



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE DE L'OTAN

COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY (CDS)


PRELIMINARY DRAFT

FOOD SECURITY AND CONFLICT: HARVESTING RESILIENCE IN THE FACE OF A GLOBAL CRISIS

Preliminary Draft Special Report
Julie DZEROWICZ (Canada)
Special Rapporteur

016 CDS 23 E – Original : English – 29 March 2023

Founded in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly acts as a consultative interparliamentary organisation which is institutionally separate from NATO. This working document only represents the views of the Rapporteur until it has been adopted by the Committee. It is based on information from publicly available sources or NATO PA meetings – which are all unclassified.



The world is currently in the grip of an unprecedented food security crisis. A combination of complex and interrelated challenges has undone decades of efforts by the international community to eradicate hunger. Among these challenges, conflict continues to act as the main driver of food insecurity, despite the recognition and protection that the right to food enjoys under international law.

Russia's criminal war against Ukraine has fuelled an alarming and rapid worsening of the already dire global food insecurity situation. The Kremlin's reckless and brutal actions have contributed to pushing millions of people to the brink of starvation. The ripple effects of this tsunami of hunger could sweep away global stability and, in turn, test the resilience of Allied countries. Addressing the food insecurity crisis is therefore both a moral duty and a security imperative for the Alliance.

This preliminary draft report aims to contribute to this effort. It provides an overview of the scale, root causes, and catalysts of the crisis as well as outlines the legal framework prohibiting the weaponization of food. It also describes the significant efforts already made by Allies to fight the scourge of hunger and suggests a set of policy recommendations to further strengthen Allied and global resilience to its tragic effects.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I-	INTRODUCTION: ON THE IMPORTANCE FOR ALLIED RESILIENCE OF COMBATTING GLOBAL HUNGER.....	1
II-	A “TSUNAMI OF HUNGER”: THE CURRENT GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY CRISIS.....	2
III-	THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF HUNGER AND CONFLICT.....	4
IV-	THE ILLEGAL AND INTOLERABLE USE OF FOOD AS A WEAPON	5
V-	RUSSIA’S WAR OF CHOICE AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS.....	7
VI-	ALLIED EFFORTS TO FIGHT HUNGER: SOWING THE SEEDS OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT.....	9
VII-	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: FOOD FOR THOUGHTS ON STRENGTHENING ALLIED AND GLOBAL RESILIENCE TO THE CURRENT HUNGER CRISIS	11
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	14

I- INTRODUCTION: ON THE IMPORTANCE FOR ALLIED RESILIENCE OF COMBATting GLOBAL HUNGER

1. The world is currently enduring an unprecedented food crisis with tragic and manifold consequences. In recent years, the number of people experiencing food insecurity – defined as a lack of regular access to enough safe and nutritious food for normal growth and a healthy life, either due to unavailability of food and/or a lack of resources to obtain it (FAO, 2023a) – has risen significantly. Lack of access to food, rather than availability, lies at the heart of this devastating crisis. It is the result of a multitude of complex and often interrelated challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, and growing inequality.

2. Conflict, however, stands out as the main driver of food insecurity around the world. Russia's unlawful aggression against Ukraine has brutally reminded us of the indisputable and disastrous link between these two phenomena. Moscow's reckless and destructive actions have further weakened global food systems that were still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. By unleashing unjustified violence against a peaceful nation, the Kremlin has driven millions of people into hunger around the world. This draft report focuses on the food insecurity and conflict nexus and, as such, discusses in depth the accelerating impact of Russia's aggression on global hunger trends.

3. Russia's actions -as are those of other state and non-state parties to a conflict that use starvation as a method of warfare- also betray its disdain for international law. Indeed, international law stipulates that people in conflict zones should continue to enjoy stable and adequate access to food. Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other subsequent international agreements enshrine the right to food of all people, both in peace and in war (OHCHR, 2023a). Contrary to the Russian regime, NATO considers respect for international law one of its foundational principles. In addition, Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that Allies aim to “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations [...] by promoting conditions of stability and well-being”. As such, NATO nations have a moral duty to do their utmost to respond to the current global food crisis and help to eliminate hunger by 2030.

4. Combatting food insecurity is not only a moral duty for the Allies. It is also critical to their national and collective resilience. Nations have already recognized the significance of food resources when they included their protection from disruption or sabotage as one of NATO's seven baseline requirements for national resilience in 2016 (NATO, 2022a). Global food insecurity means global instability. And recent crises -including the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Ukraine, and the looming threat of climate change- have laid bare that challenges originating outside the Alliance can have an impact within it and test its resilience. Addressing the spill-over effects of global food insecurity as well as its root causes should therefore be seen as a security imperative.

5. The 2022 Strategic Concept acknowledges this imperative. It states that conflict, fragility, and instability are aggravated by food insecurity, among other factors, in Africa and the Middle East region which, in turn, directly affects the security of NATO countries. It also mentions that the Alliance will develop its ability to support civilian relief operations and to prepare for the effects of food insecurity on Allied security as part of its crisis prevention and management efforts – one of the three core tasks of NATO (NATO, 2022b). Further, NATO has recognised climate change as an “overarching challenge of our time” and set for itself the goal of becoming a leading international organisation in understanding and adapting to climate change. As climate change has a direct and devastating impact on food security, fulfilling this objective will inevitably require preventing, anticipating, and combatting the rise in global hunger.

6. Further, the war against Ukraine has demonstrated that Russia is not only weaponizing food but also instrumentalizing it to advance its strategic interests, finance its criminal and imperialist


policies, create dependencies, and foster alliances with friendly governments. The Allies cannot let authoritarian states exploit food insecurity and the suffering which it causes to achieve their own malicious goals of promoting their repressive regimes and undermining the global liberal order. Providing humanitarian and development aid to countries and populations in need can thus be described as instrumental to Allied and global democratic resilience.

