The Parliamentarians’ Role in the Alliance

The North Atlantic Assembly 1955–1980

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It is thirty years since I first advocated the creation of an Atlantic consultative assembly to debate issues beyond the military problems with which NATO was concerned. Today, some three decades later, there exists the North Atlantic Assembly now in its twenty-seventh year. This Assembly is quite different in character from the kind of body envisaged by myself and the other early advocates of an Atlantic assembly. Then we imagined an Atlantic consultative assembly becoming the democratically indispensable, officially recognized, political right arm of NATO. In recent years the North Atlantic Assembly has voluntarily given up all pretensions to that status and is successfully pursuing an independent role. Despite the inability to achieve official standing the need for such a body and contribution of the North Atlantic Assembly has been attested to and reaffirmed over the years in official reports and declarations as varied as the Report of the Three Wise Men in 1956 and the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations in 1974.

It was in 1951 at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and in the House of Commons at Westminster that I first advocated an Atlantic consultative assembly. The hope was that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe - a non-military organization - would develop into an Atlantic consultative assembly. At Strasbourg, Mr. J. J. Fens of the Netherlands, M. Pierre-Olivier Lapie of France, and Mr. Finn Moe of Norway, supported this idea. At Westminster there was no support.

In 1953, Senator Robertson, the Speaker of the Canadian Senate, got in touch with me through the Canadian foreign service and subsequently wrote to me to ask me to help in arranging a meeting of parliamentarians from the NATO countries in 1955. Our conceptions originally had little in common. Senator Robertson believed that what was needed was an annual meeting of parliamentarians supporting NATO and that the suggestion of a consultative assembly would frighten off the North Americans. I felt that the political and economic affairs of the Atlantic community needed inter-parliamentary debate in a consultative assembly. It is not too fanciful to recall that this difference of approach had a parallel in English history. The Tudor idea of Parliament was of men coming together from all parts of the country to learn what the Government was doing and to return to their cities and counties to explain what was happening. It was not until the Jacobean period that Parliament began to think of itself as a body of men coming together to criticize the Government and to suggest alternative policies. In our conference, the Tudor concept has largely prevailed. As a result, Governments such as the British which were hostile in 1955, are now reconciled to the Assembly and willingly support it financially.
It was very different at the beginning. In 1955 so little help was forthcoming from
the staff at NATO Headquarters that my own private secretary served the inter-
national Standing Committee and many of the translations were done by friends from
the Secretariat of the Council of Europe who had come to the Palais de Chaillot as
spectators.

The change in attitude to the Assembly has come about slowly and has been hard
won and it is, perhaps, inevitable that the characteristics which mark the Assembly
today are rather different from those envisaged in 1955.

The struggle to achieve official recognition as the political wing of NATO, a goal
which seemed to some of us obviously desirable and achievable in the 1950's, became
increasingly less obviously either achievable or desirable as we progressed through the
1960's and into the 1970's.

It took a long time for those of us who favoured institutionalization to accept that
it was neither a feasible nor a practicable objective for the complex political relation-
ships of the 1970's. And in retrospect this dalliance may have been the most useful
endowment we could have given the Assembly. For those twenty-five years, when it
was pursuing institutionalization and fighting against official antipathy, have left their
mark. The North Atlantic Assembly, in adversity, has developed an identity, an
internal cohesion and resilience, on which it can now build. It is now making a useful
contribution to transatlantic relations and to a more critical appreciation of NATO's
role.

Today, the struggle for recognition over, the Assembly has come of age and it is my
belief that we who have supported its endeavours through the years have nurtured a
child; strong, self-reliant and resourceful, secure in its convictions and wise in the
knowledge of its own limitations. It is today, having demonstrated its independence of
official constraints, well suited to fulfill those two functions it has shown itself uniquely
placed to perform: that of a critical observer of NATO policies and activities and as a
forum for regular transatlantic exchanges at parliamentary level.

With new interests emerging and new contacts being established I feel the Assem-
bly is entering a particularly productive phase of its career. Evidence of this growth
can be found in the variety of sub-committees and special working groups which have
been generated by the individual Committees in recent years and by the high quality of
the work they have produced. This latter point is attested to by the interest being
shown in these studies by other organizations.

Another pointer to the present dynamism of the Assembly are the changes made in
the conduct of the Plenary Sessions. The introduction, in particular, of a period for
debating themes of current interest has instilled the proceedings, which had become
perfunctory and rather dull, with renewed vitality. Hopefully, the frank exchange of
views will permit a more vigorous cross-fertilization of ideas, a function which is
becoming more and more necessary as our countries face the ever more complex and
increasingly inter-related problems which arise in the fields of defence, economics and
domestic and foreign politics.

As those of us who have been supporters of the Assembly since its creation move
aside I am confident that we are leaving a body with the potential to make a useful
albeit limited contribution to the discussion of problems both within the confines of
the Atlantic Alliance and beyond.

London, April 1981

Geoffrey de Freitas
Chapter One
The Birth of the Assembly

Introduction

When on the morning of 18 July 1955, 158 parliamentarians from 14 member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance assembled for a six-day meeting at NATO's Headquarters at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris it was, in itself, both a beginning and an end.

It was the beginning of an organization which then called itself the “Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries”, becoming the “NATO Parliamentarians Conference”, and, from 1966 to the present day, the “North Atlantic Assembly”. But above all it was to be the beginning of an organized though unofficial interest by North Atlantic parliamentarians in the mutual problems of the Atlantic Community and in the policies, organization and workings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

18 July 1955, however, also signified an end to several years of lobbying by individuals and organizations for some sort of regular transatlantic forum where parliamentarians could meet to discuss common problems. Many of the lobbyists had, in fact, hoped for much grander things including the formation of a consultative Atlantic assembly as a forerunner of a federation of member states of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹

The First Trans-Atlantic Parliamentary Meeting

The first meeting of parliamentarian delegations from Europe and North America in fact took place in Strasbourg in early November 1951 when for a week seven US Senators and seven US Congressmen discussed European Union and its implications for the West with eighteen parliamentary members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. The meeting resulted from a Council of Europe invitation to the US Congress issued in May 1951.

Identical resolutions were introduced into both Houses to accept the invitations. The Senate quickly gave its unanimous approval but the House of Representatives was more cautious only passing the resolution in October after heated debate and with the proviso that it was only committing itself to a single conference.

The theme of the meeting was “The Union of Europe – its progress, problems, prospects and place in the Western World”, yet the major factor to emerge from the
talks was that it was no longer possible to discuss Europe’s problems and prospects without at the same time taking into account the problems and prospects of the North Atlantic region as a whole. Europe’s problems, it was agreed, had outgrown Europe and were no longer capable of solution on the purely European level. This realization was to grow and found echoes of support around the Atlantic Community.

Senator Gillette Calls for an Atlantic Assembly

In a speech at Charlotte, North Carolina, given shortly after the conference, Senator Gillette described the meeting as a “remarkable demonstration of the democratic vitality of the West” and as a step towards creating “a channel for direct co-operation among representatives elected to express the will of the Atlantic peoples”. In expressing this opinion Senator Gillette was reiterating a viewpoint given in an editorial in the “Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant” (NRC), a leading Dutch newspaper, a month before the Strasbourg meeting. The editorial (on 23 October 1951) asked whether there ought not to be consultation between Europe and America at parliamentary level on a permanent basis and added that there was a growing feeling that a consultative body on the lines of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly should be created within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The follow up to Senator Gillette’s November 1951 speech came six months later in Ottawa in May 1952, when a United States Congressional delegation, including Senator Gillette, held a joint informal meeting with members of the External Affairs Committees of the Canadian Senate and House of Commons. A resolution adopted unanimously by the conference urged NATO Governments to consider creating a North Atlantic Assembly, composed of parliamentary representatives, whose object would be the implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Conversion of the Assembly of the Council of Europe into an Atlantic Assembly

Mr. Livingston Hartley, a leading advocate of Atlantic Union, in a series of articles for the magazine “Freedom and Union”, analysed various existing parliamentary and consultative assemblies as potential models for a North Atlantic Assembly to emulate. He favoured the Strasbourg model, that is, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, although he did not accept the view expressed by Sir (then Mr.) Geoffrey de Freitas (United Kingdom) during a debate on foreign affairs in the British House of Commons on 21 July 1953, that the Council of Europe with its parochial European outlook was dying and that it should be transformed into an Atlantic Council, with a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly of Western Europe, Canada and the United States. Mr. Hartley argued that “in view of the basic differences between these two overall organizations this idea appears to be impracticable as it would require a fundamental transformation of the Council of Europe, the withdrawal of some of its members and the loss of some of its functions. It seems both easier and wiser to create a new North Atlantic consultative mechanism than to remove so many wheels from the existing European machinery.”
In presenting his case in "Freedom and Union" Mr. Hartley pointed to the "one obvious deficiency in NATO [serving] as the political organ of the North Atlantic Community" as the fact that it has "no body representing the North Atlantic peoples."

Mr. Hartley saw very clearly the advantages of a North Atlantic Assembly and whilst he also conceded that such a forum might undermine the position and prestige of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe he used the argument that the problems of Western Europe, both military and economic, are Atlantic in scope and that these problems could be considered far better on a North Atlantic basis.

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas meanwhile continued, in debates in the British House of Commons and in several published articles, to elaborate upon the idea of converting the Strasbourg Assembly into an Atlantic Council.⁴

On one occasion during a debate in the House of Commons, on 21 January 1954, Mr. Anthony Nutting, Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replying on behalf of the Government, addressed himself to the difficulty of having an assembly of parliamentarians discussing NATO's affairs, "if such an assembly were to concentrate . . . its recommendations to Ministers . . . on the less confidential aspects of NATO's work, the Council of Ministers might well find that its time was too much taken up with these problems and too little with the more urgent defence questions still facing NATO."

Official antipathy to any suggestion of parliamentary oversight of NATO's security responsibilities is a recurrent theme in the development of North Atlantic parliamentary relations.

The Norwegian Initiative

Before 1953, pressure for a NATO parliamentary assembly had come from private "Atlantic minded" individuals in speeches and articles and occasionally from resolutions adopted at Atlantic conferences. It was not until June 1953, that an Alliance legislature took any initiative in the matter. On 25 June, the Norwegian Storting (Parliament) voted a motion requesting their Government to take steps towards the setting up of a consultative assembly within NATO.

In an article which appeared in "International Politikk" in April 1953, the eminent Norwegian lawyer and diplomat Mr. Einar Løchen sought to explain why the Norwegian Parliament felt that NATO should be subject to a certain direct parliamentary scrutiny. The Storting's decision he said arose from "a dislike of being confronted with a fait accompli and the fact that although they have the power to reject NATO Council decisions they may only do so by annulling agreements which have possibly been reached after difficult negotiations," and he explained that "in Norway influence on events can be exerted at an early stage."⁵

The Norwegian Government, in its turn, instructed the Norwegian Delegation to NATO to make a formal proposal that such a parliamentary assembly be formed.

3
The Copenhagen Atlantic Community Conference

Whilst NATO Governments were considering the Norwegian initiative for a parliamentary assembly the second International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community was held in Copenhagen from 30 August to 5 September 1953. The Conference, like its predecessor, held in Oxford, England in September 1952, was attended by delegates from all fourteen member countries of the Alliance (the Federal Republic of Germany was not yet a member) and included parliamentarians, former civil servants and diplomats. The presence, as observers, of officials from NATO and various foreign offices lent the Conference a "semi-official" air which gave added significance to the resolution introduced by Mr. Finn Moe, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, which called upon the member Governments of the North Atlantic Council to give favourable consideration to "the creation within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of a Conference, advisory in nature, representative of the Parliaments of member nations, which would meet periodically to discuss problems concerning the development of the Atlantic Community, in particular those relating to the implementation of Article II of the Treaty."

Although national delegations did not vote uniformly the greatest support for Mr. Finn Moe's resolution came from the US, Canadian, Dutch and Norwegian delegations. British, French and Danish delegates were largely opposed, favouring the formation of Alliance parliamentary groups outside the NATO framework.

A compromise version of the original resolution calling for an advisory conference of NATO parliamentarians to meet periodically was adopted by forty-seven votes to twelve.

The Copenhagen Conference received considerable press coverage and the International Atlantic Committee (formed from the Conference bureau and the forerunner of the Atlantic Treaty Association) was asked to explore the possibility of obtaining action on the resolution from the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay. Alliance Governments were also asked to study the proposal.

The NATO Council Decision of December 1953

A reply from NATO to the Copenhagen resolution was quick in coming. The Council of Permanent Representatives at their meeting on 2 December 1953, discussed how far they could go, at that time, in the area of closer contacts between NATO and Alliance parliamentarians and on 14 December, the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay, submitted their recommendation to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. This urged member Governments to encourage the formation of parliamentary groups interested in NATO matters. "These groups will then be able to make their own contacts with each other and will perhaps wish to hold a joint meeting - for instance in Paris - and discuss matters of common interest. The international staff of NATO would, of course, provide all possible information and technical assistance."

The NATO Council's decision to encourage parliamentary visits and to offer assistance to organized groups was little reward for the years of debate, lobbying and
pressure for a meaningful parliamentary involvement in the Alliance but it did reflect the general reluctance of Alliance Governments to permit parliamentary oversight of military and security considerations.

Neither was the Council's decision to encourage visits anything new as since January 1953, parliamentary groups from Norway (two), Italy and the United Kingdom had visited NATO Headquarters and received detailed briefings on NATO operations.

But if the official attitude was on the whole cautious there were some who gave whole hearted support to the idea of a parliamentary involvement in NATO. Mr. Van Vredenburch, NATO Deputy Secretary-General, in a briefing for members of the Norwegian Parliament's Armed Services Committee in July 1953, presented a convincing case for parliamentary participation in NATO.

"NATO is not a machine that will work by itself nor by the decisions of government officials and military commanders alone. It can only succeed and last if it exists in the minds of each citizen of the member countries. To say this is to express how essential is the understanding given by Members of Parliament to NATO problems. For the parliamentarians are the constitutional link between the peoples of NATO and the national Governments represented in the North Atlantic Council: without the collective approval of a parliamentary majority, the national Governments can take no decisions concerning NATO. Without the personal action of each parliamentarian in his constituency, NATO decisions in turn cannot be understood by the citizens of the member states."

The Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association

The encouragement given in the NATO Council recommendation to Governments to set up groups of parliamentarians especially interested in NATO provided the incentive for the founding, on 14 May 1954, of the first such parliamentary group – the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. The Association was open to all Senators and Members of the House of Commons interested in NATO affairs. Its President, Senator Wishart McL. Robertson, Speaker of the Senate, was to work tirelessly towards organizing the first meeting of NATO parliamentarians in July 1955.

Once in existence the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association set about implementing the NATO Council's suggestion, regarding the development of inter-parliamentary contacts, as NATO parliamentary groups emerged in other Alliance countries. Mutual efforts were soon directed towards organizing a joint meeting of parliamentary groups.

The Declaration of Atlantic Unity

The work of individual parliamentarians and parliamentary groups towards a joint meeting was supplemented by the efforts of the sponsors of the "Declaration of Atlantic Unity." This declaration was a private initiative organized by four leading
American businessmen and former diplomats—Messrs. William Clayton, William Draper, Lithgow Osborne and Philip Reed. Together with representatives of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association they formulated a series of five recommendations addressed to Alliance Governments for strengthening NATO. One called for “the creation of an advisory Atlantic Assembly representative of the legislatures of the member nations, which would meet periodically to discuss matters of common concern.”

The five recommendations were included in a “Declaration of Atlantic Unity” which was signed by 244 prominent citizens from nine NATO countries, and presented to the North Atlantic Council in Paris on 16 December 1954, by a delegation headed by the late Sir Roy Thomson, the Canadian newspaper publisher.

The Declaration was welcomed by President Eisenhower of the United States and other Alliance Heads of State. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, said that an advisory Atlantic Assembly on the lines of the Council of Europe and representing the NATO area as a whole would have genuine value and particularly as a means of fostering better public understanding of the common problems of the Atlantic nations and of focusing the outstanding skills and talents of experienced parliamentarians upon these problems. “But”, he said, “the fundamental decision to undertake such a relationship rests with the various legislators themselves.”

The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, remarked “The Declaration was published at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was entering a new phase and when it was more important than ever for it to receive support. I deeply appreciate the active interest shown by the sponsors of the Declaration in an Alliance which is the key to the solidarity between the United States, Canada and the European members of NATO. My hope is that official agencies and private organizations alike will continue to work relentlessly for the Atlantic Unity on which the Declaration so rightly places its emphasis.”

The Norwegian Invitation

It was announced on 11 November 1954, that the President of the Norwegian Parliament had made the first moves towards a joint parliamentary visit to NATO Headquarters when he sent letters to the Parliaments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom “who had shown the most positive interest in the idea of a parliamentary assembly proposing that a visit be arranged for Spring 1955.”

The United States Congress was not invited at this time as the State Department was considered to be “lukewarm” to the idea of enhanced Alliance parliamentary interaction as proposed by the Norwegian Government to NATO during 1953. The Norwegians did not want to send Congress an invitation which it did not wish to receive.

To sound out the views of Congress Mr. Lithgow Osborne, one of the initial sponsors of the “Declaration of Atlantic Unity”, wrote to Senator Walter George, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Congressman James Richards, House Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, and Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Livingston Merchant. Senator George and Congressman Richards expressed personal
views that an invitation would, in fact, be appreciated and the State Department expressed their interest. On 19 January 1955, therefore, the President of the Norwegian Parliament, Mr. Gerhardsen sent invitations to Vice-President Nixon and Speaker Rayburn. At this time an invitation was also sent to the French Parliament which had also been considered as "unenthusiastic" by the Norwegians.

The Norwegian proposal for a Spring 1955 meeting did not prove convenient for the Canadians, however, due to the pressure of domestic parliamentary business and the Canadians subsequently assumed responsibility for arranging a joint meeting at NATO Headquarters.

The Canadian Resolution

On 13 January 1955, the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association passed a resolution calling for a meeting of Alliance parliamentarians in Paris on 18 July 1955, to discuss, among other things, the creation of a North Atlantic Consultative Assembly. This resolution was communicated to all Alliance Parliaments in an attempt to gauge reaction to the proposal. Political interest in NATO was growing and the veteran European diplomat and Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, on a visit to Ottawa in February 1955, discussed the possible formation of a political organization within the framework of NATO, with Canadian Prime Minister Mr. St. Laurent and Foreign Minister Mr. Lester Pearson. Mr. Spaak said "It is a mistake to have a military organization without a political organization. A beginning should be made now towards a political organization... which may entail each nation giving up some of its sovereignty."

At this time the "Toronto Globe and Mail" in an editorial carried also by the "International Herald Tribune" commented that, "there are powerful arguments in favour of setting up a consultative assembly. NATO is far more than an alliance in the traditional sense of the word; it is a community. Decisions on its behalf, though for the present they may have to be taken by Ministers collectively, should be informed and checked by debates in a NATO forum; and this forum, should represent all parties, not merely parties in power. It would have more than military matters to consider. NATO members, by the terms of the Treaty, are pledged to economic co-operation. It is unlikely that the projected Assembly, in the near future anyway, could have substantial law-making authority. A single legislature for such diverse lands as Turkey, Portugal, Iceland and Canada will take some time to come to life. It would be a pity, however, to saddle the embryo Parliament with the discouraging title of 'consultative'. As experience has shown, this means in practice 'negligible'. From the start the NATO Assembly should at least aim at expressing opinions which Governments will be unable to ignore."

While it was hoped that a future NATO Assembly would express opinions which Governments would be unable to ignore, it is nevertheless a significant pointer to the role envisaged for such an Assembly that both the invitations from the Norwegian President of the Storting and the resolution of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association were addressed to the Speakers and Presidents of Parliaments and not to the Governments of Alliance countries.
United States Congressional Resolutions

The Canadian resolution met with considerable interest and support in Alliance Parliaments. To answer any lingering doubts about the attitude of the U.S. Congress to a parliamentarians meeting, concurrent resolutions were introduced into the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively by Congressman James P. Richards and Senators Hubert Humphrey, Estes Kefauver, William Fulbright, John Sparkman and Mike Mansfield.

After referral to the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations, the concurrent resolutions were voted through both Houses of Congress during May.

The resolutions called for a delegation of fourteen members of Congress, seven each from the Senate and the House, to be appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to meet with other NATO parliamentary groups in conference in Paris in July.

Attitudes of Alliance Governments

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas has commented that at the time the British Foreign Office feared the creation of another consultative assembly of parliamentarians and was hostile to it and that, had the Norwegian and Canadian initiatives been addressed to Governments, no British delegation would have been sent.

The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, outlined the attitude of his Government to a NATO parliamentary assembly in a reply to a question in the House of Commons on 31 March 1955. “It is not our policy to establish a parliamentary assembly as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization machinery. We are not alone in this. Our view is shared by a number of other NATO Governments. Her Majesty’s Government, however, welcome parliamentary interest in and support for NATO through unofficial meetings of Members of Parliament from NATO countries.”

The attitude of the US Department of State seems to have been that it did not contemplate any kind of supranational legislative body nor any substantive change in the NATO relationship to result from informal meetings of parliamentarians. In the words of Acting-Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., “While there appear to be certain genuine advantages in attempting to organize an Atlantic association of parliamentarians on a permanent basis, thereby permitting regular and recurrent contacts among interested legislators, the Department suggests that there be no formal organizational connection between such an association and the existing NATO organizational machinery. Maintaining a parliamentary association as an independent body would permit each participating legislative representative to express his personal views fully and freely, without being bound by governmental policies pursued in regular NATO organs, and would also avoid any requirement for changes in the present satisfactory NATO charter and organization.”

The Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Lester Pearson, in a letter to Senator W. McL. Robertson dated June 1954, warned the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association “to avoid giving the impression that the Association is in any sense a governmental one.”
The Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay, felt that a meeting of NATO parliamentarians “could do nothing but good” but cautioned “I hope they will not try to rush things too fast. . . . the North Atlantic Parliament (as distinct from, and much more powerful than, a Consultative Assembly) which is advocated in some quarters might well be the ultimate solution, but I am afraid that we are a long way off it at present . . . one must proceed step by step and to try and draw blueprints of the far distant future only leads to disappointment.”

The common thread running through all the efforts which led up to the first Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries is the attitude of member Governments. They were quite happy for parliamentarians to meet and discuss NATO, even welcoming such contacts as providing broader based national support for governmental decisions taken within the NATO context. What they were not, indeed still are not, prepared to countenance is any attempt by Alliance parliamentarians to interfere in the decision making process within NATO.

Canadians Drop the Idea of a Consultative Assembly

The original resolution from the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association of 13 January 1955, had called for the creation of a North Atlantic Consultative Assembly of parliamentarians but by June Senator Robertson had to report that parliamentary (and obviously governmental) pressure had resulted in the proposal being dropped.

“The Association has received a great deal of correspondence since January”, he wrote, “all of which are in favour of the idea of regular meetings of NATO parliamentarians but many feel that the idea of the Consultative Assembly is not practical.”

When the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association subsequently met on 15 June, to consider the objections raised, another resolution was drawn up omitting the proposal for a Consultative Assembly but calling for interested parliamentarians in each NATO country to form national NATO Parliamentary Associations. These national Associations would meet annually and to co-ordinate their activities a NATO Inter-Parliamentary Association would be set up with its Headquarters and Secretariat in Paris.

The amended Canadian resolution was included in the provisional agenda and was the subject of considerable debate at the Conference.

Invitations were issued by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association during the first week in May, with the agreement of the Secretary-General of NATO and the Permanent Representatives of the Council, to all North Atlantic Alliance Parliaments to send delegates to a proposed parliamentarians conference in Paris in July.

Several delegations quickly confirmed their acceptance and numbers likely to attend, whereas others delayed a final affirmative until the last minute. On 8 July ten days before the conference was due to commence one country had not confirmed it would attend and the lists of delegates from three other countries were still not available.

The question of an invitation to the German Bundestag and Bundesrat which had been seen by the organizing Norwegians and Canadians as a considerable political problem, due to the rearmament question, was resolved when on 9 May the Federal Republic of Germany completed the formalities for membership of NATO.
Organization of the Conference

The physical organization of the first NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference was left mainly in the hands of the staff of Lord Ismay’s private office, who collaborated with representatives of the Canadian, Norwegian and French delegations to NATO; Senator Robertson and Mr. Finn Moe keeping in touch with developments and remaining responsible for any operational decisions. Mr. Jacques Bardoux, President of the French parliamentary group of “Friends of the Atlantic”, provided the coordinating role between “the organizers” and the French Government and Parliament who found themselves cast in the role as joint hosts for the Conference.

Lord Ismay, at the outset of plans to hold a Conference, had only committed NATO to providing technical assistance and speakers and he had assumed that national delegations to NATO and the parliamentary group itself would look after all other organizational details.

At the time of the Canadian invitation, in May, therefore, no administrative organization of any kind existed to ensure that a meeting of two hundred or more parliamentarians from fifteen different countries would take place as planned, let alone to deal with the many problems, which invariably arise at a conference of such proportions.11

Concern at this state of affairs was expressed by Colonel Walter Elliot (UK) who had accepted to lead the British delegation to the Conference and who was to become first Treasurer. Colonel Elliot contacted Mr. Douglas Robinson, Secretary of the United Kingdom branch of the Federal Union organization, and with the approval of Senator Robertson and Mr. Finn Moe appointed Mr. Robinson organizer of the Conference at a fee of £150. Mr. Robinson lucidly takes up the story: “There was no way that the NATO Secretariat could afford the embarrassment of a conference that had no degree of organization to it at all and even if it was only a one-off it required some very professional organizing. Further, to be a one-off with the end purpose in mind of the prime instigators that it should be the beginning of a new venture altogether, it required a degree of organization that was sadly lacking. I was asked if I could get leave from my then job which was Secretary of the Federal Union for a few days and organize the Conference. There was no agenda, no knowledge of Conference facilities, and nobody had decided which rooms, of the many available in the NATO Secretariat, could be used. The NATO Secretariat to put it mildly were never very keen on the idea because they reflected very much the views of Governments which was basically anti any such meeting – and certainly if it was going to produce other meetings. As professionals in a Secretariat concerned with NATO they were also not too pleased at being invaded by unknown quantities from a number of countries and particularly with the press getting to hear of it – so they had some justification for feeling that it was a bit chaotic. Then I turned up on my own for a day and a half and met various Secretariat people and we tried to create some semblance of efficiency. One thing the toilets were in a secure area and we had great discussions about getting the toilets ‘unsecured’! It was that sort of environment where one either had to have a highly developed sense of humour, or a sense of the ridiculous or both.”

The basic agenda for the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians had been agreed upon by Senator Robertson and Mr. Finn Moe in March. After scrutiny by national delegations at NATO and NATO parliamentary groups it was left largely unaltered. During the first two days 18–19 July delegates would receive briefings on NATO at
the Palais de Chaillot and at SHAPE from leading NATO officials and high ranking
Allied Commanders and the following three days 20–22 July would be taken up with
discussions on Alliance problems and the prospects for a permanent Parliamentarians’
Conference or Assembly (the Canadian resolution). The discussions were to be held in
public and any meeting of the parliamentarians with the NATO Permanent Representa-
tives would be informal.

A Steering Committee of one representative from each delegation met on 17 July
at the Palais de Chaillot the day before the Conference opened, to complete the agenda
and to establish rules of procedure. The Committee, which was chaired by Colonel
Walter Elliot (UK), elected Senator Wishart McL. Robertson (Canada) as President of
the Conference, and Messrs. Finn Moe (Norway), Frans van Cauwelaert (Belgium)
and Pierre-Olivier Lapie (France) as Vice-Presidents. The Conference later adopted
these “nominations” during their first working session on 20 July.

The First Meeting of Members of Parliament from the NATO
Countries

The first meeting of the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO
Countries duly opened on 18 July in the presence of 158 parliamentarians from
fourteen Alliance countries. The Italian delegation did not arrive until the final day
because of the domestic political situation in Italy.

No United States Senators attended the meeting due to the pressure of legislative
business in the Senate.

The stated purpose of the meeting was “to debate the problems of achieving closer
economic and political co-operation and co-ordination between NATO countries,
including the question of further meetings at parliamentary level.”

The parliamentarians’ meeting coincided with a summit meeting on European
Security and Disarmament in Geneva which obviously meant a considerably reduced
press and public interest in the parliamentarians’ discussions.

The first two days were occupied with briefings from, among others, the Secretary
General of NATO, Lord Ismay; SACEUR, General Gruenther; Field Marshal Lord
Montgomery, and General de Chassey. There were also speeches on the subject of
European integration.

The final three days of the meeting which were devoted to debate among the
parliamentarians was opened in the name of the French Government by Minister
Deputy to the Prime Minister, Gaston Palewski. The first part of the debate centred on
NATO and particularly on the economic and political aspects of the Treaty. This was
followed by discussion on the controversial issue of holding further meetings of
NATO parliamentarians and of the organization necessary to bring these about.

The Canadian amended resolution of June 1955, formed the basis for discussion.
There were basically four different conceptions of the kind of permanent parliamen-
tary forum which might be established. There was, first, the revised Canadian pro-
posal for the setting up of NATO parliamentary groups in each of the legislatures of
member countries and for these to be linked by an International NATO Parliamentary
Association (following the example of similar bodies such as the Inter-Parliamentary
Union and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association).
Delegates from the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway favoured the establishment of a parliamentary assembly, with consultative status, attached to NATO along similar lines to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. They were strongly opposed by the British delegation on the grounds that a NATO Consultative Assembly would cover much the same ground as the Assembly of the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

There was considerable interest shown in the third suggestion that the fifteen Governments should be requested to ask the NATO Council to invite parliamentarians to an annual conference. This idea was forcefully rejected and clearly showed the strong desire of the delegates to organize their annual meetings without any dependence on governmental decisions.

Eventually a fourth proposal gained unanimous approval. Based on the view that a consultative assembly was not practicable at this stage, because of the opposition of some member Governments, it was proposed that future conferences should be convened in the same manner as the first. This meant that the President or Speaker of each Parliament was to be requested to select the delegations. By so doing they prevented individual parliamentary associations from renominating the same pro NATO delegates year after year, without ensuring accurate representation of the political composition of their legislatures, an action which it was felt could have reduced the effectiveness of the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians.

The final resolution establishing both the Conference and this procedure stated:—

"The present meeting of the parliamentarians of the NATO Groups:

"Invites the Presidents of the various interested Parliaments to appoint delegations, using any procedure which they shall deem suitable, to attend a similar meeting next year.

"Expresses the hope that the Governments of the countries represented here will facilitate the holding of new meetings, through the agency of the Atlantic Council.

"Considers furthermore that, before closing the meeting, it would be appropriate to establish a Continuing Committee made up of the members of the Bureau and of other members of the Organizing Committee, to the number of fifteen, and including a representative of each NATO country, with these countries having the right to replace the delegate so appointed. It would be incumbent on this Committee to organize the next meeting.

"The present Assembly considers, in addition, that this Continuing Committee should have at its disposal a Secretariat, the members of which would, for the time being, work part-time.

"The participating Governments or the interested parliamentarians, in common agreement, should provide for the financing (which will have to be modest) of this Secretariat."

No date was fixed for the next meeting, but it was agreed that the new Continuing Committee would meet as soon as possible to consider administrative matters, in particular to draw up a budget, and to carry on the work of the Conference until the next meeting.

Colonel Walter Elliot (UK) was elected Treasurer, and Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands) was elected Parliamentary Secretary of the Conference. Mr. Douglas Robinson was appointed part-time Executive Secretary."\textsuperscript{13}
The Aftermath

The first Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries had every reason to feel pleased with its work as it had both reached a consensus and laid out a procedure for its continuation. However, many questions impinging upon its future role and status remained unanswered. The London “Economist” in an article of 6 August 1955, asked what kind of assembly would emerge and considered that it was up to the NATO Governments to reach agreement on what they want as “the parliamentarians have now demonstrated that with or without official encouragement they are determined to go ahead. They will not now be killed off by neglect: but it is difficult to see how they can flourish for long in a vacuum.” The “Economist” article went on to observe that “out of deference to the views of a number of NATO countries, the Assembly, if that is what it will be called, has no organizational link with NATO. But as soon as the discussion branches out to substantive matters, questions which have for the moment been side-stepped will immediately arise. Will the assembly have the right to ask NATO for reports? If it has recommendations to make to whom should they be addressed? In short, what precisely is to be its relationship to Governments on the one hand and to NATO as an organization on the other?”

The forebodings of the “Economist” did not, however, dampen the spirits of members of the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference, one of whom, Mr. Denis Healey, in a leader article in the London daily “News Chronicle” stated, “So far there is no intention of giving the Conference a constitutional function in the official NATO machinery, still less to give it powers. It is, and will remain, a “talking shop”. But when more ambitious international assemblies are gasping with frustration such modesty may prove well judged. . . . No ministerial committee can influence public opinion like a gathering in which a Congressman from Arizona can discuss Europe’s problems with a Deputy from Lyons and a Senator from Istanbul.

“It now looks as if the Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly will become an annual event. It will be the only forum where an American Congressman can meet his European colleagues on an equal footing.”

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas was later to enthuse that, “The debates at our first Conference in July 1955, helped to stimulate interest by Governments in Article II. In the nine months following our first Conference there was hardly a Government in the Alliance which did not suggest a new look at the Alliance. Those who suggested changes included Presidents Eisenhower and Gronchi, Prime Ministers Adenauer and Mollet and Foreign Ministers von Brantano, Dulles, Lange, Lloyd, Martino, Pearson, Pineau and Spaak. From these suggestions for change came the setting up of the Committee of Three Wise Men.”

NATO Committee of Three

The NATO Committee of Three (known as the Three Wise Men) was set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session on 5 May 1956. The Committee comprised the Foreign Ministers of Canada (Mr. Lester Pearson), Italy (Dr. Gaetano Martino) and
Norway (Mr. Halvard Lange) and its task was to advise the Council on ways and means to implement the provisions of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty by improving and extending NATO co-operation in non-military fields and promoting greater unity within the Atlantic Community.\textsuperscript{14}

As its first corporate activity the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was asked by the Committee of Three for its views on ways in which co-operation in non-military fields could be developed within the Atlantic Community.

In preparation for its meeting with the Three Wise Men the Standing Committee - the Continuing Committee had been so renamed at the second Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1956 - drew upon the results of an Alliance wide survey of parliamentary opinion conducted by the Conference Secretariat during the summer of 1956, and an interim analysis of the results was submitted to the Committee of Three.

The Survey,\textsuperscript{15} the first of its kind ever organized, evolved from a suggestion contained in a memorandum written by Mr. Douglas Robinson, the Executive Secretary, for the Continuing Committee in February 1956. He felt that a "questionnaire or Gallup Poll might reasonably be expected ... [to] strengthen the hands of those seeking the development of the North Atlantic Treaty in its economic, social and political aspects."

Some five thousand questionnaires in nine different languages were distributed to every Member of Parliament in each of the fifteen NATO Parliaments.

Approximately twenty per cent of the respondents favoured creation of a Consultative Parliamentary Association and revision of the North Atlantic Treaty to facilitate co-operation between member countries.

The memorandum submitted by the Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to the Committee of Three reiterated these views and in addition recommended more formal recognition of the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians and as a first step called for an annual report to be presented to the Conference by the NATO Secretariat.

The Committee of Three, which has been credited with establishing the guidelines for implementation of the provisions of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, recognized in its Report the contribution which the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference had made to discussion of NATO's future role in the following manner:--

"Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other Parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

"In order to maintain a close relationship of parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) 'that the Secretary-General continue to place the facilities of NATO Headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;
(b) 'that invited representatives of member Governments and the Secretary-General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.' "\textsuperscript{16}
Participation in the Committee of Three exercise was providential for the newly formed Conference of NATO Parliamentarians as it provided a basis on which to build a sense of identity and common purpose.

Footnotes


2. Livingston Hartley of the Atlantic Union Committee (USA). Author of many books and articles on the North Atlantic Alliance. Formerly of the State Department and a leading advocate of a NATO Parliamentarians' Assembly. Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States.


4. Sir Geoffrey de Freitas elaborated on his ideas for an Atlantic Council evolving from the Council of Europe in several published articles including "From Strasbourg to Quebec, A Transformation of the Council of Europe", Federal News, February–March 1954; "A Council of the Atlantic could be set up this year", European–Atlantic Review, Spring 1955; "NATO is not enough" (with Mr. Donald Mcl.achlan), Friends of the Atlantic Union, 1955; and in debates in the British House of Commons on 21 January and on 1 December 1954 and on 31 March 1955. See also an address made before the Assembly of the Council of Europe in May 1953.


6. The full text of the recommendations (from the Report) of the North Atlantic Council of December 1953 is as follows:–

   (a) Member Governments should use all suitable opportunities of informing parliamentarians of the activities of the Alliance, and whenever it is felt to be useful, of arranging parliamentary debates on NATO and the Atlantic Community.

   (b) Inter-parliamentary contact;

   (i) Member Governments should encourage the setting up within their countries of groups of parliamentarians especially interested in NATO.

   (ii) These groups should be encouraged, so far as is possible, to develop their own inter-parliamentary contacts on the basis of mutual interest in and support for NATO, either among themselves or in affiliation with pro-NATO voluntary organizations.

   (iii) When as a result of such contacts, approaches are received by NATO from the group or groups concerned, every effort would of course be made to encourage their active interest in, and support for, NATO by meeting requests for guest speakers, visits or interviews, and if necessary, furnishing secretarial and interpreter assistance in Paris for meetings organized by such a group or groups.

(c) Tours and visits for parliamentarians from member countries:

   (i) Parliamentarians should be encouraged to visit NATO Military and Civilian Headquarters, whether in smaller or larger groups.
(ii) Visits might be arranged by NATO for parliamentarians from one or more member countries to the Military and Civilian Headquarters. These visits might be combined with tours to one or more member countries.

The tours outlined above might be initiated and arranged either by NATO or by member countries.

7. The full text of the Canadian resolution is as follows:

(1) That on 18 July 1955, representative groups of interested parliamentarians arrange to meet at the NATO Headquarters in Paris. The size of the delegations should be determined by the respective countries themselves, but having regard to the physical and other limitations, we suggest that they range in number from 5 to 25. In view of the possibility that by that date other countries may have become members of NATO, we direct the President to communicate with interested parliamentarians in those countries as well.

(2) That the agenda of the proposed meeting should include the following topics for discussion:

(a) The following resolution of the Canadian Parliamentary NATO Association, namely:
   "Be it resolved that we, parliamentarians of countries that are members of NATO, respectfully urge that the necessary steps be taken to create a North Atlantic Consultative Assembly of parliamentarians, to meet at regular intervals."

(b) The progress that has been made in implementing the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly as respects Article II.

(c) The effectiveness of civil or parliamentary control over the armed forces allocated to the Supreme NATO Commander.

(d) The steps that are being taken by the Council to inform the people of the NATO countries as to the purpose and progress of NATO.

(3) That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Secretary-General of NATO for his information, coupled with a request that he give us the benefit of his judgement as to the technical and physical factors involved in the proposal and that consideration be given to having adequate press representation from each country that is represented at the meeting.

8. Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., US Acting-Secretary of State expressed this view in a letter to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, dated 5 March 1954.


10. Letter to Mr. Peter Altmeier, President of the Bundesrat, 20 June 1955.


13. Mr. Douglas Robinson had served three and a half years as Secretary of Federal Union and prior to that he had worked as a journalist and with the BBC. He was confirmed as full time
Executive Secretary by the Continuing Committee from 1 January 1956 but only until one month following the next annual conference when his position would be reviewed by the Committee. In his introduction to the pamphlet “The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, 1955–59” Sir Geoffrey de Freitas wrote that “Mr. Douglas Robinson's role in the establishment of the conference cannot be overestimated. His youthful imagination, initiative and drive were tremendous. . . .”

14. Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty is non-military in character and is often referred to as the “Canadian Article”, as it was inserted largely due to the efforts of the Canadian Government. It reads:—

“The Parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

15. The “International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion” in the NATO Countries conducted in 1956 was the first of its kind ever organized. Questionnaires were sent to every MP in the member countries of the Alliance; a total of 5260 in nine different languages. Over 1,000 or approximately 20% responded. They expressed a general desire to see the development of a parliamentary assembly with consultative status to NATO, a common foreign policy, an Atlantic Payments Union, mobility of labour between NATO countries, an Atlantic overseas investment programme, the rationalization of military production and pronouncements by NATO upon disputes between members.

The results of the survey were published in the “The Scotsman” and attracted considerable interest. A second survey was authorized in 1958.

Chapter Two
Efforts at Institutionalization

Introduction

The first meeting of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries which took place in July 1955, at NATO Headquarters in Paris marked the successful conclusion of several years of activity by parliamentarians, academicians and sympathizers seeking recognition of the many values—political, military, economic and cultural—uniting North America and Western Europe. It was also the beginning of a quest for "more formal recognition" of the Conference as a concrete expression of the ties binding the Atlantic nations.

More Formal Recognition

But what exactly did "more formal recognition" entail? In tracing the efforts to achieve institutionalization of the North Atlantic Assembly (and its forerunners, the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries and the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference) it is immediately apparent that there has been little agreement as to what constituted "more formal recognition".

Politically, the question was one of how to define the relationship with NATO. Should the Assembly be a mouthpiece for NATO policy or should it develop a more independent role with the capacity to criticize Alliance policy?

In a paper prepared for the Standing Committee in September 1956, on the merits of pursuing consultative status, the problem was summarized thus: "Obviously, consultative status would give the Conference much more weight, greater prestige and so on. It would also, however, tie the Conference to NATO, and to that extent, to the fortunes of NATO. It may be wise therefore to recognize that NATO is merely one aspect of co-operation between a group of countries with many interests in common. The case for parliamentary contacts between the NATO countries does not depend upon the existence of NATO."

Technically, the problem was whether "more formal recognition" should be achieved 1) through a legally constituted identity as established by Treaty, or 2) by means of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. The suggestion was made in 1956, for example, that the Conference might be developed into a regional organization as defined in the United Nations Charter and that consultative status could be achieved by revision of the Treaty in 1959, or 3) through a unilateral declaration made by
individual member states of the Alliance recognizing the Assembly and reinforced by ratification of a charter or 4) by the establishment of an “identity” through the views expressed in recommendations and resolutions and the quality of its reports. In the course of pursuing institutionalization all the above options have been explored.

Perceptions of what may be said to constitute “more formal recognition” have been affected by changes in the political climate. At the time of the first Conference, the ideals of those who favoured Atlantic Union were prominent, reinforced by fears of the immediacy of the communist threat which had still to be deflated by the onset of the process of detente. Both of these factors favoured the creation of an Atlantic parliamentary forum. However, it is probably true to say that in failing to avail themselves of the opportunity to present their case, afforded by the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, the supporters of an institutional expression of the Atlantic Community lost their only realistic chance of achieving formal recognition of the value of an Atlantic parliamentary assembly. The sheer effort required to obtain the agreement of twelve nations, later of course fifteen, to the North Atlantic Treaty has made renegotiation exceedingly improbable.

Omission from the North Atlantic Treaty

It is worth pausing briefly to reflect on the implications of the omission from the North Atlantic Treaty of any reference to or provision for a parliamentary assembly. Was it a deliberate omission? Indeed, was the subject ever raised during negotiations? Given that at the time there was a substantial degree of influential and educated opinion committed to the ideals of Atlantic Union it would have been surprising if these ideals including the need for a consultative body were not discussed during the Treaty negotiations. Certainly, in contemporary negotiations aimed at establishing other international organizations consultative bodies figured prominently in the discussions.

On 16 April 1948, for example, a convention establishing the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to administer the European Recovery Programme was signed. Article XII of this Convention on the function of the Organization makes provision for “systems of observation and review” a construction which could be used to create a consultative body.

In November 1948, government appointed representatives of the five Western Union nations met in Paris to discuss proposals designed to foster European unity, including the establishment of a European Assembly. A compromise solution arrived at by the Consultative Council of the Western Union agreeing to the creation of a Council of Europe, was announced in January 1949. The Council of Europe was to consist of a Ministerial Committee, meeting in private and a Consultative Assembly, meeting in public. The North Atlantic Treaty was issued in March 1949 and signed in the April. A month later the Council of Europe was established.

It can, therefore, be seen that at the time of its negotiation, there was a predisposition among the European negotiators of the Atlantic Pact towards consultative bodies. Yet no mention was made of a consultative body in the North Atlantic Treaty. It could be claimed that since the Treaty was negotiated specifically to counter a perceived Soviet military threat, a political function was considered less necessary. On
this basis it seems plausible to suggest that the question of creating a consultative body may never have been raised. Equally it could be claimed that Governments did not welcome the idea of parliamentary oversight of their activities in the realm of security.

This does not explain why in 1954 the amended WEU Treaty made specific provision for “an Assembly” and yet less than a year later a similar proposal for transforming the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians into an Assembly for the Atlantic Alliance was rejected. The issue is complicated by the close relationship between WEU and NATO. As early as April 1951, “NATO assumed full responsibility for the organization of joint defence” of the NATO-WEU nations.3 “The undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO” was recognized by the Council of WEU which agreed in Article III of the protocol modifying the Brussels Treaty to rely upon the “appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”

NATO’s assumption of full responsibility for the organization of joint defence was made before the Paris Agreements of 1954 which established an Assembly for WEU.

Given the close relationship which by 1954 existed between NATO and WEU why was an Assembly rejected for NATO yet agreed to in the case of WEU?

One can only conjecture but there does seem to be sufficient circumstantial evidence to imply a deliberate omission on the part of the Governments negotiating the Atlantic Pact, an indication perhaps that they saw little viability in the concept and ideals of “Atlantica”. Successive Governments have continued to regard the concept of an Atlantic Assembly with suspicion and antipathy.

It is worth noting that had the attitudes of Governments represented in the North Atlantic Council ever undergone a substantial change of heart in this respect, Article IX of the Treaty does make provision for the NATO Council to establish any body it deems necessary. Potentially, therefore, had the willingness ever been there this provision could have been used by member Governments to create a NATO Assembly.

Without that willingness the supporters of Atlantic Union have been forced to consider alternative schemes for maintaining cohesion within the Atlantic area. The progress towards European unity has effectively been made at the expense of the concept of Atlantic Union. Even the “twin-pillar” concept as defined by the late President John F. Kennedy envisaged a system based upon co-operation between two separate but equal pillars, North America counterbalanced by an integrated Europe.

Early Efforts at Institutionalization

The prime objective of the participants at the Conference of Parliamentarians from NATO Countries in July 1955, was to establish a “modus vivendi” as the basis for perpetuating the Conference. By rejecting both the Canadian proposal for national parliamentary associations and a more ambitious proposal for a Consultative Assembly along the lines of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the parliamentarians effectively established the characteristics of the structure through which the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, later the North Atlantic Assembly, was to function in the future. By so doing they ensured for the Conference, “a status
greater than that of an Association, such as the Canadian proposal had envisaged, yet avoided the undoubted disadvantages of an organization with consultative status.”

Report of the Committee of Three

The Committee of Three Wise Men was set up in 1956 to advise the North Atlantic Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

It was initially hoped that the Committee’s Report would lend support to the Parliamentarians’ case. However, the Report made only passing reference to parliamentary participation: “... the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and to solidarity among its members.”

Conference Activities

A variety of reports analysing the problem of the Conference’s future role and status were prepared for the 2nd NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference held in November 1956, in Paris. Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands), in a paper entitled, “Problems of Parliamentary Organization”, noted that “the main organizational problem of our Conference, in my view, is to find ways and means to increase its influence and authority within the orbits of national Parliaments.”

In “A Parliamentary Forum”, a report prepared on the theme of “Towards an Atlantic Community”, Mr. Douglas Robinson, Executive Secretary of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference sounded a cautionary note on the identity of a parliamentary forum. An Assembly aligning itself totally with the North Atlantic Organization would be subject to the fluctuating fortunes of the North Atlantic Treaty and bound by its inflexible purpose and geographical limitations.

The 2nd Conference in November 1956, took up the challenge of determining its own future. A resolution proposed by Colonel Walter Elliot (UK), invited the “Standing Committee to undertake, either directly or by agency, a review of the questions raised in debate on the functions of this Conference” and to circulate a report prior to the 1957 Conference analysing “whether the Conference should seek advisory or consultative status.”

