



#### POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

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# DEVELOPING A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY, INTEGRATED AND COORDINATED APPROACH TO RESILIENCE FOR ALLIED DEMOCRACIES\*

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The Assembly,

- 1. **Noting** that the Alliance faces an increasingly complex security environment in which military and non-military threats are multiplying and affecting societies as a whole, and **acknowledging** that tackling them requires the adoption of a whole-of-society, integrated and coordinated security approach;
- 2. **Denouncing** the attacks perpetrated by internal and external malicious actors against the democratic values and structures of the Alliance, and **recalling** that the commitment to respect and defend the latter is the cornerstone of the national and collective efforts made by NATO countries with a view to strengthening their resilience;
- 3. **Observing** that the climate and biodiversity crises expose us to growing threats in terms of natural catastrophes, population movement, and political instabilities in every part of the world, including the territories of Member States:
- 4. **Convinced** that the Alliance's ability to recover quickly from a shock is its first line of defence, and **stressing** that maintaining credible collective deterrence and defence is intrinsically linked to strengthening the resilience of Allied societies and democracies;
- 5. **Aware** that the resilience and security of the Alliance depend on a better preparedness of civilian actors and on the development of effective and in-depth cooperation with the military sector in times of peace as in times of crisis;
- 6. **Mindful** that strengthening resilience is above all a national prerogative, while **underscoring** the growing interdependence of Allied societies and the vulnerabilities and risk of cascading failures that this can entail;
- 7. **Recalling** that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the Allies to develop their resilience separately and collectively, and **welcoming** the decision taken by the Allies at the June 2021 Summit to make resilience one of the priorities for NATO 2030;
- 8. **Welcoming** also the adoption, in June 2021, of the *Strengthened Resilience Commitment*, and the decision to initiate a process of evaluation and revision of NATO's baseline requirements for national resilience:
- 9. **Considering** that the Alliance's capacity to cope with shocks also depends on that of its partners, and therefore on cooperation with non-Member States and international bodies, in particular the European Union (EU), which share our democratic values;
- 10. **Noting** that the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for civil preparedness and for cooperation between the civilian and military sectors in crisis management, and **paying tribute** to all those, military and civilian alike, who have contributed, and continue to selflessly contribute, to the fight against COVID-19;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

- 11. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and, where appropriate, NATO bodies:
- a. to place the development of resilience, including democratic resilience, at the heart of discussions about the future of the Alliance, notably within the framework of the NATO 2030 process and the forthcoming update of the Strategic Concept;
- b. to better reflect the fundamental link between democratic resilience, societal resilience and security, and to reaffirm their individual and collective commitment to common shared values by creating a Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO that can support the Allies in strengthening their democratic systems and institutions;
- c. to encourage increased cooperation between the armed forces, public authorities at every level, the private sector and the population in crisis preparedness and response;
- d. to improve communication and education on resilience aimed at civil sector actors, and in particular the population, in order to raise awareness of their essential role in effective crisis preparation and management;
- e. to grow their expertise, develop their structures, and allocate sufficient financial and human resources to achieve the objectives set with regard to strengthening the resilience of Allied societies;
- f. to take action and step up their efforts to meet NATO's current baseline requirements, in particular with a view to consolidating the resilience of their critical infrastructures, including their communication and transport systems; diversifying their supply chains; strengthening their energy security, which would help reduce their economic exposure to states that systematically engage in pernicious and hostile activities against the Alliance; and ensuring the continuity of public authorities and public services, notably health systems, in the event of a crisis;
- g. to review, strengthen, expand and render the baseline requirements more quantifiable to allow for a regular and comparative assessment, both individual and collective, of the capacities and vulnerabilities of the Allies, and to facilitate a more frequent sharing of good practices between them:
- h. to integrate the protection of democratic values and institutions as well as electoral processes into the baseline requirements, notably in the face of cyberattacks and disinformation;
- i. to test, put into practice and improve their emergency plans ahead of crises by organising frequent exercises that take into account all the threats facing the Alliance and include the civilian and military sectors, at the national and NATO levels, in particular with the support of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC);
- j. to strengthen their crisis planning and management efforts by developing early warning systems and robust and flexible emergency plans in cooperation with all military and civilian actors, and in particular private companies;
- k. to facilitate the exchange of good practices between Member States and partner countries and international organisations, notably the EU, which share the Alliance's commitment to democratic values and have acquired specific expertise in resilience-building, and to deepen their collaboration with them in this area:
- to draw lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic in the field of resilience, notably concerning the crisis response capacity of health infrastructures, and to transpose them into their policies for future crisis preparedness and response.

