NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

SUMMARY

OF THE MEETING OF THE

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

Saturday 12 and Sunday 13 October 2019

Fleming, Queen Elizabeth II Centre
London, United Kingdom

217 DSC 19 E | Original: English | 22 November 2019

ATTENDANCE LIST

Chairperson	Michael R. Turner (United States)
General Rapporteur	Joseph A. DAY (Canada)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation	Sir Nicholas SOAMES (United Kingdom)
President of the NATO PA	Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)
Secretary General of the NATO PA	David HOBBS
Member delegations	
Albania	Myslim MURRIZI
	Nimet MUSAJ
	Xhemal QEFALIA
Belgium	Wouter DE VRIENDT
	Karolien GROSEMANS
	Leo PIETERS
Bulgaria	Hristo Georgiev GADZHEV
	Plamen MANUSHEV
Canada	Pierre-Hugues BOISVENU
	Pierre J. DALPHOND
	Vernon WHITE
Croatia	Franko VIDOVIC
Czech Republic	Jan FARSKY
	Patrik KUNCAR
Denmark	Peter JUEL-JENSEN
	Karsten LAURITZEN
Estonia	Ants LAANEOTS
France	Jean-Jacques BRIDEY
	Hélène CONWAY-MOURET
	Jean-Noël GUÉRINI
	Jean-Charles LARSONNEUR
	Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER
	Cédric PERRIN
	Jean-Luc REITZER
Germany	Lorenz CAFFIER
	Jürgen HARDT
	Wolfgang HELLMICH
	Gerold OTTEN
Greece	Athanasios DAVAKIS
	Andreas LOVERDOS
Hungary	Attila MESTERHAZY
	Istvan SIMICSKO
Iceland	Thorgerdur K. GUNNARSDOTTIR
	Willum Thor THORSSON
Italy	Massimo CANDURA
	Andrea Giorgio ORSINI
	Roberta PINOTTI
Latvia	Raimonds BERGMANIS
	Gatis EGLITIS

Luxembourg	Nancy ARENDT KEMP
Montenegro	Branko CAVOR
Netherlands	Alfred ARBOUW
Norway	Trond HELLELAND
	Sverre MYRLI
Romania	Nicu FALCOI
Slovakia	Martin FEDOR
	Karol FARKASOVSKY
	Martin KLUS
Slovenia	Monika GREGORCIC
	Zan MAHNIC
Spain	José María FIGAREDO
	Alejandro SOLER
Turkey	Kamil AYDIN
	Osman Askin BAK
	Utku CAKIROZER
	Nurettin CANIKLI
	Sena Nur CELIK
	Fikri ISIK
	Mevlut KARAKAYA
	Faik OZTRAK
	Kamil Okyay SINDIR
	Zehra TASKESENLIOGLU
	Sirin UNAL
	Ahmet YILDIZ
	Taner YILDIZ
United Kingdom	Alec SHELBROOKE
	Bob STEWART
United States	Brendan Francis BOYLE
	Gerald E. CONNOLLY
	Paul COOK
	Rick LARSEN

Associate delegations

Armenia	Andranik KOCHARYAN
Austria	Michael HAMMER
	Reinhold LOPATKA
	Maximilian UNTERRAINER
Finland	Ilkka KANERVA
	Tom PACKALEN
	Mikko SAVOLA
Georgia	Giorgi KANDELAKI
Serbia	Ivan BAUER
	Dejan RADENKOVIC
Sweden	Karin ENSTRÖM
	Hans WALLMARK
Switzerland	Isidor BAUMANN
	Josef DITTLI
	Corina EICHENBERGER
	Werner SALZMANN
Ukraine	Mariana BEZUHLA
	Solomiia BOBROVSKA
	Yehor CHERNIEV
	Andriy KLOCHKO

	Serhiy LARIN Galyna MYKHAILIUK Petro POROSHENKO
European Parliament (EP)	Juozas OLEKAS Kris PEETERS
Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations	
Algeria	Noureddine BENKORTBI Hichem RAHIM
Morocco	Mohammed AZRI
Parliamentary Observers	
Australia	Kim CARR David FAWCETT
Kazakhstan	Nurzhan NURSIPATOV
Republic of Korea	Kyoung Tae CHO
Parliamentary Guests	
Afghanistan	Saleh Mohammad LALA GUL Kamal SAFI
Iraq	Gatah Nejman Jlood AL-REKABI Basher Khalil TOFIQ
Speakers	**Prof. Michael CLARKE** Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) **Keir GILES**, Research Director, Conflict Studies Research Centre **Commodore Marcel HALLÉ** Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Allied Maritime Command, Northwood **Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart PEACH GBE KCB DL** Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO **Tom PLANT** Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, RUSI **Michael SINGH** Managing Director and Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy **Bruno TERTRAIS** Deputy Director, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), Paris
International Secretariat	Ethan CORBIN, Director Jailee Rychen, Coordinator Clara DUROVRAY, Research Assistant

Saturday 12 October

I. Opening remarks by Michael R. TURNER (United States), Chairperson

1. The Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC), **Michael R. Turner** (US), welcomed all participants to London and expressed his gratitude to the UK delegation for organising the session. He then gave some practical information on the attendance list, committee dossiers, and meeting schedule. Mr Turner noted officer vacancies for the Committee and Sub-Committees: the office of DSC General Rapporteur was available, following the expiration of Joseph A. Day's mandate, mentioning Roberta Pinotti (IT) and Jean-Charles Larsonneur (FR) had expressed their interest for the position. He also noted Alec Shelbrooke's (UK) candidacy to be Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC). A Vice-Chairpersonship of the DSCFC was also open. In addition, he said the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) had two Vice-Chairpersonship vacancies, one of which Nicu Falcoi (RO) was interested in filling. Finally, he mentioned two available positions as member and one as alternate member of the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC). Mr Falcoi expressed his interest in taking one of the member positions.

2. The Chairman then welcomed the speakers. He explained that an opportunity to address the ongoing Turkish operation into Northern Syria would be given during item 19 on the meeting agenda and urged members to refrain from addressing it before this time.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [135 DSC 19 E]

3. **The draft Agenda [135 DSC 19 E] was adopted.**

III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Bratislava, Slovakia, on Saturday 1 June 2019 [154 DSC 19 E]

4. **The Summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee [154 DSC 19 E] was adopted.**

IV. Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolutions *Supporting NATO's Post-INF Treaty Defence and Deterrence Posture* [182 DSC 19 E] and *Recent Developments in Afghanistan* [183 DSC 19 E]

5. Mr Turner explained the procedure to amend the two committee resolutions, noting all amendments, written and signed, must be submitted to the Committee Secretary no later than 10:30 am that same day. Likewise, amendments to committee resolutions in the Plenary Sitting must be submitted by 10:00 am the day of the Plenary.

V. Presentation by Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart PEACH GBE KCB DL, Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, on *NATO @ 70 – Current Threats and Security Challenges, Preparing for the Future*

6. The Chairman introduced the first speaker, **Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach**, and invited him to deliver his presentation. The Air Chief Marshal stressed the importance of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) in strengthening the transatlantic relationship, developing the shared values underpinning the Alliance, and building the narrative and understanding among NATO's citizens.

7. Sir Stuart emphasised the importance of the current year for the Alliance. Russia's assertive military posture and hybrid actions, combined with frozen conflicts in Europe and challenges arising from instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, make the current security environment more unpredictable than any time since the end of the Cold

War. In response, the speaker noted that NATO Allies have implemented the biggest reinforcement of collective defence since the end of the Cold War. He outlined those measures. The Alliance has established four multinational battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It has tripled the size of NATO's Response Force and it has established the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. NATO has also set up a new Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia, to ensure the sea lanes of communication between North America and Europe remain free and secure. Moreover, it has established a Joint Support Enabling Command in Ulm to facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel across Europe. Sir Stuart also reminded the audience of the *Four 30s* initiative – the commitment to have, by 2020, 30 mechanised battalions; 30 air squadrons; and 30 combat vessels, ready to deploy within 30 days or less. NATO has established a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Mons. It has increased its presence in the Black Sea, and it conducts air policing as well as naval patrols. Finally, it has created the multi-national brigade in Romania to bolster NATO's Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region.

8. Sir Stuart then pointed to the Alliance's recent adoption of its first military strategy since the 1950s, which will help guide future decision-making and provide coherence to the Alliance's overall efforts. NATO's current deterrence and defence posture drives forward NATO's adaptation. The Alliance is developing a new warfighting concept with more focus on space, innovation, and disruptive technologies, he continued. It is also developing a concept for the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area with a clear link to the new military strategy. All of these together will define NATO's future military requirements, he said.

9. Sir Stuart noted that the complexity of today's security environment means NATO must be able to take on a wide range of military operations and missions. Over 20,000 military personnel of NATO are engaged in operations, missions and activities, he told the Committee. He emphasised NATO's role in fighting terrorism, notably by training and building local forces. He mentioned NATO's involvement in Afghanistan, its role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and the new training mission in Iraq. Furthermore, NATO is building the defence capacities of its partners, from Jordan and Tunisia to Ukraine and Georgia. Sir Stuart also mentioned the new hub for the South in Naples to monitor regional threats and coordinate responses. He also welcomed the work of the Centre of Excellence for the Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara.

