A NEW NATO IN AN AGE OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION: ACCELERATING NATO’S ADAPTATION AT THE VILNIUS SUMMIT DECLARATION 481∗

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** the historic decisions taken at the Madrid Summit on 29-30 June 2022 to adapt NATO to a radically changed security environment by reinforcing Allied unity, cohesion and solidarity;

2. **Saluting** the adoption of a new forward-looking Strategic Concept, which places shared democratic values at the heart of the Alliance’s response to today’s threats and challenges;

3. **Convinced** that the July 2023 Vilnius Summit must demonstrate Allies’ rock-solid unity and resolve while accelerating NATO’s adaptation to the new era of strategic competition;

4. **Supporting** resolutely Allies’ unshakable commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture;

5. **Welcoming** Finland’s accession to the Alliance and Sweden’s impending accession, which will not only give both countries, but also NATO, more security;

6. **Stressing** that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to Allied security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and **condemning in the strongest possible terms** its unjustified, unprovoked, illegal and brutal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine as well as the continued illegal occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions of Georgia;

7. **Applauding** the crucial political, military, economic and humanitarian assistance that individual Allies, NATO, the EU and NATO partners are providing Ukraine in support of its legitimate self-defence against aggression;

8. **Denouncing** Russia’s continuing violation and selective implementation of its arms control obligations, its suspension of the New START Treaty, its stated intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and its reckless and unacceptable nuclear sabre-rattling;

9. **Welcoming** the Strategic Concept’s recognition that the stated ambitions and coercive policies of the People’s Republic of China pose multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests, security and values, including through Beijing’s deepening strategic partnership with Russia;

* Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Luxembourg, on Monday 22 May 2023.
10. **Recalling** that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is the most direct asymmetric threat to the Alliance and that countering terrorism is essential to our collective defence;

11. **Saluting** NATO’s ongoing commitment to a 360-degree approach and to addressing other threats and challenges, including the evolving threat of terrorism, instability in the South and the East, malicious cyber activities and hybrid operations, the security implications of climate change, irregular migration, human trafficking, food insecurity, threats to energy security as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military technology;

12. **Reiterating** its unwavering support to NATO’s Open Door Policy and the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and **praising** Ukraine’s significant efforts to advance towards membership;

13. **Welcoming** the commitment in the 2023 NATO-EU Joint Declaration to take this unique and essential partnership to the next level and **supporting** enhanced cooperation with other like-minded partners across the globe that share a strong commitment to democratic values and to the rules-based international order;

14. **Stressing** the need for the Alliance to maintain capabilities and expertise in crisis management, fully embracing lessons learned from previous missions, including NATO’s almost two-decades-long mission in Afghanistan;

15. **Highlighting** that increasing national and collective resilience within the Alliance is critical for NATO to fulfil its core tasks and underpins efforts to safeguard Allied nations, societies and shared values;

16. **Convinced** that increased and sustained investment in defence is essential to address current and future threats and challenges, maintain the Alliance’s technological edge and urgently replenish and expand munition and equipment stocks;

17. **URGES** Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit in Vilnius:

a. to recommit to all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence, territorial integrity, right to self-defence and self-determination, to increase and speed up Allied, NATO, EU and NATO partners’ political, military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support, and sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail;

b. to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters;

c. to operationalise a new approach to relations with Russia based on the Strategic Concept’s characterisation of Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”;
d. to finalise as soon as possible the ratification of Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance;

e. to accelerate the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture through relevant conventional, nuclear, missile defence, space and cyber capabilities as well as through NATO’s new plans, force model and command structure, including the deployment of additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on the eastern flank, to be scaled up to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment and enhanced command and control;

f. to strengthen security in the Black Sea region, including by keeping the security developments and arrangements under close review and supporting Allied and partner countries in the region in preserving peace, security and stability in the area;

g. to continue to use NATO as a platform to coordinate in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts taking into account the prevailing security environment and effective deterrence and defence;

h. to boost awareness of China’s systemic challenge, including attempts to partner with Russia in undermining democracy and the rules-based international order, to ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;

i. to continue efforts to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups, and to remain vigilant about the increasing crime-terror nexus, including by enhancing cooperation with the EU and other partners, especially in the South;

j. to move quickly to agree on Allied capability requirements under the new guidance for NATO defence planning;

k. to agree new defence spending and investment commitments beyond 2024, exceeding a minimum investment level of 2% of GDP for defence;

l. to encourage national, EU and multinational efforts and adopt a NATO defence industrial pledge, working with industry to urgently replenish and expand stocks, while providing greater visibility on long-term capability priorities, ensuring full complementarity between these different efforts;

m. to continue to invest in innovation and maintain NATO’s technological edge through cutting-edge national and joint research, development and procurement, while shaping standards and committing to principles of responsible use that reflect the Alliance’s democratic values and human rights;

n. to implement a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to national and collective resilience while both identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, notably with respect to Allied critical infrastructure, supply chains and energy and health sectors, in close coordination with military, civilian and private actors;
o. to step up efforts to decisively and forcefully tackle attempts by Russia and other authoritarian actors to undermine Allied and partner democracies, particularly through malign cyber activities, hybrid operations and hostile information activities;

p. to strengthen the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU by stepping up political consultations and cooperation in matters of shared interest, in the context of a roadmap that operationalises the commitments made in the NATO-EU Joint Declaration of 2023;

q. to continue active support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to agree on the next steps towards Ukraine’s NATO membership;

r. to outline how Allies and NATO can assure to continue to stand with Ukraine once it has prevailed in the current war and how they can contribute to deterring future aggression against Ukraine;

s. to quickly implement enhanced tailored support packages for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova while continuing to actively support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as support Georgia in taking steps towards eventual NATO membership;

t. to further develop political and practical cooperation with other like-minded partners, including Indo-Pacific democracies, to defend the rules-based order and address common challenges;

u. to accelerate work to define the parameters of NATO’s future engagement in crisis management;

v. to further boost efforts to ensure NATO becomes the leading international organisation in understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security and enhances its own contribution to combatting climate change;

w. to sustain the momentum in carrying forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda as a key expression of the Alliance’s values;

x. to recognise the Assembly’s indispensable role and its contribution to strong and enduring transatlantic unity and cohesion, to advancing the shared democratic values which underpin the Alliance and to combatting disinformation.