially lost control of its eastern border and of most of the pipelines bringing vital gas from Russia across Transdniestria. This also explains why Moldova is determined to gain full control of this vital segment to reconcile it with the national economy.
The Transdniestrian entity
24. The Transdniestrian region is not under de facto control of the Moldovan Government. Since it declared its independence in 1990, Transdniestria has established and consolidated its own state-like structures. According to non-governmental7 sources, the armed forces from Transdniestria are estimated to number 8,000 (excluding reserves). The Transdniestrian authorities initiated their own draft of men between 18 and 40 years of age and "military potential and arsenals of the "Republic" is expected to be increased. It is of note that the Transdniestrian leadership - the secessionist Smirnov regime - is not officially recognized as legitimate by any state or international organisation.
25. The delegation was disappointed by the fact that the Transdniestrian authorities have demonstrated neither a flexible stand nor encouraging signs towards the negotiation process, nor showed a real interest in the settlement of the conflict. During the meeting of the delegation with the Deputy Speaker of the "Transdniestrian Soviet" local parliament, it was said that the Transdniestrian entity had all the attributes of a sovereign state (a Constitution adopted on December 24, 1995; an elected President and national parliament, a national bank issuing national currency, a national passport, a judicial system from the lowest courts to the Constitutional Court, a coat of arms, national anthem, a flag, an army, police, etc......). An appeal was made to the NATO-PA delegates for the recognition of the Transdniestrian entity. Similarly the Transdniestrian representatives requested that the visiting delegation recommend the lifting of the travel ban imposed by the EU and the US since 20038.
26. In 2007 it is expected that Romania will join the EU, Moldova will therefore become a neighbour of the Union. As there is no effective border control at the internal Moldovan boundaries, the border between the future EU (Romania) and Moldova will be all that separates Western Europe from Transdniestria. Moreover, it appears that approximately 300,000 inhabitants of Moldova9 have already been granted Romanian citizenship10 and more are expected to apply in the next few years, making it difficult for the EU to control this border. A settlement of the conflict is therefore essential for the stability and security on the expanded EU's new border.
The negotiation process
27. A long lasting and painful negotiation process has been held under the auspices of the OSCE since 1993. In accordance with the principle of territorial integrity, the OSCE mediation is based on the clear understanding that independence for Transdniestria is not an option. At the same time it rules out simply re-integrating Transdniestria into a unitary Moldovan State without taking the historical and socio-economic peculiarities of the region into account. Since the "Kyiv document", a proposal developed in 2002 by the mediator and with the help of the OSCE, the idea of the republic of Moldova as a federal state is being discussed.
28. An agreed settlement was within reach in November 2003, but failed at the last minute. The President of Moldova declined to sign the OSCE proposed agreement. Instead he began a bilateral negotiation with the deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Mr D. Kozak, effectively excluding the OSCE from the negotiation process. The so-called "Kozak plan" included a number of provisions unacceptable to the Moldovan opposition and to the OSCE. The proposal -based on a federalist reform of the State- gave unconditional control over state affairs to the Transdniestrian leadership. Under pressure of the OSCE and other international organisations and foreign embassies, President Voronin declined to agree with this last proposal. The negotiation on status appears to be deadlocked again.
29. Nevertheless, the OSCE is now making efforts to encourage all parties to the conflict to resume talks; a new round of consultation began in January 2004. The work of the "Joint Constitutional Commission", responsible for drafting the new constitutional project and composed of members of both Moldovan and Transdniestrian assemblies,11 has come to a halt, deadlocked over disagreements over crucial questions. Efforts are now being made to find an acceptable federalist system that would maintain the unity of the country and accommodate the wish of the Transdniestrian leadership for the highest degree of self-management.
The principle of federation
30. Transdniestrian authorities had clearly expressed they would not resume talks unless a federal system would be considered. The principle of federalism introduced by the Kyiv Document in 2002, at first raised strong negative reactions in Moldova. Chisinau's arguments are on the one hand due to a fundamental attachment to the unitary character of the country and on the other hand fears that a federal model would result in the Transdniestrian authorities (and according to some interlocutors, possibly Russia) acquiring strong influence on the central political decision making process.