10. Chiefs of Defence across the Alliance recently discussed how NATO could deliver the political direction to improve readiness and responsiveness, i.e. create a culture of readiness. Sir Stuart Peach said the Chiefs of Defence have committed to increase the speed of decision making at the strategic level and will develop further counsel to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on that subject. Sir Stuart concluded his presentation by reminding that for the past 70 years, NATO has adapted to challenges and will continue to deliver collective security by collective defence.

11. **Bob Stewart** (UK) asked how quickly the NAC could decide to take action if an article 5 incursion was to occur. The Air Chief Marshal answered the NAC can act at the speed required for the challenge. He mentioned an exercise held this year, which ran continuously for almost two weeks, and during which 20 military committee meetings were held to provide guidance to the council on how to react to a range of crises. The speaker expressed his gratitude to the many Allies that play significant roles in those exercises at a very senior ministerial level. He urged Allies to use the Crisis Management Exercise as an opportunity to make sure that all national procedures are in line with those of the Alliance.

12. **Sir Nicholas Soames** (UK) noted the difficulty of achieving greater synergy in the use of weapons and tactics, especially in cyber warfare. He asked how NATO works to achieve consensus and how successful it is at determining a clear line between competition and conflict. The Air Chief Marshal first noted that NATO has worked very hard to transform its

intelligence capacity, deliver meaningful sharing, and enhance the indicator warnings through which the operational HQ understands what is going on. This includes informational awareness in cyber. Then, the speaker highlighted NATO's efforts to build cyber capacities. He encouraged the Alliance to demonstrate its resilience daily and not just during exercises. Furthermore, NATO needs to show that innovation is not just done outside the Alliance but by the Alliance itself. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is playing a key role to be more creative in the creation and employment of disruptive technologies. The speaker stated that the balance between the operational HQ and ACT's development of capabilities is vital. He concluded by encouraging Allies to do more and to share technologies.

13. **Gatis Eglitis** (LV) noted the lack of NATO maritime assets in the Baltic Sea. He inquired about Sir Stuart's opinion on using Liepaja as a potential maritime base for NATO naval assets. The Air Chief Marshal responded by talking about NATO's commitment to its maritime responsibilities and the Alliance's significant focus on the Baltics. He notably mentioned the annual naval exercise *BALTOPS* and the Enhanced Forward Presence, which the Alliance continues to integrate with the Baltic Air Policing mission and other maritime activities. He also noted the need to develop a single understanding of NATO's intelligence picture and he commended the work of the Centre of Excellence on Strategic Communication in Riga.

14. **Alec Shelbrooke** (UK) asked about the challenges to moving the Rapid Reaction Force across the Alliance. Sir Stuart first reminded the audience of the creation of the Joint Support and Enabling Command centre in Ulm to deal with this. He then mentioned NATO's work with the EU on military mobility to enhance interoperability and promote the adoption of common standards. He noted transportation is an important point for parliamentarians, as they grant permission to move military equipment and personnel across the Alliance. This question is also addressed in cooperation with the new command in Norfolk and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Finally, he explained the Alliance has now made international logistics one of its priorities.

15. **Aants Laaneots** (EE) commented on NATO's decision not to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe in response to Russia's deployment of Iskander missiles. He worried this would create an imbalance of power with Russia. The Air Chief Marshal responded by emphasising that deterrence takes many forms. NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltics combines air, land, and sea. He also acknowledged that Russia's modernisation of weapon systems calls for an appropriate mix of forces. This is tackled by the deterrence effect of all the measures, not just local ones.

16. Mr Turner asked the speaker to elaborate on the threats and responses related to Russia's military modernisation. Sir Stuart Peach explained that deterrence only works if it is credible. To this effect, NATO must develop a culture of readiness as well as more professional and modernised intelligence capabilities. With this approach, the Alliance understands the threat better and can adapt its deterrence posture, including in the cyber domain. This involves developing a narrative of what Russia's military modernisation means and including this in the narrative of why NATO matters.

17. **David Fawcett** (AU) asked about NATO's measures to address weapon systems and cyber security. The Air Chief Marshal emphasised the necessity to maintain the interoperability of weapon systems. Part of it, he said, is making sure that future systems are secure by design and that the security of networks is resilient. The Alliance also pays attention to the way they are kept secure, which is currently a challenge for software-based systems.

18. **Mariana Bezuhla** (UA) mentioned Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, notably in the cyber domain, and called for continued and stronger cooperation. She also put forward the proposition to create a Centre of Excellence for hybrid threats and challenges in Ukraine. Sir Stuart said he would take note of her suggestion. He also explained that Ukraine's

experience is important in teaching lessons to Allies, particularly the need to strengthen resilience.

19. **Athanasios Davakis** (GR) asked what technological breakthroughs were the most concerning to the speaker. He replied that NATO must speed up the process by which it develops, delivers, and adopts technologies. The Alliance has created an innovation board in the headquarters, but noted it is still challenging to match speed, common sense, and necessity when it comes to innovation. NATO has also implemented a series of workshops in ACT to communicate on this point. For Sir Stuart, experimentation is the second element, for instance through exercises. Sharing good ideas and best practices is the third vector he identified.

VI. Presentation by Prof. Michael CLARKE, Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on *UK Defence Priorities*

20. The Chairman introduced the second speaker, **Prof. Michael Clarke**. Mr Clarke started his presentation by outlining the United Kingdom's defence priorities. The first, he said, is to maintain full spectrum capability for the UK armed forces, even with a reduced number of forces or equipment. He argued the United Kingdom is a "10% ally", meaning it spends about 10% of what the United States spends on defence and, not surprisingly, gets about 10% for its investment in terms of capability – although, he admitted, the actual number may be closer to 7%. The 10%, however, he continued, make the United Kingdom strategically significant, allowing it to plug into existing operations with the United States, or to run operations independently. This strategic independence has been a consistent priority, he noted. Mr Clarke then said the second UK defence priority is to have forces capable of flexible deployment potentially anywhere across the globe. The United Kingdom deploys nuclear forces via its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) capabilities. The United Kingdom also maintains an armed forces presence in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrein. It contributes with one capital ship almost at all times in East Asia and collaborates closely on freedom of navigation operations in the East China and South China seas. Mr Clarke said approximately 37,000 UK personnel are engaged in 36 different operations around the world. Only the United States and the United Kingdom are capable of operating everywhere. He emphasised that this outstrips the capabilities of China and Russia, and even of its close NATO Ally, France. Although this will change quickly, the United Kingdom will still belong to a rather exclusive club for the near future. Mr Clarke said the United Kingdom's third priority is its commitment to transformational forces. The United Kingdom's 2010 Defence Review outlined a design for a major force recapitalisation across the services. He noted the British Navy and Air Force had already significantly recapitalised their forces, whereas the Army started later because of the Iraq War and is, therefore, a hint further behind in the process. The recapitalisation should be completed across the services by 2025. The ability to use those forces in transformational ways is also built into the programme. The fourth priority, he continued, is making the armed forces contribute to a full spectrum version of UK security. In 2010, the government identified three tiers of security – from the global to the regional to the national. The armed forces increasingly see contributing to a wide spectrum of domestic security priorities as part of their role as well.

21. Mr Clarke next mentioned a series of challenges in operationalising these priorities. The first one is recapitalising forces appropriately to handle the challenges they may face. For instance, he explained the Navy can have a global orientation and the Army a European one. Those conceptions, he admitted, are optimal in peacetime but not in case of a major conflict. The second challenge is raised by rapid technological innovation. The United Kingdom has only a limited budget to spend on new technologies such as biotechnologies, quantum computing, or nanotechnologies because most is dedicated to force recapitalisation. These new technologies will be reaching a point of maturity very soon. He underlined that the United States, China, and Russia will be the ones to weaponise them, not the European

powers. The third challenge is of strategic significance. As Mr Clarke explained, if UK forces are too small, they fall below the threshold of strategic significance and are no longer able to make a difference. Finally, the fourth challenge is Brexit, which will affect defence in a way that remains unclear. He predicted the United Kingdom will be even more committed to NATO after the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. He concluded by saying the question now is whether the framework of strategic coherence is appropriate and can be fulfilled.

22. The Chairman opened the discussion by asking about Russia's military modernisation. For Mr Clarke, Russia can be a tactical nuisance to the Western world for the next 10-15 years. Yet strategically it is a declining force, especially with regard to China. He also explained that Russia's motivations are genuinely defensive because President Putin sees NATO as an offence. The problem is the security dilemma of each side's perception of their respective defensive measures. Russian ground forces are still, broadly speaking, poorly equipped, but parts have been modernised and can be very dangerous. Russia's acquisition of new nuclear capabilities and missiles is also a real concern, he noted. He also noted Russia's use of hybrid war and asymmetrical tactics as destabilising. He expressed concerns about Russia's ability to undermine Euro-Atlantic political consensus. He concluded that Russia can only be a strategic nuisance if we let it.