7. In view of the multidimensional importance for Allied resilience of fighting hunger, this draft report first provides an overview of the scale and severity of the current global food crisis. It discusses the complex and self-reinforcing relationship between conflict and food insecurity. It then outlines the international legal framework governing the right to food and prohibiting its weaponization. It goes on to describe how Russia has recklessly violated these norms in its brutal invasion of Ukraine and consequently endangered the lives of millions of food insecure people. The report concludes by suggesting a set of policy recommendations to strengthen Allied and global resilience to hunger and its tragic effects.


II- A “TSUNAMI OF HUNGER”: THE CURRENT GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY CRISIS

8. After steadily declining for decades, hunger has been on the rise again globally since 2020. According to the United Nations, as many as 2.3 billion people -29.3 per cent of the world’s population- were facing moderate or severe food insecurity in 2021, an increase of 350 million compared to 2019 (UN News, 2022). Among those, more than 900 000 people are currently struggling to survive in famine-like conditions (the worst form of food insecurity), a tenfold rise since 2018. And 49 million more people are under imminent threat of famine (WFP and FAO, 2022). In 2023, about 350 million people across 79 countries are considered acutely food insecure, an increase of 200 million people compared to early 2020 (UN News, 2023).

9. The World Food Programme (WFP) has described this emergency as “the largest global food crisis in modern history” and called it a “tsunami of hunger” (WFP, 2022a). The situation is predicted to worsen in 2023 with global food insecurity reaching new heights and overtaking the tragic records set in 2007 and 2008. This crisis of unprecedented proportion is having a devastating impact on countries and regions that were already vulnerable prior to its onset due to a combination of security, climate, and economic challenges. A corridor of starvation has emerged that stretches from Central America to Afghanistan. In the latter, as well as in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen, millions of people are currently on the brink of starvation (WFP and FAO, 2022). Without immediate delivery of humanitarian help, the situation in these countries could further deteriorate in 2023. It could result in famine and cost numerous lives. Food insecurity is not limited to developing countries or conflict-



ridden states, however. Even within richer regions and countries, hotspots of food insecurity persist, highlighting the global nature of the challenge.



Source: Global Hunger Index (<https://www.globalhungerindex.org/>)

10. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by the ongoing food insecurity crisis. The WFP estimates that they account for 60 per cent of chronically hungry people globally. In 2021, 31.9 per cent of women across the world were experiencing food insecurity, compared to 27.6 per cent of men. And this gap has widened in recent years (UN News, 2022). Children are particularly impacted too. Within the 15 states currently considered most afflicted by hunger, at least 40 million children are severely food insecure. UNICEF warns that in these countries, nearly 8 million children under the age of five are currently at risk of death from severe wasting and one additional child falls into malnutrition every 60 seconds (UNICEF, 2022).

11. The current global food insecurity crisis is the result of interrelated, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic acted as a disastrous catalyst exacerbating an already dire situation and driving millions of people into hunger. The virus and the measures taken to mitigate its spread disrupted harvests and food distribution networks. Although necessary, these policies also led to higher levels of unemployment and loss of income that have, in turn, made access to food increasingly difficult for those directly affected (UNSDG, 2020).

12. Already before the pandemic, the global food system was vulnerable due to climate change and extreme weather events. These phenomena constitute primary drivers of food insecurity. As they increase in both number and intensity, disasters are destroying more lives, properties, and crops than ever and undercutting efforts to feed the world's population. Long-term changes in the global climate have resulted in persistent droughts, decreased precipitation, and increased temperatures. These factors have contributed to lower agricultural yields, loss of available arable land, and thus greater food insecurity. Somalia is a heart-breaking and foretelling illustration of the impact of climate change on food security. After experiencing its longest and most severe drought in decades, the country has reached near-starvation levels in 2022 with 7.1 million people facing acute food insecurity (WFP, 2023a).

13. A marked increase in global food prices has worsened food affordability, an issue intricately linked to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters, climate change, and conflict. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) recorded a 14 per cent surge in global average prices of major food commodities, including cereal grains, meat, cooking oil, and sugar in 2022 (FAO, 2023b). This increase came at the heel of a 28 per cent increase in 2021. The relentless rise in the cost of food pushed millions into hunger, particularly in low-income countries and in poorer communities.


III- THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF HUNGER AND CONFLICT

14. The current global hunger crisis is fuelled by various overlapping forces and challenges. But, from localized violence to interstate war, conflict represents the main driver of food insecurity around the globe (FAO, 2022a). More than 70 per cent of people experiencing acute levels of food insecurity globally live in conflict-affected countries (WFP and FAO, 2022; Global Hunger Index, 2022). Conflict and hunger interact in a systemic and complex way, with the emergence of one fostering the rise of the other, creating a destructive feedback loop (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021).

15. Conflict often results in the destruction of agricultural resources and the disruption of food production and distribution systems. Armed violence can also lead to reduced investment in agriculture, with lasting effects on development. Therefore, conflict erodes the resilience of affected populations and their ability to produce, trade and access food.

16. Forced displacement and migration caused by conflict also greatly exacerbate food insecurity. When entire groups of people are compelled to leave their homes in the face of imminent threats to their lives, they lose their livelihoods and access to food. In turn, these forced displacements put additional pressure on the resources of host communities, thereby extending and aggravating the scope of the challenge. In 2021, nearly 90 per cent of the 51 million people currently internally displaced globally lived in 24 countries experiencing severe food crises (WFP, 2022b).

17. Conflict contributes to the ongoing shrinking of the humanitarian space - i.e., the increasing security and administrative difficulties that hinder the capacity of humanitarian actors to support the most vulnerable communities. As such, conflict prevents the provision of urgent and essential aid to food-insecure civilians. In violent and unstable settings, humanitarian actors face growing challenges to the fulfilment of mission. Security threats, restrictions of movement, and damaged critical infrastructure all complicate the delivery of aid to populations in need, while at the same time exacerbating those needs (Demeuse, 2022). Similarly, counter-terrorism measures and sanctions can sometimes restrict aid workers' access to people in need during armed conflicts. For example, Canada's 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act introduced anti-terrorist financing offences in the Criminal Code, including that of directly or indirectly providing or making property available knowing it will be used to carry out a terrorist activity. Although necessary, this provision lacks an explicit humanitarian exemption that would permit the delivery of vital aid to vulnerable and food-insecure communities living in areas under the control of terrorist groups, such as Afghanistan. An Act -Bill C-41- addressing this



shortcoming was being discussed in the Canadian parliament at the time of writing (Government of Canada, 2023).