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# SUPPORTING NATO'S COMMITMENT TO STRONGER DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE TOWARDS 2030\*

RESOLUTION 467

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** the complex conventional, hybrid, and non-military challenges facing the Alliance from state and non-state actors, and **acknowledging** NATO's 360-degree approach to maintain a dynamic, credible, and effective defence and deterrence posture;

- 2. **Applauding** the important steps taken since 2014 to adapt and strengthen the Alliance's defence and deterrence posture to meet the challenges of the international security environment facing the Euro-Atlantic community, which have significantly improved force readiness, presence, and resilience across the Alliance;
- 3. **Welcoming** the decision to develop NATO's new Strategic Concept to reflect the range of complex security challenges facing NATO Allies today;
- 4. **Strongly condemning** Russia's increasingly aggressive foreign policy and, in particular, the illegal annexation and occupation of territories, backed by the continued expansion and modernisation of its conventional and nuclear forces, which is leading to dangerous brinkmanship along NATO's eastern borders and adjacent seas;
- 5. **Alarmed** by Russia's intensifying attempts to target NATO Allies and partners' critical infrastructure and democratic institutions via cyber-attacks and aggressive disinformation campaigns, and its provocative use of other malicious hybrid tactics in an attempt to disrupt and divide the Alliance;
- 6. **Concerned** that China's increasingly assertive behaviour, including its military ambitions in the cyber, space, and maritime domains, presents a systemic challenge to the rules-based international order, with potential security implications for NATO and its member states;
- 7. **Troubled** by the recent rapid expansion of China's nuclear arsenal and its growing number of land-based missiles, unsettling the global balance of nuclear deterrent forces;
- 8. **Vigilant** to the persistent threat terrorism poses to international security, and mindful of the evolving complex ways and means employed by terrorist and armed group networks;
- 9. **Echoing** Allies' stated determination at the June 2021 Summit to continue to strengthen NATO as the organising framework for the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, and **supporting** Allies' ongoing commitment to maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence;
- 10. **Encouraged** by the adoption of the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) and the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (CDD) as agreed in the NATO 2030 Agenda to further ensure the modernisation and readiness of Allied forces;

presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

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- 11. **Stressing** the importance of preserving the Alliance's technological edge to maintain a credible defence and deterrence posture as the character of conflict evolves, and, therefore, **encouraged** by the establishment of the civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) to foster transatlantic cooperation and investment for the development of emerging and disruptive technologies;
- 12. **Supporting** the establishment of a Space Centre of Excellence in France in recognition of the need to continue to ensure effective defence and deterrence across all operational domains;
- 13. **Recalling** Allies' continued commitment to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge to underwrite the Alliance's ongoing defence and deterrence adaptation and broader goals of the NATO 2030 Agenda;
- 14. **Reiterating** NATO's continued support for the Open Door policy, as stated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;
- 15. **URGES** member state governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to fully support the Alliance's renewed emphasis on deterrence and defence as NATO's principal core task, essential to the enduring transatlantic bond, and underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; and, to ensure the new Strategic Concept reflects this core principle;
- to continue to work collectively to ensure the Alliance maintains a dynamic and adaptable defence and deterrence posture based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, and reflecting the realities of the international security environment;
- c. to match the determined political will demonstrated at the June 2021 Summit with the resources necessary to maintain and reinforce the full suite of the Alliance's post-2014 initiatives, particularly via a continued commitment to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge;
- d. to guarantee the swift and effective implementation of the new decisions taken at the June 2021 Summit to enhance the Alliance's defence and deterrence posture, particularly the NWCC and the CDD as key instruments to streamline the modernisation and readiness of Allied forces;
- e. to inspire dynamic and cutting-edge defence innovation across the Alliance via investment in the civil-military DIANA, and through the active encouragement and financial sponsorship of meaningful cooperation between governments, the private sector, non-governmental actors, and academia;
- f. to sponsor Allied initiatives to strengthen NATO's position in cyberspace and space, particularly via support for the recently established Cyberspace Operations Centre and the Space Centre of Excellence;
- g. to continue to enhance NATO's role in the international community's fight against terrorism, particularly via the update of NATO's counter-terrorism action plan, which strengthens the Alliance's capacity to detect and prevent terrorism via important national and Allied investments at home, as well as enhance partner capacity building and operations abroad;
- h. to continue to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence posture by developing already existing cooperation with NATO aspirants;