31. Although the Moldovan leadership has agreed to discuss a federal model, this idea remains unpopular in Moldova, particularly among the opposition parties, civil society and the public. Among the most controversial issues are: the number of units in the federation; the distribution and limitation of competencies, the language issue, the dispute settlement's mechanism, the role of guarantors (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE, others?) the modalities of the transition period, the military guarantees, withdrawal of foreign forces and the peacekeeping operation.
32. This means that if a proposal-which will be adopted through a referendum- is viewed or presented as favouring Transdniestrian interests, the chances are that the Moldovan population would reject it. It also means that political parties from all sides must accept the responsibility of supporting the settlement process in particular of defending the national as opposed to the party interest.
Withdrawal of foreign troops and peacekeeping operations in Transdniestria
33. The Soviet 14th Army stationed in Tansdniestria (9,250 troops in 1992) played a crucial role when Transdniestria declared its independence form Moldova in 1990-1991. Not entirely under Moscow's control, the 14th Army declared its loyalty to the Transdniestrian leadership and assisted in the creation of the new defence forces of the secessionist regime, effectively securing Transdniestria's de facto independence.
34. These troops, as well as the heavy equipment abandoned by the Soviets in Transdniestria in the early 90's are subject to limitations set by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). As a result of bilateral discussions between Moldova and Russia a final agreement was signed, though the Russian Duma refused to ratify it.
35. The withdrawal of Russian troops began slowly and has still not been achieved, as approximately 1,200-1,300 Russian military personnel are still present on this territory. The NATO PA delegation regrets that this process initiated in 1990 (CFE12) is still -in 2004- incomplete. Not only does this make the settlement of the conflict more complicated, but it drags the Russian Federation into the heart of the conflict. It is also a blunt failure by Russia to honour international commitments it has undertaken13.
36. By 1999, the number of troops had been reduced to 2,600. At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in December 1999, Russia formally accepted deadlines for the withdrawal or destruction of all CFE-related equipment by 2001 and the withdrawal of troops by the end of 2002. Due to obstruction from the Transdniestrian side -together with other reasons- the process stalled in 2001. The OSCE Porto Ministerial (2002) extended the deadline for the withdrawal of the remaining troops and the remaining equipment to the end of 2003. The OSCE Porto agreement only acknowledges a Russian "Intention" rather than a clear-cut obligation to withdraw the forces. In addition this document introduces a clause that could open the door to further delay: that the withdrawal should be conducted "provided the necessary conditions are in place". These last two elements were seen in Moldova -in particular by the main opposition factions and some representatives of the civil society- as a clear setback with regards to the Istanbul document and an inappropriate and unjustified concession to Moscow and Tiraspol.
37. The NATO PA delegation understood from its discussions with the leadership of the Operative Group of Russian Forces in the Transdniestrian Region of Moldova (OGRF) that although there seems to be much goodwill from the Russian authorities to implement the agreement, the Russian Federation sees it in its interest to maintain a military presence in this region. Such a presence responds to two major concerns: the first being the protection of the Russian or Russian-speaking minority and the second being the peacekeeping role of Russian forces in maintaining the current military status quo and monitoring the destruction or withdrawal of the stock of ammunitions. The NATO PA delegation was told of the logistical difficulties which faced implementation of the withdrawal agreement, namely the restrictions put on the transit of trains transporting arms and ammunitions to Russia through Ukraine and the reluctance shown by the Transdniestrian authorities in providing the carriage or the official documents necessary to evacuate the equipment.
38. The OSCE reported that the Transdniestrian authorities had in several instances failed to honour a signed agreement on destruction of ammunitions on site14. It was also said that these operations had stopped since the failure of last year's negotiations. The Transdniestrian authorities had now linked the continuation of this process to a satisfactory proposal for a federal state and the lifting of the economical blockage imposed on Transdniestria. As a result, the Transdniestrian authorities have denied OSCE personnel access to the ammunition storage site since 23 December 200315. Moreover, Transdniestria claims that it inherited the military equipment and munitions from the Soviet Union and has asked for compensation. In other instances, these same authorities had requested from Russian officials a gas debt write-off to expedite the removal process.