18. Even after peace has been achieved, lasting obstacles to food security persist. Remaining landmines and unexploded ordnance, for instance, prevent the resumption of agricultural activities years after the cessation of hostilities. The disastrous economic costs and destruction of conflict continue to plague countries and communities for years, sometimes decades, leaving entire generations undernourished and with limited access to food.

19. Just as conflict fuels food insecurity, food insecurity conversely fuels conflict. Competition and disputes over control and fair distribution of arable land and water resources, state inability to provide food to populations, and sharp increases in prices of essential goods are all factors contributing to, catalysing, or prolonging social unrest, tensions, and violence. These factors often conflagrate with broader grievances about poverty, unemployment, inequality, and marginalisation, among others. Many experts consider, for instance, that price rises for major food staples such as bread across much of the Middle East and North Africa played a part in sparking the protests that became the Arab Spring. Similarly, the 2007-2008 food crisis ignited social unrest in over 40 countries, particularly in Africa (Simmons, 2013).

20. Uncontrolled migration flows are a growing concern for Allied governments and populations. Research shows, however, that migration flows are shaped by a combination of drivers and relocation is only one -and not the first- of the coping mechanisms to escape hunger. Food insecurity may contribute to increased displacement -often temporary-, particularly among poorer households and in famine-like situations. This, in turn, can strain the resources of the host communities and cause tensions and violence (WFP, 2017).

21. Food insecurity also provides fertile ground on which extremist groups can take root. Armed groups intentionally stoke hunger and cynically exploit the desperation and instability that it generates to thrive. For example, in Somalia, research shows that lack of access to food, among other factors, contributed to the recruitment efforts of Al-Shabaab -one of the largest armed extremist groups in Africa, controlling over a fifth of the country- by eroding trust in the government and fuelling radicalization in rural areas (Botha and Abdile, 2014).

IV- THE ILLEGAL AND INTOLERABLE USE OF FOOD AS A WEAPON

22. Recognizing the close link between hunger and instability, **international humanitarian law** prohibits the deliberate use of hunger against civilians in conflict. The three core principles on which it is based - distinction, proportionality, and precaution - provide a certain degree of protection to the infrastructure, land, and other elements that contribute to the food security of civilian populations caught in conflict settings. The principle of distinction requires all sides to distinguish between civilian and military targets, hence parties to a conflict are prohibited from attacking any objects critical to the sustenance of the population. Proportionality forbids the use of disproportionate tactics and weapons that may cause long-lasting damage to land and agriculture, such as poisons, biological or chemical weapons or herbicides. The principle of precaution obliges the sides to take all necessary steps to prevent, or minimize, incidental harm on civilians and civilian infrastructure during military operations.

23. The proscription of starvation as a method of warfare in both international and non-international conflicts is codified in, respectively, protocols I and II additional to the Geneva Conventions established in 1977. These protocols also forbid attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects “indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” such as foodstuffs,

agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works. In 2021, the United Nations Security Council reasserted this notion in a resolution (2573) (UN, 2021).

24. Attacks on dams, dykes, and nuclear plants are forbidden when they may trigger the release of dangerous forces that would cause directly or indirectly -through radioactive contamination of agricultural areas, for example- heavy losses among the civilian population in the short or long term. Additional specific rules concerning the conduct of hostilities further limit the use of hunger by warring parties. Sieges and naval blockade, although not explicitly banned by international humanitarian law, must not deprive the civilian population of its access to supplies essential to its survival, including food. The besieging or blockading party must allow civilians to leave the area or let food and other essential goods enter it unimpeded. The prohibition of pillage prevents the exploitation or seizure of food and property used for producing and distributing food.

25. Parties to an armed conflict have primary responsibility for adequately meeting the basic needs of the civilians under their effective control. Even in the case of the unlawful occupation of a foreign territory, the occupying power has a duty to supply food to the population. Parties to a conflict cannot arbitrarily hinder the rapid and safe passage of impartial humanitarian relief. Such relief is particularly critical when a party is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of the civilian population living on territories under its effective control (ICRC, 2022, Demeuse, 2022). In 2018, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed these principles by unanimously adopting landmark resolution 2417 which condemned the use of starvation as a war tactic and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations (UN, 2018).

26. **International human rights law** recognises the right to food, defined as “the right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access -either directly or by means of financial purchases- to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food...”. It is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other international agreements. It must be respected and protected by all states, including in times of armed conflict (OHCHR, 2023b). In a 2019 resolution, the United Nations General Assembly reiterated this notion and expressed its deep “concern over the negative effects of armed conflicts on the enjoyment of the right to food” (UNGA, 2019).

27. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) identified the act of “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” as a violation of **international criminal law** and a war crime in international conflicts in 1998 (Rome Statute, 1998). The offense was extended to non-international conflicts in 2019 by an amendment to the Statute.

28. Yet, despite the broad recognition and protection that it enjoys in international law, **the right to food continues to be inexcusably violated in many conflict situations**. Various state and non-state groups relentlessly and recklessly weaponize food. In Yemen, human rights organizations have documented extensive violations of international law since 2014, including the targeting of farms, water facilities, and fishing boats (Magdy, 2021). In Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia, and Sudan, the stealing or killing of livestock, burning of harvests, destruction of crops, and raiding of markets are common tactics (FAO, 2022b). Although unlawful, sieges aimed at starving civilians are still used in contemporary conflicts. Between 2013 and 2018, for example, the Syrian regime (with the support of the Kremlin) purposefully prevented the provision of food to civilians trapped in the besieged city of Ghouta, thereby causing large-scale starvation (UN, 2018).