- i. to remain committed to the dual-track approach as the main framework for NATO-Russia relations by ensuring a credible and dynamic deterrence posture against Russian aggression, while remaining open to meaningful dialogue, when possible;
- j. to work together to develop a comprehensive and joint transatlantic strategy towards China, ideally seeking cooperative engagement when possible, but also preparing to meet any challenges China's rise may pose to transatlantic security and the international rules-based order;
- k. to evaluate the progress achieved in the implementation of the NATO 2030 agenda related to deterrence and defence at the upcoming NATO Summits in Spain in 2022 and in Vilnius in 2023.

#### LEARNING THE LESSONS OF NATO'S ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN† RESOLUTION 468

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The Assembly,

- 1. **Honouring** the service and sacrifice of Allied, partner country, and Afghan personnel who served shoulder to shoulder over the past twenty years in Afghanistan;
- 2. **Paying tribute** to the Allied soldiers, the soldiers of partner countries, and civilian staff who ensured the safe evacuation of over 120,000 Allied citizens, partner country nationals, and at-risk Afghans from Kabul in August 2021;
- 3. **Supportive** of Allied and partner efforts to resettle eligible Afghan nationals who assisted NATO and Allied operations in Afghanistan;
- 4. **Recalling** the Allies' powerful demonstration of solidarity with the United States when NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first and only time in its history following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001;
- 5. **Underlining** that the UN-mandated NATO mission in Afghanistan followed the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, which were orchestrated from Afghanistan, and that, due to the effort and solidarity of over 50 nations, no terror attacks on Allied soil have been organised from Afghanistan since:
- 6. **Determined** to ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for global terrorism and to preserve the gains made to that end over the last twenty years;
- 7. **Highlighting** that NATO's presence in Afghanistan contributed to unprecedented political, economic, and social achievements for the Afghan people, especially for Afghan women and girls;
- 8. **Affirming** that any Afghan government must adhere to its international obligations; safeguard the human rights of all Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities; uphold the rule of law; allow unhindered humanitarian access; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for international terrorism;
- 9. **Troubled** by reports of arbitrary detentions, intimidation, and violence committed by the Taliban against the Afghan people;
- 10. **Deeply concerned** by the possibility of humanitarian crisis, civil war, an increase in crime, illegal migration, human and drug trafficking and regional destabilisation within and beyond Afghanistan;
- 11. **Stressing** that any Afghan government which fails to meet its international obligations risks deep international isolation;
- 12. **Acknowledging** that the collapse of Afghanistan's institutions raises questions which Allies must address together;

presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

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- 13. **Welcoming** an Allied commitment to learn lessons from their engagement in Afghanistan and **determined** to contribute actively to this process;
- 14. **Convinced** that the lessons drawn from NATO's engagement in Afghanistan are directly relevant to and must be reflected in NATO's next Strategic Concept;
- 15. **Confident that** NATO's next Strategic Concept will reflect the range of complex security threats facing the Alliance, particularly the challenge of international terrorism as it has evolved over the two decades since Allies first engaged in the country;
- 16. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to conduct a thorough, clear-eyed, and comprehensive assessment of the Alliance's 20-year engagement in Afghanistan;
- b. to incorporate lessons learned into NATO's new Strategic Concept and the broader NATO 2030 agenda, particularly lessons relating to political consultation, threat assessment, in-operation decision making and adaptation processes, intelligence, counterterrorism, partner training and capacity-building, anti-corruption, and counter-narcotics;
- c. to harness the NATO Parliamentary Assembly as a forum for open discussion on the Allied engagement in Afghanistan, where Allied lawmakers can debate difficult questions, agree on necessary lessons, and maintain cohesiveness while the Alliance undertakes next steps;
- d. to participate in the work of the international community aiming to pressure any Afghan government to respect its international obligations, using all diplomatic, political, and economic tools available to the Allies to ensure the new Afghan authorities forgo violence and reprisals; support an inclusive political process respecting the basic human rights of all Afghans and guarantee women's participation to political and civil life; prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for global terrorism; permit eligible Afghans and non-Afghans to leave the country safely if they wish, allow unfettered humanitarian access to Afghanistan and to take more responsibility for the refugee crisis and not to leave its heavy burden to neighbouring countries alone;
- e. to integrate the lessons learned into the reflection process in order to adapt the Alliance's counterterrorism approach to new strategic circumstances, engaging regional and international partners to ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for international terrorist organisations, but also to meet the challenge of international terrorism wherever it threatens Allied interests and populations;
- f. to cooperate actively with countries in the region and relevant organisations such as the UN and the EU to support Afghan refugees, mitigate the impact of the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and maintain regional stability;
- g. to increase efforts to prevent terrorism by supporting stability and the related development of security capabilities in regional partner countries, in order to avoid possible interactions with fundamentalist groups in the Mediterranean area.

