

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

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


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on

THE INFORMATION POLICY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE*

- 1. <u>Melcoming</u> the successful outcome of the Summit of Heads of State and of government of the member states of the Alliance in May 1989, and the initiatives taken at that meeting, particularly as regards disarmament;
- 2. <u>Concerned</u> that the Atlantic Alliance be given its rightful image as a group of countries genuinely determined to reduce international tension, but also <u>stressing</u> the need to warn Western public opinion against excessive optimism regarding the possible consequences of the swift conclusion of the current disarmament negotiations on the defence effort of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- 3. Noting that one of the effects of the present international climate is to make it difficult for public opinion in the democratic nations to understand the need to continue to devote a substantial effort, particularly in financial terms, to the maintenance of an adequate defence of their way of life and independence, and to put up with the consequences of a sizeable international military presence;
- 4. Applauding, for these reasons, the Alliance's move towards a redefinition of the respective roles of its North American and Western European halves, in the direction of greater autonomy for the latter, as the only response to the idea of a "common European house";
- 5. <u>Emphasizing</u> the need to show the public that the Atlantic Alliance plays a mainly political role, and is not only a military organization;
- 6. <u>URGES</u> the governments of the member states of the Alliance:
- a. to stress, when addressing the public, that the important and hopeful changes which have recently occurred in the member states of the Warsaw Pact still remain uncertain, and that there is a continued need for a steadfast defence, seen as an insurance against possible reversals of the trend;

^{*} presented by the Civilian Affairs Committee

- b. to draw attention to the intrinsic strategic superiority of the Soviet Union in a Europe where the states of the European Community would not have drawn very much closer politically and militarily;
- c. to underline the recent trend towards giving the European countries organized in the Alliance a specific role within it;
- d. to carry out a general review of NATO's information methods, based on a cost/effectiveness analysis.

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on

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND CIVIL PROTECTION*

- 1. Recalling the terms of its Resolution 196 of 1988:
- 2. Welcoming the agreement in principle given by the Secretary General of NATO, in his reply to that Resolution, to the idea of a civil protection databank, and trusting that steps will rapidly be taken to this effect so that reliable and instantly retrievable information will be available to the Alliance states in the event of emergency;
- 3. Affirming that the public's future support for the Atlantic Alliance depends largely on the expansion of NATO's tasks towards non-military activities, and particularly civil protection;
- 4. <u>Stressing</u> that NATO is irreplaceable in this area, since it has means for immediate action which are unmatched by any other international organization;
- 5. URGES the governments of the member countries of the Alliance:
- a. to instruct NATO's International Secretariat to investigate the feasibility of setting up a databank on civil protection:
- to unify, as far as possible, the information procedures and systems of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance in the field of civil protection;
- c. to create a network of civil protection correspondents in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- d. to envisage in the longer term the creation of a unified command-control system between the member countries of the Alliance and the setting up of a Standing Committee for civil emergency means planning.

presented by the Civilian Affairs Committee

on

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS*

- 1. <u>Welcoming</u> the positive developments taking place in some countries of the Warsaw Pact;
- 2. But <u>deeply concerned</u> at the forcible assimilation policy and the violation of the rights of the Turkish muslim minority by the Government of Bulgaria, which has led to a tragic mass exodus of over 300,000 people, and at the repression of fundamental human rights by the Romanian authorities:
- 3. And <u>also concerned</u> by the continued repression of independent thought by the governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, as a result of which 110,000 East Germans so far have left their country;
- 4. <u>Stressing</u> that, even in countries where the humanitarian situation is improving, such as the Soviet Union, serious problems remain, foremost among which is the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes;
- 5. Noting the increase in grass-root expressions of national and ethnic identity in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which denote the need for this basic human right, and hoping that these developments will keep on a peaceful character, in the spirit of the statement made by the President of the USSR to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, which is broadly in line with the statements made on this subject by the leaders of democratic nations, and as such represents a welcome improvement in European relations;
- 6. <u>Welcoming</u> the conclusion of the Vienna Follow-up meeting of the CSCE and in particular the monitoring mechanism agreed upon by the concluding document of this meeting;
- 7. <u>Underlining</u> the importance of the human dimension in East-West relations, as an indispensable factor in trust between states;

