POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

ADOPTED IN 2023

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A NEW NATO IN AN AGE OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION:
ACCELERATING NATO’S ADAPTATION AT THE VILNIUS SUMMIT
DECLARATION 481*

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** the historic decisions taken at the Madrid Summit on 29-30 June 2022 to adapt NATO to a radically changed security environment by reinforcing Allied unity, cohesion and solidarity;

2. **Saluting** the adoption of a new forward-looking Strategic Concept, which places shared democratic values at the heart of the Alliance’s response to today’s threats and challenges;

3. **Convinced** that the July 2023 Vilnius Summit must demonstrate Allies’ rock-solid unity and resolve while accelerating NATO’s adaptation to the new era of strategic competition;

4. **Supporting** resolutely Allies’ unshakable commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture;

5. **Welcoming** Finland’s accession to the Alliance and Sweden’s impending accession, which will not only give both countries, but also NATO, more security;

6. **Stressing** that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to Allied security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and **condemning in the strongest possible terms** its unjustified, unprovoked, illegal and brutal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine as well as the continued illegal occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions of Georgia;

7. **Applauding** the crucial political, military, economic and humanitarian assistance that individual Allies, NATO, the EU and NATO partners are providing Ukraine in support of its legitimate self-defence against aggression;

8. **Denouncing** Russia’s continuing violation and selective implementation of its arms control obligations, its suspension of the New START Treaty, its stated intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and its reckless and unacceptable nuclear sabre-rattling;

9. **Welcoming** the Strategic Concept’s recognition that the stated ambitions and coercive policies of the People’s Republic of China pose multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests, security and values, including through Beijing’s deepening strategic partnership with Russia;

10. **Recalling** that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is the most direct asymmetric threat to the Alliance and that countering terrorism is essential to our collective defence;

11. **Saluting** NATO’s ongoing commitment to a 360-degree approach and to addressing other threats and challenges, including the evolving threat of terrorism, instability in the South and the East, malicious cyber activities and hybrid operations, the security implications of climate change, irregular migration, human trafficking, food insecurity, threats to energy security as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military technology;

* adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Luxembourg, on Monday 22 May 2023
12. **Reiterating** its unwavering support to NATO’s Open Door Policy and the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and **praising** Ukraine’s significant efforts to advance towards membership;

13. **Welcoming** the commitment in the 2023 NATO-EU Joint Declaration to take this unique and essential partnership to the next level and **supporting** enhanced cooperation with other like-minded partners across the globe that share a strong commitment to democratic values and to the rules-based international order;

14. **Stressing** the need for the Alliance to maintain capabilities and expertise in crisis management, fully embracing lessons learned from previous missions, including NATO’s almost two-decades-long mission in Afghanistan;

15. **Highlighting** that increasing national and collective resilience within the Alliance is critical for NATO to fulfil its core tasks and underpins efforts to safeguard Allied nations, societies and shared values;

16. **Convinced** that increased and sustained investment in defence is essential to address current and future threats and challenges, maintain the Alliance’s technological edge and urgently replenish and expand munition and equipment stocks;

17. **URGES** Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit in Vilnius:

   a. to recommit to all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence, territorial integrity, right to self-defence and self-determination, to increase and speed up Allied, NATO, EU and NATO partners’ political, military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support, and sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail;

   b. to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters;

   c. to operationalise a new approach to relations with Russia based on the Strategic Concept’s characterisation of Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security”;

   d. to finalise as soon as possible the ratification of Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance;

   e. to accelerate the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture through relevant conventional, nuclear, missile defence, space and cyber capabilities as well as through NATO’s new plans, force model and command structure, including the deployment of additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on the eastern flank, to be scaled up to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment and enhanced command and control;

   f. to strengthen security in the Black Sea region, including by keeping the security developments and arrangements under close review and supporting Allied and partner countries in the region in preserving peace, security and stability in the area;

   g. to continue to use NATO as a platform to coordinate in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts taking into account the prevailing security environment and effective deterrence and defence;
h. to boost awareness of China’s systemic challenge, including attempts to partner with Russia in undermining democracy and the rules-based international order, to ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;

i. to continue efforts to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups, and to remain vigilant about the increasing crime-terror nexus, including by enhancing cooperation with the EU and other partners, especially in the South;

j. to move quickly to agree on Allied capability requirements under the new guidance for NATO defence planning;

k. to agree new defence spending and investment commitments beyond 2024, exceeding a minimum investment level of 2% of GDP for defence;

l. to encourage national, EU and multinational efforts and adopt a NATO defence industrial pledge, working with industry to urgently replenish and expand stocks, while providing greater visibility on long-term capability priorities, ensuring full complementarity between these different efforts;

m. to continue to invest in innovation and maintain NATO’s technological edge through cutting-edge national and joint research, development and procurement, while shaping standards and committing to principles of responsible use that reflect the Alliance’s democratic values and human rights;

n. to implement a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to national and collective resilience while both identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, notably with respect to Allied critical infrastructure, supply chains and energy and health sectors, in close coordination with military, civilian and private actors;

o. to step up efforts to decisively and forcefully tackle attempts by Russia and other authoritarian actors to undermine Allied and partner democracies, particularly through malign cyber activities, hybrid operations and hostile information activities;

p. to strengthen the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU by stepping up political consultations and cooperation in matters of shared interest, in the context of a roadmap that operationalises the commitments made in the NATO-EU Joint Declaration of 2023;

q. to continue active support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to agree on the next steps towards Ukraine’s NATO membership;

r. to outline how Allies and NATO can assure to continue to stand with Ukraine once it has prevailed in the current war and how they can contribute to deterring future aggression against Ukraine;

s. to quickly implement enhanced tailored support packages for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova while continuing to actively support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as support Georgia in taking steps towards eventual NATO membership;

t. to further develop political and practical cooperation with other like-minded partners, including Indo-Pacific democracies, to defend the rules-based order and address common challenges;

u. to accelerate work to define the parameters of NATO’s future engagement in crisis management;
v. to further boost efforts to ensure NATO becomes the leading international organisation in understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security and enhances its own contribution to combatting climate change;

w. to sustain the momentum in carrying forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda as a key expression of the Alliance's values;

x. to recognise the Assembly's indispensable role and its contribution to strong and enduring transatlantic unity and cohesion, to advancing the shared democratic values which underpin the Alliance and to combatting disinformation.
UNITED AND RESOLUTE IN SUPPORT OF UKRAINE DECLARATION 482*