### ALLIED DEFENCE SPENDING AND CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT\* RESOLUTION 469

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the COVID-19 pandemic and the global recession it triggered have placed significant pressures on Allied budgets;

- 2. **Noting** that allocating scarce resources constitutes a serious and enduring challenge for democratic governments and parliaments;
- 3. **Acknowledging** the legitimate concerns that Allied governments could be tempted to reduce defence spending to cover other pressing spending priorities;
- 4. **Observing** that the security landscape remains fraught with threats and risks that the pandemic and related economic crisis have only exacerbated;
- 5. **Recalling** that, even prior to the pandemic, Allied governments had identified a shared need to ensure that military spending and investment would be sufficient to meet both current and future security requirements;
- 6. **Reaffirming** that at the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies committed to allocate 2% of their GDP on defence and 20% of their respective defence budgets on major equipment, research, and development;
- 7. **Encouraged** that, since 2014, a number of Allies have achieved these spending and investment targets while others have made important progress and are on pace to fulfil them by 2024;
- 8. **Concerned**, however, that several Allied countries are not on track to meet spending and investment commitments by 2024 and that this could undermine the very solidarity that has made NATO so successful:
- 9. **Convinced** that defence spending remains a foundation of national security, a prerequisite for economic growth and, can foster job creation while generating technological advances with important commercial applications;
- 10. **Stressing** that sharp and sustained defence spending cuts would invariably weaken the defence industrial base, lead to permanent loss of human capital specialised in this sector, and thereby make it very difficult to ramp up future production when needed;
- 11. **Noting** that multinational capability development can help Allies increase their collective purchasing power, reduce costs, increase interoperability, and achieve capability targets;
- 12. **Applauding** the establishment of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) which will boost transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability and harness civilian innovation across Allied member states:

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<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

- 13. **Welcoming** an approach to European defence cooperation that would strengthen both the EU and NATO, while ensuring that NATO capabilities are neither duplicated nor diminished, and **underscoring** NATO's role as the preeminent transatlantic defence and security organisation;
- 14. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to ensure that all Allies meet the Defence Investment Pledge, most recently reaffirmed at the June 2021 NATO Summit, focusing not only on reaching the 2% spending benchmark, but also on capabilities' development and the benchmark to invest 20% of national defence budgets in procurement and research and development;
- b. to avail themselves of the NATO 2030 process and the development of the new NATO Strategic Concept to galvanise the political will needed to meet these core security commitments and to deepen cooperation in ways that enhance the efficient use of scarce defence resources:
- to undertake collective and national efforts to advance capabilities' development and long-term defence investment, in particular, to meet the capability targets agreed and allocated to individual Allies through the NATO Defence Planning Process;
- d. to strengthen efforts to achieve greater defence spending efficiencies thus minimising financial burdens while enhancing critically needed capabilities;
- e. to maintain procurement and defence investment budgets, which will ensure a functioning defence industrial base and future capabilities' development;
- f. to promote consolidation in highly stressed defence industries, at both the European and the trans-Atlantic levels, which would reduce costs, deepen interoperability, and foster greater defence integration across the Alliance;
- g. to encourage more open transatlantic defence markets;
- h. to complement the 2% spending benchmark with additional metrics, including outputs such as capabilities development and/or spending trends, which can help provide a more comprehensive picture of national and collective defence efforts.