29. Warring parties also continue to arbitrarily block or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid to populations in need. In Ethiopia, for instance, between November 2020 and November 2022, the government used starvation as a method of warfare by preventing the delivery of food and critical aid to the Tigray region in the context of the conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Although the situation has gradually improved since the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement, 5.3 million people remain in need of humanitarian assistance and protection in the

region. In addition, the deliberate targeting of humanitarian workers continues to be a serious concern in many conflicts. In 2021, 140 humanitarian aid workers were killed around the globe, with most of this violence concentrated in South Sudan, Syria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN, 2022a, Demeuse, 2022).

V- RUSSIA'S WAR OF CHOICE AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS


30. **Russia's unjustified and illegal aggression against Ukraine represents the most evident and reprehensible case of food weaponization today.** The Kremlin is using hunger as a method of warfare against both Ukraine directly and the rest of the world indirectly. Prior to the renewed invasion, Ukraine was a global agricultural powerhouse. It ranked among the top five global exporters of maize, wheat, and barley, and accounted for 20 per cent of the world's grain exports. It was also responsible for half of the global share of sunflower seed oil export (FAO, 2022a). A monthly average of six million tonnes of Ukrainian grain reached the shores of dozens of states in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, helping to feed more than 400 million people, many of them in food-insecure countries (Strubenhoff 2022; WFP, 2023b).

31. Russia's war of choice has gravely disrupted Ukraine's production and export of agricultural products. The number of hectares sowed with spring crops in the country in 2022 decreased by 22 per cent compared to 2021 (a loss comparable to a territory almost the size of Belgium) (European Council, 2022). In addition, a quarter of Ukraine's wheat was previously produced in territories currently illegally occupied by Russia. As a result, Ukraine's grain production and exports decreased approximately by 40 and 30 per cent respectively in 2022 compared to 2021. The situation is expected to further worsen in 2023, with grain production and exports projected to be down by 20 and 15 per cent (European Commission, 2023). Furthermore, many of the country's farmers have joined the ranks of the Ukrainian army or been forced to leave their fields in search of safety (FAO, 2022c).

32. The Kremlin closed sea lanes and imposed a blockade of the Black Sea, despite knowing that such actions would fuel food insecurity in Ukraine and globally. In doing so, the Russian leadership demonstrated once more its disregard for international law. Before Russia's renewed invasion, 95 per cent of Ukrainian wheat and grain travelled via sea routes. Some sea routes have partially reopened since July 2022, thanks to the Black Sea Grain Deal -an agreement between Ukraine, Türkiye, and Russia brokered thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations and Türkiye. However, Russia is still blockading seven of the ten Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea (Wong and Swanson, 2023). Additionally, hundreds of sea mines have been laid. They pose a serious threat to ships and further impede Ukrainian grain exports (Tondo, 2022).

33. Russian attacks unlawfully targeting agricultural land and critical infrastructure, in contravention of the three core principles of international humanitarian law, have taken a severe toll on Ukraine's ability to produce and store food. In at least 41 separate instances since February 24, Russian forces hit food or water facilities in Ukraine including food markets, water treatment facilities, dams, farms, and warehouses (PBS, 2023). Russian forces have also deployed landmines in crop fields, rendering these areas unusable both today and for the years to come (Klain, 2022). Unexploded ordnance and remnants of war similarly hinder the cultivation of arable lands in areas previously or currently affected by the conflict. Within just the first six weeks of fighting, six grain storage facilities had already been targeted by Russian attacks and one of the largest grain export terminals in Mykolaiv destroyed, highlighting the deliberate nature of these attacks (Holland and Nichols, 2022).

34. Russian forces also extensively and methodically engage in pillage by plundering tonnes of Ukrainian grain from the Ukrainian territories that they illegally occupy. They subsequently export them to third countries to finance the Kremlin's war machine (Beake et al., 2022). Investigations have revealed that truckloads of stolen grain are being transported from Ukrainian territory to Russian-operated ports and vessels where it is mixed with Russian grain and shipped in vessels under Russian certification to obscure its origins (Ha et al., 2022).



35. Russian troops have unlawfully used hunger as a weapon by entrapping and starving civilians in besieged cities without allowing them to leave or letting food and humanitarian aid in (Hopkins et al., 2022). They have also carried out attacks near and on nuclear power plants, in contravention of international humanitarian law, at great risks to the environment and thus the short and long-term food security of Ukraine, the region, and the world (Hibbs, 2022).

36. These immoral and illegal acts as well as Russia's incessant and reckless targeting of Ukrainian critical agricultural infrastructure, blockage of export routes, and depraved theft practices betray its clear intent to weaponize the food security of civilian populations. As such, these attacks constitute war crimes and possible crimes of genocide against Ukraine and its population, intolerable violations of the basic principles of the global liberal order and the United Nations' Charter, and an unjustifiable threat to the lives of millions of food-insecure people around the world.

37. Despite the heroic and remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian institutions and society, Russia's aggression is having a **devastating humanitarian impact on millions of Ukrainians**. According to a WFP study, in May 2022, one-third of households in the country were food insecure. Populations living in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine or internally displaced were most affected. Six out of ten people had experienced a reduction of income compared to before the invasion or had no income. One in four had to borrow money to buy food (WFP, 2022c). Overall, the destruction and suffering unleashed by Russia in its invasion has left 17.6 million people in Ukraine – amounting to 40 per cent of the population – in need of urgent humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2023).

38. **At the global level, Russia's invasion has further worsened the already existing global food crisis**, sparked primarily by climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Kremlin's criminal actions in Ukraine triggered unprecedented increases in food and fertilizer prices. Shortly after the start of the renewed aggression, global food prices rose by 13 per cent in March 2022, the fastest pace ever within a monthly period. Prices of fertilizers soared even faster (Trompiz, 2022). Although prices have dropped in recent months, they nevertheless remain at elevated levels compared to previous years. Continued fertiliser shortages and price increases threaten to further disrupt harvests and transform the ongoing food affordability crisis into a food availability crisis.