The Assembly,

1. **Standing** firmly with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people;

2. **Condemning** in the strongest possible terms Russia’s ongoing unprovoked, unjustified, brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

3. **Stressing** that Russia’s war seeks to crush Ukraine’s democracy and, by extension, undermine the values that are fundamental to NATO and the entire democratic, civilised and peaceful world;

4. **Conveying** its continued profound respect and admiration for the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian people, security forces and authorities and their determination to fight for their freedom and liberate the territory of Ukraine according to its internationally recognised borders of 1991;

5. **Reaffirming** its unwavering support for Ukraine’s democracy, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, self-defence and self-determination;

6. **United and resolute** in its determination to sustain this support for as long it takes for Ukraine to prevail;

7. **Recognising** that by standing up to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression, Ukraine makes a significant contribution to Euro-Atlantic security;

8. **Convinced** that the NATO Summit in Vilnius should send a clear political signal to Ukraine and must further strengthen Ukraine's membership path;

9. **Welcoming** the invitation extended to President Zelenskyy to participate in the Vilnius Summit and hopeful that a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at Heads of State and Government level can be held at the Summit;

10. **Reaffirming** clearly its statement in Resolution 479 on NATO post-Madrid that, with its deliberate attacks against urban centres and critical infrastructure, which have left millions of people across Ukraine without electricity and disrupted water and heating systems, the Russian state under the current regime is a terrorist one;

11. **Recalling** that Russia’s aggression has caused 5.5 million Ukrainians to be internally displaced and over 8 million to seek refuge in other countries;

12. **Affirming** that it will never recognise any of Russia’s illegal and forcible annexations of Ukrainian territory;

13. **Determined** to hold accountable the Russian regime, its co-aggressors in the Belarusian regime and all other perpetrators, including for the crime of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible acts of genocide committed in Ukraine;

14. **Welcoming** the historic decision of the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant of arrest for Vladimir Putin, who is allegedly responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of

* adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Luxembourg, on Monday 22 May 2023.
population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, in prejudice of Ukrainian children, and noting that the forcible transfer of children from one group to another group with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group is an act of genocide according to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948;

15. Concerned about the Belarusian regime’s growing support of Russia’s war of aggression, in particular the use of the territory of Belarus for training and logistic purposes;

16. Denouncing the Iranian regime’s support to Russia and Russia’s attempts to secure the provision of arms and ammunition, notably from North Korea;

17. Emphasising that any provision of lethal aid by China to Russia would be a historic mistake, which would have profound implications;

18. Welcoming President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula, which provides the foundation for a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace;

19. Determined to support Ukraine’s reconstruction and the continued strengthening of Ukraine’s democracy and encouraging Ukraine to accelerate the adoption of needed reforms;

20. Denouncing Russia’s employment of hunger as a weapon as part of its ideology and practices of ruscism, and stressing the ongoing importance of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by the United Nations and Türkiye, to global food security;

21. Convinced that Ukraine’s future is in the Euro-Atlantic family and determined to continue to support Ukraine on the path towards NATO membership, which the Ukrainian people have chosen and is anchored in Ukraine’s Constitution;

22. Praising Ukraine’s significant efforts to advance towards NATO membership and commitment to reforms even in times of full-scale war;

23. Reiterating that Russia today is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

24. Supporting resolutely Allies’ unshakable commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture;

25. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to recommit, at the Vilnius Summit, to all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, right to self-defence and self-determination, to increase and speed up Allied, NATO, EU and NATO partners’ political, military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support, and sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail and restore in full its territorial integrity;

   b. to continue to step up and speed up deliveries by Allies of the military equipment which Ukraine urgently needs, including additional ammunition, advanced artillery, missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles, air defence systems, fighter aircraft and the necessary sustainment elements to help Ukraine in strengthening its defence capabilities and potential, including land, sea and air components;

   c. to explicitly recognise the Wagner group as a criminal and terrorist organisation, and to firmly condemn its actions in Ukraine and other parts of the world;
d. to expel Russian diplomats engaged in hostile activities, including spreading hate speech and disinformation, fuelling the conflict and destabilising the situation in Ukraine;

e. to fill all pledges and strengthen the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, and to commit additional funding for a strategic multi-year NATO assistance programme for Ukraine, including support for mine clearance, medical treatment and rehabilitation, Ukraine’s transition from Soviet-era to NATO equipment, standards and doctrines, training and education for the Ukrainian military and enhancing interoperability between Ukrainian forces and NATO forces;

f. to reconfirm that Ukraine’s rightful place is in NATO, that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance, that Allies will assist Ukraine to fulfill the necessary conditions along the clear path towards accession and that Ukraine has achieved significant strides along that path;

g. to continue active support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to agree on the next significant steps towards Ukraine’s NATO membership;

h. to highlight, at the Vilnius Summit, the need for firm future security guarantees for Ukraine until acquiring NATO membership;

