



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUMMARY

of the meeting of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security

*Sala N Iorga, The Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies)
Bucharest, Romania*

Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017

ATTENDANCE LIST

Committee Chairperson	Vitalino CANAS (Portugal)
General Rapporteur	Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM (France)
Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance Rapporteur	Jane CORDY (Canada)
Special Rapporteur	Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany)
President of the NATO PA	Paolo ALLI (Italy)
Secretary General of the NATO PA	David HOBBS
Member delegations	
Belgium	Georges DALLEMAGNE Brigitte GROUWELS Sébastien PIRLOT Alain TOP Luk VAN BIESEN Veli YÜKSEL
Bulgaria	Spas PANCHEV
Canada	Marc SERRÉ
Croatia	Nenad STAZIC
Czech Republic	Tomas JIRSA
France	Anissa KHEDHER Joaquim PUEYO
Germany	Anita SCHÄFER
Hungary	Sandor FONT
Italy	Bruno CENSORE Emilio FLORIS Luca FRUSONE Domenico SCILIPOTI ISGRO Luciano URAS
Latvia	Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS
Lithuania	Dainius GAIZAUSKAS
Luxembourg	Alexander KRIEPS
Montenegro	Genci NIMANBEGU
Netherlands	Marjolein FABER Raymond KNOPS Maria MARTENS Rigmor AASRUD
Norway	Pawel BEJDA
Poland	Angel TILVAR
Romania	Anton HRNKO
Slovakia	Jasna MURGEL
Slovenia	Matej TONIN
Spain	Ana Maria BOTELLA
Turkey	Ziya PIR Zehra TASKESENLIOGLU
United Kingdom	Mary CREAGH Lord JOPLING
United States	Gerald CONNOLLY Thomas MARINO

Associate delegations

Armenia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Finland

Georgia

Republic of Moldova

Serbia

Sweden

Switzerland

Ukraine

Linda SANCHEZ

Suren MANUKYAN

Edmon MARUKYAN

Koryun NAHAPETYAN

Hubert FUCHS

Anton HEINZL

Kamran BAYRAMOV

Nikola LOVRINOVIC

Asim SARAJLIC

Eero HEINALUOMA

Tom PACKALEN

Mikko SAVOLA

Irakli BERAIA

Irakli SESIASHVILI

Mihail GHIMPU

Vladimir DJUKANOVIC

Göran PETTERSSON

Isidor BAUMANN

Chantel GALLADÉ

Werner SALZMANN

Yurii BEREZA

Iryna FRIZ

Serhiy LARIN

Oksana YURYNETS

**Regional Partner and Mediterranean
Associate Member Delegation**

Morocco

Mohammed AZRI

Youssef GHARBI

Parliamentary Observers

Australia

Kazakhstan

Palestinian National Council

Republic of Korea

Ross HART

Yersultan BEKTURGANOV

Abdelrahim BARHAM

Mohammed HEGAZI

Sang Don LEE

Jong-Kul LEE

Speakers

Ambassador Sergiu CELAC

Member of the Scientific Council of the New
Strategy Center

Salam KAWAKIBI

Deputy Director, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)

Mark GALEOTTI

Senior Researcher and Coordinator, Centre for
European Security, Institute of International
Relations Prague

Theresa FALLON

Director, Centre for Russia, Europe, Asia Studies
(CREAS)

International Secretariat

Andrius AVIZIUS, Director

Ceylan TACI, Coordinator

Joseph SADEK, Research Assistant

Saturday 7 October 2017

I. Opening remarks by Vitalino CANAS (Portugal), Chairperson

1. In his opening remarks, **Chairman Vitalino Canas** (PT) welcomed Committee members and new colleagues to Bucharest. He then thanked the Romanian delegation for their outstanding job in preparing for and hosting the 2017 annual session. The chairman noted four administrative points: the procedure for the committee's question and answer session; a reminder for red badge wearers to sign the attendance register; the session's official hashtag (i.e., #natopabucharest); and for delegates to safeguard their documents.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [156 CDS 17 E]

2. **The draft Agenda [156 CDS 17 E] was adopted.**

III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security held in Tbilisi, Georgia, on Saturday 27 May 2017 [144 CDS 17 E]

3. **The summary [144 CDS 17 E] was adopted.**

IV. Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolutions on *Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region* [219 CDS 17 E] and *Confronting the Weaponisation of Information* [215 CDS 17 E]

4. Chairman Canas identified the two resolutions for the delegates and reminded them that the procedure for submitting amendments would be posted in the committee room. He also noted the deadline to submit amendments would be by 10:30 on Saturday 7 October 2017 and that only amendments submitted and signed by the Committee Secretary would be acceptable.

