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## RESOLUTION

on

### SAFEGUARDING ELECTIONS IN THE ALLIANCE\*

The Assembly,

1. **Concerned** that Russia's aggressive actions, including the threat and use of force as well as hybrid operations, are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order;
2. **Recognising** the overall strategic challenge of Russian cyber and information operations to Allied security;
3. **Recalling** NATO's founding principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
4. **Strongly stressing** the need to preserve the institutions that make democracies strong, including freedom of the press, freedom of speech and free and fair elections;
5. **Unequivocally condemning** any foreign attempts to undermine elections and other democratic processes, including referenda;
6. **Denouncing in the strongest terms** Russia's recent targeting of elections and referenda in Allied and partner countries as well as its broader attempts to destabilise democracies in Europe and North America;
7. **Convinced** of the need to deter any foreign interference in elections and in any other type of democratic processes or, failing that, be prepared for and resilient against such interference by developing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches as well as national and international responses at every level, in all forums and through every channel;
8. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to conduct regular risk assessments of election infrastructure and remedy any identified gaps or vulnerabilities;
  - b. to institutionalise pre-election processes against potential election interference;
  - c. to consider mandating post-election security audits;
  - d. to provide adequate funding and assistance to election bodies;
  - e. to explore the possibility of designating election infrastructure as critical infrastructure;
  - f. to outline real and credible consequences in case of foreign interference, for example through legal actions and sanctions;

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- g. to make use of the possibility of holding consultations under NATO's Article 4 when applicable;
- h. to further develop public-private partnerships and outreach with civil society, private companies and media outlets concerning election interference;
- i. to encourage non-government institutions and organisations central to the democratic process, such as political parties and campaigns, to adopt increased cybersecurity measures, facilitated by government support if required;
- j. to develop better information-sharing procedures with the non-government sector on cyber and hybrid threats;
- k. to further develop cyber and hybrid defence and security strategies, policies and institutions at the national level, at NATO, the EU and beyond;
- l. to develop clear and actionable protocols and action plans as well as lines of authority and coordination at the national, regional and local levels to expedite responses in the event of election interference;
- m. to systematise and institutionalise cooperation on cyber and hybrid threats through the NATO-EU strategic partnership;
- n. to promote civic education and media literacy concerning the threat of foreign interference in democratic processes;
- o. to encourage greater transparency in the social media sector and reasonable access to social media data for independent researchers;
- p. to continue to explore if and how social media activity or companies could be regulated to guard against foreign interference in democratic processes;
- q. to explore how to increase the transparency of political advertising on social media and whether foreign-paid social media political advertising could be banned;
- r. to encourage conversations in the journalist community about standards of use for material of questionable sourcing as well as about the potential motives behind a source;
- s. to encourage and support independent fact-checking initiatives;
- t. to engage in public information campaigns about the threat of foreign election interference and instances of attempted or successful interference;
- u. to encourage increased research on cyber and information operations and develop effective tools, paying close attention to artificial intelligence, big data analytics and other emerging technologies.