^{*} presented by the Civilian Affairs Committee

- 8. Applauding, therefore, the prospect for early agreement on disarmament issues in the CSCE process, but <u>cautioning</u> that progress should enhance peace and encourage the rapid development of the human dimension;
- 9. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to ensure that the human dimension of the CSCE process is seen as the essential condition for peace and security in Europe;
- b. to make sure that the CSCE meetings dealing with its human dimension are kept open to interested groups and monitoring organisations;
- c. to utilise the opportunity afforded by the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (CDH) for creating the conditions of an open and fruitful dialogue on human dimension matters between participating states, beyond their participation in different military alliances, especially by including in their national delegations members of non-governmental human rights organizations and personalities dealing with human rights;
- d. and importantly, to encourage parliamentarians to play a role in the monitoring mechanism agreed in the Vienna Concluding Document by inciting member governments to use it when violations of human rights take place in CSCE participating states.

on

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL*

- 1. Recalling Resolution 198 on Finalizing and Implementing a START Treaty overwhelmingly passed by the Assembly in 1988;
- 2. Noting the Alliance's repeated and unconditional support for a 50% reduction in the strategic arsenals of the USA and the USSR, most recently reiterated at the Heads of State and Government Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in May:
- 3. Acknowledging the commendable progress made by the Reagan Administration in negotiating a framework agreement with the Soviet Union designed to bring such an historic and stabilizing treaty within reach;
- 4. <u>Assured</u> that this START framework protects the survivablity of the US strategic forces by imposing sharp reductions in Soviet forces possessing first strike potential while permitting the United States to disperse its retaliatory forces to the maximum extent deemed necessary;
- 5. <u>Welcoming</u> the apparent progress made by the United States and the Soviet Union in recent weeks in resolving some of the outstanding issues which stand in the way of a START agreement; and therefore
- 6. Rejecting any residual sentiment that further progress in the START talks need in any way be hostage to the fortunes of conventional arms control negotiations;
- 7. <u>Hopeful</u> that the new American START initiative on a prior verification regime will not have the effect of impeding progress at a time when other important differences require immediate attention; and
- 8. Anticipating that the Soviet Union will show the same degree of receptivity to intensive verification demands at START it has exhibited in the context of the INF Treaty regime;

presented by the Defence and Security Committee

- 9. <u>Convinced</u> that a START agreement consistent with the agreed framework would be in the overall security interests of the Atlantic Alliance, and further convinced that the remaining obstacles can be overcome with the requisite degree of political will on both sides;
- 10. <u>Confident</u> that the government of the United States has the resources, capabilities and support to proceed at equal speed and with equal vigour to conclude agreements at the Geneva START negotiations and the Vienna CFE negotiations;
- 11. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to continue to offer the United States full and unconditional support to proceed without delay — and without linkage to any other set of arms control negotiations — to overcome the remaining obstacles to a START agreement based upon the framework negotiated by the Reagan Administration.

on

SUPPORTING, ASSISTING AND MANAGING THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN EUROPE*

- 1. <u>Mindful</u> of the indivisibility of the concept of security in Europe, as well as of the inter-relationship between the steady integration of the East European countries in the world economy, stability in Europe and the step-by-step elimination of the unnatural continental division;
- 2. <u>Supportive</u> of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika, as well as of comparable initiatives aimed at economic and social change taken in other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, to the degree that these initiatives bring the countries concerned closer to market economics and democratic institutions;
- 3. <u>Encouraged</u>, therefore, by, and <u>supportive</u> of, the process of democracy in Poland and Hungary and the efforts being made to restructure these economies to incorporate significant market elements;
- 4. <u>Convinced</u> that the steps being taken toward economic reform in some East European countries are long-term pre-requisites for stable democratic development;
- 5. <u>Emphasizing</u>, furthermore, the existing and potential positive and regenerative effects of reforms in the Soviet Union on governments and societies in other countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization;
- 6. <u>Concerned</u>, therefore, that the momentum of reform in the Soviet Union may be negatively affected by the lack of concrete economic results and the spread of consumer dissatisfaction, ethnic and nationalist tensions, industrial unrest and political opposition;

^{*} Combined version of the texts adopted by the Economic Committee, the Defence and Security Committee and the Political Committee.