V. Panel discussion on *Political and Security Developments in the Black Sea Region*

- **Presentation by Ambassador Sergiu CELAC, Member of the Scientific Council of the New Strategy Center, on *The Romanian Perspective on the Black Sea Security and Stability***

5. **Ambassador Sergiu Celac's** remarks gave a strategic overview of the Black Sea Region, which he discussed in the context of NATO's broader eastern flank. Romania's commitment to NATO is two-tiered—that the security of each member-state is the concern of all the others and that national security begins at home. It is for this reason that the Ambassador stressed the importance of NATO member states to invest in their own national security and why he regarded the Wales Summit pledges so important. The Speaker stressed Romania's commitment to the NATO pledges and its defence as well as the European defence initiatives. The Ambassador contended that the current security environment requires Romania's active participation across the NATO alliance, from the Baltic Sea to Romania's north to the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea to Romania's south. The ambassador emphasised that both the Romanian government and the general public is supportive of both European and American pillars of NATO. The argument that one must choose between the two is a false choice.

6. The Speaker's second point focused on Russia's negative role in militarising the region and destabilising the Republic of Moldova. The provocations in Transnistria are consistent with Russian actions in Georgia, Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Syria. The ambassador called this familiar pattern an attempt by Russia to change the facts on the ground and seek a semblance of legalistic cover for its geopolitical gains. It was his belief that the issue of the Republic of Moldova's sovereignty over

Transnistria was of immediate relevance to transatlantic security in military terms. The Speaker reminded everyone that the military build-up and undermining of Moldovan sovereignty was both destabilising and perceived as a national security threat by the Ukrainian and Romanian governments. Finally, the militarisation of the Black Sea Region and the deployment of A2/AD anti-access (area denial) capabilities in Crimea were a threat to NATO.

7. The Ambassador's remarks concluded with a final point on the prospects for regional cooperation. The current situation of brinkmanship in the Black Sea Region could not endure for much longer. And, although multi-lateral institutions in the Black Sea Region have all been undermined by geopolitical prerogatives, Ambassador Celac believed that these organisations remain important and need to be kept alive. Even with reduced expectations, democratic/multi-lateral institutions would be useful when the political environment improves.

- **Consideration of the draft Special Report *Advancing Stability in the Black Sea Region* [159 CDS 17 E] by Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany), Special Rapporteur, followed by a discussion**

8. **Ulla Schmidt** (DE) presented her report and stressed that it would focus on the littoral states of the Black Sea and that suggestions to expand the scope of the report would have to wait for a future report on the topic. The main message of this report was that one cannot talk about the Black Sea Region in purely military terms. This region is extremely diverse and of its six littoral states, two are EU members, three are NATO members, and two are close partners of our Alliance. And then, of course, there is Russia, which is obviously a major, albeit difficult neighbour. It is also a strategic region, which brings together Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The Black Sea is a major energy hub and a major trade corridor. It is also a touristic hub.

9. The special Rapporteur stressed that violations of territorial sovereignty are disconcerting and NATO must not sit back idly; however, the Alliance's response must go beyond military reassurance measures. The Euro-Atlantic community should place a greater emphasis on civilian measures, designed to increase trade, travel and people-to-people contacts among the Black Sea states. Regional co-operation should be revitalised under the ownership of the Black Sea states themselves. The EU as a soft power and an economic player has an important role to play in assisting the region's development.

10. The report listed common interests of all littoral states: environmental preservation; fighting human trafficking and organised crime; the promotion of tourism and economic growth. The draft report also addressed democratic backsliding and the erosion of human rights, media freedom and the rule of law in some parts of the Black Sea area, issues that are central to the work of our Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security.

11. The special Rapporteur concluded with optimism for the Black Sea Region while cognisant of the support it needs to thrive, which can only be accomplished through integration and dialogue.