23. Bob Stewart said that 90% of UK forces used to be committed to NATO and asked what the percentage was now. Mr Clarke explained that at the end of the Cold War, it was clear that Britain's forces would become much smaller, on the basis that it would maintain full spectrum capability, albeit at lower numbers. He noted this was a sensible way to approach the early post-Cold War period. Today, however, it may be difficult politically and technically to expand back to a larger force footing; there is little public or political will to expand beyond current spending. As long as NATO is not facing an imminent threat, the United Kingdom is only committing 50-60% of its available forces to the Alliance.

24. **Andreas Loverdos** (GR) asked a question about the United Kingdom's main concerns and priorities in the High North. Mr Clarke explained this is increasingly important for three reasons. First, as the ice is melting, it is freeing crucial minerals. Second, climate change is having significant environmental impact. Third, it is opening up a passage from Asia to Europe. This brings attention back to the security of the GIUK Gap, which implies being capable of re-booting modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

25. **Ilkka Kanerva** (FI) asked the speaker to describe the potential role for national armed forces in the High North. Mr Clarke said the current framework of the Arctic Council was effective when the Artic was not a renewed arena of great power competition, but it lacks a mechanism for mitigating security competition. Yet he does not think the Arctic Council will be upgraded or replaced. He noted that great powers are increasingly dealing with international affairs bilaterally, rather than seeking new multilateral mechanisms. This is a challenge for other NATO Allies, more comfortable in a multilateral context. He therefore urged the United States to seek more multilateral solutions on High North issues.

26. Sir Nicholas Soames inquired about the effect of Britain leaving the EU on the United Kingdom's military standing. Mr Clarke answered by highlighting the United Kingdom's diplomatic power in Europe will be significantly reduced, which will in turn affect its bilateral relationships in NATO. Brexit will impact its domestic security policy more than its defence policy, he continued, as the United Kingdom will lose its role in Europol and, therefore, the European Arrest Warrant and the European information system. As the country is integrated in policing activities across the European continent, this will be a key loss of a poorly negotiated Brexit. Mr Clarke was however confident that defence institutions will understand the importance of preserving the transatlantic relationship.

27. **Kamil Aydin** (TR) asked why the speaker sounded worried about the coming decade. As Mr Clarke explained, the 2020s will be difficult for the EU for structural reasons. He noted that rising great powers outside of the Alliance are revisionist powers and are more bilaterally minded. Europe will be in a poorer economic situation in 2020s than it was in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, he predicted. European states, whether part of the EU or NATO or not, will have to evolve within the space of the geopolitical will of the great powers.

28. **Jürgen Hardt** (DE) asked about the possibility for the United Kingdom to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) after Brexit. Mr Clarke highlighted that everything the United Kingdom may do after Brexit with the EU will be voluntary. If PESCO is opened to non-EU European states, which he thinks would be a good idea, PESCO should be welcomed if it produces willingness to create stronger military capabilities. In Mr Clarke's opinion, so far, PESCO has failed to do so. He also reminded the delegation that, after Brexit, 80% of NATO's military capabilities will come from outside of the EU, and that the command structure does not matter as much as military capabilities.

29. Mariana Bezuhla, drawing from Ukraine's own experience in 2014-2015, noted the difficulty to expand forces given the ambivalence the younger generation in Europe today has toward the armed services. She asked how to make progress in this regard. Mr Clarke said that enlarging forces is a matter of resources. In the United Kingdom, around 2% of the GDP is considered to be what the public is prepared to spend, as compared with 4% during the Cold War. Nobody, however, is asking to commit more than 2%. He also concurred that if countries want to expand their armed forces, they need a permissive environment within their own public. He noted that the United Kingdom has not had much experience in conscription in modern history, which creates a particular relationship between the armed forces and society. For historical reasons, many other countries have not had such a good relationship with their armed forces. He also underscored that it is difficult to expand armed forces in an efficient way when countries are already under pressure, as is the case for Ukraine. A focus must be to make a nation's armed forces fit for the purposes of national defence in peace time.

30. **Hélène Conway-Mouret** (FR) first encouraged NATO to invest in disruptive technologies and intelligence sharing to respond to cyberattacks and hybrid warfare. She then mentioned the growing threat represented by China. The speaker agreed that the essence of efficient military transformation is intelligence. He also explained intelligence collaboration is not easy, as it is based on trust and, more often than not, deep bilateral trust. He encouraged NATO to work more Alliance-wide intelligence sharing, although he noted that Europe has already substantially improved its intelligence collaboration since 9/11. Generally, he continued, NATO should be more committed to political agility. He also agreed with the remark about China. China's base in Djibouti is very close to the US base, Djibouti owes China a sum equivalent to 80% of its GDP, and the Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as a debt trap. China's ability to take physical control of assets is now becoming increasingly strategically important. For Europe, the threat of China is economic and market-based, but the speaker predicted that in 15 years, the threat will also be military for NATO.

31. Mr Turner next talked about the responsibility of European partners within the transatlantic relationship. As explained by the speaker, the United States equals 52% of the collective GDP of NATO and contributes to 71% of military expenditures. Although President Trump has a more confrontational approach, his demands are not different from previous presidents'. This is therefore a long-term issue which could become a lasting fissure.

32. **Gatah Nejman Jlood Al-Rekabi** (IQ) asked to have more information about the possible transfer of Daesh members from Syria to Iraq after the Turkish offensive. Mr Clarke did not have information about that.

VII. Round table discussion on Post-INF Challenges: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control in a New Strategic Environment

33. **Bruno Tertrais**, Deputy Director, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), Paris, explained he would tackle two issues: the understanding of Russia's nuclear policy and the consequences of the demise of the INF Treaty. Starting with Russia's nuclear policy, he mentioned the narrative of a Russian "escalate to de-escalate" in the West, which he said is particularly strong in the United States and in NATO. The narrative implies that Russia is prepared to use low-yield nuclear weapons on the theatre of operation to de-escalate a conventional conflict it may not be able to win, and that its exercises are proof of a worrying evolution in its nuclear policy. He argued this is a very problematic and poorly substantiated narrative. He explained there is much to worry about Russia's nuclear policy, but not along these lines. Regarding the doctrine, he continued, Moscow has raised rather than lowered its nuclear threshold over the past ten years because it feels more comfortable with the reliability of its conventional forces. The speaker said that Russia deploys a high and increasing number of dual-capable theatre systems, on which it emphasises the conventional rather than the nuclear part. Regarding nuclear exercises, Mr Tertrais noted the lack of public evidence that Russia is using exercises to practice the use of theatre nuclear weapons. He demonstrated there is no evidence that *Zapad 2009* involved nuclear weapons. Likewise, he said the NATO Secretary General's secretariat was unable to provide the source on which it based its assertion in the 2014 report that Russia practised a nuclear strike against Sweden.

34. Mr Tertrais then explained there are other reasons to worry about Russia's nuclear policy, as the nuclear shadow weighs very heavily on its strategic behaviour in general. Russia knows that European states are uncomfortable with nuclear weapons and uses this as a useful political tool. Russia's risky nuclear behaviour could escalate to a severe crisis very quickly, he warned, especially since nobody knows, even within Russia, how the Kremlin would use nuclear weapons in a crisis.

35. The speaker then talked about the INF Treaty. He characterised its demise as the end of a strategic phase in Russia-US/NATO relations, but said we are not entering into a new arms race phase. Mr Tertrais said new systems are indeed being deployed, but the scope remains much smaller than during the Cold War. Mr Tertrais then explained how NATO should respond to the demise of the INF Treaty. He first asserted there is no prospect for a new treaty that would include China. NATO has four possible responses. First, responding in kind. He immediately excluded this option, however, because he said the problem with Russia is more conventional and political than nuclear. The second option is new nuclear deployment, but he noted this is unnecessary at this point. Rather, it is important to maintain what NATO has now – a combination of nuclear procedures, broad participation of non-nuclear Allies, and the back-up of the US deterrent including deployed low-yield missiles as well as UK and French deterrents. Mr Tertrais also declared that Russia's proposal not to deploy new missiles West of the Ural if there is no NATO or US deployment is a trap. The third option is the deployment of new conventional missiles. He argues that for now, the foreseeable conventional missile balance does not call for new deployments. Finally, the speaker said cruise missile defence is a more promising choice. If Russia deploys battalions of 9M79s, NATO will have to take a close look at its defence options. NATO should however not press for a military response. Since deterrence is also based on Russia's perception of NATO's unity, it is much more important to show broad-based political and military unity.