- 7. <u>Welcoming</u>, as part of the economic reform underway in some European countries, the declared intention of several Warsaw Pact nations to reduce the overall defence burden and to transfer resources from the defence to the civilian sector (and noting steps taken already in this direction including, inter alia, unilateral reductions and the willingness in CFE to accept asymmetrical cuts);
- 8. <u>Concerned</u>, however, that because of the lead-times involved such a transition is inevitably a long process, and that economic benefits from breakthroughs in disarmament will not materialize in the short-term:
- 9. <u>Believing</u> that Alliance members should try to help to encourage this process, not only with respect to their arms control and defence policies but also in terms of providing actual assistance in the short-term through policies such as those recently called for by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
- 10. Acknowledging the commitment of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance to constructive change in Eastern Europe as embodied in the Washington Treaty, the Harmel Report and the CSCE Final Act, and recognizing that Poland and Hungary will not be able to bring economic reforms to a successful conclusion single-handedly;
- 11. <u>Encouraged</u>, therefore, by the declared international readiness to support the reform efforts in Eastern Europe as long as they lead to more democratic and pluralistic societies, and by the unanimous decision taken by the Summit Seven in Paris in June that the EEC Commission take a leading role in co-ordinating support for Hungary and Poland;
- 12. <u>Convinced</u> that Western countries should act more quickly to provide food aid and credit guarantees, and to make possible debt rescheduling, for those reform-minded countries requiring such assistance; and <u>welcoming</u>, as a first step, the recent decision of the European Commission to help in the restructuring of the economies of Poland and Hungary;
- 13. <u>Persuaded</u> that, under the present circumstances, financial injections into the economies of reform-minded member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are most productive when linked to market-oriented reform;
- 14. <u>Encouraging</u> the Western countries to translate verbal pledges into practical assistance where and when it is most needed;
- 15. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to work together to stimulate economic and social change in the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization:
- a. by using their influence upon friendly states, international organizations and institutions in favour of promoting the social and economic reforms in East and Central Europe;

- b. by supporting the relief of Poland's debt problem through the conclusion of a reasonable agreement between the IMF and Poland, enabling the provision of much needed stand-by credit, and through a longer-term and more comprehensive rescheduling of Poland's guaranteed debt within the framework of the Paris Club;
- c. by ensuring the concentration of direct financial support to Poland and other reform-minded countries on initiatives that promote competition and provide new opportunities for trade, such as the establishment of small and medium-sized businesses, craft undertakings and service industries, improvements in farm productivity and the distribution of agricultural produce throughout the food supply chain and the enhancement of professional and managerial training;
- d. by promoting the speedy signing of trade and co-operation agreements within the framework of the European Community and by supporting further trade liberalization;
- e. by exploring possibilities within the European Community for the feasibility of the involvement of the European Investment Bank in the financing of appropriate infrastructure projects;
- f. by improving market access for reform-minded countries to Western economies; and by encouraging the establishment of East-West joint ventures through, inter alia, the introduction of measures, on both bilateral and multilateral levels, which provide Western investors with a degree of guarantee for their investment in such operations;
- g. by stimulating East-West technical co-operation and trade, particularly in the crucial field of environmental protection, through, inter alia, projects of scientific co-operation and a co-ordinated and selective reduction of the technology export controls embodied in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM);
- h. by facilitating and promoting visits to their countries by tourists, students, scholars, researchers, engineers and businessmen from reform-minded member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization through, inter alia, the establishment of training and exchange programmes, and a relaxation of visa requirements;
- i. by actively encouraging the participation of these countries in international economic institutions such as the GATT and the IMF if and when they are ready to assume the obligations of such institutions and can fulfil the normal requirements for entry, and by granting interested countries observer status in these institutions in order to help them to adapt their rules to normal international practice;

- j. by supporting, as a manifestation of the objectives laid down in the May 1989 Declaration of the Alliance Heads of State and Government, the unique role of the NATO Economic Committee as a forum for discussion of the economic and security dimensions of change in member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of initiatives taken by Alliance member countries towards the region, and by ensuring participation in this forum at the highest possible level:
- 16. **URGES** member parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to consider special initiatives, as a matter of urgency, analogous to those being considered in the US Senate, for the appropriation of special funds to assist in the process of democratization and reform in Poland, Hungary and other East European countries willing to institutionalize political democracy and economic pluralism and respect for human rights:

17. RESOLVES

that the North Atlantic Assembly, unique in comprising parliamentarians from all sixteen Alliance nations, will serve as a point of contact with parliamentarians from the Warsaw Pact member countries to exchange practical experiences and ideas on the role of legislatures in shaping and overseeing domestic and foreign policy, and will assist where possible and appropriate in fostering greater understanding and confidence-building among their governments and societies.