12. Both **Zehra Taskesenlioglu** (TR) and **Irakli Sesiashvili** (GE) disagreed with some of the assessments in the report on democratic backsliding among the Black Sea littoral states. The two delegates also expressed concern for certain language and terminology used in the report. Additionally, Ms Taskesenlioglu mentioned that, contrary to the report's findings, cooperation in the Black Sea Region continues. **Iryna Friz** (UA) underlined the aggressive actions, both cyber and kinetic, taken by Russia in the region to undermine Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty. The next intervention came from **Angel Tilvar** (RO) who sought to ensure that the CDS committee's Black Sea resolution reflected the common objectives of NATO in the Black Sea Region, including a maritime presence in the region. Finally, **Mihai Ghimpu** (MD) expressed his dissatisfaction with the 5+2 format for peace in Transnistria and that a better solution would be to unite the Moldovan and Romanian Republics.

13. Ms Schmidt first clarified that nowhere in the report does it say that cooperation in the Black Sea Region failed or was failing, but it was certainly challenged. With regard to the aftermath of the July 2016 coup in Turkey, the Rapporteur stressed that any response should be consistent with the NATO values of democracy and transparency. Ambassador Celac added that Turkey has for a long time played a facilitating role in leading cooperation in the Black Sea Region. The Ambassador highlighted Ms Friz's intervention, stating that Russia's actions were unacceptable, and described the dire situation in the region.

14. The Chairman requested adoption of the report. **The draft report [159 CDS 17 E] was adopted**, with the Turkish representatives voting against the adoption.

VI. Panel discussion on The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria and Iraq

- **Consideration of the draft General Report *The War in Syria and Iraq: Humanitarian Aspects* [157 CDS 17 E] by Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM (France), General Rapporteur**

15. **Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam** (FR) began by stating that the wars in Syria and Iraq are the biggest crisis in recent history especially in Mosul, Deir ez Zour, and Raqqa. While Daesh* has withdrawn and its territorial (90% territorial loss in Iraq and 65% in Syria) and financial strength is diminishing, the root causes of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq were still to be addressed. NATO contributions have been successful by providing AWACS and advisers to Iraqi soldiers. The Alliance must maintain its support to the Iraqi government. Though NATO does not have a combat mission in Syria and Iraq, it must maintain its commitment to the global coalition there. The Alliance must also support commitments to ceasefires as they are negotiated and work with the UN roadmap to find a political resolution to the conflict. The Rapporteur emphasised that if the humanitarian situation continues to worsen, the Alliance must consider contributing to the establishment of security zones and air exclusion zones. NATO must also continue to train Iraqi troops to combat terrorism.

16. The Rapporteur also stressed that the Syrian populations have been victim to human rights violations and war crimes and that these crimes must not be left unpunished. Ms Garriaud-Maylam cited that UN efforts continue to be underfunded. The deficit has an effect on emergency assistance and it has impacted Syria's neighbours who have taken in over 5 million refugees. The Rapporteur encouraged the delegates to increase their support to the region.

17. The Rapporteur reminded the delegates that although Europe was struggling to face migrant challenges, only 8% of refugees have been relocated. She urged that European countries must uphold the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal. Beyond the humanitarian crisis, the Euro-Atlantic community must reinforce its borders in a collective way.

18. Given ethnic and religious groups, the future of Syria and Iraq remains uncertain. One thing is certain; the commitment of the Alliance must not weaken to confront these political and humanitarian issues.

- **Presentation by Salam KAWAKIBI, Deputy Director, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), on *In Syria: Enticing Reconstruction and Burying Democracy*, followed by a discussion**

19. **Salam Kawakibi** began his presentation with his pessimism about the situation in Syria, differentiating it from the decade of conflict in Iraq. The violence in Syria and the emergence of radical groups only developed three years after a peaceful revolution. The Speaker expressed his frustration over seven years of advocacy for human rights. Based on his experience with the Friends of Syria, a coalition of 126 nations which supported the popular revolution in Syria, little was ever achieved at their global summits. The result of global inaction has been the alarming civilian death toll and destruction

* Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria"

of Syrian infrastructure. The Speaker wanted to be very clear that the destruction in Syria is being led by the Assad regime in a war against its people. Similarly, the rise of violent religious radical groups could be attributed to Assad's military campaign.