36. **Tom Plant**, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, RUSI, started by asserting that nuclear weapons remain a foundational element of national security for those states possessing nuclear weapons. He illustrated this point by mentioning the rate of reductions in global nuclear stockpiles this decade, which have been approximately half of the preceding decade and are almost only due to reductions in the US and Russian arsenals. The other states (China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) have increased the size, diversity, capability, and

military utility of their nations' arsenals over the same period. Worries also remain about the Iranian nuclear programme and Tehran's intentions of acquiring a nuclear weapon. These developments in the nuclear arena drive increasing complexity in future security relationships. Advances in strategic non-nuclear technologies and access to these affect nuclear use and decision making. Mr Plant argued there is a new form of multipolarity in international affairs which will revolutionise global strategic affairs and global security, including deterrence and arms control.

37. The speaker then surveyed some nuclear developments. He first explained China has kept a declaratory policy of no first use. Beijing claims that its stockpile is kept centrally and not matched with delivery systems. It also is widely believed to have stopped producing nuclear material. But Mr Plant emphasised that none of this has been independently verified. Even if it was true now, it will be challenged in the coming years. He also said China is developing a modern strategic triad with the inclusion of dual-capable missiles in its arsenal and wants to sustain a SSBN deterrent patrol. The speaker explained this will affect the Euro-Atlantic security in different ways. In addition to indirect effects for NATO's partners, the Allies themselves will also increasingly rub up against China's nuclear assets. In the longer term, China may try to use its nuclear deterrent in the High North and may cooperate with Russia. The bilateral nuclear relationship between NATO and Russia could therefore become trilateral to include China. Mr Plant then spoke about Pakistan and India. Although it has a less direct impact on North Atlantic security, the recent crisis shows that nuclear capacities remain problematic. Pakistan's emphasis on battlefield nuclear weapons attracts the most attention, but the speaker told delegates to look more closely at India's aspirations to develop a triad, as well as its aspirations for missile defence and anti-satellite capabilities. He asserted India could be an increasingly important partner or competitor.

38. Mr Plant then talked about the proliferation states. He said Iran intends to hedge its capabilities. He however argued it is still unsure whether Tehran has made the decision that it wants nuclear weapons. Iran's narrative of resistance and defence against external oppression relates to the nuclear programme per se, but not necessarily to nuclear weapons. He then contrasted this with North Korea. Pyongyang has experienced greater economic hardship than Iran, but it still wants to develop advanced nuclear capabilities. North Korea has integrated its status as a nuclear power into its national narrative, identity, and constitution. Although for now its aspirations for nuclear deterrence are based on a secure second strike, that deterrence may in the long term coexist with a coercive intent for their use. Mr Plant underlined that North Korea is already playing into the security picture by driving US missile defence in the region, which raises China's concerns about the survivability of its own second strike capability.

39. The speaker next addressed revolutionary technological advances that influence nuclear decision making and employment. They shape the informational environment of decision makers not only during a crisis but also in the run-up to a crisis. This comes on top of more conventional issues, such as the potential deterioration of command and control with precision strikes. He underscored that non-nuclear states also have agency in the nuclear picture because those capabilities are becoming more widespread. Therefore, Mr Plant said we need to revisit our thinking about strategic stability. So far, strategic stability has just meant removing the possibility of first strike from one bloc to another. It is however unclear whether that two-dimensional system still works. According to the speaker, this has two consequences. First, for complexity and management theory, it implies that as the number of control nodes in the system increases, the complexity of the system increases as well. There is a point when the system is too complex to be controlled and can only be guided. Second, whereas you can have similar behaviours in a two-dimensional system, in a multidimensional system, there are new possible behaviours, thus blurring the lines between stable or unstable systems. Mr Plant argued we should think about how to maintain stability and control in those systems. He said we need adaptable and fluid agreements that consider how nuclear and non-nuclear

capabilities interact. We must also establish ways to communicate to understand each other's models. Finally, he asserted this should not be a two-way street, with nuclear states telling non-nuclear states how to behave.

40. Mr Turner opened the discussion. He mentioned Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and the Budapest Memorandum and argued that this is not just an issue of doctrine, but also of commitment to treaties. Mr Tertrais added the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter to the list. He argued that arms control is a symbol of a paradigmatic shift of Russia's behaviour. He also nuanced his statement by reminding that even during the golden age of arms control, the situation was unstable. For Mr Tertrais, Russia will come back to arms control when it believes it is in its interest to have more predictability about what the United States is doing and how to cap some of its capabilities. This is not happening right now. He explained that when Russia claims it wants arms control, it tries to put everything on the table, making negotiations impossible. Unless we see a dramatic reversal of Russia's policy, we will stay in this phase for a few years, until the Kremlin thinks it is in its interest. Mr Plant was more optimistic about Russia's desire to have arms control because of domestic constraints on its military capabilities. Russia's industrial basis will not be able to keep up with advancement. For Mr Plant, we think of arms control as if they would be respected. We have become good at detecting violation, but we must now think about what we would do in case of violation.

41. Mariana Bezuhla emphasised that Russia has adopted a hybrid approach that leads to conflict. She characterised violations of international agreements as a kind of aggression against stability. She also expressed concerns about Russia's outdated nuclear equipment, which presents inherent risks of accident. Mr Plant agreed there are many sources of disruption, but he said these violations would be a form of violence rather than aggression. He added that the escalation ladder is not purely vertical anymore. There is however no good answer now. We should think about those efforts to shape the environment in a way that contradicts our interests and how we can respond, potentially in asymmetric ways. Mr Tertrais added that the Skyfall accident revealed that the Russian industrial military complex has been given a free pass. It has been granted many resources and has taken risks as a result. Yet, public opinion is more concerned today than it was during the Soviet era, which may teach the Kremlin some lessons. Mr Tertrais also agreed there are horizontal dimensions to escalation. A possible escalation with Russia will integrate cyber, little green men, or shaping public opinion to its advantage.

42. **Pierre Dalphond** (CA) asked if in the short term, satellite states will have access to the technologies of their partners and friends (Iran, North Korea, Russia). Mr Tertrais answered that the 21st century has been characterised by the proliferation of long and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. Those are generally conventional but sometimes dual-capable. He reiterated that the problem with Russia is not just nuclear. India and Pakistan are the threats in terms of proliferation. North Korea has been and is a major supplier of missiles of Soviet origin towards Pakistan, Iran, etc. The receiving country then modifies the technology. As such, it is crucial to promote the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Mr Plant added we need to stop thinking of the smaller nuclear powers or non-nuclear powers as mere perturbations, but rather as fundamental elements. He also noted that North Korea exposes itself to risks when it seeks to proliferate nuclear know-how. Therefore, it needs to build long-term relations with the actors with whom it shares nuclear know-how. Thus, the greatest problem is when technologies are provided to states that sponsor non-state terrorist groups (Syria, Iran, etc.).

43. Sir Nicholas Soames asked under which circumstances there would be a real effort to secure and reform the whole structure of the system. Mr Plant gave the example of the Treaty on Open Skies. He argued that with the degradation of this treaty, we lose the build-up of relationships between adversaries at a working level. The second element is the principle of non-surprises: we must build in ways for information to be shared outside the structure of the

treaty. The means employed in Open Skies are important, as they are an open source and produce data on which both sides agree. Mr Tertrais added that for now, neither the Russian nor the US administrations are interested in arms control. This will not change unless Mr Putin or his successor feels weakened or fears what NATO/the United States is doing. This may however not be sufficient because the United States does not trust Russia on arms control anymore. Mr Tertrais concluded by noting that Russia's weaknesses remain intact. As a footnote, Mr Turner specified that the debate in the United States on the Open Skies treaty deals with how it could be misused by Moscow but does not undermine the importance of the verification measures.

VIII. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities

44. **Utku Cakirozer** (TR), Vice-Chairman of the DSCFC, presented the future activities of the DSCFC for 2019 and 2020. After a successful visit to China, the Sub-Committee will be traveling to Jordan with the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) for a joint visit in November. He also informed the members that in 2020, the DSCFC will study NATO's Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative. To support this report, the sub-committee will visit Georgia and Tunisia.

IX. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation

45. **Attila Mesterhazy** (HU), Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC), then presented the future activities of his Sub-Committee. The Committee visited Iceland and Sweden and will soon go to Norfolk and Washington, D.C. Mr Mesterhazy announced the DSCTC will study the security situation in the Western Balkans in 2020. To this effect, it has planned to visit North Macedonia and Kosovo.

X. Presentation by Michael SINGH, Managing Director and Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, on *Iran's Regional and Global Challenge: Renewing a Multilateral Strategy toward Iran*

46. Mr Turner then invited Michael Singh to deliver his presentation on *Iran's Regional and Global Challenge: Renewing a Multilateral Strategy toward Iran*.

47. **Michael Singh** started by explaining the Iranian challenge is a "three in one" crisis. It is nuclear, regional, and transatlantic. According to Mr Singh, the problem was that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had wide support in the world but not in the United States. Initially, Iran decided to keep adhering to the JCPOA to wait out the Trump administration. For some in the United States, this was the best of both worlds whereas for others, it implied a failure to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table. The latter camp proved correct. Mr Singh explained that Iran has now decided to change the rules of the game. Its actions could be interpreted in different ways. It could be trying either to convince the United States to change its approach, or to build up leverage in case of any possible negotiations. He noted that both approaches are not mutually exclusive.