on

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES*

- 1. <u>Welcoming</u> the commencement on 9 March 1989 of the 35-state Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM);
- 2. <u>Encouraged</u> by the several points of convergence among the Alliance, Warsaw Pact, and neutral and nonaligned proposals;
- 3. Noting with satisfaction the early establishment of working groups;
- 4. <u>Convinced</u> that the CSBM negotiations have an important role to play in the structuring of a new security system in Europe by inhibiting the threat or use of force, complementing the parallel negotiations on Conventional armed Forces in Europe (CFE);
- 5. Recognizing that the elimination of disparities prejudicial to security and stability in Europe offers the best conditions for negotiating constraints on military activity, should they prove in the common security interests of all participating states:
- 6. <u>Satisfied</u> up to this point with the implementation of the 1986 Stockholm Document;
- 7. <u>Welcoming</u> the 12 June 1989 US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities as a substantial contribution to building international confidence and security;
- 8. <u>Supporting</u> President Bush's 12 May 1989 initiative for an "open skies" regime applied to the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union and, as agreed, of their respective allies, as a major step forward in fostering military transparency;

presented by the Political Committee

- 9. **URGES** the 35 participating states:
- a. to strive to adopt a new set of mutually complementary CSBMs, necessary elements of which should include:
 - i. exchange of information on ground and land-based air forces, including normal peacetime location, designation, and strength.
 - ii. notification of garrison-to-garrison unit transfers and the call-up of reservists, preferably along the lines established for military activity notifiable in advance.
 - iii. notification of the planned deployment of new major conventional ground and air force weapon systems.
 - iv. on-site inspection of normal peacetime locations to evaluate the information provided concerning military forces and major new conventional weapon deployments:
 - v. adjustments to be agreed to increase the effectiveness of the Stockholm Document, including as appropriate additional thresholds and types of notifiable activity.
 - vi. enhanced conditions for accredited military personnel.
 - vii. establishment, if judged necessary, of an efficient network for the timely distribution of CSBM-related information.
 - viii. equal treatment of media representatives.
 - ix. periodic exchange of views on military policy tied to actual conventional force posture and structure and related questions, including training, activity in the field, and defense spending.
- 10. <u>REOUESTS</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to explore under what conditions the present alert exception to notification in advance of military activity could be safely eliminated.
- b. to examine how the purposes and procedures of the 1989 US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities and other agreements could be applied to prevent and contain incidents in and around the whole of Europe, including accidents by nuclear-powered vessels and violations of airspace and the territorial sea.

- c. to consider, in conjunction with Alliance strategic formulations, national position papers setting out in useful detail views on the potential application of CSBMs to naval activity, beyond that agreed in the Stockholm Document.
- d. to review whether confidence— and security-building would be promoted by instituting a program of regular and reciprocal exchanges between NATO military and civilian officials and their counterparts in the Warsaw Pact countries.
- e. to consider, as contributing toward a valid assessment of the announced unilateral force reductions and defensive restructuring within the Warsaw Pact, the immediate adoption by all parties to the negotiations of the Alliance proposals for exchange of information on, and evaluation of, military forces and major conventional weapon deployment programmes, and for enhancing travel and other conditions for accredited military personnel, pending the results of the CFE negotiations.

on

THE PLIGHT OF THE TURKISH MUSLIM MINORITY IN BULGARIA*

- 1. <u>Recalling</u> resolutions 168, 184 and 190 passed in 1985, 1986 and 1987 respectively, urging member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to continue to attach importance to the problem of the repression of the Turkish muslim minority in Bulgaria;
- 2. <u>Recalling</u> the declaration made by the Secretary General of NATO on behalf of the Allies in August 1989 calling upon the Bulgarian Government to respond positively to international appeals to meet its responsibilities under the CSCE documents:
- 3. Recalling the provisions of the 1971 constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria guaranteeing equal rights and non-discrimination to the Turkish muslim minority in Bulgaria, as well as the pertinent stipulations of the CSCE Final Act Document which guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities in the signatory states;
- 4. <u>Respectful</u> of human rights and fundamental freedoms which constitute the basis of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- 5. Noting with deep concern the brutal assimilation drive perpetrated by the Bulgarian Government since late 1984 aiming to eradicate the ethnic, religious and cultural identity of the 1.5 million strong Turkish muslim minority, in blatant violation of Turkish-Bulgarian agreements and international instruments:
- 6. <u>Deploring</u> in most categorical terms the use of excessively heavy-handed methods by the Bulgarian authorities, resulting in death and casualties, in order to suppress the peaceful demonstration and mass hunger strikes staged by ethnic Turks in support of their demands for the termination of the campaign of assimilation and the restoration of their rights and status;