In discussion with Mr. Robinson the new Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, expressed the view that the Parliamentarians’ Conference could best improve its status and enhance its effectiveness by expanding the facilities and increasing the budget of the Conference. Mr. Spaak was clearly expressing an official viewpoint when at a press conference he stated that while the Conference most certainly did have a role to play, it should not necessarily be assumed that this should be on the lines of assemblies already existing in Europe.

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, in a report to the 3rd Conference in 1957, presented the results of an “International Survey of Parliamentary Opinion” in the NATO countries, organized by the Secretariat in 1956.
and made several recommendations for improving the Conference. (For further details see Chapter One: “The Birth of the Assembly”.)

In addition to the holding of Conference meetings at NATO Headquarters and the constitution of adequately staffed Political, Military and General Affairs Committees, he called specifically for an annual report to be presented by the Secretary-General of NATO for debate by the Conference, for the establishment of a bulletin similar to the “Council of Europe News” and for more “official” visits. These proposals were incorporated in a Political Committee resolution submitted to the 3rd Annual Session.

Atlantic Congress

The Atlantic Congress in June 1959 (for further details see Chapter Three: “The Initiatives”, page 35) discussed the future role of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference. A contemporary article published by a Dutch newspaper expressed the opinion that “NATO Parliamentarians should form their own officially recognized organ in NATO.”

However the Congress Political Committee was rather more cautious and called for a special conference to discuss whether the Atlantic Community should or should not be strengthened by the development of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference. The idea of a special conference was supported by the Parliamentarians at their 5th Conference in 1959. This initiative was to culminate in the Atlantic Convention of 1962.

Internal Changes

While support was growing for an Atlantic Assembly outside the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference attitudes within the Conference were moving away from dramatic schemes for the establishment of an Atlantic Consultative Assembly. Instead increasing emphasis was being placed upon steps which the Conference could take to improve its performance. In a report to the 5th Conference in 1959, entitled “NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference – some observations”, the Executive Secretary commented on the desire for “more formal recognition” and noted that this would depend “at least in Government circles, on its ability to produce proposals which ‘on merit’ will gain the attention of Governments of NATO and of Parliaments and parliamentarians alike.”

While self-improvement became a permanent feature of the Conference’s attempt to become institutionalized NATO support remained cautious. When requested to give his views on the value of resolutions adopted by the Conference being submitted to the North Atlantic Council, Secretary-General Spaak in a meeting with the Executive Secretary, Mr. Robinson, commented that “the fact that the Conference was a private organization would probably cause an objection in principle to such an official action being taken by the Bureau.”

He suggested that the Conference should first seek official recognition by member countries of NATO and also that a move to Paris would facilitate his giving assistance to the Conference.

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In 1960 the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference did move its Secretariat from London to Paris. Its status remained unchanged after the move. The French Government expressed the opinion that because the Conference was an unofficial body it was not entitled to be granted international status.

During that year a Statute Committee, chaired by Mr Frans van Cauwelaert (Belgium) prepared a detailed analysis of the terms of reference which would be necessary for the recognition of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference by the North Atlantic Council.

A renewal of interest in transforming the Conference into an Atlantic Consultative Assembly is to be seen in the views expressed in a report prepared for the Political Committee in 1961 by Mr. Lucien Radoux (Belgium). Mr. Radoux’s proposal that the Conference “should become a Consultative Assembly with real functions and limited powers” was the subject of a draft resolution submitted by the Political Committee to the 7th Conference in 1961. Interestingly the draft resolution which called upon the Standing Committee to report to the next session “on the conditions that would enable this Conference to become a consultative body to NATO” was not among the resolutions adopted at the 7th Conference.

While members were once again seeking concrete recognition of the Conference relationship with NATO, the new Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk Stikker, in an address to the 7th Plenary Session referred to the Conference as “an essential institution of NATO” (consequently) “Your legal status seems to me only a very secondary issue.” He described the Conference as “...the living link” between public opinion and those who are “responsible in an official capacity for the execution of policy.”

Alternative Atlantic Structures

Contemporary with discussions on the development of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference was a larger debate on the future configuration of the Atlantic Alliance. Various proposals were under active consideration most memorable of which, perhaps, was the vision of the late President Kennedy of an integrated Atlantic Community founded on twin-pillars. The idea that the Atlantic nations could become increasingly integrated was not, however, without its critics. Professor Walter Hallstein, then President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, in an address to the 8th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference in 1962, cautioned that “partnership is only possible between comparative equals... In the sense that we are now accustomed to use it, the word ‘community’ is an innovation, adopted to describe the fundamentally new organism established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome. If that organism is not fully either a federation or a confederation, it is nevertheless very different from even such an international organization as NATO...[it] already represents partial politicalunion. Would it be reasonable then to expect the US to join in so thoroughgoing a venture?”
Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations – Declaration of Paris

The Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations provided an opportunity for discussing such issues and the Declaration of Paris, adopted on 19 January 1962, urged that the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference be developed into a Consultative Atlantic Assembly, “which would review the work of, and make recommendations to, all Atlantic institutions.” It is perhaps significant that this definition would encompass consultation not only with NATO but also OECD.

Creation of a Sub-Committee to Study Institutionalization

The recommendation of the Atlantic Convention helped revive interest in the prospects for institutionalization of the Conference. A special Sub-Committee was appointed by the 8th Conference in 1962 “to study and submit recommendations . . . on . . . a constitution or charter for a Consultative Atlantic Assembly.” The Sub-Committee whose membership included a representative of each country was chaired by Mr. Hauch (Denmark) with as Vice-Chairman, Mr. Wayne Hays (US) and Lord Silkin (UK) and Messrs. Boscher (France) and Radoux (Belgium) as Rapporteurs.

It was a blow to the supporters of institutionalization when the Sub-Committee reported to the 9th Conference in 1963 “that as matters stand, it is not at the moment practicable to change the status of the present Conference . . . because such a change would involve the signing of an additional protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.”

In their report the Sub-Committee limited themselves to advocating various refinements in Conference procedures designed to increase its effectiveness, for example, that there should be two plenary meetings a year, that a Rapporteur-General should be appointed to prepare an annual report analysing NATO’s role in world affairs, and the enlargement of the Secretariat.

An interesting sidelight on this report, showing the divergence of opinions among parliamentarians, is that its findings are in direct conflict with the original draft of a report prepared by Mr. John Lindsay (US) (Rapporteur) and submitted to the Political Committee. Mr. Lindsay’s report argued that parliamentarians of the Atlantic nations, “including the membership of both NATO and OECD, acting independently of all existing parliamentary bodies including the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, should organize themselves forthwith to take positive steps towards the creation of a Consultative Atlantic Assembly to serve as a parliamentary body for both NATO and the OECD.”

The suggestion was developed in the report that an assembly embracing OECD and NATO membership could be achieved by “dividing the work of the assembly between two separate plenary sessions” one dealing with military and political matters pertaining to NATO, the other with economic and social matters pertaining to OECD. This enterprising and independent line did not survive the Committee stage and a compromise report was drawn up stating that “an Atlantic Consultative Assembly involving OECD nations cannot [now] be created out of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference.” The report recognized that while the proliferation of assemblies should be avoided “the eventual creation of such an assembly, with formal status and consultative powers, would be a major dramatic step toward Atlantic
solidarity." The report expressed the hope that "such an institution will one day evolve."

These sentiments were reaffirmed in a Political Committee recommendation adopted by the 10th Conference in 1964, which recognized the need for a broadly representative trans-Atlantic parliamentary body possessing consultative powers.

The views expressed by the Sub-Committee in its report on Institutionalization reflect much more closely the attitudes of successive Secretaries-General of NATO. Secretary-General Dirk Stikker stated frankly to the 9th Conference in 1963 his view that "in seeking to formalize its position, your Conference may find itself grasping at the shadow of status only to lose the substance of influence." As for the speed with which improvements could be implemented, the new Secretary-General Manlio Brosio told the 10th Conference that they could either try to "force the pace" or "concentrate on making the best possible use of the [current] set up."

The de Freitas Report

A sense of frustration may be inferred from the demand by parliamentarians for preparation of a report "on the possibility of converting the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly of NATO" which was contained in a Political Committee resolution adopted at the 11th Annual Session in 1965 which initiated the next major effort towards institutionalization.

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas' (UK) report marked a significant departure from earlier thinking in two respects. It recognized that an official relationship with the North Atlantic Council could not effectively incorporate a relationship with other international institutions such as OECD, thus finally burying the concept which had been expounded by Mr. Lindsay (United States) some years earlier.

The report "Conversion of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly of NATO" advocated the constitution of an Atlantic Assembly "by means of formal agreements" in preference to a Treaty, a method which would avoid the pitfall of renegotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty which had proved a major stumbling block in the past. Success could be achieved, so the report claimed, by securing the approval of individual NATO Governments. To this end, a draft outline for a charter was appended to the report.

The report was clearly influenced by the political situation at the time it was written. French withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO had placed a damper on current enthusiasm for European/Atlantic integration. The suggestion in the report that "If any NATO countries did not wish to help to set up an Assembly, the others could proceed without them, but leave the door open for them to come in later" meant that France could be welcomed into the proposed Assembly at some time in the future.

The "Working Party on the Reform of NATO" (see Political Committee page 122) in its report to the 12th Session "entirely endorsed" the recommendations made by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and advocated "careful and detailed study of the relationship between the European Parliament and any such Atlantic Assembly."

The report and charter were adopted by the 12th Plenary in 1966 and subsequently submitted to the North Atlantic Council with the recommendation that
"Member Governments should draw up and adopt an agreement establishing such an Assembly as soon as possible."

A year later in his address to the 13th Annual Session the Secretary-General of NATO was discouraging. His words were carefully chosen to present as positive a picture as possible, — "during the past year, this problem has been discussed repeatedly both by the Council and the Political Committee with all the attention your initiative certainly deserves. From these deliberations it soon became apparent that Governments felt strong reluctance to move towards institutionalizing the relations between NATO and an Atlantic Assembly. This reluctance was to a great degree motivated by consideration of constitutional issues: for instance, institutionalization could require changes in the Treaty of Washington, which no Member Government, to my knowledge, would be disposed to envisage", — but the message was undeniable, the view of Alliance Governments that NATO should not be subject to political oversight remained unchanged.

North Atlantic Assembly

With the failure of this latest attempt to achieve official recognition of the Conference interest in institutionalization waned. Instead efforts were once again directed towards self-improvement. As a first step the Conference at its 12th Session unanimously decided to change its name to the North Atlantic Assembly.

This would seem to have been at the behest of French parliamentarians. General Bethouart’s (France) proposal, submitted by Professor Portmann (France), had indicated that “The replacement of the reference to NATO by the reference to the Atlantic Alliance would considerably facilitate the French Government’s position vis-à-vis the Organization. It might even be a decisive factor in maintaining French participation in the Conference.”

From Paris to Brussels

The Assembly Secretariat moved to Brussels in 1968 where NATO had relocated after its forced removal from Paris following the French decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966. The proximity of NATO and the Assembly since 1968 has been an important factor in the strengthening of cooperation between the two bodies.

Following the removal to Brussels and the appointment of a new Secretary-General, Mr. Deshormes, negotiations began with the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Assembly being granted official status in Belgium.

NATO Ministerial Meeting – December 1967

In December 1967, the NATO Ministerial Meeting noted that, “The Council discussed proposals presented by the North Atlantic Assembly parliamentarians at their
recent meeting for closer co-operation between themselves and the Council. The Secretary-General was authorised to study ways and means for this purpose and to submit suggestions to the Council.”

Negotiations Between the Secretary-General of NATO and the Newly Appointed Secretary-General of the Assembly

Following this decision a new initiative commenced to formulate criteria for a practical working relationship between NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly. Negotiations took place between the Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Manlio Brosio and the recently appointed Secretary-General of the Assembly, Mr. Philippe Deshormes. At a meeting on 25 March 1968, a new working arrangement was agreed upon.

It was agreed that the Secretary-General of NATO should make regular statements on the Alliance to the North Atlantic Assembly, that the NATO Secretariat would give active support to the Assembly’s Committees in their work, that relations between the Assembly and NATO would be channelled through NATO’s Political Directorate, and that henceforth the North Atlantic Council would make comments via the Secretary-General of NATO on the recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly. These four points of accord have formed the basis of the NATO/Assembly relationship ever since.

The formal arrangements were agreed to by the North Atlantic Council although the French Permanent Representative abstained from voting and asked that his reservations be officially represented to the Assembly.

While far short of the institutionalized status sought for the Assembly these working arrangements can be seen as recognition of its durability and as a reward for sheer persistence!

In a telling sentence, Mr. Deshormes summed up the frustrations of twelve years of struggle for such meagre rewards “... I am somewhat surprised that the Assembly should have so persistently deluded itself into thinking that institutionalization would be readily granted ... in fact everything still remains to be done.”

North Atlantic Council’s Continued Antipathy

NATO’s attitude to institutionalization still remained a sensitive issue. Mr. Jaenicke, Assistant Secretary-General of NATO for Political Affairs, commented to the Political Committee, during a speech on 20 May 1968, that the Council’s attitude to institutionalization of the North Atlantic Assembly was dependent on the fact that NATO was an international but not a supranational body, and by its members’ determination to remain sovereign states which had led them to refuse to institutionalize the Assembly.”

He was immediately challenged over the weakness of this defence. Mr. Gulek (Turkey) commented that “he failed to understand why the institutionalization of the Assembly jeopardised the sovereignty of states” and Mr. Peel (UK) (later Sir John Peel) responded that “without being in any way supranational bodies, the Council of
Europe and WEU were nevertheless institutionalized.” Mr. Jaenicke could only reply that as far as the member Governments were concerned, “as no provision had been made in the North Atlantic Treaty for a parliamentary body, to institutionalize the Assembly it would mean renegotiating the Treaty and going through the process of parliamentary ratification again. Many countries did not want to do this.”

Reappraisal of Efforts Towards Institutionalization

A motion presented to the Political Committee by Messrs. Goedhart, Wierda, Koudijs, Janssen, and Dodds-Parker for submission to the 1968 Plenary also reaffirmed the long-term aim of institutionalization but held that “the main responsibility for improving the quality of its work rests with itself.” The motion called for a revision of the Rules of Procedure, creation of a Credentials Committee and a Committee on Budgetary Affairs.

These proposals were examined by the Working Party on the Reform of NATO, and in an amended form were incorporated in the revised Rules of Procedure adopted by the Assembly in 1969.

While the Assembly was passing through this period of self-analysis discussions continued on the long-term aim of institutionalization. These protracted discussions undeniably benefited from the very positive attitude shown by the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manlio Brosio. That so little was achieved resulted as Mr. Brosio himself admitted, from the fact that “without having the unanimous support of the Council [it was not possible for him] to do any more than he had already to improve relations between NATO and the Assembly.”

In 1969 a report on the “Prospects for developing the Assembly’s activities” was prepared for the Standing Committee which emphasized the need for the Assembly to establish an easily recognizable identity.

A second report that year prepared by the Political Committee’s Rapporteur, Mr. Lucien Radoux (Belgium) analysed the contribution the achievements of 1968 had made towards the eventual institutionalization of the Assembly. Mr. Radoux also identified four areas where the Assembly could continue to press its case. These were; implementation of the measures contained in the de Freitas report and draft charter of 1966, improvement of relations between NATO and the Assembly, attempting to obtain the support of national authorities and by efforts to improve the quality of the work produced by the Assembly. None of these, however, were novel ideas.

Efforts were now being directed at national Parliaments rather than the North Atlantic Council. At the 15th Annual Session in 1969 a Political Committee resolution was adopted calling on members of the Assembly to take “appropriate action in their own Parliaments to bring about the recognition of the Assembly as the parliamentary consultative body of the North Atlantic Alliance.”

In support of this initiative further studies were undertaken on revision of the Rules of Procedure with the objective that “no doubt should remain concerning [the Assembly’s] functional character as an international parliamentary assembly . . . .” The revised Rules of Procedure were submitted to the 1972 Session and were described by
the Secretary-General as "an additional element in strengthening the institutional
nature of the Assembly since they invest it with a certain number of more precise
procedural rules that reinforce the character it now has of an international assembly as
against that of a conference of parliamentarians which it had in earlier days."
If nothing else they served to provide the Assembly with a more precisely definable
identity, a characteristic which it had long lacked.

Committee of Nine

In 1971 a proposal was made by Senator Javits (US) that "seven prominent present or
former parliamentarians . . ." be appointed "to conduct a thorough study of the
future of the Atlantic Alliance and of the most appropriate and desirable role to be
played by the Assembly within that context." This proposal was accepted in amended
form and Senator Javits (US), retiring Chairman of the Political Committee, was asked
to chair the Committee, which was enlarged to nine members (for further details see
"The Initiatives" page 50).

A chapter of the Committee of Nine interim report was completed by the 18th
Annual Session in 1972. This was a special study commissioned from Mr. P. C.
Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade,
Ottawa, Canada, on "Transatlantic Interparliamentary Links and the Future of the
North Atlantic Assembly." It henceforth became known as the "Dobell Report".

The Dobell Report came out against increasing membership, a move which it was
felt would be counter-productive, "because it is important to have a fixed membership
which is representative of a definitive entity and the present membership of the
Assembly has such a character." Provision could nevertheless be made for the partici­
pation of non-members on specific activities. Mr. Dobell concluded that the lack of
official status allowed the Assembly greater flexibility in its discussions and it should
capitalize on its freedom and its unique character as the only trans-atlantic body with
regular participation of North American parliamentarians (other than the Inter­
parliamentary Union). Mr. Dobell recommended that the Assembly should declare
that it no longer intended to seek consultative status with NATO and would in future
direct its efforts towards providing an effective inter-parliamentary forum for the
discussion of all problems having a trans-atlantic dimension.

In an analysis designed to show the Assembly's effectiveness in its present form,
Mr. Dobell compared the North Atlantic Assembly and the parliamentary assemblies
of the Western European Union and the Council of Europe, in terms of the compar­
ative evolution of their budgets. These findings were set out in an Annex to the report
and were some indication of how comparatively inexpensive the Assembly was to run.
De Freitas Sub-Committee on the Dobell Report

Not all members of the Assembly were satisfied with the conclusions of the Dobell Report and a Sub-Committee “on the study of the Appendix to the Interim Report of the Committee of Nine” was set up by the Political Committee in May 1973 to conduct its own review of the proposals.

The Sub-Committee, chaired by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas took issue in particular with the proposal that the Assembly should sever its links with the North Atlantic Council. In the Sub-Committee’s opinion “the advantages of a declaration of independence by the Assembly from the North Atlantic Council [would be] heavily outweighed by the disadvantages.”

The Assembly would lose the services provided by NATO and member Governments in giving assistance with sessions, in making arrangements for military tours, in providing briefings and the replies now given as a matter of course by the Secretary-General of NATO to the Assembly’s recommendations, all of which contributed to the authority of the opinions expressed by the Assembly. Equally a decision to sever all official links would not be conducive to persuading member countries to increase their financial contributions to the Assembly.

The Sub-Committee also considered a proposal contained in a memorandum submitted to its European members by Mr. Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany) that the North Atlantic Assembly be extended to include all members of the European Communities. The proposal was not taken up. Mr. Blumenfeld also urged that “the Statute of the North Atlantic Assembly be changed so that recommendations of its Plenary Session and of its important Committees respectively, might become initiatives binding the various national Parliaments.”

Committee of Nine – Final Report

The Committee of Nine who submitted their Report to the 19th Annual Session of the Assembly in 1973 drew on the Dobell Report and the report of the de Freitas Sub-Committee in formulating the views expressed on “interparliamentary cooperation”. The Committee called for greater recognition of the Assembly’s role in Atlantic affairs and also proposed that a declaration should be made by individual states recognizing the Assembly as the parliamentary arm of NATO.9

Ottawa Declaration

To a limited degree official recognition was finally achieved in 1974 when the North Atlantic Council, during its meeting in Ottawa on 19 June, approved a “Declaration on Atlantic Relations” which was subsequently signed by the Heads of Government in Brussels on 26 June. This “Ottawa Declaration” as it has since become known marked the culmination of the United States foreign policy initiative devised by Dr. Henry Kissinger to improve trans-atlantic relations 1 the Year for Europe. It also marked the 25th Anniversary of the foundation of NATO.
Article XIII of the Declaration stated that "We recognize that the cohesion of the Alliance has found expression not only among our Governments, but also in the free exchange of views among the elected representatives of the peoples of the Alliance. Accordingly, we can declare our support for the strengthening of links among parliamentarians."

New Approaches

In 1974 the Assembly received encouragement with the granting of quasi-official status in Belgium.

The recommendation of the Committee of Nine for a declaration on the Assembly by individual states was followed up with the preparation of a draft protocol and of a draft "unilateral declaration by member Governments of the Alliance concerning the Assembly." However when this was submitted to the various Governments for comment it met with a less than enthusiastic response. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its review noted somewhat acerbically that the draft declaration might gain "both in conciseness and eloquence if it would contain a succinct enumeration of the main features arguing in favour of the Assembly", and advocated that the final chapter of the Report of the Committee of Nine be used as a guideline for development of a new role for the Assembly.

Two important and interlinked proposals were submitted by the Political Committee for approval by the 20th Annual Session in 1974. Institutionalization was no longer considered the prime long term objective. Instead the Committee called for closer contacts to be established between the Assembly and the Governments of the Alliance countries.

Recommendation 44 urged the NATO Council to give specific recognition to the "important contributions of the Assembly in international co-operation in the Atlantic area". Resolution 23 and Order 14 were primarily concerned with expanding relations with member Governments of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Standing Committee was instructed to seek establishment of a "high-level contact body" which would pursue such official recognition as is appropriate from member Governments and Parliaments and to oversee the implementation of Resolution 23 on expanding of Assembly relations with national Governments.

Creation of a Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments

The Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments was subsequently created. However the Secretary-General of NATO was rather negative in his comment upon the proposals contained in Recommendation 44. He felt that a statement of recognition of the worth of the Assembly's activities, if it was not repeated each year, could be interpreted as a cooling in NATO/North Atlantic Assembly relations. On the other hand an annual statement would soon lose its impact.
The newly established Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments held several meetings in 1975. Its membership included the President and three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Political Committee, who also chaired the Sub-Committee. A series of fact finding visits to national authorities were planned. A circular letter formulated by the Assembly President Mr. Wayne Hays (US) and Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (FRG) (as Chairman of the Sub-Committee) setting out the Assembly's case to be granted official status was sent to member states with a request for a meeting.

After the rejection of the draft charter attached to Sir Geoffrey de Freitas' proposals in 1966 the Sub-Committee was wary of presenting Governments with a draft protocol which it was felt would be easy for officialdom to reject. It was considered desirable, therefore, that Governments first be consulted "to ascertain whether there were a consensus of opinion as to how the Assembly could proceed further."

The Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments received support from the then United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who agreed, prior to each visit by the Sub-Committee, to send a telegram expressing his support of the Assembly initiative. The Sub-Committee delegation made its first official visit to Britain on 19 September 1975, when they were received by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Mr. Harold Wilson, who stated that "his Government was prepared to support the idea of making the Assembly an official body." Mr. Wilson gave the delegation his permission to mention the support of the British Government in their visits to other Alliance Governments. Subsequently, visits were made to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. Results were mixed although Norway and Denmark did agree to improvements in the manner of selecting delegates to the Assembly. In future, selection procedures would be in the same manner as for the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

A further impediment to the Assembly's pursuit of official recognition was identified by officials in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were shown a copy of the Sub-Committee's draft report. This concerned the possibility of communist participation. "One had to keep in mind that, raising the status of the Assembly could lead to an intensification of communist interest in the Assembly, which in turn could seriously impair the envisaged political co-operation."

It had been hoped to have a proposal ready for submission to the 1977 Spring NATO Ministerial Conference, raising the subject of "reconsideration of the Assembly's status within the Alliance by the NATO Council." However after two years only half the member countries had been visited and the initiative slowly ran out of steam. The Secretary-General, Mr. Deshormes, speaking in May 1977, stressed that "it is illusory to think that the relations with NATO, which are good, can be improved in the sense of a greater officialization of the Assembly..."

Historically the time had passed when serious consideration could be given to institutionalization of the Assembly. By 1977 emphasis had shifted to encouraging the development of better relations with the United States and Canada. To this end Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, President of the Assembly (1976–78), visited President Carter in June 1977. President Carter expressed his interest in the activities of the Assembly and the various aspects of its role in the Atlantic Alliance.

Renewed efforts were made to strengthen co-operation with other international bodies such as OECD. Internal improvements such as the preparation of more detailed Committee reports and the selection of topics for special study and better
staffing arrangements have all contributed to providing the Assembly with a recognizable and independent identity.

However, institutionalization as an objective was abandoned by the Assembly in 1979.

Footnotes


   "Article V: 'a new article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."'"

   For a full text of the Protocol see “NATO Basic Documents”, NATO Information Service, September 1973, page 57.


8. For fuller details compare the draft annual report of the Political Committee (Rapporteur, Mr. John Lindsay, (US)) for 1963 with the adopted version. See also Minutes of the Political Committee meeting, 5 November 1963, Item 3, “Report of the Special Committee on Institutionalization."


Chapter Three
The Initiatives

Introduction

It is significant that the initiatives described below took place largely within the first fifteen years of the existence of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference.

There was, at the time, a desire among NATO Parliamentarians to contribute to the development and success of the Atlantic Alliance through co-operation between the Atlantic nations in implementing the provisions of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty. This desire happily coincided with the long term aim of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference to achieve official recognition as the parliamentary wing of NATO – institutionalization as it became known.

A major consideration for the parliamentary supporters of institutionalization was that the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference should demonstrate that it was both worthy and capable of assuming such a responsibility and indeed, through its various activities, to integrate itself into the NATO system to the point where it becomes indispensable to the smooth running of the Alliance.

Viewed in this light it becomes apparent that it was no coincidence that the majority of initiatives were undertaken in those earlier years when the enthusiasm which had given rise to the first Conference of the NATO Parliamentarians was still at its peak and when the goal of “institutionalization” was still conceived of as a realistic aim which could be achieved through effort and application.

As the goal slowly receded energy was dissipated in different directions as new interests emerged. Several of the group of Atlanticists who, in the early years had provided the motivation and energy behind the contribution of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference to initiatives such as the Atlantic Congress, the Atlantic Convention, ADELA and EMDI moved on and were replaced by parliamentarians with more diverse interests.

The North Atlantic Assembly, as it was now called, moved away from large-scale public initiatives and concentrated on establishing the pattern of relationships and activities which in modified form exist today. In fact the last major initiative with which the Assembly was associated, the Committee of Nine which reported in 1973, paved the way for this shift in emphasis. Chapter Five of the Committee of Nine Report provided a detailed examination of changes which the Assembly needed to make to adapt to the changing demands of the 1970’s several of which were subsequently implemented.

It is important to appreciate the contribution the initiatives presented below made to the development of the Assembly in those early years.
The Atlantic Congress

The first major initiative undertaken by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was the organization of the Atlantic Congress in 1959. The Congress, held to mark the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, was a great success. Ostensibly a celebration the Congress was also made the occasion for discussion of ways in which co-operation could be developed within the framework of the Alliance and in particular through the implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In 1956 Professor Hans Kohn of Harvard University, and Professor Strausz-Hupe, then Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and later US Ambassador to NATO, had approached Mr. Robert Schumann, then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Foundation of European Cultures, to co-operate in arranging a conference on the cultural foundations of the Atlantic nations. The idea was taken up by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference and modified to permit consideration of potential fields of co-operation between the Atlantic nations.

The resolution adopted by the NATO Parliamentarians in 1957 acted as a catalyst in encouraging support for such a conference. It was supported by Senators Kefauver and Javits of the United States. A motion was subsequently introduced in the US Senate in February 1958 which called on the President "to use his best efforts to implement in co-operation with other Governments of NATO the recommendation and proposal of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference . . . ."

The Secretariat of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference undertook the responsibility of organizing the Congress. Following a meeting in July 1958 with interested individuals from member countries a network of national committees and an Atlantic Congress Advisory Council were formed to ensure the smooth running of administrative arrangements in each country.

Six hundred and fifty delegates from fourteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance eventually attended the five day Congress which took place from 5 to 10 June 1959. On 24 May 1959 Iceland withdrew from the Congress following the reported ramming of an Icelandic coastguard vessel by a British destroyer.

After the formal opening by Her Majesty the Queen in Westminster Hall, London, at which both the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and the President of the Congress, Mr. J. J. Fens, also spoke, the Congress opened its Plenary Session at Church House, Westminster. In the course of five days it heard addresses from the Archbishop of York, Mr. Joseph Luns (Foreign Minister of the Netherlands and President of the NATO Council), Mr. J. F. Cahan (Deputy Secretary-General of OEEC), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT), General Norstad (SACEUR), Dr. Mordecai Johnson (President of the Howard University, Washington D.C.), and Mr. J. Oldenbroek (Secretary-General of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).

A special Plenary Session was held on 9 June under the chairmanship of H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and included speeches by Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak (Secretary-General of NATO), Mr. Halvard Lang (Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs), Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Hugh Gaitskell (Leader of the British Labour Party). Under the watchword "outward and forward looking" five committees assisted by sixteen sub-committees examined in detail the problems facing the NATO countries in their relations with each other, with the free and uncommitted world and with the Communist Bloc.

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Some of the most significant resolutions to emerge from the Congress included the Economic Committee's call for the transformation of OEEC into an Organization for Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Political Committee pressed for a special conference of leading citizens to discuss ways of increasing co-operation as a means to promote Atlantic unity. With a similar goal in mind the Spiritual and Cultural Committee urged the creation of an Atlantic Studies Centre or Institute. Having provided an effective focal point for discussion of those major issues currently confronting member countries, the organizers of the Atlantic Congress could view with some satisfaction the transformation in 1960 of OEEC into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the establishment in 1961 of the Atlantic Institute and in January 1962 the holding in Paris of an Atlantic Convention of NATO nations.

The Atlantic Congress secured considerable publicity for the North Atlantic Alliance, in that the event was covered by nearly three hundred correspondents representing the world's press. Fifty radio stations transmitted news of the Congress and newsreel film was distributed to 140 television stations in a world-wide distribution. In summing up the event in his book "The Super Parliaments" Mr. J. Allan Hovey, Jr. called the "Atlantic Congress a brilliant international celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Alliance."

For the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference the success of the Atlantic Congress had a particular significance. Conference members participated actively in the arrangements for the Congress and the name of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was clearly associated with the Atlantic Congress in the press. It was therefore important to the long term aspirations of the NATO Parliamentarians that their contribution to discussions on the future prospects of the Alliance nations be understood and appreciated.

The Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations

Initial interest in an Atlantic Convention was expressed in the United States in the 1950's among the supporters of Atlantic Union. The leading advocate of Atlantic Union, Clarence Streit, in an article "Freedom against Itself" published in 1954 called for an Atlantic Convention to be "convoked as a first step to Atlantic Union."

The reason why the notion of Atlantic Union gained particular support in the United States was because the US, with its preponderance of strategic nuclear weapons had become the guarantor of Western security and military effectiveness dictated the need for a centrally controlled nuclear strategy compatible with the technical requirements of the missile age. However this implied a degree of political integration not to be found among sovereign nation states. The supporters of Atlantic Union believed it would encourage the mutual pooling of sovereignty necessary for a centrally controlled nuclear strategy. At the same time the increasing interdependence of states politically and economically called for an increasing measure of co-operation and co-ordination of policies, a task which would be made easier - for its members - by the foundation of a federation of Atlantic states.

The Atlantic Union movement owed much to the tireless efforts of Clarence Streit but it always suffered from the failure to attract mass public support. In the post-war
period public interest had been caught by the creation of the United Nations system and later the formation of the European Communities diverted European attention away from the concept of Atlantic Union.

In any event, the formation in the United States in 1949 of an Atlantic Union Committee provided a focus for channelling support into productive activities. Both the Atlantic Congress and the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations owe not a little to the enterprise and vision of these early supporters of Atlantic Union.

There was Congressional support for the holding of an Atlantic Convention and the “Atlantic Union Resolution” introduced by Senator Estes Kefauver, on 26 July 1949 was the first of a series of resolutions designed to popularise the idea. A subsequent resolution introduced into the US Congress on 15 January 1951 with the additional support of Senators Humphrey and Nixon and Congressman Christian Herter requested the President “... to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates representing their principal political parties to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples and the peoples of such other democracies as the Convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.”

The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference first lent its support to the idea of an Atlantic Convention in 1957 when with Senator Kefauver as its Chairman, the Political Committee submitted a resolution calling for a Convention. The Conference unanimously called upon member Governments to “bring about ... a conference composed of leading representative citizens ... to examine ... how greater cooperation and unity of purpose ... within the Atlantic Community may best be developed.” Though officially appointed it was recommended that delegates should be free to “act in accordance with their individual convictions.”

The strongest pressure for an Atlantic Convention continued to be exerted in the United States where the idea had by 1960 achieved considerable Congressional support although the official response remained lukewarm. Resolutions reiterating the need for such a Convention were placed before the US Congress in 1958 and 1959. Senate hearings were held. The State Department finally gave its approval to the Convention and following the necessary legislation Public Law 86–719 was enacted on 7 September 1960.

A “US Citizens Commission on NATO” was subsequently established and the 6th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1960 urged that the US Commission be regarded as a model for the creation of similar commissions in other member countries. These commissions were to co-ordinate arrangements for an Atlantic Convention. An International Preparatory Committee was created to make the arrangements.

In 1961 the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference again expressed the hope that “the Convention will fulfil its great potentialities by recommending to Governments and peoples the necessary changes in existing relationships, including new institutions, if any, required to create an adequately integrated Atlantic Community.”

It was felt that the Convention had extensive potential for “providing new and unprecedented means of seeking fresh approaches to solutions of the problems of the Atlantic Community.”

Much was hoped of this Convention which had been a decade in the making. Clarence Streit conceived of it as a body patterned after the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, with “heavyweight” political leaders taking part, and taking several months
to complete its task. In the event it was authorized only "to explore means by which
greater co-operation and unity of purpose may be developed" among the NATO
nations. The meeting lasted only two weeks and the ninety participants came from a
wider cross section than the politically minded elite who had attended the Philadel-
phia Convention.

The Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations opened in Paris on 8 January 1962
and elected former United States Secretary of State Mr. Christian Herter, as its
Chairman and Mr. Richard J. Wallace, as its Secretary-General. To emphasize that
delates spoke and acted as individuals and not as members of national delegations,
they were seated in alphabetical order. The Convention established two committees,
one for political and economic issues, the other for consideration of cultural, scientific
and spiritual matters. Resolutions were submitted by delegates to these committees.

The first five days were devoted to speeches and Mr. Herter in his keynote address
defined the Convention's central purpose as "generating public awareness of the need
for change and for the introduction of new political arrangements to meet the
demands of the nuclear era." He proposed the following as suitable topics for
discussion by the Convention: "how can we accelerate the historic process of Atlantic
unity; how can we engineer a political breakthrough; how can we produce an act of
multiple national wills?" He cautioned against the Atlantic Convention and the
supporters of Atlantic Union being too ambitious, "as we push for political ties to
crown our economic and military co-ordinate efforts, let us not try to outrun the
maturation process lest our political product die stillborn."

This definition of the Convention's task was far removed from the aspirations of
Clarence Streit and reflected the very real and fundamental divergence of opinion
within the Alliance on the extent to which Atlantic unity could be realized in practical
terms.

The "Declaration of Paris" which was the concluding act of the Convention was a
lengthy document in two parts containing resolutions on political and economic
questions and on moral and cultural questions.

The most significant recommendations made in the Declaration were that the
NATO Governments should "draw up plans for the creation of an Atlantic Commu-
nity suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this
era" and, to this end, to "appoint members to a special governmental commission on
Atlantic unity which would study the organization of the Community and propose
such reforms and simplifications of existing institutions and such new institutions as
may be required."

The Declaration proposed the creation of a Permanent High Council whose
competence would extend to political, economic, military and cultural matters and
which would "prepare and concert policies on current questions."

It was also recommended that the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference be turned
into a Consultative Atlantic Assembly which would "receive reports regularly trans-
mitted to it by the Secretaries-General of other Atlantic bodies, consider the work
of the Atlantic Institute and make recommendations to other Atlantic bodies and
Governments."

The creation of an Atlantic High Court of Justice to "settle legal differences
between members" arising "from the interpretation and application of treaties" was
also called for.

The Convention adopted the "Declaration of Paris" with three abstentions — two
Italians and one Canadian — who explained that they felt the recommendations did not go far enough. The conflict between idealism and reality is significant because had the proposals for a Permanent High Council, the development of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a Consultative Assembly, and an Atlantic High Court of Justice been put into effect there may have been real progress towards a truly integrated Atlantic Community.

The major problem facing the Convention was that it could not pass resolutions on the operation of the North Atlantic Council because the majority of delegates did not possess an intimate knowledge of the Council's operations, most of which are classified.

For this reason, above all, the Convention failed to live up to its supporters' expectations. One fact emerged clearly — this type of Convention, while it can achieve a significant consensus of opinion, is not suitable for the drawing up of constitutions which require technical knowledge and the participation of experts.

The Founding of the Atlantic Institute

The creation of an Atlantic Institute or Studies Centre was seen as a means of encouraging increased Atlantic co-operation and was recommended frequently by citizens groups and Atlantic oriented conferences in the years following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

It was first brought to the attention of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957 when Mr. Douglas Robinson, Executive Secretary, submitted proposals to the Conference for the creation of an Atlantic Institute. A separate set of proposals were made by the Conference's Special Committee on the Provision of Scientific and Technical Personnel in NATO Countries. Under the chairmanship of Senator Jackson (USA) the Special Committee recommended an Atlantic Community Foundation which would stimulate the exchange of scientists and technicians, inform public opinion on scientific issues and propose scientific activities for NATO.

The Standing Committee subsequently resolved "to prepare specific proposals directed towards the creation of such an Institute or Centre, and to take whatever action, to this end, may be possible in the period between May 1958 and the Fourth Annual Conference (November 1958)."

The objective in creating an Atlantic Institute was to provide the Atlantic Alliance with an intellectual hub, where the cultural ties binding the Atlantic nations could be examined and developed and the growth of a common cultural identity promoted. It was hoped that such an Institute once established would assist in the revitalization of western culture, the harmonization of the long term interests of the Atlantic Community with those of the developing countries and that it would function as a focal point for the "Atlantic Community's cultural response to the challenge of communism and other forms of totalitarianism."

The idea of an Atlantic Institute was also receiving attention in Government circles where the location of the Institute was regarded as being a source of prestige for the country which won the right to construct the Institute on its territory. Various proposals were under active consideration when the Cultural Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference were briefed on the progress being made during the Third Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in 1957 by three
of the Institute's leading advocates, Mr. Willy Bretscher, a leading Swiss journalist, Mr. Hendrik Brugmans, Rector of the College of Europe and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. It was never the intention of Conference members to take the lead in establishing an Atlantic Institute. The suggestion was made however that the creation of an Atlantic Institute should be included among the topics for discussion at the Atlantic Congress.

The proposal was subsequently debated by the Atlantic Congress in June 1959, and resulted in the following resolution: "With reference to previous declarations by several organizations . . . the Congress wishes to remind NATO that its purposes are not only military and political, but also cultural. Therefore the Congress proposes that in the very near future a Studies Centre for the Atlantic Community be created. The creation of the Centre shall be entrusted to a group of persons chosen by the members taking part in the preparation of this Congress. . . ."

A Provisional Committee was organized by Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands), Chairman of the Atlantic Congress. The Committee held its first meeting on 16 October 1959, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium). To speed up the proceedings a working group with a six months mandate was created to prepare a feasibility study on the creation of an Atlantic Institute. Mr. James Huntley, an employee of the United States Information Agency, acted as Rapporteur for the working group. A series of meetings discussed plans for the internal structure of the Institute and gave some consideration to its future programme and a report was submitted to the Provisional Committee in April 1960. This report formed the basic text on which a pamphlet was compiled giving a general idea of the aims of the Atlantic Institute. It recommended a budget of one and a half million dollars for an initial five year period.

The Provisional Committee subsequently resolved to ensure the creation of the Atlantic Institute; designate personalities in each country responsible for raising the funds required for the Institute; propose someone of "high-standing" for the position of Director-General and name the first twenty-eight members of the Board of Governors.

On 17 June the working group submitted a final report to the Provisional Committee, which recommended that 10 July 1960 be considered the date of the founding of the Institute, that the Board of Governors should assume their responsibilities from that time and that the Institute should become operational on the day on which the Director-General was named, and as soon as the necessary financial support could be provided. Mr. Huntley would assist the Board of Governors as Executive Secretary.

The Board of Governors held their first meeting between 29 October and 12 December 1960 and ensured that all final preparations for the opening of the Atlantic Institute were in hand. The position of Executive Director for Europe was given to Professor G. L. Bassani (Director-General of the Institute for the study of International Politics in Milan). Mr. van Zeeland assumed the duties of the Chairman of the Board of Governors.

As to financing, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Greece and the United States had all responded favourably and negotiations were continuing with other Governments. Private funding was promised from American and European Foundations.

The Institute finally opened its doors on 1 January 1961. A comprehensive programme had been devised. It included a study to be conducted on the "basis of the
Atlantic Community” and co-ordination work on topics such as organization of trade patterns in the free world, relations with the uncommitted world, and the meaning of the Soviet economic challenge.

The Assembly has maintained close working relations with the Institute. Several joint projects have been conducted, the most recent being a seminar on burden-sharing.

The Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America (ADELA)

Latin America in the early 1960's was a politically unstable region. The Cuban Revolt was regarded as a portent of increasing instability and having gained a toehold on the American Continent there was real fear that communism would spread. The “Alliance for Progress” was a foreign policy initiative of the Kennedy Administration in the United States conceived as a programme for preventing the spread of communism through Latin America by providing support for democratic regimes.

The fear of conflict had deterred both foreign and domestic investment despite the advantages of cheap labour and the proximity of raw materials. Increased economic and military co-operation between the United States and its Latin American neighbours were therefore important aspects of the policy.

The problems of Latin America were first brought to the attention of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference by Senator Jacob Javits (USA) at the Eight Annual Conference in 1962, when as Chairman of the Economic Committee he put the following draft recommendation to the Plenary Session. “That all nations of the Atlantic Community . . . should join in the task now being undertaken through the ‘Alliance for Progress’ to enlist the private and public sectors of the member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in an accelerated development programme for Latin America.” The scheme proposed by Senator Javits was for an international private investment consortium, which it was hoped would be “instrumental in attracting the funds . . . needed to bolster the economic strength of Latin America.”

The Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America (ADELA) came into existence on 6 April 1963, with its Headquarters in Paris and as Executive Directors, Mr. Aurelio Peccei (Managing Director, Italconsult) for Europe, Dr. Julio Gonzales del Solar (European representative, Inter-American Development Bank) and Mr. Warren Wilhelm (Foreign Manager, Texaco Inc) for the United States. The Secretary was Mr. Herbert J. Blitz of Senator Javits' staff.

A working party set up by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to examine the possibilities for private investment in Latin America proposed a Conference on the theme “Private Enterprise and Public Co-operation for Latin American Development.” Co-operating closely with the OECD, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Organization of American States (OAS) the working party reviewed alternative investment proposals and submitted an interim report to the Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in June 1963.

A jointly organized conference to which over 100 private industrial and banking representatives were invited took place in Paris on 10 and 11 January 1964. The
participants supported the idea of a co-ordinated private sector initiative in Latin America and a group of eight private banking and industrial representatives who attended the Conference met on 11 January and established the Interim Organizing Committee which was charged with setting up the ADELA Investment Company.

It was at this time that the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference involvement with ADELA was concluded and responsibility was transferred to the ADELA Investment Company with a small consultative committee of top officials from OECD, IADB and OAS and international figures like Senator Javits.

The Company commenced operations with funds from fifty-four industrial and financial corporations in the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan. Its first investment was a new forge plant at Bucaramanga, Colombia.

By 1970 ADELA had been instrumental in creating and developing 180 ventures mostly in the agro-industrial and general manufacturing sectors. It remains the only private venture capital firm operating throughout Latin America.

The Eastern Mediterranean Development Institute (EMDI) and the Greek-Turkish Project

Although the Parliamentarians' Conference contributed significantly to discussion on the structure and programme of ADELA its involvement remained superficial. The organization's involvement in the creation of EMDI and its commitment to the Institute however was much greater.

The idea of creating an Institute was raised during discussion of progress on ADELA at the 9th Annual Conference in 1963. Mr. Kasim Gulek (Turkey) commented that "properly organized charity begins at home" and that "as well as helping the underdeveloped areas of the world with organizations such as ADELA the NATO countries should also be concerned with the less developed countries among their own members". The Conference subsequently adopted a resolution providing for the creation of a working group to study the problems of the developing countries within the NATO Alliance. The working group held its first meeting in May 1964 and continued to function for nearly a decade. The countries initially included in the survey were Greece, Turkey, Iceland and Portugal but it was later decided, following a series of visits by Senator Javits, Chairman of the working group, to confine its activities to Greece and Turkey.

Politically the decade 1963–73 was a turbulent one particularly in the Mediterranean area. Greece and Turkey became embroiled over the question of Cyprus. The Arab-Israeli conflict flared up, the Suez Canal was closed and oil was dramatically used as a political instrument. The creation of EMDI may therefore be regarded as a remarkable achievement given that Greek-Turkish co-operation took place at a time when politically they were adversaries.

The 10th Annual Conference in 1964 authorized the creation of a Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries with a mandate to "study and make recommendations on action which should be taken to accelerate economic development in the less developed NATO countries." Preliminary surveys indicated two possible fields in which co-operation would be most beneficial. These were tourism and the development of the Maritsa-Evros river area.

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The Ford Foundation granted $150,000 to the project to conduct further studies. At the same time, at a meeting of the Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries, an International Advisory Council was set up on Greek-Turkish economic co-operation. Following consultations with the World Bank, the United Nations Special Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the European Economic Community (EEC), private industry and financiers, a series of specific proposals were formulated on the prospects for mutual development of tourism, the fishing potential in the South Aegean, and improvements in the cultivation, packaging and distribution of early fruits and vegetables to Western Europe.

The concentration of Alliance parliamentary interest on the problems of Greece and Turkey seems to have had a catalytic effect. At two meetings in Paris, in May and November 1965, great interest was shown by Greek and Turkish businessmen in the expansion of co-operation between the two countries.

The projects had the support of both Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers and such high level support, even during the Cyprus crisis, enabled niggling problems like visas and prolonged entry permits to be solved without problems. It is important not to forget that the crisis in Cyprus was at its height throughout this period. Senator Javits recognized this fact in his description of progress in the field of tourism. "It is significant, far beyond the limitations of the tourism project", he said, "that, at a moment of history as difficult as this, it is possible to hold such a meeting, to have frank and friendly discussions and to make the progress which is evident."

By 1966, all feasibility studies had been completed and government action from both Greece and Turkey was required to permit further progress. A "status of the project" paper prepared by Senator Javits indicated what had already been achieved and analysed what remained to be done. It noted that "from the outset it has been our concern that recommendations emerging from the project be developed simultaneously with appropriate mechanisms for ensuring that these recommendations be carried out." This was the first mention of the desirability of providing institutional arrangements of a more permanent character than that of the project for Greek-Turkish economic co-operation. The project itself was planned for a period of two years with a final conference to be held in March or April 1967.

The recommendation was made that some thought be given to the establishment of an "Eastern Mediterranean Investment Corporation". Two institutions were proposed: a non-profit making Institute supported by Foundations to advise and make recommendations on suitable projects for co-operation, and an Investment Company.

A joint meeting of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference Special Committee and the International Advisory Council in May 1966, approved in principle the creation of an Institute for Greek-Turkish Economic and Social Co-operation. Following a meeting of the Task Force on international arrangements in Rome, in September 1966, a memo was produced concerning basic points of agreement and articles of incorporation were taken out under the laws of the District of Columbia (USA).