i. to expand massive, crippling and sustained sanctions for as long as it takes until Russia withdraws all of its troops from all Ukraine’s territory within its internationally recognised borders;

j. to continue to support the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression and support national and international courts in documenting and prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and potential acts of genocide;

k. to support Ukraine’s efforts to promote its plan for a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace;

l. to continue to mobilise substantial short- and long-term humanitarian, financial and material assistance to Ukraine;

m. to support a comprehensive aid programme akin to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of a more prosperous Ukraine firmly anchored to the liberal democratic family of nations;

n. to support reparation and compensation mechanisms and consider the use of frozen Russian assets to ensure Russia pays for the damages and losses it has caused and helps fund the rebuilding of Ukraine, whilst being mindful of the lessons of history;

o. to recognise that reconstruction will demand sustained financial and political support from the international community and to begin to outline in close consultation with Ukraine, the EU, and key international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF a strategy for financing Ukraine’s economic rebirth;

p. to recognise the Assembly’s important role in supporting Ukraine’s democratic consolidation and in bringing Ukraine closer to the full membership status.
PROTECTING ALLIED DEMOCRACIES AND PARTNERS FROM DISINFORMATION
RESOLUTION 483*

The Assembly,

1. **Considering** that disinformation in all its forms constitutes a severe threat to the security, cohesion and democratic functioning of the Alliance and Allied societies;

2. **Deploring** the increasing dissemination, sophistication and impact of false information, spread among, and by, people who sometimes lack sufficient access to reliable sources of information by means of elaborate communication technologies;

3. **Denouncing** the use of disinformation campaigns by authoritarian states to weaken Allied countries and their partners, and to delegitimise their democratic institutions, officials, processes and principles, while promoting their own repressive models of governance;

4. **Concerned** by the creation and dissemination of disinformation by multiple non-state actors, including within Allied societies;

5. **Recalling** that, although malicious actors take advantage of the openness and freedom of expression that characterise Allied societies to spread their false narratives, the fight against disinformation must not lead to democratic principles being undermined;

6. **Reaffirming** the importance of NATO's role in supporting and coordinating resilience-building and the fight against disinformation, even if these areas are primarily a national prerogative;

7. **Welcoming** the strong emphasis on combatting disinformation campaigns and the commitments made in this regard in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, and **applauding** the efforts made in recent years by Allies and NATO to strengthen their ability to detect and counter disinformation campaigns;

8. **Strongly denouncing** the aggressive and intensive disinformation campaigns launched by Russia and its proxies in the information domain in the context of its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, **commending** the effectiveness of the Ukrainian response, and **welcoming** Allied support for the Ukrainian authorities;

9. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance, and, where appropriate, NATO bodies:
   
   a. to implement the commitments already made in the fight against disinformation and to continue to place this fight at the centre of their present and future initiatives to strengthen Allied resilience;

   b. to enhance their understanding of the threats posed by disinformation in order to respond more quickly and effectively, in particular by stepping up their efforts to detect campaigns and identify the actors behind them;

   c. to clearly attribute disinformation campaigns wherever possible and punish those responsible;

* presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark.
d. to conduct regular and thorough assessments of their resilience to disinformation in order to detect and address potential vulnerabilities;

e. to promptly refute false narratives spread in the information space that pose a risk to Allied societies, while avoiding unduly increasing their visibility;

f. to consolidate their national legislation so as to better protect the information space against the dissemination of disinformation, while guaranteeing respect for freedom of expression;

g. to allocate sufficient human and financial resources to the fight against disinformation at the national and intergovernmental levels, in particular by strengthening the capacities of specialised institutions and increasing support for quality media and relevant civil society organisations;

h. to promote media literacy and run campaigns to raise awareness of disinformation among Allied populations, including through the media and education systems;

i. to encourage social media platforms to better integrate the fight against disinformation into their advertising, content moderation and algorithm development practices;

j. to maintain and increase their support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian disinformation and propaganda, and to learn from and adopt the lessons of Ukraine’s successful response;

k. to enhance collaboration and facilitate the exchange of best practices among member and partner states, international organisations, including the European Union, and relevant civil society actors, as well as between NATO and the NATO PA, in order to disseminate verified information about the Alliance;

l. to create a Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO that can serve as a platform for sharing resources and exchanging best practices among Allies and their partners;

m. to assess and prevent any negative impact of the use of Artificial Intelligence developments in disinformation campaigns.
IMPLEMENTING NATO’S NEW DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE BASELINE RESOLUTION 484*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the Russian Federation’s unprovoked, unjustified, brutal and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has broken the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, gravely altering the security environment facing Allies, and creating a reality in which Allies can no longer discount the possibility of attack against Allied sovereignty and territorial integrity;

2. **Understanding** that disruptive strategic competition, pervasive instability, and recurrent shocks define Allies’ broader security environment, which is global and interconnected;

3. **Concerned** by the growing global challenge authoritarian actors pose to Allied interests, values and democratic way of life, as evidenced by their increased investments in sophisticated conventional and nuclear missile systems, interference with Allies’ democratic institutions and societies via myriad hybrid tactics, and deliberate attempts to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance;

4. **Viewing** the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area today, and **understanding** it seeks to establish direct control of its near abroad via coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation, as well as establish spheres of influence in its near abroad;

5. **Troubled** by Russia’s destabilising military modernisation and build up; particularly via investments in disruptive new nuclear forces, and its continued multi-domain military build-up and presence in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Sea regions, and across the Arctic;

6. **Alarmed** by the Russian government’s reckless nuclear rhetoric directed at NATO Allies and partners and continuing violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments, reflecting a pattern of aggressive brinkmanship contributing to the deterioration of the broader security landscape;