39. The NATO PA delegates also understood from the Russian military Commander that some officers and military personnel formerly attached to the 14th Soviet battalion had remained -in Transdniestria after demobilisation and established their "own private armed militias", possibly interacting with the Transdniestrian troops from the local Ministry of Internal Affairs. Such militias could be responsible for the trafficking of small arms and other weapons. The military Commander added that to his knowledge there are no chemical weapons or toxic substances in the region.
40. Two major questions remained: First, the origin of military equipment currently possessed by the Transdniestrian "armed forces"; second, the official status of the Russian military based on this territory -in particular in regard to international law-. Moreover, the delegation was concerned as to what conditions (protection of Russian population's interests, status of the Transdniestrian entity, type and form of the peacekeeping force...) were to be considered as necessary for a prompt, clear and final implementation of the Russian Federation's commitment to withdraw.
Peacekeeping forces and peace settlement guarantees
41. A peacekeeping structure was established by the ceasefire agreement of July 2002. The peacekeeping force (PKF) composed of 1,500 men (500 Russian, 500 Moldovan and 500 Transdniestrian military personnel) under the supervision of the "Joint Control Commission" which also oversees key security and administrative operations in the Security Zone.
42. Although it could be argue that a peacekeeping force composed of representatives of the "conflicting parties" not only runs counter to the idea of "traditional peacekeeping" but is potentially dangerous. In addition, Moscow has staffed its peacekeeping forces with troops from the OGRF -presumably to be withdrawn in the near future- making the link between the Russian military and the peacekeeping forces confusing.
43. The delegation concluded from their observations that the ultimate solution lies in a balanced international peacekeeping operation with the participation - of the three participating parties: Russia, Moldova and Transdniestria. They also consider that whatever the form of this operation should have, a European Union, OSCE, UN or NATO mandate and supervision would reinforce its legitimacy and efficiency.
Conclusions
44. The delegation is convinced that the conflict affects all sides of the political and economic development of the country and deeply undermines its image abroad. The delegation is convinced that only a collective approach to the conflict will enable the parties to find an acceptable agreement.
45. The delegates seriously fear that without the settlement of this conflict in the near future, the NATO and the EU enlargements to Romania might just set a seal on the unfortunate division of the country and confine this conflict to a deadlocked and frozen situation. In addition, it would also risk drawing a "new Berlin wall", a new border between the East and the West, Europe and non-Europe, the Oriental and Russian sphere of influence versus the Western and European one, which in the views of the delegation must be avoided at all costs.
IV. ECONOMIC SITUATION
46. Moldova is the poorest nation in Europe. GDP was US$1.6 billion (US$460 per capita) in 200216; 51% of the population lived below the poverty line. Real GDP grew by 7.2% in 2002. Moldova's economy is extremely fragile and a dependence on agriculture means that unforeseeable circumstances, such as poor weather conditions, could prompt a sharp downturn in economic growth as happened during the drought in summer 2003. As for foreign debt, in 2002 it reached over US$1.4 billion (75% of national budget!). Moldova must import all of its supplies of oil, coal and natural gas, largely from Russia. Moldova's small market, law enforcement concerns, and corruption problems dissuade foreign investment.
47. Nevertheless, both the Social Protection Committee and the Committee on Economical Affairs have noted some economical improvements over the last 3 years (+20% in the GDP, increase of salary and pensions) but have raised serious concerns regarding the current economic indicators and the lack of perspectives for better performances of the economy. They have underlined the disastrous impact of the de-industrialisation, degradation of economic infrastructures (in 2004, the PNB is 38% of what it was in the 90's!) on the employment rate (unofficially 73% of the population according to a World Bank informal assessment) and the drastic emigration of labour forces and qualified specialists that resulted from this state of play.
48. Around 6-800,000 citizens17 -more than one third of the working age population- have left Moldova, temporarily or permanently. Thus, the perspective of getting a European-Romanian passport will probably lead numerous citizens to further apply for citizenship or emigrate to neighbouring Romania in the next few years. The Parliamentary Committee of Social Protection informed the delegation that a serious brain drain together with the financial reductions of state budgets for science and research (0.2% of the state budget), the country was loosing its intellectual and scientific elites, attracted by better working conditions abroad.