The Eastern Mediterranean Development Institute (EMDI) was created in principle at a meeting three months later. Senator Javits was asked to be Chairman and Messrs. Gulek (Turkey) and Arliotis (Greece) were made Directors of the Institute. An Organizing Committee was created to prepare the statutes of EMDI for consideration at the next meeting, and to prepare a provisional budget.
Senator Javits viewed this progress with enthusiasm and was impatient for EMDI to commence operations. — “once it had been financed, once the Board was in charge, once it was ready to move, they could feel that they had handed on the torch to a living organism.”

In May 1968, the Board of Directors was increased to seventeen and at their first meeting in November 1968, the full Board decided that the finances of the Institute should be managed by the Government Affairs Institute in Washington. Subsequently, it was decided to dissolve EMDI as an American Corporation, returning it to the status of an unincorporated association because of the tax-exempt status of such an organization. The Special Committee of the recently renamed North Atlantic Assembly was deactivated in July 1968.

The Mediterranean Development Organization

It was at this time that discussions were held on the possibility of extending EMDI into a Mediterranean Development Organization which would permit more complex projects to be undertaken. The growing tension in the Mediterranean region meant the proposition was politically sensitive and it was suggested, naively perhaps, that Arab-Israeli co-operation along the lines established between Greece and Turkey should be encouraged.

At the Fifteenth Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1969, a recommendation on the “establishment of a Mediterranean Development Organization”, was adopted. A joint working group comprising members of the Assembly’s Political and Economic Committees and in consultation with EMDI undertook a feasibility study on the potential for creating a Mediterranean Development Organization.

Unfortunately by April 1970 EMDI itself had run into serious financial difficulties with the Ford Foundation grant coming to an end. Also there was not the same degree of interest in creating a Mediterranean Development Organization as there had been in ADELA and EMDI. Finding financial support was becoming increasingly difficult, although certain large foundations had given a positive response to requests for grants. Current political events in that area including President Nasser’s death and problems in Jordan made potential subscribers reluctant to release funds into a politically unstable area. There were problems too over the fact that it would probably have to be government based rather than privately and independently organized as EMDI was.

In November 1970, the North Atlantic Assembly instructed its Political and Economic Committees and their joint working party to “postpone work on such a feasibility study until the necessary financial support has been provided.”

So the scheme to create a Mediterranean Development Organization collapsed although, at the Nineteenth Annual Session of the Assembly in Ankara in October 1973 the idea showed signs of being revived when a recommendation presented by the Economic Committee on “the Improvement of Economic Co-operation in the Mediterranean Basin” was adopted which recalled the recommendation of 1969 on the creation of a Mediterranean Development Organization, and called for the preparation of a draft joint development plan for the Mediterranean area. It also urged the
North Atlantic Council to take the initiative in devising a new form of co-operation with the Mediterranean countries.

The Deauville Conference and the International Institute for the Management of Technology

The Deauville Conference on the "transatlantic technological imbalance" was convened in May 1967, as a result of a joint initiative on the part of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. During the 1960's, in particular, technological imbalance had been a key issue in American-West European relations. West European countries expressed concern at continuing US technological domination and various suggestions aimed at reducing the gap attracted considerable attention.

The subject was first discussed by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957 when Senator Jackson submitted a report to the Scientific and Technical Committee on the implications of the shortage of skilled technical and scientific manpower in Europe. In subsequent years the parliamentarians returned to the issue. In 1966, for example, a recommendation adopted at the Twelfth Annual Session urged Members of Parliament to introduce bills in their national Parliaments requiring any foreign industry establishing itself in their countries to devote a percentage of its profits to scientific research.

It was at this time that a proposal for a conference on transatlantic collaboration submitted to the Scientific and Technical Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania was accepted. The proposal called for a conference to establish the major contributing causes of the Atlantic technological imbalance, the nature and magnitude of the problem, the relationship between Atlantic political, economic, strategic and technological problems, and alternative means of collaboration and their implications.

The role played by the Scientific and Technical Committee was largely to encourage and co-ordinate European participation in the Conference.

The number of participants in the Deauville Conference was to be between 50 and 80 academics, scientists, businessmen and governmental observers; one-third being North American, and two-thirds West European.

Despite the efforts of Dr. Strausz-Hupe in the United States and the support of Professor Portmann (France), Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee (who also chaired the Conference), Senator Javits (USA and Mr. Olivier Giscard d'Estaing (France) for the Conference, there seems to have been a waning of interest in the latter stages of preparation on the part of the North Atlantic Assembly as a whole. Support was however forthcoming from several prominent European figures including Professor Armand, Dr. Pececi and Ambassador Dowling (Director-General of the Atlantic Institute).

In drawing attention to the technological imbalance the conference was a success although its principal recommendation the International Institute for the Management of Technology was ultimately a failure.
International Institute for the Management of Technology

The major recommendation to emerge from the Deauville Conference concerned "recognition of the necessity for the various countries of the Free World to achieve a comparable technological level." The Conference resolved to give the highest support to the study and realization of this goal. To this end the creation of a European Institute of Science and Technology was recommended.

The idea of an Institute of Technology was not new. The Armand Report – "Increasing the Effectiveness of Western Science" – had called for the creation of an International Institute of Science and Technology in 1960 (see "Scientific and Technical Committee", page 142). This proposal had been endorsed by the Scientific and Technical Committee in a Resolution adopted by the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference during its 6th Annual Session in 1960 which had recommended that the NATO Science Committee set up a study group to consider the idea of combining a technological institute with the proposal for a European University. The Killian Report commissioned by NATO in 1961 to examine some of the suggestions made in the Armand study affirmed the desirability of establishing an International Institute of Science and Technology (IIST), within Europe “...to educate leaders and creative scholars in science and engineering who combine professional excellence with cultural understanding” and not least as “...a fillip for Western morale”.

Further recommendations from the Scientific and Technical Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference endorsed the Killian Report and other proposals. For example in 1963 a recommendation welcomed the initiative by “a group of technical universities ... to establish an Interdisciplinary Centre in Earth Sciences” and called upon “all other NATO nations [to] consider joining the group and that NATO nations and agencies [should] assist, in so far as practicable, the efforts already begun by this group”.

Following this recommendation a study group was set up under the auspices of the OECD and chaired by Mr. Olivier Giscard d’Estaing (France) to investigate the problem of the technology gap. It subsequently affirmed the feasibility of establishing a European Institute of Science and Technology. It is largely through Mr. Giscard d’Estaing’s participation that the Assembly maintained its contacts with the project.

In a speech to the Scientific and Technical Committee at the 13th Annual Session in November 1967, Mr. Giscard d’Estaing described the subjects discussed by the Study Group who favoured the concept of “continuous education”, collaboration between industry and university so that there could be simultaneous research and teaching and that the Institute should be genuinely “European” in character.

The most contentious issue for the Study Group was finding a suitable location for the Institute. Florence, Milan, Strasbourg and Maastricht were all considered.

A meeting of the Scientific and Technical Committee on 27 May 1968, heard of progress to date. The Institute was due to open in September 1969. Funds would hopefully be obtained from Governments, from industry and from students’ fees, and as regards the title, “European” was to be dropped in favour of “International” – as first proposed by the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1960. The Institute proposal attracted considerable interest from the OECD and the NATO Science Committee.

The first meeting of the Institute’s Board of Management took place in April 1969 before the location had finally been decided. It was attended by representatives from
the four participating Governments, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy as well as business delegates. Switzerland and Sweden asked permission to send observers and others expressed interest. But there were critics. The Belgian Government appears to have taken the view that projects such as this should be launched within the framework of the EEC despite the fact that the EEC's only higher education project to that time, the European University, had been moribund for years. France refused to continue to support the enterprise and Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, the steering group chairman, felt it necessary to stand down. The Chairman of the Board was to be Professor E. Petel, Rector of the Hannover Technical Institute.

The Institute was virtually ready for its planned start in the academic year 1969–70 with limited advanced management training courses available.

The third "North Atlantic Assembly News" in January 1970 contained a progress report on the Institute. The title was now the "Institute for the Management of Technology", and the site finally decided on was Milan. The draft Charter which had been submitted to interested Governments, defined the Institute's objective as the training of high level management cadres in the fields of management and technical innovation and the encouragement of joint research in these two sectors. The draft agreement would enter into force after four Governments had ratified it.

It had come a long way from the Institute envisaged in the Killian Report where knowledge of science and technology would be developed in new fields, to an Institute where the emphasis would be placed on evaluating developments in the administration of science and technology.

The Scientific and Technical Committee maintained its interest in the Institute and in May 1972 received a progress report from the Chairman of the Institute's General Council. Six countries were then participating – Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. They were preparing to sign an intergovernmental convention with which representatives of major industries, also taking part in the Institute, would be associated. The countries involved had not yet ratified, however, and Sir John Chadwick (new Chairman of the Governing Board), hoped the Scientific and Technical Committee could help by putting pressure on member Governments.

The Assembly was urged to use its influence to attract additional support for the Institute.

The Institute, however, suffered from financial insecurity from the outset. Though formally established in 1971 it only began functioning fully in March 1974 and less than a year later its courses had been suspended and its future was in doubt. A Committee set up to review the Institute’s future prospects proposed in June 1975 that "its present objective as a high-level educational body should be abandoned." The Committee suggested various alternatives, including its transformation into a research centre for the European Communities.

The ultimate failure of this project must raise the question of what potential demand were the supporters of the Institute responding to? Was there a need for a European based science and technology education centre? Was there an obvious gap in educational facilities which this Institute could fill that was not being adequately covered either by private industry or national universities? Did it offer the appropriate curriculum?

The Institute’s failure would indicate that these questions were never considered in sufficient depth.
The Training of Public Servants – Seminars on Public Administration

The increased interest in public administration techniques in the United States was reflected in a proposal presented to the Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee by its Chairman Senator Karl Mundt (USA) and adopted as an Assembly initiative at the 11th Annual Session in 1965. The proposal called for the strengthening of exchange programmes and support for Atlantic studies, and recommended “the creation of a study commission to explore the feasibility of establishing an educational centre for the training of civil servants and other administrators”.

No significant action occurred before the 12th Session in 1966 at which time the Committee repeated its recommendation, calling upon the International Secretariat to undertake “a staff study of the feasibility and means of establishing such a centre and to co-operate with the study commission in developing its findings”.

Following a “fact finding mission” to several NATO European capitals in the Spring of 1967 a draft report entitled “Proposals for Improving the Training of Public Servants” was prepared by Dr. W. O. Farber, an adviser to Senator Mundt, and presented to the Committee in June 1967. The report recommended the creation of a “Government Employees International Training Programme” in which the North Atlantic Assembly could participate by offering Assembly Fellowships. Mention was also made of the feasibility of establishing NATO internships.

The various proposals contained in the report were discussed at the 13th Annual Conference in 1967 and the November Plenary Session adopted a recommendation calling upon the NATO Secretariat to work with the Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee in “the creation and financing of a pilot programme in international training with the collaboration of the College of Europe, for the purpose of bringing together men and women who are in important administrative posts in their respective countries”.

The Assembly noted “the growing and vital role of public servants in the preservation of democratic institutions” and “the need for better understanding of the administrative systems of NATO and other Governments”. A sub-committee was set up with Dr. Farber as adviser and instructed to co-operate with the competent persons to make specific proposals concerning the setting up and administration of such a pilot programme.

A two-day meeting was held at the College of Europe (Bruges) in June 1968 to discuss the establishment of a seminar on “civil administration with special reference to international affairs.”

The prospective programme provided for an annual seminar lasting one month for an initial three year period with the option to make it a permanent fixture at the end of the trial period. Participants would be drawn from the ranks of administrative civil servants with about ten years’ experience.

Mr. Manlio Brosio, Secretary-General of NATO, supported the scheme and following a meeting with Senator Mundt in June 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a memorandum concerning the Bruges Seminar to the Permanent Representatives of the NATO countries. This stated: “The value of the proposal is that (a) it would acquaint medium and senior level civil servants with new developments in administrative practices and methodology and (b) it would enable an exchange of ideas concerning
developments in administrative techniques in Europe and North America in an appropriate international setting. On these grounds alone the proposal merits favourable consideration."

The major problem, however, was financing the project (requirements were estimated at $36,000 per year). It was hoped that funds could be obtained from the NATO civil budget, Governments and Foundations. The scheme met with a favourable response from the NATO Council, who described it as being "an interesting project clearly worthy of consideration." The Sub-Committee of the Cultural Affairs, Education and Information Committee was asked to present its report to NATO in due course "so that details of financial and other assistance . . . from NATO can be examined." In February 1969, the NATO Science Committee allocated $21,000 to the project, but for one year only. Governments were less helpful, preferring to restrict their support to collective NATO contributions.

A Steering Committee, comprising Senator Mundt, Dr. Knight (NATO Scientific Affairs Division) and Dr. Brugmans (College of Europe) was created.

The first seminar on “New Techniques in Public Administration” was held between 24 August and 20 September 1969. The programme was divided into two main sections (a) Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) and (b) Systems Analysis. It was generally held to be a success in publicizing the non-military aspects of NATO’s work.

The 15th Annual Session of the Assembly in 1969 adopted a resolution requesting the NATO Council to “recommend the financing from the civil budget of a seminar on modern methods of approaching environmental problems with a special emphasis on metropolitan areas, for administrative grade civil servants, to be held at the College of Europe in 1970.”

The second seminar was duly held from 3 to 23 September 1970, and in the outline programme circulated in April 1970, the College of Europe again referred to the project as a “North Atlantic Assembly initiative jointly financed by NATO and the Ford Foundation. Lectures included such topics as the problems of urban growth and pollution. Group projects focused on developing an economic systems model to analyse air pollution. On this occasion participants were invited from Brazil, India, Japan and Venezuela but they declined to come. It was suggested by Mr. Aano (Norway) that this may have been because the topics selected for discussion held little relevance for them and that this fact should be borne in mind when selecting seminar “themes” in future.

While the second seminar proved successful preparations for a third, to be held in 1971, soon ran into difficulties. Senator Mundt was forced to retire from the Assembly through ill health following the 15th Plenary Session in 1969 and Dr. Brugmans assumed responsibility for obtaining financial support. It was not to be however and the “North Atlantic Assembly News”, of March 1971, recorded that “there would be no seminar in 1971, since NATO has not yet renewed its grant, but it is hoped that a third Seminar on Public Administration will be held in 1972.” The problem was summed up by Dr. Brugmans: “It was a danger that plans conceived with great enthusiasm were sometimes apt to lose their momentum. There was always a tendency to pursue what was in vogue rather than to aim for continuity.”

Although the 17th Annual Session of the Assembly held in Ottawa in September 1971, urged The North Atlantic Council “to make a financial contribution of at least $20,000 towards the cost of holding a third Seminar on Public Administration . . . to
be organized . . . during 1972” the cancellation of the Seminar in 1971 was the effective end of the project. The NATO Council refused to grant any more money. Their comments, as transmitted by the Secretary-General of NATO were, “the objectives of the Seminar are laudable and its contribution to the development of the techniques of public administration is appreciated. Unfortunately the necessity to reduce expenditures in the NATO budget has not permitted the granting of a subsidy for the Seminar for 1971 or 1972.”

Various options such as holding seminars at the new Institute for the Management of Technology in Milan were considered but without the enthusiastic support of its creator, Senator Mundt, the seminar project was abandoned.

The Committee of Nine

Origins
The creation of the Committee of Nine in 1971 reflected a growing feeling within the Alliance that a reappraisal of the role of NATO and the Alliance was necessary. Just as fifteen years before, the Report of the Three Wise Men (see Chapter One, “The Birth of the Assembly”) had succeeded in providing the Alliance with a sense of purpose and direction in dealing with the broader issues of civil concern, so it was hoped a similar report could present guidelines for a realistic role for the Alliance in the 1970's.

Senator Javits proposal that “Seven Wise Men” be appointed by the President of the North Atlantic Assembly to carry out a thorough investigation of the “projected aims and responsibilities of the Alliance in the decade of the '70s”, was adopted in amended form by the 17th Session in 1971. The Committee of Nine’s brief was “to conduct a thorough study of the future of the Atlantic Alliance, and of the most appropriate and desirable role to be played by the Assembly . . . [and] to report to the Assembly not later than November 1972”.

Administration and Finance
The study was undertaken in association with the Brookings Institute (US) and with the guidance of its Senior Fellow, former United States Assistant-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Ambassador Philip Trezise and Prince Guido Colonne (Italy), former Assistant Secretary-General of NATO and OECD.

Financial backing for the study was forthcoming from the Ford and Mellon Foundations each of which contributed $100,000. Additional financial support was sought when it was agreed that the study should be prolonged into 1973. By November 1972 the Committee of Nine “had received voluntary contributions from some seventeen private individuals, corporations and foundations totalling $200,000.”

Procedure
A series of reports which had been commissioned from an “international consortium of scholars” on the major aspects of Alliance relations served as a framework within
which discussions were conducted by the Committee during eight meetings, the first of which was held at Bellagio, Italy, in April 1972. Ambassador Trezise undertook to prepare a paper synthesizing the conclusions of the twenty-five reports.

An interim report was adopted at the third meeting in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, Canada on 9 and 10 September 1972 when it was noted that “preliminary consensus” had been established on four points; the need for an Atlantic security alliance would continue throughout the 1970’s; concerted action at the highest political level within the Alliance was urgently required to prevent tensions leading “to a serious weakening of the Alliance itself and to the erosion of public support for it”; NATO, being essentially a military institution was not suited to resolving such political problems; new procedures and approaches were needed to facilitate the establishment of a “permanent dialogue” between North American and Western European countries.

North Atlantic Assembly Impressions

The Assembly remained in close contact with the Committee of Nine. Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (FRG) Chairman of the Political Committee in a personal memorandum on the interim report expressed the view “that it is desirable for some sharply focused suggestions to emerge from the work of the Committee of Nine”, and he submitted four proposals for consideration by them. These were creation of a “high level contact body”; negotiation with the new United States Administration of guaranteed US force levels for the duration of the Administration in exchange for the European allies agreement to ameliorate the US balance of payments difficulties and/or improve their own defence posture; a meeting of the proposed high level contact body prior to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; and recognition of the Assembly as the official North American/European parliamentary body.

Dobell Report

Attached to the interim report was a study entitled “Transatlantic Interparliamentary Links and the Future of the North Atlantic Assembly” commissioned from Mr. Peter Dobell, Director of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, Canada.

The “Dobell Report” as it became known subsequently took on an identity distinct from the Committee of Nine Report and its conclusions that “the Assembly should declare that it does not intend to seek consultative status with NATO and that it will direct its efforts to providing an effective inter-parliamentary forum for the discussion of all problems having a transatlantic dimension” led to the creation of a Sub-Committee of the Political Committee at the 18th Annual Assembly in 1972 “to study those proposals of the Committee of Nine (and any other proposals) which relate to the future of the North Atlantic Assembly and to report to the Political Committee at its next meeting”. The Sub-Committee, chaired by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, submitted its findings to the May 1973 meeting of the Political Committee. These were later incorporated in Chapter Five of the Final Report of the Committee of Nine.
Committee of Nine Report

The completed report was officially presented to the President of the Assembly, Mr. (now Sir) John Peel (UK), on 2 October 1973 at which time it was hailed in a press release as "a major reassessment of European-American relations". However its conclusions were largely undistinguished.

The report was divided into five chapters – (1) General Introduction, (2) Security Co-operation, (3) Economic Co-operation, (4) Political Co-operation, (5) Interparliamentary Co-operation, and included annexes on the composition of the Committee of Nine, memoranda (from members of the Committee) of comment, reservation or dissent and a record of proceedings. It also reflected suggestions made by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld and elucidated upon by the Sub-Committee established to consider the Dobell Report.

Recommendations

The Committee of Nine urged "realignment" of the European-American security relationship to take account of changes in the East-West balance of power and of technological advances and an increase in intra-European defence co-operation leading to the "systematic coalescence of Western Europe's defence capabilities" including nuclear arms. It was considered that particular attention should be paid to studying "indigenous forces in Western Europe with a view to eliminating anachronisms dating from the immediate post war period". The Committee was also of the opinion that "no member nation stationing troops abroad in the common defence should suffer significantly in its balance of payments due to the foreign exchange costs of such deployments", and that a resolution of the difficulties should be sought as quickly as possible.

Within the economic sphere the Committee of Nine recommended a thorough reform of the international monetary system and the creation of a system based on "an internationally agreed unit of account" with Special Drawing Rights made the principal reserve asset.

In Chapter Four the Committee urged revitalization of European-American political co-operation and favoured "summitry" as a particularly effective mechanism in this respect.

Chapter Five concluded with a recommendation that the Assembly receive greater official recognition and a more established status by means of a "formal protocol for subscription by member states" or where appropriate through a suitable declaration.

The Committee of Nine reaffirmed that in its opinion the Assembly was and should remain the primary institution for interparliamentary co-operation "between North-American and Western European parliamentarians and suggested that observers from other nations should be invited to participate in the work of the Assembly's Committees whenever desirable.

A small group of distinguished European and North American delegates from the Assembly could, it was suggested, visit major capitals such as Tokyo to personally convey the substance of Assembly resolutions. The Report also supported the proposal that consideration be given to creation of a "high-level contact body" to watch over the report on emerging European-American differences.
Follow-up to the Committee of Nine Report

The issues raised above and others were taken up and examined by the various Committees of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1974. Copies of the Report were also mailed, as requested in a resolution adopted at the 19th Assembly in Ankara, "for consideration and comment" to Parliaments and Governments of member countries of the Assembly, to the Secretary-General of NATO and to representatives of international organizations. Their comments were duly collated by the Assembly's Secretariat and presented in report form in May 1975.

Reactions were on the whole confined to letters of acknowledgement although detailed comments were received from the Secretary-General of NATO, the US Department of State and Department of Defense, the Bundestag Defence Committee and the Bundesrat. Responses from international organizations clearly indicated a feeling that their roles had not been sufficiently evaluated.

Some of the proposals emanating from the Dobell Report and the Assembly's own Sub-Committee have been implemented in amended form by the North Atlantic Assembly (see Chapter Two; "Efforts at Institutionalization") most notably in the creation of the Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments.

In the limited sense that it served to concentrate influential Atlantic opinion upon the problems facing the Alliance the Committee of Nine can be said to have succeeded in its primary objective. But it signally failed to stimulate Alliance members into a more dynamic reaffirmation of the Alliance.

The question must be asked why, given the wealth of talent and experience represented by the Committee of Nine, did so little emerge from their deliberations? After all, it was not short of funds, nor time (two years) nor background research. Yet the criticism has been voiced that the Committee largely covered well-trodden ground and that its conclusions were commonplace.

The predominant reason appears to have been disagreements between members of the Committee of Nine as to the fundamental political premises on which their conclusions should be based. At all events far from providing a framework for a revitalized Alliance the deliberations of the Committee of Nine have sunk quietly into obscurity.  

Footnotes

The Atlantic Congress


The Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations

2. Clarence Streit, founder of Federal Union Inc. – an organization calling for the freedom of Atlantic democracies. Author of several books on this subject including "Union Now", "Freedom Against Itself", etc. In his book "Freedom Against Itself" (1954) Clarence Streit argued that: "One way whereby NATO might better meet the present danger would be that a Consultative Assembly be added to the NATO organs so that co-operation could
develop on the parliamentary level, as it has already on the executive, diplomatic, military and technical levels through existing NATO organs. . . . This Assembly can be set up at once by mere intergovernmental agreement under the provisions of the existing North Atlantic Treaty.

In the proposed Assembly a select delegation of Members of Congress and of the Parliaments of the NATO countries would meet regularly in common session to discuss and recommend a common Atlantic policy for providing and financing Atlantic defence.

This method would have a government evolve through the legislative branch tackling day-to-day operational problems, without even calling a constitutional convention to work out a written constitution. . . . NATO already has operating problems, and the proposed Assembly would permit these to be considered on a much broader basis than now. It can be started soon, with relative ease, so long as it is merely consultative. Above all, it has the great advantage of allowing leading legislators in the various Atlantic nations to get to know each other personally, and to see better the common interests of Atlantica as a whole."

International Institute for the Management of Technology


Committee of Nine

4. Order 1 adopted at the 17th Annual Session in 1971 requested the "retiring Chairman of the Political Committee, Senator Jacob K. Javits, to chair a Committee of Nine prominent present or former parliamentarians of member countries of the Alliance . . . ."

The Committee as finally established comprised:

President: Senator J. Javits (United States)

Members:
- Senator Manlio Brosio (Italy)
- Mr. Michel Habib-Deloncle (France)
- Professor Walter Hallstein (Fed. Rep. Germany)
- Lord Harlech (United Kingdom)
- Hon. Wayne L. Hays (United States)
- Mr. Halfdan Hegtun (Norway)
- Rt. Hon. Lester Pearson (Canada) until Dec. 1972; followed by Senator John Aird (Canada)
- Mr. Max van der Stoel (Netherlands) until May 1973; followed by Mr. Ivo Samkalden (Netherlands)

Advisers: Senator Ihsan Sahri Caglayangil (Turkey)
- Dr. Karl Mommer (Fed. Rep. of Germany)
- Ambassador Alberto Franco Nogueira (Portugal)

Ex Officio Members: Mr. Philippe Deshormes.

The Committee was assisted by two Executive Directors, Mr. Darnell Whitt (United States) and Mr. Anthony Hartley (United Kingdom).

5. Several papers were produced by the North Atlantic Assembly in connection with the Committee of Nine Report.

These were:
(i) "Transatlantic Interparliamentary Links and the Future of the North Atlantic Assembly", a report by Mr. P. C. Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, Canada, North Atlantic Assembly, Standing Committee paper, October 1972.

(iii) "Exchange of Letters between the Chairman of the Political Committee and Heads of State or of Government of Member and Candidate Countries of the European Communities", North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee Information Document, October 1972.

(iv) "Memorandum on the Interim Report of the Committee of Nine", presented by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, Chairman of the Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1972.


(ix) "Report on the reactions and comments received on the Committee of Nine Report, the North Atlantic Assembly paper, May 1975."
Chapter Four
The Work of the Committees

The first Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO countries held in July 1955 consisted entirely of plenary sessions, the sole committee being to edit the resolutions.

By the second session in November 1956, however, it had become evident that Committee Sessions must be included in the agenda as the effective outcome of the Conference would depend to a great extent on the study of ideas and material submitted by specialist committees who could reduce them to a set of clear expressions and workable proposals. Consequently, the parliamentarians met in four committees – Economic, Political, Military and Cultural – and produced five resolutions for the final plenary session of the 1956 Conference to consider.

For the 1957 Conference the Committees were restructured to comprise three Committees dealing with Military, Political and Scientific and Technical matters and a General Affairs Committee which included the Cultural and Economic Committees of the previous year.

In 1958 the Committees were changed again to the structure which still exists today, namely the Economic, (Education) Cultural Affairs and Information, Military, Political and Scientific and Technical Committees.

The Economic Committee

General Introduction

An Economic role for NATO

Quite clearly a solid economic base is as essential to maintaining the credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance as is an effective deterrent and defence force. However there has been something less than unanimous agreement that discussing economic problems is a legitimate function of NATO rather than an undesirable diversion of resources away from political and military affairs.

The emphasis placed upon implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic
Treaty in the Report of the Committee of Three in 1956 marked the first attempt at giving economic issues serious consideration.

Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that "members will seek to eliminate conflict in their economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

The Committee of Three commented that "political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable" and they supported NATO involvement in economic affairs on the grounds that it would enable issues to be raised "on which [it is felt] consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress" and that consultation within NATO "might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community." The Committee of Three cautioned against "duplicating the operating functions" of existing international economic organizations and declared that it was neither "necessary nor desirable for NATO members to form a 'bloc' in such organizations."

The first Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1955 contributed to the discussions on the potential role of NATO in Alliance economic relations. A draft resolution submitted to, but not adopted by, the Conference stressed the unique positions of Atlantic Alliance countries with respect to "invoking" the provisions of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

However, several suggestions made by the participants in that first Conference on issues such as convertibility, eventual full freedom of trade, mobility of labour, development of a "North Atlantic Low Tariff Club" and the setting up of a joint programme for the development of underdeveloped territories were subsequently incorporated in the Report of the Committee of Three.¹

Since it evolved from, and replaced, the Economic Section of the General Affairs Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957, the Economic Committee has sought to consolidate and define the position of economics as a proper concern of NATO. In 1958 the Committee advocated eleven principles of "economic aid and trade" which should be followed in pursuance of Article II.

Doubts persisted, however, as to the justifiability of NATO expressing a view on economic issues. The North Atlantic Council had created an Economic Committee in 1957 but as the NATO Secretary-General Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak was forced to admit, in an address to the 5th Parliamentarians' Conference in 1959, in implementing the provisions of Article II "the progress and successes of the organization are extremely modest." He urged therefore that "before elaborating too many economic resolutions the parliamentarians [should] make an effort to decide once and for all whether or not Article II had been a mistake, and, if not, precisely what competence NATO should acquire in this field" so that "when proposals are presented to NATO [it would no longer be possible] to take refuge behind a negative position of principle."

The Atlantic Congress in 1959 (see page 35) had raised the idea of either an Organization for Atlantic Economic Co-operation (OAEC) or a NATO Economic Council (NEC) as alternatives to transforming the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) into a more broadly based Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Economic Committee used these various proposals as a basis for evaluating NATO's potential economic function. Unwilling to endorse either proposal the Committee temporized calling for increased co-operation within the OEEC whilst other ideas such as an NEC were given further consideration.
By the time of the 6th Annual Session in November 1960, the decision to create an OECD had been taken. The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference recommended ratification of the agreement establishing the OECD without delay. The opportunity for investing NATO with a significant economic function had passed. Senator Jacob Javits (United States), at least, was not dispirited and during the 6th Annual Conference he declared that "the forthcoming establishment of OECD would serve to take Article II 'out of the fuzzy stage' and enable NATO to be far more effective in the economic field than ever before."

NATO's contribution to promoting Atlantic economic relations has remained largely incidental to its major functions. Various suggestions made by the Economic Committee have however been adopted and modified over the years by NATO. For example, an Economic Committee recommendation adopted at the 18th Annual Session in 1972 "on the better exploitation of the potentialities of NATO with respect to relations between NATO member countries called for the regular participation of Economic and Finance Ministers at NATO Ministerial Meetings. A similar proposal adopted during the 21st Annual Assembly in Copenhagen in 1975 elicited the comment from the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Joseph Luns, that NATO was ready and willing to arrange meetings between the Finance and Economic Ministers of member countries "if they so wish and if they consider them necessary to the smooth running of the Alliance."

**The Parliamentarians' Role**

While NATO's potential economic function remained, for the time being, ill defined the parliamentarians' contribution, following the creation of OECD, was expanding. The 6th Annual Conference recommended "that authorised members of all the Parliaments of countries of OECD should meet from time to time to consider matters of common interest arising under the working of OECD. This proposition was rephrased in an Economic Committee recommendation adopted at the 10th Annual Session in 1964 which called for the "attendance of parliamentarians as observers at the work of the Economic Committee of OECD."

In discussions at the 6th Annual Conference Senator Javits (United States) had declared that "the formulation of a caucus view" was a task more suited to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference than to the North Atlantic Council.

The value of the Economic Committee's contribution to the discussion of economic policies within the Alliance context was subsequently considered in its annual report in 1967. The Rapporteur commented: "The failure of the inter-war period and the successes of the last 20 years confirm the value beyond measure of continuous, institutionalized and expert co-ordination of national economic policies. The meetings of this Committee are an important part of that process."

The Economic Committee's paramount consideration has been that its deliberations should contribute to the co-ordination of national economic policies (on both domestic and international levels).

The Committee has looked at issues of concern within the Alliance, at relations with Eastern Europe and with the Third World. In recent years it has also examined the problems affecting member states both domestically and within their international relations. Most notable in this respect has been the importance of securing energy supplies and the impact of the dramatic increases in the price of oil.
Intra-Alliance Economic Relations

National Economic Reports

One of the earliest suggestions to emerge from the Economic Committee was the recommendation made in 1957 that each national delegation to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference should "appoint a Rapporteur to report to the Fourth Annual Conference upon those economic affairs of his country which are susceptible to consideration by NATO" and requested from OECD and other pertinent international organizations, information respecting the contribution which can be made within the NATO framework to the work of each agency.

For the next few years individual committee members submitted regular reports on both the problems and progress of their national economic policies. These reports served the useful function of drawing to the attention of Alliance parliamentarians the special problems faced by member states and particularly the less developed countries. They also highlighted areas of conflict between member states. A report by Mr. Benedikt Grondal (Iceland) in 1957 entitled "The Importance of Fisheries to the Icelandic People" led to the establishment of an ad hoc Sub-Committee on the Fisheries Dispute which subsequently submitted a report and a resolution expressing concern at "the possible threat to the harmonious relations between some members of the North Atlantic Alliance which will exist for as long as no solution acceptable to the interested NATO countries actively fishing in northern waters is achieved."

The Economic Committee has supported the establishment of economic advisory groups in member countries. It has also contributed to two major initiatives. The former (ADELA) (see page 41) aimed at securing private investment in Latin America as part of the Alliance for Progress programme. The latter (EMDI) (see page 42) was conceived as a programme similar in aims to ADELA but aimed at the less developed countries of the Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean. While ultimately unsuccessful it had the notable achievement of bringing together, in an harmonious working relationship, Turkey and Greece at a time when their political relations were in disarray.

Economic Relations Between NATO Member Countries

A Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Member Countries was created in November 1970 when a minor recession provoked real fears of "an uncontrolled growth of retaliatory measures of trade discrimination" which could cause damage "to the political and military cohesion of the North Atlantic countries."

During its first year it examined ways of promoting free trade and of eliminating monetary and trade tensions between member countries of the Alliance.

In his draft report, presented at the end of the Sub-Committee's first year in 1971, the Rapporteur, Congressman Sam Gibbons (United States), advocated a policy of trade-liberalization as a counter-offensive against the growing threat of protection in world trade and an Alliance wide programme of trade and economic co-operation. The programme required the removal of all trade barriers between NATO member countries; reductions in non-tariff barriers and adoption of a common set of health, safety and environmental protection standards.

During debate on the draft report at the 17th Annual Session the suggestion was made by Mr. Erwin Lange (Fed. Rep. of Germany) that a permanent organization be established "within NATO to review such matters as trade conditions as well as
capital and currency flows" and that no action should henceforth be taken by individual countries without prior consultation in this new organization.

A draft recommendation formulated by the Sub-Committee was adopted at the 17th Annual Session in 1971. It called upon the member countries of NATO to "eliminate the present underlying causes of the deterioration of economic relations through developing intra-alliance consultation and participation in international organizations."

The decision to discontinue the Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Member Countries on the grounds that "the major problem of trade relations between NATO member countries should be the responsibility of the full committee and of its General Rapporteur" was taken at the Spring Meeting in May 1972.

A guest speaker at the May meeting of the Economic Committee was Ambassador Schaetzel (United States Representative to the European Communities). He favoured the "historic enlargement" of the European Communities and called for a "further institutionalization of United States relations with the Communities." He also welcomed the role played by the North Atlantic Assembly in fostering United States-European Community relations and described the Assembly as an excellent device for considering economic matters which technically were beyond the scope of the Alliance. Ambassador Schaetzel suggested that Japanese representatives should be invited to participate in meetings on an ad hoc basis.

In November 1972, the Economic Committee established a second Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Trade Relations. This Sub-Committee seems to have resumed the title of Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Member Countries. Recommendation 26, "On the better exploitation of the potentialities of NATO with respect to economic relations between member countries" adopted at the 18th Annual Session in November 1972, called upon the North Atlantic Council to consider several specific proposals, designed to upgrade the level of economic work done by NATO. Particularly noteworthy points were the inclusion of Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs as regular participants in NATO Ministerial meetings; monthly meetings of the Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council to discuss economic affairs; and appointment of a group of "high level independent experts" - similar to the "Three Wise Men" - to define the role of the Alliance in the 1970's. The proposals were favourably received by the Secretary-General of NATO who commented that the recommendation contained "some extremely interesting suggestions which I have carefully examined and which I will propose be discussed in the Council."

In 1973 the revitalized Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Member Countries produced a paper on the "consequences for transatlantic economic relations of the enlarged European Community." Individual members compiled reports on their respective country's position in transatlantic economic relations which were included as appendices to the Sub-Committee's interim report.2

A meeting of the Sub-Committee in April 1973, was addressed by several experts on transatlantic economic relations. During the meeting Mr. Lange, General Rapporteur of the Economic Committee, proposed that Alliance member countries should give serious consideration to the concept of an "Atlantic Free Trade Association" under the terms of Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Mr. Lange renewed this call in the General Report on Atlantic Economic Questions and it became the subject of a resolution adopted by the 19th Annual Session in
Ankara which urged examination of the feasibility of an “Atlantic free trade area according to Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” The resolution also reiterated the suggestion made in a recommendation adopted the previous year for regular meetings of Ministers of Economics and Finance and the establishment of a regular consultation procedure.

The Sub-Committee’s report produced by Mr. Ingvar Helle (Norway) in October 1973, stressed the “importance of permanent economic consultation within the Alliance.” He quoted Mr. Helmut Schmidt then Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany: “Atlantic economic relations cannot continue to be based on burning issues which arise occasionally, such as trade wars on chicken or soya beans as well as on controversial statements on the problems of equal burden sharing. This obviously attracts publicity but might at the same time erode public support for Atlantic relations. Furthermore, the dialogue on Atlantic economic relations cannot be based on one 'big subject' which is of particular concern for one or other of the partners should it be the question of co-operation on energy supplies or the problems regarding foreign investment and the activities of multinational corporations.”

The Sub-Committee on Economic Relations continued to monitor progress in transatlantic economic relations and welcomed the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations made in June 1974, which marked the conclusion of the discussions on transatlantic relations initiated by Dr. Henry Kissinger as part of the United States “Year of Europe.”

A recommendation adopted by the 20th Session in London in November 1974, reiterated many of the proposals made in earlier years and called for implementation of the recommendation contained in the Ottawa Declaration that the Alliance nations security relationship should be supported by harmonious political and economic relations and by removing sources of conflict between their economic policies, and by agreement to speak with one voice in the emerging dialogue with developing countries on a “new economic relationship.”

The Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Member Countries was deactivated in 1975.

The mounting economic problems of the past five years have been reflected in the recommendations emerging from the Economic Committee. The effects of the global recession which followed the energy and financial crises of 1974 have in the opinion of the Committee been aggravated by “the complete lack of co-ordination between different national economic policies” within the Alliance.

A recommendation adopted at the 21st Session held in Copenhagen in 1975 urged member Governments to implement a policy of consultation among themselves. Commenting on this recommendation the Secretary-General of NATO was less than enthusiastic about the idea: “NATO has, of course, no direct responsibilities in the economic sphere and so is not the proper forum for the co-ordination of national economic policies”, such work being, in his view, the responsibility of the OECD and the European Economic Community.

The co-ordination of Alliance nations’ economic policies nevertheless remains a favourite topic for those who see in the achievement of a common economic stand the enduring spirit of the old Atlanticists. Never having totally abrogated this concept the Sub-Committee’s most effective work has been in suggesting ways to improve United States-European relations rather than in advocating the co-ordination of Alliance economic policies within the wider context of the OECD.
Economic Problems of the Least Developed Countries of the Alliance

Effective co-ordination of national economic policies within the Alliance remains something of an ideal while some of its members are still developing countries. Recommendations by the North Atlantic Assembly calling for assistance to developing countries within the Alliance have in consequence derived from the pragmatic motivation that hastening the development of these countries would in the long term prove beneficial to the Alliance as a whole both economically and strategically.

The strategically sensitive region known as the Southern Flank has benefited considerably from this enlightened thinking.

The annual national economic reports (see page 59) produced by members of the Economic Committee had proved a useful insight into the problems of developing countries within the Alliance. In 1957, Mr. Panayotis Yokas, in a national economic report on Greece described his country as still predominantly rural although it was industrializing and said that it would benefit from aid. Senator Malulk Tamakas of Turkey made a convincing request for aid: “no member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be left alone in her efforts towards economic development. Any member of NATO without a sound and healthy economy would not contribute much to the common cause of security of the Free World.” Senator Tamakas called for an investment fund for member countries.

Regular proposals have been made calling for urgent attention to be given to the problems of the underdeveloped regions in NATO. For example a resolution adopted in 1960, during the 6th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, called for special priority to be given to help for underdeveloped Alliance partners “with the aim of strengthening their economies and their possibilities of defence. But it was only in 1963 that, following the 9th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, a Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries was created.

This Special Committee contributed significantly to the preparatory work done on the Greek–Turkish project and subsequently monitored progress with the Eastern Mediterranean Development Institute (EMDI) and the unsuccessful proposal for a Mediterranean Development Organization. Although ultimately a failure the project scored a notable achievement in facilitating co-operation between Greeks and Turks during a period of strained political relations.

The Economic Committee has continued to recommend economic assistance for the Alliance’s Southern Flank. In 1975, a resolution on economic aid to Portugal, Greece and Turkey stated clearly that the Alliance should “abandon [its] shortsighted and politically erroneous wait and see attitude vis-à-vis Portugal and grant immediate and effective financial help to support the country’s process of democratization. The resolution was made at a time of domestic political crisis and upheaval in Portugal.

The Economic Committee was briefed on the problems of the Portuguese economy by Dr. Alfredo de Sousa, Rector of the New University of Lisbon, during the 24th Annual Session of the Assembly held in Lisbon in November 1978. Dr. de Sousa declared that “between now and 1982 Portugal needed foreign loans of five billion dollars to enable it to be in a position to accede to the European Economic Community.” A resolution urging member Governments to “improve the economic position
and the international economic integration of its less fortunate members in Southern Europe" was adopted during the session.

The evolution and future prospects of the Portuguese economy were the subject of the 2nd International Conference in 1979 on the Portuguese Economy sponsored by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the German Marshall Fund of the United States held in Lisbon from 26 to 28 September.

The Conference was attended by some 25 speakers and more than 200 economists and experts from industry, governments, universities and international organizations. Representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly's Economic Committee participated and had the opportunity of discussing the various points raised in the Assembly's information report on the economic situation and Portugal's economic and military aid requirements, with the experts present. During the 25th Annual Session held in Ottawa in October 1979, it was decided to create a Working Group on Portugal.

The working group held its first meeting in the Foundation Eng. Antonio de Almeida in Oporto on 19 and 20 March 1980. This first meeting, which discussed the areas of the Portuguese economy most in need of assistance, attracted considerable interest in the Portuguese press. The first day was devoted to a visit to Aveiro where the group were briefed on the prospects and plans for the modernization of the town's important commercial and fishing harbour and to Vila da Feira, where the group received further briefings on the region's urgent water supply and sewage system problems.

### Balance of Payments Problems

The problems arising from balance of payments deficits were of particular concern to NATO from the late 1960's onwards because of the adverse effect military expenditures were having upon the balance of payments of its major contributor — the United States of America.

The problem was compounded by several non-economic factors, in particular the enormous drain upon America's resources of the Vietnam War. The failure of America's European Allies to endorse her crusade in Vietnam only served to add fuel to mounting United States resentment that it was shouldering too much of the burden of NATO's defence and that its European allies, now restored to economic vigour, should assume a greater share of their own defence. Resolving the problem required a determined political commitment to collective action on the part of all Alliance nations.

Some of the economic factors involved were examined during 1968 by individual parliamentarians. Mr. Bishop (United Kingdom), Vice-Chairman of the Economic Committee, in a paper entitled "Devaluation in the Context of the International Monetary System: Its Effect on the Balance of Payments and the Challenge it poses for the Future" discussed the likely impact of devaluation upon public expenditure in Britain and in particular for traditional defence commitments. He made it clear that some reduction in military expenditure would be necessary.

Senator Birch Bayh (United States), Rapporteur of the Economic Committee, in his Annual Economic Report, looked at United States balance of payments problems and current international efforts such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to resolve world trade problems and their impact upon domestic balance of payments.

Senator Percy (United States) who had taken an active interest in the problem of defraying the cost of stationing troops abroad, urged, during the Committee meetings at the 14th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1968, the adoption of the principle that no Alliance member nation should benefit or lose in its balance of payments as a result of expenditures made for common defence.

Discussion of this and similar points led to the adoption at the 14th Session of a recommendation which called for a study of the problems posed by the effect of defence expenditures on the balance of payments.

Senator Percy continued his efforts to persuade NATO Parliamentarians of the urgency of achieving a collective solution to the economic problems caused for individual member states, and in particular the United States of America, by their shouldering the financial burden of stationing troops overseas. In a paper prepared for the Assembly’s Spring meeting in May 1969 Senator Percy reported on “burden sharing and the economic aspects of the common defence” and contributed two suggestions to the discussion on financing military contributions.

These were that a clearing house should be established by NATO whose task would be to estimate a year ahead the state of the financial relationship between member states, in respect of the troops of one of them stationed on the territory of the other as part of its NATO commitment and that a “special fund” be created to correct any imbalance. His second suggestion was for the creation, by the Economic Committee, of a sub-committee to examine in detail defence expenditure in the light of balance of payments problems.

During discussion of his proposals, Senator Percy sought to reassure his European counterparts on the Economic Committee that he was not advocating or supporting the movement, which had arisen in the US Congress, for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. In a revealing comment — which briefly illuminated what is perhaps the major contribution the North Atlantic Assembly can hope to make to Alliance relations which is that of increasing mutual awareness and understanding — Senator Percy stated that as a result of attending the Military Committee meeting on the previous day he had been made aware “that the European countries were worried that if they increased their troop contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this would involve a reduction in the United States force level”.

Clearly recognizing that behind the apparent European reluctance to discuss the issue was the fear that reduction in the numbers of American troops stationed in Europe would imply a reduction in the United States commitment to the security of Europe and ultimately in its willingness to resort to its strategic nuclear umbrella to defend Europe, Senator Percy sought to reassure the members of the Economic Committee. He explained that current United States efforts directed towards achieving a more equable sharing out of the burden of defence expenditure within NATO in no way implied a lessening of the United States commitment to Europe or of its nuclear guarantee and were aimed solely at resolving American balance of payments problems. Senator Percy nevertheless emphasized that “the main threat to the maintenance of United States forces in Europe was the balance of payments problem.” Budgetary problems would not cause the withdrawal of troops, but inability to finance them might.

The Economic Committee discussed his proposals and called for a “plan for a
military balance of payments offset arrangement to be worked out for military expenditures within NATO.” It also endorsed the idea of a Sub-Committee on Balance of Payments whose task would be to promote the adoption by member Governments of NATO of such a plan.

The Sub-Committee held its first working meeting at the Assembly Secretariat three months later in August 1969. Among the subjects discussed were the comments received from several member Governments on Senator Percy’s draft report on “burden sharing and the economic aspects of the common defence effort” and the possible establishment of national committees to examine the feasibility of a multilateral solution to balance of payments problems arising out of national contributions to the common defence effort.²

Acting as Rapporteur, Senator Percy summarized the opinions expressed by the various member Governments in his report prepared for the 15th Annual Session in October 1969. These, as might be expected, were only cautiously favourable. An offset agreement was not considered appropriate unless a general payments deficit was specifically caused by military expenditures on collective defence; an offset of 100% was not in any case considered feasible; and since the United States had unilaterally abandoned the concept of burden sharing, and procurement alone could not defray the deficit, only bilaterally negotiated solutions were thought possible.

He also energetically developed the views he had expressed the previous Spring: “I feel it is only fair to advise you, in as blunt and straightforward a manner as legislative diplomacy will allow, that as one United States Senator representing eleven million Americans in my own State of Illinois, I do not intend to continue voting to support the balance of payments cost or even the full budgetary cost for our NATO expenditures at their present level without substantive changes in financial arrangements between countries involved in the common defence of Europe. I can assure you I am not alone in this feeling.” Despite the intense pressure from Senator Percy and other American Congressmen for a definitive statement on a plan for offsetting military expenditure within NATO the 15th Plenary Session of the North Atlantic Assembly only made passing reference to the issue in a recommendation on Special Drawing Rights which called upon the North Atlantic Council to consider measures to achieve a better balance in their international payments.

The Sub-Committee on Balance of Payments continued its work throughout most of 1970 but was deactivated during the 16th Annual Session following the submission of a concluding report and draft recommendation calling for “new arrangements . . . [to] be sought involving budgetary contributions from the NATO partner countries to the official requirements of visiting forces — which should take effect from 1 July 1971.”

This clearly followed Government thinking in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany who had recently concluded a tripartite agreement whereby Germany agreed to defray part of the costs involved in stationing American and British troops in Germany.