7. **Vigilant** to Russia’s deepening military integration with Belarus via the deployment of advanced Russian military capabilities and military personnel, including its stated intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, in Belarus, which has implications for regional stability and Allied deterrence and defence;

8. **Guarding** against terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, as the most significant asymmetric threat to Allies’ populations and to international peace and prosperity and **understanding** that terrorist organisations are expanding their reach and lethality via broader networks and increased access to new technologies;

9. **Cognisant** that the People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies pose multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests, security, and values, including through Beijing’s deepening strategic partnership with Russia;

10. **Acknowledging** that malign actors increasingly seek to disrupt and degrade Allied institutions, critical infrastructure, economies, and societies via cyber operations;

* presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark
11. **Very concerned** that the Russian Federation’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape; and, **aware** that the continued erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and norms undermines strategic stability;

12. **Welcoming** the far-reaching decisions taken at both the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius NATO Summits, which demonstrated Allied unity and laid the foundation for a fundamental shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and its most detailed and robust regional defence plans since the Cold War;

13. **Recalling** that the 2022 Strategic Concept set a new baseline for the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture;

14. **Noting** the significant steps taken since 2014 to adapt and strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, which have significantly improved force readiness, presence, and resilience across the Alliance;

15. **Recalling** that NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complimented by space and cyber assets; and, **stressing** that this posture is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with our international commitments;

16. **Stressing** the importance of the Alliance’s forward presence along NATO’s eastern flank – from the Baltic to the Black Seas – and **welcoming** Allies’ commitment to scale up these battlegroups to brigades where and when required to guarantee the security of all Allied populations and territory;

17. **Welcoming** the rapid progress towards the full integration of Finland into NATO’s deterrence and defence and Allies’ commitment to complete this process as soon as possible; and **looking forward** to welcoming Sweden as a NATO member as soon as possible;

18. **Encouraged** by Allies’ agreement to improve the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence;

19. **Praising** Allied leaders’ enduring commitment to invest at least 2% of GDP annually in defence to underwrite Allies implementation of the new baseline for deterrence and defence;

20. **Supporting** the Defence Production Action Plan agreed to by Allies in Vilnius to facilitate investments in the capabilities required to meet NATO’s new baseline for deterrence and defence, as well as replenish dwindling armour and ammunition stocks;

21. **Applauding** Allied leaders’ adoption of new regional defence plans, signalling the largest overhaul of NATO’s military structure and posture in the post-Cold War era, and their commitment to establish a new multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force, which will further strengthen Allies’ 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence;

22. **Welcoming** the establishment of the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France in recognition of the need to continue to ensure effective deterrence and defence across all operational domains;

23. **Welcoming** the establishment of the NATO-EU Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and the collaboration between NATO and partner countries like Japan to enhance maritime capabilities through increased interoperability and preparedness;
24. **Commending** EU’s efforts to enhance protection of undersea infrastructure, and **highlighting** the valuable NATO-EU cooperation on maritime-related issues, especially initiatives engaging the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in Lisbon;

25. **Noting** that NATO’s Strategic Concept recognises the need to identify and mitigate strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities with respect to Allies’ critical infrastructure;

26. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to remain united in their focused efforts to further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, understanding it as the backbone of Allies’ Article 5 commitment to defend each other;

   b. to implement fully and promptly NATO’s new force model to modernise NATO’s force structure to continue to strengthen its eastern flank from the Baltic to the Black Seas, implement its new regional defence plans, and permit Allies to maintain a 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence;

   c. to invest in the capabilities needed to defend against threats across all domains, including long-range precision strike capabilities, advanced air and maritime systems, cutting-edge cyber defences and space assets; as well as modern air and missile defence systems necessary to defend against increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats ranging from simple Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to sophisticated hypersonic missiles;

   d. to match defence investments with the strong political will demonstrated at the 2022 and 2023 Summits to continue to maintain and reinforce all of the post-2014 NATO initiatives, underwritten by a stronger Defence Investment Pledge by which all Allies agreed to in Vilnius to spend at least 2% of GDP annually on defence;

   e. to continue to pursue strategic stability via strong and effective deterrence and defence, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue;

   f. to continue to take all measures necessary to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of NATO’s nuclear deterrent mission;

   g. to channel the power and potential of Alliance-wide initiatives, such as the Defence Innovation Fund and the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), to support defence innovation, enhance Allies’ technological edge and contribute to the development and adoption of dual-use emerging technologies to address today and tomorrow’s critical defence and security challenges;

   h. to work together to lower barriers to inter-Alliance cooperation on defence production;

   i. to sponsor Allied initiatives to strengthen NATO’s position in cyberspace and space;

   j. to ensure the enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility by guaranteeing the legislative frameworks necessary for effective command and control, as well as military mobility across all Allied territory;

   k. to continue efforts to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups, and to remain vigilant about the increasing crime-terror nexus, including by enhancing cooperation with the EU and other partners, especially in the South;

   l. to continue the development of their national goals and respective implementation plans to enhance national and collective resilience in line with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;
m. to continue to develop and strengthen existing cooperation with NATO aspirants Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and to work with them to build their integrity and resilience, develop their defence capabilities, uphold their political independence, and underwrite the tailored support measures endorsed at the NATO Madrid Summit in 2022;

n. to work together responsibly, as Allies and with like-minded partners, to address the systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic and global security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies; and,

o. to continue to solidify and evolve the EU-NATO strategic security partnership, welcoming the commitment in the 2023 EU-NATO Joint Declaration to take this unique and essential partnership to the next level, and ensuring effective cooperation playing to each organisation’s strengths, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and ensuring the fullest involvement of non-EU Allies.
STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION FOLLOWING RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE MILITARY INVASION OF UKRAINE
RESOLUTION 485*

