DECLARATION¹
CONFRONTING RUSSIA’S THREAT

The Assembly,

1. **Condemning**, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war of choice against Ukraine and the horrific war crimes for which it must be held accountable;

2. **Underlining** that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and other recent aggressive actions, rhetoric and ultimatums fit into a pattern of persistent violations of its international commitments and systematic attempts to undermine democracies, to upend the European security order and to destroy the international rules-based order;

3. **Condemning** Russia’s ongoing illegal occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, the systematic human rights violations in occupied territories and the persistent efforts to destabilise these countries and derail their European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration;

4. **Stressing** that Russia’s aggressive actions, grounded in revisionist policies and backed by extensive military modernisation, constitute the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security;

5. **Recognising** that Russia’s renewed, full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a new strategic reality which NATO Allies confront;

6. **Stressing** that Russia’s recent actions confirm the relevance and timeliness of the Assembly’s two key priorities for NATO’s new Strategic Concept – reaffirming the Alliance’s shared democratic values and core principles and adapting NATO to a radically altered security environment;

7. **Stating unequivocally** that Russia has turned its back on the core principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act;

8. **Reaffirming** that NATO, as a defensive alliance, is not seeking confrontation with Russia;

9. **Declaring absolute** the NATO Allies’ commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and **making clear** that Allies will take all necessary measures to deter and defend every inch of NATO territory and across the entire spectrum of Russia’s threats to transatlantic security;

10. **Acknowledging** that, while NATO has consistently affirmed its openness to meaningful dialogue, Russia’s own actions currently make such dialogue impossible;

11. **Cognisant** of Russia’s growing military co-operation with China and **troubled** by the 2022 Russia-China Joint Statement, in which the countries challenge the rules-based international order and where China, for the first time, echoes Russian opposition to the right of all nations to choose their own path;

¹ Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Monday 30 May 2022.
12. **Welcoming** the submission by Finland and Sweden of their application to join the Alliance, and **denouncing** the threats directed against those NATO partners;

13. **Applauding** the unity and resolve of Allies and their key partners, including NATO’s primary partner the European Union, in the face of Russian aggression, the practical and political support provided to Ukraine and other partners and the swift and necessary measures taken by the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture;

14. **Aware of** the multiplication of cyber threats and disinformation operations for political purposes carried out by Russia;

15. **Stressing** that continued Allied unity and resolve, guided by shared democratic values, is fundamental to meeting Russia’s threats;

16. **URGES** Allied Heads of State and Government when they meet in Madrid:

a. to reaffirm all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s war, as recommended in the Assembly’s declaration on **Standing With Ukraine** [111 SESP rev.1 fin];

b. to clearly identify Russia’s malign revisionism and aggressive actions as the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security in NATO’s new Strategic Concept;

c. to continue to significantly strengthen and adapt the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture across the full spectrum of military power, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities;

d. to swiftly move to a “forward defence” posture, especially through the permanent deployment of troops and equipment along NATO’s Eastern flank, improving command and control structures and increasing military preparedness;

e. to reaffirm and meet the 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety and to enshrine the 2%/20% guidelines of the Pledge as a minimum commitment for the long term;

f. to refine concepts for deterring and defending below the Article 5 threshold, through a combination of political and military tools;

g. to step up efforts to decisively and forcefully tackle Russia’s cyber threats and their consequences, including disinformation;

h. to assess and address the implications of Russia-China co-operation for Euro-Atlantic security;

i. to keep channels for diplomacy, de-confliction, de-escalation and arms control open with Russia to avoid unintended escalation, misunderstanding or miscalculation;

j. to support one another in bolstering transatlantic energy security and independence by diversifying energy sources, considering new routes and phasing out coal, gas, oil and uranium imports from Russia;

k. to ensure effective information exchange on potential further Russian aggressive actions beyond Ukraine and its attempts to expand its influence in key regions, from the Black Sea to the Western Balkans and the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood, including through mercenaries like the Wagner Group;
l. to step up political and practical, including military, support for other NATO aspirants and partners subject to Russian pressure and attempted intimidation, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;

m. to reaffirm the Open Door policy which no third country can veto;

n. to continue working closely with the European Union and other key partners in addressing Russia’s threat;

o. to place shared democratic values at the heart of NATO’s response to Russia’s threats, including through the establishment, within NATO, of a Democratic Resilience Centre to serve as a resource and a clearinghouse of best practices and cross-fertilisation on democratic benchmarks available to member, partner and aspirant states.

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2 i.e. prevent or challenge