39. By provoking these shocks, the Kremlin pushed hundreds of millions of people to the brink of starvation, particularly in fragile economies already experiencing some form of food insecurity. In Somalia, where Ukraine and Russia account for over 90 per cent of the country's wheat imports, prices for the cereal have soared by 300 per cent (CARE, 2022). In Lebanon, the cost of a basic food basket -the minimum food needs of a family for a month- has risen by 351 per cent. In Syria and Yemen, the cost of food has increased by 97 and 81 per cent respectively, compounding already alarming levels of conflict-induced food insecurity (WFP, 2022d).

40. Food supply disruptions also undermine global humanitarian action. As a result of Russia's war of choice, humanitarian organisations are increasingly struggling to respond to the worldwide food crisis which it is fuelling. For instance, the WFP -which used to buy more than half of its wheat from Ukraine- has seen the cost of its operations skyrocket in 2022 (Beasley, 2022). The organisation paid 50 per cent more to deliver food to the world's hungry in 2022 than in 2019 (Gold, 2022). These additional costs come at a time when the needs have never been greater. They are widening the humanitarian funding gap to an alarming level (Riquier, 2022).

41. Russia is not only weaponizing food security by attacking Ukraine's production and export capacity. It is also leveraging its own food and fertilizer supplies as a propaganda and foreign policy tool, with complete disregard for the global humanitarian consequences of its inexcusable actions. Russian disinformation actors spread lies about the alleged role of Western sanctions in fuelling food shortages and price rises, when in fact they include exemptions for food and fertilizer exports (Welsh, 2023, Garriaud-Maylam, 2023). The Kremlin is also using these shortages to its advantage by capitalising on the sale of its own agricultural exports to replenish its coffers and boost its diplomatic influence. In fact, in April 2022, Dmitry Medvedev -former president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia- openly described food as a "quiet but ominous weapon" used by the Kremlin (Gijs, 2022). Russia is cynically relying on a global food crisis which it has itself worsened to gain support from the countries most affected by that very crisis and to obtain the resources needed to keep waging the war that triggered it. Addressing the current global food crisis is therefore essential not only to support global security and strengthen Allied resilience. It is also critical to counter Russia's ability to wage its unjustified aggression against Ukraine and to spread its pernicious influence on the world stage.

VI- ALLIED EFFORTS TO FIGHT HUNGER: SOWING THE SEEDS OF STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

42. The international community set an ambitious goal for itself in 2015, when it pledged to eliminate "all forms of malnutrition" by 2030 as part of the United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since then, and until recently, some progress had been achieved in the **global fight to end hunger**. Allies are playing a leadership role in humanitarian and development efforts to eliminate food insecurity. By way of example, in 2021, four of the top five contributors to the WFP's budget were Allied states, while the European Union as a whole -with many of its members also Allies- was the third biggest donor (WFP, 2021). The United States is the largest spender on humanitarian and food security aid in the world. In 2022 alone, it spent over USD 11 billion and pledged to spend USD 2.5 billion more on food security in Africa following the US-Africa Leaders' Summit which it organized (White House, 2022). Denmark and Norway, and other Allies, consistently rank among the top contributors to global food programmes per capita or compared to GDP.

43. The Allies have urged the international community to acknowledge the correlation between conflict and food insecurity and integrate it into its efforts to eradicate hunger worldwide. The United Nations Security Council's adoption of landmark resolution 2417 is a testament to that realisation. It emphasises the self-reinforcing feedback loop of conflict and food insecurity. In May 2022, the Security Council -under the presidency of the United States- adopted a *Roadmap and Call for Action for Global Food Security* which further underscored that, although critical to alleviating the immediate suffering of starving populations, humanitarian action alone will not solve the global food crisis. It pointed out that the international community must understand and address hunger's root causes, first among which is violent conflict, to effectively and durably eradicate hunger (US Department of State, 2022). Over 100 UN member states have so far endorsed it.

44. Despite this significant contribution by Allied countries to the global fight against hunger, the positive trend of the past decades has recently reversed due to the impacts of worsening climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's unjustified invasion of Ukraine. This devastating combination of factors has pushed millions of people into malnutrition and hunger. The reversal is taking the international community further away from achieving its goal of ending hunger by 2030. The United Nations estimate that around 670 million people -8 per cent of the global population- will still wake up not knowing where their next meal will come from by that date (Global Hunger Index, 2022).

45. In the face of this bleak perspective, **Allied countries have done their utmost to bolster global food security in the wake of Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine.** Together with their partners, they have intensified their efforts to support food-insecure countries and populations. At the multilateral level, the United States co-hosted a Global Food Security Summit around the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Germany and the United Kingdom initiated a Global Alliance for Food Security in 2022 and the Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact under their respective presidencies of the G7 (World Bank, 2022). Either bilaterally or through international organizations, Allies have strengthened their immediate humanitarian assistance to populations in need and their investments in longer-term development and stability -particularly by supporting agricultural productivity increases in vulnerable countries. The United States, for instance, nearly doubled its funding for the WFP for 2022. There is enough food in the world today to feed every human on the planet. This crisis is one of food access and affordability, not availability. Allied nations and other developed countries must therefore muster the political will to further increase their support to food-vulnerable countries and communities.

46. Allied nations also played a critical role in the facilitation of the exportation of Ukrainian agricultural products blocked by Russia as part of its illegal aggression. With Ukrainian ports blockaded and Black Sea traffic obstructed by Russian troops, various NATO countries -notably Romania and Poland- supported the transportation of Ukrainian grain via railroad or trucks either directly to export markets or through their own ports. Romania's largest port of Constanța, for instance, became one of the main transit hubs for Ukrainian grain. More than a million tons of Ukrainian grain has been exported through the port. Although the flow has decreased since July 2022, Ukrainian grain is still being shipped through it (Ilie, 2022).