Congressman Wayne Hays (United States) addressing the 16th Session once again sought to allay suspicions as to the United States’ actual motives in trying to redefine relationships within NATO, “Let me speak plainly in this matter. American soldiers are not stationed in Europe at great expense to our tax payers and to the detriment of our balance of payments, out of charity. They are here, in the first instance to defend the vital interests of the United States which include the freedom of Western Europe.”
The deliberations of the Sub-Committee on Balance of Payments problems provided a very worthwhile insight into the complex inter-relationships between national economic interests and Alliance policy decisions and showed the value of member nations working closely together and trying to find collective solutions to their individual problems.

It also demonstrated that by providing an intimate forum for the airing of grievances, the correcting of misconceptions, the discussion of possible solutions and the formulation of common approaches to particular problems, the North Atlantic Assembly could make an effective and worthwhile contribution to increasing mutual awareness and understanding particularly between North American and European parliamentarians thus helping to promote long-term stability within the Alliance.

The Economic Committee has continued to examine the economic aspects of military security. The 1978 General Report on "the Economics of Atlantic Security" discussed the relationship between economic stability and defence efforts. The Spring 1978 meeting was addressed by Dr. Bernhard Udis from the University of Colorado on the desirability of joint financing of military projects by the allies.

A similar proposal was made by Mr. David Greenwood, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen University, who advocated "the international division of labour within the Alliance" as one mechanism for facilitating defence efforts. Mr. Greenwood warned Committee members that "without a satisfactory programme of rationalization there could be a progressive diminution in the effectiveness of the Alliance."

Alliance Energy Policy

Introduction

The dramatic rise in oil prices and the uncertainty surrounding continued oil supplies has caused considerable anxiety among Alliance nations. The Economic Committee has regularly called for co-operation at the international level including the creation of an international framework for the exploration of global natural resources and the harmonization of Alliance energy policies. The scramble for oil supplies which occurred as a result of the global energy crisis in the winter of 1973/1974 provided unwelcome proof of the fragility of existing attempts at co-operation.

Dr. Burgbacher (Fed. Rep. of Germany) had first drawn the attention of the Economic Committee to the problems of safeguarding energy sources in the NATO area in 1961, in a paper describing the nature and implications of the current "Soviet Oil Offensive". A recommendation adopted by the 8th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1962 urged "the avoidance of excessive dependence on oil imports" and drew attention to the dangers of depending upon Soviet oil. "It called for the determination of a safe percentage of oil to be drawn from Communist countries."

In 1968 the Economic Committee again discussed the strategic implications of guaranteeing energy supplies in times of crisis and adopted a suggestion made by Dr. Burgbacher which called for a "strategic economic plan for NATO's European member states" as a means of countering the threat posed by the build up of the Soviet submarine fleet to NATO supply routes. The proposed plan outlined economic measures which could be taken by European members of the Alliance in the event of their supply lines being endangered.
In 1970 Mr. Mahoney (Canada) noted two current developments which could have an "important impact on the security of NATO Europe's energy supply, viz. experiments with tanker movements in the Arctic and the significant oil discoveries in the North Sea." But he tempered speculation with caution concluding that "nothing in the developments of the past year has changed the precarious condition of NATO-Europe's security of petroleum supply in the event of a world-wide crisis."

The Committee continued to review the military implications of safeguarding energy supplies, and in a report written prior to the Middle East war of 1973, Dr. Burgbacher again assessed the energy situation in the member countries of the Alliance and stressed that the "... defence effort will be effective only if adequate energy supplies are guaranteed, including in the event of crises." He considered the following measures to be necessary:

1. ensuring, over the longer term, the availability of domestic energy sources,
2. long term commitments concerning the establishment of energy stocks in the member countries,
3. participation in energy production in third world countries,
4. diversification of production sources,
5. broadening of trade policy towards third world countries beyond energy deliveries,
6. savings and recycling in the energy sector.

Dr. Burgbacher concluded his report with the warning that "it is not possible to guarantee the availability of the energy that would be absolutely indispensable in time of crisis, unless an exact and complete analysis is made followed up by a commitment from the member countries to take the necessary measures to the extent that this is feasible and of utility at the national level and, from there, on an Alliance-wide scale as well."

The Assembly subsequently adopted a recommendation, submitted jointly by the Economic and Scientific and Technical Committees, on guaranteeing and developing energy supplies in the area of the Atlantic Alliance which urged member Governments to establish, at the national level, a carefully planned energy programme and at the international level a programme of co-operation which would include the creation of a Western "community of interest for the joint purchase of oil" and a contingency plan for Alliance members to share oil in the event of a shortage.

Resolution 20 adopted at the 20th Annual Session in 1974 noted the destabilizing effects of the energy and financial crises of 1973/1974 and their military implications for the security of the Alliance and called upon member Governments to ensure short and long term energy supplies and in particular the "security of energy supplies for maintaining the strength of military defence co-operation" especially through the immediate availability of adequate reserve stocks.

Members of the Economic Committee were doubtless encouraged in their efforts to promote the harmonization of Alliance energy policies when they learned from Ambassador Davignon, President of the International Energy Agency in May 1975, that an "insurance scheme for emergency oil sharing in times of crisis" had been devised by the Agency. The International Energy Agency (IEA) was created to implement the International Energy Programme agreed by 18 countries in November 1974.

The North Atlantic Assembly's activities have not been restricted to consideration of the security problems arising from the necessity of guaranteeing energy supplies.
Other aspects have been usefully considered by two joint Sub-Committees. The first, drawing its members from the Economic and Scientific and Technical Committees and referred to as the Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies, was established following the 19th Annual Session in October 1973, and in the immediate aftermath of the Middle East War with the disruptive effects this had had on global energy supplies still clearly in evidence.

**The Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies**

A major concern of the Joint Sub-Committee during its first year was the scientific and technical aspects of energy supplies and alternative sources of energy. The Sub-Committee’s report, prepared by Mr. Van Amelsvoort (Netherlands) and submitted to the London Session in 1974, reiterated the importance of guaranteeing oil production for the foreseeable future. During a debate on the report it was suggested that industrialized countries should offer the Arab Countries technological aid to help achieve industrialization whilst at the same time “co-operating with the Arabs in research into other energy sources”. Senator Jackson (United States) also advocated the establishment of a “Ministerial Council of Western industrialised states with adequate powers to strengthen financial institutions.”

The Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing the useful work done by the Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies. It urged the provision of more incentives for oil producing countries with a surplus to invest in consuming countries, advocated abstaining from discriminating investment controls and welcomed and supported an in depth study of the problem of achieving better security for energy supply routes.

A series of meetings were held with national energy experts in member countries during 1976. One meeting in Paris in October provoked a lively debate on the level of information available to the general public on future energy supplies. Several participants felt that public opinion consistently underestimated the scale of the energy problem and this had led to the erroneous belief that the energy crisis was more or less resolved. The Sub-Committee affirmed its intention “not to let public opinion slip away but to continue to arouse the necessary and appropriate interest for the vast number of problems related to energy”.

A resolution submitted on behalf of the Joint Sub-Committee to the 22nd Annual Session in 1976 largely reiterated the demands of previous years while underlining the “imminent possibility of a new oil shortage in 1977”. It was during the 23rd Session in Paris in 1977 that the Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies was formally dissolved and a Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Policy created in its stead.

**The Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Policy**

The Sub-Committee on Energy Policy, with a membership drawn from the Economic, Political and Scientific and Technical Committees, reported to the 24th Annual Session in Lisbon on the sensitive issue of nuclear proliferation.

A draft resolution directed attention to the current policy of the United States Administration in relation to the supply of nuclear fuel to other countries which, the Sub-Committee recognized, had been designed to “add further and more effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapon capacity”. Nevertheless, the anxiety felt by European members of the Sub-Committee over the implications of this policy of “concentration” were clearly expressed in their report. “This policy appears
to involve a renegotiation of the previous agreement between the United States and Euratom, resulting in a serious threat to the planned development of nuclear power for electricity generation in European countries of the Alliance, which is essential to meet the possibility of an energy gap before the end of the present century."

A consensus gradually emerged between European members and their American counterparts who favoured a policy of concentration and resulted in the adoption of a rather more general resolution than the draft version. Members were content to urge the United States and Euratom to "strengthen their co-operation against the dangers of nuclear proliferation" while "ensuring the continued and uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel by the United States to Euratom".

In September 1979, members of the Sub-Committee on Energy Policy toured various nuclear installations in the South of France, including Eurodif, a facility for uranium enrichment by gas diffusion, the Phoenix fast breeder reactor, a nuclear waste vitrification plant at Marcoule and the solar energy installation at Cadarache.

In 1980 attention was once again focused upon the problems associated with oil. The Bureau of the Economic Committee, which included Mr. Gerhard Flamig (Federal Rep. of Germany), Special Rapporteur on Energy Policy, paid a fact-finding mission to Saudi Arabia to gather information on the kind of problems oil wealth has brought to one of the world's largest producers of oil.

A review of the general energy situation was the subject of a meeting between members of the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and representatives of the OECD held at the latter's Headquarters in Paris in February 1980.

**East-West Economic Relations**

Harmonization of the economic policies of member nations in respect to their relations with the Eastern bloc has been a long-standing objective of the North Atlantic Assembly, both as a counter to potential Soviet economic aggression and later as a means to promote detente.

The major consideration in the early 1960's was the danger of economic warfare. The intentional disruption of markets or dumping was regarded as a tactic of economic warfare and the Economic Committee in a resolution submitted to the 6th NATO Parliamentarians Conference in 1960 called for the development of an effective means of meeting the dangers of economic warfare by communist or other totalitarian regimes imperilling the free world.

Following discussion of a report by Senator Javits (United States) on "Certain Aspects of Economic Policy towards the Communist bloc" in 1961, a resolution was adopted which urged member nations of NATO to co-ordinate their policies on East-West trade, in particular on the Soviet economic aid and trade offensive, the better to determine the adequacy of their policies to meet the objectives of NATO.

This rather vague recommendation was reiterated in greater detail the following year when specific proposals were made in a recommendation adopted at the 8th Annual Session. These included, (1) uniformity of embargoes on strategic materials and establishment of an agency to determine exceptions; (2) co-ordination of policies on non-strategic goods and to ensure that member countries are not vitally dependant on their trade with communist countries; and (3) development of an administrative
agency for co-ordinating Alliance policies and providing compensation in cases of economic warfare.

The establishment of a "Code of Fair Practice" governing the conduct of economic relations between East and West which could both counteract the dangers of economic warfare and at the same time provide a solution to the problem of extending credits to Eastern bloc countries was an initiative first proposed to NATO parliamentarians by Senator Javits. In reports prepared for the 9th and 10th Annual Conferences in 1963 and 1964 he outlined an "East-West Trade Code" which would require the establishment, by the Alliance countries, of an organization similar to the Eastern bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

As the already chronic shortage among Eastern bloc countries of convertible currencies worsened fears grew that "competition in respect of credit terms" was posing a threat to Western cohesion as a whole.

In his report on "Current Economic Problems" in 1965, Mr. Anthony Kershaw, (United Kingdom) described how "credit terms offered by Western countries to Communist countries are sometimes more generous than those granted to developing countries . . . a sort of disguised policy of financial assistance to Communist countries." Violations of the Berne Agreement which limited the extension of credit to a period of five years were reported.

Some limited progress in harmonizing economic policies was recorded by Senator Birch Bayh (United States) in 1966 when he reported that the United States had taken the initial step towards bringing American export licensing controls more closely into conformity with the export controls of other NATO countries, a minor step towards harmonization of Alliance economic policies.

The increasing momentum of East-West trade was apparently disrupted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However the picture was complicated and Senator Bayh, in the Economic Committee report for 1969, recorded that while "it seems logical that this decline in the growth-rate of East-West trade may have been influenced by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia . . . other potential determining factors, for example, normal fluctuations in East-West trade are not to be discounted."

Senator Bayh favoured a pragmatic Western response based on remaining as open and receptive to the East as circumstances might permit "rather than an emotional full scale resumption of Cold War economic and political sanctions."

By 1970 East-West trade and scientific and technological exchanges were regarded as being an integral part of the process of detente, although some Western observers remained critical of the increases in East-West contacts, claiming that the West had gone too far in accommodating the Eastern bloc in the economic sphere. A response to this criticism was provided by Congressman Jack Brooks (United States) in his General Report on Economic Questions in 1972: "nonetheless since eventually even purely economic relations begin to have social and ideological spin-offs, controls notwithstanding, East-West trade, carefully excluding items likely to enhance Soviet military technological capability, represents an important mechanism for promoting constructive change with Eastern countries, even though its political effect will probably be slow in coming."

The Economic Committee continued to monitor and comment upon developments in East-West economic relations. The major problem remained the Eastern bloc's lack of convertible currencies and the heavy imbalance between the level of
imports to the East and its exports. The problem was exacerbated by Western inflation, which, combined with the fixed price system and rigid planning programmes of the East, did not permit much flexibility in compensating for currency fluctuations.

The Committee therefore welcomed efforts to establish a formal relationship between the European Communities and COMECON and the negotiations which culminated in the Accords signed at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1975.

Basket two of the Helsinki Accords contains specific provisions for promoting economic relations and scientific and technological exchanges.

Various aspects of the Soviet economy have been examined in recent years. In May 1978, the Committee was briefed by Dr. Ulrich Damm, General Manager of Commerzbank International in Luxembourg, on new trends in Communist countries' indebtedness vis-à-vis Western economics. The increase in new loans in 1977 was substantial but markedly lower than in previous years, said Dr. Damm, who also mentioned the growing infiltration by Western hard currencies of the Eastern financial system and the role of compensation agreements.

A new element was added to the Economic Committee's deliberations on economic relations with the Communist countries when the proposal, made during the 24th Annual Session held in Lisbon in November 1978, that the NATO nations should seek to develop economic relations with China, was rejected on the grounds that such a step could be construed as taking sides between two communist powers.

International Monetary Situation

Introduction

Throughout its discussions on the international monetary situation the Economic Committee has adhered to the agreements hammered out at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 and which until recent times formed the framework for global economic relations and monetary policies. Since the mid 1970's the demand for a new international economic order (NIEO) has become the focus of concern.

Problems such as inflation, worsening balance of payments, the trend towards protectionist measures in world trade and most recently the deepening global recession have been discussed and attempts to remedy these problems commented upon in detail.

It was Senator Javits who, in 1963, first presented the Economic Committee with a report on "Developments in the International Monetary Situation and World Economic Growth" which contained a brief outline of the various elements comprising the international monetary system. A prominent concern at the time was how to sustain adequate international liquidity ratios.

The Bretton Woods system came under increasing strain as the necessity of supporting international liquidity grew. The 1966 Economic Committee report contained a reference to a plan then being discussed by the Group of Ten major industrial countries which would supplement existing sources of world liquidity by the provision of a new Special Drawing Right (SDR) facility on the International Monetary Fund. The Economic Committee endorsed the provisions of the plan in a recommendation adopted by the 12th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly which
called on "all NATO countries to continue their efforts in co-operation with other states to find a solution to the problem of world liquidity."

Final agreement to create a Special Drawing Rights mechanism was achieved in 1967. Senator Bayh in his annual report to the Economic Committee welcomed the new Special Drawing Right facility but cautioned: "We have made considerable progress towards freeing international trade from the barriers inherited from the pre-war crisis and from the last World War. We now have at hand the institutional mechanism necessary to provide the continuing increases in reserve necessary for the support of this trade. However, we still seem unable to make continuing balance of payments adjustments without subjecting our domestic economies to fiscal or monetary burdens which most of us find incompatible with our goals of social progress, full employment and economic growth. Unless we can find ways to improve the functioning of the adjustment process, the full benefits expected from the Special Drawing Rights will not be realised."

The decision made in mid March 1968 at the Washington meeting of the Central Bank Governors of the Gold Pool nations to establish a two-tier gold price system, thus effectively ending the unstable relationship between gold speculation and the use of monetary gold as a means of international monetary exchange was therefore welcomed by Senator Bayh in the Annual Economic Report in 1968.

He cautioned however that "the day will soon be gone when the deficits of reserve currency countries provide the necessary liquidity for the expansion of the world's trade", and stressed the need for consideration "of the question of major monetary reform and the exact place of gold within the system." He advocated "multilateral decision-making based on consensus and mutual co-operation" as an essential requirement in supporting the growth of international commerce. As a first step "our international monetary policy should aim to ensure adequate international reserves and credit facilities."

Reserve Currencies — Balance of Payments Problems

The balance of payments difficulties of the primary reserve currencies, the dollar and sterling, were a continuing source of anxiety. Two reports prepared by Mr. Ted Bishop (United Kingdom), Vice-Chairman of the Economic Committee, in 1968 dealt with the effects of devaluation of sterling and international efforts to stabilize the situation. The first dealt with "devaluation in the context of the international monetary system: its effect on the Balance of Payments and the challenge it poses for the future", the second with "The Basle Facility and the Sterling Area."

Mr. Bishop described "The $2000 million facility to offset fluctuations in the sterling area countries" which was announced in Basle on 9 September and the related agreements which had been negotiated with sterling area countries as "a milestone in the evolution of the sterling area and a major contribution to world monetary stability."

A recommendation "on international monetary co-operation and the balance of payments adjustment process" was adopted by the 14th Annual Session in 1968. It largely reiterated the demands made in a recommendation adopted the previous year but was also concerned with the "contradictory effect" fiscal and monetary restrictions imposed by the United States and United Kingdom might have "on the economies of the European Communities." A decade later the Economic Committee
returned to this topic when they discussed the impact of monetary problems on the relations between North American and European currencies.

In 1971 Mr. Bishop drew the attention of the Committee to the relationship between the United States dollar and the rest of the world’s currencies. When the International Monetary Fund system was set up a quarter of a century ago, the dollar was clearly pre-eminent. Now after two substantial wars, a vast programme of international investment and a cumulative balance of payments deficit, the United States has seen her reserves run down to nominal size in relation to her commitments.

He noted prophetically: “While the United States may be determined to treat the latest crisis as a purely European affair, the monetary tides are running hard and fast beneath the surface. Whatever happens in Brussels, within the European Economic Community, the date of birth of a European currency, rivalling the dollar in strength and acceptability, must be appreciably nearer unless the Community (and Britain’s hopes of joining it) is torn asunder in the process.”

When updating his report a few months later Mr. Bishop had to acknowledge the fulfilment of this prophecy. “The ten per cent surcharge on imports and other United States unilateral measures has resulted in other countries taking steps to protect their own national interests. The danger of trade warfare looms large.”

Mr. Bishop went on to advocate renovating the existing system of reserve currencies and made the following proposals:-

(1) Revaluation of currencies must take account of the prospects of instability and other disadvantages to world trade;

(2) The Group of Ten Finance Ministers and others concerned should work towards the establishment of an internationally-backed reserve asset to replace gold and the role of the dollar and sterling. This would not only replace currencies whose exchange rates have grown increasingly intolerable to others but should shield the United States and United Kingdom from the effects of a run on their currencies with resulting economic instability. It should help towards world trade liquidity and encourage greater investment. More important, such a world-backed international asset would not be threatened by the action of any single Government;

(3) There should be an adjustment of parities in the meantime and there should be internationally concerted action to bring short-term capital movements under control;

(4) It should be the declared policy of the United States to end or phase out their surcharge before others are encouraged to take damaging retaliatory action. Trade liberalization and working towards the aims of the Kennedy Round and GATT must continue with greater determination by all NATO member countries. This in turn may involve modification of European Economic Community policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy; and

(5) A review of the existing system of Special Drawing Rights within the International Monetary Fund should be undertaken to establish to what extent they can be used to achieve the aims set out in the preceding paragraphs.

The continuing malaise of international currencies precipitated discussion of increasing flexibility in fixing exchange rates and of the concept of a “crawling peg”. Mr. Bishop in a series of annual reports on the “International Monetary Situation"
stated his belief that "surplus countries" should periodically revalue their currencies and that "realignment is a necessary pre-requisite of any more elaborate reform of the adjustment process such as the introduction of a system of crawling pegs." As a pre-requisite to realignment of parities and greater flexibility in foreign exchange it was essential that "Governments should cease to regard their currencies as a symbol of national virility. When the balance of payments is in fundamental disequilibrium it is wholly proper that the par value of currency should be changed."

Reference was again made to the desirability of achieving a "greater degree of flexibility in the existing exchange rate system" in the "Progress Report on International Monetary Problems" prepared by Mr. Bishop in 1970.

Reform of the International Monetary System

The attention of members of the Economic Committee was first drawn to the need for "new world-wide monetary and trade realignments" in the report prepared by Mr. Erwin Lange (Fed. Rep. of Germany) in 1973. Mr. Lange proposed that there should be a "return to fixed but adjustable exchange rates", "provision for a temporary float", possible assumption by the Special Drawing Rights facility of the role of "leading and reserve currency . . . under the condition that they will be kept under strict control and serve only for the purpose of the international monetary system" and a surveillance system for exchange rates.

An information document "On World Monetary Reform" which chronicled the activities of "the Committee of Twenty" and its successor "Interim Committee" in deliberating reforms of the international monetary system and related issues, was issued by the Committee in 1975.

The 1976 report was able to report that "after the fifth meeting of the International Monetary Fund Interim Committee on the 7 and 8 January 1976, in Kingston, Jamaica, participants as well as observers were 'euphoric' about the results."

Mr. Lange however cautioned against unwarranted optimism: "It is doubtful whether Jamaica has really succeeded in shaping a new monetary order. One positive measure, however, has been taken: the system of floating exchange rates has been legalised and made subject to stricter supervision by the International Monetary Fund." He warned that big problems such as controlling world liquidity and international inflation remained to be tackled and that "the Jamaica decisions may blow up liquidity by another $6 to $9 billion and give another push to international inflation."

In a speech to the Economic Committee during the meeting held in Oslo in May 1979, Mr. Nobumitsu Kagami, General Manager of the Nomura Research Institute in London, criticized the fact that after the Bretton Woods system broke down the necessary financial adjustments had been delayed, protectionist barriers had been raised and the main function of the monetary system, the transfer of surplus savings to the most productive sectors and regions of world economy, was disregarded.

The election of Mr. Gunnella (Italy) as Special Rapporteur for International Monetary Questions during the 24th Annual Session in 1978, reflected an increasing concern with international monetary problems.

In his draft report submitted to the Committee during the meetings held in Ottawa in May 1979, Mr. Gunnella reviewed the evolution of the world monetary situation and the relation between North American and European currencies. Members commented on the interdependence of dollar weakness and increased United States oil imports.
Third World Development

Introduction

Development assistance to Third World countries was initially seen as a way of combating Soviet influence in the Third World and as a means of providing a potentially vast new market for the products of Alliance countries. At the same time, an altruistic desire to support the efforts of developing countries has led to a degree of ambivalence in the parliamentarians' apparent attitude to developing countries. In assessing the value of Western contributions to Third World development, Assembly parliamentarians have recognized the importance that the colonial legacy has had in shaping the attitudes both of the recipient and of the donor countries.

As a matter of historical record, a resolution submitted to the first Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1955 by French and Portuguese delegates, drew attention to the "beneficial influence" exercised by the NATO European countries on the African continent over the last hundred years, as exemplified "... by the development of latent sources of wealth" and "that such expansion on the part of the Western European nations increases the value of their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and constitutes a benefit to all mankind." It requested Alliance Governments "to resist all attempts, such as those made within the United Nations Organization, to drive European nations out of Africa, which was once united to the continent of Europe."

In 1956 the "Problem of Aid to Underdeveloped Countries" was described thus in a resolution adopted at the 2nd Conference of NATO Parliamentarians: "considering that freedom and peace cannot flourish in a world where the greater part of humanity is still living in conditions of poverty, ill health and ignorance ... aid to underdeveloped countries is ... itself a contribution to freedom and peace."

A different interpretation of the role of aid was discussed in a report prepared for the 2nd Conference by Mr. Ruggero (Italy) entitled, "NATO and the Soviet Bloc." This emphasized the role of economics in the struggle with communism. Economic assistance to non-communist countries would enable them to develop strong balanced economies as a defensive measure and would "provide the social stability on which communism cannot thrive."

In the suggestions made to the Committee of Three Wise Men in 1956 the NATO Parliamentarians advocated a kind of "multi-lateral Marshall Plan" as the basis for assistance to less developed countries outside the Alliance. A programme of this type, it was suggested, would reap three-fold benefits for the Alliance in terms of propaganda for the Free World, utilization of insufficiently exploited resources from NATO countries and provision of immediate new markets for capital goods and future markets for consumer goods.

Perhaps it was recognition of the ambivalence of the attitude of NATO countries on aid to the Third World that led the Earl of Listowel (United Kingdom) to caution, on the occasion of the ratification of the Charter of the OECD in 1961, that it was important for OECD not to "be suspected of ulterior motives with respect to developing countries." It was felt that an "integrated" approach to aid would avoid the criticism of "Neo-imperialism."

The movement towards multilateral aid programmes has stimulated the growth of consultations between developed nations aimed at achieving comparable negotiating
positions in world conferences where the agenda revolves around North-South issues. The desirability of such consultations for Alliance nations was recognized in an Economic Committee recommendation adopted in 1969. This called upon member Governments “to consider the benefits of close consultation among themselves prior to important trade conferences.”

The desire of Western industrialized nations to present an image of Western cohesion was a reaction to increasingly pressing demands from Third World countries for a restructuring of the world economy of which the formation of the Group of 77, now with over 100 member countries, was the call to arms.

Global Development Strategy

In 1967, Mr. Robert MacNamara, President of the World Bank proposed a “bold new global development strategy” for increasing the standard of living in developing countries. A recommendation from the Economic Committee adopted by the 13th Annual Session in 1967, urged support for this proposal.

The Economic Committee continued to recommend support for the idea of a global development strategy and urged acceptance of the principle that every economically advanced country should endeavor to provide developing countries with funds corresponding to at least one per cent of gross national product.

However in a report entitled “Towards Effective Development Co-operation in the 1970’s” the Special Rapporteur – Mr. Westerterp (Netherlands) – noted that in financial terms aid was decreasing in part because “rigid adhesion as a bloc to extreme supply and demand positions thwarted any fruitful co-operation and hindered the finding of practical compromises. The result has been stagnation. This lack of a predetermined and co-ordinated approach has caused confusion and controversy about the policies to be pursued.” Mr. Westerterp welcomed efforts to elaborate a charter and development strategy.

Development Assistance

The Committee’s attitude towards development assistance has shifted over the years from an emphasis on political and strategic considerations to economic issues. The trend towards multilateral aid projects and away from bilateral agreements has led the Committee to re-examine its views on the concepts of aid, assistance and in the terms of the Brandt Commission the mutual benefits to be derived from expanding world trade between the developed and developing countries.

Since the appearance in 1964 of the Group of 77 the Economic Committee has discussed the increasingly forceful demands the Group has made for a fundamental reconstruction of the global economic system.

A resolution “on the improvement of the world economic order”, adopted at the 22nd Annual Session in 1977 in Williamsburg, Virginia, USA, urged member Governments to develop a common policy leading to a new world economic order, a new world-wide division of labour and to elaborate an effective export earnings stabilization scheme drawing upon experiences gained from the Lomé Convention.

Commenting upon these proposals, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, emphasized the intention of Allied nations to work “for an equitable world system in which all countries developing as well as developed will see their best interests served and which can sustain the economic progress of all.”
Theoretical support notwithstanding, protectionist measures were again high on the agenda for discussion during the Economic Committee’s meeting at the 24th Annual Session in November 1978. Protectionism was condemned. However the concept of “fair trade” was held to be a more useful standard than “free trade”.

The elaboration of a new international economic order will take time and effort but most important, if it is to be successful, a new international economic order will require the active support of those persons charged with making and implementing the policies of Governments. It is to be hoped that the discussions in the Assembly’s Economic Committee between parliamentarians from nations at differing standards of development can throw light on novel aspects of the problems to be faced in reconstructing the global economy and that this will assist individual parliamentarians to prepare themselves for what may well be the most significant task of the 1980’s.

Footnotes

1. Annotated proposals for the Committee of Three, NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference paper 1956.

2. Individual national reports attached to the Interim Report on the Activities of the Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO member countries prepared by Mr. Ingvar Helle (Norway), Chairman of the Sub-Committee, are as follows:
   “The United States in Transatlantic Economic Relations,” (Mr. Frank Annunzio).
   “Preliminary Comments on the UK’s position on Trans-atlantic Economic Relations” (Viscount Simon).
   “The Preferential Trade Agreement and the Mediterranean Policy of the European Community” (Mr. Aristide Gunella – Italy).
   “Canada’s Atlantic Economic Relations” (Mr. Peter Bawden).


The Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information

General Introduction

The Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information (CIC) has over the years discussed topics of a particular importance for the cohesion of the Alliance and its image in world affairs. Attention has been focused on the moral and spiritual values common to member states of the Alliance.
Central to Committee discussions has been recognition of the need to communicate clearly the aims and objectives inherent in the concept of the “Atlantic Ideal” and its role in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance. A recommendation adopted in 1962 called for a conference of appropriate authorities “to consider the means of achieving improvement in the general level of instruction in the Atlantic Idea.” A similar recommendation was made in the report prepared by Mr. Robert André-Vivien (France) for the Committee meeting during the 10th Annual Session in 1964, “the Atlantic Ideal must be taught in our schools in the same way as we teach Greek, Roman and Medieval civilization of which it is both the sum and the fruit.”

However there was something less than unanimous agreement on what the Atlantic Ideal meant. A report prepared by a Consultant, Mr. James Huntley, in 1963, examined the problem of “ideological multiplexity . . . being inherent in the Western idea of freedom, over against the apparent strength of communist doctrinal uniformity.”

Mr. Lønning (Norway), Rapporteur of the Committee, was concerned with a different issue when he wrote in his report for the 9th Annual Session in 1963 of the need to preserve the “Mitmenschlichkeit”, the human belonging together against the dulling influence of a robot society, and that to promote the conscious awareness of this basic value, is . . . in the long run . . . a vital concern for our democracy. And it is of substantial importance for our possibilities of fighting the battle of the minds in the countries looking for a foundation of their new culture. Thus the Atlantic Ideal cannot rest in itself as an idea of certain countries benefiting by sticking together once and for all; it involves a vision of man and society relevant to the future of the whole world.”

The prime concern of the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information has been how to give flesh and bones to that vision and in particular how to promote greater awareness of the moral, cultural and political ties of the NATO countries. In 1965, for example, the Committee advocated the pooling of information as one means of “enabling NATO countries to know each others cultures” and as a step towards an Atlantic Cultural Community. Recognition of these ties and of the identity of purpose of the allied nations was considered likely to provide the strongest deterrent to the aggressive instincts of potential enemies. Much consideration has, therefore, been given by the Committee to education and information programmes designed to promote awareness of these fundamental ties.

Educational projects considered by the Committee have included a survey of Alliance history textbooks, an Alliance Information Centre for Teachers and the creation of an Atlantic Institute (see page 39). They were also instrumental in organizing the Bruges Seminars (see page 48). More recent was the Committee’s decision to create a Working Group on the Successor Generation. This was agreed at the 25th Annual Session in Ottawa, October 1979, and reflects a renewed interest in the positive aspects of political education.

Discussions in the field of information programmes have covered a wide variety of issues including the role of the NATO Information Directorate and what image the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be seeking to project within the Alliance. To this end a series of round table meetings were held with journalists and young people. A considerable amount of time has also been spent in examining the information aspects of East-West relations. Prompted by the Helsinki Accords which concluded the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) the Committee created a Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information to monitor progress in the
implementation of the human rights provisions of Basket Three. A "Bulletin" incorporating information on the current situation with respect to human rights in Eastern Europe is published quarterly. A series of meetings with dissidents culminated in a round-table in Ottawa in 1979. The Committee has also considered the political implications of information programmes directed towards the developing countries and aimed at filling the cultural void left by decolonization.

While these considerations are admittedly peripheral to the central physical need to guarantee the security of the Alliance, in the long term the emotional commitment of the Allies may well determine the continued vigour of the Alliance and it is for this reason that the discussions within this Committee are of particular significance.

Cultural Affairs

Behind all of the Committee's early endeavours in respect of cultural matters was the desire to achieve recognition of the moral unity of Alliance nations as a bastion of solidarity. In 1956, with the Cold War at its height, a recommendation was adopted calling for a group of cultural experts to explore potential avenues for the "development of moral ties and cultural progress." Two years later a comprehensive resolution again urged action to stimulate awareness of moral ties.

The Atlantic Intellectual and Cultural Committee of the Atlantic Congress of 1959 (see page 35) in describing the Alliance found that the "moral and spiritual values which constitute the common heritage of its members ... are the basis of their solidarity." It was regarded as vital that a sense of these values should "penetrate into the consciousness of our people and cultivate their attachment thereto."

In endorsing this view the Committee at the 5th Session of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1959 called upon Governments and legislatures to "make available to institutions of learning the text in which the London Congress has defined the moral and intellectual values which are the basis for solidarity." It was recommended that the text be included in civil education programmes and that information and education programmes should be directed not only towards the young but also to adults regardless of the social class to which they might belong.

The Committee welcomed the idea of an Atlantic Cultural Community and in 1965 circulated a questionnaire on cultural and information activities within the Alliance. The results were summarized in the Committee's report for the 11th Annual Session in 1965 prepared by the Rapporteur Mr. Robert André-Vivien (France). The Committee called for the reorganization of NATO's activities to permit more time for cultural and information projects.

A variety of Alliance-wide cultural activities have been endorsed by the Committee - most notably the Atlantic Congress in 1959 and the Atlantic Convention in 1962.

Recently the Committee has been considering the possibility of organizing an exhibition of works of art by artists from member states of the Alliance. The idea emerged from discussions during the Committee meeting at the 24th Annual Session in Lisbon, in November 1978. It was felt that such an exhibition would foster awareness of the close cultural ties existing between the member states of the Alliance.

The Gulbenkian Foundation offered its support on the condition that the exhibition had no overt political theme.
Despite the strenuous efforts of its supporters, in particular the then President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Mr. Paul Thyness (Norway) the project has not received active support or encouragement from most member states and is now moribund.

Education

Introduction

The Committee has achieved a notable success with the holding of the Bruges Seminars on Public Administration in 1968 and 1969 (see page 48) and also played a significant role in the establishment of the now defunct Institute for Management of Technology (see page 46).

It has done useful work in promoting the reciprocal recognition of university entrance requirements. The subject is an important one for Alliance nations interested in sharing developments and pooling knowledge in science, technology and administrative skills. Exchanges of scientists, administrators and technical personnel have increased but for students wishing to pursue their studies or obtain work in another country there have often been problems in gaining recognition of their academic qualifications.

The Committee first discussed the subject in 1964 and a recommendation “on steps to be taken to facilitate the access to a common culture of all young people in NATO and OECD member countries” was adopted by the 10th Annual Session. It called for the equivalent recognition of university entrance requirements, reciprocal recognition of periods of university study in foreign countries, for professional diplomas at university level to be afforded equivalent value and for an increase in Alliance fellowships.

Two further recommendations “on the mutual acceptance of diplomas and periods of study abroad” and “on the establishment of special university programmes both in Europe and North America” were submitted to the 11th Session in 1965.

The subject was also discussed by the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1966 and the 12th Annual Session saw the adoption of a recommendation urging “that the problem caused by non-equivalence and non-acceptance of university qualifications be brought to the attention of Governments and of the several Defence Ministers of NATO nations.” It was also raised at the Deauville Conference in 1967.

The Committee maintained an interest in progress in the field of reciprocal recognition of university entrance requirements and periods of study and in 1973 during the 19th Annual Session held in Ankara, Turkey the President of the Assembly was requested “to examine the possibility . . . of increasing the scope and volume . . . of student exchanges.”

The problems of reciprocal recognition of university requirements have been examined in depth by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and a series of conventions covering Latin America, the Arab States bordering the Mediterranean and the European Region have now been agreed.

The Committee in a recommendation in 1976 called for a joint effort by the NATO Research and Fellowship Programme and themselves “to support scholarship which would explore the status and content of citizenship education in selected countries of the Alliance.” Nothing of substance resulted.
One of the projects discussed by the Committee which did materialize was the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers established in 1963 to provide refresher courses for European and North American teachers of modern history and geography at secondary-school level. The Centre also co-ordinated information on teaching methods, available documentation and teaching aids.

Giving a progress report to the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information in 1970 the then Director of the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, Dr. Otto Pick, said that non-Alliance countries such as Sweden, Japan and Yugoslavia were interested in its work. He described some of the new programmes being devised by the Centre including advanced study courses in education.

The Committee maintained its links with the Centre and at the 19th Annual Session in 1973, an order was passed instructing the Standing Committee “to consider the granting of consultative status by the Assembly to the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers.”

In 1974 the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers was requested to analyse the “Atlantic dimension” in a selection of school textbooks used in the member states. An interim report was submitted to the 22nd Session in November 1976, but unfortunately the Centre was wound up before the study was completed.

Survey of Alliance Textbooks

Political education despite its negative connotations has been a fruitful source of discussions and recommendations within the Committee.

Having determined at an early stage that increasing mutual awareness of commonly held values was essential to maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance, the Committee looked at ways of improving mutual knowledge of current concerns. In a policy statement to the 19th Assembly in 1973, the President, then Sir John Peel (United Kingdom), declared that “the younger generation appears to have little sense of appreciation or comprehension about the Alliance.”

While the lack of information in schools on the bare historical and geographical realities of NATO was decried by them, it was the lack of explanation of the political and peaceful functions of NATO which particularly worried the Committee. A recommendation adopted in 1967 urged that “an understanding of NATO history and objectives be a part of school curricula in all member countries.”

Two years later the 15th Annual Session called for the promotion through teaching of “a more complete understanding among students of the work for peace pursued by NATO.” Specifically it urged a conference of representatives of Ministers of Education to discuss the inclusion in school history books of the work and achievements of the Alliance since its conception. The suggestion received a very mixed reaction. It was criticized by the Secretary-General of NATO, in his comments upon the Assembly’s recommendations, on the grounds that “a group of historians could more appropriately draft textbooks for schools.” His comment was in turn contested by Mr. Giraud (France) who felt that “experience had shown that Governments could disregard the agreed views of historians.” The NATO Director of Information, Mr. Koren, considered that “group drafting” was an unsatisfactory process and preferred the preparation of a draft text by one author “which could then be tailored to the needs of individual Governments [since] it was highly unlikely that a single text, however anodyne would be acceptable to all the Governments concerned.”

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Despite these discouraging responses to its proposal the Committee persisted in its efforts to gain acceptance for the idea of an Alliance textbook. Subsequent to the granting by the Assembly of consultative status to the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers it was agreed that the Centre carry out a survey of the way in which the Alliance is presented to students in their textbooks.

The survey under the direction of Dr. Otto Pick was awarded a grant of £4,000 in January 1974, by the NATO Information Directorate. Six countries were to be surveyed over a period of eighteen months (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, United States) and the International School-book Institute in Braunschweig, Federal Republic of Germany supplied a set of criteria to be used for the survey. The Assembly maintained contact with the project through a special Sub-Committee established by the Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Klaus G. de Vries (Netherlands).

Interim reports on the progress of the survey were prepared in 1974 and 1975 and a final report was submitted to the 22nd Annual Session in 1976 when the Standing Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly were instructed to consider how it might "best be used so as to contribute to a greater public understanding of the present state of the Alliance." Unfortunately the voluminous report was not taken up and has apparently been allowed to pass into obscurity.

Study of Asian and African Languages

Senator Henry Jackson (United States) was the initiator of the proposal to study Asian and African languages and both the Scientific and Technical Committee and the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information gave the idea consideration. A report - "Road to Understanding" - prepared for the 4th Conference, outlined some of the problems to be faced. It recognized that "pride in one's own language has become an integral part of emerging nationalism." Furthermore, while Communists were able to speak in many tongues, the Atlantic Community was restricted to the tongues of former governing nations. The report concluded that "knowledge of an indigenous tongue is a primary tool of understanding."

Acting upon this conclusion a Study Group on Asian and African Languages was set up under the auspices of the School of Oriental Studies in London. A generous grant from the Ford Foundation enabled twenty-six top language experts to meet in May 1959. It was their conclusion that inadequate attention had been given to studying Asian and African languages in Europe and North America and that more time should be spent on language studies.

The London Study Group recommended that a NATO Language Adviser be appointed and that the Study Group should continue so that it might assist the Adviser in the formulation of a NATO Language Programme. A Guide to Teaching Materials for Asian and African Languages and an Inventory of Human and Institutional Resources were two further suggestions made by the Study Group. It was intended that the Guide should reveal "key" languages not adequately covered in existing national programmes. A NATO Language Fellowship Programme with a first year budget of $250,000 was recommended to enable experts to meet and exchange information with colleagues from other Alliance countries. Advanced Study Institutes
and Research Seminar Programmes in African and Asian Languages were also recommended.

The London Study Group concluded, “the vital interests of the Western allies now demand that NATO launch a programme to invigorate the study of Asian and African Languages throughout the NATO area” with a first year budget of at least $500,000.

“Without the tools that such a programme can provide, we cannot hope to convince the younger nations of our sister continents that their cause and ours are one . . . the cause of dignity, freedom and justice for all men everywhere.” A better understanding of mutual interests between the Western world and the peoples of Asia and Africa was regarded as increasingly vital.

Commenting on the London Study Group report the Committee noted that the lack of demand within the Atlantic Community for education in Asian and African affairs, had impeded work on the problems of communication. Training should be given within universities and funds provided for preparation and publication of materials and adequate libraries.

The level of idealistic abstraction on which the debate was held is epitomized in the conclusion, “the peoples of the West cannot and should not attempt to sustain the complete study of Asia and Africa without the collaboration of Asians and Africans.” Would any serious scientist contemplate an investigation without the participation of the subject under investigation!

Information

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its image and the role of its Information Service in disseminating information about NATO and the Alliance in general has been a regular topic of conversation in the Committee.

Explaining NATO’s role is a problem which has been complicated over the years by the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As tensions decreased in Europe the need for collective security became less obvious. There has also been disagreement as to the degree of visibility NATO should aim at achieving. An article entitled “NATO and its Public Image – A Commentary”, which appeared in the July 1971 issue of “Atlantic News” summed up the dilemma: “the purpose of the Alliance is not to invite conflict but to avoid it.”

Were NATO to invite a high degree of visibility public opinion would be better informed. Inevitably, however, media coverage would at times be critical and could prove detrimental. At all events caution dictated that NATO for the most part should maintain a low profile. But keeping a low profile has proved disadvantageous. NATO has developed an ambiguous image and this has made it difficult to refute criticisms. Furthermore its failure to present a convincing response to many of the moral dilemmas of the age has resulted in public disillusion and cynicism about the ultimate aims and objectives of the Alliance.

When addressing the 8th Plenary Session in 1962 the Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Dirk U. Stikker put his finger on one of the major problems to be overcome in projecting a positive image of the Alliance, “an Alliance like ours is bound to suffer
sometimes from the vast gulf which there is bound to be between aspiration and achievement, between desire and performance."

Unfortunately for leaders faced with convincing Alliance public opinion of the virtues and necessity of the Alliance and NATO in the era of detente, the lack of an immediately identifiable external threat led to the perception that NATO was potentially expendable. Or as Mr. Debucquoy (Belgium) put it, "Whilst intelligent people realised that it required a positive effort to preserve Western democracy, the man in the street, particularly if he had seen films showing the finer aspects of Russian life, did not see why he should pay to defend his way of life. It was part of the task of this Committee to help with the education of such people."

The image-makers' task has been complicated by the controversial actions of individual members of the Alliance, by the negative image of NATO in the Third World where it is often seen as a right-wing military organization dedicated to preserving the status quo and by NATO's failure to take an identifiable position on controversial issues such as American participation in the Vietnam War, Alliance acquiescence in the implementation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in recent years the political upheavals in Portugal. Their failure to provide a satisfactory explanation of these issues has tarnished the democratic image of the Alliance and led to accusations of its moral pragmatism.

The accusation of moral pragmatism was examined in considerable detail in the report prepared by Mr. K. Lomas (United Kingdom) for the 16th Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1970. While conceding that the ambivalent reaction of member states of the Alliance to the unfolding tragedy in Vietnam tended to rob the West of its moral leadership in the eyes of many the Rapporteur commented that there could be little doubt that both Superpowers were prepared, if necessary, to indulge in the use of force to obtain political ends, an instance of which the World had recently witnessed in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Under such circumstances moral pragmatism, while less attractive than the noble aspirations of the Atlantic Ideal was surely a more realistic and useful interpretation of the activities of Alliance member Governments than the illusions perpetrated by an image of moral unity and making the World safe for democracy.

Having taken up the challenge with a spirited defence of moral pragmatism, the Committee report to the 16th Session leapt to the attack with a proposal aimed at convincing public opinion of the necessity for NATO in the era of detente. Complimenting the NATO Information Service for its fine work in representing NATO the report nevertheless concluded that NATO's image should be refurbished for "they cannot improve [its] image until the image itself is more clearly defined."

The Committee has made considerable efforts to assist in projecting a positive image for NATO and its activities and objectives and in explaining what common interests lay behind the creation of the Alliance.

As early as 1959 the Committee considered the problems of "assimilating and disseminating authentic information on NATO." From its discussions emerged a proposal for the creation of an "Atlantic Study Committee" or an "Atlantic Institute" which could be devoted to the study of non-military problems. An Atlantic Institute was established in 1961 (see page 39).

Attention was also drawn to the responsibility devolving upon individual member states to encourage informed public opinion within their own countries.

In drawing attention to the role of NATO's Information Service the Committee
has sought the opinion of journalists in a series of "round-table" discussions – the first taking place in 1971. Criticisms were forthright. Mr. Schavoir, of the Deutsche Presse Agentur, stated "correspondents were concerned with news and not public relations" and that it was frustrating when the argument that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was composed of fifteen sovereign states was used as a pretext for providing very little information. He felt that the authorities were often afraid to provide information for fear of disclosing conflict.

The Nord Deutscher Rundfunk representative, Mr. Strupp, commented that "the policy of secrecy was fantastically exaggerated." He cited one instance when NATO had declined to provide information on the Soviet fleet in the Atlantic and Russian film had been used instead!

A round-table discussion with Turkish journalists during the 19th Annual Session in Ankara in 1973 was particularly revealing. What emerged from these round-table discussions was a feeling that the NATO Information Service should be given greater discretionary powers in the processing of information. The Committee called upon the North Atlantic Council to "grant a greater degree of autonomy to the Information Services."

In expressing this view the Committee was calling for the development of a "political information policy." As had become apparent during the round-table discussions one of the major problems was the "unanimity rule" which dictated that any policy statement must be agreed by all the member states' Permanent Representatives before being issued. In practice this meant there could be no immediate comment on political events which resulted in a loss of impact in terms of establishing a "NATO voice." When opinions were issued they were all too often innocuous representing, as they did, a diplomatically contrived response.

Other proposals, aimed at revamping NATO's image, which have been made by the Committee, include the suggestion made in 1966 that the distribution of the "NATO Letter" (now "NATO Review") should be substantially increased. This proposal has since been implemented. The Committee also suggested in its report to the 16th Annual Session in 1970, that one issue in four of "NATO Review" should be dedicated exclusively to illustrating the various peaceful activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Specific proposals were made in 1971 to upgrade NATO's press and information activities. These included the appointment, by national delegations, of a qualified press and television liaison officer to process information for domestic consumption, the relaxation of security restrictions on filming manoeuvres of the armed forces, the opening to the public of meetings of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) and regular meetings between the Information Services and the journalists assigned to cover NATO.

More proposals were made in 1974. It was suggested that the Information Service should give more publicity to activities of member Parliaments, that more information should be distributed to parliamentarians and that a tour of the Assembly should be included as part of the NATO visitors' programme.

In a policy statement, commenting on the proposals for developing the North Atlantic Assembly contained in the Committee of Nine Report, which was made available to the press during the 19th Annual Session in Ankara in 1973, it was suggested that the North Atlantic Assembly, as the primary body for inter-parliamentary co-operation in the Atlantic area, was ideally positioned to assist in
convincing public opinion that the “enjoyment of freedom was not something guaranteed for all time and that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was one way of ensuring that it was preserved.”