The Assembly,

1. **Denouncing** in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, illegal and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the continued illegal occupation of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, which demonstrate daily the Russian Federation’s significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

2. **Recognising** that Russia’s actions highlight the increasing strategic importance of the Black Sea region to Euro-Atlantic security, as acknowledged in the 2022 Strategic Concept, and the need for the development of a comprehensive Black Sea strategy;

3. **Commending** Ukraine's courageous self-defence against Russia’s aggression to protect its sovereignty and democracy, as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter; **saluting** the strong Allied and partner support shown for Ukraine’s heroic defence of its nation and territory, and our shared values at the Vilnius Summit; and **encouraged** by the establishment of the mechanisms necessary to continue and strengthen this support over the horizon;

4. **Praising** the continued, significant, and vital Allied and partner military, economic, political, and humanitarian support to Ukraine, including the upgrading of NATO’s own political relationship and practical assistance to Ukraine;

5. **Appalled** by Russia’s persistent and unconscionable attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, particularly on its electricity grid, maritime and Danube ports, and other vital-to-life critical infrastructure, many of which are launched from the Black Sea;

6. **Hyper vigilant** about the direct impact and potential for escalation that Russia’s missile barrages against Ukraine have on Black Sea littoral states, particularly Romania and the Republic of Moldova, with missile attacks occurring on riverbanks opposite Romanian territory, and flagrantly violating Moldovan airspace, causing power blackouts, and producing debris falling on both countries’ territory;

7. **Denouncing** that, since Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, and particularly since its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia's military build-up on Crimea and in the Black Sea, particularly via its imposition of a naval blockade of Ukraine’s coastline, to include significant sea mining in the area, contravenes international law regarding the freedom of navigation;

8. **Condemning** Russia’s declared intention to build a naval base in Ochamchire, located in Georgian territory illegally occupied by Russia, threatening to further destabilise the Black Sea region;

9. **Welcoming** also the EU’s suspension of the broadcasting activities and licenses of several Kremlin-backed disinformation outlets that have been used by the Russian government as instruments to manipulate information and promote disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine,

* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark.
including propaganda aimed at destabilising the countries neighbouring Russia, as well as the EU and its Member States, and calling upon Allied states who have not done so yet to do the same;

10. **Lamenting** Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative;

11. **Recognising** Russia’s crimes related to its intensive deliberate attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube ports and agricultural facilities, resulting in significant human casualties and economic destruction and undermining global food security;

12. **Applauding** NATO’s Black Sea Allies for their efforts to find ways and means to facilitate Ukrainian grain exports onto world markets, in particular Türkiye for its efforts to revive the Black Sea Grain deal in a sustainable and reliable manner, and the critical role of Romania in facilitating the transit of Ukrainian grains worldwide and the additional measures to increase the capacities via its Black Sea ports and the Danube corridor;

13. **Warning** that, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has further increased its full spectrum of military and hybrid tactics to include a systematic disinformation campaign to destabilise the government of the Republic of Moldova and to support pro-Russian candidates and pro-Russian parties, so as to increase its influence over the Black Sea Region and beyond;

14. **Welcoming** the far-reaching decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius Summits to establish a new baseline for deterrence and defence for NATO, which comprises a substantial strengthening of the Alliance’s forward defence capabilities along the eastern flank, including the establishment of new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the most detailed and robust regional defence plans since the Cold War;

15. **Applauding** Türkiye’s efforts to impartially implement the 1936 Montreux Convention, which is the essential element in the context of Black Sea security and a key instrument for escalation management, and its diplomatic efforts to implement the new status quo regarding the passages of warships through the Turkish Straits for the benefit of all parties;

16. **Commending** Allies’ decision to establish a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO Headquarters and a Maritime Centre for Critical Undersea Infrastructure at NATO Maritime Command in the United Kingdom;

17. **Standing behind** Allied efforts to implement the tailored support packages for NATO’s Black Sea partners most vulnerable to outside interference, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly efforts to strengthen the Republic of Moldova’s resilience, and the reiteration of the 2008 Bucharest Summit decision that Georgia will become a member of NATO with the Membership Action Plan as an integral part of that process;

18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   a. to develop a NATO Black Sea strategy with a tailored and structured approach, including an Action Plan, underwritten by increased Alliance support to national Black Sea strategies;
   b. to implement fully and effectively the decisions adopted at the Madrid and Vilnius Summits to establish a new baseline for NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture, and anchor a strong forward defence along its eastern flank;
   c. to support fully the implementation of NATO’s new regional plan south, which will focus on the Black and Mediterranean Seas, dividing its attention equally between Russia and terrorism, NATO’s most significant direct and most direct asymmetrical threats respectively;
d. to work with and encourage Black Sea Allies to increase investments in military force generation and modernisation across all domains, as well as to improve the critical infrastructure and legal frameworks necessary for effective and efficient military mobility across the region;

e. to continue to increase and speed up Allied, NATO, EU, and partners’ political, military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine, and sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail and rebuild;

f. to continue to support Ukraine’s NATO membership goal by assisting, to the extent possible, with its reform agenda;

g. to continue to support the activities of the International Crimea Platform, including its parliamentarian dimension and the Black Sea Security Conference, guided by an understanding that security in the Black Sea cannot be guaranteed without a full restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including with Crimea and the territorial waters of Ukraine;

h. to deliver on their promise to fund the enhanced Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine as a multi-year programme in a sustained and predictable way;

i. to continue to denounce, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian critical and vital-to-life infrastructure, including grain export terminals;

j. to develop measures to assist Ukraine in restoring infrastructure critical to grain export;