49. The authorities have undertaken a number of formal reforms (adoption of labour code, ratification of numerous European Conventions in the field of social protection...) and the government is working toward increasing average monthly salaries and pensions and improving the cost-effectiveness of the agriculture and industry. The Government is in the process of finalizing a national strategy for combating poverty, which should address the situation of the 25% of the population still leaving in extreme poverty and the 50% of the population living in poverty.
Corruption and shadow economy
50. The Moldovan illegal economy is thriving. It scored 2.4 in Transparency International's 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index (10 representing highly clean and 0 representing highly corrupt). According to this score, Moldova was the 10th most corrupt country of the 133 countries surveyed by the organisation. In 2002, Transparency estimated that the bribes given to public functionaries to resolve various problems amounted to one third of the State budget.
51. This "grey economy" has benefited from the fact that part of the country -including long borders with neighbouring countries- have fallen out of the central State's authority. The border with Ukraine covers 1.222 km out of which 453km lie between Transdniestria and Ukraine, with 76 border crossings, 26 of which are in Transdniestria, out of the control of central authority; and the border with Romania covers 862 km, with 9 crossings18. Transdniestrian have established their own customs posts at the border with Ukraine. Important trafficking routes are known to pass trough the cities of Tiraspol and Odessa toward Europe; Turkey, for southern Europe destinations and the Middle East, and through Poland, Russia.... The revenue of the Customs Department headed by the son of I.Smirnov is said to be larger than the Transdniestrian state budget and the profits for the Transdniestrian leadership from illegal operations is estimated at USD 1 billion annually19. It is said that the annual narco-dealing business turnover in Moldova is estimated at USD 200-250 Million, which is 4 times higher than the annual foreign direct investment in Moldova. 20
Illegal trafficking and organised crime
52. Organised crime, in particular the smuggling of weapons, drugs, contraband cigarettes and alcohol, are prevalent throughout Moldova, and especially in Transdnistria. Moldova is also a source country for women and children trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation, most of whom are destined for Turkey, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, and Serbia and Montenegro but also Russia and Romania. From these countries human beings and particularly women and girls are being trafficked to the countries of final destination, Europe among others.
53. According to non-governmental sources21, it appears that traffickers are looking to diversify the countries of destination and that one main new channel leads to the Middle East and Arab world. In 82% of the cases of persons being trafficked, the purpose of the traffic is sexual exploitation. The victim's profile is the following: 83% of the cases are women aged between 14-26 years old (including 15% minors), out of which 50% come from rural areas and 80% from vulnerable environments. 85% have not graduated from school and in 90% of the cases the women have no professional skills. New purposes of trafficking are being identified: including the traffic of organs, drug smuggling and dealing, pornography, but also seasonal work in the case of male's trafficking.
54. The delegation took note of the clear message from local NGOs and other actors in the field of counter trafficking requesting that the countries of destination cooperate with the "countries of origin" in identifying criminal networks and routes, victims and perpetrators. They urged law enforcement bodies of the countries of destination to share necessary information for the countries of origin to address the trafficking mechanisms and called for the development of tight cooperation among organisations caring for victims.
55. The Moldovan government has adopted the recommendations of the Stability Pact, urging a National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking. A National Committee was created in 2002 to reflect on this phenomenon. The authorities indicated to the delegation that fighting corruption, organised crime and illegal trafficking is a state priority and stated their strong will to cooperate with international institutions on these issues. A new Criminal Code, together with other specific laws were adopted in 2002-2003 to complete the legislative basis necessary for more effective enforcement activities against traffickers22. However, specialised international institutions are of the opinion that in addition to these legislative tools, only regional cooperation and improved transparency and border control could further help in strengthening the fight against trafficking.