^{*} presented by the Political Committee

- 7. Alarmed by the subsequent Bulgarian policy of forcing Turks to leave Bulgaria without their property, possessions, social rights and in some cases, their spouses and children, whereby over 310,000 Turks have so far arrived in Turkey;
- 8. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to sustain and enhance their efforts on behalf of the Turkish muslim minority and thus contribute to the timely resolution of this tragic issue and in this vein to call upon Bulgaria to put an end immediately to its policy of assimilation of the Turkish muslim minority and to restore the rights and status of muslim Turks in compliance with its obligation under the Turkish-Bulgarian agreements and international instruments;
- b. to mobilize the possibilities at their disposal to persuade Bulgaria to agree to negotiate with Turkey with a view to restoring the rights and status of ethnic Turks and concluding a comprehensive agreement on emigration;
- c. to prevail upon Bulgaria to desist from policies and practices which force the ethnic Turks to leave Bulgaria "en masse";
- d. to call upon Bulgaria to accord the international press and visiting delegations full and unimpeded access to the predominantly Turkish populated parts of the country;
- e. to continue to monitor the situation of the Turkish muslim minority until the question is resolved;
- f. to convey the contents of this resolution to the President of the Bulgarian Parliament;
- 9. <u>INVITES</u> the governments and parliaments of allied countries to take swift and tangible action in order to induce the Bulgarian Government to honour its international obligation vis-à-vis the Turkish muslim minority.

on

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION*

- 1. <u>Concerned</u> by evidence that increasing numbers of nations are acquiring the means to construct nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missile delivery systems;
- 2. <u>Alarmed</u> by the relative ease with which chemical weapons can be manufactured:
- 3. Noting that the acquisition of nuclear or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them provides an impetus to other states within range of these systems to acquire a similar capability;
- 4. Aware that efforts to control the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons and the means of delivery face many difficulties;
- 5. <u>Supporting</u> international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons under the auspicies of the Non-Proliferation Regime;
- 6. <u>Welcoming</u> initiatives such as the imposition of export controls by the "Australia Group" on chemicals which can be used in weapons production to limit the spread of chemical weapons;
- 7. Applauding the efforts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons,
- 8. <u>Encouraged</u> by indications of progress in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a global chemical weapons ban;
- 9. <u>Supporting</u> the efforts of the nations involved in the Missile Technology Control Regime to curb exports of missile technology; but
- 10. <u>Concerned</u> that nations with relevant expertise do not participate in this Regime;

^{*} presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee

- 11. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and the government and parliament of the Soviet Union:
- a. to put additional pressure on nations suspected of acquiring nuclear, and unitary and binary chemical weapons and delivery systems to abandon these acquisition programmes and provide evidence that they have done so:
- b. to cease to provide military and economic assistance to nations which are suspected of acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons and delivery systems until they provide satisfactory evidence that such programmes either do not exist or have been abandoned;
- 12. <u>URGES</u> member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

to continue their efforts to achieve a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

on

ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION*

- 1. Alarmed by evidence of ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere;
- 2. <u>Applauding</u> international efforts to limit ozone depletion by curtailing emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons; and,
- 3. <u>Melcoming</u> the commitments made by many nations to curtail these emissions more rapidly than originally agreed in the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol; but,
- 4. Noting that current emission agreements do not address carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform which cause severe ozone depletion;
- 5. Aware that alternatives to CFCs and halons are being developed which would cause far less damage to the ozone layer; and,
- 6. <u>Convinced</u> that a global ban on ozone-depleting chemicals must be implemented;
- 7. Alarmed by the growing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and by widespread deforestation which reduces the biosphere's capacity to absorb carbon dioxide:
- 8. <u>Concerned</u> by the difficulties the developing world would face in limiting emissions of greenhouse gases and in forgoing CFCs and halons;
- 9. <u>Welcoming</u> the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change under the auspices of the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization;
- 10. Recognizing growing public concern about global climate change;
- 11. <u>Commending</u> NATO nations for instigating a programme to stimulate research into global climate change;

^{*} presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee

- 12. <u>Convinced</u> that the NATO nations should be at the forefront of efforts to promote environmental protection;
- 13. **URGES** member parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to cease the production and release of CFCs and halons as in most cases viable alternatives are available, but no later than 1995;
- to take immediate action further to determine the sources of carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform in the atmosphere and take whatever steps are necessary to cease their output into the atmosphere without delay, and no later than 1995;
- c. to encourage sustainable forestry development and sustainable, environmentally acceptable energy development in developing countries utilizing debt instruments, technical assistance and multilateral and bilateral aid programmes;
- d. to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable and non-fossil energy sources and fossil fuels such as natural gas, aiming to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide as soon as possible;
- e. to consider and wherever possible provide technical and financial resources that will enable the developing world - without impeding its economic development - to reduce emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals;
- f. to encourage co-operation with the Warsaw Pact countries in order to bring about mutual environmental protection through joint scientific, technological and co-operative abatement programmes;
- g. to support research efforts intended to establish the consequences of the build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