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#### MAINTAINING NATO'S FOCUS ON THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE\* RESOLUTION 470

The Assembly,

- 1. **Stressing** that, in the context of the increasingly complex global strategic environment, the Russian Federation's aggressive actions continue to pose the most immediate threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
- 2. **Regretting** that, despite NATO's consistent efforts to engage with Russia, especially since the signing of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, currently relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community are at a new post-Cold War low, as a result of Moscow's aggressive actions and unacceptable violations of international laws and norms, which constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
- 3. **Noting** that the upcoming development of NATO's new Strategic Concept constitutes a timely opportunity to adjust the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's approach towards the continuous and evolving challenges posed by Russia;
- 4. **Reaffirming** the continued relevance of the dual-track approach based on strong defence and deterrence while remaining open to political dialogue towards Russia, **stressing** the focus on strong deterrence and defence and **underscoring** that until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, there can be no return to business as usual:
- 5. **Condemning** Russia's ongoing violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the illegal curtailing of the freedom of navigation to and from the Sea of Azov, as well as in the Black Sea, Russia's persistent efforts to destabilise these countries, to derail their European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration, and to incite reckless and irresponsible escalations;
- 6. **Expressing concern** about the grave human rights violations and ethnic discrimination against Georgians in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, **stressing** the necessity of implementation of the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement by the Russian Federation and **underlining** the right of internally displaced people and refugees to return to their homes:
- 7. **Applauding** the establishment of the Crimea Platform which aims to restore Ukraine's control over this territory in full accordance with international law, **emphasising** that the Euro-Atlantic community will never recognise the temporary occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea and **condemning** in the strongest terms the systematic human rights violations and the oppression of the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian communities in the peninsula;
- 8. **Cognisant** of Russia's current extensive military modernisation programme, including endeavours to develop new destabilising nuclear weapons, its military build-up and deployment of modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems along NATO's eastern flank, including in the illegally occupied Crimea, its deepening military integration with Belarus, its growing military co-operation with China and its military presence in the Arctic and the Middle East;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

- 9. **Deeply concerned** by Russia's actions that undermine the global arms control and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-proliferation regime, including its violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, its failure to fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, its selective implementation of the Vienna Document, and its failure to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;
- 10. **Disturbed** by the regular breaches of Allied airspace, aggressive behaviour towards Allied vessels exercising their right to freedom of navigation in the Black Sea as well as the conduct of large-scale, no-notice and snap exercises near the borders of NATO Allies and partners;
- 11. **Mindful** of the challenges to Euro-Atlantic security posed by hybrid warfare tools Russia employs in attempts to subvert Allies and partner nations, including cyberattacks, disinformation, the deployment of mercenaries, disruptive actions by Russian intelligence services, including targeted killings using prohibited chemical substances, the use of energy and corruption as foreign policy tools and the meddling in domestic political affairs, and **welcoming** the statement made by Allied leaders at the 2021 Brussels Summit that "in cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty";
- 12. **Denouncing** the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime, the systematic repressions against the remnants of democratic opposition, civil society and independent media, the absence of free elections and independent judiciary and the attempts to curtail internet freedom;
- 13. **Condemning** the illegal organisation and holding by Russia of the elections to the State Duma in the annexed Crimea as well as compelling Ukrainian citizens with illegally issued Russian passports to take part in these elections in the occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
- 14. **Further condemning** Russian support of brutal dictatorships across the world, including in Belarus, which is currently instrumentalising migration as a tool of hybrid warfare against NATO's eastern flank countries:
- 15. **Underscoring** the inalienable right of Russia's neighbours to choose their alliances, and **reiterating** its unwavering support for the NATO Open Door policy which no third country can veto;
- 16. **Welcoming** decisions of the Allied leaders at the 2021 Brussels Summit aimed at strengthening the Alliance's defence and deterrence vis-à-vis the threats emanating from Russia, and **praising** the effectiveness of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and tailored Forward Presence (tFP) as a demonstration of a common resolve to face security threats on the Alliance's eastern flank;
- 17. **Reaffirming** that the Alliance solely serves a purpose of defending its members and supporting its partners and does not seek confrontation with Russia;
- 18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- to clearly identify in the new NATO Strategic Concept that Russia's aggressive actions pose the most immediate threat to Euro-Atlantic security and NATO's shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
- to pursue a clear-eyed policy vis-à-vis Russia primarily based on strengthening the Allied defence and deterrence capabilities and societal resilience against threats posed by Russia, and remaining open to periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue, in line with NATO's dual-track approach;
- c. to implement the decisions taken at the 2021 Brussels Summit to further enhance the Alliance's defence and deterrence posture, including on the eastern flank, to consider holding