Human rights and fundamental freedoms
56. From the few contacts with non-governmental organisations, the delegation sensed that the NGO sphere is rather active despite financial and economic constrains. The human rights situation was reported to be satisfactory. However media representatives voiced serious concerns, one in particular is the fact that Moldova has not yet fulfilled its commitment to transform the state TV channel into a national public broadcast service. This was described -by certain interlocutors- as a political tactic of the government to keep this channel under control. Other interlocutors expressed the feeling that even if the censorship was officially abolished, the general climate in the country as well as informal pressure or "warnings" were leading the journalists to apply self-censorship. The independent press is still fragile and local independent journalists regretted the parliament's decision to amend the press law to prohibit funding or support of the local media from foreign governments. In general, the freedom of association seems to be respected in this country. Local NGOS and opposition parties denounced the unequal access of some parties to mass media outlets and general political life, which in a pre-electoral situation raises serious concerns.
57. Some worrying information on the general human rights situation in Transdniestria was reported to the delegation. Political parties, newspapers and local NGOs demonstrating critical positions toward the ruling party suffer serious restrictions and harassment from local authorities. Major sources of information (newspapers, TV channels) are reported to be in the hands of the executive power of the separatist authorities. Allegations of torture and degrading treatments in the Transdniestrian prisons were reported. In general it seems that the rule of law is not respected in this part of the country.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Democratic Governance
Luxembourg Niki BETTENDORF
Rapporteur of the Subcommittee on Democratic Governance
Iceland Gudmundur Arni STEFANSSON
Chairperson of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security
United Kingdom Alice MAHON
Special Rapporteur of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security
Romania Petre ROMAN
Members
Turkey Mustafa ACIKALIN
Erol CEBECI
United Kingdom Michael CLAPHAM
Lord Michael JOPLING
Associate members
Estonia Tiit MATSULEVITS
Latvia Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS
Lithuania Alvydas SADECKAS
Russian Federation Nikolai BEZBORODOV
Ukraine Oleg ZARUBINSKY
European parliament Ward BEYSEN
Delegations staff
Lithuania Snieguole ZIUKAITE
Romania Liviu MARIA
Russian Federation Oleg MELNIKOV
Elena KOUDRYAVTSEVA (interpreter)
Ukraine Ihor MYSYK
International Secretariat
Director of the Committee on the
Civil Dimension of Security Raphaëlle MATHEY
Co-ordinator of the Committee on the
Civil Dimension of Security Isabelle ARCIS
Interpreters
Romanian - English Sergiu BUFTEAC
(Chisinau only) Angela GLAVAN
Russian - English Marina AIDOVA
(Tiraspol only) Marina LAZO
_____________
1 Agreement concluded under the aegis of the OSCE Mission in Moldova and the OSCE Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.
2 Ambassador's Hill report to the OSCE Permanent Council, 5 February 2004.
3 GUUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova.
4 "Wider Europe -Neighbourhood: a New framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", 11 March 2003, European Commission, and European Council conclusions of 16 October 2003
5 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 17 October 2003 or the European Parliament Resolution on Moldova dated 4 January 2004.
6 European Council, Council of Common Position 2003/139/CFSP
7 Human Rights Watch Report and BBC Monitoring Service, 26/2/99.
8 Considering the lack of progress in the negotiations process, the Council of the European Union decided on 23 February 2004 to renew the travel ban on key members of the leadership.
9 Moldova report, International Crisis Group, 12 August 2003
10 In 2003 a new law was adopted that allows Moldovan citizens to hold dual citizenship.
11 settled by President Voronin in 2004, following the Kyiv round of negotiations and includes participation of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE mediators.
12 In 1990 first and then in 1992 at the CSCE Ministerial in Stockholm and Russia committed itself to withdraw from Moldova.
13 CFE, Council of Europe Opinion n°193(1996)
14 Ambassador's Hill report to the OSCE Permanent Council, 5 February 2004
15 OSCE Mission to Moldova, activity report January 2004.
16 World Bank figures, 2002.
17 OSCE and IOM estimates.
* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its consitutional name.
18 IOM-SIDA Migration Management Moldova, Assessment 2003
19 Moldova report, International Crisis Group, 12 August 2003, "La strada" Background Paper 2004
20 Transparency international, Chisinau, working paper, 22.05.2003
21 International Centre for Women's Rights; Protection and Promotion "La Strada"
22 Since 2002, 52 people have been convinced of trafficking-related offences. Source IOM-SIDA Migration Management Moldova, Assessment 2003.
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