47. Further to these efforts, Türkiye -in a joint diplomatic effort with the United Nations- brokered an agreement in July 2022 with Kyiv and Moscow enabling Ukraine to resume shipping its desperately needed grain through three of its Black Sea ports. Known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the agreement has become a lifeline for many import-dependent countries. Although export levels remain far below what was intended, it allowed for the export of over 11 million metric tons of agricultural goods from Ukrainian ports (as of November 2022) (UN, 2022b). About 65 per cent of the wheat and 48 per cent of the maize exported under the deal have gone to developing countries (EU Council, 2023). As such, the agreement has helped to avert an even further heightening of the global food crisis.

48. Russia has been undermining the agreement at every step since day one, however. Hours after the signing of the agreement, Russian forces carried out missile attacks on the Ukrainian port of Odesa which resulted in serious damages and impeded grain shipments (Francis et al., 2022). And, in October 2022, Russia temporarily withdrew from the deal. Although the agreement was eventually renewed in November 2022 for an additional 120 days, Moscow continued to hinder the flow of goods from Ukrainian ports by lengthening the inspection procedures to which the ships are subjected (Choursina and Quinn, 2023). In March 2023, when the agreement expired again, the Kremlin only agreed to extending it for 60 days, despite its existing terms providing for a 120-day extension minimum (RFE, 2023). By deliberately blocking the export of millions of tons of grain from Ukrainian ports, Russia is delaying the urgent delivery of food to the world's hungry and thus further worsening the global food crisis which it set off with its illegal invasion. Furthermore, Moscow has

threatened to not extend the agreement beyond 18 May when it will expire. The uncertainty stoked by Russia's irresponsible behaviour could trigger new rounds of price increases for agricultural goods and incentivize stockpiling of fertilizers and grains, leading to market shortages, with tragic consequences for vulnerable countries and communities around the world.

49. In addition to jeopardizing global food security, Russia's renewed aggression has triggered urgent and widespread humanitarian needs among the Ukrainian population. NATO countries have swiftly responded to these needs and **massively scaled up their assistance to Ukraine**, both bilateral and multilateral. Fifteen of the top 20 donors of humanitarian aid to Ukraine since February 2022 are Allied countries. Among them, the United States has provided USD 3.9 billion, Germany USD 2.6 billion, the United Kingdom USD 420 million, and Canada USD 364 million, as of February 2023 (Masters and Merrow, 2023). Despite ongoing hostilities and complex challenges, these funds have provided lifesaving assistance and essential supplies -including food- to people in need across the country.

50. On top of this immediate humanitarian help, Allies are at the forefront of efforts to bolster the resilience, productivity, and development of Ukrainian agriculture. The United States launched a programme called AGRI-Ukraine which has already helped over 13,000 farmers in Ukraine -over a quarter of the country's farmers- through the provision of financing, technology, and mobile storage units (USAID, 2023). Similarly, the European Union has funded an FAO initiative to support Ukrainian farmers and small agricultural businesses through the purchase of new farming equipment and the provision of direct financial assistance to impacted businesses (FAO, 2023). These programmes aim to strengthen Ukraine's present and future food security.

VII- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: FOOD FOR THOUGHTS ON STRENGTHENING ALLIED AND GLOBAL RESILIENCE TO THE CURRENT HUNGER CRISIS

51. Despite the Allies' significant contribution to the fight against hunger, the world is now moving away from its objective of eradicating this plague by 2030. Russia's unjustified renewed aggression against Ukraine has further weakened global food systems that were already disrupted by the combined effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating climate change. Millions of people have been pushed to the brink of starvation as a result.

52. Russia's illegal war highlights the strong link between food insecurity and conflict and the importance of simultaneously tackling the root causes of both phenomena. These efforts are essential to alleviate the suffering of the world's most vulnerable, but also to strengthen global stability and bolster Allied resilience. As such, combatting the interwoven scourges of hunger and violence as well as their underlying drivers constitutes both a moral duty and a security imperative for the Alliance. The following section therefore lays out policy recommendations for governments of NATO countries to address the global food insecurity crisis and strengthen global and Allied resilience.

- a. **Decisively condemn Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and take measures to mitigate its devastating impact on global food security:**
 - i. Denounce Russia's unjustified aggression against Ukraine and its role as an accelerating factor for the global rise in hunger levels: Allies should continue to condemn this illegal war and urge the Russian regime to withdraw its troops from all of Ukraine's internationally recognised territory. Only then can Ukraine fully return to producing and exporting the food that the world so desperately needs. Allied governments must also make clear to publics within NATO countries and in the rest of the world as well as to

decision-makers at the national, regional, and multilateral levels that Russia's brutality is responsible for the starvation of millions of people.

- ii. Reiterate calls for Russia to stop deliberately undermining global and Ukrainian food security: Allies must continue to insist that Moscow ceases all measures aimed at restricting the production and transport of agricultural products, including attacks on agricultural facilities and food markets as well as the blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea ports and the plundering of Ukrainian grain.
- iii. Bolster sanctions and measures aimed at tightening compliance to ensure that Russia cannot deviously take advantage of this food crisis of its own making: These efforts are needed to prevent the Kremlin from either selling its food production at high prices and using the proceeds to finance its illegal war or instrumentalising its exports as a tool to muster diplomatic support from food-insecure and import-dependent countries for its illegitimate actions.
- iv. Strengthen Ukraine's short and long-term food security: Allied governments must continue to do their utmost to address the humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian population, including food needs, triggered by Russia's unacceptable actions. The Allies must also mobilise resources and start contributing without delay to the long-term recovery and development of Ukraine's agricultural sector.
- v. Support efforts to demine Ukrainian farmlands: As part of their endeavour to assist and rebuild Ukraine now and in the future, Allies must bolster their financial and human contribution to initiatives aimed at demining fields contaminated with mines and remnants of war and bringing them back to their full production capacity.

