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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

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NATO 2030: A MORE UNITED AND STRONGER ALLIANCE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE*

DECLARATION 460

The Assembly,

1. **Saluting** the timely decision by Allied Heads of State and Government in December 2019 to launch a forward-looking reflection process, under the auspices of the NATO Secretary General, to further strengthen the political dimension of the Alliance, including consultation;
2. **Noting** that the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath have brought to light important lessons which Allies must learn as part of this reflection process;
3. **Welcoming** the valuable work conducted by the Group of Experts in support of the NATO Secretary General's efforts;
4. **Applauding** the NATO Secretary General's NATO 2030 initiative and the three priorities it lays out for the Alliance, namely being strong and united politically, staying strong militarily and taking a broader approach globally;
5. **Emphasising** the important opportunity this process offers to engage the Alliance's publics and thereby strengthen public understanding and support for the Alliance;
6. **Convinced** that NATO's strength now and tomorrow lies in its commitment to shared values and to the transatlantic bond;
7. **Recognising** that NATO must continue to adapt to meet its core task of collective defence, while defending against new threats and rising to emerging challenges;
8. **Acknowledging** that NATO's actions and partnerships contribute not only to Euro-Atlantic security but also to security in its neighbourhood and on the global stage;
9. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - 9.1 **Priority 1: Europe and North America United Around Shared Transatlantic Values**
 - a. to reaffirm the indivisibility of Europe and North America's security and the centrality of the transatlantic bond for Allies' foreign policy and defence policies;
 - b. to rededicate the Alliance to the shared democratic values that constitute its founding principles, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, by recalling the obligations resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty and the recommendation previously adopted by the Assembly to consider the creation of institutional mechanisms within NATO to assist NATO member states that seek to strengthen their democratic institutions;
 - c. to foster the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and subsequent resolutions, including by promoting gender equality and mainstreaming gender through all NATO policies;

* presented by the Standing Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

- d. to reaffirm NATO's role as the unique and essential forum for transatlantic security consultations;
- e. to increase the scope and frequency of political consultation and develop a range of tools to facilitate the convergence of views among Allies, increase predictability of national actions and resolve any differences in full respect of international law; these could include more regular exchanges on national strategic priorities and operations, increased intelligence sharing, as well as, when needed, the use of mediation or the setting up of *ad hoc* working groups to address divisive issues;
- f. to make informal meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) a regular new practice as well as consider new formats for the NAC as appropriate;
- g. to strengthen the role of the NATO Secretary General as facilitator of consensus-building among the Allies;
- h. to take full advantage of the Assembly's role as a forum for frank political exchanges by increasing dialogue between the NAC and the NATO PA at all levels;
- i. to continue and reinforce efforts to implement the Defence Investment Pledge and parallel efforts in terms of capabilities and contributions to operations, as fair sharing between the Allies of the burdens and responsibilities for defence is crucial for Alliance cohesion and necessary to maintain and, where necessary, rebuild the military capabilities to deter and defend against potential adversaries; initiatives aimed at reinforcing European defence must be conducted in complementarity with the strengthening of NATO;
- j. to support the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and relevant national actors, including parliamentarians, in their efforts to increase public awareness and understanding of NATO, to reach out to new generations of Europeans and North Americans, and to help build grassroots solidarity among Allied societies;
- k. to reaffirm their commitment to NATO's Open Door policy as a tool to enlarge the zone of stability and spread democratic standards throughout Europe, to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine, and to help strengthen their resilience against foreign interference.

9.2 Priority 2: An Alliance Fit to Address Evolving Threats and Challenges at 360 Degrees

- a. to update NATO's Strategic Concept to reflect the changed security environment;
- b. to reaffirm that NATO's greatest responsibility is to protect and defend collectively its territory and populations against attacks;
- c. to continue to affirm the crucial role of a safe and resilient nuclear deterrent for the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture, and to strengthen NATO's contribution to effective arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, taking into account the prevailing security environment;
- d. to continue to strengthen NATO's enhanced deterrence and defence posture in the East and the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and to continue to adapt collective defence and deterrence to new threats, including hybrid actions, and new domains of conflict, including cyber and space;