20. The Speaker gave his thoughts on the negotiations in Geneva and Astana. He stated that the Geneva negotiations are ineffective because the climate in Syria is not ripe for negotiations. This was due to the current situation where Russia and the Assad regime have no incentive to make concessions because they believe they are winning.

21. The Speaker cited the historical repression of the Assad regime, specifically the massacre in Hama, Syria, in the 1980s. Based on the historic violence of the regime, repression will unlikely stop unless there is a major change in Syria and engagement with its ally Russia. The Russians have well-known strategic interests inside Syria that can be leveraged. Iran, on the other hand, is more ideological and their preferences will be different than Russia's.

22. While Syrians wait for the realities on the ground to change, the Speaker stated, Syrians have been pursuing several governance projects to decentralise the state and governance. They have been practicing democracy. For example, there are local councils in non-war zones, where there is a strong female representation. The Speaker reminded the delegates that Syrians are preparing for democratic governance.

23. Zehra Taskesenlioglu emphasised the importance of the international community to carry a fair share of the burden in giving asylum to refugees and migrants. **Mary Creagh** (UK) followed Mr Kawakibi's intervention noting that a coherent European policy on Syria has yet to develop. Ms Creagh went on to make two comments: first she describes the war economy that has developed in Syria and secondly, the ineffective nature of de-escalation zones. The ongoing conflict, she warned, would lead to youth radicalisation in Syria. **Mohammed Hegazi** (PNC) restated the dire humanitarian situation in Syria. Specifically, he asked how Syrians can be reintegrated into the areas from which they left and were under the control of Daesh. **Koryun Nahapetyan** (AM) also wanted to know what concrete efforts the Alliance could take to get vital aid to those in need in Syria, with special mention of the Armenian communities.

24. The Rapporteur agreed with Ms Taskesenlioglu and thanked Syria's neighbours for hosting Syrian refugees and called for other countries in the region and in Europe to step up their support to all victims in the conflict. Ms Garriaud-Maylam also re-emphasised the importance of the Euro-Atlantic community to address governance in Syria and to confront radicalisation at home and abroad. Mr Kawakibi highlighted Mr Nahapetyan's concerns stating that there are many areas in Syria, including Idlib, where the regime is restricting the access for aid to civilians. The Speaker warned that this will radicalise people even further.

25. The chairman requested adoption of the report. **The draft report [157 CDS 17 E] was adopted.**

VII. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance *Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications* [158 CDS DG 17 E] by Jane CORDY (Canada), Rapporteur

26. **Jane Cordy** (CA) began by stating that the social media revolution has touched nearly all aspects of daily life across the globe. Social media networks have facilitated dialogue among individuals and communities and have made communication with other people easier and less costly. Ms Cordy cited that there are almost 3 billion active social media users today worldwide. This number is growing at the rate of about 20% a year.

27. The Rapporteur noted that social media's impact on societies at large has produced significant consequences for governments both inside and outside our Alliance and she cited several examples. She warned that social media does not necessarily cultivate productive discourse, nor does it necessarily strengthen democratic institutions. The way these networks' algorithms distribute content increases political polarisation. Social media, the Rapporteur argued, has also been weaponised by state and non-state actors. The report listed some of the ways social media is weaponised, including intelligence collection, psychological warfare and even command and control activities. Among non-state actors, Daesh is the most capable group in its use of social media. The group has shown remarkable skills in utilising networks to spread its ideology, recruit members, raise funds, share instructions and publicise its brutality.

28. The Rapporteur claimed that the pattern of Russian operations on social media suggests an effort to subvert democratic governance, interfere in the sovereign affairs of states and attack the reputation of the Alliance. Importantly, NATO had already begun addressing the challenges posed by Russia's malign use of social media. However, despite the actions taken so far, the Rapporteur urged the delegates that more needs to be done both by national governments and the private sector.

29. The report contained several recommendations that are reflected in a draft resolution on countering the weaponisation of information. Ms Cordy concluded by emphasising that the Alliance had the difficult task to both protect our democracies from subversive forces and maintain an open internet. She believed it is possible to strike a balance between protecting member-states' institutions and maintaining robust discourse online and offline that strengthens our values and is consistent with Alliance principles.