b. Support humanitarian and development efforts to enhance global resilience to hunger and conflict:

- i. Provide adequate humanitarian aid to food-insecure populations: Allied governments must muster the political will and allocate the necessary resources to further increase the bilateral aid that they provide to the populations and countries most affected by the current global food insecurity crisis, particularly those affected by violent conflict. They must also boost their support to international humanitarian organisations to allow them to fulfil their essential mission in support of the world's most vulnerable in the face of mounting security challenges and soaring food prices.
- ii. Invest more in development assistance to address durably the root causes of food insecurity and conflict: Allies must scale up their human and financial contributions to relevant international development organisations and funds with a view to foster economic advancement, accelerate the development of sustainable agricultural practices, promote greater equity and good governance, and enhance the resilience of food systems to external shocks.
- iii. Support efforts to better understand and anticipate food crises and related conflict risks: Allies should establish individual and collective mechanisms to continuously monitor global, regional, and national hunger levels and related conflict risks, and develop early warning mechanisms to ensure that the international community is prepared to address food insecurity crises before they break out. Allies should also support the development and harness the potential of artificial intelligence-powered tools to both predict and prevent food crises and make food systems more efficient and sustainable.

c. Strengthen Allied resilience to the risks posed by rising global food insecurity:

- i. Recognise and address the consequences of the global food crisis on Allied societies: Building on NATO's seven baseline requirements for national resilience, the Allies must develop policies and adopt measures to increase the resistance of their food systems and supply chains as well as bolster their preparedness levels to future emergencies.

- ii. Strengthen their capacity to cope with spillover security challenges sparked by rising global hunger levels: Allied governments must devote more resources to preparing for possible direct or indirect effects at home of soaring food insecurity -and the rise in violent conflict which it fuels- beyond the borders of the Alliance, including uncontrolled migration flows and terrorism and violent extremism.
 - iii. Tackle the impacts of food insecurity on vulnerable communities within the Alliance: Allied governments must address the deleterious economic and social effects on the most disadvantaged communities of the inflationary pressures and shortages caused among their populations by the global food crisis. Such rising food inequalities may otherwise be exploited by potential adversaries aiming to spark political dissatisfaction and fuel societal tensions within the Alliance.
- d. Promote understanding of and respect for the prohibition to weaponize hunger and the right to food under international law:**
- i. Urge compliance with international law among belligerents: Allies should bolster efforts to disseminate more widely information about international law, including norms pertinent to the prohibition to weaponise food and to the right to food.
 - ii. Integrate humanitarian exemption into all sanctions: Exemptions should consistently be built into national and international sanction regimes to ensure that they do not undermine food security.
 - iii. Hold accountable perpetrators of violations of international law jeopardizing food security: Allied governments must ensure that international courts, particularly the ICC, have the necessary human and financial resources as well as sufficient political and diplomatic support to prosecute breaches of international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law, including the denial of access to humanitarian assistance, the use of starvation as a method of warfare, and the unlawful destruction of civilian critical agricultural infrastructure. Such efforts should, in particular, support the prosecution of all Russian soldiers, military commanders, and senior decision-makers responsible for the use of hunger as a method of warfare and for violations of the right to food against civilians in Moscow's war of choice against Ukraine and for the devastating impact of those illegal actions on global food security.
- e. Deepen cooperation to address efficiently the food insecurity and conflict nexus:**
- i. Better coordinate national and multilateral efforts: Allied governments must further intensify their exchanges, among themselves as well as with partner countries and relevant international and civil society organizations, regarding initiatives and policies focused on addressing the devastating feedback loop of food insecurity and conflict. Such reinforced cooperation would inspire new synergies, increase efficiency, and avoid duplications.
 - ii. Keep food security at the top of the international community's agenda: Allies should build on initiatives such as the *Roadmap and Call for Action for Global Food Security* and initiate new ones in multilateral forums to build common understanding and solutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beake, Nick, Korenyuk, Maria, and Reality Check Team, “Tracking where Russia is taking Ukraine’s stolen grain.” BBC, 27 June 2022.
- Beasley, David, “The Ukraine war could leave hundreds of millions hungry around the world.” The Washington Post, 8 March 2022.
- Botha, Anneli, and Abdile, Mahdi, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia.” ISS Paper 266, September 2014.
- CARE, “Ukraine conflict: soaring food and fuel prices threaten wellbeing of millions in East, Central, and the Horn of Africa.” 22 March 2022.
- Choursina, Kateryna, and Quinn, Aine, “Ukraine Crop Deal Misses Target as Russia Slow-Walks Ship Checks.” Bloomberg, 6 February 2023.
- Demeuse, Rodrigue, “Acting to Preserve the Humanitarian Space: What Role for the Allies and for NATO?” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Democracy and Security, 19 November 2022.
- EU Council, “Infographic – Ukrainian grain exports explained.” 20 January 2023.
- European Commission, “The impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on global food security.” The European Commission’s Knowledge Centre for Global Food and Nutrition Security. February 2023.
- European Council, “How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further aggravated the global food crisis.” 2 December 2022.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations):
- (2022a) “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in The World 2022”
 - (2022b) “Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations”
 - (2022c) “Impact of the war on agriculture and rural livelihoods in Ukraine”
- FAO:
- (2023a) “Hunger and Food Insecurity.” March 2023.
 - (2023b) “World Food Situation.” 3 March 2023.
 - (2023c) “Ukraine: EU-FAO partnership to ensure recovery and development of agricultural value chains.” 4 January 2023.
- Francis, Ellen, Fahim, Kareem, Parker, Claire, “Russia attacks Odessa port a day after signing grain deal, Ukraine says.” The Washington Post, 23 July 2022.
- Garriaud-Maylam, Joëlle, “Russia’s War on Truth: Defending Allied and Partner Democracies Against the Kremlin’s Disinformation Campaigns,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Democracy and Security, March 2023.
- Gijs, Camille, “Russia threatens to limit agri-food supplies only to ‘friendly’ countries.” Politico, 1 April 2022.
- Global Hunger Index, “Global Hunger Index Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance.” Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide, October 2022.
- Gold, Shabtai, “WFP costs up 50% since 2019, with Ukraine set to make matters worse.” DEVEX, 18 March 2022.
- Government of Canada, Bill C-41: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 21 March 2023.
- Ha, Oanh, Quinn, Aine, and Dodge, Samuel, “How Russian Ships Are Laundering Grain Stolen From Occupied Ukraine.” Bloomberg, 17 October 2022.
- Hibbs, Mark, “Civil Nuclear Energy Risks From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April 2022.
- Holland, Steve, and Nichols, Michelle, “Photos show Russian attacks on Ukraine grain storage – US Official.” Reuters. 1 April 2022.
- Hopkins, Valerie, Hubbard, Ben, and Kolata, Gina, “How Russia Is Using Ukrainians’ Hunger as a Weapon of War.” The New York Times, 29 March 2022.