- e. to maintain NATO's policy towards Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence as well as openness for meaningful dialogue, while holding Russia accountable for its unacceptable violations of international laws and norms and adopting necessary responses;
- f. to reaffirm NATO's readiness to address any threats and challenges which have the potential to affect Euro-Atlantic security at 360 degrees;
- g. to further enhance NATO and Allies' counterterrorism efforts, and continue to share assessments about the future evolutions of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations;
- h. to strengthen support to stability and defence and related security capacity building in the partner countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea and in the sub-Saharan area, including within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), and stand ready to support selected partners upon request, given the increasing instability on NATO's southern flank, especially the crises in Syria, Libya, and the ensuing migratory flows;
- i. to better understand the consequences of the rise of China, to assess the opportunities and challenges that its global ambitions and actions – as well as its cooperation with Russia – could pose to NATO and the Allies, and to examine the possibilities for a closer dialogue with China; in this respect, exchanges with relevant NATO partners, the European Union and partners in the Asia-Pacific region should be pursued;
- j. to continue to assist Allies in building their resilience to hybrid threats, disinformation, and other attempts at undermining democratic processes and political and economic independence including – in full respect for national prerogatives – in the areas of foreign investments and technological reliance;
- k. to contribute to the improvement of their ability to deal with future natural or man-made health emergencies;
- l. to bolster NATO's situational awareness in the Arctic region, including through greater information sharing, the creation of a working group on the Arctic, and training and exercises, and to maintain a good dialogue with Allies about search and rescue capabilities in the region;
- m. to fully recognise climate change-related risks as significant threat multipliers in their foreign and security policies, and increase the frequency of military and political consultations on climate change within NATO;
- n. to step up investment and Allied collaboration in defence science, technology, research and development to maintain NATO's scientific and technological edge, especially in emerging and disruptive technologies and new domains of warfare, consistent with Allies' international obligations.

9.3 Priority 3: An Alliance with a Global Voice and Broad Network of Partners

- a. to stress that NATO can contribute to both Euro-Atlantic and global security by working hand-in-hand with, and building the capacity of, its partners around the world;
- b. to emphasise NATO's commitment and role in safeguarding the rules-based international order;

- c. to continue to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, ensuring coherence and complementarity, with a view to enhancing NATO and EU members' response to common challenges;
- d. to ensure the fullest involvement of non-EU Allied countries in efforts to enhance European security and defence in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of the two organisations;
- e. to continue to develop political and practical cooperation with the United Nations, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other relevant international organisations;
- f. to establish a NATO-certified Centre of Excellence on the Indo-Pacific region.

FURTHERING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 AND THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA*

RESOLUTION 461

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** that, in October 2000, twenty years ago, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), which recognised the specific impact of conflict on women and girls and acknowledged women's essential role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as in peacemaking and peacebuilding;
2. **Reaffirming** the importance of fully implementing UNSC resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on WPS;
3. **Reminding** that 2020 also marks the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a critical milestone in the realisation of gender equality and the advancement of the rights of women and girls worldwide;
4. **Saluting** NATO's adoption of measures supporting the advancement of gender equality through the three guiding principles of integration, inclusiveness, and integrity;
5. **Restating** its commitment to furthering the aims of UNSC resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, including within its own organisation;
6. **Bearing in mind** that conflicts disproportionately affect women and put them more at risk of violence and exploitation as conflicts amplify entrenched inequalities, strain social relations, and weaken community support mechanisms;
7. **Emphasising** that sexual violence is recognised under certain conditions as a crime against humanity and a war crime, and that its use as a tactic of war is prohibited;
8. **Reaffirming** that the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda, and the advancement of gender equality more broadly, should constitute constant guiding principles in the development and execution of all policies and activities in the area of peace and security;
9. **Restating** that the equal participation and full involvement of women and men at all levels is indispensable to prevent and resolve conflicts and to achieve sustainable peace, security, and economic development;
10. **Convinced** that the participation of both women and men in military operations improves their operational effectiveness and credibility, as well as contributes to a stronger and broader engagement with the local population;
11. **Reiterating** that all parties involved in armed conflicts must cease and prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse and take special measures to protect women and girls from sexual violence;