more frequent joint exercises, increasing rotational deployments and addressing capability gaps in the region, to consider using NATO's common funding to support eFP and tFP and to ensure, in co-operation with the EU, the effective implementation of military mobility projects to enable rapid reinforcement of NATO units on the eastern flank in case of crisis;

- d. to step up NATO's support for the efforts of Georgia and Ukraine to accelerate their process of Euro-Atlantic integration, to signal solidarity with Georgia and Ukraine through increased joint exercises and practical support to their ability to defend themselves, and to continue to denounce Russia's temporary occupation and illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, including in the NATO-Russia Council;
- e. to support the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Crimea Platform participants, issued in Kyiv, Ukraine, on 23 August 2021;
- f. to reinforce Allied resilience in the face of Russia's hybrid threats by further improving NATO's situational awareness and expanding its toolbox to counter these threats, including exchanging best practices of identifying and debunking Russian disinformation, mainstreaming responses to hybrid threats in joint exercise scenarios and enhancing collaboration with the private sector and the EU;
- g. to increase strategic awareness of new Russian foreign policy endeavours, such as its relations with China and its activities in the Middle East and Africa, which could affect the Euro-Atlantic security, by creating a designated unit within NATO's Joint Intelligence and Security Division to monitor these trends and share intelligence;
- h. to use every diplomatic and economic leverage, including the continued application of meaningful sanctions, to raise the cost for Russia's aggressive and destabilising behaviour and its violation of international law and human rights, and to promote the adoption of Magnitsky legislation across the Euro-Atlantic community and beyond in order to hold Russian officials and individuals accountable for human rights abuses and significant corruption;
- to address vulnerabilities stemming from dependency on Russian resources, including by demonstrating solidarity with Allies and strategic partners on projects affecting their energy security, and by redoubling efforts to implement ambitious climate agendas in Europe and North America;
- j. to keep current channels of communication with Russia open in order to prevent accidental escalation and, while being realistic about the prospects of genuine dialogue with the current regime, to explore avenues for dialogue in specific areas, including arms control, counter-terrorism, pandemic response and climate change, if it serves the Alliance's security interests;
- k. to build international pressure on Russia to immediately release all prisoners of conscience and to stop its assistance to political persecutions and human rights violations in Belarus, and to explore ways for individual Allies to support Russian civil society and those facing repression by the current regime for their political and civic activities.

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## REAFFIRMING TRANSATLANTIC COHESION AND IMPLEMENTING 2021 NATO BRUSSELS SUMMIT DECISIONS\*

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The Assembly,

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- 15. **Recognising** the ongoing profound changes in the global strategic environment, marked by the reignition of geopolitical competitions, the challenges to the rules-based global order posed by the Russian and Chinese authoritarian regimes, the increasing urgency of global threats such as climate change and pandemics, and the proliferation of emerging and disruptive technologies;
- 16. **Recognising** that the strong transatlantic bond between Europe and the United States and Canada remains the cornerstone of stability and security in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area;
- 17. *Highlighting* the significance of the 2021 Brussels Summit in revitalising the transatlantic bond and laying out a clear path for NATO's ongoing adaptation to this new strategic environment;
- 18. **Welcoming** in particular the greater emphasis placed at the Summit on shared democratic values, which constitute the foundation of NATO, along with shared security concerns, and distinguish it from other military alliances;
- 19. **Applauding** the endorsement by Allied Heads of State and Government at the Brussels Summit of the NATO 2030 agenda and its key lines of effort, including the development of NATO's new Strategic Concept;
- 20. **Recognising** that many of these priorities align with the Assembly's own recommendations and **grateful** to the NATO leadership for the active and fruitful engagement with the Assembly on NATO 2030:
- 21. **Emphasising** the important opportunity that the upcoming development of the new Strategic Concept offers to seal a new transatlantic strategy for the changing security environment, reaffirm the Alliance's democratic values, and bolster transatlantic unity, and **looking forward** to contributing to this process;
- 22. *Highlighting* in particular the Allied leaders' pledge to deepen and broaden political consultations in NATO;
- 23. **Paying tribute** to Allied and partner armed forces for their service and the sacrifices they made in Afghanistan since 2001, ensuring that Afghanistan did not serve as a terrorist safe haven and facilitating significant democratic, economic, and human rights achievements in the past 20 years;
- 24. **Recognising** that Russia's aggressive actions, both military and hybrid, including through proxies, increasingly threaten Euro-Atlantic security and contribute to instability along NATO borders and beyond;
- 25. **Recognising** that the rise of China is one of the most complex geopolitical shifts in generations that presents systemic challenges to the global rules-based order, but also brings opportunities to engage on areas of relevance to the Alliance;