48. The international community has been challenged to respond but has so far been paralysed. Mr Singh said there are two risks. On the one hand, if Iran continues to put pressure and the West simply ignores it, this would erode deterrence in the region. On the other hand, if the United States and other actors respond, this may spark a conflict. The international community must therefore define its objectives. They are: first, to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities. Second, to limit and counter Iran's development and proliferation of missiles, which was not covered by the JCPOA. Third, to counter and contain Iran's destabilising regional actions. The speaker highlighted the necessity to recognise that these objectives are

shared within NATO, even if the Allies have different ideas about how to achieve them. The United States is taking the approach of maximum pressure and is seeking a comprehensive deal. Some have speculated that Washington wants regime change, but Mr Singh disagrees. Europe, for its part, is encouraging dialogue instead of maximum pressure. Mr Singh stressed that dialogue and pressure are not mutually incompatible. To achieve these common objectives, three conditions are necessary: comprehensive tools - not just sanctions, but also diplomacy and military tools; a multilateral strategy; and a sustainable strategy.

49. Mr Singh then outlined three-course corrections which are needed to achieve this strategy. The first one is to restore deterrence. The attack on the Saudi oil infrastructures was one of the most important conventional attacks we have seen and we still have not responded. For Mr Singh, the international community needs new creative ways to respond to this attack, by anticipating where the next attacks may come rather than reacting. The second-course correction is that Europe must take steps to respond to and punish Iran's incremental violations of the JCPOA. The final correction is to restore dialogue in the United States. Mr Singh argued that a more robust US and Allied Middle East policy is crucial to deny Iran its regional opportunities. The speaker concluded by stressing that this issue must be kept in perspective and in proportion to other challenges, such as great power competition and deterrence. Iran is not a top priority, but it is still in NATO's vital interest.

50. Mr Turner opened the discussion by asking what Iran has gained from responses to its attacks on US unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Saudi oil installations. For Mr Singh, Iran did not anticipate consequences, because it is convinced none will come. He also highlighted that deterring Iran in a manner that does not lead to escalation is a continuous problem. Therefore, Iran may have figured that we are averse to risk and that the red line is Americans being killed in these attacks.

51. **Brendan Boyle** (US) argued that the most problematic point in the JCPOA was the sunset issue and that addressing this question is necessary for another agreement. The speaker concurred with this statement. He stated that the United States should be pressing for a new nuclear, rather than comprehensive, deal. He then outlined the JCPOA's flaws. One of them is the temporary nature of the deal, which is due to the coexistence of two narratives. One dominated the other in the end. The preferred US narrative was that it was a two-sided deal where Iran agrees not to engage in certain activities and the rest of P5+1 agrees not to sanction; in Iran's narrative, the treaty was about rehabilitating Iran and treating it as a normal country under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For the Iranians, that meant their obligations would expire even though the sanctions relief would not. This asymmetry was problematic. A second flaw was the JCPOA's failure to address the right element of the nuclear programme. Iran used its known facilities and its P1 centrifuges, whereas in reality, it would have used its clandestine facilities. Therefore, Mr Singh argues the agreement should have focused on what Iran would need to make nuclear weapons clandestinely: more advanced centrifuges, a military weaponisation programme, and missiles.

52. Bob Stewart asked Mr Singh if a revolution was likely in Iran. The speaker said that these expectations are not new and have been wrong. The regime is surviving immense economic pressure. The hope of regime change cannot be the basis of policy.

53. Andreas Loverdos enquired about the US position on Turkey's operation in Syria. The speaker explained that Washington does recognise Turkey's security concerns as legitimate but was opposed to the operation. It worries about the humanitarian crisis it could entail, but also that it could turn the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) towards the North and divert their attention from ISIS, leading to the release of prisoners and opening the way for Mr al-Assad to regain control in the northern regions of the country. This could lead to the withdrawal of all US troops.

XI. Consideration of the draft General Report *A New Era for Nuclear Deterrence? Modernisation, Arms Control, and Allied Nuclear Forces* [136 DSC 19 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur

54. The committee then considered the draft General Report on *A New Era for Nuclear Deterrence? Modernisation, Arms Control, and Allied Nuclear Forces*, presented by **Joseph A. Day** (CA).

55. The Rapporteur started his presentation by outlining Russia's efforts to develop new, destabilising missile systems. He then explained to the Committee that Russia is not the only country whose behaviour is destabilising the international security environment. China, North Korea and Iran have also demonstrated their desire to develop their nuclear capabilities. In the face of this rapidly changing international nuclear environment, Mr Day argued that maintaining a credible defence and deterrence posture is crucial for NATO. Nuclear weapons play a key role in that posture. Therefore, the modernisation programmes of NATO nuclear states, along with the Alliance's nuclear burden sharing arrangements, are indispensable to maintain the Allied nuclear deterrence posture. The Rapporteur also emphasised NATO's continued commitment to the international architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation. Highlighting Russia's responsibility in the demise of the INF treaty, he made clear that NATO is not seeking further tensions with Russia; it is only taking the steps necessary to maintain a credible defence and deterrence posture. Mr Day also mentioned the new Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START), whose expansion remains uncertain given the volatility of the international environment. The Rapporteur concluded his presentation with the following recommendations. First, he urged NATO governments and parliaments to support the maintenance of a strong, capable, and survivable nuclear deterrent. Second, he encouraged them to continue to invest in the modernisation of existing nuclear systems and infrastructures. Third, he said Allies must continue to show their financial and political support for the new measures announced by NATO following the collapse of the INF Treaty. Fourth, governments and parliamentarians across the Alliance must educate their citizens on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence and deterrence posture. Finally, Mr Day declared that NATO must maintain its support for arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament efforts, including the NPT.

56. **Kyoung Tae Cho** (KR) explained that North Korea's threatening behaviour, demonstrated by 11 missile launches this year, has led the Republic of Korea to consider the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula. Considering NATO's experience with the deployment of nuclear weapons on European bases, he enquired about the NATO PA's opinion on similar deployments in South Korea. The Rapporteur said he learned about this discussion during a previous visit to the Republic of Korea. He underlined that the draft Report mentions Iran and North Korea's efforts to develop new missile systems that could be equipped with nuclear warheads, demonstrating the NATO PA's commitment to the issue.

57. Bob Stewart expressed his concerns that NATO was creating a gap in its deterrence response to Russia by not deploying intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Joseph A. Day acknowledged the risk but reiterated NATO's position that enhancing the current deterrence posture with the steps mentioned in the draft Report would make up some of that gap.

58. The Chairman then asked the members to vote on the draft General Report. **The draft General Report [136 DSC 19 E] was adopted.**

XII. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution *Recent Developments in Afghanistan* [183 DSC 19 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur

59. The Committee then considered the amendments on the draft resolution *Recent Developments in Afghanistan*. Mr Turner proposed to vote only on the amended paragraphs. Mr Day would start with his reactions to the amendments and the Committee would proceed to a vote if required. The members agreed to that procedure and started discussing the amendments.

60. Mr Day read the amendments following the order of the text. He started with amendment 8, put forward by Christian Cambon and Philippe Folliot (FR), which was adopted without opposition. Mr Day then moved on to amendment 4, authored by Gerald E. Connolly (US). The amendment was adopted by unanimous consent and the paragraphs were adopted as amended.

61. The Committee then discussed amendment 3, put forward by Osman Askin Bak (TR) The Turkish delegation explained the irrelevance of the word “Islamic”. The Director of the Committee, Ethan Corbin, nuanced this affirmation by highlighting the discussion relates to Afghanistan and not the Middle East. **Kamal Safi** (AF) then took the floor to give his impressions about the resolution. He demanded more autonomy on Afghanistan’s control of its budget and emphasised that the first condition for a settlement should be a ceasefire. He also mentioned corruption as well as the problems of narcotics trafficking and asked for a real inclusion of Afghan actors in the so-called “intra-Afghan” dialogue. Finally, regarding the resolution, he said that many terrorist groups operate in Afghanistan, not just ISIL-KP. Going back to the discussion of the amendment, the Rapporteur proposed to use “ISIL-KP (also known as Daesh)”. This was accepted and the paragraph was adopted as amended.

62. Amendment 1 was withdrawn by its author Karl A. Lamers (DE).

63. Amendment 5 and 6, both proposed by Mr Connolly were adopted with no objection. The paragraphs were adopted as amended. Amendment 7 was accepted. The last amendment authored by Mr Lamers was also accepted. Both paragraphs were adopted as amended.

64. The Chairman then asked the members to vote on the resolution as a whole as amended. **The draft Resolution [183 DSC 19 E] was adopted unanimously**. This marked the ending of Committee proceedings for the day; Mr Turner adjourned the meeting.

Sunday 13 October 2019

65. The meeting reconvened on Sunday 13 October at 9:30. The Chairman proposed to change the agenda and removed the formal coffee break, since the meeting started late due to logistical issues.