* presented by the Committee on Civil Dimension of Security and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

12. **Stressing** the importance of paying particular attention in relief and recovery efforts to the needs of the most vulnerable, including survivors of sexual violence, displaced women and girls, and those with disabilities, and of systematically including them in the design and implementation of such efforts;
13. **Acknowledging** the crucial role played by women in building more resilient and democratic societies and as such in ensuring durable peace, stability and security;
14. **Recognising** women's vital contribution in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences;
15. **URGES** Allied governments and parliaments and, where appropriate, NATO institutions:
 - a. to fully translate existing National Action Plans on the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 into concrete actions and, for those Allies that have not yet done so, to adopt such a plan;
 - b. to encourage the participation of women at all levels in their national armed forces and increase the share of female personnel deployed as part of NATO operations;
 - c. to strive for gender balance and advocate for the appointment of more women to leadership positions in international organisations, including at NATO, as well as in parliamentary and government institutions in the field of foreign policy, defence, and security;
 - d. to incorporate the particular needs, concerns, and interests of both women and men into all decisions and operations;
 - e. to provide all national armed forces and NATO personnel with trainings dedicated to gender mainstreaming and ensure that the principles of WPS are integrated in all NATO trainings for Allied armed forces and education activities for partner nations;
 - f. to actively involve women in the strategic reflection processes launched by Allied countries and NATO, in order to further integrate their perspectives in the development and analysis of future emerging security scenarios;
 - g. to take all possible measures to prevent any acts of sexual violence in conflict situations throughout all operations;
 - h. to increase financial funding and other resources for the implementation of the WPS agenda, both within and outside the Alliance, and to refrain from using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to reduce their efforts and lower their ambitions in this area;
 - i. to consistently prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence against women, as it is recognised under certain circumstances as a crime against humanity and a war crime;
 - j. to meet the needs of survivors, such as access to sexual and reproductive health services, psychological support, judicial redress, and financial reparations;
 - k. to include gender perspectives in post-conflict relief and recovery efforts and meet the needs of women and girls, in particular, in post-conflict settings;
 - l. to ensure, that local women's groups and civil society networks are informed of their rights and options, that they receive training as the need arises, and that such local actors are involved as equal partners in negotiations and decision-making processes;

- m. to intensify efforts to engage with and mobilise men as invested partners and actors of positive change through outreach and communication on the benefits for both men and women of the implementation of the WPS agenda;
- n. to cooperate more closely with partner countries, relevant international organisations, and institutions as well as civil society organisations on the implementation of the WPS agenda and to promote the exchange of information, lessons learnt, and best practices;
- o. to mainstream the importance of implementing the WPS agenda and, more broadly, of advancing gender equality into the “NATO 2030” reflection process;
- p. to integrate gender perspectives and to mainstream the advancement of the WPS agenda into their short- and long-term response to the pandemic and its social, economic and security consequences.

MAINTAINING ALLIED DEFENCE INVESTMENT MOMENTUM AFTER COVID-19*

RESOLUTION 462

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** the devastating tragedy of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has claimed more than a million human lives and continues to upend economies and societies across the globe;
2. **Applauding** the important role of Allied forces and structures, particularly the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, in the coordination and oversight of hundreds of medical relief missions, in support of national medical and civilian services, which mobilised over half a million men and women to provide critical support to civilian responses in both Allied and partner nations;
3. **Praising** Allies' demonstration of strong solidarity by stepping up to assist one another and their partners via the provision of critical supplies, personnel, military transport, logistical, and other support when the need was acute;
4. **Encouraged** that, while NATO continues to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic via relief missions to assist Allies and partners, Allies are also preparing for any future pandemics over the horizon via strategic planning, stockpiling, and investing;
5. **Highlighting** that, despite their engagement in the delivery of critical pandemic-related assistance to Allies and partners, NATO forces have seen to the seamless delivery of credible, capable, and effective defence and deterrence, keeping Allied missions and operations staffed and focused on their objectives, thereby clearly demonstrating their ability to respond rapidly to any threat;
6. **Concerned** that, despite the ongoing pandemic, international security challenges for Allies have not diminished, but have in fact been amplified, adding further complexity to an already volatile and increasingly dangerous international security environment;
7. **Denouncing** Russia's continued provocations, which not only display its new military capabilities, but also seek to probe NATO forces' readiness on land, in the air, at sea, and in space;
8. **Concerned** that the COVID-19 pandemic and the attendant economic downturn will put pressure on Allied defence budgets;
9. **Reaffirming** the Alliance's commitment to guarantee peace and security for its populations and the sovereign integrity of its territories, and to working with partner nations to help improve security and project stability; also, **stressing** that such commitments necessitate sustained investment in Allied defence and security institutions;
10. **Recalling** Allies' commitment in Wales in 2014 to reverse a downward trend in defence spending, which has resulted in six consecutive years during which total defence spending by European Allies and Canada has increased, resulting in over USD130 billion in new investments since 2016, and with 10 Allies surpassing the 2% GDP benchmark for spending on defence and others poised to do so;

* presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

11. **Remaining focused** on the central tenet of Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, which notes that all “Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”; and **stressing** that each Ally’s continued investment in its armed forces is what provides the Alliance with the means to fulfil its core tasks of collective defence, crisis response, and cooperative security;
12. **Determined** not to lose the defence investment momentum of the last six years, which has resulted in tangible gains and well positioned the Alliance to face the complexity of today’s international security environment,
13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to recognise the essential role their armed forces have played in mitigating the impact of the pandemic;
 - b. to thereby recommit to increase their spending to at least 2% of their GDP on defence and invest 20% or more on major equipment, including research and development, with a goal of meeting NATO’s capability targets and filling shortfalls;
 - c. to understand their continued increased defence investments act not only as a safeguard against future threats, but also against the next potential pandemic;
 - d. to remain committed to their national defence investment plans, which detail investments necessary to strengthen each Ally’s contribution to the fair sharing of the burden for the whole-of-Alliance effort to maintain a credible and strong defence and deterrence posture capable of maintaining peace and security at home and projecting stability abroad;
 - e. to focus their efforts to reduce overreliance on any single supplier country of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other technologies that may be critical during a future crisis;
 - f. to explore ways to strengthen Euro-Atlantic defence industrial cooperation, which will not only increase Alliance resilience, but also help revitalise defence industrial sectors that may be facing procurement and budgetary uncertainties as a result of the pandemic;
 - g. to increase investments in the medical components of member states’ armed forces in order to maintain and improve medical expertise within Allied armed forces;
 - h. to better protect critical Allied infrastructure from predatory investments by external actors, particularly when the potential investor is a strategic rival;
 - i. to invest in the infrastructure and institutions necessary to strengthen resilience in the face of pandemics, which, in turn, will allow national armed forces to remain focused on potential external threats;
 - j. to increase cooperation with the EU, particularly on military mobility to facilitate more efficient movement of Allied forces across Europe and help speed up the delivery of medical supplies and personnel responding to potential regional health emergencies.

ECONOMIC RESILIENCE AND PANDEMICS*

RESOLUTION 463

The Assembly,

1. **Noting** that the global community is currently undergoing the most consequential pandemic since the outbreak of the Spanish influenza in 1918-1919;
2. **Affirming** that beyond the horrific loss of life pandemics inflict, they are also essentially negative economic shocks that can affect supply, demand, monetary and fiscal conditions, while weakening consumer and investor confidence;
3. **Understanding** that measures undertaken to minimise the impact of a pandemic, such as enforced quarantines and travel bans, will undermine national economies over the short-term, although such measures can have salutary economic impacts over the longer term if they help limit the spread of catastrophic diseases;
4. **Realising** that those measures should strike the right balance between protecting public health and maintaining social and economic life;
5. **Acknowledging** that when the world's economies slow together, as they have during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a pro-cyclical impact that both hastens and deepens recession;
6. **Applauding** the emergency fiscal and monetary measures that North American and European governments as well as the EU have undertaken to counter the recessionary shock COVID-19 has inflicted;
7. **Lamenting** that a pandemic can also have a rapid and negative impact on trade, particularly once governments have shut down many commercial activities and undertaken measures to close borders;
8. **Underlining** that as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, heavily leveraged financial markets confront their gravest challenge since the 2008 global financial crisis;
9. **Warning** that this crisis has revealed that Allied countries are overly dependent on strategic rivals like China in several critical medical and high-technology sectors and that foreign investment in Western firms represents one means by which these countries potentially put vital supply chains at risk;
10. **Concerned** that developing countries confront particularly momentous challenges in the midst of this pandemic because of capital flight from poor to rich countries but also because many less well-off countries lack the financial means, technical capacity and social capital needed to cope with the medical and economic dimensions of the crisis;
11. **Acknowledging** that the economic destinies of North America and Europe are undergirded by a dense web of trade and investment relations as well as by essential diplomatic and security ties, of which NATO is the highest expression;

* presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

12. **Welcoming** the crucial role played by NATO structures supporting Allied and partner nations in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the contributions made by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) which facilitated crisis relief missions, including the provision of medical supplies and equipment;
13. **Noting** the paradox that defence budgets are politically vulnerable in a period of heightened scarcity but that, historically, geopolitical risks often mount precisely when an international economic crisis unfolds;
14. **Recognising** that the defence industrial sector currently confronts unique problems linked to procurement and budgetary uncertainties as well as a burgeoning crisis in civilian business sectors, which increasingly “spin-in” essential technologies to today’s defence platforms;
15. **Convinced** that pandemics are not one-off events, but rather recurrent over human history and that there is consequently every reason to anticipate new global epidemiological challenges over the coming decades;
16. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to acknowledge that failing to hedge against the likelihood of a future pandemic could be catastrophic and that states may need to partly restructure their approaches to public health to better react to this kind of emergency in the future;
 - b. to invest in infrastructure, institutions, personnel, equipment, training, procedures, contingency planning and thoroughly articulated international procedures to build national and international resilience in the face of pandemics;
 - c. to forge innovative partnerships among governments, scientists, and economists to better prepare for catastrophic risk and to ensure that there is strong international collaboration in the development of a vaccine against COVID-19;
 - d. to help counteract the economic and medical plight of developing countries, many of which have been struck very hard by the current crisis;
 - e. to mount clear and credible long-term strategies aiming to unwind debt burdens that will almost inevitably mount as the current crisis unfolds;
 - f. to intensify European and transatlantic monetary and fiscal cooperation while reinvigorating the transatlantic trade relationship, which has long provided a foundation of prosperity and well-being;
 - g. to monitor foreign investment in critical strategic sectors while reducing overreliance on any single supplier country of vital medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other critical technologies, particularly when the investing country is considered a strategic rival;
 - h. to nonetheless resist the temptation to engage in broader protectionism while reasserting a collective commitment to free trade and open markets;
 - i. to work with multilateral institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD which play a crucial role coordinating international economic strategies for coping with the economic fall-out from pandemics and to ensure that the WHO effectively coordinates global public health responses to pandemics;

- j. to redouble national and multilateral efforts to enhance the security of cyber-infrastructure, which plays a central role in sustaining economic activity during pandemics;
- k. to employ smarter collective approaches to defence procurement and deeper defence industrial and doctrinal cooperation, which will enhance efficiency, interoperability and military capabilities;
- l. to continue investing in military mobility across the Euro-Atlantic area which can, among other things, facilitate the rapid movement of medical supplies and personnel to regions struck by health emergencies;
- m. to rededicate themselves to allocating 2% of GDP to defence and 20% of overall defence spending on major equipment procurement and related research and development in order to ensure that Allies remain capable of defending their societies against geopolitical threats, some of which a pandemic and related economic crises will only exacerbate.