The Alliance’s Image in the World

The Committee has always considered it important that the Alliance, through NATO, should disseminate “objective information” about itself to counteract the campaign of disinformation waged by its adversaries. So that other nations should be left in no doubt as to what the Alliance stood for the information provided should “not only tell how we defend ourselves, it must also make clear why we defend ourselves” argued Mr. Lønning in a report prepared for the 9th Annual Conference in 1963.

The Committee has paid particular attention to the information requirements of two target audiences, the developing countries and the Eastern bloc nations.

In advocating an information policy geared to the developing countries committee members in the late 50’s and early 60’s were seeking to combat what were regarded as determined efforts to attract newly independent nations to the communist camp. Several alarmist reports attempted to analyse the Western failure to attract the “uncommitted”. “Communism”, it was noted in the Committee’s report presented to the 9th Annual Session 1963, “provides a firm belief in values securing a unified concept of life” whereas Western democracies tended to present a picture of spiritual and ideological confusion and until this picture was clarified the nations of the Alliance could only “blame themselves for the possible communist conquest of minds.”

The problem, according to the report submitted to the 10th Annual Session in 1964, lay not only in presenting the ideals upon which the Alliance is based as simply and convincingly as communist ideology but in recognising that the grave economic and social problems faced by the developing Asian and African nations required novel responses not necessarily to be found in the established democratic patterns of Alliance nations which in any case were tarnished by association with Colonial rule.

The political realities of East-West relations have influenced the recommendations made by the Committee on information policy in respect of the Eastern bloc countries.

Cold War rivalries clearly influenced the adoption at the 3rd Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1957 of a recommendation calling for a publication on NATO and the Atlantic Community which would reply effectively “to the propaganda and policy of lies of its enemies.”

A recommendation adopted at the 7th Conference in 1961 on the circulation of information behind the Iron Curtain, supported a related recommendation from the Political Committee on the provision of unbiased information to captive nations and urged the North Atlantic Council to ask member Governments to press for the free circulation of information behind the Iron Curtain—a freedom already enjoyed by the free world. It also advocated the uninterrupted use of external broadcasting facilities as an effective instrument for disseminating information “to the farthest corners of the Soviet Union” until such time as a “world wide agreement on the free circulation of information” is attained. A study on the use of television as a further means of conveying objective information to the peoples of the Soviet Union and their satellites was also called for.

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Having reaffirmed their recommendations on the dissemination of objective information adopted the previous year, the Committee in 1962 further proposed the initiation of a review procedure to survey annually the foreign and domestic information policies of member Governments. Such a procedure it was felt would assist in the dissemination of information and would encourage an agreement on "what action properly belongs to NATO."

**Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty**

The role of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) in the dissemination of objective information to the Eastern bloc countries has been a particular concern of the Committee.

Their information activities were first brought to the attention of the Committee in 1972 when they ran into financial difficulties and European assistance was sought. An information document containing an address made by Mr. Stewart S. Cort, Chairman of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, and a member of the Board of Radio Free Europe was distributed to Committee members. In his address Mr. Cort traced the development of the US Administration's attitude to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Mr. Cort quoted a letter, sent to him by President Nixon 23 December 1971, ""... the free flow of information and ideas among nations is indispensable to more normal relations between East and West and to better prospects for an enduring peace. The comprehensive news and comment which East Europeans get from Radio Free Europe helps immensely to neutralise the censorship of speech and press that is still imposed under communist rule. Radio Free Europe's broadcasts thus serve what should be everyone's right, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."

Yet barely two months later Senator Fulbright in a speech to the United States Senate (17 February 1972) described Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as an "irritant to our relations" with the Soviet Union. Their activities constitute "meddling in the internal political affairs of other countries." They are "fundamentally inconsistent with the purposes of the President."

The Committee was asked by Senator Tunney (United States) to give verbal support to the efforts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Members were deeply divided over the wisdom of expressing parliamentary approval of financing the information activities of apparently independent organs of the media, lest this be misconstrued as undue interference in the free flow of information.

Preliminary negotiations were by this time under way in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and Assembly parliamentarians were loath to make a definitive statement which could in any way decrease their Governments' flexibility in negotiations by appearing to tie them to a particular policy. By coincidence a Committee resolution would have been presented to the 18th Plenary Session in 1972 on the day negotiations on security and co-operation opened in Helsinki!

The members of the Committee temporized preferring to wait until the publication of the Eisenhower Report on "The Right to Know" prepared for the United States Administration. In the interim Mr. Peter Corterier (Fed. Rep. of Germany), then Rapporteur, analysed for the Committee the contributions Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were making to "the free passage of ideas"; a contribution which would
be lost if they ceased to operate and were not replaced by a similar mechanism.

Mr. Corterier described their functions: (1) the "home service" function they provided for Eastern Europe "if only national services broadcast from West to East there would be no element of 'home service'. In the opinion of your Rapporteur, something important would be lost." (2) the ability of the two Radios to speak to the nations of Eastern Europe – particularly those in the Soviet Union – which are not states. In the future submerged nationalities will demand greater outlets for their self-awareness. Respect for the free flow of information demands that all nationalities of Europe should participate. (3) Cross-reporting – telling the Hungarians what was said about Hungarian nationalism in "Pravda".

The Report concluded: "There are dangers in approaching the Helsinki talks without a close study of the consequences of concessions on the free flow of information by radio; and some sort of supranational transmissions are absolutely necessary, whatever their institutional framework is".

The Eisenhower Report – "The Right to Know" – when published, proposed a compromise over financial arrangements on the grounds that "direct public support of broadcasting operations by European Governments could lead to confusion in operating policies. This could ultimately impair the effectiveness of the stations as free and responsible information media within the context of United States foreign policy objectives. The Commission therefore believes that the stations must continue to be financed mainly by United States appropriated funds."

The Committee subsequently submitted to the 19th Annual Assembly in 1973 in Ankara a resolution on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which described the stations as having "demonstrated their effectiveness in furthering open international communication of information and ideas and are widely recognised for the professional quality of their research and the objectivity and completeness of their broadcasting services."

The resolution urged support for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty by Governments and interested private groups, and called upon individual European Governments to consider making a financial contribution. It also warned member Governments to scrutinize most carefully "any Soviet proposal which might compromise the future of the two stations" made during the CSCE negotiations.

The Committee maintained its interest in the means used to disseminate information and in 1974 considered the implications of the use of satellites for beaming television programmes across international boundaries.

It should be noted that in 1961 the Committee had called upon the North Atlantic Council to conduct a study into the use of television as a further means of conveying objective information to the peoples of the Soviet Union and their satellites.

In 1977 a resolution adopted by the 23rd Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly called on member Governments to protest against the jamming of broadcasts at the Belgrade follow-up meeting to the Helsinki Agreements.

The Sub-Committee on Free Flow of Information has recently expressed anxiety about current developments in the field of freedom of information and in two resolutions adopted at the 24th Annual Session in Lisbon, November 1978, called upon member Governments to oppose any attempts to curtail the right to freedom of information.

Member Governments participating in the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) in 1979 were urged to "oppose forcefully" any attempts to "restrict in
any way the free flow of information on the shortwave broadcasting bands.” Resolution 79 denounced “the attempts made in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation [UNESCO] to restrict the freedom of the press in the international community” and urged support for the protection of and improvements in the working conditions of journalists.

Information and Youth

The attitude of young people towards NATO and the institutions of Western democracy has been a source of considerable interest to the Committee. Student unrest, the violent demonstrations against American involvement in Vietnam which characterized the late 1960’s together with drug taking were seen as factors potentially destabilizing to the Alliance.

A proposal for a special Assembly Committee to study information and youth problems was adopted at the 14th Annual Session in 1968. As a basis for discussion two reports were commissioned; one from Mr. James Huntley, a consultant to the Committee on “The Implications of Student Unrest”, the other by an editorial team from the magazine AGENOR on “Student Attitudes to Government and Democratic Institutions and NATO.”

In August 1969 the Committee held what the Rapporteur, Mr. Jacob Aano (Norway), described as a “pioneering” round-table discussion with students who had taken part in demonstrations in the past couple of years. One of the students invited to participate in the round table quit soon after the meeting opened stating that “he was not prepared to take part in a discussion with bourgeois politicians. Further, he was not prepared to take part in a discussion with people representing NATO which he detested. He was returning to the Netherlands to organize an anti-NATO demonstration.” He left the room. The incident had repercussions. Some time later during a political discussion on Dutch television, Mr. Klaas de Vries (Netherlands) a Dutch Member of Parliament, and a member of the Assembly who had been present at the round-table discussion was able to refute the claim made by the student, Mr. de Lange, that the Huntley report which had been given a wide distribution, was a NATO inspired document and not an impartial paper. Mr. de Lange’s “anti-NATO activities” were made clear to the viewers.

A second round table on “Violence and Society” was organized but proved less successful than the first as both sides tended to assume dogmatic positions.

A report summarizing the views expressed during the round-table discussions was prepared for the Committee by Mr. John Lambert, a member of the Editorial Board of AGENOR. Entitled “Dimensions of Democracy” the report set out details of the ways the young people questioned wished to see society changed.

“To us, a society is only democratic when those in it can meaningfully take part in determining the events and developments which affect them. This is not so in our society today.” Mr. Lambert concluded on a fairly optimistic note: “Many of the older generation are groping towards criticisms which young students have felt instinctively and have expressed by the whole range of their political actions of challenge and contestation.”

It is nevertheless a sad reflection on the alienation of the generations one from another that an order adopted by the 16th Annual Session in 1970 instructed the Committee “to pursue its survey with groups representing different views of youth in

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order to establish contacts with them and possibly to engage in dialogue with political and social groups" as though they were somehow two mutually exclusive species. NATO was encouraged to convene a Conference of NATO representatives, independent experts and young people to pursue the discussions further, but the subject was allowed to rest until 1979 when it was revived with the formation of the Working Group on the Successor Generation.

**Working Group on the Successor Generation**

The Committee's most recent project has resulted from a profound conviction on the part of several members that the future of Western society is somehow threatened by the cynicism and alienation from traditional values of its young people.

The feeling that national education programmes had somehow failed in transmitting to the successor generations (defined as those generations of North Americans and Europeans who lack first-hand knowledge of shared experiences during World War II and the immediate post-war development of institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) the shared values upon which the Alliance was formed has resulted in support for the development of a clear programme of political education to overcome the gap in political awareness of young people.

A recommendation on this theme was adopted at the 24th Annual Session held in Lisbon in 1978. Recommendation 64 concerned "political information and education" and called upon the North Atlantic Council to organize consultation on questions of information and education. It drew special attention to the "present failings in the intellectual and moral defence of the Western World."

It was subsequently decided during the 25th Annual Session in Ottawa to create a working group to study how youth is informed and involved with international politics in general and Atlantic affairs in particular and to recommend appropriate actions to fill gaps in the education systems of member countries.

The Special Working Group on the Successor Generation met for the first time in London in February 1980, with the participation of five Committee members and four representatives of interested Atlantic organizations, and was addressed by prominent British officials and experts in political education. From their discussions emerged a programme of study.

An interim report setting out the issues involved was prepared for the Committee meeting in Luxembourg in June 1980. In the report it was suggested that the working group should focus upon the Atlantic dimension in political education and should give serious consideration to a recommendation made at the London meeting that the North Atlantic Assembly should hold a "Junior Assembly" thus bringing together representatives of the successor generations from the member states with Assembly parliamentarians. It was estimated that such an event would take two years to arrange with the collaboration of organizations such as the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders. An information document prepared in October 1980 contained details of the organizations which it was proposed to invite to participate in a "Junior Assembly", and the practical issues which remained to be resolved.
Human Rights

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

It was in 1973 that a specific policy decision was taken by the North Atlantic Assembly to assign responsibility for monitoring the progress of human rights developments in the countries of East Europe to the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information. This was partly an internal decision to give the Committee more “weight” and quieten the calls from those parliamentarians who considered it a “lightweight” compared to the Military and Political Committees, and who wished to see it wound up. However it was also recognition of the increasing importance being attached to the human rights provisions of the draft agreement being hammered out in Helsinki.

By 1974, when the decision to create a Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information was taken, the Committee had already made a significant contribution to debate within Alliance countries on the question of security and co-operation in Europe and the desirability of giving permanent recognition to the configuration of political boundaries which obtained in Europe after the Second World War.

A recommendation adopted at the 18th Annual Assembly in 1972 drew attention to the dangers of “negative propaganda” tactics being employed during the Helsinki negotiations. It also made specific proposals for items to be included on the Helsinki agenda, the most far reaching of which called for the establishment of a permanent East-West negotiating machine. Other ideas were the creation of joint long term East-West programmes on housing, employment and social problems; the establishment of libraries jointly stocked by East and West, reciprocal arrangements to increase the exchange of newspapers and the facilitation of tourism.

Similar proposals were made in 1973 in a resolution which emphasized the value of contacts established through the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and of unofficial contacts, “to seek recognition of basic human freedoms by the Soviet Union and the other member countries of the Warsaw Pact, in practice as well as in principle.”

The annual report prepared for the Committee included a detailed analysis of “cultural, human and information aspects of East-West relations” and discussed the implications of three possible political outcomes of the Helsinki negotiations. These were, firstly, an agreement confining “detente” to the sphere of inter-state security without pressing for freer contacts and communications. This would have to be recognized not as a genuine peace settlement but as a limited agreement. Secondly, the most radical outcome would be an all embracing peace settlement including procedures for the gradual creation of conditions beneficial to the free exchange of persons, ideas and information, and thirdly, the most realistic outcome, the Rapporteur concluded, was Western acceptance in principle of the limitation of agreement to the inter-state sphere whilst accepting that confrontations in the ideological sphere would continue in the foreseeable future yet continuing to work towards the dismantling of ideological confrontations in the long term.

In support of this latter objective the Rapporteur proposed that the Committee first “initiate the collection of information on bilateral agreements now in force” between individual countries in the East and the West and later on “to undertake a
monitoring task . . . [with] the general aim . . . [of] pull[ing] aside the curtain of misapprehension which exists between both ends of Europe, and between one end of Europe and North America.”

**Post Helsinki**

Following the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Security and Co-operation in Europe which ended with the signing of the Helsinki Accords, in August 1975, by every European country (except Albania) and the United States and Canada, the Committee turned its attention to discussing what happens next.

A recommendation on East-West Relations submitted jointly with the Political Committee was adopted at the 21st Session of the Assembly in Copenhagen in 1975. Member Governments were urged to monitor carefully the implementation of the “Basket Three” obligations so that there could be a detailed accounting at the Belgrade Follow-up Conference in 1977 and to search for areas where a “commonality of interests” would facilitate the development of East-West contacts.

Similar suggestions were made in a resolution adopted at the 22nd Session in 1976 when it was additionally proposed that Members of Parliament should be included in the delegations to the Follow-up Conference in Belgrade. In 1977 the Committee called for the establishment of monitoring groups within member states to study their compliance with the Basket Three provisions. It also called for clarification and agreement on a common understanding of the provisions on “internal interference” and Soviet and East European definitions of Principle VII of the Helsinki Third Basket provisions to be placed on the agenda at Belgrade.

Mr. Paul Yuszyk (Canada) Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information participated in the Belgrade Follow-up Conference. Although profound East-West differences concerning the definition of “detente” limited the possibilities for substantial accomplishments the Follow-up Conference attracted both public interest and activity.

The concluding document reaffirmed the participants’ commitment to implement the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in full and further committed them to attend a second Follow-up Conference in Madrid in 1980.

In recommendation 65 adopted at the 24th Session in 1978 the Committee urged that careful preparation be made for the Madrid Follow-up Conference in 1980 with the “objective of reaching concrete agreements for the expansion of East-West Co-operation in all areas.” The recommendation was repeated in 1979 at the 25th Session in Ottawa and the Committee expressed the view that failure at Madrid could be fatal not only for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe but could also endanger detente. Every effort must therefore be made to “maintain an atmosphere conducive to dialogue.” Member Governments were urged to seek a “balanced review of all sections of the Final Act” rather than place undue emphasis on one basket.

The Committee in these recommendations and resolutions adopted over five years has been careful to pursue a balanced and pragmatic approach. This is demonstrated, in particular, in the proposal made in 1977 that member countries should examine their own performance in respect of human rights as well as monitoring the Eastern bloc and by the concern demonstrated in the 1979 recommendation that the Madrid Conference should be a balanced review of the Helsinki Agreement and should not place disproportionate emphasis on Basket Three – the human rights provisions.

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Their caution, in the light of the protracted negotiations which heralded the start of
the Madrid Follow-up Conference, has been shown to be well founded.

The Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information
This desire to see the Assembly make a positive contribution to the promotion of a
new order in Europe was in part given expression by the creation of the Sub-
Committee on the Free Flow of Information.

The decision to establish the Sub-Committee was made at a meeting of the
Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information in Washington D.C. on 7
June 1974. The Sub-Committee's initial activities centred around the preparation,
circulation and analysis of a detailed questionnaire on the extent of information and
educational exchanges between Alliance nations and the Soviet Union, Poland, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. This was sent on 31
December 1974 to each Permanent Mission to the North Atlantic Council. A report
was prepared summarizing the information obtained.

Through its Chairman, Mr. Manfred Gessner (Fed. Rep. of Germany) the Sub-
Committee participated in a unique diplomatic initiative when a meeting was
arranged during the concluding stages of the Helsinki negotiations between Mr.
Gessner and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Mr. A.
Dobrynin, thus establishing the first official Soviet contacts with the North Atlantic
Assembly.

It was decided in 1976 to publish a regular bulletin monitoring progress in
complying with the provisions of the Helsinki Third Basket in anticipation of the
Belgrade Follow-up Conference.

In 1978 national delegations were asked by the Sub-Committee to provide infor-
mation on activities connected with human rights in their own countries for inclusion
in "The Bulletin" to give it a more balanced East-West perspective in preparation for
the Madrid Follow-up Conference in November 1980.

The Bulletin is steadily gaining a reputation for conscientious monitoring of the
status of human rights in both East and West.

Links with East European Dissidents
Concerned at the slow progress in the development of human rights in Eastern Europe
the Committee first issued an information sheet on "Dissent in the Soviet Union", prepared by Lord Lyell (United Kingdom) in 1974.

The report provided the basis for a lively debate on human rights which occurred
at the 20th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1974. Mr.
Pavel Litvinov, a Soviet dissident and a recent emigre, was invited to the Committee's
meeting. He expressed the view that "the campaign being conducted in the United
States by Senator Jackson for trade deals with the Soviet Union to be tied to progress in
human rights had had a very great influence on the policy decisions of Soviet leaders
and had proved extremely useful."

The 20th Session adopted a resolution calling upon member Governments "to
confirm their commitment to basic human rights and to recognise the vital connection
these freedoms have with a genuine East-West detente."

The plight of one Soviet dissident was made the subject of a telegram sent by
several members of the Committee to Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the
Russian Communist Party on 16 November 1974, “Valentyn Moroz, Ukrainian Historian is close to death in Vladimir prison after five months hunger strike. For sake of detente on humanitarian grounds we urgently appeal to you to release and hospital ise him immediately.” It was signed by:

Senator John Tunney (United States)
Lord Lyell (United Kingdom)
Mr. K. de Vries (Netherlands)
Senator Paul Yuzyk (Canada)
Senator Alexander MacDonald (Canada)

The Committee subsequently invited other Soviet dissidents living in the West to address their meetings. Dissidents who have accepted an invitation include Dr. Zhores Medvedev and the late Mr. A. Amalrik.

In Ottawa in 1978 a public meeting was arranged by the Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information to which observers representing various groups of émigrés were invited. The meeting was addressed by General Grigorenko who gave examples of Soviet violations of the Helsinki Agreement and warned Alliance members against pursuing a hypocritical detente. General Grigorenko also denounced all forms of imperialism and underlined the dangers of declining moral standards in the West.

In October 1979 the Sub-Committee organized a public round table with ten representatives of various dissident movements in the Soviet Union. A resolution expressing concern about the persecution of private Helsinki monitoring groups in East European countries was subsequently adopted at the 25th Session of the Assembly, in Ottawa, in October 1979.

Footnotes


The Military Committee

General Introduction

First among equals within the Assembly’s Committee structure, the Military Committee has established itself as a minor but influential voice in North American–Western European relations. The Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation has in recent years regularly given evidence to the United States Congressional Armed
Services Committees. Several reports on topics as widely ranging as Eurogroup and Reserve Forces and Home Guard Units have been printed and received wide distribution. This is a particularly creditable achievement given the constraints under which the Military Committee operates, namely, an unwillingness to duplicate the work of the Political Committee in such areas as the strategy that NATO should adopt, and a lack of technical expertise from which to evaluate and compare the often highly sophisticated information made available on weapons systems.

The topics discussed over the years have nevertheless covered a broad span of issues of interest to the Alliance. Not unnaturally they have also reflected the shifting concerns of the Western nations. More surprising perhaps is the cyclical repetitiveness with which the same issues come to the fore and are discussed and debated every few years.

At the very first meeting of the Conference of Parliamentarians from NATO Countries in 1955 much was made of the necessity of member countries achieving standardization. Twenty-five years later this concern is still central to discussions on NATO policy.

The North Atlantic Alliance's legitimate sphere of interest is another recurring theme while the control of nuclear weapons, first raised at the 1955 meeting, has taken on added urgency with the combined results of technological advance and national chauvinism which have led to demands for the proliferation of nuclear capability.

The topics discussed by the Military Committee over the years fall into five general categories: Nuclear strategy, control of nuclear weapons, conventional strategy (troop deployments and weapons systems), standardization and the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty.

**Nuclear Strategy**

*Introduction*

Central to the Military Committee's discussions concerning NATO strategy has been the unquestioning acceptance of two statements: "the strategy is to deter war" and "NATO is a defensive alliance."

NATO, it is said, is a defensive organization which will only react to aggression not initiate it and yet the "first use" of nuclear weapons has never been foreseen. It is this logical inconsistency which has made the development of a coherent strategy such a complex issue for Alliance strategists.

The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was discarded after incidents such as the Hungarian Revolution had revealed the impotence of a strategy relying on the fear engendered by the threat to launch an all out nuclear attack, at an early stage in a conflict, to deter provocative acts. As the Russian tanks rumbled into Budapest the allies were left with no active response other than "massive retaliation". The Military Committee commenting upon the implications of the Hungarian Uprising urged that in future "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should seek the initiative rather than leave it to the Russians." NATO "should not be taken by surprise again" and should endeavour to "exercise pressure on the Soviet flank" rather than pursue a policy of frontal attack.
Rather than be faced with having to take the initiative Western strategic thinkers developed a more sophisticated strategy known as "flexible response" to provide a range of possible responses through a controlled escalation of conflict.

"Flexible response" like "massive retaliation" is considered a defensive strategy permitting the use of nuclear weapons only in retaliation, yet events are once again overtaking theory. Threats to the security of vital economic interests such as guaranteeing oil supplies have been mentioned as sufficient cause for recourse to nuclear weapons. Another aspect of this dilemma is the blurring which has taken place between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons with the development of "grey area" weapons.

The Military Committee's main concern has been to suggest a comprehensive strategy adequate to meet the demands of the nuclear era whilst continuing to emphasize the importance of a strong conventional component. As early as 1957 the Military Committee report called for the establishment of a co-ordinated Alliance policy which would serve as the basis for a common system of defence against the danger of aggression, provision of adequate strategic reprisal forces and sufficient ground, air and naval forces, an adequate shield (including tactical nuclear weapons), close collaboration between political leadership and military leadership, enhancement of military co-ordination in organization, logistics, training and communications and dissemination of information to Members of Parliament on political and military developments affecting NATO.

What this recommendation may have lacked in specificity it certainly made up for in comprehensiveness!

Forward Defence Strategy

The Military Committee has discussed the merits of NATO's conventional forces deployment policy on several occasions. Defined in the 1962 Military Committee general report as "defence up to the Iron Curtain" its virtues were regarded as allowing greater depth for defence operations and strengthening allied morale. Recommendations in support of a "forward deployment strategy" were adopted by the 8th Conference of the NATO Parliamentarians in November 1962. Attention was drawn to the importance of stockpiling arms and equipment in the vicinity of potential combat theatres.

Forward Defence was not always treated so sympathetically. Captain D. Groos (Canada), for example, in his draft report on the State of Atlantic Security in 1970 challenged the doctrine of "forward defence" describing it as "sacred cow" which "obliges NATO to commit its sparsest conventional resources to a thin line of divisions strung out in forward positions in such a way that it is very difficult for them to be moved laterally or regrouped for a counter-attack wherever one is needed."

Intense opposition to this statement was expressed at the Spring meeting of the Assembly in May 1970 and it was subsequently withdrawn from the final report. However, the reaction is interesting as an example of the very real and significant differences of opinion which debates within the Assembly's Committees have exposed.

Redefinition of NATO's Defence Posture

The Military Committee has maintained a particular interest in the development of strategic thinking on conventional defence. Redefinition of NATO's defence posture
was the subject of a recommendation adopted at the 19th Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1973 which described NATO forces as being designed "to fight a war of lengthy duration whereas present military doctrine indicates that any conflict in Europe would probably be of short duration."

The speed with which reinforcements could be made available therefore became critical and in a recommendation adopted at the 22nd Session in 1976 the Military Committee advocated "pre-positioned supplies", maximum use of combat resources, for example, civilian aircraft and specialized merchant shipping as efforts which could be made in peacetime to facilitate rapid reinforcement in a crisis. A resolution adopted in 1977 on "readiness and reinforcement" called for special attention to be given to "measures permitting immediate assignment of forces to NATO commanders which will improve combat readiness."

**Political Warning Time**

A crucial factor in Alliance strategic thinking has been the element described as "political warning time." It is considered that prior to the outbreak of hostilities there would be a period of increasing political tension which would serve as a signal for the allies to mobilize. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and more recently of Afghanistan suggest that Alliance forecasts of the period of "political warning time" may have been optimistic.

Attention was drawn to this point by the General Rapporteur Mr. Patrick Wall (United Kingdom), in his 1977 report: "NATO strategy depends to a very critical extent on the reinforcement of the existing 'in place' forces. Such reinforcement will only be of use if it is begun before commencement of hostilities. Thus the crucial element will be recognising warning time and acting on it; . . . whereas previously it was considered that NATO could rely on as much as three weeks warning time, now this could be as little as three days."

**Control of Nuclear Weapons**

*Introduction*

Fundamental disagreements over the control of nuclear weapons have resulted in some lively discussions in the Military Committee.

While political control of nuclear weapons has been the paramount consideration the Military Committee on several occasions examined the immensely complex military issues involved in the use of nuclear weapons. In 1957 the Military Committee drew attention to the need for a military policy adequate to the demands of the nuclear era and which would necessarily include stockpiling of strategic reserves on allied territory.

A resolution adopted in 1958 urged that clear directives should be issued by the North Atlantic Council "at the appropriate time" to NATO Commanders "as to the situation under which the weapon might be used."

Unfortunately, the impracticality of envisaging, at a time of growing international tension and instability, the representatives of individual Alliance Governments reaching a consensus on guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons renders the proposal both ineffective and naive. Also the time frame in which the suggestion is
presumably couched is more suited to the human pace of conventional warfare than to
the mechanistic speed of a nuclear exchange.

The lack of official guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons has been criticized as
a major structural weakness in Alliance strategy. It has also been seen as an advantage,
a means to keep the enemy guessing thus adding to the Alliance's capacity to deter
aggression.

The argument was only partly resolved by the adoption of the "Athens
Guidelines" in 1962. During a Ministerial Meeting held in Athens in May 1962, the
North Atlantic Council reviewed the circumstances under which NATO might be
compelled to use nuclear weapons. Subsequent reviews of topics such as "initial
defensive tactical use of nuclear weapons, general guidelines for a procedure to be
followed during consultation on an actual use" have been conducted by the Nuclear
Planning Group.1

The fact of life which has given to one member control of a nuclear arsenal which
 guarantees the security of the whole Alliance, has perhaps inevitably provoked dissension
among European members who would welcome a greater sharing of decision making
authority, particularly where nuclear weapons are based on their territory.

This subject was raised by Mr. Denis Healey (United Kingdom) at the first
Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1955. "The fact that NATO's whole
military strategy depends on the use of an arm which is not under NATO control is, I
suggest, an extremely dangerous fact. It tends to corrode the Alliance in Europe,
because the European members of the Alliance have no control over their main means
of defence. . . . I believe it is very dangerous indeed that NATO should continue to rely
on a strategy which it does not itself control and which may not become available to it
in a crisis in the future."

In a major policy statement made to the 6th Conference of NATO Parlia­
mamentarians in 1960 SACEUR (then General Laurie Norstad) commented upon the sugges­
tion that control of nuclear weapons might be passed to NATO as a means of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear powers.

"It cannot be assumed that the creation of a multilateral atomic authority, making
NATO a fourth atomic power, as has been expressed, would necessarily influence the
desire of some nations to pursue their own independent quest for an atomic weapons
capability. However, such action might very well satisfy the desires and interests of
others by meeting fully the military requirements, and by assuring an equal voice in the
control of the particular pool of forces which could be established as essential to the
direct defence of Europe.

"There are several additional advantages or dividends to be gained by adding this
responsibility to NATO. I will mention only one: for the Alliance to have continuing
life and meaning, it needs increasing authority; it needs power of some form. If
politically feasible, action to pass to the Alliance greater control over atomic weapons
and to subject their use more directly to the collective will could be a great and
dramatic new step."

The following year Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary-General of NATO, proposed to
the Parliamentarians a singularly unsatisfactory method of sharing control of nuclear
weapons through weighted votes. "Without prejudicing the rights of producing
countries, the political decision on the use of nuclear weapons could be taken after an
appreciation of the necessity for it by Supreme Allied Commanders by a majority of
weighted votes."
Given the apparent frankness and openness with which both SACEUR and the Secretary-General of NATO responded to this question of sharing control of the nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Alliance, including analysis of the military issues involved, it is a little surprising to see the view expressed in the Military Committee's report for 1962 that because the control of nuclear weapons was essentially a political problem it was therefore "not incumbent on the Military Committee to express an opinion."

This short sighted perspective was reversed the following year and in a meeting on 8 July 1963, the Rapporteur of the Military Committee, General Couzy (Netherlands), was instructed to clarify the military aspects of the "control of nuclear weapons and the [proposed] NATO multilateral/multinational force."

The Multilateral Force (MLF)

A concept which underwent regular metamorphoses - the multilateral force - in its original conception was laid before the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1960 by the Eisenhower Administration. It entailed the possibility of giving NATO five ballistic missile submarines with eighty Polaris missiles before 1963 and called for a system of multilateral control to be devised.

The Multilateral Force (MLF) as it became known was a compromise formula aimed at involving European allies collectively in the responsibilities and decision making processes of nuclear statesmanship. As SACEUR had proposed it would have meant making NATO a fourth nuclear power (after the USA, USSR and the UK), a development which it was hoped would prevent further nuclear proliferation by stemming the demand for independent nuclear forces.

The demand for multiple control of the strategic forces available to the Alliance had been precipitated by a growing European desire to participate in decisions of vital national interest. The decision to use strategic nuclear weapons resides ultimately with the American President and there was a growing sense of doubt in Europe as to the credibility of the United States guarantee to defend its allies' interests through resort to its own nuclear arsenal, when this could lead to the devastation of America. This mood coupled with an undeniable chauvinism was reflected in independent efforts notably the French "force de frappe."

By the time of the Nassau Agreement in 1962 between the British Prime Minister Mr. Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy of the United States the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal had become inextricably interwoven with the idea of a Multinational Force under NATO Command, and in a joint statement on national defence systems both nations pledged to use their "best endeavours" towards the creation of a Multinational Force. Following the Nassau Agreement the decision was taken at a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Ottawa in May 1963, to create a Multinational Force from existing resources to be transformed into a Multilateral Force in due course. Since the cost would be heavy, the Multilateral Force was to consist initially only of American submarines armed with Polaris missiles whose cost would be borne by the allies, while discussions continued on the desirability of acquiring surface ships with mixed crews.

A thoughtful analysis of the issues was provided by General Couzy in his report for the Military Committee in 1963. Responding to the rhetorical question "Is a NATO nuclear force really necessary from a military and political point of view?" the
Rapporteur concluded that: 1) control of nuclear weapons is a political problem; 2) militarily a numerical increase in nuclear resources is superfluous, so the formation of a multilateral nuclear force must be regarded as a waste; 3) militarily the formation of a multinational nuclear force from existing resources seems unnecessary; 4) however, if the formation of this multinational force can lead to a better command structure, but particularly if the allies can in that way be involved intensively in the operational preparation, then such an organization should be instituted as soon as possible.

Such a force was politically desirable as it would give those countries on whose territories nuclear weapons were stockpiled a greater control over their deployment.

The Rapporteur based these conclusions on the understanding that militarily an existing "overkill" capacity made increases in nuclear resources superfluous. "The danger is not imaginary that such contributions would be effected at the expense of the conventional resources which should be given powerful reinforcements rather than weakened. On the other hand, grouping existing NATO nuclear forces would not mean superfluous expansion, only the command structure of the existing forces would have to be altered."

The Military Committee affirmed these conclusions in a recommendation adopted by the 9th Annual Conference held in Paris from 4 to 9 November 1963. The recommendation welcomed the NATO Ministerial decision taken at Ottawa, May 1963 to create the nucleus of a NATO nuclear force and urged "that these proposals be further developed to enable all member nations to have a real participation in the full strategy of the Alliance, covering both nuclear and conventional forces", through the eventual establishment of a "system of joint political control over the existing nuclear weapons within the Alliance."

Having presented the arguments for and against a Multilateral Force in 1963, the Rapporteur in 1964 described the force as "superfluous" from a military point of view and declared it would do nothing to "reinforce political unity." In the report it was stated that "the formation of a Multilateral Force is once again an example of following the line of least resistance. The setting up of a new military organization in the form of a Multilateral Force, to which the United States would contribute only 5% of their total nuclear resources, is thought by some, including myself, to be superfluous from a military point of view, and to do nothing to reinforce political unity. On the contrary, for as long as there is no adequate definition of the political authority which will control the Multilateral Force, the present difficulties in NATO will merely be increased. Instead of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a fourth nuclear power would be added to the three Western nuclear powers existing already."

The inauspicious history of the Multilateral Force (United States) and Multinational Force (United Kingdom) proposals is officially recorded by NATO with the sterile comment that "[these proposals]. . . were for a while under study by a number of Governments. However, neither of these projects reached the stage of actual implementation".2

Arms Control — The Alliance Dilemma

Introduction

The Military Committee's early concern with the credibility of the American guarantee to defend the Alliance with its own strategic nuclear weapons and the desire expressed by European members of the Alliance to have a greater role in the control of
nuclear weapons based on their territory has grown with the technological develop­ments in weapons systems and the bilateral negotiations between America and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms which, by definition, have excluded discussion of theatre nuclear forces (TNF).

Technological advances on both sides have resulted in a complex array of nuclear devices ranging from the strategic inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), through medium and shorter range missiles described as theatre nuclear forces, to those intended for use on the battlefield and known collectively as tactical nuclear weapons. The increasing accuracy of these weapons together with innovations such as multiple warheads (MIRV's and MARV's) and the potential introduction of mobile missile systems, has led to increasing concern as to how these changes affect the balance between deterrence and defence within the Alliance. The most recent tech­nological developments have produced weapon systems which cannot adequately be described either as strategic or theatre nuclear weapons and have fallen into an area loosely defined as "grey area systems."

These developments are considered by some observers not to have contributed to the effectiveness of the Alliance doctrine of flexible response but rather to have reduced the credibility of the Alliance deterrent by providing strategists with nuclear weapons systems whose use could be considered in a scenario which stopped short of an all out nuclear exchange. It may be said that these weapons systems have increased the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in an East-West conflict at an early stage. However it is also claimed that these developments have increased the effectiveness of the Alliance's capability to deter potential aggression from the East.

The unease and divergence of opinion which these innovations in weapons tech­nology have produced have been reflected in the Military Committee debates in recent years.

Progress in detente and political events in East-West relations have also influenced the Committee's deliberations. The conclusion of the first agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT I) in 1972 was a highpoint in arms control negotia­tions and was reinforced by the recognition, inherent in the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975, of the need for confidence building measures to stabilize East-West relations and enhance detente. However, the protracted negotiations towards a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement and the uninspiring negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) have provided plenty of time for reflection, particularly among the European Allies, as to the desirability of arms control negotiations which in the case of SALT are restricted to bilateral talks between the Superpowers, albeit with "adequate consultation" with the allies, and which make no provision for the theatre nuclear systems of paramount importance to Europeans.

The future of detente as an acceptable basis for East-West relations has also been called into question in recent years by the Soviet pursuit of a global maritime capability, by Soviet political adventurism in Africa and by East European violations of the spirit of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Agreement.

The draft general reports of the Military Committee in 1978 and particularly in 1979 which dealt exclusively with the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring the security of the Alliance, sparked off a more than usually lively debate in the Committee's meetings at the 24th and 25th Annual Sessions of the Assembly held in Lisbon and in Ottawa respectively.
The prospective second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) provided a basis for discussion in 1978. The Rapporteur, Mr. Klaas G. de Vries (Netherlands), having first outlined the background to the negotiations and examined the main features of the current draft of the Treaty and the remaining problems still to be resolved, clearly stated that he was in favour of the current draft and that in his opinion the SALT process "is essential to our future stability." Mr. de Vries reasoned that while, "as an arms control agreement, the present draft is deficient in several respects... it will achieve important constraints in certain areas... [although not] the substantial reductions in totals or ending of new programmes that many would like to see. Measures of this nature, however, will only arrive when a higher degree of confidence exists on either side than at present. This confidence can only be built up through the dialogue and exchange of information that SALT permits. SALT then should not be judged through the narrow and restricted world of strategic theory but in the broader political context of establishing and ensuring mutual stability and security through negotiation."

The draft report's conclusions were strongly contested by Senator Jackson (United States) who chose the Lisbon meeting to announce his official opposition to the proposed Treaty. The Senator based his opposition to the emerging Treaty on the grounds that it would undermine Alliance security because it "failed to constrain the Soviet threat to the Minuteman force, and allowed the Soviet Union a significant number of heavy missiles that the United States was denied." Thus acceptance by the United States of this Treaty would confer on the Soviet Union rights and options to continue their military build up which were denied to the United States and its allies.

Also controversial were Mr. de Vries' views on discussion of theatre nuclear weapons within the context of the potential SALT III negotiations and the contribution of the European allies to these projected negotiations. Mr. de Vries expressed the view that "Because of the inherent complexities and overlapping of the various systems... a comparison of the two sides theatre nuclear forces has very little significance... [and in fact]... an emphasis on the separateness of NATO's theatre nuclear systems from the central United States strategic systems is wholly counter-productive as it will produce the very development, that of 'decoupling', that it is designed to avoid."

The depth of disagreement over the contents of the report led the Committee to decide to "take note of" the report rather than attempt to concoct, out of the diversity of views, a compromise formulation acceptable to the majority.

Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF)

The debate continued in 1979 when Mr. de Vries provided a sophisticated critique of current Alliance concern at the effectiveness of NATO's doctrine of deterrence through flexible response and particularly the adequacy of the United States strategic and theatre nuclear forces to sustain this strategy. He examined the issues involved from the point of view of a forthcoming Alliance decision; whether it was desirable for NATO to develop and deploy Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) in Europe.

Mr. de Vries reasoned that "If Europeans already have no confidence that the United States President would launch a retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union with existing Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces based in Europe or with missiles from
the United States or sea-based systems, why should the availability of an admittedly small increment of weapons employing new technologies suddenly erase such deep-rooted doubts." To resolve these doubts he suggested that various measures should be taken including obtaining "unequivocal reassurances of the American guarantee to Europe and the promotion of higher public awareness of the substantial capabilities of existing systems."

He also reiterated the argument made the previous year that "the deployment of long-range capabilities may lessen the American perception of the linkage between its strategic forces and its security interests in Western Europe, a development which would have profound implications."

Mr. de Vries went on to argue that while the Soviet Union could not continue indefinitely the expansion of its theatre forces without invoking a Western reaction the Alliance had first to determine the extent to which its reciprocal modernization programmes should go beyond improving or bolstering existing capabilities in order to obtain Soviet restraint and the degree to which this restraint could be achieved through arms control negotiations.

Following from this decision the Alliance could seek either an arms control solution or a technical solution. The latter alternative would necessitate a decision on basing, an issue of particular political difficulty and sensitivity within the Alliance. Failure to achieve agreement on basing requirements could be divisive within the Alliance and could place additional constraints on Western negotiators in any subsequent East-West talks by thus publicizing the divisions within the Alliance.

The Rapporteur argued that the arms control option should therefore be pursued before any decision is made concerning the deployment of new capabilities and that negotiations should be conducted within the context of future SALT negotiations.

When these views were first aired during the May meeting in Oslo in 1979 they provoked considerable critical discussion and contributed to the decision to establish a Presidential Working Group on Arms Control. Its members comprised the President of the North Atlantic Assembly, the Rapporteurs of the Military and Political Committees and the Chairman of the Military Committee. Its brief was to monitor developments with respect to SALT negotiations and theatre nuclear modernization and to prepare for a debate during the Plenary Session in Ottawa.

**The Presidential Working Group on Arms Control**

On the invitation of Senator Frank Church (United States), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Presidential Working Group appeared before the Senate Committee on 10 September 1979, to give evidence about European attitudes to the Treaty. Introducing the Working Group, Senator Church declared that it was very rare for the Senate to receive testimony from foreign citizens but that in this case it was felt the European attitude was very relevant to the Committee's deliberations. The members of the Working Group, whilst expressing different concerns, were all agreed in their support for SALT.

The President's Working Group also testified before the Senate Sub-Committee on European Affairs and gave evidence to a House of Representatives hearing on European security issues conducted jointly by the Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East and the Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. The Group received high-level briefings during their visit to Washington.

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On the issue of Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) modernization the Working Group held discussions with defence and foreign affairs officials of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn and with British defence officials in London.

As a result of these experiences the Presidential Working Group co-ordinated the drafting of two resolutions on SALT II and the Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) which were debated at the 25th Session in Ottawa in 1979.

The deliberations on theatre nuclear forces modernization at the Ottawa Session aroused considerable interest in the media. Mr. William Whitehurst (United States) a member of the House Armed Services Committee, speaking on behalf of the U.S. Delegation, made a strong appeal to NATO nations to pursue modernization of theatre nuclear forces. He criticized portions of Mr. de Vries' report, "the finding that the present NATO-Warsaw Pact theatre nuclear force balance is 'something very close to parity' is in fact dangerously misleading."

When asked for his views, Mr. Thyness, President of the Assembly, 1978-80, commented that the modernization programme was necessary "to demonstrate the will and ability of NATO to augment its forces. Without this the Warsaw Pact will never act on its own to scale down forces." In the event that such a decision were made he felt it would then be "possible to sit down in SALT III negotiations with the Soviet Union and put a ceiling on nuclear weapons on the European Continent."

Conventional Requirements

Introduction

A prime objective for NATO in maintaining the credibility of the Alliance deterrent has been to ensure the provision of "sufficient" ground forces to complete the "shield-sword" balance. Yet regular estimates of requirements notwithstanding the principle of "minimum force levels" has never been fully implemented.

The Military Committee has been regularly briefed by successive Supreme Allied Commanders and other NATO officials on the numbers of ground forces considered to be sufficient to this purpose and have responded by recommending that priority be given to bringing ground forces up to the minimum levels required. As a first step - a resolution adopted in 1958 called for a NATO working party "to examine improvements in efficiency and economy among the forces of the West." In 1961 the 7th Conference adopted a recommendation which urged member states to raise the strength of the divisions committed to NATO.

The Military Committee has not always been uncritical in its evaluation of NATO policy decisions. At the May 1967 NATO Defence Ministers' meeting the decision was taken to implement a new NATO force policy during the five year period, 1968-72.

The viability of this new policy of force planning was questioned by Senator J. Sherman Cooper (United States) in his Report for 1967. While accepting that the new force policy based on the capability of "sustained financing" was more realistic than its predecessor Senator Cooper was not convinced that the force levels achieved would be "adequate to support the demands of deterrence strategy and flexible response."

The following year, however, the Military Committee was again referring to the need for maintaining "forces sufficient for a credible deterrent" against any potential
military threat, in a recommendation adopted at the 13th Annual Session, without apparently giving consideration to whether such provision would be financially feasible.

As events indicated the impracticability of relying on the complete achievement and maintenance of theoretically "sufficient" force levels and as perceptions of the threat to be faced changed so new expedients were devised to accommodate changing needs.

**Allied Command Europe Mobile Force**

An early development considered by the Military Committee was the NATO proposal for the creation of mobile airborne units under the control of Allied Command Europe, which at a moment's notice could be ordered anywhere in the world to act in the capacity of a "fire brigade". The idea was first discussed by the Military Committee in 1956 as a contingency in the event that the Soviets should lure "NATO forces to distant operational theatres and then strike a decisive blow in Europe."

A resolution calling for the production of aircraft suitable to lift such a mobile force to a threatened area was adopted in 1958. The Military Committee also considered the potential value of a mobile force in reinforcing NATO's "menaced flanks". A resolution to this effect was adopted at the 6th Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1960.

The decision to create a mobile force was taken in principle by the North Atlantic Council in September 1961. Its role was defined as providing rapid reinforcement at any point in the NATO area where there is a potential threat and against which these forces would be effective. Its establishment was also regarded as a demonstration of NATO solidarity. Comprising land, sea and air units, the forces were initially to be drawn from among the troops of the five nations now deployed in Central European Command area. Atomic support would be available if required. Flexibility in the provision by individual nations of personnel and in the number and type of combat and support units was also regarded as beneficial. The first exercises were planned for the autumn of 1962.

The Military Committee maintained interest in the development of the mobile force and was advised of the outcome of exercises. In a series of recommendations adopted in 1962, 1963 and 1964 parliamentarians urged member states to contribute either support units, air transport or financial assistance.

In 1970 the Military Committee discussed the movement towards smaller divisions, which were more comparable in structure and firepower to a Warsaw Pact division. The Military Committee report, presented to the 16th Session of the North Atlantic Assembly, commented: "how far in continuing to duplicate the classical pattern of advance or counter-attack by tanks, supported by aircraft or artillery and followed up by infantry to occupy and hold land, are we tactically merely refighting the Second World War . . . NATO should not be afraid of carrying out radical changes in the structure and tactical training of NATO military units". In conclusion the Rapporteur observed: "the need seems to be for highly manoeuvrable and preferably inexpensive weapons systems that can be used effectively by small bodies of men against a numerically larger opponent."
One of the first sub-committees created by the Military Committee, the Sub-Committee on Reserve Forces and Home Guard Units was established in October 1969, under the chairmanship of Sir Fitzroy Maclean (United Kingdom).

In February 1970, the Sub-Committee despatched to the Permanent Representatives of the fourteen member countries of NATO participating in the Assembly at that time a questionnaire requesting information on the state of reserve forces and home guard units in their countries. The information was collated and a final report was presented to the 17th Annual Session of the Assembly in 1971.

The report, which included an analysis of the contribution reserve forces can make to the rapid build up of conventional forces, plus sections on guerrillas and saboteurs, made several proposals. These included the establishment of a NATO guerrilla warfare and explosives school and national training schemes for specially selected personnel which would permit them to learn for themselves how to manufacture explosives and train others to do so. The report also recommended the creation of a NATO committee on home guard forces to advise and co-ordinate national units.

The Assembly accepted the Sub-Committee's conclusions and in a resolution adopted by the 17th Annual Session called for a study of each member state's methods of training and mobilizing reserve forces as a first step towards modifying existing procedures to obtain greater efficiency and greater uniformity among the reserve forces of the Alliance countries.

In a second resolution European Governments were urged to investigate the usefulness of establishing a central NATO committee on home guard forces. This committee would draw up guidelines and publish training manuals for the use of home guard units which could work in close co-operation with specially created national home guard committees to advise member Governments on the special conditions in their country.

Withdrawal of Allied Forces Stationed in Europe

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions made by parliamentarians to the development of West European-North American relations were the revealing debates which took place under the auspices of the Assembly concerning the possibility of American and Canadian troop withdrawals from Europe and the concept of burden sharing.