30. **Mikko Savola** (FI) asked the first question on how societies should educate their citizens to filter real and fake news. Mary Creagh and Iryna Friz mentioned the harmful effects they have witnessed in their own countries of both domestic and international information warfare and cyberbullying. **Veli Yuksel** (BE) asked how the alliance can balance the freedom of speech with regulating speech online and whether this should be the task of legislators or private companies. Zehra Taskesenlioglu identified an issue she had with paragraph 9 of the report regarding the Gezi park demonstrations. Finally, **Marc Serré** (CA) asked if the Rapporteur has looked at how our private information is shared with these companies and then shared through social media and how fake news is disseminated, and how trolls and bots generate information.

31. Ms Cordy echoed Mr Savola, Ms Creagh and Ms Friz's words that education was extremely important and that cyber bullying needed to be addressed across the Alliance. She then clarified the text for the Turkish delegate, noting that Turkey was not being singled out and that the report also discussed similar developments in other allied states. The Rapporteur gave due concern to Mr Serré's point that Parliamentarians need to better understand social media companies' data collection methods.

32. **The draft report [158 CDS 17 E] was adopted.**

VIII. Presentation by Mark GALEOTTI, Senior Researcher and Coordinator, Centre for European Security, Institute of International Relations Prague, on *Russian Information Warfare*, followed by a discussion

33. **Mark Galeotti** gave a holistic perspective on Russian information and hybrid warfare. Firstly, he explained that the Russian Federation thought about information warfare differently from NATO members or the 'West.' Russian hybrid warfare involves everything from information warfare to financial hacking. The broader term in Russia is political warfare. Galeotti explained that while Western countries silo these topics into different issue areas, the Russians nest business corruption, state espionage, and other hybrid tactics into a broad doctrine.

34. Mr Galeotti explained that the aim of this doctrine is threefold: to divide the Alliance, to distract it from Russian strategic issues, and to scare the Alliance into believing the hybrid threat is greater than it actually is. Mr Galeotti then began to discuss the Russian Federation and its President's strategic priorities. While the Speaker did not believe that President Putin harbours territorial ambitions on "NATO Europe" Putin does want to have control of the future of post-Soviet states. The Russian President knows very well how to play up his country's strengths, claimed Mr Galeotti. Though Russia has little soft power, it mobilises its strengths against what Mr Putin views are the Alliance's weaknesses-democratic institutions. Russia continues to use its hybrid tools to exploit the Alliance's legitimate disagreements and does it through the Alliance's own free press.

35. The Speaker concluded with two final points. First, members of the NATO alliance have to recognise that information warfare in and of itself has little impact. The reason there has been an impact is because Russian information actors are magnifying tensions that already exist within the Alliance. All the Russians are providing is a little extra leverage to existing issues. Second, Russian leadership is very happy the Alliance is talking so much about information warfare because it makes them seem more powerful. While the Alliance has a notion of how much it should spend on kinetic/traditional threats, the Alliance is lagging in solidarity on counter-intelligence issues.

36. With regard to the need for solidarity and the urgency of addressing Russia's malign influence, **Anna Fotyga** (EP) and Iryna Friz agreed with the Speaker. Chairman Canas asked to what extent is Russia exporting organised crime as a foreign policy weapon. Mr Galeotti responded, stating that Russia does not export corruption broadly, but that its agents exploit corruption uniquely in every country. Rather than low-level crime, Russian organised crime tends to be a more sophisticated operation. For better or worse, the Russian state can be understood as a "hub and spoke", mobilisation state, whereby the hierarchy and success of one's business depends on what that enterprise can do for the state, at home or abroad.

37. Mark Galeotti concluded his remarks discussing ways in which the Alliance can address the asymmetric quality of media organisation. Mr Galeotti believed that a norms-based approach for media organisations would be helpful. If any media producer can be an accredited news media organisation then it affects the quality of the industry. Rather, a set of guidelines should define news media organisations.