<sup>\*</sup> presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

- 26. **Stressing** the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions for Euro-Atlantic security;
- 27. **Acknowledging** that NATO's adaptation to meet current and emerging challenges from all directions and across domains will require a further evolution of its deterrence and defence posture;
- 28. **Convinced** that meeting Allied level of ambition requires additional resources, both through national defence expenditure and NATO common funding;
- 29. **Commending** NATO and individual Allies for demonstrating solidarity and providing invaluable support with medical supplies and equipment to Allies and partners requiring assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic;
- 16. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to reassert, in the updated NATO Strategic Concept, the solidarity of the Alliance in the face of old and new threats, and to re-affirm the importance of North American political engagement and military presence in Europe, as well as the transatlantic commitment to the shared principles of democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law, which are enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty;
- b. to identify, building upon their agreement at the Brussels Summit, practical ways in which NATO can help promote and defend these shared democratic values, including by considering the Assembly's proposal to establish within NATO's institutional structure a centre on democratic resilience that would serve as a resource to monitor threats to democracy and assist Allies and partner nations, upon request, in strengthening their resilience to these threats;
- to specify and implement the Allies' ambitious decisions on enhanced political consultations and demonstrate political will to use NATO consultation mechanisms in an equally ambitious manner;
- to fully implement the decisions taken at the Brussels Summit to further reinforce and modernise the NATO Force Structure and develop the full range of forces and capabilities to meet current and future deterrence and defence needs;
- e. to take the necessary steps to enhance coherence between relevant national and NATO activities, plans and concepts, including those on deterrence, defence and future warfighting;
- f. to ensure the implementation of defence spending commitments in line with the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge, and to consider increasing the level of NATO common funding, which would send a strong political message of the Alliance's cohesion, resolve and commitment to partnerships;
- g. to continue investing in maintaining NATO's technological edge and make full use of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC);
- h. to strengthen strategic partnership with the EU, while respecting the organisations' different mandates and NATO's role as the bedrock of European security, and actively cooperate on military mobility, emerging and disruptive technologies, climate change and security, resilience and space security, as well as other areas of common interest, and to promote the fullest possible involvement of non-EU NATO Allies in the EU's defence-related initiatives;

- i. to continue holding Russia accountable for its ongoing and unacceptable violations of international law and norms and aggressive actions; as well as adopting necessary responses, including the application of sanctions, while remaining open to meaningful dialogue, when possible, in specific areas such as arms control;
- j. to develop a more comprehensive and joint Euro-Atlantic strategy on China, based on the growing convergence of European and North American views on China, enhancing the Alliance's preparedness to meet challenges posed by the rise of China, explicitly declaring unconditional solidarity with the Allies, which are under unprecedented pressure from China for their active support of human rights in China and countries in the East Asian region, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;
- k. to continue NATO and Allies' counterterrorism efforts, and update the NATO Counterterrorism Action Plan to take account of the evolving threat of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations;
- to continue efforts to ensure that NATO retains the ability to project stability, particularly by intensifying NATO's assistance and capacity-building support to partners in NATO's neighbourhood;
- m. to engage fully in the lessons learned process from the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan which NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed on 20 August 2021;
- n. to continue fully recognising and addressing the security implications of climate change;
- o. to deepen partnerships and forge new ones with countries and organisations around the world with shared values, including in the Asia-Pacific;
- p. to reaffirm their commitment to NATO's Open Door policy, and to step up support for Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and to help them accelerate their Euro-Atlantic integration;
- q. to continue considering the Mediterranean as an area of vital interest for the security of the Alliance, by strengthening support for the stability, defence and related development of security capabilities of partner countries, also in light of the challenges posed by the significant and increasing presence of China and Russia in the area;
- r. to continue enhancing and including in their actions the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