k. to support the efforts of the littoral Allies in the Black Sea aimed at upholding security, safety, stability and freedom of navigation in the region, including through the 1936 Montreux Convention;

l. to foster increased investments in regional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, long-range precision strike capabilities, improved coastal defence systems, new layered air and missile defences, increased air policing, and surface and subsurface naval vessels (crewed and uncrewed);

m. to step up efforts to monitor and combat Russian disinformation and propaganda in the Black Sea region, even though resilience remains above all a national prerogative, as well as support efforts to enhance resilience to combat hybrid threats;

n. to quickly implement the enhanced tailored support packages for Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, while continuing to actively support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia, as well as support Georgia in taking steps towards eventual NATO membership through its efforts to progress its reform agenda, including key democratic reforms, and making best use of the Annual National Programme.
TOWARDS THE RECONSTRUCTION OF UKRAINE
RESOLUTION 486*

The Assembly,

1. Concerned that in launching an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia has inflicted incalculable damage, above all, upon Ukraine and its people, while violating critical international law and norms, damaging the global economy, and attacking the foundations of the post-war international order;

2. Determined to play its part in mobilising the support needed to sustain the Ukrainian state as well as its institutions and people so that this essential partner and future NATO member is positioned to thwart Russian aggression and thus emerges from this war as a stable and prosperous democracy;

3. Stressing that significant investment in Ukraine’s reconstruction will be critical not only to that country’s long-term resilience but also to transatlantic security and the democratic values it upholds;

4. Applauding the generous military, humanitarian, and budgetary support that Allied countries, international financial institutions, and the international community more broadly have extended to Ukraine to support it in its hour of need;

5. Endorsing efforts among donors to coordinate military, humanitarian, and economic support for Ukraine to maximise the impact of assistance and reduce administrative and other burdens on the Ukrainian people;

6. Noting that Ukraine knows best its own needs and must be the architect of its reconstruction as reflected in that country’s Recovery and Development Plan;

7. Welcoming the establishment of the Ukraine Development Fund, which both recognises the fundamental role of the private sector and international investment in the reconstruction process and is working effectively to raise the level of private investment in Ukraine;

8. Condemning Russia’s war crimes and deliberate, systematic, immoral and criminal attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, including the intensive deliberate attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea and Danube ports and agricultural facilities, the massacres of civilians, the torture and sexual violence used as a weapon of war, the deportation and kidnapping of children, the mutilation of prisoners of war, and attacks in densely populated areas;

9. Recognising that the reconstruction of Ukraine will require an unprecedented mobilisation of resources but that the benefits to Ukraine, the international system, and the global economy will outweigh these up-front costs;

10. Cognisant that respect for human dignity and human rights must be a core value undergirding reconstruction;

11. Observing that the war has taken a terrible toll on Ukraine’s traumatised population, but it has responded to these challenges with admirable resilience and a clear determination to prevail in this war and to build an enduring, stable and prosperous democracy;

* presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark
12. **Noting** that Ukraine confronts a long-term challenge to rid Eastern Ukraine of mines laid by Russian forces which have rendered large swathes of the countryside unusable;

13. **Acknowledging** that the reconstruction process should not lead to a return to the *status quo ante*, but rather to the development of a technologically advanced market capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century;

14. **Reaffirming** that the prospect of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration will infuse the country’s reconstruction effort with coherence, structure, and ambition reflecting the desires and needs of the Ukrainian people and their democratically elected government;

15. **Encouraged** that even in the midst of a terrible war, Ukraine continues to make progress in countering corruption and improving transparency and, in many ways, has already begun the process of reconstruction;

16. **Convinced** that Russia must pay for the damages it has inflicted on Ukraine’s economy, infrastructure and people, and that the initial payment should come from seized Russian assets;

17. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   
   a. to inform their support for Ukraine, in part by recognising that the Kremlin’s ultimate ambition is to alter fundamentally the European security order, end NATO’s presence in Europe, and move the borders of its state further into the heart of the continent, and to understand that a strong, democratic, and secure Ukraine is the key to thwarting the Kremlin’s nefarious European vision;
   
   b. to prioritise support for demining the Ukrainian countryside, which will be essential to restoring economic activity to a significant part of that country’s territory, and to offer their assistance in removing and neutralising explosive remnants of war, which continue to constitute a risk to civilians;
   
   c. to respect the principle that Ukraine is the ultimate arbiter of its reconstruction, and, accordingly, to coordinate closely their support with Ukrainian officials and civil society;
   
   d. to ensure that Russia is held to account for its crime of aggression, its war crimes including crimes against humanity and reported acts of genocide committed in Ukraine, and the horrific and unjustified damages it has wrought, and that it helps fund reconstruction, in part, through seized and frozen Russian assets as much as it is possible under the law, and encourages all states to develop such a framework;
   
   e. to continue working with representatives of the Ukrainian state and civil society to build resilient democratic institutions, legal frameworks, and civil society practices that will collectively serve to enhance transparency and governmental accountability while helping Ukraine to continue reducing the level of corruption in the country;
   
   f. to strive to coordinate and bundle military, humanitarian, and economic support for Ukraine to minimise the burdens on precious state resources and personnel and to audit this support so that it is not diverted away from its intended purposes and thus serves the goals of building a secure, democratic and prosperous Ukraine anchored in the democratic values and institutional life of the transatlantic community of nations;
   
   g. to continue supporting Ukraine largely through grant-based aid; and only after the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty within its internationally-recognised borders and the implementation of major reconstruction programmes agreed by Ukraine with its Euro-Atlantic partners, convert grant-based aid into loans structured so as not to overwhelm the state budget but rather to hasten the return to normal fiscal practices and the good habits of democratically audited budgetary management;
h. to help Ukraine address the emotional and psychological trauma its people have suffered and to ensure that this care is extended in an inclusive and unbiased fashion to all Ukrainians, including minority groups, women, and children, who must also be included in the reconstruction process;

i. to support Ukraine’s path to EU and NATO membership and to target its support programmes to help transform this ambition into a reality.
DELIVERING ON THE VILNIUS SUMMIT DECISIONS: ACCELERATING NATO’S ADAPTATION, SUPPORTING UKRAINE
RESOLUTION 487*