A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY ON CHINA*

RESOLUTION 464

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the People's Republic of China (henceforth China), as the world's most populous country, second biggest economy, second largest defence spender and a global technology leader has emerged as a highly consequential global strategic actor, which brings with it a duty to act responsibly and defend the rules-based global order;
2. **Mindful** that China's mounting influence on the international stage and in multilateral forums has consequences for Euro-Atlantic security, that this presents both opportunities and challenges which the Alliance needs to address jointly, as Allied leaders recognised at the December 2019 London meeting; and that this is one of the themes identified by NATO's Secretary General within the framework of the NATO 2030 reflection process;
3. **Welcoming** the existing avenues for dialogue and cooperation between NATO and China, and **convinced** that a transatlantic strategy on China must seek cooperation wherever possible while being clear-eyed about the multifaceted challenges posed by China's rise;
4. **Underscoring** that the Chinese leadership does not share the liberal democratic values that underpin the Alliance, that it acts to undermine elements of the rules-based liberal world order while threatening open societies and that it attempts to export its authoritarian governance model;
5. **Cognisant** that China is rapidly developing and deploying advanced military capabilities, including intercontinental nuclear missiles, hypersonic weapons and blue-water naval capabilities, while refusing to engage in arms control negotiations in key areas;
6. **Troubled** by China's increasingly assertive international behaviour, including diplomatic and economic bullying, regional brinkmanship, demonstrations of force in the South and East China Seas as well as in the Himalayas, military exercises in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean and its blatant disregard for international maritime law, especially in the South China Sea;
7. **Closely monitoring** China's strategic ambitions and activities in the Arctic region;
8. **Strongly condemning** massive human rights violations, including the crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong and oppression of religious and ethnic minorities, particularly members of the Uyghur and Tibetan communities;
9. **Appreciating** China's assistance to Allied members and partners during the Covid-19 pandemic, but **deeply regretting** related targeted disinformation and political pressure campaigns that aim to undermine social and political trust in democratic societies;
10. **Recognising** China's growing technological prowess and the significant progress it has made in areas such as Artificial Intelligence, but **deploring** China's continued sponsorship of massive cyber-espionage programmes and intellectual property theft as well as its use of sophisticated technology to monitor and control its own citizens;
11. **Acknowledging** China's immense economic clout, development assistance and the significant volume of infrastructure and other strategic investments it has made within the framework of the 'Belt and Road' Initiative;

* presented by the Political Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

12. **Cautioning** that investments in critical infrastructure, such as ports, motorways and rail systems can serve China's strategic and military ambitions; and **recognising** the need for Allies to reduce their reliance upon sole-source providers in strategic sectors and address vulnerabilities linked to China's powerful position in global supply chains;

13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO partners:

- a. to encourage constructive engagement between NATO and China and examine opportunities to expand the ongoing NATO-China political and military dialogue to matters such as military transparency, freedom of navigation, emergency response and disaster management among others;
- b. to engage in information-sharing within the Alliance and joint assessment of Chinese activities with potential security implications with the aim of achieving a greater unity of purpose on matters pertaining to China;
- c. to align NATO's Strategic Concept, as well as defence planning, training and capability development priorities with a rapidly shifting global strategic environment in which the rise of China is a key feature;
- d. to establish a NATO Centre of Excellence on the Indo-Pacific region in order to identify initiatives that allow Allies to collaborate with regional partners on shared priorities, to enhance Allies' understanding of the challenges China poses to NATO, and to forge a consensus on how best to cope with these challenges ;
- e. to prioritise the human rights dimension in their approaches to China and to hold China accountable for rights abuses;
- f. to enhance individual and collective resilience to the threats of Chinese disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks and cyber-interference;
- g. to establish or enhance mechanisms that assess potential risks to national and collective security - in accordance with national prerogatives - linked to third-party investments in strategic sectors, including 5G networks and health-related supply chains, and to improve coordination of these policies among the Allies and with the European Union;
- h. to undertake diplomatic efforts to strengthen the wealth-generating rules-based open global economic order while resisting the establishment of highly transactional, opaque and unaccountable trade and investment systems like the 'Belt and Road' Initiative;
- i. to exercise vigilance when dealing with China on matters pertaining to the Arctic as many of its commercial investments in the region have potential military and strategic implications for the Alliance;
- j. to maintain regular exchanges with the European Union and Indo-Pacific partners in order to gain a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges presented by the emergence of China.