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#### REVIVING ARMS CONTROL IN A DYNAMIC STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT\* RESOLUTION 472

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the Alliance faces a volatile strategic environment, characterised by growing systemic competition and rapid technological change;

- 2. **Reaffirming** NATO's longstanding commitment to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation as reaffirmed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the 2021 Brussels Summit:
- 3. **Applauding** the agreement between the United States and Russia to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and open a Strategic Stability Dialogue;
- 4. **Deploring** Russia's non-compliance with other arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
- 5. **Concerned** by the rapid and unprecedented expansion of China's strategic nuclear arsenal, and, in light of this development, Beijing's refusal to engage in international arms control talks;
- 6. **Aware** that Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) can revolutionise future military capabilities, which may challenge existing international arms control frameworks and undermine strategic stability;
- 7. **Emphasising**, however, that EDTs may also render verification regimes more comprehensive and effective, thereby strengthening international arms control;
- 8. **Recalling** that, as space technology has advanced rapidly in recent decades, so too has the need for a more robust arms control framework preventing the weaponisation of space, especially the deployment of offensive weapons in space;
- 9. **Reiterating** Allies' policy to forgo offensive weapons in space, while **condemning** Russian and Chinese deployments of offensive weapons in space as a threat to global peace and security;
- 10. **Underscoring** that the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the threat of biological pathogens to global health and security while also raising awareness of the potential spectre of bioterrorism;
- 11. **Mindful** that rapid advances in the field of biotechnology make biotechnological tools and applications more accessible to the public, and could facilitate future acts of bioterrorism;
- 12. **Convinced** that in an uncertain strategic environment, arms control and collective defence and deterrence must go hand in hand and **welcoming** Allied support for further arms control negotiations with the aim of improving Alliance security, taking into account the prevailing international security environment;

Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 11 October 2021

- 13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to maintain a safe, secure, effective and survivable Allied nuclear deterrent that can effectively adapt to the rapid technological change taking place today;
- b. to work together to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which is the only credible path to nuclear disarmament.;
- to maintain pressure on Russia to uphold its commitments and international obligations to existing arms control frameworks while also encouraging Russia to work with Allies to strengthen the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention (BTWC);
- d. to engage Chinese leaders directly on the need for their participation in arms control by identifying the shared benefits that mutual, comprehensive, and verifiable arms control can provide for all parties;
- e. to encourage public debate regarding the benefits, objectives, and utility of international arms control;
- f. to enhance the use of NATO as an important platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on international arms control efforts between all 30 member states, with the aim of jointly crafting comprehensive, coherent, and united positions for future arms control negotiations that will improve the security of the Alliance;
- g. to jointly explore preliminary rules-of-the-road, standards, and norms governing the global deployment of EDTs in military systems in order to preserve strategic stability in the future;
- h. to evaluate how parties can best mobilise EDTs to enhance arms control verification mechanisms, making arms control increasingly robust, comprehensive, and effective;
- i. to increase funding for Allied research and development (R&D) of EDTs especially the seven EDTs<sup>\*\*</sup> identified in NATO's "Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies" to maintain NATO's technological edge;
- to support initiatives to enhance safety and security in outer space, which can contribute to the development of a new arms control framework that could prevent the weaponisation of space and build directly upon the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which remains the foundation on which space arms control rests;
- k. to increase awareness of both the spectre of biological threats and the importance of biodefence with national parliaments and the public;
- I. to evaluate closely if and how measures to detect and prevent the proliferation of dual-use biological materials and equipment can be improved, and
- m. to strengthen the international regulatory framework for biodefence by providing more support for the BWTC and implementation Support Unit, which is woefully underfunded and understaffed, and explore opportunities for the adoption of an effective verification protocol whose aim would be to monitor and assess the compliance with the Convention.

Artificial intelligence (AI), data and computing, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancements, hypersonic technologies, and space