Criticism of the Canadian decision to withdraw troops was voiced in the Military Committee meeting of 10 June 1969. Mr. Goedhart (Netherlands) indicated that he considered the Canadian decision was "against the spirit of collective defence and against the Alliance." Mr. Gillespie (Canada) defending the Canadian action stressed that "Canada believed as much as ever in the Alliance but that it was within its rights to aspire to a new role – it was not unilaterally violating any agreement."4

The Canadian decision did not provoke half so much controversy, however, as the realization that the discussion within Congress and American public opinion on reducing the level of troops committed to NATO could well become a reality. American troops rightly or wrongly had come to be regarded as the symbolic expression of America's commitment to defend her allies.

In exposing misconceptions on both sides of the Atlantic, airing grievances and
alaying fears, the Military Committee can be said to have played a significant role of minor historic importance on this issue.

In a speech to the 10th Annual Session in 1964, Senator Henry Jackson (United States) warned fellow parliamentarians from Europe that “it will become increasingly difficult to maintain American support for those of you on this side of the Atlantic who want such a force unless you are prepared to accept a greater share of the costs of protecting the North Atlantic area.”

The Committee discussed the possible effects of redeployment of allied troops on Alliance defence. Western European parliamentarians were able to hear at first hand from American Senators and Congressmen the depth of division within the United States Congress over the Mansfield Resolution. The Military Committee meeting at the 14th Annual Session in 1968, though overshadowed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, nevertheless witnessed a discussion on the Mansfield Resolution of which Sir Fitzroy Maclean (UK) said: “I have been a member of the Assembly and of the Military Committee for a good many years and I cannot recall hearing a better debate or one which was more closely allied to reality.”

Debate focused on balance of payments difficulties, war in Vietnam and United States discontent that Europe was not doing enough to support itself. In the United States these issues had crystallized, however illogically, into the Mansfield Resolution calling for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe. Senator Stennis (United States) warned the meeting that while the invasion of Czechoslovakia had temporarily stopped the movement calling for United States troop withdrawals, “as the perception of a threat dwindled voices might well be raised again calling for troop withdrawals.”

Mr. Paul Findley (United States), addressing the 15th Annual Session in 1969, summarized the potential effects of withdrawals in graphic terms. “The immediate danger I see is not so much from external assault as from internal bleeding. The question which must be faced is how to stop the haemorrhage before it becomes fatal.” Mr. Findley also warned that “while President Nixon has plainly expressed his determination that United States forces in Europe will not be reduced for the time being he cannot deliver indefinitely more than public opinion will sustain.”

Anxieties were perhaps temporarily assuaged by an assurance of the continuing United States commitment to European defence given by the Congressional representatives at the Military Committee meeting of 2 July 1970.

Burden Sharing

“The necessity for closer co-operation, the lack of which would make the financial burdens of the defence efforts insupportable”, was recognized in the Military Committee report adopted at the 6th Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1960. However, it was not until the mid 60’s, when American involvement in the Vietnam conflict was expanding and the financial aspects of maintaining an effective defence and deterrent force were becoming punitive, that any significant discussion of burden-sharing occurred.

Burden-sharing had, in fact, a broader connotation than simply sharing the financial costs of Allied security. For some Americans it meant participation in a global effort to defend mutual interests. Most particularly in those years “global responsibilities” seems to have been associated with tangible allied support for the American role in Vietnam. Senator Stevens (United States) referred to this point in
1968: "help from Western Europe in that respect, even if only in the diplomatic field would be greatly appreciated. The threat was on Western Europe's doorstep, and the United States would continue to carry what it considered its duty, but unless the other allies gave strong support, Western Europe could find itself in a very serious situation."

He asked that his words be regarded as a warning, not as a threat.

Senator Edward Kennedy (United States) speaking in 1969, complained of a "double standard" within the Alliance "which seems automatically to enlarge the mistakes or sins of omission of the United States and correspondingly to diminish those of the European members."

It had developed, he suggested, from European reliance on American financial and military support during the period of reconstruction after the Second World War. However that reliance on a supposed temporary expedient changed into acceptance of the status quo, thus tending to perpetuate American influence within the Alliance long after European economic recovery was completed.

Burden sharing was also discussed in the restricted sense of achieving a more equitable distribution of the financial responsibility for NATO expenditures in Europe. Discussions were precipitated by the balance of payments crises experienced by the United States and the United Kingdom in the late 1960's.

Trilateral discussions between the United States, United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany on the question of the latter defraying or "offsetting" the expenses incurred by the United States and United Kingdom in stationing troops in the Federal Republic took place in October 1966 and April 1967. These discussions were however criticized by other allies for violating the collective decision making principles on which the Alliance is based.

Senator Jackson, discussing the problem of distributing more fully the economic costs of defence, summarized the problem in 1966: "the point to be emphasized is that the economic problems inevitably involve a fundamental political problem: to devise burden-sharing and other arrangements which will support rather than upset the intelligent allocation of defence tasks among the allies."

Senator Cooper (United States) examined the problem extensively in his report to the 15th Annual Session in Brussels in 1969. Drawing on 1967 figures he demonstrated that while the United States was spending almost ten per cent of its gross national product on defence, European allies' contributions varied from 1.2% in the case of Luxembourg to 6.7% by Portugal.

Admitting that a high proportion of American defence expenditure did not concern NATO at all Senator Cooper expressed the opinion that the European members' contributions to the common financing of Western security "viewed in the overall context" were substantial but that a greater effort was still needed, particularly in regard to maintaining adequate force levels. In this case the ally best placed financially to support an increased troop commitment was the Federal Republic of Germany. This raised the equally difficult problem that a substantial increase in German troop levels might be regarded as provocative by the Soviet Union.

The agreement concluded between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany was welcomed by Senator Percy (United States) when submitting a recommendation to the 15th Annual Assembly in 1969 calling for a more equitable distribution of the financial costs of alliance defence. The recommendation drew attention to the fact that had the Mansfield Resolution been put to a vote in the United States Senate at that time it would have been passed by a substantial margin.
It is interesting that despite national differences of opinion the Assembly collectively has regularly reiterated its support for the principle that countries stationing troops abroad through their commitments to NATO should not suffer financial loss and it has supported the concept of a common fund within which excess costs could be met.

**Comparison with Warsaw Pact**

The Military Committee has spent some time considering the comparative strengths of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

A draft report produced by Senator Cooper in May 1968, proved to be particularly controversial. It quoted figures extracted from a report by Mr. Alain Enthoven’s “Arms and Men: the Military Balance in Europe”, which suggested that NATO troop levels were roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact, a proposal quite at odds with NATO statistics. The figures were contested both formally by Admiral Koudijs (Netherlands) in a letter to Senator Cooper which asked for clarification of the assessment “that NATO has about 900,000 troops compared to 960,000 for the Warsaw Pact countries”; and in a lively Committee meeting addressed by General Jurgen Bennecke, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Europe, when Mr. Goedhart (Netherlands) expressed the desire that Mr. Enthoven’s figures should be removed from the report because “they tended to throw doubt on NATO data.”

Mr. Denis Healey (United Kingdom, Minister of Defence), speaking to the 15th Annual Session in 1969 also contested Mr. Enthoven’s conclusions: “Mr. Enthoven is right in suggesting that a crude comparison between the number of divisions in NATO and those in the Warsaw Pact exaggerates the Soviet preponderance since the Soviet divisions are much smaller in manpower. On the other hand, I think he goes to the opposite extreme when he suggests that a count of heads world-wide gives us an adequate picture of relevant capabilities. . . . What is critically important is forces which are, or which can be made, readily available on the spot.”

Following the Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions issued by NATO Ministers at the time of their meeting in Reykjavik on 24 and 25 June 1968, at which it was agreed that any future reductions in troop levels would only take place in the context of reciprocal East-West reductions, the Military Committee shifted its attention to consideration of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

**Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)**

A Sub-Committee on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) was created in 1972 to “undertake a continuing study of the proposals weighed and advanced at meetings on MBFR.” An important aspect of the Sub-Committee’s work has been to provide continuous assessment of developments in the painstakingly slow talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. This continuity of approach has enabled successive rapporteurs to assess the shifting positions of the participants in the negotiations. The Assembly has adopted several recommendations based on the Sub-Committee’s work.
A comprehensive survey of the developments in and current standing of the negotiations on MBFR was prepared for the 25th Annual Session in 1979 by a Special Rapporteur, Mr. Alfons Pawelczyk (Fed. Rep. of Germany). Both the Military Committee and the Political Committee had singled out “unequivocal respect for the twin essentials of parity and collectivity” as the basis for fruitful negotiations. Comparing the initial proposals made by both sides in November 1973 with their current positions Mr. Pawelczyk concluded that “Although NATO has not abandoned its fundamental position with regard to parity and collectivity the positions of both sides on the question of the structural framework of an agreement have come together on a number of important points.”

In support of this assessment the Rapporteur pointed to the attempt by the NATO nations during the 16th, 17th and 18th rounds of negotiations to focus on contentious, unresolved issues; following the considerable rapprochement achieved in principle in summer 1978 regarding the framework of the Treaty; as being conducive to the advance of the negotiations. He suggested that “the negotiations have reached the stage where it should be seen whether a top political level compromise can be reached leading to an initial MBFR agreement, while safeguarding the NATO essentials.”

The draft report was considered by both the Political and Military Committees and an interesting divergence of opinion emerged over attitudes to future developments. Regarding confidence building measures the Political Committee in common with the Rapporteur took the view that “All confidence building measures agreed upon within the CSCE context should be covered by agreements in accordance with the MBFR framework.” The Military Committee preferred to elaborate, “All military measures calculated to inspire confidence which were decided on in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the basis of national sovereignty should be reinforced in the framework of the MBFR negotiations. If at all possible they should be covered by agreements with respect to the geographical CSCE area.”

Standardization

Introduction

A subject to which the Military Committee has regularly returned is the question of standardization. From the first Conference in 1955, Assembly parliamentarians have supported efforts towards integrating the variety of conventional weapon systems available to the armies of the Alliance. Progress has been slow because what is militarily desirable is not necessarily, politically acceptable.

Where member Governments agree jointly to purchase a particular weapon system, this will benefit the producers’ economy but may result in competitors from other countries being put out of work. In practical terms standardization would mean most weapon systems being purchased from the United States to the detriment of European industries, a result which would lead not to the “two-way traffic” envisaged in political dialogue but to a “one-way street”.

The problems this would create for the smaller nations of the Alliance were examined in the report prepared for the 11th Annual Session in 1965. The Rapporteur, Captain Groos (Canada), described small nations as “triple losers” in respect of
standardization for the following reasons (1) military equipment must be purchased abroad (with a consequent loss of valuable foreign exchange); (2) no industrial or technological benefit could be derived; and (3) frequent suspicion that equipment acquired is second best "since many factors in addition to straight military value play large roles in the negotiations leading up to a final purchase contract."

Sub-Committee on Standardization of Weapons and Equipment

A Sub-Committee on Standardization of Weapons and Equipment in NATO was established in 1966 under the chairmanship of Mr. Philip Goodhart (United Kingdom). In its report submitted to the Military Committee in 1967 the Sub-Committee drew attention to the "imprecision of objective between complete standardization . . . and compatible equipment", a distinction defined in the former case as "standardization from the top", that is "from the concept stage" and in the latter case as, "standardization from the bottom" or "interoperability".

The report drew heavily on the work of Mr. Robert Rhodes James of All Souls College, Oxford. Mr. Rhodes James was a former Secretary to the Military Committee and attended meetings as a UK observer from 1965 to 1967.

Defining "The basic division between 'NATO interests' and 'national interests' in the Alliance . . . [as] the fundamental problem in the creation of an agreed NATO policy for material standardization and procurement", the report made three proposals which emphasised the need for co-operation from the planning stage: 1) the machinery for initiating standardization agreements should be made the responsibility of a senior officer or official in NATO such as the Chairman of the Military Agency for Standardization; 2) the provision of a central funding scheme as the first and most crucial step towards central direction of procurement; and 3) that success in standardization and the common production of material lay in adoption of the "international industrial consortium arrangement." A recommendation confirming and supporting these proposals was subsequently adopted by the 13th Annual Session in 1967.

The Military Committee has continued to review progress towards achieving interoperability among national weapon systems.

Eurogroup and Joint Procurement

A separate but related study entitled "Eurogroup – an Experiment in European Defence Co-operation" was adopted by the 19th Annual Session in 1973. It documents the informal origins of Eurogroup as a result of a personal initiative by Mr. Denis Healey (then British Minister of Defence) in 1968 and records the initiative's progress through the formation of sub-groups to the establishment, in 1970, of the European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP).

The report records the early achievement of EURONAD in May 1972, of "Principles of Equipment Collaboration" and concludes by being cautiously optimistic that Eurogroup might supply the answer to "the delicate question of relations between a European Defence Community and the Atlantic Alliance [which could] perhaps be solved more easily by using the Eurogroup as a basis for a European Defence Community than by any other method."

The question of French participation in defence collaboration projects was seen as a problem by the supporters of "improved procurement collaboration." Prospects
seemed brighter in November 1975, when Eurogroup Defence Ministers agreed, in principle, to the creation of a European defence procurement secretariat, a European-North American dialogue on a "two-way street" for defence equipment purchases, and to "extend co-operation in European armaments procurement in an independent forum open to all European members of the North Atlantic Alliance." France subsequently participated in the first session of the Independent European Programme Group, on 2 February 1976.

In recent years several jointly funded projects, of which the multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) is probably the best known, have been agreed between European allies.

The activities of Eurogroup have been covered for the Military Committee by successive Sub-Committees, the first of which, the Sub-Committee on Joint Weapons Procurement, traces its descent from the interest shown in the report on "Eurogroup" by Messrs. Damm (Fed. Rep. of Germany) and Goodhart and from an individual initiative on the part of Mr. John Morris (United Kingdom).

Mr. Morris presented a paper entitled "Major Collaborative Defence Projects" in which the United Kingdom are engaged to the meeting of the Military Committee in Bonn in November 1972. Following discussion of the report Sir Fitzroy Maclean (UK), then Chairman of the Military Committee, suggested that a new sub-committee would be appropriate to investigate the topic on a broader basis. The result was the Sub-Committee on Joint Weapons Procurement which submitted an interim report during the 19th Annual Session in Ankara, October 1973.

The 19th Plenary adopted a recommendation "On Increased Defence Co-operation and Integration" which called for annual reports giving details of present and planned co-operation projects to be made available to the Assembly. The recommendation also called for an investigation of the possibility of a "joint funding system to facilitate a more global approach to the procurement of weapons". However when given the opportunity to comment on the "joint-funding scheme" the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, described the proposal as "impracticable".

Speaking on the proposal, Senator Nunn (United States) favoured creation of a joint-fund "if it could be used to offset American expenditure." It was a timely remark since the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the United States Defense Procurement Bill, which could have provided for a full offset from Europe, was currently before the United States Congress.

The Sub Committee on (European) Defence Cooperation

From 1974 the Sub-Committee on Joint Weapon Procurement was reconstituted as the Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation which held its first meeting in the Hague on 8 April 1974, with Mr. Damm in the chair. This Sub-Committee, initially intended to be a two-year project, quickly gained a reputation for solid research and constructive proposals. The first report by General van Elsen (Netherlands) Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee was the source of two proposals adopted at the 20th Plenary Session in 1974.

Recommendation 42 welcomed the current studies on "rationalization" of
defence resources and the contribution such a policy could make to the long term aim of standardization. It requested that the maximum amount of information concerning deficiencies be made available to the Assembly.

Resolution 22 endorsed the Sub-Committee’s proposal that “Eurogroup undoubtedly represented the most appropriate and efficient framework within which European allies should work.” While calling in general terms for improvements in the working mechanism of Eurogroup, and the broadening of Eurogroup to encompass other issues it also encouraged a common solution to the replacement of the F104 fighter plane and the maximization of co-operation under the agreed principles of equipment collaboration.

General van Elsen’s (Netherlands) 1974 report on the activities of the Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation was the subject of a meeting between the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU in London on 13 November 1974. It was the first of many similar meetings.

The Sub-Committee has in recent years broadened its remit to cover the complex political and economic issues impinging upon defence cooperation between Western Europe and North America and it has consequently dropped the word European from its title.

Representatives of the Sub-Committee visiting Washington to give evidence before the Sub-Committee on Research and Development of the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1976 expressed their views on Eurogroup, European efforts at collaboration and specific projects such as the replacement of the F104 which they felt “illustrated many of the problems inherent in attempting closer co-operation in the armaments field.” They were also able to represent to the Americans, European views on increasing transatlantic co-operation in the reciprocal purchasing of defence equipment and especially the “two-way street”.

The value of such a meeting should not be underestimated. For the first time an American Congressional body was able to hear at first hand European views on a topic of vital mutual concern. This meeting arranged at the instigation of Senator Nunn was repeated in January 1977, when members of the Sub-Committee returned to the United States and met with the House Armed Services Committee, “for a mutual exchange of views on the problems inhibiting Atlantic co-operation in armaments co-production”. The Sub-Committee also participated as the European “leg” at the first meeting of the Transatlantic Policy Panel established under the auspices of the Georgetown Centre for International and Strategic Studies.

Some two years later in August 1979, a delegation from the House Armed Services Committee visited Brussels as guests of the Sub-Committee. They discussed burden-sharing, the two-way street, developments in integration of the European defence industry and the situation in Turkey.

In January 1980, the Sub-Committee on Defence Cooperation returned to the United States, where, in addition to attending the House and Senate Armed Services Committees’ meetings, they were able to visit the Northrop and McDonnell-Douglas Corporations and participate in a seminar on NATO organized by the Defence Preparedness Association.
Effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty

Introduction

A major area of interest to the Military Committee has been the North Atlantic Treaty, its implementation and effectiveness. It is inevitable in an Alliance of fifteen disparate nations that there will be tensions with national interests pulling member states in different directions. Yet it is in this field that the Alliance could most justifiably claim quietly significant if undramatic successes. Despite French withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO it is still a contributor to the various civil activities of the Organization. Equally two member states, Greece and Turkey, have been engaged in a damaging dispute. Greece like France removed itself from the integrated military command yet the cohesiveness of the Alliance has proved a stronger bond than the strains to which it has been exposed.

It is worth noting that France and Greece, with the exception of a seven-year period following the Greek coup d'état in 1967, have continued to send a delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly.

"Automaticity" of Response

The French decision in 1965 to develop an independent nuclear "force de frappe", followed in 1966 by the decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command provoked considerable discussion on the "automaticity" of response to aggression. "Automaticity" signifies the point at which a member state, pursuant to its obligations under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (which provides that in the event "of an armed attack" each ally should take "forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"), would activate its national forces in defence of the Alliance.

The strength of the French commitment to this obligation following withdrawal from the integrated military command was questioned. During a briefing session in May 1966, a joint Military and Political Committee Meeting received the following definitive opinion from Mr. Hockaday, of the NATO International Secretariat, that the "wording of the Treaty referred to automatic support but not to automatic armed intervention."

The continued availability of French air lanes, military bases, and the use of French territory for training purposes was also called into question. In the only recommendation forthcoming from the Military Committee in 1966 the Conference called on the North Atlantic Council to seek long term agreements with the French Government or military authorities on the continued use of existing NATO infrastructure on French territory, and to seek the use of French air space at the very least for NATO North-South communications and for training.

Feelings were still running high in 1967. While there was sympathy for and understanding of the French desire to maintain an independent stance members of the Military Committee were particularly concerned with the tactical problems created by the French decision to withdraw its troops from bases in allied countries, and the demand that NATO troops on French soil should come under French control. In his report for the 13th Annual Session Senator Cooper (United States) described "The loss of French troops and the uses of its territory to NATO as having left a gaping breach in
the defence of Western Europe and the Atlantic nations. There was no question that France's withdrawal was a blow to the military strength and political solidarity of the Alliance.

A meeting of the Military Committee at NATO Headquarters in Paris in May 1967 received a confidential briefing from General Lemnitzer, then SACEUR on the military effects on NATO of French withdrawal.

Senator de Chevigny (France), while clearly speaking on his own initiative, was able to clarify the French position for the Military Committee. He indicated that the French Government "had not for a moment considered that in the event of hostilities it would be outside the Alliance and the obligations thereby implied."

The subject was still under discussion in 1968 when Messrs. Kragh (Denmark) and Hansen (Luxembourg) expressed the view that France was committed by Article IV of the WEU Treaty to provide "automatic military assistance" if any fellow members were attacked.

Territorial Limitations on the Implementation of the Treaty

The second major issue to which the Military Committee has addressed itself are the geographical limitations on the implementation of the Treaty.

At the first meeting of the Parliamentarians in 1955 the then Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Ismay, expressed the opinion that the Treaty could only have a binding effect "for problems within the Alliance area itself." Consultations on all other matters "are or have to be of a purely informative character."

According to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty the extent of NATO interests is limited to the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties. (See Appendix 7)

However, as Article IV makes clear the Parties "will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." And as NATO is keen to make clear "The definition of a geographical area for the purposes of Article V in no way precludes discussion by the Council of events which may occur outside that area. On the contrary. The maintenance of peace and security in any part of the world is dependent upon the international situation as a whole and the Council as a matter of normal practice exchange information and views on major world events whenever they occur."8

What then are the limitations on the application of the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty? In 1956 the members of the Military Committee were of the opinion that "NATO interests are not limited to Article VI" and urged recognition "that events elsewhere may influence the security of NATO countries to such an extent as to render a common intervention necessary."

The Military Committee based this opinion on the view that the Communist "strategic objective was more concerned with outflanking the NATO countries and cutting off their lines of communication with their economic resources in particular the oil area." While addressing the Military Committee in 1962 Vice-Admiral Smeeton expressed the view that application of the North Atlantic Treaty could not
reasonably be constrained by territorial limitations since the aim of the Alliance was to safeguard "a way of life".

Similar opinions were still being expressed some twenty years later. The Rapporteur of the Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies was drawing on the experiences suffered during the global energy crisis in 1973 and 1974 and the ensuing financial crisis when he commented, "The refusal by member countries to perceive or accept that the security of Europe cannot be restricted solely to the present geographical boundaries of the Alliance is, in the Sub-Committee's opinion, a serious and potentially harmful situation. From a military point of view an extension of these boundaries would be desirable but the Sub-Committee is aware of the political difficulties it would create in some countries to agree to such a step."

The question of the globalization of NATO responsibilities has been raised on several occasions. As recently as 1978 the Alliance's "sphere of responsibility" was discussed by the Military Committee in the context of allied intervention in Zaire. Mr. Roux (France) in calling for "improved machinery for co-operation" in order to be prepared for the possibility of "a quick joint reaction in similar situations" nevertheless noted that it would be "difficult to extend NATO's sphere of responsibility and that any such extension would strain its cohesion." Rear Admiral Morgan Giles (United Kingdom) however, declared that, "Despite the political difficulties the Alliance must face the fact that the sea routes around Africa were NATO's real Southern Flank".

The general opinion seemed to be that while "an active Western response in Africa" was not desirable, it would not make "tactical political sense" wholly to reject the option that some "preparations should be made in the event of a dire emergency" and finally that "there were various options open to the West other than direct military action and compensating action could be taken in other spheres."

**Linkage Between Alliances**

On the whole the Military Committee has shied away from identifying itself with a wish to extend NATO's boundaries. As an alternative the Committee has supported the concept of "linkage". In a recommendation adopted by the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1960, the Military Committee urged increased "co-operation between NATO and other organizations such as CENTO and SEATO for the defence of the Free World." During discussion of the reform of NATO in May 1965, the Committee returned to the subject. Sir John Eden (United Kingdom) describing the threat to NATO as "indivisible" and "worldwide" said "It was . . . essential to organize a world basis of defence."

As a first step assistance was provided by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in the establishment of a CENTO Parliamentarians Conference.

**Extending NATO's Membership**

The Military Committee has also, on occasion, discussed the possibility of extending NATO membership.

In 1967 the idea of Israeli accession to NATO was welcomed by Mr. Hansen (Luxembourg) on the grounds that since the Soviet Union was endeavouring to penetrate the Mediterranean, NATO should try to acquire reliable allies and hence
encourage Israeli membership. Mr. Goodhart (United Kingdom) took the opposite view that "if Israel were brought into NATO there would be a danger of driving Arab countries as a bloc into the other camp." Given the Western dependence on Arab oil, any moves toward extending NATO boundaries to include Israel would in this instance have proved counter-productive.

In different situations extending NATO's territorial limits has been considered desirable. Currently negotiations aimed at making Spain a member of NATO are taking place. Spanish membership would provide the vulnerable Southern Flank with additional support.

An important topic in this respect has been the extent of protection the Treaty obligations afford in practical terms to the Alliance's vulnerable flanks. The Military Committee has done some valuable in-depth studies of the particular problems of the Northern and Southern Flanks.

The Sub-Committee on the Southern Flank

The Sub-Committee on the Southern Flank held its first meeting in Washington from 18 to 20 March 1975, at which it was briefed by Admiral M. Johnson, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and made a tour of the Southern Flank area visiting Ankara, Izmir, Athens and Naples from 9 to 13 June 1978.

The current crisis in Cyprus provided the focus of the Committee's work. In his interim report the Rapporteur stated that "unless some form of settlement is found for the present dispute between Greece and Turkey the security and cohesion of the Alliance will be permanently compromised." Following the Washington meeting the Committee issued a press statement calling for the "framework of the Alliance to be used to its fullest potential to achieve settlement of the Cyprus crisis". In describing the United States arms embargo against Turkey as "an extremely regressive piece of legislation which has succeeded only in exacerbating the situation" Mr. Ploeg (Netherlands) was expressing a view held by many Committee members.

The Sub-Committee continued to monitor activities in the Mediterranean area until it was discontinued in 1977.

The Sub-Committee on the Defence of the Northern Flank

The first Sub-Committee on the Defence of the Northern Flank was created in September 1971 with Mr. P. Thyness (Norway) acting as both Chairman and Rapporteur. His report to the 1972 Plenary Session concluded, significantly, that the Northern Flank countries cannot unaided successfully conduct a sustained conventional defence against a major attack by the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact forces in Northern Europe.

A recommendation on the defence of the Northern Flank adopted at the 18th Session in 1972, endorsed the proposals contained in the report. These included the suggestions that steps be taken to reduce the time needed to reinforce Northern Europe Command from Canada and elsewhere; that Northern European countries should improve the reception and deployment facilities for the build up of reinforcements; and that Northern European air defences be increased. A further recommendation also urged further analysis of the effectiveness of Warsaw Pact electronic warfare systems.

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Recognition of the extreme importance to the Alliance of defence along the Northern Flank led to the emergence, in 1978, of a joint Sub-Committee on the Northern Region with a two-year remit. The joint Sub-Committee's final report presented at the 25th Session won the strong endorsement of the Committee. Its message was clear and uncompromising. In the last half decade the Nordic balance had changed considerably resulting in a new and unbalanced situation with the West at a considerable disadvantage. The report emphasized that in the Northern region the military dimension is closely tied to economic and political factors and that any Western attempt to restore the Nordic balance should not place in jeopardy the basic fabric of the Nordic commonality and actions unnecessarily provocative to the Soviet Union should be avoided.

The Sub-Committee's report has contributed to an improved appreciation of the strategic importance of the Northern Flank within the NATO area.

The Sub-Committee on the Soviet Maritime Threat
Established at the same time as the Sub-Committee on Defence of the Northern Flank with Admiral Koudijs (Netherlands) as Chairman and Mr. Patrick Wall (United Kingdom) as Rapporteur, the Sub-Committee on the Soviet Maritime Threat reflected the importance which the Military Committee attaches to the rapidly developing capability of the Soviet naval fleet to operate on a global basis. Of particular concern to the Military Committee are its potentially destabilizing effects on NATO communications and vital oil supply routes and the implications for East-West stability of Soviet plans to develop a global naval strategy.

The implications of the Soviet activity were examined by Mr. Wall in his report prepared for the 18th Session in 1972: "the growth of the Soviet navy has been accompanied in recent years by a dramatic shift in strategy from the defence of the Soviet homeland and coastal waters to an aggressive strategic posture of forward deployment. This forward deployment enables the USSR not only to operate as a global power against other navies, but also gives it a limited capability to intervene throughout the world and the capability of preventing other countries from taking military action in situation(s) where they might otherwise wish to do so."

Footnotes
3. Following the 1967 coup d'état Greece was not a participating member of the North Atlantic Assembly at that time.
4. Minutes of the Military Committee Meeting 10 June 1969. Presumably Mr. Gillespie was referring to the understanding reached by the NATO Ministers at Reykjavik – 24–25 June 1968, that further alliance troop reductions would only be made on the basis of reciprocal reductions with the Eastern bloc – literally – in the context of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.
5. Dr. Alain Enthoven, US Assistant Secretary of Defence (Systems Analysis); figures taken from a study entitled "Methodology for evaluating conventional forces"


7. Article 2 (ii) of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, October 22, 1951, London refers additionally to the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties.


The Political Committee

Introduction

There has been a remarkable consistency in the issues selected for study by the Political Committee which has focused upon two central concerns: the need for political stability within the Alliance and the implications of developments in East-West relations for the security of the Alliance.

In an important sense these two concerns are inextricably linked by the belief that a united and politically stable Alliance presents a more credible deterrent to potential aggressors than a divided one and that the nations of the West can negotiate in international matters from a position of strength if they are united.

It is from this standpoint that the Political Committee has discussed the political implications of events such as the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military command, a topic which might with reason be considered more suitable for the Military Committee.

Clearly there are occasions when military and political considerations are not easily distinguishable. In such cases the Political Committee has tended to examine the issues philosophically while the Military Committee has favoured the practical aspects. Thus the two Committees have sought to complement rather than duplicate each other's work.

Within the two spheres of intra-Alliance relations and East-West relations the Committee has discussed a broad range of issues. During the first decade of the Assembly's existence intra-Alliance relations were dominated by discussions on the desirability of placing those relations in an institutional framework, either as a loose federation of Atlantic nations or, as the European Communities became a reality, between a united Europe and North America. Another important aspect of intra-alliance relations considered by the Committee has been the issue of control over the strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.

As the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance recovered from the devastation of the Second World War they not unnaturally sought a greater say in the control and deployment of nuclear weapons based on their territories. In
response to the changing needs of the Alliance and NATO the Assembly has under­
taken comprehensive studies and made detailed recommendations, for example, on
the reshaping of NATO. The Political Committee's "Working Party on the Reform of
NATO" produced a document of high quality and originality which unfortunately did
not receive the consideration it merited. Shortly after the Working Party had con­
cluded its analysis NATO commissioned its own survey under the chairmanship of
Mr. Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister.

The Political Committee have also discussed national political problems which
have arisen within the Alliance. For example, in the case of Greece, the Committee
spearheaded an Assembly initiative to support Greek parliamentarians following the
military coup in 1967.

By the mid-1960's East-West relations were gathering momentum. The tensions of
the Cold War were gradually being superseded by the process of "detente." The
Political Committee has in its meetings and reports monitored the progress of detente
and the crises and complex issues which have emerged.

Intra-Alliance Relations

In its early years the Political Committee provided the impetus for several important
Alliance initiatives including the Atlantic Congress (see page 35) and the Atlantic
Convention (see page 36). In the late 1960's a proposal made to the Political Commit­
tee by Senator Javits (United States) led to the setting up of the Committee of Nine (see
page 50), to review the current situation and future prospects of the Alliance.

Such initiatives were in a sense peripheral to the main concern of the Committee
which was the development of a stable political framework within the Alliance. The
Atlantic Congress and Atlantic Convention provided leaders of public opinion from
the member states with the opportunity to meet together amidst great publicity to
discuss their expectations for the Alliance and thus to promote an awareness of
common purpose and the strength and stability to be found in unity.

Quite how common ideals were to find expression politically was a subject
frequently discussed by the Committee.

In 1956 the Committee of Three Report had endorsed, as the long-term aim of the
NATO nations, "the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper
even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the
permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater
unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democ­
racies, they have in common."

Such additional protection as might be derived from "permanent association"
must have seemed even more desirable following the crushing of the Hungarian
Uprising in 1956. The 2nd Conference of the NATO Parliamentarians in an
emergency general resolution on the implications of the Hungarian Revolt declared
"the unity and solidarity of . . . the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in upholding
peace and collective security against any aggression [is] more imperative than ever."

However finding a formula for "permanent association" acceptable to all member
states with their conflicting national interests has proved a rather more intractable
problem than the earnestly expressed ideals of unity among the free Atlantic peoples
would indicate. On the one hand dedicated Atlanticists were promoting a vision of “a great federal republic”: Atlantica. Others, seeing in the creation of the first European institutions the first steps towards an integrated Europe favoured rather an Atlantic partnership based on the equality in dimension of a united Europe with North America.

Of all the issues involved in the conception of an Atlantic Community the aspect which appears, not unsurprisingly, to have most interested the Committee, was what parliamentary body the achievement of “permanent association” would give rise to? In January 1962, the Atlantic Convention in its concluding document supported the idea that the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference should be developed into an Atlantic Consultative Assembly.

A proposal for an “Assembly of the Atlantic Alliance” submitted to the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference by Mr. Arthur Conte, a French Parliamentarian and at the time President of the Assembly of the Western European Union (1961–62), was subsequently described by Lord Crathorne (United Kingdom) as “the only constructive proposal made so far which was acceptable to both the United States and Europe.”

Mr. John Lindsay (United States), Rapporteur of the Political Committee submitted a proposal of his own to the 8th Annual Session of the Conference in 1962. He called for the creation of “new machinery... to build not merely European unity but an Atlantic partnership transcending both national and natural boundaries.” In his view “two Assemblies and two only [were] in fact needed, namely a European Parliament and an Atlantic Assembly.”

A recommendation of the Political Committee adopted at the 8th Annual Session of the Conference in 1962 echoed Mr. Lindsay’s proposal and called for the creation of a sub-committee to study and submit recommendations on “the precise powers and functions to be exercised” by an Atlantic Consultative Assembly. The recommendation does not seem to have been taken up as both the Political Committee and the Conference appear to have switched their energies to the more immediate demands of institutionalization (see “Efforts at Institutionalization,” Chapter Two, page 24).

The Political Committee has also discussed measures which could be taken to improve relations within the Alliance both through the creation of new institutional mechanisms, through the reform of NATO and through steps which individual Governments could take to facilitate the development of a common approach to Alliance problems.

A 1958 resolution called for increased consultation and co-operation. Meetings of the North Atlantic Council prior to an East-West summit in 1959 were therefore welcomed as “instances of increased regular and intimate consultations between all the NATO members.” Economic co-operation and co-ordination of policies on “an Atlantic scale” was endorsed by the Political Committee “as the only method of meeting the economic challenge of the communist world.”

The suggestion that there should be more frequent Ministerial meetings and more meetings between the Heads of Government of the member states has occurred naturally as domestic and international policies have become increasingly complex and indistinguishable.

The Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1959, provided an opportunity for reflecting on the “organization, the objectives and means of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” The Political Committee proposed that
the Rapporteurs of the various Committees of the then NATO Parliamentarians' Conference should prepare memoranda on how NATO should "adjust itself to changing world conditions." A recommendation submitted to the 8th Conference in 1962 summarized the common objectives of the Atlantic Community to be pursued "in concert through NATO and other organizations" as: harmonization of political, military and economic policies, priority development of an "agreed NATO policy with respect to nuclear weapons" and the formation of a trade partnership between the European Economic Community and North America as a basis for an Atlantic economic partnership.

A further recommendation from the Political Committee, adopted at the 8th Conference called for "a form of association with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)", the creation of a "Permanent High Council at Ministerial level to plan, concert and, in defined cases, to determine policy on matters of common concern to the Atlantic Community" and the creation of an "Atlantic High Court of Justice."

One specific suggestion made by the Political Committee is that the Alliance should have an institutional mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes between member states.

A 1957 resolution called on the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary-General of NATO to "renew their endeavours to bring about peaceful settlements of ... disputes" and invited member Governments to "improve the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes."

The Political Committee returned to this subject in 1970, when Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany) in his annual report, endorsed a proposal, first made by Mr. Gulek (Turkey) in his Presidential Address to the Assembly in October 1969 and reasserted by Congressman Wayne Hays (United States) in his "Policy Platform" for the 1970 Assembly, to the effect that "NATO should establish an appropriate institutional mechanism", to deal with internal Alliance disputes.

In his Presidential Address Mr. Gulek had referred to the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, "the case of Cyprus should underline the need to establish, within the framework of the Alliance, a procedure and institutions to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes. This mechanism, which would conform to the provisions of Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, should start to function immediately that differences might arise between the NATO members."

Reappraisal of the Role of NATO

The Working Party on the Reform of NATO

The breakdown of the Brussels talks on the enlargement of the European Communities, in 1963, together with growing dissension over the control of nuclear weapons and the role of NATO, formed the background against which the Standing Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference established a Working Party on the Reform of NATO in November 1964, with Mr. Lucien Radoux (Belgium) as Chairman and Mr. Emlyn Hooson (UK) as Rapporteur.
An interim report prepared for the 11th Annual Session in 1965, focused on three issues, the scope and posture of the Alliance, the organization of NATO and the control of nuclear weapons. A joint meeting of the Political and Military Committees agreed on four possible alternative patterns of development for the Alliance and these were included in the report. They envisaged:

(1) that NATO could carry on as at present, but with certain vital reforms to its structure. However, this alternative left the fundamental problem of control over nuclear weapons unresolved;

(2) two-tier membership providing both for increased co-operation and the looser ties envisaged by General de Gaulle. In the view of the Rapporteur this alternative suffered from the weakness that in “trying to accommodate all points of view, one might end up by not representing any point of view”;

(3) a two-pillar approach requiring the development of a European Defence Community inclusive of Great Britain. Whilst this was regarded as the most attractive possibility in the event that Alliance integration could not be achieved, it nevertheless suffered from the same problem as the concept of an integrated NATO, for example, how to persuade nations to surrender a sufficient degree of national sovereignty to supranational control;

(4) a variation of the third alternative providing for a narrower European Defence Community based on French-German union.

Periodic contacts were maintained with the Secretary-General of NATO who had expressed a keen interest in the Working Party's deliberations and findings.

In 1966 the Working Party shifted its emphasis from structural to political and juridical concerns and an amended North Atlantic Treaty was proposed. The Draft Report of the Working Party on the Reform of NATO presented at the 12th Annual Session in November 1966, acknowledged that NATO was primarily still a defensive Alliance and remained essential to the security of the Western World. The North Atlantic Alliance gave “the democratic countries of Western Europe a cohesive resistance, and sustained each country in the face of constant pressure, applied externally and internally calculated to erode its morale and destroy its instinct for self preservation.”

Having outlined four alternative modes of development for the Alliance in its interim report, the Working Party in the concluding draft favoured the two-pillar approach: “the two-pillar system will... work and be successful if it is recognized that the North American pillar and the European pillar are complementary and if their political objectives are well defined and shared.”

The Report also called for the establishment of a NATO Policy Planning Committee, for regional groupings within NATO and for an in-depth study of crisis management techniques and the means to harmonize policies.

In sum the Working Party concluded that “the greatest single need of the Atlantic Alliance is to have a set of agreed political objectives.” The report contained suggestions for amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty although the Rapporteur expressed the opinion that “In practice it is probably much easier to work under the old Treaty with all its disadvantages, than to found a new one.”

Although the Working Party's mandate was reviewed at the 12th Session little further work seems to have been done.

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Harmel Report

Less than a month after the 12th Annual Session of the Assembly in 1966 NATO commissioned an official study "of the future tasks which face the Alliance" following up an initiative made by Mr. Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister. The sub-committees created under the "Harmel Exercise" surveyed several of the topics already covered by the Working Party on the Reform of NATO.

During 1968 the Working Party received confidential extracts of the Harmel Report and the May 1968 Meeting of the Political Committee was addressed by Mr. Jaenicke, Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Political Affairs, on the work done during the Harmel Exercise. The Working Party subsequently declined to prepare its own follow-up to the Harmel Report, a decision which in the long term is to be regretted given the quality of the work originally done by the Working Party on the Reform of NATO and which never received an adequate circulation.

Public Opinion Survey on NATO

An exercise which emerged from the investigations of the Working Party on the Reform of NATO was a survey of public opinion on NATO and the Alliance. Appointing Colonel Wierda (Netherlands) as ad hoc Rapporteur for the survey in May 1968, the Working Party charged him with preparing a paper based on the survey's findings which would explain in simple language the need for the Alliance and NATO.

A questionnaire was circulated to the Standing Committee, members of the Assembly, to representatives of all member countries and to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in each country. A further questionnaire was sent to selected youth organizations and student associations in an attempt to cover as broad a selection of opinion as possible.

The number of replies received in response to the questionnaire did not permit statistically accurate conclusions to be made but some general tendencies could be observed. Most notably, the responses demonstrated the common confusion concerning international institutions. 44% of Belgians surveyed believed that NATO was part of the United Nations Organization, 51% of the Dutch sample believed Sweden was a member of the Alliance, 48% of Canadians did not know of NATO and there was great confusion as to its aims among the remaining 52% of Canadians. Ironically, the French were well informed on NATO and 45% of those sampled could tell the difference between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO: a fact which probably reflects the pre-eminence of Gaullist policy on French national defence and its relationship with the Alliance at that time.

In spite of the confusion which the survey revealed, Colonel Wierda concluded that NATO continued to enjoy considerable public support even among the young of whom he commented "[W]e should amend our judgement of youth, since a critical contribution is better than a thoughtless one."

If the study can be said to have proved anything it is that the Alliance suffered in media terms from a lack of generally available information about its activities. Although the Atlantic Associations contributed to a better knowledge of NATO and the Alliance in the member countries "the radius of action of our Associations does not reach the large social strata of our societies."
Colonel Wierda proposed that NATO should be given a more colourful identity away from the beflagged Headquarters image with the “dreary pre-meeting pictures of ministers behind their name-plates” and suggested a publicity campaign should be launched through the Atlantic Associations, Atlantic periodicals, the Atlantic Institute and the NATO Press and Information Service.

He concluded: “If we want to make of today’s NATO the European Community of tomorrow, we should realise that this goal will not be reached if we run counter to opinion or in the face of indifference. We shall need thoughtful and active support. It is up to us to pave the way.”

West European–North American Relations

Political Control of Nuclear Weapons

Within the context of the Atlantic Alliance several issues have proved a continuous source of discord between the European nations and the United States. One such issue which has been the subject of considerable discussion within the Political Committee has been the delicate question of political control over nuclear weapons consigned to NATO.

When the Atlantic Alliance was first created this had not been regarded as a major problem. The European states were still emerging from the devastation wrought by the Second World War and it was convenient for all parties to accept the protection offered by the American strategic nuclear umbrella. The nuclear weapons made available by the United States to NATO remained under American control. In similar fashion the United Kingdom retained jurisdiction over her nuclear force.

As the European nations regained their economic strength and vigour a new vision of an integrated Europe emerged and was reinforced by the creation of the various European Communities. The creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) was also envisaged and in different guises has been seriously considered on several occasions although nothing concrete has yet emerged. One objective of a European Defence Community would be for the European nations to have their own nuclear force. The creation of a European Defence Community, notwithstanding, the European member states of NATO began seeking greater participation in the decision making, control and deployment of nuclear weapons stationed on their territories.

A Political Committee resolution adopted at the 6th Conference in 1960, favoured the “establishment of NATO control over nuclear weapons.” A similar proposal was made at the 9th Annual Conference in 1963 when the Committee called for a “unified strategic planning system.” The Political Committee report prepared for that Session expanded upon this recommendation advocating development of the North Atlantic Council “into a High Council . . . with powers and functions similar in at least some respects to those exercised by the highly effective combined Chiefs of Staff in World War Two and that the revised North Atlantic Council should engage in political as well as military planning.”

The seeming inability of the European nations to reach agreement on the creation of a European Defence Community and the lack of a concerted effort by the North Atlantic Alliance powers in seeking a formula for investing NATO with control over nuclear weapons meant that the issue of sharing control over NATO strategic forces
deployed on the territory of European member states went unresolved and was the source of considerable strain between the United States and its European allies by 1965.

French Withdrawal from NATO

In 1965 it became the ostensible reason for the French decision to develop its own independent "force de frappe" and in 1966 to withdraw from the integrated military command of NATO. The French Premier, Mr. Georges Pompidou, ascribed the decision to build a "force de frappe" to the need to guarantee the European right "to the creation of its own political personality."

In a speech to the French National Assembly on 17 June 1965, Premier Pompidou declared "No nation exists, be it a European nation or France, unless it is independent, that is with its own policy, its own defence, its own power of decision. That is why, by defending our own independence, we are defending that of Europe to which we belong and we are the real Europeans."

Reactions to this apparent threat to the unity of the Alliance were mixed. Mr. Paul Findley (United States) in a sympathetic evaluation, which was apparently aimed at explaining Gaullism to an American audience, noted, "de Gaulle is not a lonely anachronism...[he has] invoked latent forces that were potent and durable not only in France but also in the rest of Western Europe." Mr. Findley went on to observe that European dissatisfaction "stems from the present NATO structure which forces them to rely under all circumstances upon American strategic capabilities and decisions for the most basic requirements of their national security." Mr. Findley's conclusion was unequivocal - our European allies "want and deserve a larger voice in these vital life-and-death decisions."

With relations between France and the rest of the Alliance deteriorating, Mr. Boscher (France) in 1965 submitted a stimulating and controversial report to the Political Committee, which was duly noted, but not accepted. In it he justified the dissident French position: "so-called military integration (which is held by some to justify political integration) can scarcely be regarded as laid down in Articles III and IX of the Treaty which merely set up a permanent Council for the purpose of considering "matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty", of which the Defence Committee is simply the instrument and provides that "the Parties separately and jointly...will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Mr. Boscher declared: "Be it noted in passing that this latter paragraph justifies the creation of national nuclear forces quite as much as that of an 'integrated' force."

Within the Political Committee there was considerable sympathy for the French position and following the announcement of the intended French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command there was a willingness to re-examine Alliance policies in the light of French criticisms. Above all, parliamentarians were anxious to maintain an "open-door" policy towards France and to counter any suggestion that the French decision to withdraw had diminished the credibility of the Alliance deterrent capability.

In his report to the Political Committee at the 12th Session of the Conference in 1966, Senator Javits noted: "French statements and actions have forced Alliance members to take stock. Many vital questions about the nature of the Alliance and its
future had lain dormant. President de Gaulle's probing has brought about needed discussion and reassessment."

However, the central problem of sharing control over nuclear weapons stationed in Europe remained unresolved.

**Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

Senator Javits discussed the implications of the proposed nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in his report to the 12th Annual Session in 1966. He took the view that "a Non-Proliferation Treaty must take precedence over a NATO nuclear force." Mr. Manlio Brosio, Secretary-General of NATO in his annual address to the Parliamentarians in 1966 also referred to the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty but in the context of reforming the Alliance, "Priority belongs not to a Non-Proliferation Treaty but to the requirements of an Alliance which in itself ensures a Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Recommendation 1 of the Political Committee adopted at the 12th Session reiterated the line taken by Senator Javits, recognizing "the prime importance of an appropriate nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and the "need to develop and establish the NATO consultative procedure on nuclear doctrine" and called upon the North Atlantic Council to support the speedy conclusion of the "efforts of the McNamara Committee... in this field."

**European Arms Procurement Agency**

Gradually the emphasis shifted from European participation in control of NATO nuclear weapons to European efforts to establish an integrated conventional weapons procurement agency, as a practical first step towards the long-term interest in a European Defence Community. Mr. Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany), who replaced Senator Javits as Rapporteur of the Political Committee from 1968 to 1970, first proposed a European Arms Procurement Agency in 1968 and in 1969 a "European Mobile Force."

Introducing his 1969 report, Mr. Blumenfeld described the suggestion as part of an "integrated proposal... that European members of the Alliance should not only continue to develop the practice of concerting their views..." but should seek to achieve joint action on an Arms Procurement Agency and a joint mobile force or "fire brigade".

Political Committee recommendations endorsed these proposals calling in 1968 for a conference of interested European Heads of Government to discuss the establishment of the Joint European Arms Procurement and Defence Agency and in 1969 for "the eventual establishment of an integrated European force."