XIII. Consideration of the draft Report of the DSCFC *NATO Exercises – Evolution and Lessons Learned* [137 DSCFC 19 E] by Lara MARTINHO (Portugal), Rapporteur, presented by Utku CAKIROZER (Turkey), Vice-Chairperson

66. Mr Turner invited Utku Cakirozer, Vice-Chairperson of the DSCFC, to present the draft Report of the Sub-Committee *NATO Exercises – Evolution and Lessons Learned*. Mr Cakirozer replaced Lara Martinho (PT) who could not attend the session because of parliamentary elections in Portugal.

67. Mr Cakirozer explained that the draft Report highlights the benefits of an expanding exercise regime to test, train, and prepare Alliance forces for an increasingly complex international security environment. He emphasised the updates compared with the version presented in Bratislava. This edition incorporated sections on: military mobility challenge, Russian nuclear exercising, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Centre, biological and chemical warfare, the importance of exercising with key partners like Georgia, and NATO-EU joint exercising. The Vice-Chairperson explained the importance of paying attention to Allied exercising, since until recently, Russia was far surpassing NATO efforts. He then stated that the Alliance is now shrinking the gap, as illustrated by *Trident Juncture 2018*. Mr Cakirozer next talked about the benefits of multinational exercising. In addition to maintaining force readiness, those are: discovering potential deficiencies in military operations, cost-effectiveness, delivering key messages of deterrence and reassurance, and strengthening the transatlantic bond. Mr Cakirozer said NATO's 2019 exercise schedule is ambitious, totalling 102 discrete exercises and reflecting NATO's 360-degree approach to security. They include, for instance, command post exercises, cyber exercises, or exercises with partners. Therefore, the draft Report argues that NATO is doing more and more to confront the new threats it faces, from asymmetric challenges in the South to a modernised and increasingly unpredictable Russian military in the East. Mr Cakirozer however pointed out that the remaining question is whether this is enough. Last month, Russia conducted its annual strategic exercise, *Tsentr 2019*. It is clear Russia remains focused on maintaining its annual large-scale exercises to demonstrate the potential of its new modern armed forces and its ability to build a non-Western block. In its conclusion, the draft Report emphasised that the Alliance must remain equal to the Russian challenge today and urged the Allies to do more. It encouraged member governments and countries to support funding initiatives for the large-scale training exercises that are necessary in today's security environment. It also urged parliamentarians to champion the value of these exercises in their parliaments and in their home constituencies. Finally, it advised NATO parliamentarians to help tackle the military mobility challenge by investigating how they can contribute to streamlining customs procedures or supporting infrastructure development at home.

68. **The draft Report [137 DSCFC 19 E] was adopted with unanimous consent.**

XIV. Keir GILES, Research Director, Conflict Studies Research Centre, on *Russia is back! (where it started)*

69. **Keir Giles** started his intervention by explaining his argument: the Ukraine crisis between Russia and the West was a symptom, not a cause, of the deep-seated and long-term incompatibility of the views of the world held by Russia and by the Euro-Atlantic community. He added that the state of confrontation between Russia and the West was an enduring state of affairs. Pretence at friendship or indeed strategic partnership with Moscow had only been possible while Russia was in a position of relative weakness. Consequently, it was the preceding 25 years of relative calm that were the exception to the norm in relations between Russia and Europe. He finally argued that the long-term outlook will be continuing conflict and confrontation with Russia.

70. Mr Giles then explained that Russia is back in a form which is overwhelmingly familiar. The aspects of Moscow's current behaviour that surprise and dismay Western leaders are in fact Russia reverting to means of dealing with internal and external challenges that have been remarkably consistent over centuries. The speaker noted that one lesson can be learned from the Cold War: coexistence is possible while accepting that the strategic interests of Moscow and the West are incompatible. At the time, there was no coordinated attempt by either side to reconcile their conflicting views of the world, since this did not appear possible or perhaps even necessary. If the West renounces its hope that Russia will turn out to be the kind of country with which it can get along, then mutual understanding with Russia should be possible. Mr Giles told the Committee that a willingness to accept confrontation and invest in prevailing

in it is the only way of constraining Russian ambition and hostile intent. He deplored current efforts to reset the relationship without addressing its fundamental contradictions. Deterrence of Russian adventurism in Europe, he said, consists in ensuring that Russia does not perceive deficits of political, or military, or societal power - or of the will to employ them. A policy of de-escalation, in Russia's view, equates to a weakness that can be exploited.

71. He then explained it is dangerous to assume that political change in Russia is desirable because it will necessarily be an improvement. Things could be far worse with Russia. Moscow's approach is to probe and provoke adversaries, but not enough to cause military escalation that exceeds the Kremlin's tolerance. He also deplored that the extent and volume of Russia's hostile activity remain largely outside public consciousness. He outlined multiple problems with NATO's approach. First, by not properly publicising Russian irresponsible behaviour, it cedes the information space to Moscow instead of properly educating Western publics. Second, it leads to an inadequate perception of threat among Western populations and political leaders.

72. Mr Giles concluded that Russia must be contained. Clear signalling and setting of boundaries will assist in deterring, defending, and contesting in a calibrated and measured way. Before dealing with Russia, however, we need to address our own challenges. Russian power is still a function of Western incoherence, division and disunity.

73. Mr Turner opened the discussion by asking Mr Giles' thoughts on Russia's use of nuclear weapons and the escalate to de-escalate policy. The speaker answered that there is no such stated policy. It is however true that assumptions about nuclear use are changing, as illustrated by the demise of the INF Treaty. Mr Giles said this was not a surprise but a long-term ambition which dates to the earliest days of Mr Putin's presidency, when he prioritised the creation of missiles that would be in breach of the INF Treaty to correct a perceived imbalance. He concluded the roots of the issue lie in the period when nobody was paying attention to Russia because of the gap between its stated goals and ambitions and its military capabilities.

74. Nicholas Soames then asked who approaches a policy of dealing with Russia in a sensible way. Mr Giles said we have to take lessons from the Baltic states' mix of pragmatism and principles when dealing with Russia. There are ways to work with Moscow on a day-to-day basis that do not sacrifice our interests. He illustrated this point with Finland's behaviour, which balances the recognition of Russia as an immediate threat and the need to engage with Russia where it is essential, for instance the economy.

75. **Wouter De Vriendt** (BE) asked first if the Russian economy was ready for this confrontation. He then talked about the EU's approach to Russia and asked if the EU should maintain its sanctions and relaunch the NATO-Russia council to reopen dialogue. Mr Giles explained that dialogue must not be just for the purpose of having diplomacy, or it could be seen as a concession to Russia. The purpose of dialogue should be to establish the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to re-establish stability and predictability. He also said sanctions are necessary and are now doing exactly what they were intended to do. The problem was that their objectives were not properly explained when they were designed.

76. **Juozas Olekas** (EP) asked how to strengthen, on the one hand, cooperation with partners such as Ukraine and Georgia, and on the other hand, EU-NATO cooperation. Mr Giles responded by saying the EU is the one area where Russia could prevail. The EU has failed to address the non-military threats, where Russia is more active and present. He reminded that after the Warsaw summit, there was a joint declaration that the EU would boost resilience in front-line states. Yet there has not been much coordination. As a result, parallel measures have been taken. He noted the United Kingdom's Joint Expeditionary Force, to work in situations where Article 5 does not apply, and the Zinc network, to share resources and counter disinformation.

77. Gatis Eglitis asked about the resilience of the Russian government despite the economic hardship. Mr Giles said that we cannot assume the patience of the population will never be exhausted. He however does not think the regime will crumble. The economy is not as weak as it is often reported and Moscow is controlling its defence budgets. He also underscored that a contest between Russia and the West need not be a contest of GDPs, particularly if Russia wishes to make the conflict swift and have it lead to a *fait accompli* that the West has to accept instead of engaging in a proactive conflict where Moscow knows it would not prevail.

78. **Fikri Isik** (TR) asked how Russia's relations with China will be evolving and how this will affect NATO-Russia relations. Mr Giles explained that the relations with China are less predictable because Russia does not accept its economic and demographic decline within the relationship. The Russian leadership does not hint at possibilities of tensions with China, which does not even feature in Moscow's military strategy.

79. **Giorgi Kandelaki** (GE) mentioned the recent murder of a Georgian intelligence officer in Berlin. He enquired about the significance of this event for the overall context and for the extent of Russia's adventurism. Mr Giles said this question relates to the urgent desire of European states to reset the relationship without discussing the contradictions. He explained there is a cycle where resetting the relationship does not work, creating disappointment and then new tensions. Regarding the murder, he said the implications were already clear because of the very different reactions of the UK government in the Skripal case and of the German government, which is not interested in taking action and publicising the event. He then nuanced Russia's adventurism. Except those attacks on individuals or cyberattacks, the pattern of Russia's action has always been to stop the degradation in a situation where, by Moscow's criteria, its sovereignty is threatened (for instance Syria and Crimea). Russia is not destabilising situations which are stable by its standards. However, Mr Giles underscored that we should think about our reaction if this situation was to occur.