Sunday 8 October 2017

IX. Presentation by Theresa FALLON, Director, Centre for Russia, Europe, Asia Studies, on *Instability Risks in East Asia*, followed by a discussion

38. **Theresa Fallon** began her presentation with North Korea's (DPRK) nuclear and ballistic missile tests. She pointed out that the most recent test in September 2017, the sixth of its kind this year, sparked increased rhetoric between the United States and the DPRK's leader Kim Jung-Un. Despite the rhetoric from the US administration, it is unclear what changes have been made to US strategy in East Asia. Ms Fallon reminded the delegates of the situation's relevance for the global community as the DPRK is geographically situated to strike many NATO members and partners with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) capabilities. Ms Fallon also discusses China and Russia's increased role in the crisis.

39. Next, the Speaker discussed the challenges in the South China Sea. In an effort to subvert the International Court of Justice and change the facts on the ground, the Chinese state has engaged in land reclamation to create islands as well as recruit a "maritime militia" to assert its influence and threaten Japanese ships in the region. The tactics used in the South China Sea are also being replicated in the East China Sea where confrontation with Japan is well-documented.

40. The third topic Ms Fallon discussed was militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Specifically, her presentation focused on the Philippines and the Duterte regime. The Speaker cited that fighting is ongoing in the area of Marawi and insurgents from the Middle East and central Asia are flocking to the region. Ms Fallon acutely noted that this will have an effect on China's One Belt, One Road initiative—so the Chinese state may have a stake in addressing the situation there.

41. The Speaker concluded that the future prospects in the region look unclear because analysts are unsure what the US administration's strategy is in East Asia and because of the unpredictability of the Trump Kim Jong-Un relationship.

42. **Jong-Kul Lee** (KR) expressed his grave concern for the security situation on the Korean peninsula considering the DPRK's most recent tests. Mr Lee extended his gratitude to NATO's active support to stop the DPRK's nuclear ambitions.

43. Chairman Canas and **Andrew Laming** (AU) asked about China and Russia's role in the region. Specifically, Russia's growing relationship with the DPRK and China's undemocratic tendencies in Hong Kong and throughout Southeast Asia. **Lord Jopling** (UK) asked whether there might be renewed interest in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Ms Taskesenlioglu brought attention to the human rights violations against Myanmar's Rohingya population.

X. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft *Resolution Confronting the Weaponisation of Information* [215 CDS 17 E] by Jane CORDY (Canada), Rapporteur

44. Ms Cordy remarked that the draft resolution presented encapsulates the main findings of the Sub-Committee report and builds on several briefings that our Committee members received in recent years on the challenges of the cyber revolution.

45. The Rapporteur stressed that steps need to be taken by the governments of the member states to adapt to the challenges of the Information Age. In particular, the draft resolution recommended designating specific institutions responsible for identifying disinformation attacks and countering them with facts. The resolution recommended that the Alliance must continue applying restrictive measures, such as removal of the extremist content and blacklisting of the most active disinformation warriors.

46. Specifically, the Alliances' armed forces will need to adapt faster and to incorporate social media aspects in the training and exercises of their personnel and build in the capacity to: utilise social media at every level of command; improve the exchange of best practices for protecting the electoral process; establish robust partnership with media companies to enhance their capabilities dedicated to taking down unlawful content and developing fact checking software; invest more in educating citizens and developing their digital competencies and critical thinking, so that they would be able to recognise the use of 'trolls' and 'bots'. Finally, while countering these challenges, the Rapporteur urges everyone to be mindful of and faithful to the principles of openness, pluralism and inclusion that underpin the NATO Alliance.

47. The Chairman had two amendments to review. The French delegation's amendment sought to insert the phrase, "to the respect for fundamental freedoms" into the resolution's first paragraph. The German delegation suggested including a reference to the Western Balkans. **The draft resolution [215 CDS 17 E], as amended, was adopted.**

XI. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft *Resolution on Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region* [219 CDS 17 E] by Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany), Special Rapporteur

48. Ms Ulla Schmidt presented the draft resolution on the Black Sea. This resolution highlighted the importance of the Black Sea for the Euro-Atlantic community and the support for our Allies and partners in the region. The Rapporteur reiterated the Alliance's vision for a democratic and conflict-free Black Sea Region; however, challenges remained to democracy, continued violations of sovereignty, and an increasingly tense maritime security situation hindered regional stability and cooperation initiatives. The special Rapporteur cited Russian military build-up and violation of Ukrainian and Georgian territorial integrity, which demand a firm, proportionate and prudent response.