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), “Starvation, Hunger and Famine in Armed Conflict: An Overview of the Relevant Provisions of International Humanitarian Law.” 28 June 2022.

Ilie, Luiza, “Romanian Black Sea port to keep shipping Ukrainian grain, seeks EU funding.” Reuters, 3 August 2022.

Institute for Economics and Peace, “Ecological Threat Report: Understanding Ecological Threats, Resilience and Peace.” October 2021.

Klain, Doug, “Russia Is Seeding Ukraine’s Soil With Land Mines.” Foreign Policy, 15 September 2022.

Magdy, Samy, “Groups: Both sides used starvation as tool in Yemen war.” Associated Press, 1 September 2021.

Masters, Jonathan, and Merrow, Will, “How Much Aid Has the US Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.” Council on Foreign Relations, 22 February 2023.

NATO, “Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3.” 20 September 2022a.

NATO, Strategic Concept, 2022b.

OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), “Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023.” 20 January 2023.

OHCHR, International standards: Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 2023a.

OHCHR (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner), “About the right to food and human rights.” 2023b.

PBS, “War Crimes Watch Ukraine.” February 2023.

RFE (Radio Free Europe), Kremlin, Kyiv Remain At Odds Over Extension Of Black Sea Grain Deal, 18 March 2023.

Riquier, Marie, “War in the breadbasket: Hunger and the humanitarian fallout from the war in Ukraine.” SIPRI, 6 April 2022.

Rome Statute, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 1998.

Simmons, Emmy, Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation, Wilson Center, 2013.

Strubenhoff, Heinz, “The war in Ukraine triggered a global food shortage.” Brookings Institution, 14 June 2022.

Tondo, Lorenzo, “Sea mines: the deadly danger lurking Ukraine’s waters.” The Guardian, 11 July 2022.

Trompiz, Gus, “Food prices hit record high in March, UN agency says.” Reuters, 8 April 2022.

UN News, “Siege of Syria’s eastern Ghouta ‘barbaric and medieval’, says UN Commission of Inquiry.” 20 June 2018.

UN News, “World is moving backwards on eliminating hunger and malnutrition, UN report reveals.” 6 July 2022.

UN News, “Continued urgent action needed to prevent food and nutrition crisis from worsening”, 8 February 2023.

UN (United Nations), Continued urgent action needed to prevent food and nutrition crisis from worsening, 8 February 2023.

UN:

- (2022a) “More than 140 aid workers killed in 2021 as crises soar worldwide,” 16 August 2022.
- (2022b) “Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre Operational Update,” 17 November 2022.

UN, “Adopting Resolution 2417, Security Council Strongly Condemns Starving of Civilians, Unlawfully Denying Humanitarian Access as Warfare Tactics.” United Nations Press, 24 May 2018.

UN, “Security Council Strongly Condemns Attacks against Critical Civilian Infrastructure, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2573.” United Nations Press, 27 April 2021.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly), “Resolution 74/149 on the right to food.” 18 December 2019.

UNICEF, “Global hunger crisis pushing one child into severe malnutrition every minute in 15 crisis-hit countries.” 22 June 2022.

UNSDG (United Nations Sustainable Development Group), *“Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Food Security and Nutrition.”* June 2020.

US Department of State, *“Chair’s Statement: Roadmap for Global Food Security – Call to Action,”* 19 May 2022.

USAID, *“Agriculture Resilience Initiative – Ukraine (Agri-Ukraine).”* February 2023.

Welsh, Caitlin, *“Russia, Ukraine, and Global Food Security: A One-Year Assessment,”* CSIS, 24 February 2023.

WFP (World Food Programme):

- (2022a) *“A global food crisis – 2023: Another Year of Extreme Jeopardy for Those Struggling to Feed Their Families”*
- (2022b) *“Global Report on Food Crises – Joint Analysis for Better Decisions”*
- (2022c) *“Ukraine Food Security Report: Summary”*
- (2022d) *“War in Ukraine pushes Middle East and North Africa deeper into hunger as food prices reach alarming highs”*

WFP:

- (2023a) *“Emergencies: Somalia Emergency”*
- (2023b) *“Emergencies: Ukraine Emergency”*

WFP, and FAO, *“Hunger Hotspots FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity,”* 21 September 2022.

WFP, *“Contributions to WFP in 2021,”* December 2021.

WFP, *“Food Security and Emigration: Why people flee and the impact on family members left behind in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras,”* September 2017.

White House, *“Remarks by President Biden at the US-Africa Leaders Summit Closing Session on Promoting Food Security and Food Systems Resilience,”* 15 December 2022.

Wong and Swanson, *“How Russia’s War on Ukraine Is Worsening Global Starvation,”* The New York Times, 2 January 2023.

World Bank, *“Joint Statement: G7 Presidency, World Bank Group Establish Global Alliance for Food Security to Catalyze Response to Food Crisis,”* 19 May 2022.