XV. Round table discussion on North Atlantic Security

- **Consideration of the draft Report of the DSCTC *Evolving Security in the North Atlantic* [138 DSCTC 19 E] by Sir Nicholas SOAMES (United Kingdom), Rapporteur**

80. Mr Turner invited Sir Nicholas Soames to present the DSCTC's draft Report *Evolving Security in the North Atlantic*.

81. The Rapporteur started his presentation by declaring that the strategic importance of the North Atlantic and its surrounding waters should neither be underestimated, nor taken for granted. Russia, however, is increasingly challenging Allies' ability to command and control this area. Sir Nicholas gave the example of the Northern Fleet's increasing patrolling activities in the North Atlantic. The Rapporteur said that for Russia, unrestrained access to the Atlantic is a vital interest. According to NATO commanders, Russia has increased its naval patrols in the region and its submarine activity in the North Atlantic is at its highest level since the Cold War. Sir Nicholas next explained that Russian military modernisation has prioritised the development of new, high-quality maritime capabilities. He further detailed these new capabilities, such as submarines, patrol boats, frigates, destroyers, and the *Kalibr* missile system. These systems are regarded as a serious challenge to Allied freedom of manoeuvre on land, in the air, and at sea. The Rapporteur stressed that Russia's increased presence in the North Atlantic poses a very real challenge, particularly if it gains control of the crucial corridors between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom known as the GIUK gap. Since the end of the Cold War, he continued, NATO has removed or decommissioned many of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets invested there. Sir Nicholas Soames explained this has limited the Alliance's ability to track Russian assets operating in the area today. He then described the threats this has created. The first threat is conventional. An enhanced Russian ability to operate unseen could hinder Allied military movements in the

event of a conflict, thereby weakening NATO's overall deterrence posture. The second threat is non-military. The Rapporteur explained that the North Atlantic combines vital commercial shipping lanes, significant Allied oil and gas reserves, and critical undersea cables. Russia's presence in the North Atlantic is therefore a threat to Allies' trade, and financial and communication systems. Sir Nicholas continued by explaining that after years of waning attention, NATO has recently begun to rise to the task. He then gave examples of steps taken. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, member countries agreed to establish Joint Force Command Norfolk, which will oversee NATO's ASW activities and protect strategic lines of communication in the North Atlantic. Moreover, Allied nations have begun investing in the capabilities needed to monitor and secure the North Atlantic, and the US Navy reactivated its Second Fleet. The draft Report noted as a final example NATO's use of its enhanced exercise programme to train for ASW and increase its understanding of how to operate in the complex security environment of the North Atlantic today. Sir Nicholas Soames however said that more can and should be done. He repeated that Russia has modernised its navy and increased its activities. He also explained Moscow has even reoccupied seven former Soviet bases in the Arctic. These new assets are further strengthened by a series of Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) coastal-defence missile systems, as well as new land-based aircraft and air-defence systems. As a result, the Russian Navy's ability to challenge Allied freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic and its attached water spaces is at its most capable since the Cold War. The draft Report concluded with the following recommendations. First, it urged Allies to reopen former bases, or open new ones, in strategically significant locations in and around the North Atlantic. Second, it encouraged Allied governments and parliaments to pursue their greater investment in naval capabilities, particularly advanced maritime patrol aircraft. Thirdly, it advised European Allies to modernise their infrastructure. Finally, it urged NATO to expand its anti-submarine exercising in the North Atlantic.

82. Alec Shelbrooke asked whether Allies should accelerate the recapitalisation of their navy. The Rapporteur answered that NATO navies do not have enough ships. The ongoing programmes of ship purchases will need to be sped up to respond to the threats in the North Atlantic.

83. **Thorgerdur K. Gunnarsdottir** (IS), after highlighting Iceland's strategic position, talked about climate change in the Arctic. She urged NATO Allies to recognise that climate change is a shared risk, just like Russia or the Belt and Road Initiative. She said Allies must focus on finding a strategic response to it. Sir Nicholas agreed on the importance of the issue. He explained that NATO has taken steps but needs to accelerate its response. He also concurred with the affirmation that climate change must be part of any strategic planner's strategic thinking.

84. **The draft Report [138 DSCTC 19 E] was adopted unanimously.**

85. **Commodore Marcel Hallé,** Deputy Chief of Staff Plans, Allied Maritime Command Northwood, first commended the NATO PA for its role in advancing awareness about NATO's security challenges. He then noted that in the post-Cold War era, most Allies significantly reduced their military capabilities, as illustrated by the documented decline in Allied ASW capabilities in the decades following 1991. In the current context of "contested peace", however, NATO has seized the problem and is looking to close the gap, he said.

86. The speaker then argued that the lead up to the 2014 annexation of Crimea had been unfolding for some time, when Mr Putin started modernising his forces. He explained that the Soviet approach of quantity over quality has given way to a more sophisticated force that has demonstrated its joint-force capabilities in Syria and Ukraine, but also in its recent exercises such as *Ocean Shield*. Commodore Hallé continued by stating that given the importance of the North Atlantic, we must not isolate it from other areas of Russia's activity. Around 80% of SACEUR's area of responsibility rests in the maritime domain. He told the delegation the

Readiness Action Plan was too land-centric, as noted by the Secretary General during the 2018 Brussels Summit, and NATO decided to look more at the maritime domain.

87. Commodore Hallé then said that the post-Cold War landscape in this domain has changed greatly. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia has secured a foothold in Tartus, Syria, which means a continuous and more responsive presence in the region. In the North Atlantic, Russia has emerging and increasing maritime capabilities, especially with regards to the range and lethality of weapon systems, submarines, and A2/AD capabilities. The new Russian guided missile-submarines *Severodvinsk* is a case in point. Another challenge is the risk of damaging or destruction of vital undersea infrastructures, especially cables. Therefore, the Commodore affirmed that monitoring Russia's activity across this spectrum is essential to understand and analyse its behaviour. He then outlined a number of measures taken to shape NATO's deterrence posture and better equip the Alliance. The Standing Naval Forces broke into four groups in addition to other joint assets, such as the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and in the future, the Global Hawk. NATO is adapting its command structure to be more robust, which is witnessed by a greater investment in capabilities, the creation of a third joint force HQ in Norfolk, a joint Enabling Command for the Rear command, a logistics command, and a theatre component command for each domain. He also said that MARCOM, the maritime theatre component commander level and principal adviser to SACEUR on maritime matters, works closely with the other theatre components. Finally, the speaker mentioned the *Four 30s* initiative. He said that the maritime component, 40 combat vessels, will be in addition to the current construct of the Standing Naval Forces.

88. Commodore Hallé then explained that the exercise programme has also changed. In addition to the ASW exercises *Manta* and *Mongoose*, there are new exercises such as *Steadfast Defender*, of which part 1 will focus on North Atlantic sea lines of communication, and the annual exercise *First Defender*, which will commence in 2021. The speaker also noted the recent stand up of the US Second Fleet. He said NATO thereby gains a greater understanding of Russia's maritime capabilities, threats, and norms. He also noted Russia's overly aggressive behaviour, with electronic warfare jamming, particularly GPS, as well as intrusion in exercises.

89. The speaker then discussed the rise of China. China's number of vessels has exceeded that of the US Navy. Its presence in NATO's maritime areas of interest has increased and it is engaging in bilateral exercises with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO must therefore deal with potential encounters with China, which would probably be in the Pacific. The speaker however emphasised that NATO must also keep other areas of focus in the maritime domain. NATO has developed the Allied Reinforcement Maritime Posture that recently delivered the maritime operational concept policy. The Commodore said that more must be done in the ASW area, particularly regarding autonomous vehicles and greater experimentation. Efforts are already underway, as illustrated by revamped exercise programmes and recapitalisation processes. Finally, he took the example of Canada to illustrate what NATO nations are doing. He mentioned the new maritime helicopter capability acquired by the country, the *Cyclone*; the recent upgrade of Canada's maritime patrol aircraft fleet; the delivery of Arctic and offshore patrol vessels; the delivery of two ships as part of the replacement programme; the ongoing destroyer and frigate replacement with the intent to build 15 *Type 26* ships; the modernisation of submarine capabilities; and the building of a new ice breaker for coast guards.

90. Alec Shelbrooke opened the discussion. He asked how to counterbalance threats on undersea cables. Commodore Hallé said this could come with a combination of autonomous vehicles and new technologies. He highlighted the importance of joint capability. Drawing from the example of ASW capabilities, he explained we need to better understand what our enemy's capabilities are and how we must react.

91. **Pierre-Hughes Boisvenu** (CA) asked the Commodore's opinion about the ongoing recapitalisation of the Canadian navy and how it could help NATO's operations in the North Atlantic. The speaker emphasised he was proud of these efforts, which demonstrate the willingness to close the gap with the Cold War era. He also said we would need to see when those capabilities would be delivered and how they would be integrated into NATO's.