**Declaration on the Future of the Alliance**

Other contentious issues between Europe and North America have included the cost of stationing troops abroad, the concept of burden-sharing and economic concerns such as the penetration of European markets by the United States particularly with the sale of military hardware. These problems have been discussed by the Military and Economic Committees.
Their views were combined in 1970 in a joint Political Committee, Military Committee and Economic Committee “Declaration on the Future of the Alliance.” In the preamble the Declaration enumerated political pressures and problems currently confronting the Alliance and in a nine-point programme indicated those actions which in the Committees’ opinion should be taken to place the Alliance on a firm foundation. These included increased defence co-operation between the European members of the Alliance, and achieving agreement on “ways and means of easing the costs to the United States of maintaining forces in Europe.”

The Declaration also called for strenuous efforts to promote better relations with the countries of Eastern Europe whilst expressing the conviction “that these efforts should be rooted in political and military solidarity between the Atlantic allies.”

The Year of Europe

In one sense the Declaration on the Future of the Alliance marked a watershed in the North Atlantic Assembly’s attitude to the Alliance. Recommendation 2 of the Political Committee adopted at the 17th Annual Session in 1971 looked to “new possibilities for Atlantic Co-operation.” However the American foreign policy initiative in 1973–74 which came to be known as the “Year of Europe” highlighted just how far removed Atlantic relations were from the ideal. The Year of Europe revealed that fundamental differences still separated North America from its European allies.

Mr. Knud Damgaard (Norway) in a Presidential Address to the 19th Session in Ankara in 1973 sought to define the differences as a conflict between the United States “global approach to problems” and the European approach which tended to be more “regional and nationalistic.”

A less theoretical explanation was given by Mr. Pieter Dankert (Netherlands) in his report to the Political Committee in 1973. In his view the continuing conflict resulted from Europe “still [being] dependent on American military power for her security; while in the economic field she adopts the role of rival and competitor.”

A Political Committee resolution on “intra-alliance problems” adopted in 1974 continued to urge European members of the Alliance to demonstrate to their North American partners their “willingness and determination to maintain an equitable share of the defence burden” and at the same time expressed concern “that concentration on a European approach should not lead to friction within the Alliance.”

Despite the differences which had manifested themselves during the “Year of Europe”, the Ottawa Declaration represented a significant reaffirmation of official support for and faith in the Atlantic Alliance and a renewed commitment to NATO.

The Ottawa Declaration was particularly significant for the North Atlantic Assembly because it recognized “that the cohesion of the Alliance has found expression not only in co-operation among [member] Governments, but also in the free exchange of views among the elected representatives of the peoples of the Alliance” and furthermore declared “support for the strengthening of links among parliamentarians.”

Since the Ottawa Declaration the Political Committee has supported a proposal made by President-Elect Carter in 1976 “for a new architectural effort within the Alliance” in a resolution adopted at the 22nd Plenary Session in 1976 which was held in Williamsburg, Virginia, USA.

West European–American relations have however ceased to be a major concern of the Political Committee which has shifted its gaze to other political developments.
Internal Political Developments

Berlin and the Division of Germany

In addition to developments in the West European–American relationship the Political Committee have considered the implications of political developments within and between member states where these developments appeared as a potential threat to the stability of the Alliance.

One problem which has continued to influence the development of intra-alliance and East-West relations is the position of Germany and of Berlin. In the 1950’s the goal of reunification of Germany was still very much in the forefront of Alliance objectives. In 1958 a Political Committee resolution adopted at the Fourth Annual Conference urged the Soviet Union to “fulfil its responsibilities for the reunification of Germany.” A year later the Committee resolved that no solution to the problem of Berlin and the reunification of Germany should be admitted “which would jeopardise the security, freedom and right of self-determination of democratic West Berlin” and its links with the Federal Republic of Germany.

General Laurie Norstad, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in a speech to the 7th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference in 1961 described Berlin as “a symbol of a larger issue, a greater problem.” He was speaking at the time of the construction of the Berlin Wall and in his speech he recalled that “it was an earlier threat to Berlin, in 1948, that provided one of the major factors which inspired twelve nations [later of course fifteen]... to join together for the common defence of common principles.”

The larger issue for the Alliance was the long-term political status of Germany and the question of German rearmament which would materially affect the ability of the European member states to construct a European Defence Community.

French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in 1966 led to further discussion on the role of a reunited Germany. Senator Javits in his annual report noted that “a reunited Germany could have the strength to tip the balance of power between East and West and thus Germany’s future international role is of cardinal importance to both sides.”

While recognizing the importance of the German question to internal Alliance relations the Political Committee has also been careful to note its role in East-West relations. Thus while a recommendation of the Political Committee adopted at the 13th Annual Session in November 1967 declared the “ending of the division of Germany and the removal of barriers in Europe [to be] the aim of the Alliance, this could only be achieved by a lasting peace settlement in Europe.”

For all practical purposes the understanding reached at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975 has given recognition to the existing political divisions in Europe. The question of re-unification of Germany must therefore await a more propitious season.

Problems of NATO’s Southern Flank: Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Portugal

The problems of NATO’s exposed flanks have presented particular problems for the internal cohesion of the Alliance.

The military coup d’etat which, on 21 April 1967, overthrew the Greek monarchy and led to the dissolution of the Greek Parliament was a shock to all Western
democracies. Calls for a speedy return to democracy in Greece were voiced in various European bodies including the Council of Europe.

For NATO Parliamentarians the desire to see a return to democracy in Greece was coupled with concern that Greek instability might pose a threat to the stability of the Alliance's Southern Flank and that every endeavour should therefore be made to keep Greece within the Atlantic Alliance.

Initial discussions in the Political Committee in June 1967 centred on the appropriate form of response to a letter received from His Excellency Mr. Chastian X. Palamas, Greek Ambassador to NATO. The letter asserted that, in discussing the internal situation in Greece, the Political Committee would be running "counter not only to the most elementary rules of international law but also to the spirit of the North Atlantic Alliance. To evaluate and judge what is happening in an allied country in the absence of that country and with no knowledge of the facts would be an inadmissible and inimical proceeding. We are not here to judge each other."

In his reply, the acting Chairman of the Political Committee Mr. Erik Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany) noted the declaration made by Mr. Kollias, the Greek Prime Minister on 30 May 1967, concerning the intention of the new regime in Greece to create a commission to revise the Constitution and stated that it was the Committee's earnest hope "that the Greek Government would demonstrate its anxiety to conform to [the] basic principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law which are upheld in the North Atlantic Treaty."

The Standing Committee, during a meeting in London in July 1967, issued an invitation to the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Kollias, "to send a parliamentary delegation to the next annual session of the Assembly" in November 1967. The invitation was given additional significance because of the declaration made by the United States delegate Mr. Wayne Hays that his Government "could exercise a certain pressure on Greece by indicating that it would receive no more aid from the United States unless it sent a delegation to the Assembly in November."

No delegation representing Greece appeared and the Assembly subsequently decided to return the Greek contribution to the Assembly's budget, an act which meant for all practical purposes that Greece was no longer to be regarded as a member of the community of NATO nations by the parliamentarians of the Alliance until such time as democracy was restored there.

Efforts continued meanwhile to enable either an official or private party to visit Greece on a fact finding mission for the newly named North Atlantic Assembly, while a resolution adopted at the 15th Annual Session in 1969 drew attention to the effect the continuing "failure of Greece to return to democracy [was having] on criticisms of NATO at all levels of public opinion within the member countries of the Alliance." Similar fears about the impact of the Greek situation on the Alliance were expressed in 1971. "Greece not only represents a problem with respect to the moral credibility of our Alliance but also poses a question concerning the political posture of NATO."

One event in 1970 brought into sharp relief the complexity and interrelationship between domestic problems and Alliance concerns which the political situation in Greece represented. Following an invitation made at the suggestion of Senator Javits (United States) Chairman of the Political Committee, Mr. Papaspyrou, Speaker of the last Greek Parliament prior to the coup, attended a luncheon for members of the Political Committee and other interested parliamentarians to present his view of the current situation in Greece. Mr. Papaspyrou, who departed from Greece with no
security for his return, observed in a strong and moving speech that "il fut clair de l'origine que le coup d'État visait l'instauration d'une dictature permanente" (it was clear from the beginning that the coup d'État would result in the installation of a permanent dictatorship). He felt that the Alliance's failure to act decisively would in the long term be seen as "une énorme bêtise politique" (an enormous political mistake). Mr. Papaspyrou concluded with an appeal to Alliance nations to act not by intervening in the internal affairs of Greece "mais l'arrêt de cette intervention. Il faut mettre fin au cynisme" (but by putting an end to intervention in the interests of which it was necessary to reject cynicism). The occasion of this speech was recalled during the visit of the President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas (UK) to the Greek Parliament in May 1978 when he was welcomed by Mr. Papaspyrou, now Speaker of the Greek National Assembly.

Contacts were established by the Assembly with the then exiled former Premier Caramanlis and with former members of the Greek Parliament and efforts were made by parliamentarians to help those ex-Members of Parliament jailed under the new regime, a fact which has since been acknowledged by the present leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Zilidis, in a book ("For Democracy in Cyprus"), on his years in detention.

With the holding of elections in 1974 democracy was once again established in Greece. A delegation was subsequently returned to the Assembly in 1975.

Responding to the situation in Greece had represented something of a problem to Western Governments, Parliaments and public opinion. The years when democracy was absent from Greece were also marked by the ruthless crushing of an experiment in democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The North Atlantic Alliance could hardly condemn the relentless imposition of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to guarantee the security of the "socialist community" yet itself act in such a manner over Greece as to expose the Alliance to the criticism of interference in the internal affairs of a member nation. In so far as the Assembly through its Political and Standing Committees energetically continued to support the taking of steps necessary to the re-establishment of democracy in Greece it is to be commended in particular in continuing to support former colleagues from the last Greek Parliament before the coup.

If the coup in Greece can be considered to have presented the Alliance nations with a moral dilemma, the crisis in Cyprus in 1974 produced problems of a more practical nature. Mr. Pieter Dankert (Netherlands) Rapporteur of the Political Committee, in an analysis of "Crisis and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean" was emphatic in his criticism of Alliance action over Cyprus. "The conflict of Cyprus brought two members of the NATO Alliance close to full scale war, and resulted in Greece withdrawing its forces from the integrated command structure of NATO. It was, in the view of many critics, the most serious crisis to have affected the Atlantic Alliance since its inception. Furthermore, the conflict revealed the inherent weakness of the Alliance and the emptiness of the rhetoric on which its membership is based."

Mr. Dankert took the view that while the Greek military junta should bear chief responsibility for the crisis, the Alliance was culpable because it had "shied away from adopting a critical attitude towards the dictatorship in Greece and from exerting any form of pressure on the junta to return to democratic rule."

In one sense the pessimism was well founded. It is only now, some seven years later, that negotiations for the return of Greece to participation in the integrated military command system of NATO have been concluded. It is tempting to believe that a more positive and united reaction by the Alliance nations at the time of the coup
in Greece could have permitted a speedier resolution of the parliamentary crisis and forestalled the developments which led Greece and Turkey to open hostility over Cyprus.

The Political Committee, anxious that events in Cyprus were weakening the Southern Flank of the Alliance, has continually monitored developments in its annual reports. In 1978 for example, the Rapporteur Mr. Peter Corterier (Fed. Rep. of Germany) welcomed the lifting of the American arms embargo on Turkey as a step towards improving not only American-Turkish relations but also Turkish-NATO relations and felt that it would also help strengthen the Alliance's Southern Flank.

The problem of the Southern Flank were compounded by the military take-over in Turkey in September of 1980, an event foretold by Mr. Corterier, in his report on Alliance Political Developments in 1979, "the extreme economic difficulties of . . . Turkey require a rapid and massive response from the other members of the Alliance . . . not only [because] these economic problems weaken the military capabilities of the entire Southern Flank . . . but [because] Turkey's economic difficulties have become so extreme that they could feasibly erode the support for its democratic institutions."

The role of Alliance nations and NATO when faced with a crisis in a member state or between member states still remains to be defined. In the case of Portugal, the Political Committee in a resolution adopted at the 21st Annual Session held in Copenhagen in 1975, expressed concern "that the reluctant and apprehensive attitude of most Western Countries [to the current political upheavals] could contribute to an eventual polarisation of forces in Portugal and produce a situation extremely disadvantageous to the Alliance."

The criticism that inaction can often be as influential as action is not new. Mr. Vander Stoel (Netherlands) commenting in 1970 on whether the Alliance could be justified in intervening to help restore democracy and stability in Greece, had pointed out that "to ignore the matter would equally be a political act." The Committee seems to have decided on this occasion that constructive support was the more agreeable alternative, for the resolution urged member countries to aid Portugal in dealing with the Angolan refugees and generally to give economic assistance and encouragement to the development of a genuine democratic process in Portugal.

The Assembly has subsequently played a significant part in implementing the latter proposal with the setting up, following the 24th Session of the Assembly in Lisbon in 1978, of a special study on the economic problems of Portugal (see "The Economic Committee", page 63).

Recent Developments

Not since the Year of Europe (1973-74) revealed the extent of the differences between America and her European allies have so many political issues and crises coalesced to demonstrate the divergence of views between the United States and Europe. It is not simply that the United States as a superpower has a global perspective on international problems while European countries have concentrated on a more Eurocentric approach. The taking and holding hostage of the American Embassy personnel in Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan, the public relations fiasco over the "neutron bomb" and the failure by the Superpowers to ratify the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, have produced considerable disquiet about the Alliance's ability to function as a collective unit with an agreed policy.

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Some of the reasons for this were examined in the general report submitted to the Political Committee in November 1980 which noted that the failure of detente has become a critical issue particularly for Europeans for whom “it is not merely a matter of detente at any price as some Americans appear to perceive the European stance, but a matter of what kind of detente policy the Alliance as an Alliance is prepared to pursue.”

In consequence the apparent inconsistency and “zig-zag” character of certain United States' foreign policy decisions in the recent past has led Europeans to be cautious in their response to American requests for support, a view which in turn has been misunderstood in the United States. A common European complaint, “inadequacy of consultations” which emerged palpably during the latter stages of the negotiations over SALT II were fuelled by the announcement of the Olympic boycott by the United States with apparently no prior consultation with her European allies.

The failure of the Alliance to recognize and take account of the renewed nationalism and assertiveness sweeping American politics is another factor which in the opinion of the Rapporteur contributed to these differences.

While the need for the Alliance has been dramatically reinforced by the invasion of Afghanistan and the critical threat posed by the Gulf War to the energy supplies which are the lifeblood of the nations of the Alliance, the allies’ ability to achieve agreement on a common policy has been complicated by the divergences in short term needs and long term goals between the United States and her European allies. In some respects it may also herald a fundamental disagreement as to the role of the Alliance. Mr. Corterier (Fed. Rep. of Germany) cites, as one reason for the allies’ reluctance to support “punitive action” against Iran following the taking of the hostages, as “a genuine question as to whether the Alliance was the proper international framework from which to initiate action.”

**East-West Relations**

Underlying the Political Committee’s approach to East-West relations is a philosophy which has remained remarkably constant despite the profound changes which have occurred in the political climate since 1955. The basic elements in this philosophy are: a belief in the desirability of developing contacts between East and West and, in particular, for the West to demonstrate the virtues of her democratic way of life and the determination that in East-West negotiations the Alliance should be in a position to negotiate from strength. “Strength” has been interpreted as an Alliance at once united in pursuit of common goals and at the same time composed of independent, stable, economically prosperous states.

It was felt that the more united and determined the Alliance appeared, whilst at the same time remaining open and receptive to relations with the East, the more moderate the Soviet Union would be in its actions and demands. Although the international system has moved since 1955 from the “Cold War” through detente to what some have described as the post-detente era, these basic beliefs continue to be reasserted expressly or by implication in Committee debates, reports and recommendations.

While the rhetoric and the means appear to have changed the ends are not substantially different from those elucidated in the 1950’s. Where the talk was once of
"containment" it is now of "confidence building measures" but the basic belief in reducing tension and achieving a stable "modus vivendi" between two political ideologies remains.

In 1959 the Political Committee welcomed "recent indications that the Soviet Union may be prepared to engage in a serious discussion of world problems and the prospect of high level discussions between East and West" and in a resolution adopted at the 5th Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in 1959 endorsed the hope "that as a result of a satisfactory solution of European problems causing East-West tension a system of collective security will be established for the whole of Europe in which both the United States of America and Canada will participate."

Clearly there was a long way to go before such a situation could be envisaged, and resolutions in 1960 and 1961 were primarily concerned with the "means of making known the values involved in a democratic way of life", and called for the provision of accurate and unbiased information for the peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites. It was felt that demonstrating "the very fact of Western unity would constitute an added inducement to Soviet moderation."

An initiative which grew out of this desire to correspond, on a meaningful level, with people from Eastern Europe led the Political Committee in 1966 to seek informal contacts with representatives of the Assemblies of Eastern European countries "with a view to seeing if more favourable talks cannot usefully be held in order to create conditions favourable to detente in Europe."

Unfortunately the invitations to the Presidents of the Parliaments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, provoked a swift reaction not from Eastern Europe but from the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference itself and particularly from the Federal German delegation. It was felt that the invitation could be construed as implying recognition of the German Democratic Republic. With some embarrassment the invitations were withdrawn, and although similar suggestions have been made in recent years they have not been taken up. On the whole, the Assembly seems to have accepted the view expressed by the German delegation in 1966 that the Inter-Parliamentary Union was a neutral ground where parliamentarians with different political backgrounds could participate on an equal basis whereas an approach from the NATO Parliamentarians, albeit informal, to parliamentary representatives of members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization risked being misconstrued.

The mid 1960's were a period when internal relations both in the West and in the Eastern bloc became increasingly complex. In the West negotiations were in hand for the enlarging of the European Communities and the effect this would have on transatlantic relations was the subject of considerable discussion. The Eastern bloc was experiencing similar shifts, a situation described by Mr. G. Kliesing (Fed. Rep. of Germany), President of the Conference in 1964 as the "development of centrifugal tendencies." The Sino-Soviet split proved a shock to both East and West. However, Mr. Manlio Brosio, Secretary-General of NATO in an address to the 12th Annual Session of the Conference in 1966 cautioned against ascribing too much importance to the de-stabilizing effects of the split upon the Communist countries: "We are sometimes inclined to see the mote in Communist eyes and to overlook the beam in our own." The Alliance was also experiencing its own problems with the French decision to withdraw from the integrated military command of NATO.

A more sophisticated device was needed to explain the increasingly complicated
web of relations developing between and among the nations associated with the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The concept of two monolithic blocs was no longer sufficient to encompass political reality. In due course the policy of detente or "peaceful coexistence" was enumerated. As early as 1960 NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Paul Henri-Spaak in an address to the 6th Annual Conference referred to "peaceful coexistence" as it had been defined by Mr. Kruschev as a continuation of the ideological struggle on all levels short of warfare.

Indeed Western scepticism over the Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence" was still very much in evidence in the mid-1960's. In the General Report of the Political Committee in 1966, Senator Javits (United States) examined the changing nature of the Communist threat and urged that while the Soviet Union should be encouraged to resume its place in Europe, the Western nations should maintain extreme vigilance at all times: "There should be no doubt that to the extent Soviet behaviour has moderated itself this is due to the strength and unity of NATO... to the extent that the Soviet Union pursues a policy of peaceful co-existence it is because of their leaders' belief that 'objective conditions' demand such a course."

The invasion of Czechoslovakia and implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968 led the Rapporteur of the Political Committee, Mr. Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany) to reaffirm the need for constant watchfulness on the part of the Alliance: "Preparedness cannot be excluded from its calculations. The unpredictability of the Soviet Union has become more predictable... although the Soviet Union is not familiar with the term 'neutrality' she understands 'neutralisation' as a step towards the integration of a given country in her sphere of influence."

For the Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Manlio Brosio, the invasion of Czechoslovakia actually spelled the end to one scheme, that of "a security system in Europe founded on the full independence of all countries with no need for any coalition or Alliance." Henceforth "peaceful coexistence" would rest on Western recognition of the Soviet determination to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine just as it had formerly accepted the inviolability of the boundaries of their respective "spheres of influence". Any future settlement on European security would have to take account of that.

In considering the multiple negotiations which have been the predominant feature of East-West relations during the last decade the principles first enunciated by the parliamentarians in 1955 have been strongly upheld in the Political Committee's discussions. In a resolution on East-West relations and political priorities adopted in 1970 the Political Committee urged that the development of closer relations with the countries of Eastern Europe be pursued from a position of European political unity and on the basis of a strong Atlantic Alliance.

In 1971 a Political Committee recommendation called on the North Atlantic Council "to work out and apply a joint programme of short and long term aims to be secured by members of the Alliance in the course of present and future East-West negotiations."

**Detente**

Since the Harmel Report in 1967 the Alliance has emphasized that security is composed of two primary elements: defence and detente. In discussing East-West relations the Political Committee has kept abreast of major developments in defence and detente through its general reports but in 1974 it was felt that a more comprehensive
review of detente was desirable, and the Political Committee established the Sub-Committee on Detente at the 20th Annual Session held in London in 1974 with the broad mandate to study the meaning, possibilities and limits of detente.

In four years of activity from 1975 to 1979 the Sub-Committee pursued a programme which concentrated initially on the practical applications of detente. This included studying security and defence issues, particularly SALT, the then newly established MBFR talks, and, after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, the implementation of that agreement with special attention being given to the confidence building measures (CBM's) and geographic areas where it was felt the principles of detente would be tested. The programme of investigation was later expanded to include new developments such as the impact on detente of Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, the political implications of the Soviet growth in military capabilities and the emergence of China's activist foreign policy. The investigations were assisted by meetings with officials and experts in Alliance and neutral countries for hearings and discussions.

The Final Report of the Sub-Committee on Detente examines the differing concepts of detente in East and West, assesses the achievements of detente as well as its setbacks and the developments that have contributed to Western dissatisfaction and gives an analysis of the prospects for detente in the future.

A fundamental issue confronted in the report is the impact of the continuing Western misunderstanding of the Soviet perception of detente as a continuation of ideological conflict: "Soviet policy statements and the recent history of detente have made it unmistakably clear that for the Soviet Union, detente is not global and indivisible... and there is no reason to believe it will change its policy in the future, unless the West can persuade it to extend the limits of detente and make it global out of mutual interest.

"For the Soviet Union, detente is a European and superpower policy, a regional policy. The West should accept that more narrow and restricted view of detente as the basis of its own policy. It should accept that definition before trying to extend detente. If the Soviet Union cannot be persuaded that it is in its interests to extend the limits of detente, the West must be prepared to compete."

In acknowledging that the West must be ready to compete the report is quite clear that it is not advocating that the Alliance be prepared to compete. Indeed it finds the idea of an Alliance "military intervention capability for eventualities in the Third World or an African policy" undesirable because of the "danger of transforming local and regional developments into East-West conflicts." In this respect the Sub-Committee concludes that the interests of the Alliance, African nations and detente are best served by continuing to handle African developments through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and that more intensive consultation and co-operation among members of the Alliance should be encouraged.

The desirability of globalizing the principles of detente is the major conclusion made in the report which calls on decision-makers within and outside the Alliance to recognize the common interest in mutual survival. The Sub-Committee has highlighted basic tasks within the framework of detente which in its view are essential for mutual survival. These are the mutual renunciation of the use of military force backed up by arms control, without which "the mutual renunciation of the use of force and detente cannot remain credible", and the organization of economic co-operation including the Third World on a stable basis.
These conclusions were endorsed in a resolution adopted at the 25th Annual Session in Ottawa, October 1979. The Committee called for work to deepen, broaden and make detente global "through intensified efforts for arms control negotiations, increased East-West economic co-operation, expansion and strengthening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe particularly in confidence building measures and human rights, maintenance of the military balance between East and West, co-ordinated assistance by Western authorities towards Chinese modernization programmes and support for Third World aspirations to independence and self-determination.

In a preface to the report, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee Mr. Kurt Mattick (Fed. Rep. of Germany) summarized the Sub-Committee's views and concluded with a warning not to raise our expectations of detente too high: "... continuing to follow a detente policy will not bring an immediate end to East-West tension. ... Detente is aimed at reducing tensions in spite of differences in ideologies and political systems between East and West."

**Arms Control: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)**

Committee members have frequently reiterated the view that the various arms control negotiations, SALT and MBFR, should be held concurrently with negotiations on European security.

A 1968 recommendation on arms control called upon the United States (in close consultation with NATO and with its other allies) to renew efforts to seek agreement with the Soviet Union ... to curb the arms race ... the ultimate aim being the controlled destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons, and further recommended that the NATO Council should consider establishing a NATO arms control agency to serve as a centre for information research and idea-development in the field of arms control which could in time become an agency for negotiating arms control agreements with nations outside NATO. Had such a proposal been implemented it would have required a qualitative expansion in NATO responsibilities.

The following year 1969, a Political Committee resolution on SALT called on the United States "to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, on a basis consistent with enhancing Western security, on limitations to the strategic nuclear arms race."

The successful conclusion of the SALT I agreement in 1972 was welcomed by the 18th Annual Session. A recommendation urged support for the United States efforts to "consolidate the initial SALT accords by negotiating with the Soviet Union further agreements limiting the qualitative and quantitative nuclear competition between them", and also advised the rapid conclusion of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva as a step towards the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

The military and political implications of the ongoing strategic arms limitation negotiations have been analysed in detail in the Military Committee (see page 100). However the Political Committee in its annual reports on Alliance political developments has referred to the current state of negotiations on SALT II.

In 1978 the Committee, worried by the tantalizingly slow pace of the SALT II negotiations sought to draw attention to the fact "that SALT agreements are the only realistic alternative to further acceleration of the arms race, which produces increasing political and military instability and insecurity and an enormous financial burden on
both sides.” Moreover,” stated the Rapporteur, “failure to approve an agreement, once reached, would have the most serious political consequences for the dynamics of detente.”

That these potentially undesirable consequences have been foreseen is evident in the concern expressed at the political implications of "grey area weapons systems" and the policy of theatre nuclear modernization.

"Grey-area weapons" are by their nature ill-defined but they broadly constitute that part of the spectrum of weapons systems which are not covered in the two central fora of East-West arms control negotiations, MBFR and SALT. Their capabilities are thus largely of interest within the European theatre and it is for this reason that the Rapporteur, Mr. Corterier, urged that "the negotiation format for 'grey-area' weapons systems must be arranged to accommodate European NATO members."

Discussion of grey-area weapons in the context of the politics of theatre nuclear modernization continued in 1979 when Mr. Corterier again serving as Rapporteur to the Political Committee claimed that "the growth in Soviet theatre nuclear weapons has become a corrosive factor in East-West relations, fanning into open fire Western suspicions about Soviet intentions and making the task more difficult for those who wish to pursue detente and see it extended."

Having presented a brief resume of the technological and political developments leading to the achievement of "strategic parity" he warned that the fear that "a gap has been created in NATO's ability to respond flexibly" should not be allowed to justify policies likely to result in shifting the arms race to Europe. By emphasizing theatre nuclear weapons and de-emphasizing the American nuclear guarantee or seeking a "Euro-strategic" balance, "the very possibility of decoupling is more strongly raised." What the Alliance needed was a common position on arms control and theatre nuclear forces modernization to which end it "should acquire a modest programme of selective survivable response."

In the event that there are SALT III negotiations it will be necessary for the European allies to "participate in the development of negotiating positions, that is to say; to participate before a decision is made or an agreement is reached." Mr. Corterier concluded his evaluation by supporting "the idea of parallel simultaneous negotiations aimed at reaching more rapid agreements" and capable of circumventing "the delays that characterized the SALT II negotiations."

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

The Political Committee has welcomed and supported the negotiations which led to the signing of the Helsinki Agreement at the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in August 1975. It has always taken the view that the CSCE negotiations should be considered in conjunction with arms control negotiations and not separately, since both represent essential elements in the dynamics of East-West detente.

A joint Political Committee and Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee recommendation adopted by the 21st Annual Session in 1975 welcomed the continuing process of detente, called for the speedy conclusion of agreements necessary to fulfil the Helsinki Accords and the continued application of pressure for
progress in MBFR negotiations. A related resolution adopted in 1976 called for a review of progress in implementing the agreements reached during CSCE, for new initiatives to curb the arms race and to facilitate arms control. A similar combination of objectives were identified in 1977 and 1978.

The Belgrade follow-up Conference which completed its work in March 1978 made several important contributions to detente according to the Rapporteur Mr. Corterier in his general report to the Political Committee in 1978. The most significant contribution to detente was that “the Belgrade Conference convened and completed its work”, an important factor because the Helsinki Final Act is not a legally binding document but a declaration of intent by the signatories. Equally important was the institutionalization of the review process with the agreement to reconvene in Madrid in November 1980.

Among the achievements considered in the report was the Conference's success in demonstrating that “East and West could conflict over important issues, such as human rights, and still engage in a degree of co-operation.” However the Rapporteur concluded with the warning that while “the West presses its case for basic citizen security as a fundamental component of European security, it must be realistic and learn from Belgrade not to overload the Madrid Conference.”

During the 25th Session held in Ottawa in 1979 it was decided to set up a Working Group on Preparations for the Madrid CSCE Review Conference. Composed of members from the Political, Military, Economic and Education Committees the Working Group was requested to prepare briefing material for NATO parliamentarians.

The Working Group convened at NATO on 24 March 1980, to learn from senior NATO officials the general lines of policy the allies were following in coordinating preparations for the Madrid Conference.

Footnotes

1. For further details see “Union Now”, Clarence Streit, 1949, Harper and Brothers.

2. For further details on alternative proposals for Atlantic partnership see “The Fate of the Atlantic Community”, Elliot Goodman, Published for the Atlantic Council of the United States, Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

The Scientific and Technical Committee

Introduction: NATO Science Activities

Two significant events in the 1950's forced member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to take a closer look at national scientific programmes in particular and the possibilities of broader scientific co-operation in general.

In October 1957 the launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union symbolized the progress made by Soviet science and technology. The strategic implications for the West were obvious. Throughout the 1950's there was a growing realization of the technological imbalance between North America and Western Europe or the "technology gap" as it became known.

The Report of the "Three Wise Men", in 1956, helped place these problems in perspective: "One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology... progress in this field... is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that Alliance members should ensure every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined."

The question remained what should the West, and in particular the European nations be doing to rectify the situation and what role could NATO usefully play in this respect?

The Special Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel

At the 2nd Conference of the NATO Parliamentarians in 1956, the Economic Committee, following a personal initiative by Senator Henry Jackson (United States), sponsored the creation of a "Special Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel", with the objective of focusing Alliance parliamentary attention on the implications of the shortage of skilled technical and scientific manpower in Europe.

The Special Committee received the following brief: "to investigate the training of scientific and technical personnel, the comparative utilisation by NATO and the Soviet Bloc of their existing resources in this field and the development of such resources for future security and economic growth."

The Committee reported to the 3rd Conference in 1957 that "NATO is confronted with a... genuine crisis in the form of serious shortages in skilled scientific and technical manpower. This shortage is due above all to the scientific revolution through which the world is now passing."

The Soviet Union, the study noted, was currently producing trained scientific manpower at twice the annual per capita rate of the Atlantic Community. NATO could contribute most effectively to reducing this imbalance by supporting and expanding the work of existing institutions and through implementing such measures as: a Talent Development Programme designed to produce 500 doctoral degree holders annually; an Awards Programme for Teachers and Students in Secondary Schools; Summer Study Institutes; International Exchanges of Scientific and Technical Personnel; Co-operative Project Research under NATO sponsorship and a European-wide Employment Clearing House.
The Report of the Special Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel, together with that of the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation, were subsequently bound in one document and distributed under the heading "Scientific and Technical Co-operation in NATO."

**The NATO Science Programme**

The creation of the NATO Science Committee in 1958 was followed by implementation of several of the suggestions made in the two reports on Scientific and Technical Personnel and on Scientific and Technical Co-operation. The contribution made by the parliamentarians towards the establishment of the NATO Science Committee is recognized in a report on the creation of the NATO Science Programme. It is noted that "The Science Committee will be responsible, in particular for making specific recommendations to the Council for action... on the many valuable proposals which have been put forward by the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation and by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference."

The NATO Science Programme is described in "NATO Facts and Figures" as "the only co-operative international effort embodying multilateral Government support for advancing the frontiers of modern science through high-level basic research."

One of the foremost concerns of the NATO Science Programme has been to facilitate research and educational exchange. The Special Committee Report on Scientific and Technical Personnel had said that, as a long-term goal, Alliance nations should aspire to educational systems with "no barriers to the development of talent." In pursuing this goal, NATO could ideally play a vital role and "should aim at initiating chain reactions which extend over the broadest scientific and technological front... [in order to] support and broaden the work of existing schools, research centres and agencies in this field, rather than to create new institutions."

An early creation was the NATO Science Fellowship Programme, a scheme which had first attracted the support of NATO Parliamentarians. With an initial budget of $1 million, the first Fellows were selected in 1959, and by the early 1960's, some 1000 Fellows were being funded annually.

The NATO Advanced Study Institutes Programme is also indirectly attributable to the Parliamentarians' 1957 initiative, and sponsors some 50 meetings a year, with 40 to 130 scientists participating in each Institute. Since its creation, in 1959, the Programme has sponsored over 650 Institutes, which have attracted some 35,000 scientists, many leaders in their respective fields. The Programme seeks to provide high-level scientific exchange in inter-disciplinary areas. The programme is considered unique and is highly regarded in the scientific community.

**The Armand Report**

With the establishment of the NATO Science Committee, the Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference turned, in 1958, to considering “an integrated and long-range policy for scientific research and development.”
Senator Jackson, again taking the initiative, directed the Committee's attention towards the "continuing challenge" to be faced from the Soviet Union for dominance in the export field. Soviet policy was perceived as a desire to "reach and over-reach" the West in scientific and industrial achievements as well as advanced weaponry. He was careful to note, however, that science should not be improved solely because of dangers from without. "Now we are in the scientific revolution. The destiny of our community in this and the coming centuries will depend upon our imagination and perseverance in devising new solutions to the new problems posed by the scientific age."

Similar concerns were reflected in the appointment by the Secretary-General of NATO in June 1959, of a study group to be chaired by Dr. Louis Armand, former Director of the European Atomic Energy Community, whose brief was to consider ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of Western science. The Armand Report, as it became known, was to have an influence second only to that of the Report of the "Three Wise Men."

The Armand Report was submitted to the NATO Council on 12 October 1960, and was discussed by the Parliamentarians at their 6th Annual Conference in 1960. The Report declared that "national self-sufficiency in science is a delusion... Science represents a social and political force of decisive importance."

The report by the Armand Committee made several recommendations, the most important of which was the creation of a working party to study the feasibility of establishing an International Institute of Science and Technology. It also advocated increased national planning and support of science as a means of achieving improvements in the quality and quantity of scientists and technicians and called for the removal of national barriers to research and international co-operation.

A scientific questionnaire drawn up by members of the Scientific and Technical Committee on the basis of the Armand Report suggestions, was sent to all Alliance countries. Responses were to be analysed with a view to presenting a synthesis for a five to ten year plan (based on the concept of a group of inter-disciplinary centres devoted to research and education at the planning group level).

One of the results of the Armand Report was the formation of the Killian Group, on 18 January 1961, to examine the feasibility of establishing an International Institute of Science and Technology. The Group concluded unanimously that it was both feasible and desirable to establish such an Institute within Europe, "...to educate leaders and creative scholars in science and engineering who combine professional excellence with cultural understanding" and not least as "a fillip for Western morale."

Following the two reports, the Scientific and Technical Committee recommended in 1961 at the 7th Annual Conference, and again in 1962, that consideration be earnestly given to the project by scientists of member nations. It was felt that NATO bodies should give seminars rather than hold permanent chairs so that the proposed Institute would not have a "permanent NATO label, only a NATO birth-certificate." There the matter seems to have rested until the Deauville Conference in 1967, on the technological gap between Europe and the USA (see page 45).

The Deauville Conference considered the problems of training and recommended that steps be taken towards setting up an international institute of higher education to accelerate technological progress in Europe. This recommendation led to the establishment of an Institute for the Management of Technology, which ultimately was unsuccessful and which ceased operation in 1974 (see page 46).
Social Problems

Narcotics

The Scientific and Technical Committee has a long established interest in problems related to the control of narcotics.

In 1962, following a report by Mr. Peter Rodino (United States) on the control of pharmaceutical products in the light of the Thalidomide tragedy, the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference recommended that "national control of the toxicity of new pharmaceutical products be strengthened by exchange of information . . . from national, private and public laboratories on toxicity and counter-indications of new chemical products and on systems of national control."

During the May meeting in 1963, Mr. Rodino, quoting from the United States Drug Research Report, commented that action by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was one of the factors which led to the adoption of a resolution at the 16th Assembly of the World Health Organization which stated "that international cooperation was essential for the achievement of the best possible protection against hazards for man arising out of the use of drugs."

The Scientific and Technical Committee returned to the subject of narcotics in 1970 when a first working group was formed at the 16th Annual Session at the Hague in November. During the session Mr. Rodino released a personal statement calling on the Alliance member countries to crack down on illegal trafficking in narcotics.

The working group submitted a comprehensive report to the 17th Annual Session in Ottawa in 1971 which concluded that drug abuse was a serious threat to the security of the Atlantic Alliance.

In the working group's report on the "Control of Narcotics", Mr. Rodino wrote: "it is quite clear that greater drug abuse by young men, even at the school stage, automatically influences the behaviour of future servicemen in this field. Thus all measures undertaken to save the health of adolescents also serve to enhance the effectiveness of the allied forces."

The report made specific recommendations on measures which should be taken by member states towards the establishment of an emergency programme for drug abuse control. These included the permanent exchange, on an intra-Alliance basis, of experts and knowledge in the field of combating illicit drug traffic, the encouragement of close co-operation between specialist police services through such measures as the establishment of common training centres and the enactment of legislation to control opium cultivation.

A recommendation adopted at the 1971 Ottawa Session called on member Governments to provide financial assistance to countries banning opium production for the purpose of developing crop diversification and urged that whenever trafficking in opium was discovered it should be discouraged by the systematic imposition of sanctions and co-operation between police forces. It also called for more research into synthetic drugs and proposed a pilot study on narcotics.

In his comments on the recommendation the Secretary-General of NATO called on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society to develop a forum among the allies on "an assessment of the drug abuse situation" and to act "as a catalyst for follow-up action elsewhere by Alliance countries, individually and collectively." He
concluded, however, that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society could best fulfil its role without the establishment of a formal pilot project on narcotics control.

Mr. Rodino presented a report on progress in the control of narcotics in 1972 and in 1973 several parliamentarians presented individual reports on activities in their own countries. Mr. Salazar Leite described the campaign currently being waged against the use of narcotics in Portugal, Mrs. Griesinger (Fed. Rep. of Germany) dealt with the drug situation in the state of Baden-Württemberg and Mr. Martin reported on the control of drug abuse in France.

In 1974, the Working Group was discontinued.

Initiated again by Mr. Rodino, a new working group was established at the 21st Annual Session held in Copenhagen in 1975, with a mandate to continue the assessment of national legislative and administrative action on narcotics. This second working group submitted a report to the 22nd Annual Session held in Williamsburg, in November 1976, on the national activities of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Turkey and the United States.

During discussion of the report, committee members praised Turkish efforts to control opium cultivation. Mr. Akarca (Turkey) informed the Committee that his country's success in controlling opium production had been attested to by a United Nations representative who had stated during a press conference in Ankara that it was the most extensive and successful programme his organization had studied. Mr. Akarca emphasized that it was now the responsibility of the consuming countries to control drug-trafficking and use.


Genetic Manipulation

Reflecting the desire of parliamentarians to be better informed about controversial issues of current concern, the Sub-Committee on Genetic Manipulation was set up during the Assembly's 24th Annual Session in Lisbon in November 1978, to review the state of recombinant DNA research, and to compare the regulations governing its conduct and application in various member countries.

An Information Document on Recombinant DNA Research and Regulations which was prepared for the 24th Annual Assembly attempted to set the issue in context by reviewing some of the benefits and risks associated with the gene-splicing technique. “So far there is no indication that hazardous organisms have resulted from any of the experiments that have been conducted but, in what is a new science, insufficient knowledge is the major reason why the public is faced with a range of differing opinions in the press and from the scientific community.”

During 1979, the Sub-Committee visited the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States and received briefings from scientists, senior government officials and private industry on the benefits and potential hazards of genetic engineering techniques and tried to assess for themselves the nature and extent of the risks involved in genetic manipulation techniques.
Members became aware during their visits to research centres and discussions with scientists that while opponents continued to fear "the present state of ignorance of the basic principles governing the regulations of gene expression", increasingly the scientific community were coming round to the conclusion that their earlier fears had been groundless and indeed that "experiments with viruses using recombinant DNA techniques are likely to prove safer than working with the virus itself."

Their findings were summarized in a report submitted to the 25th Assembly in Ottawa in October 1979. The variety of safeguards and controls employed in different countries were also considered and the Rapporteur, Mr. Robert McCrindle (United Kingdom) concluded his survey with tentative proposals for an internationally acceptable control system for recombinant DNA research combining elements of both the United States (National Institutes of Health) and United Kingdom (Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group) approaches and providing protection for the public in general and researchers in particular without hampering research or burdening staff with time-consuming over-bureaucratic procedures.

Sub-Committee members have participated in a further round of visits and briefings in 1980 including a trip to Switzerland and a concluding visit to the United States.

At the 26th Annual Session in Brussels in November 1980 Mr. McCrindle presented the final report of the Sub-Committee on Genetic Manipulation. He concluded that the benefits outweigh the risks and that maximum encouragement should be given to develop this research for the benefit of mankind.

Controls, however, are still seen as essential on certain aspects of the research such as experiments on unknown or highly dangerous pathogens or on the germ cells of human beings. But the report argues for a flexible set of control guidelines which both protects the public from any possible dangers that may arise whilst not hampering research and at the same time ensuring that the public benefit from all the possibilities offered by the implementation of this new technology.

Only nuclear energy has surpassed recombinant DNA research as a scientific topic whose implications have been so widely argued and discussed in many countries throughout the world. But in recent years, scientific caution regarding the potential dangers inherent in the research has slowly diminished as increased knowledge and the results of risk assessment experiments have demonstrated that earlier concern was exaggerated.

Opposition still remains because of our relative ignorance of the principles governing the regulation of gene expression. Paradoxically however this basic research and all that it implies regarding the fight against inheritable diseases is also seen as one of the most immediate and advantageous applications of recombinant DNA technology.²

Employment Problems

A topic which received considerable discussion within the Scientific and Technical Committee in the early 1970's was that of the impact of technology on employment structures and the quality of life. The subject was initially broached in a resolution adopted in 1971 on technical progress and the protection of the environment. The resolution urged further study of the detrimental effects of any technological project or new industry to human beings.
During the Spring meeting in May 1972, the impact of technological advances on employment structures was debated and it was decided that an inventory of the issues be prepared for the 18th Session in November 1972, by a Special Rapporteur Mr. Herman de Croo (Belgium). The inventory cited, as issues of particular concern: the relationship between technological developments and the use of manpower; adaptation of technology and the development of employment with current economic problems; technology; industrial production and the quality of life; technical progress and work. A recommendation adopted at the 18th Session “on inter-action between technological development and unemployment” drew attention to the unfortunate consequences of the unrestricted application of technological development upon employment patterns.

A general report on employment problems in the Alliance countries presented by Mr. de Croo in 1973 focused on the problems of young people, women, handicapped persons and migrant workers. In the latter case a special study on the problem of adaptation experienced by foreign labourers in Baden-Wurtemberg was prepared by Mrs. Annemarie Griesinger (Fed. Rep. of Germany).

The report concluded that to combat rising unemployment greater mobility was needed with a labour market conducive to intra-company transfers of labour, an awareness of social considerations and easier access to higher education.

Rising unemployment was the subject of a draft resolution submitted by Mr. Damgaard (Denmark), to the meeting of the Scientific and Technical Committee during the 22nd Session of the Assembly in November 1976. Committee members exchanged views on the various methods of coping with domestic unemployment in their own countries.

Energy

Introduction

The problems of guaranteeing continuous access to energy supplies and the implications for the security of the Alliance have concerned members in all Committees of the North Atlantic Assembly.

Of particular concern to the Scientific and Technical Committee has been the growing awareness of the potential gap between the demand for energy and the existing sources of supply. The Committee has examined, in some detail: alternative sources of energy; methods of conservation; the possibilities for co-operation between energy producers and energy users; and co-operation between members of the Atlantic Alliance to share-out available oil supplies in the event of a crisis.

A Joint Sub-Committee on Energy Supplies was established at the 19th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Ankara in October 1973 and comprised members from the Economic, Military and Scientific and Technical Committees. It attempted to provide parliamentarians with an interdisciplinary response to the problems of securing sufficient energy supplies.

In a report which comprised the scientific component of the report of the Joint Sub-Committee, Mr. Flamig (Fed. Rep. of Germany) the Special Rapporteur, in November 1974 examined the four major fields where international co-operation was vital: energy conservation; detection of new resources of “traditional energy” and development of alternatives to the current energy sources; and in resolving the serious conflict between “more energy” and “more protection of the environment.”
International co-operation remained the major consideration in 1975. In his report Mr. Flamig listed the fourteen areas selected by the OECD as being suitable for immediate international co-operation, but warned: "Scientists are undoubtedly able to do much to solve the energy problem - but they cannot do it alone. They need the active support and clear decisions of politicians"; and he called on members of the Scientific and Technical Committee to do all they could to encourage their Governments to co-operate in the fourteen areas selected by the OECD.

**Nuclear Energy**

The particular problems associated with nuclear energy and the potential of nuclear power as a source of future energy were also raised in the 1975 report and in subsequent reports various aspects of the nuclear power controversy were considered in detail.

In resolution 42 adopted at the 21st Session in Copenhagen in 1975, the Assembly urged a thorough review of nuclear policies and an extensive cost/benefit analysis of nuclear power. Governments were also urged "to provide the parliamentarians with complete information about the pros and cons of nuclear energy so that they can help the public understand and accept the necessary decisions."

But if the public find nuclear issues hard to comprehend so do politicians. In his report on nuclear energy in 1976 Mr. Flamig focused upon the special problems faced by parliamentarians in reaching a decision on nuclear energy: "The dilemma is that a clear position does not exist, the issue is far too complex and needs far too much differentiation to say 'yes' or 'no'."

The report contained information on current controversial problems such as safety precautions and nuclear proliferation and in a recommendation adopted at the 22nd Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1976 the North Atlantic Council was requested to provide an in-depth study of the proliferation problem and to establish itself as a "forum of continuous consultation among member Governments exploring nuclear technology with a view to developing a homogeneous policy of Alliance member countries on proliferation."

The increasing importance of issues such as proliferation and the disposal of radio-active waste led the General Rapporteur, Mr. Mundeleer (Belgium) in his 1977 report to focus on the implications for the future, of the fact that "given the world wide aspiration of improved living standards and the likely depletion of reserves of fossil fuel during the next century the only source sufficiently proven to provide adequate energy supplies is considered to be nuclear power."

The Special Report on nuclear energy in 1977 surveyed the problems associated with the reprocessing, recycling and ultimate disposal of radio-active waste and concluded that the "growing number of critics of nuclear power . . . claim that to manage dangerous and unfamiliar materials like plutonium by the equally unfamiliar techniques of dumping or burial constitutes a potentially lethal legacy to countless future generations."

The Rapporteur also focused on recent global developments in the nuclear field which were considered as being almost without exception, "contrary to a free and unrestricted expansion in the projected application of nuclear power." The implications of this trend for relations between the United States and Euratom were clearly recognized in a resolution on the security of nuclear fuel supplies adopted at the 24th
Session in Lisbon, November 1978, which not only urged co-operation against the dangers of nuclear proliferation but in particular called for "the continued and uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel by the United States to Euratom."

The 1979 general report included a section on recent developments in the field of nuclear energy. The disruption of oil supplies and a substantial rise in the price of oil that year had stimulated renewed anxiety about the vulnerability of Alliance countries' attempts to secure sufficient energy supplies. The accident at the Harrisburg nuclear plant in the United States having added fuel to the nuclear debate, the Rapporteur deplored the inadequate information available to the general public on such incidents and urged that Governments and the bodies responsible for running the nuclear stations should provide all the necessary information regarding the operation of existing facilities.

An integrated approach to the problems of energy policy was endorsed in a seven-point resolution adopted at the 25th Annual Session in Ottawa, October 1979 which called for co-operation in promoting a comprehensive co-ordinated Alliance energy policy.