49. The Rapporteur called for all parties to continue looking for ways to reignite inclusive regional cooperation in order to reduce tensions, foster regional stability and facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts. Further she encourages all NATO Allies, along with the European Union, to strengthen engagement in the region. Finally, she urged that the Alliance should also make explicit its commitment to upholding international laws that govern the Black Sea.

50. The resolution was purposed to demonstrate broad and enduring support for all democratic reforms and anti-corruption efforts in the Black Sea. It is the task of the Alliance to speak out against and hold everyone accountable for democratic backsliding and to promote media freedom and good governance throughout the Euro-Atlantic space. Political stability, restoration of sovereignty, and human rights and democracy in the Black Sea are integral to Euro-Atlantic security.

51. A great number of amendments were submitted by the Azerbaijani, Georgian, Moldovan, Romanian and Turkish delegations. To speed up the proceedings, the Romanian and Georgian delegations withdrew several less essential amendments they initially proposed. The majority of amendments were related to highlighting the role of Alliance in the Black Sea and the importance of supporting Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. With few exceptions, the amendments were adopted unanimously. The rejected amendments included the Turkish proposal to limit the points regarding democratic developments to non-NATO member states in the region. The amendments by the Azerbaijani and Moldovan delegation to broaden the scope of the resolution were also rejected.

52. **The draft resolution [219 CDS 17 E], as amended, was adopted.** The Turkish representatives expressed their disagreement with parts of the resolution.

XII. Summary of the future activities of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance

53. The Chairman thanked the UK delegation for hosting the Sub-Committee's visits to London and York. He also thanked the delegates for their attendance at the September joint Sub-Committee visit to Philadelphia and Carlisle. The Chairman gave special mention to Lord Jopling for chairing the visit's panels.

54. The Chairman reminded the Committee that there will be an upcoming visit to Kuwait from 13-15 November and that delegates are encouraged to register as soon as possible. The visit to Kuwait would include a visit to the NATO-Kuwait ICI Regional Center and topics of the visit will include Euro-Atlantic cooperation with Kuwait and the Gulf region among others. In 2018, the committee and sub-committee are slated to visit Qatar, a Nordic country (either Iceland or Norway), Prague and Budapest.

55. Next, the Committee discussed report topics for 2018. First, the newly elected General Rapporteur Ulla Schmidt would continue her reporting on the developments in the Black Sea Region with special attention to democracy, human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption. The Sub-Committee's report would cover a new topic: search and rescue capabilities in the Euro-Atlantic area. The relevance of search and rescue capabilities was especially relevant to two regions touching

the Euro-Atlantic community: the High North and the Mediterranean Sea. Thirdly, the CDS special report for 2018 will likely focus on the challenges of hybrid warfare, particularly with regard to Russia's actions to undermine the Euro-Atlantic unity and trust in the Alliance's institutions. Among other issues, the Chairman suggests the report should address the issue of protecting our electoral processes from outside interference.

56. The Chairman asked the chamber if members had any comments on the proposals. Koryun Nahapetyan asked if partner states could attend the above-mentioned visits. Chairman Canas said that such decisions would have to be made on a case by case basis.

57. Finally, the Chairman suggested that the Committee launch another survey examining the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. And, that this year the Assembly is planning to organise a special event on gender issues. The Chairman suggested that Ms Ulla Schmidt take the lead on drafting and implementing the survey. Ms Schmidt agreed to take on this initiative.

XIII. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers

58. Chairman Canas then led the election process for Committee and Sub-Committee officers. Senator **Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam** (FR) was elected by acclamation to chair the Committee and succeed **Vitalino Canas** (PT)—who was applauded for his tenure. He was then elected by acclamation to chair the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG). Next **Ulla Schmidt** (GE) was elected by acclamation to be the Committee's General Rapporteur. Lord Michael Jopling was elected by acclamation to special Rapporteur. Finally, Representative **Brett Guthrie** (US) was elected to the Vice Chairmanship CDSDG succeeding Chairwoman **Lois Frankel** (US).

XIV. Any other business

59. No new business was discussed.

XV. Date and place of next meeting

60. The Chairman concluded by stating that the next meeting of the Committee will be at the 2018 Spring Session, Warsaw, Poland 25-28 May 2018.