92. **Paul Cook** (US) said that in the past, carriers have received most of the funding to the detriment of submarines. He therefore commended the committee for raising this point. The Commodore added that although it is important to look at capability gaps within the Alliance, decisions are eventually made based on national factors, among which economic factors play a key role.

93. Gatis Eglitis mentioned NATO's assessment of its maritime posture in the Baltic sea, especially above the Kalinin line, and the possibility of using the port of Liepaja to accommodate Allied military assets. The speaker described NATO's increased maritime presence in the Black Sea. Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 1 and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG2) 1 find themselves in the northern half of the Allied maritime area of operations, and SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 in the southern part. In the Baltic region, he noted the Enhanced Forward Presence and the Air Policing assurance measures. Finally, on the maritime front, he said NATO wants to continue increasing the relationship between maritime and land capabilities. This acts as a deterrent in itself.

94. **José Maria Figaredo** (ES) asked first if NATO should adapt its deterrence posture to avoid further escalation. He then enquired about NATO's strategy and initiatives to avoid future tensions with China. The Commodore assured that NATO determines its deterrence posture with the understanding of striking the right balance and with the goal of avoiding escalation. Concerning China, he reiterated that as a maritime actor, Beijing is getting more global and is reaching towards the High North. He said NATO must monitor that and include it in its posture.

XVI. Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution *Supporting NATO's Post-INF Treaty Defence and Deterrence Posture* [182 DSC 19 E] by Joseph A. DAY (Canada), General Rapporteur

95. The Chairman proposed to change the agenda and to consider first the amendments to the draft resolution *Supporting NATO's Post-INF Treaty Defence and Deterrence Posture*. He also proposed to use the same procedure as the day before. The Committee agreed.

96. The General Rapporteur read amendment 2, which proposed to delete the word "escalating" in the first paragraph. After Mr Turner explained the importance of this specific semantic, Germany accepted to withdraw the amendment.

97. Amendment 5, suggested by Yehor Cherniev, Solomiia Bobrovska and Andriy Klochko (UA), was adopted with unanimous consent. The same authors also tabled amendment 6, which was adopted with a slight modification. The same delegates also put forward amendment 7, which after discussion, was adopted as initially proposed.

98. Amendment 1, tabled by Mr Connolly, was then considered. The amendment was adopted with unanimous consent.

99. Mr Cambon and Mr Folliot put forward amendment 4. It proposed, after the words "New START", to leave out the remainder of the paragraph and to insert "now the only remaining strategic nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, which is due to expire in 2021, and calling for its extension beyond the date given its importance in re-establishing a framework of security and trust in Europe that also takes the new strategic balances into account". Mr Turner noted this is a treaty between the United States and Russia,

of which European partners are not part. He therefore proposed to use “encouraging” instead of “calling for” and to leave out the rest. This was accepted.

100. The Committee finally considered amendment 3, moved by Mr Lamers. Its author wanted to use “safe, secure and effective” instead of “strong, capable and survivable”. The Rapporteur explained the idea was to use the same wording as in the report. Mr Lamers said he would like to underscore the technical aspect of the safety of nuclear weapons. The members eventually agreed on adding “safe, secure” before “strong, capable and survivable”.

101. The DSC then voted. **The draft Resolution [182 DSC 19 E] was adopted with unanimous consent.** Mr Turner closed the discussion by thanking Joseph A. Day, who was retiring from the Canadian senate.

XVII. Election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers

102. The Chairman then moved on to the election of Committee and Sub-Committee Officers. He said there were several vacant positions and positions in which the standing officer was not up for reelection, as already explained in his opening remarks the previous day. Given that the elections were not contested, he proposed to proceed by acclamation. The DSC therefore elected by acclamation: **Cédric Perrin** (FR) as DSC Rapporteur; **Roberta Pinotti** (IT) as Vice-Chairperson of the DSC; **Alec Shelbrooke** (UK) as Chairperson of the DSCFC; **Brendan Boyle** (US) as Vice-Chairperson of the DSCFC; **Gatis Eglitis** (LV) and **Nicu Falcoi** (RO) as Vice-Chairpersons of the DSCTC; **Bob Stewart** (UK) and **Nicu Falcoi** (RO) as members of the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council. The members then reelected by acclamation all other Committee and Sub-Committee officers who were seeking re-election. Mr Turner declared all eligible officers reelected for one year.

XVIII. Presentation by Senator David FAWCETT (Australia) on *Countering Foreign Interference and Espionage*, followed by a discussion

103. David Fawcett explained that his objective was to give a cyber view on hybrid warfare. He said that Australia, given its geographic location, has a different view on the world but shares the Allies’ interest in preserving the rules-based order. He then stated that the risk of terrorism has plateaued and that we need to rebuild and extend capabilities for conventional, high-intensity warfare. He also underscored that espionage is now a far broader concept in hybrid warfare. The shaping phase for the next conflict is underway, marked by an unprecedented level of foreign intelligence activity.

104. Senator Fawcett then detailed national security measures taken by Australia to make sure that its critical infrastructure is safe from foreign interference. He first mentioned the 2018 Security of Critical Infrastructure Act. This law aims to protect basic infrastructures like water supplies or energy, but also in areas such as IT. He reminded the audience that Australia will not accept companies who are exposed to extra-jurisdiction coercion from the United States, for instance Huawei. The speaker then talked about the 2018 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act. It states that registrants must disclose information about the nature of their relationship with a foreign principal and the activities they are undertaking on behalf of the foreign principal. This provides the public and decision-makers with visibility over the nature, level and extent of foreign influence in Australia. A third measure is the 2018 National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act. Mr Fawcett explained that in the digital age, the act of acquiring companies or intellectual property theft has become part of espionage. The act provides a range of measures to give law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools to act against these actions. For instance, it introduces new foreign interference offences; reforms the Commonwealth’s secrecy offences; introduces a new theft or trade secrets offence; etc. Finally, the Senator talked about the creation of the Foreign

Investment Review Board. This entity examines proposals by foreign persons to invest in Australia and makes recommendations to the Treasurer.

105. Mr Fawcett then described Australia's defence policy. He explained that the country revaluated its strategic position with the 2016 Defence White Paper. Australia is facing an environment characterised by a growing intent and capability to challenge the rules-based order. In 20 years, half of the submarines and half of the world's advanced combat aircraft will be operating in the region. In response, Australia has taken measures. It has committed to a USD 200 billion investment program over the decade and to spend 2% of its GDP. It has contracted 57 new surface ships and submarines. Furthermore, it has decided to invest in infrastructure and enablers such as port infrastructure or information and communication technologies (ICT).

106. As explained by the speaker, Australia has also adopted the 2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan. Mr Fawcett explained that Australia's defence industry does not allow the country to design, manufacture and produce everything it needs. To avoid relying on other countries, it has sought a combination of national capabilities and joint development projects with the United States and European nations. The Senator then outlined his country's investment in defence capabilities, which cover the sea, air and land capabilities. For instance, Australia has contracted 12 attack class submarines; Hunter class frigates; 72 Joint Strike Fighters; P8 and Triton; armoured vehicles; etc. Moreover, he underscored the focus on enabling capabilities, i.e. ICT, critical infrastructure, and logistics. He said NATO should look at federated mission networks and the work in Estonia's Cyber Centre of Excellence to address inefficiencies identified in some combat systems by the US government Accountability Office report of October 2018. Finally, he explained that Australia is reinvesting in its land capabilities, after decades focused on counter terrorism operations in the Middle East. The Senator concluded by saying that the view from the South is that we need to be prepared for conventional conflicts. Although Australia understands NATO's focus on Russia, the speaker encouraged the Committee to look globally. He also highlighted the importance of cyber warfare and of protecting the enablers that will develop and sustain the necessary military capabilities.

107. Mr Turner first thanked Mr Fawcett for acknowledging the risks regarding ownership of companies, as illustrated with Huawei. Sir Nicholas Soames then asked about Australia's oversight mechanisms on relevant entities. Senator Fawcett explained there are two main oversight committees; the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which is the oversight committee on intelligence agencies.

108. Mariana Bezuhla asked how to strike a balance between taking international investments and enforcing national security. The speaker outlined three scenarios. A first one is when a nation state that is not a close ally wishes to invest in a company close to a strategic area. He explained this will be refused. In a second scenario, a company wishes to invest in a critical infrastructure, significantly changing the national degree of control. This will also be rejected. In other areas however, Foreign Direct Investments are welcome, as economic factors must also be considered.

XIX. Date and place of next meeting

109. The Chairperson announced the entire committee will reconvene at the Joint Committee meetings in Brussels from 17-19 February 2020. He also said the Spring session will take place in Kyiv, Ukraine, from 22-25 May next year.

XX. Any other business

110. No other business was raised.

XXI. Closing remarks

111. Mr Turner thanked everyone for their constructive participation and expressed gratitude toward guest speakers and the host nation. Finally, he thanked Committee Secretary Meltem Şener, Committee Director Ethan Corbin, Committee Coordinator Jailee Rychen, and Research Assistant and notetaker Clara Durovray.