The Assembly,

1. **Saluting** the demonstration of Allied unity, cohesion of purpose and commitment to shared values at the milestone Vilnius Summit on 11-12 July 2023, and **welcoming** the adoption of far-reaching decisions that will make the Alliance stronger in the face of the deepest security crisis in the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of the Second World War and other multiple and complex challenges of this era of renewed strategic competition;

2. **Applauding** the strong alignment between the Vilnius Summit decisions and the NATO PA’s recommendations, laid out in its Declarations 481 and 482 adopted at the session in Luxembourg in May 2023, including the call for accelerating the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO’s enhanced deterrence and defence posture and a recommitment to all aspects of Allied support for Ukraine;

3. **Fully sharing** the reaffirmation, at the Vilnius Summit, that the Russian Federation presents the most significant and direct threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the Alliance;

4. **Condemning** in the strongest terms Russia’s continuing conduct and escalation of its illegal, unprovoked and brutal war, including regularly and overtly targeting population centres and civilian infrastructure, such as food storage and transportation facilities, and systematically committing numerous and atrocious war crimes, crimes against humanity and reported acts of genocide in illegally occupied territories, and **reiterating** its position that the Russian state, under its current regime, is a terrorist one;

5. **Convinced** that NATO should have a clear vision on how the war in Ukraine must end and stand with Ukraine until Ukraine’s victory is achieved;

6. **Rejecting** Russia’s illegal attempts to annex parts of Ukrainian territory which will never be recognised or accepted by the international community;

7. **Reaffirming** its unwavering support for Ukraine’s democracy, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, self-defence and self-determination, and wholeheartedly **welcoming** the Vilnius Summit decision to offer a new substantial package of expanded political and practical support for Ukraine as well as the announcements of new bilateral support packages;

8. **Convinced** that Ukraine’s membership of NATO is the best way to deter future Russian aggression, and that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration would contribute to Allied collective defence, and **welcoming**, in this regard, the Vilnius Summit decision to streamline and upgrade Ukraine’s NATO integration process by removing the requirement to obtain a Membership Action Plan and establishing the NATO-Ukraine Council;

9. Also **welcoming** the commitment of G7 nations to negotiate bilateral security commitments and arrangements with Ukraine and to provide sustained military and economic support, while Ukraine commits to press ahead with the reform agenda;

* presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark
10. **Looking forward** to Sweden’s forthcoming accession to NATO, which will make both Sweden and NATO stronger and safer;

11. **Reaffirming** its steadfast support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and for the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;

12. **Seconding** concerns expressed at the Vilnius Summit about the multiple and systemic challenges that the People’s Republic of China poses to Euro-Atlantic security, as Beijing, in partnership with Moscow, attempts to undermine the rules-based international order;

13. **Stressing** the importance of further developing partnerships with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region;

14. **Applauding** milestone decisions taken at the Vilnius Summit to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, including putting in place a new generation of regional defence plans, implementing the new NATO Force Model, streamlining command and control arrangements, announcing a renewed defence investment commitment and endorsing a Defence Production Action Plan;

15. **Supporting** the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to security to retain the ability to address multiple and multifaceted challenges, including instability in the South, the implications of climate change, threats in space and cyber domains, threats to energy security, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lethal autonomous weapons systems and emerging destructive technologies;

16. **Looking forward** to the 75th anniversary NATO summit in Washington, D.C. in 2024 as an opportunity to reaffirm the enduring strength of the transatlantic bond and to further entrench the Alliance as the bulwark of the rules-based international order, including by operationalising NATO’s commitment to shared democratic values;

17. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to fully and promptly implement decisions taken at the Vilnius Summit, particularly with regards to ensuring the Alliance’s ability to defend every inch of its territory and to deploy and sustain additional robust, combat-ready forward-deployed forces on NATO’s Eastern flank;

   b. to fully and swiftly deliver on their renewed defence investment commitment to invest at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence, including at least 20% of defence budgets on major equipment, while recognising that the more contested security order will likely require expenditure beyond 2% of GDP;

   c. to redouble efforts to mobilise the international community to push back against the attempts by revisionist authoritarian powers to undermine the rules-based global system, based on the principles of the UN Charter, and to operationalise the Allied commitment to shared democratic values, including by establishing, ahead of the 2024 Washington Summit, a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing resources and exchanging best practices among Allies and their partners;

   d. to agree on further bold strategic decisions regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership;

   e. to further increase their military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine, including by accelerating deliveries of sufficient quantities of advanced weapons that Ukraine needs to protect itself and to restore territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders of 1991, including long-range missiles and multi-
purpose fighter aircraft, and to sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail, while reaffirming the principle "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine";

f. to double down on efforts to sustain the transatlantic consensus on Ukraine’s NATO membership, and to pro-actively use NATO-Ukraine partnership mechanisms, including the NATO-Ukraine Council, to help Ukraine meet the conditions for membership as soon as possible;

g. to define clearly the reforms to be implemented by Ukraine to meet the conditions for NATO membership referred to in the Vilnius Summit Communiqué;

h. to work towards the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression, and to support national and international courts in documenting and prosecuting the numerous war crimes, crimes against humanity and reported acts of genocide committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine;