DEFENCE INNOVATION*

RESOLUTION 465

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the severe health, economic, financial, and other effects of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate the need to strengthen resilience across the Alliance and its partners;
2. **Realising** that the Alliance remains in a technological adoption race which may not be won by those with the best technology, but by those with the most agile organisations;
3. **Concerned** that the unprecedented speed and global spread of the coronavirus have caused unparalleled health, economic, financial, and social disruptions that further undermine an already volatile security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region;
4. **Stressing** that the world has become more unstable as Russia and China challenge the existing global order and asymmetric threats have increased;
5. **Recognising** that NATO forces need an array of robust, sophisticated, and evolving capabilities across all domains to meet today's and tomorrow's security challenges;
6. **Recalling** that, since the foundation of the Alliance, NATO's technological edge has been pivotal for maintaining peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region;
7. **Alarmed** that NATO's technological edge is rapidly eroding as peer competitors are catching up and that the easy availability of commercial and dual-use technologies allows malignant non-state actors, including terrorist and extremist militant groups, to weaponize them;
8. **Observing** that biological agents are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain and **gravely concerned** that the COVID-19 pandemic is giving rise again to the spectre of bioterrorism;
9. **Underlining** that the rapidly shifting innovation environment of the 21st century requires new ways to leverage the creativity of NATO nations, which are, on aggregate, second to none in research and technology and capital in support of NATO's technological edge;
10. **Stressing** that the private sector is an important driver for innovation and that Allied governments therefore need to improve collaboration and involvement with non-traditional defence firms;
11. **Noting** that complex military procurement processes and a lack of funding often prevent fast-moving technology companies, especially start-ups, from considering military contracts;
12. **Aware** that defence innovation is driven by member states and **applauding** NATO's invaluable role as an innovation engine, which has fostered intellectual, technological, and scientific collaboration within the community of Alliance member nations and partners;
13. **Concerned** that the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic downturn are likely to put pressure on Allied defence budgets, including on defence innovation budgets;

* presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted online by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 23 November 2020

14. **Concerned** about the limited pool of expertise in disruptive technologies and about the under-representation of women in science and technology, and innovation more broadly, and **noting** that encouraging the participation of women is likely to bring new ideas and perspectives to research, development and implementation;
15. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to commit to maintaining their defence spending budgets at their current levels despite the pressures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce them;
 - b. to rededicate themselves to allocating 2% of GDP to defence and develop post-COVID-19 recovery plans that underpin their commitment to stay at the forefront of innovation by providing sufficient financial resources, including ring-fencing resources for innovation;
 - c. to put an increased emphasis on defence innovation in the biotechnology field, particularly regarding integration, testing, response and resilience;
 - d. to promote innovation hubs for defence, both nationally and integrated with Allies, to bring together think tanks, academia, experts, and start-ups to generate new technology;
 - e. to support greater risk-taking in defence innovation, which leads to occasional failures, but often allows NATO's innovation community to unlock truly revolutionary technology;
 - f. to better integrate non-defence firms – including the smaller, fresh-thinking start-ups – by facilitating their access to government contracts, streamlining bureaucratic procedures, and ensuring reliable financial returns from such public-private partnerships;
 - g. to enhance the NATO innovation agenda by developing a more strategic planning approach and fostering an agile, innovative and risk-tolerant mindset through, inter alia, sharing best practices across the NATO innovation community; and particularly by exploring financial tools, including seed money for start-ups, which can be used to exploit potential opportunities as part of a broader Alliance-wide systemic approach to innovation;
 - h. to establish a quantifiable mechanism to measure defence innovation, e.g., along the lines of the OECD's Oslo manual, and develop a more robust process to scan, identify and rapidly adopt new technologies and approaches;
 - i. to pursue a blended approach to strengthen efforts to leverage civilian-oriented innovation ecosystems in defence innovation and to encourage commercial organisations to mitigate the vulnerabilities in their technologies;
 - j. to develop a joint approach for enhanced export controls of sensitive technologies, to better coordinate screenings of investments, intellectual property protection and restrictions against S&T/innovation collaboration with problematic institutions associated with adversarial nations and, in this regard, to consider working out common regulatory approaches to the innovation spread together with Enhanced Opportunities partner states;
 - k. to report on progress in achieving a better gender and age balance in the NATO S&T expert network, particularly in the area of emerging and disruptive technologies.