i. to expand and sustain sanctions on Russia aimed at crippling its ability to continue the war for as long as it takes until Russia ends its aggression and withdraws all its troops from all Ukraine’s territory, and to step up national and multi-lateral mechanisms to prevent sanction circumvention;

j. to continue enhancing the ability to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups, as well as strengthening capacity-building cooperation with relevant partners and supporting the work of the NATO Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism;

k. to dedicate adequate attention to the southern neighbourhood and to support the North Atlantic Council in producing a comprehensive study on the security challenges and opportunities for engagement with southern partners;

l. to continue efforts to address China’s systemic challenge, including raising shared awareness, resilience and preparedness, de-risking economic relations and working with new and existing Indo-Pacific partners, while continuing to seek conditions-based opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing, especially on strategic risk reduction and greater transparency with regard to China’s nuclear weapon policies and capabilities;

m. to further develop collaboration with NATO’s unique and essential partner, the European Union, including by pursuing synergies in the area of military mobility, ensuring non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts and supporting the work of NATO-EU Staff Coordination on Ukraine;

n. to encourage partners at risk Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to take full advantage of NATO’s support tools in order to strengthen their resilience, increase security and conduct reforms, and to continue supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina while encouraging progress on necessary reforms;

o. to sustain focus on the Western Balkans as a region of strategic interest for the Alliance, including by supporting the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in its efforts to respond to recurrent tensions, while calling on Belgrade and Pristina to de-escalate and implement the agreement reached in Brussels and Ohrid in good faith;

p. to continue fostering the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and integrating it across all NATO core tasks;

q. to fully use NATO as a platform to address the relationship between climate change and security, including by supporting the work of the Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security.
The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, such as undersea communication and energy cables as well as offshore wind farms, drilling rigs and pipelines, is essential to ensure the uninterrupted flow of goods, energy and information;

2. **Recollecting** that this protection of critical infrastructure on Allied territory is first and foremost the national responsibility of states;

3. **Recalling** that this infrastructure is not only indispensable for the essential functioning of our states and economies, but also for the security of NATO member states and the Alliance;

4. **Concerned** about the vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure, noting that Russia has been actively mapping this infrastructure;

5. **Welcoming** the NATO decision to increase the number of ships patrolling the North, Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and strengthen its presence around key undersea infrastructure;

6. **Acknowledging** the challenges associated with protecting vast maritime areas, the depths at which operations must be conducted, and the technological complexities involved;

7. **Aware** that detection of attacks is difficult given the advanced capabilities of malicious state and non-state actors and the significant role played by private actors in the operation of most maritime infrastructure;

8. **Recognising** the dual nature of technological advancements, and **underlining** the need for effective cooperation between public and private entities in protecting critical maritime infrastructure;

9. **Emphasising** the role of technology, including sensors and autonomous systems, in protecting such infrastructure, including by facilitating threat identification, surveillance and monitoring, as well as situational awareness;

10. **Welcoming** national efforts of Allies to protect critical maritime infrastructure through initiatives such as the procurement of multi-role surveillance vessels, the development of autonomous and remotely piloted drones, and investment in other uncrewed systems;

11. **Supporting** NATO initiatives, including *Operation Sea Guardian* and the establishment of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell (CUICC) and the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within MARCOM to facilitate industry engagement and to encourage the use of innovative technologies that enhance defensive capabilities;

*presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary sitting on Monday 9 October 2023 in Copenhagen, Denmark*
12. **Emphasising** the important role of the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) in promoting and coordinating innovative solutions for maritime security challenges, in particular through the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), which, despite limited financial resources, conducts valuable research that addresses persistent gaps in Allies’ maritime capabilities;

13. **Applauding** NATO efforts to strengthen capabilities for the monitoring and protection of critical undersea infrastructure, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic’s (DIANA) challenge on *Sensing the Coastal Undersea Environment* and the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) activities focusing on maritime situational awareness;

14. **Welcoming** the establishment of the NATO-EU Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and the collaboration between NATO and partner countries like Japan to enhance maritime capabilities through increased interoperability and preparedness;

15. **Commenting** EU’s efforts to enhance protection of undersea infrastructure, and **highlighting** the valuable NATO-EU cooperation on maritime-related issues, especially initiatives engaging the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in Lisbon;

16. **Noting** that NATO’s Strategic Concept recognises the need to identify and mitigate strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities with respect to Allies’ critical infrastructure;

17. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

   a. to raise awareness about the need both to enhance the resilience of critical maritime infrastructure and to prioritise action to protect it;

   b. to redouble NATO and Allies’ national efforts aiming to protect critical maritime infrastructure by encouraging the establishment of national strategic doctrines;

   c. to decrease Allied dependence on high-risk providers by promoting more secure alternatives and deepening collaboration with partners, including the EU;

   d. to strengthen collaboration among Allies by fostering the sharing of data, intelligence, national risk assessments, incident reports, and best practices through platforms such as the CUICC while improving the interoperability of crucial sensor technology;

   e. to improve Allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for enabling vehicle tracking, threat detection, communication, and strategic planning;

   f. to increase investments in the STO, and specifically the CMRE, both to leverage its potential in identifying risks and vulnerabilities related to emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and to develop defensive capabilities like sensors and autonomous systems;

   g. to provide much-needed support for the CUICC and for MARCOM’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in order to institutionalise and strengthen a dialogue with industry as a basis for public-private partnerships that facilitate the development of defensive capabilities and improve the resilience of critical maritime infrastructure;

   h. to enforce stringent evaluation processes for military systems and critical maritime infrastructure by conducting rigorous assessments and audits to ensure that all hardware and software components meet established security standards.