Other Aspects of Energy Problems

Strengthening scientific co-operation in the field of energy was the major topic covered in the general report of the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1974. Mr. Georges Mundeleer (Belgium), General Rapporteur, described recent multilateral and bilateral efforts to improve co-operation both in the fields of energy supplies and protection of the environment and concluded that since it was "no longer possible to make a distinction between a scientific and technological policy as regards energy, raw materials and the environment", international co-operative efforts should be directed towards trying to "find balanced solutions" to all these problems.

The general report for 1975 surveyed current international efforts at co-operation and advocated an internationally co-ordinated policy for raw materials. A resolution calling on member Governments to develop urgently a coherent common policy for raw materials was adopted at the 21st Session in 1975.

The general report in 1976 deplored the fact that "because of two years of relatively stable energy and raw materials prices, as well as a continuous supply, public interest in these problems had progressively declined", and warned "... sooner or later research and development will profoundly change our way of life and our consumption habits. In order to prevent these changes from provoking a dangerous crisis in industrial democracies, the peoples of these democracies must be prepared for what seems to be an inevitable evolution."

Environmental Issues

Introduction

The growing public awareness of the need to protect and conserve the environment from the consequences of unrestrained exploitation has been reflected in the frequency with which these issues have been addressed in the Scientific and Technical Committee.

The dangers of environmental destruction were well described in the report
prepared by Mr. G. Mundeleer (Belgium) for the 10th Session in 1964: "it is no longer tolerable that man's thoughtless actions should be allowed to endanger, not only his existence, but that of future generations."

Pollution of the Oceans

Pollution of the oceans has increasingly become recognized as a potentially grave hazard to the conservation of aquatic life. The disastrous consequences of the Torrey Canyon incident provided a graphic portent of the scale of the problem which would be posed in the future by other oil spills.

A comprehensive report by Mr. St. Pierre (Canada) in 1971, gave an indication of the technical aspects of the problem and alternative methods of prevention. Existing methods of neutralization of oil spills - burning, sinking, detergents, bacterial degradation, containment booms, mechanical removal, gelling, wonder chemicals - were, as Mr. J. Wardley Smith, a United Kingdom member of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, noted, still pitifully inadequate. "The methods of dealing with oil pollution reveal little change, except in matters of detail, from those proposed by the UK Ministry of Technology in 1961." Discussions in the Scientific and Technical Committee led to a recommendation adopted at the 17th Annual Session, which endorsed extensive research into neutralization of the effects of oil spills and called for further study of the damaging effects of hydrocarbon pollution.

The long-term effects of other pollutants were also discussed. Mr. St. Pierre (Canada) alluded to this problem in his 1972 report: "the presence of mercury compounds in the tissues of fish will not impede the passage of ships from one port to another, whether or not they carry the cargoes which eventually add to such pollution."

During the 18th Session in October 1972, it was decided that the Scientific and Technical Committee should prepare a full study on the fisheries problem in the North Atlantic to pinpoint depleted or endangered marine populations and to determine the areas of potential collaboration in the use of the full range of surveillance facilities, including satellites, to monitor fishing operations, fish migrations and pollution dangers.

A report entitled "Fisheries and Pollution Problems of the North Atlantic" was presented by Mr. Ian Watson (Canada) in 1973, and a recommendation that the Scientific and Technical Committee compile a feasibility study on the potential for satellite surveillance to monitor fishing operations, fish migrations and pollution dangers was adopted.

The Scientific and Technical Committee over the years has monitored, with interest, the progress of the protracted negotiations on formulating an international legal order for the sea and its environs. It was hoped that effective mechanisms for controlling pollution of the oceans could be achieved. The ineffectiveness of existing legislation was emphasized by Senator Pell (United States) in 1969 when he presented the Scientific and Technical Committee with a copy of a draft Ocean Space Treaty he was sponsoring in the United States Congress. Senator Pell stated that many activities in ocean space "... are taking place and will continue to take place in a legal vacuum."

In a follow-up report in 1970 entitled "The Oceans - Man's Last Great Resource", Senator Pell examined some of the major issues currently under negotiation including
exploration rights and the problems of oil pollution such as had occurred in the Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara disasters.

The 16th Annual Session subsequently adopted a recommendation calling upon the NATO Council to promote discussion within the Alliance of the draft Convention submitted by the United States to the United Nations on the International Sea-bed Area.

The pollution of the sea by oil spills was the subject of a recommendation adopted in 1971 which strongly endorsed the need for a new Law of the Sea Conference.

Monitoring marine life and pollution in the North Atlantic was discussed in 1972 and 1973 and a report on the feasibility of satellite surveillance as an impartial international control mechanism was recommended.

A resolution adopted at the 22nd Annual Session in 1976 returned to the theme of a rational development of the oceans. It supported: recognition of a 200-mile economic zone; an international body under United Nations control to regulate and manage sea development; the establishment of a common heritage fund for humanity; and effective control of transnational corporations' activities in the development of marine resources.

In 1977, a recommendation "on ocean information and marine resources management" proposed the establishment of a technical committee to set up mutually beneficial ocean information retrieval systems with the ultimate goal of a global ocean management infrastructure. The recommendation also proposed a two-to-three-day technical conference on the subject of Ocean Information Management.

The general report for 1977 stated that "in the absence of an initiative by any other organization, including the two fisheries commissions, the North Atlantic Assembly itself or NATO should forthwith undertake a preliminary study of the proposal to establish an international satellite surveillance mechanism for the North Atlantic."

During the 24th Annual Session held in Lisbon in 1978, the Scientific and Technical Committee discussed a report on the "impact of advanced technology on ocean management" and a recommendation was adopted calling upon the NATO Council to organize a conference to "review requirements for ocean data in support of ocean management activities."

**Ecological Destruction of the Arctic**

A 1969 recommendation on research in Arctic waters noted that "plans are now under way for extensive oil operations between Arctic waters and for the transportation of oil across Arctic waters, and realising the dangers of pollution inherent thereto, recommends that an operational research study be made to determine environmentally acceptable levels of oil pollution occurrences in cold-temperature waters and pollution safeguards and a research project into the effects of oil and other chemical pollutants on marine life and of methods of combating pollution in cold-temperature waters."

The following year, Mr. St. Pierre (Canada) reporting to the Scientific and Technical Committee on the "Threat of Ecological Disaster in Arctic Regions", noted that "... the blackening of the thousands of square miles of the Arctic's surface could... not only result in a change of climate patterns in southern regions of the Northern hemisphere but could also have incalculable results for patterns of urban life in the populated regions of the globe."
Air Pollution

In 1968 the Assembly first recommended NATO to consider the question of air pollution, and, specifically, that "under the guidance of the Scientific and Technical Committee, NATO should publish an annual survey of the specific air pollution problems including all technological accomplishments and legal measures combating this growing menace." In support of this recommendation a questionnaire on air pollution problems was submitted to member nations in 1969. However, basic as this questionnaire was, Mr. Mundeleer reported in 1970: "[we] were forced to realize that such an action would take up far too much of the time of the Secretaries of our delegations and was beyond the resources of our Secretariat." A pilot study on air pollution was subsequently set up under the auspices of NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).

A detailed study of air pollution caused by motor vehicles was undertaken in 1970 and it was recommended that the Assembly consider the idea of "set[ting] up a foundation for the development of vehicles using an unconventional and non-polluting source of power", to be financed jointly by Governments and industry, and that a CCMS pilot-study should look into the harmonization of regulations and, together with the Scientific and Technical Committee, sponsor an international conference on automobile exhaust gases. These proposals, together with a warning on the introduction of lead into petrol, were incorporated in a recommendation adopted at the 16th Annual Session in 1972. Mr. Mundeleer reported that the United States was working towards an almost pollution-free engine by 1975.

Trans-frontier Air Pollution

An important, though until recently under-publicized, aspect of pollution is its transferability from one geographical location to another and from one legal regime to another. Pollution recognizes no boundaries and therefore presents a considerable political as well as environmental problem.

Recognition of this fact, led the General Rapporteur, Mr. Ian Watson (Canada), in 1978 to consider one example of trans-frontier pollution in his annual report, the problem of sulphur and nitrogen oxide pollution.

Sulphur air pollution at high concentration deposited as dry particulates can affect human health contributing to chronic bronchitis, tuberculosis and respiratory illness and death, and aggravating heart and lung disease and asthma and has been described as "perhaps the most serious environmental dilemma of the century", in particular because there is as yet little conclusive evidence about its long term effects. The report drew upon material from an OECD report on "Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants" published in July 1977, which represented the first detailed attempt at measuring and locating the movement of air pollutants in Northern and Western Europe.

Current international attempts at environmental co-operation were described and the Rapporteur concluded with a proposal for an "international treaty aimed at limiting and controlling man-made air pollution."

The Committee in 1979 again considered developments in international efforts at environmental co-operation. The general report welcomed the recent agreement on a draft text for a convention on long-range trans-boundary air pollution due to be

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**Noise Pollution**

In 1971, the Scientific and Technical Committee considered the problem of “noise pollution” of the environment. The Rapporteur Mr. Mundeleer emphasized the need “for avoiding the adoption by each nation of varying forms of noise emissions as an international agreement on this subject seems indispensable, as well as criteria for standardization, and a programme to cut down sources of noise should be drawn up unanimously by all countries.”

Noise pollution may be seen as endemic in industrial society ranging from the boom of supersonic aircraft to urban traffic.

The 17th Annual Session in 1971 urged agreement on the application of existing techniques for reducing noise caused by the air fleets of member Governments; the application of international standards relating to aircraft noise recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the application of ICAO standards to supersonic airliners; and the support of initiatives for international conferences dealing with the effects of sonic bangs on the human environment.

**Microwave Radiation**

The 1979 General Report contained an interesting review of the potential dangers from microwave radiation which is emitted from an increasing number of products in everyday military, medical, industrial and public use and whose effect on health has given considerable cause for concern. Mr. Watson, the Rapporteur, noted that the type and severity of the effects of microwave radiation appear to be influenced by a number of factors, in particular the rate at which microwave radiation is absorbed and the size, density and shape of the organ or body part exposed.

However, given the lack of definitive information on the particular effects of microwave radiation it remains difficult to separate the effects of exposure to radiation, carcinogens, noise, cigarettes etc., from the general health problems of the population in question.

In the meantime the benefits derived from microwave products are considerable and the report concluded that a balanced approach to the problem was vital. While it is essential that public health be protected research is clearly needed to enable “sensible maximum standards to be set to allow for a safe but optimum use of microwave emitting products.”

**International Efforts to Control Pollution**

The realization that pollution hazards were no longer necessarily domestic in origin and that domestic legislation was no longer sufficient to regulate activities likely to cause pollution led parliamentarians to consider various mechanisms for achieving international co-operation in protection of the global environment.

In 1970, Mr. Mundeleer, in a report significantly titled “On the Eve of the Battle of the Environment”, urged the development of a “global environment strategy on which a coherent and balanced policy may be based.” A 1971 resolution, on technical progress and the protection of the environment, called upon parliamentarians to
“establish what the effects of any technological project or any new industry may be to human beings; recognize the absolute necessity of the fight against pollution; the need to re-establish a healthy environment; and to standardize controls.”

In 1972, the Assembly discussed the results of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and the implications of such schemes as “Earthwatch.”

In a general report on the current state of co-operation in scientific and technological research and the environment in 1973, Mr. Herman de Croo (Belgium) surveyed various initiatives and why they had not been successful. He concluded that failure was due to insufficient attention to management structures and suitable commercial criteria, inter-governmental disagreements on programme goals, refusal of Governments and companies to become really interdependent in the sensitive technological sectors and use of co-operative programmes solely as tools of foreign policy.

Some successes were however recorded by the Committee. The final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975, included a section on the environment where the thirty five participating states acknowledged that one state’s activities should not degrade the environment of another state.

The significance of the CSCE agreement lies in the fact that it is the first comprehensive international environmental co-operation agreement signed between countries of both East and West.

*International Environmental Impact Statements*

A resolution adopted at the 23rd Annual Session in 1977, on international environmental analysis, supported an initiative placed before the United States Senate by Senator Claiborne Pell (United States) on a proposed treaty providing for International Environmental Impact Statements.

It was envisaged that any State, Party to the proposed Treaty would “ensure that an International Environmental Impact Statement regarding the potential adverse physical environmental effects of such activity is prepared and submitted to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and to any other Party to this Treaty whose physical environment or environmental interests may be adversely affected by such activity.”

Draft Article 1 (1) stated: “No State shall undertake, nor permit to be undertaken, any major project, action, or continuing activity within its territory, the territory of another State, or upon any global commons, as defined by conventional and customary international law, which may be reasonably expected to have a significant adverse effect on the physical environment or environmental interests of another State or States party to this Treaty, or on a global commons area, unless these activities are carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.”

The NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)

With the establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) on 6 November 1969, NATO interest in, and involvement with, scientific
and technological advances in member states may be said to have truly matured. The NATO Science Committee, established a decade before, has always maintained a low profile and has never fully developed its potential although its programmes have been highly successful. In terms of efficiency and value for money it represents one of the most effective scientific programmes in the world.

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, on the other hand, has played a well publicized role as the catalyst in co-ordinating joint-studies between member states on many contemporary problems, particularly in the environment.

It was President Nixon, speaking at the 20th Anniversary celebrations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in Washington D.C. in April 1969, who first urged that “we create a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, responsible to the Deputy Ministers, to explore ways in which the experience and resources of Western nations could most effectively be marshalled towards improving the quality of life of our peoples.”

The North Atlantic Council did not grant the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) a budget - a measure designed to prevent the growth of yet another bureaucracy within NATO. Instead, CCMS became a co-ordinating body for nationally initiated pilot studies.

The pilot-study concept ensures flexibility. One nation undertakes responsibility for a project with the optional participation of co-pilots. Studies are specifically designed to seek solutions to current problems within a limited time-span. Complete openness of the studies means that results are available to all countries which could benefit from the findings.

The CCMS, having agreed to a project, debate the subsequent report and submit it plus recommendations, to the North Atlantic Council for approval and continue to press for implementation.

While the North Atlantic Assembly have given vigorous support to CCMS the scheme is not without its critics.

Mr. Mundeleer (Belgium), the General Rapporteur, in two lucidly argued reports in 1969 and 1970 however challenged these critics. In his 1969 report he said to the traditionalists who felt that NATO, as a military and political organization, should restrict itself to the twin dimensions of defence and deterrence: “in 1949 we built an Alliance for the purpose of the Cold War. Is it not somewhat surprising that it cannot, today, satisfy the more flexible and diversified needs of the ‘Cold Peace’?”

To the sceptics who feared yet another level of bureaucratic duplication of effort in the battle for the environment, he said, “CCMS is not a research organization. This means that its purpose is not to increase the number of existing studies, but to make every effort to utilise existing knowledge to meet immediate objectives.”

To Ministers, disinclined to bind their Governments to an agreement to action which might prove politically and economically embarrassing, Mr. Mundeleer asserted, in 1970: “… measures envisaged in these different countries are limited and fragmentary. What is lacking is the creation of a global environmental policy.”

To parliamentarians, Mr. Mundeleer declared: “We may also hope that with the creation of CCMS our recommendations and resolutions will no longer remain without response. I hope that CCMS will prove to be the attentive interlocutor which our Committee has sought for so long.”

The report contained specific suggestions as to the role CCMS might fulfil: 1) “As a forum to promote discussion and frame proposals” it should draw attention to
subjects which would otherwise be overlooked. 2) Co-ordinating national research programmes. 3) Promoting and co-ordinating the application of results of national research. 4) An executive role leading to the establishment of an Alliance Community for Technology.

Looking forward to the implementation stage of the proposals made as a result of the pilot studies Mr. Mundeleer also made several suggestions as to how this might best be organized. He felt that the NATO Scientific Affairs Division should be enlarged to cope with the extra work. Ministers of Science and Technology from the Alliance countries should attend certain NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings or at least meet together; and that there should be closer co-operation between NATO and the European Economic Community. He also suggested that Assembly parliamentarians should be kept informed of developments.

The Scientific and Technical Committee which has observer status at CCMS meetings has maintained regular contact with the activities of CCMS by suggesting possible subjects for study, informing Parliaments of the results of completed studies and urging them to press for the implementation of recommendations made as a result of pilot studies.

In the long term the effectiveness of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society will depend on its ability to promote legislation within and between member states which will implement the recommendations deriving from the pilot studies. However, the basic problem has been in “formulating measures of a legislative nature.” If only one or two nations participate in a pilot study, is it reasonable to expect others to be bound by a study in which they may have not shown interest and had no input? This is clearly a problem for the future.

For the Scientific and Technical Committee, the success of CCMS is something of a backhanded compliment in that it is one of the few occasions when the Assembly has received official recognition of its activities. In “NATO Facts and Figures”, the chapter on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is concluded thus: “One extremely important contact for the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is the North Atlantic Assembly. This group of parliamentarians representing all 15 nations has, through its Scientific and Technical Committee, continuously given strong support to the activities of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. This group has encouraged especially effective national implementation and follow-up of the CCMS pilot-study recommendations and resolutions. It has also appealed for better national information activities on the CCMS and for pilot-study proposals to replace completed studies. To demonstrate its active concern, the Scientific and Technical Committee set up a Sub-Committee on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society in November 1973, so that continuing attention could be given to the work of the CCMS.”

Space and Satellites

Peaceful Co-operation in Outer Space

The Atlantic Congress of June 1959 (see page 35) commenting on the challenge represented by peaceful co-operation in the upper atmosphere and outer space, declared that: “Scientists of many nations can design and make the instruments to be
carried in the payload of these space vehicles, assist in tracking them, receive and interpret the data and attempt to apply these findings in astronomy, physics, biology, meteorology, communications and navigation.”

The Scientific and Technical Committee, at the 5th NATO Parliamentarians Conference in November 1959, subsequently recommended the “speeding of satellite and space probe experiments as part of the Atlantic Alliance effort in peaceful outer space research.” The goal was a NATO Space Programme, which it was suggested could be achieved through co-ordinated research.

A joint meeting of members of the Scientific and Technical Committee with NATO Science Advisors in May 1961 was forced to admit that co-operative research in space was not developing as had been anticipated due largely to disinterest on the part of the United States.

There were some limited successes however. A NATO-ONR Solar Eclipse Expedition with a research grant from NATO which was led by Dr. Witnuski (United States) and Professor Blamond (France) conducted investigations above the troposphere where solar observations could be made without hindrance from the Earth’s atmosphere. A low-cost operation, it nevertheless provided valuable information including 6,000 photographs of the sun’s atmosphere.

**European-United States Space Collaboration**

An issue which particularly concerned European members of the Scientific and Technical Committee was the elaboration of a role for Europe in space research and exploration.

In reports in 1971 and 1972, Mr. Olivier Giscard d'Estaing (France) examined the requirements for effective transatlantic co-operation in space. At the European level this entailed hammering out a joint space programme and at the transatlantic level it depended on devising the best co-operative arrangements. He cited the lack of political unity within Western Europe and the imbalance between the resources devoted to space activities by the United States and by its European partners as the major problems to be overcome.

When considering the possibility of European participation in the post-Apollo programme, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing continued to make the assumption that “all the technical information generated by the development of the complete post-Apollo system” would be made freely and readily available to Europeans.

A progress report in 1972 had little positive to add and concluded by exhorting parliamentarians to greater efforts in bringing to the attention of their Governments and public opinion the growing importance of space activities, the need for a co-ordinated European space policy and for transatlantic co-operation. A resolution adopted at the 18th Session in Bonn in November 1972 endorsed these conclusions and called upon European Governments “to agree to a joint and coherent programme in the space field . . . under the responsibility of an international body” and “to reach agreement with the United States on participation in the post-Apollo programme.”

The Committee has also made several recommendations on the development of satellites designed to perform specific functions.

**Meteorology**

The 7th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1961 recommended that a long-range weather forecast system be established by NATO and that reports “in
accordance with NATO's 'good neighbour' policy ... could be made available to the neighbouring friendly nations ... in Europe ... [and] Africa.” In 1962, this recommendation was expanded into a proposal to establish a NATO Meteorological Centre.

However, this scheme was criticized on the grounds that the projected Meteorological Centre would merely duplicate the work already being done by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), ELDO and ESRO and was counterproductive since it would separate East and West when they were already cooperating in WMO.

The Committee also discussed a draft Weather Modification Treaty presented by Senator Claiborne Pell (United States) in 1972.

Communication Satellites

Communication satellites were debated at the 8th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1962, and were the subject of a recommendation that AGARD (the Advisory Group on Research and Development) should immediately establish a working group to investigate the application of satellites to NATO command and control communications, sea surveillance and other important operational problems; and to recommend, where appropriate, the development of specific satellites for NATO applications.”

In December 1966, NATO's Defence Planning Committee approved a recommendation from the Special Committee of the NATO Defence Ministers for a feasibility study of an Alliance-wide satellite communication programme. This was given the go-ahead in 1967, and in June 1970 the Defence Planning Committee noted the development of methods for improving co-operation in research and development; and the production, successful launching and testing of the first NATO communications satellite.

Thus, the satellite first proposed by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1959 became a reality in 1970.

Documentation

The Committee has taken an active interest in the development of documentation centres. In 1959, for example, they recommended a commission to study the ways and means of bringing into existence a depository of all scientific and technical knowledge then available in the North Atlantic Alliance countries. In 1962 they endorsed a recommendation that each member nation of the Alliance should ensure the creation of a National Defence Documentation and Information Centre and specifically that a science data centre be established as a depository for United States research data. Various aspects of the problem of documentation storage and retrieval were discussed in ensuing years.

Reducing the rapidly expanding quantity of information now available to a usable level is a global problem. This was recognized in a report prepared by Mr. Georges Mundeleer (Belgium) in 1966 which considered whether NATO or another organization such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) or the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) were best placed to perform a co-ordinating function.

Mr. Mundeleer also advocated an ambitious role for the Scientific and Technical Committee in organizing the centralized publication of information on current research so that research workers could “seize immediately on the detailed subtleness of experiments conducted by colleagues.” The Report concluded that the Scientific and Technical Committee could also play a role as “inquisitor” of specialists and government representatives and as a centre for the accumulation of the resources essential to the pursuit of research.

The period 1966–68 saw several studies on information problems; for example, on “Documentary and Communication Problems in Limiting Publications” prepared by Dr. Cade and on “Information Storage and Retrieval” submitted jointly by Mr. P. Rodino (United States) and Captain Maxwell (United Kingdom).

The storage and dissemination of information was again discussed in 1973, in a report by Mr. Ian Watson (Canada) on an “International Information System on Science and Technology for the Use of Parliamentarians.”

Lord Wynne-Jones (United Kingdom) and Mr. Watson proposed the establishment of an international data bank specifically for the use of parliamentarians, a proposal also included in the Final Communique of the 3rd Parliamentary and Scientific Conference, Lausanne, in 1972.

Using language strongly reminiscent of the Armand Report – “information is power and wealth” – the report stressed the parliamentarian’s need to be able “to evaluate consequences of technological innovations before developing or adopting them.”

In a resolution passed in 1973, the Scientific and Technical Committee requested the Secretary General of OECD to submit a feasibility study for the establishment of an international science and technology information system.

Saline Water Conversion

The NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference is justified in claiming the initiative of drawing Alliance nations’ attention to the potentialities of saline water conversion. In a special message on natural resources to the US Congress in 1961, President Kennedy had declared: “no water resources programme is of greater long-range importance for the relief, not only of our shortages, but for arid nations the world over, than an effort to find an effective and economical way to convert the World’s greatest and cheapest natural resources – our oceans – into water fit for consumption in the home and by industry.”

At the 7th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference in 1961 the recommendation was made that the United States Office of Saline Water be used as a clearing-house for information on national progress in the conversion of saline water. In a statement to the 8th NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference in 1962, the United States Office of Saline Water noted, “... the action by the NATO Parliamentarians in recommending that the Office of Saline Water be designated as the clearing-house for all research in their field throughout the North Atlantic Alliance nations, was received here with considerable pleasure, tempered by a profound sense of responsibility.”

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It also noted the NATO Parliamentarians' interest in future co-operation with the Office of Saline Water. The recommendation which had been adopted at the 7th NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was included in the House Report to the 11th Congress, and in due course, the Office of Saline Water became a repository for several European studies on saline water conversion.

The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference maintained its involvement with a questionnaire distributed jointly by NATO and by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to Alliance member nations on the use of the Office of Saline Water as a clearing-house for information and on the need for national representatives; on current national water costs and on the need for a geographical analysis of areas in Europe and throughout the Alliance.

Mr. Mundeleer, in a report to the 9th Annual Session in 1963 defined the Conference's role as one of determining mankind's needs and making them known. The effects of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference initiative were cumulative. For example, Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the United States, a military institution engaged in atomic research, subsequently designated a proportion of its time and labour resources to the peaceful pursuit of water desalination.

NATO Parliamentarians also proposed a research centre to study water conversion problems in Africa. In 1965 a symposium held in Washington drew representatives from fifty-eight countries to study the problem of saline water conversion.

In his 1967 report, Mr. Mundeleer summed up the North Atlantic Assembly's contribution thus: "... the reception given to our reports on the desalting of water, ... the symposium held in Washington... bear eloquent witness of the worth of our opinions." He was also able to report that the United States had achieved the production of desalinated water at a competitive price (12.5 cents per thousand gallons).

**Fishing**

A particularly controversial issue for parliamentarians because of its political implications has been fishing and the need to prevent over-fishing of existing resources in order to safeguard future supplies.

The subject was first discussed by the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1965 following a report by Mr. Mundeleer entitled "Ocean Movements and Improving the Fishing Industry" and the recommendation was subsequently made that the Assembly "[being] concerned with the increasing amount of fishing being carried on by the NATO countries and [recognizing] the value of co-ordination of the fishing policies of all members, recommends that NATO take steps to provide co-ordinated assistance in the field of advanced fishing technology. . . ."

At the 13th Annual Session in 1967, Mr. Rodino (United States) presented two reports to the Committee on this problem. The first, "Fishery Resources of the World", noted that the United States had called on the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to arrange a conference on fishery problems. Mr. Rodino felt that such a conference would serve to ensure the development of world-wide conservation programmes designed to protect all fishery resources from over-exploitation.

The second report described United States oceanographic efforts and develop-
ments and discussed the increased use of fish as a food resource. A recommendation from the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1967 advocated that the nations of the Atlantic Community jointly investigate the protein contents of fish and its exploitability as a readily manufactured, low-cost and highly nourishing fish protein concentrate.

Following on from these reports Mr. Rodino suggested that a tripartite working party be set up within the Scientific and Technical Committee on fishing techniques in Greece, Portugal and Turkey. Norway, Iceland and Canada, as interested parties, had associate membership of the working party.

Algae Resources of the North Atlantic Area were discussed by the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1968 and it was subsequently recommended that the Committee should initiate a specific research analysis of seaweed resources of the North Atlantic area with a view to publishing a reference bibliography. A progress report on the publication of national algae bibliographies was prepared for the 15th Annual Session in 1969, but by 1970, the project had run into financial difficulties.

Footnotes

1. For more information on scientific co-operation in NATO see “NATO and Science: An account of the activities of the NATO Science Committee 1958–1972”, NATO Scientific Affairs Division.
2. “Genetic Manipulation” (Recombinant DNA research, application and regulation), North Atlantic Assembly paper, 1981.
3. Dr. Cade of the NATO Scientific Affairs Division.
Chapter Five
The Future of the North Atlantic Assembly

Introduction

In February 1979, it was formally announced that “the long pursued objective of having the Assembly institutionalized . . . has been abandoned.”

Since then a revitalized Assembly has emerged. It is more dynamic and more outward-looking – seeking contacts with parliaments in countries not necessarily member states of the North Atlantic Alliance. Special studies are either in progress or completed on topics as varied as the economic problems of Portugal, arms control, the successor generation and genetic manipulation.

There have also been changes in the organization of the Plenary Session. The introduction of a period for debating in public one or two themes of current concern to the Alliance has proved particularly successful in stimulating a lively exchange of views. These and other developments are positive indications that the Assembly is growing in stature and has benefited from throwing off the quixotic burden which pursuit of institutionalization had become. Interestingly this new approach has only emerged since official recognition ceased to be an objective.

The long struggle in pursuit of institutionalization has left its mark however. What has emerged from the Assembly’s twenty-five year struggle against official antipathy is a body confident in its identity, resilient and aware of its own limitations. In comparison with other assemblies it costs little and is generally considered to be good value for money.

The question this chapter seeks to examine is how the North Atlantic Assembly will develop in the future? What kind of role can the Assembly play in international politics? What kind of relationship should it be seeking with Alliance Governments and Parliaments and international organizations? How can the Assembly be made to function still more effectively?

There are two important factors with a bearing upon the Assembly’s possible development. It must build on those qualities it possesses and which are unique among parliamentary assemblies – namely the regular participation of North American parliamentarians and the links established with NATO. The Assembly also needs to give a sense of overall direction to its activities, provide continuity in its approach to issues and follow up the impact of reports, resolutions and recommendations in member states.
What Role can there be for the North Atlantic Assembly in International Politics?

Introduction

The Assembly's goal has always been to achieve a consultative status similar to that enjoyed by the assemblies of the Western European Union and the Council of Europe and has pursued a road befitting that goal. Having voluntarily surrendered this goal what role, if any, can it now realistically envisage playing in international politics in the foreseeable future, which is both worthwhile and not fulfilled by another body?

International assemblies are increasingly under attack for being expensive, obese, inefficient and ineffective and, above all, for being removed from the reality of day to day decision-making. There exist so many international bodies that their functions and interests inevitably overlap and this duplication is a further source of irritation to their critics.

Several suggestions have been made for the merging of two or more organizations but, for various political, legal and economic reasons and mostly through sheer bureaucratic inertia, these have never received widespread support.

A proposal was made in 1962 by Mr. John Lindsay (United States) at the time a member of the Assembly's Political Committee that "two, and two only, assemblies were needed in Europe - a European Parliament and an Atlantic Assembly." A convincing explanation of why this and similar schemes came to naught is given by Professor Eliot Goodman in his book "The Fate of the Atlantic Community".1

Referring to an attempt to hold meetings of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe back-to-back with sessions of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference which failed, Professor Goodman noted that "Events demonstrated that the two assemblies idea was a highly arbitrary and contrived argument in any case. The shift of political life is too intertwined to separate out some aspects neatly from others."

Professor Goodman made a detailed study of the relative merits of the various institutions and inclined to the opinion that it was the Western European Union which "... would increasingly become absorbed in European problems and in the construction of a larger European entity." It was for this reason that he felt that "those institutions... designed to deal with Atlantic problems like the NATO International Secretariat and the North Atlantic Assembly [would] become more essential than ever before, lest the Europeans become consumed with their own affairs [and] drift away from their transatlantic partners."

If the Assembly was an officially constituted body there would be a justifiable case for transferring the role of guardian of the commitments embodied in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and Paris agreements of 1954 from the Western European Union (WEU) to the North Atlantic Assembly and winding up WEU. Since it is not and since the treaty commitments of WEU are considered important, and there is little likelihood that they could be renegotiated today, it is almost certain that the overlap of functions between these international organizations will continue for the foreseeable future.

The duplication of interests particularly of the North Atlantic Assembly and WEU and, to a certain extent, the Council of Europe is thus inevitable.

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The Assembly must therefore develop those activities where it can make a particular and unique contribution to international relations such as facilitating European-United States parliamentary contacts and in promoting an increased critical appreciation of NATO and its problems and activities among parliamentarians. The Assembly may also encourage recognition of the fact that it is less costly to run than either the WEU Assembly or the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Yet it is still able to make an effective contribution to Atlantic relations. It has also been suggested that the Assembly, in comparison with other assemblies, provides parliamentarians with a more relaxed and open forum in which to express their views, a role which offers many opportunities for development.

**North Atlantic Assembly–NATO Relations**

Relations with NATO have always been, and are likely to remain, the key to the Assembly’s continued relevance in, and contribution to, Atlantic relations. It was the NATO Parliamentarians’ original preoccupation with Alliance affairs and particularly Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty which provided them with a common ground of sufficient mutual interest on which to base their discussions and which has encouraged North Americans to return each year to the Assembly. According to the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Joseph Luns, from NATO’s point of view, “the Assembly is fulfilling, in a practical way, a task which would otherwise not have been undertaken and which is useful to the Alliance in its international context and to the Governments which are members of the Alliance.”

There is, therefore, some justification for the fear that in diversifying its interests into fields not directly relevant to the security of the Alliance the Assembly may dissipate its energies, duplicating the work of similar bodies whilst divesting itself of its principal drawing power – its “eye” on NATO. Just how the Assembly will achieve a working compromise between these interests remains to be seen. On balance it is probably right that the Assembly’s principal concern should remain NATO with special interest studies and contacts remaining a secondary consideration.

The pattern of NATO–Assembly relations has developed from an agreement reached in 1968 between the (then recently appointed) Secretary-General of the Assembly, Mr. Philippe Deshormes and the Secretary-General of NATO, the late Mr. Manlio Brosio. This agreement (for further details see Chapter Two, “Efforts at Institutionalization”, page 27) provided that the Secretary-General of NATO would, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council, receive and comment upon the recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly.

The impact of this particular provision however seems to have declined in recent years due almost certainly to unsatisfactory comments on lengthy, obscure and often, irrelevant Assembly texts.

The Secretary-General of NATO attends Assembly sessions and gives spontaneous answers to parliamentarians’ questions and SACEUR and other senior NATO personnel regularly address Assembly meetings.

Assembly representatives are now permitted to attend, as observers, meetings of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) but a request that the Assembly be granted observer status at Ministerial and other major meetings of the Alliance has not been accepted. A “reciprocal” arrangement permitting NATO observer status at meetings of the Assembly’s Standing Committee was favourably
received but NATO have rarely taken up the opportunity. On the other hand Assembly Committee meetings are attracting increasing numbers of NATO personnel and representatives of national delegations.

Of considerable importance are the detailed briefings arranged by NATO for parliamentarians upon request, on defence, scientific, information and economic matters. These are in addition to the annual tours of allied military installations organized so that parliamentarians can see at first hand the defence systems in use in Alliance countries. Parliamentarians are also invited to observe SHAPE exercises.

Working relations, such as the exchange of information, are conducted on an individual basis between Assembly Committee Directors and their counterparts in the various NATO Directorates. NATO has also demonstrated a willingness to correct "misinterpretations of fact" in studies being conducted by the Assembly.

The willingness to co-operate and mutual growth in confidence raise the question of the Assembly's role vis-à-vis NATO. Should the Assembly serve as a mouthpiece for NATO? Should it provide critical support? Should it seek interests in fields not directly relevant to the security of the Alliance? In practice the Assembly is today acting in all these roles. It has always served as a vehicle for the dissemination of information about the Alliance and NATO, a role recognized by Professor Goodman who called attention to the "important, if limited contribution" which the North Atlantic Assembly has made over the years to "disseminating an understanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the problems associated with it."

However General van Elsen (Netherlands), a member of the Assembly from 1971 to 1978 advocates a much more critical approach towards NATO policies and activities by the Assembly. In his view, no organization is infallible and the Assembly could be more supportive to NATO by pointing out weaknesses in its policies rather than by accepting, without question, the information fed to it by NATO. While this view has much support the Assembly remains too small, and lacks the resources, to provide the degree of informed comment produced by the network of Committees in national legislatures.

For this reason the suggestion made by Professor Goodman that the Assembly should be granted the necessary powers to enable it to consider NATO defence expenditures including the common NATO infrastructure as well as expenditure on civil agencies and the International Secretariat on the grounds that "even though ... parliamentary oversight is frequently lacking in legal sanctions and is only imperfectly developed, it is a useful function that deserves encouragement", while attractive in principle, is untenable in practice. Even if NATO Ministers accepted the proposition the Assembly simply lacks the necessary financial and accounting expertise to do the preliminary analysis and without the benefit of this background analysis there is a danger that an endorsement by the Assembly of NATO financial provisions could lend NATO programmes a spurious democratic legitimacy.

How relations between the Assembly and NATO develop in the future will depend in large measure on the way NATO and the member Governments respond to the challenges facing the Alliance. The way forward is less clear and the problems are more complex than at any time since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance.

In 1949 the focal point of international relations was Europe, then effectively divided into two ideologically opposed power blocs. Today new power blocs have emerged. Nuclear capability has proliferated. The arms race, despite limitation agreements concluded and still under negotiation, continues apace. Economic issues,
in particular guaranteeing energy supply routes, have assumed increasing significance in security considerations. Detente appears to be suffering a winter of discontent.

All these factors have implications for NATO’s ability to ensure the security of the Atlantic Alliance. A fundamental reappraisal of the international system and of the Alliance’s role in it is needed in order that a strategy may be devised which, while it continues to provide an adequate deterrence and defence against potential aggression, will also take into account the political and economic complexities of this time.

The Assembly provides Alliance parliamentarians with an opportunity to discuss these issues and although there is no guarantee that their deliberations will have any impact upon governmental decisions it is surely desirable that their views are brought to the attention of member states and NATO, particularly if a consensus is reached, as a source of informed and considered opinion which might not otherwise be heard.

As for concentrating on issues not directly relevant to the security of the Alliance, the Assembly’s Committees have been doing this with great success and have now published several special studies. In general terms too the Committees tend to select a broader sample of topics than are covered by NATO. For example, a recent investigation into the economic problems of Portugal led by the Economic Committee attracted much interest from NATO’s Economic Directorate as well as other international organizations.

**European—North American Contacts**

The Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Luns has commented that the Assembly plays a “unique role in the development of European—American relations as it is the only place in which Members of Parliament from North America and Europe meet regularly.” In Mr. Luns’ view “in several cases where there were difficulties in European—American relations the Assembly has played a useful role in ironing them out.” Certainly other attempts to foster a dialogue between North American congressional figures and European assemblies have not been successful.

Debates within the Military, Economic and Political Committees on issues such as burden sharing and the possibility of troop withdrawals have provided United States Congressional figures with first hand evidence of the impact of American foreign policy in Europe. European parliamentarians have also been made aware, through an exchange of views with their American colleagues, of the domestic pressures they are facing.

A more detailed exchange of views has taken place during the last five years and meetings between the United States House and Senate Joint Armed Services Committees and members of the Assembly’s Sub-Committee on (European) Defence Cooperation, which first took place in 1975, have become an annual event. In 1978 the US Department of State Bulletin described the meetings as “extremely valuable since they enable parliamentarians to further their understanding of the American position on weapons systems and their deployment. At the same time, . . . the visitors are able to convey the European point of view to a wide body of Americans.”

The 1978 meetings had “particular significance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT II] negotiations under way and with heightened European interest in security problems.”

Mr. Stanley Sloan, a senior analyst at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in his survey on the Assembly for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1978,
refers to the Sub-Committee’s influence: “The Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation is credited by many observers as facilitating a more effective transatlantic dialogue on issues of armaments co-operation. They point out that the meetings that this group has held with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees illustrate how the Assembly can be an effective vehicle for creating greater understanding between American and European legislators on issues of crucial importance to the Alliance.”

Canadian parliamentarians have been very active participants in the Assembly over the years and were instrumental in its creation. They have contributed greatly to improving its reputation through the quality of the work produced in several of the more important and influential studies. For Canadian parliamentarians, too, perhaps participation in the North Atlantic Assembly has the additional benefit of demonstrating the value both to Canada and to her European allies of her continued participation in the defence of Western Europe, a view which can surely be conveyed to the Canadian electorate better by a parliamentarian with the courage of his convictions and from experiences gained during discussions with fellow parliamentarians from Europe.

**Relations with Governments and Parliaments in Member Countries**

In a survey conducted by Mr. Glen Mower, individual parliamentarians were asked for their perceptions of the impact of Assembly recommendations upon their Governments and Parliaments. Most gave the realistic assessment that it was fairly minimal. At the same time Mr. Mower’s study indicated that only one-third of the responding delegates “feel obligated” at Assembly meetings to support their Government’s stand on military-security matters. On political and functional issues, none do.

The relationship between delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly and their national and party affiliations is indistinct. Delegates to the assembly do not feel obliged to adhere to the party line but traditionally are free to make friends and contacts among other delegates, to exchange views and to learn at first hand of the problems faced by fellow delegates in their national Parliaments.

The Assembly’s impact upon national legislatures depends to a great extent therefore on the impressions gained by individual parliamentarians during the meetings and the ideas they take back with them. In this sense the more stimulating and informative a delegate finds the reports and debates at the Assembly the more likely he is to bring what he has learned to the attention of his national parliamentary colleagues.

Certain improvements in communicating Assembly activities to member Parliaments could be made. Already in certain national Parliaments a day-long debate is held on the Assembly proceedings, a practice which could be copied in all member states. The United States Congress produces an annual report on the Assembly’s plenary meetings including the Committee’s reports and the recommendations and resolutions adopted – again an action which could be implemented in other member countries.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag prepares a paper on the Assembly’s activities which includes a summary of the views expressed by the German delegates at Assembly meetings and a translation of the recommendations and resolutions adopted.
While most delegations today make some form of report on the proceedings to their national Parliaments some simply make a written report, others speak in Committees. In others again, a delegation member will make a statement to the Parliament. It is this variation which makes concerted action between delegations on Assembly recommendations, resolutions and reports so difficult to organize. A series of guidelines designed to streamline the process so that similar procedures are followed in each country would be an important step forward in drawing attention to the views expressed by the Assembly and would provide support for those parliamentarians seeking Government action on a proposal.

The position of the individual parliamentarian vis-à-vis his national Parliament and Government today was aptly defined by Mr. MacFarquhar (UK) as being "on the periphery of power". General van Elsen (Netherlands) was of a similar opinion and felt that individual parliamentarians and groups could be influential but it was essential to know how and where to bring such influence to bear. He made some interesting observations on the kind of influence parliamentarians could have on their national Parliaments and Governments. Parliamentarians should, he felt, be more aggressive in seeking meetings with Ministers to bring to their attention the recommendations made by the Assembly and in asking Ministers for their comments.

In this respect NATO parliamentarians have a responsibility to see that the views expressed at Assembly meetings on how the Alliance should confront the new challenges arising from international developments are brought to the attention of Ministers and where appropriate a response sought.

**Relations with Non-Alliance Countries**

Since the termination of the Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments which was received by Governments leaders and representatives in several countries (see "Institutionalization," Chapter Two, page 31), and with the decision to cease pursuing institutionalization, more attention has been given to the establishment of contacts with Governments and Parliaments in countries outside the Alliance.

In some instances the prospect of future membership of NATO is an incentive for both parties to seek to establish contacts. Spanish parliamentarians, participating as individuals, have now been observing the Assembly's meetings since 1977.

During a visit to Japan in May 1980, an Assembly delegation was received by the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Diet, the President of the House of Councillors, and the Director-General of the Defence Agency.

That a delegation from the North Atlantic Assembly should be received in Japan at all may be seen as something of a diplomatic coup given the delicate constitutional balance Japan has evolved in respect of its self-defence forces and their implications for Japan's ability to join Alliance and collective security arrangements. In this case the unofficial status of the Assembly undoubtedly has given it greater flexibility and freedom in establishing unofficial contacts between Alliance parliamentarians and individual members of the Japanese Diet for an exchange of views on issues of mutual interest.

A delegation of Japanese parliamentarians attended as observers the annual session of the Assembly in Brussels in November 1980.

Following his participation in the mission to Japan Mr. Paul Thyness (President of
the Assembly from 1978 to 1980), had some interesting observations on the merits of establishing links outside the NATO area. The aim, according to Mr. Thyness, is to establish a dialogue which will provide the North Atlantic Alliance nations with a global perspective on their activities which is currently lacking. “We need to see how the Alliance fits into the bigger world outside.”

The suggestion has also been made that parliamentarians from non-Alliance countries should be invited to attend the Assembly sessions as observers with the right to speak though not to vote. This does of course, beg the question: should the invitation be extended to all non-Alliance Parliaments? What would be the attitude to representatives from Eastern Europe? The problems which arose in the 1960’s when such an invitation was extended to various countries in Eastern Europe (see Political Committee, page 134) are likely to be no less disruptive in the 1980’s in this respect.

It is more feasible that contacts should be sought with countries with interests in common such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Relations with International Organizations
During the past twenty-five years the Assembly has established working relations with several international organizations. Some, such as the link with the Atlantic Institute, are of long-standing, and include several joint-initiatives. The most recent joint-project was a seminar on burden sharing.

The North Atlantic Assembly was also a founding contributor to the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations (SCAO) with which it has remained closely associated, participating in annual meetings arranged by SCAO to consider contemporary problems facing the Alliance. For example, the 1981 meeting is due to examine the responsibilities of NATO outside its geographic area.

Working relations have also been established with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). What began as a simple exchange of information on an ad-hoc basis has now developed into an annual meeting between the Economic Committee of the Assembly and OECD experts, at which the Assembly delegation is briefed on energy and economic issues by OECD personnel. Regular meetings are also held between the Assembly’s Military Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of Western European Union (WEU).

There is the prospect of the Assembly establishing useful working relations with other organizations in the future and these developments are to be welcomed for they enhance the Assembly’s reputation and standing and, more importantly, lead to the views expressed by its members receiving wider circulation.

Can the North Atlantic Assembly Function More Efficiently?

There are two factors with an important bearing upon the Assembly’s ability to function and evolve. One, financial resources, is a physical constraint since it limits the Assembly’s capacity to become involved in new activities. The other is rather more conjectural and concerns flexibility: the freedom of parliamentarians within the Assembly to air personal views and to feel at liberty to discuss whichever topics, and to study whatever subjects, appeal to them – free from party pressures and loyalties.
Budget

When compared with similar assemblies the North Atlantic Assembly continues to be run on a small budget. Figures compiled in 1972 on the comparative annual costs of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe, Western European Union and the North Atlantic Assembly show clearly that the North Atlantic Assembly costs something in the order of forty to fifty per cent of the Western European Union (WEU) and approximately two per cent of the budget costs of the Council of Europe.5

A recent comparison between the 1981 budgetary estimates for the North Atlantic Assembly and the WEU Assembly indicates that at 46,986,915 BF (inclusive of 900,000 BF from NATO) the North Atlantic Assembly now costs 58% of the WEU Assembly, whose budget is estimated at 80,414,640 BF.6 This is despite the fact that the North Atlantic Assembly has fifteen member nations and 172 delegates while the WEU Assembly has seven member nations and 89 delegates.

Both Assemblies allocate comparable amounts of their total budgets — approximately 60% — for salaries and other expenses associated with staff. However though both Assemblies employ similar numbers of staff — WEU (28) and the North Atlantic Assembly (26) — the WEU provisional allocation is given as 48,731,640 BF while the North Atlantic Assembly estimates 27,706,915 BF. The discrepancy is even more marked for general administrative costs, one quarter of the WEU Assembly’s budget against ten per cent for the North Atlantic Assembly. The WEU Assembly’s expenditure includes the travel expenses of rapporteurs and chairmen of committees. However this is less than 3% of that portion of the budget allotted for general administrative costs.

Perhaps the most revealing comparison is the proportion of the budget allocated to the sessions. This Assembly’s provision is close to thirty per cent while the WEU estimate is 16 per cent of their total budget. The session expenses for the North Atlantic Assembly are of course swollen by the need to transport personnel, documents and equipment from one location to another.

The Assembly’s provisional budget for 1981 is then still comparatively small and it is interesting that in one case at least a similar pattern is revealed in delegation expenses.

Statistics quoted in “Hansard” in reply to a question asked in the British House of Lords show that the cost of sending delegations and staff to meetings of the North Atlantic Assembly is much less than to the Western European Union and the Council of Europe.

There are, of course, disadvantages to functioning on a small budget. In the past there was some feeling that the Assembly’s small budget somehow reflected the low status and credibility with which it was viewed by the member Governments of the Atlantic Alliance. Today, the size of the Assembly’s budget is described by the former President, Mr. Paul Thyness, as sometimes “stifling” yet it also has its compensations in that it has “made it imperative for us to produce reasonably good work and to justify our existence.”

However if the Assembly is to hold two plenary meetings a year — and there is an indication that this would be welcomed, for example, in June 1980 there was a Special Plenary meeting on Afghanistan and in Venice in May 1981 there will be another Extraordinary Plenary Session requiring additional conference facilities — more finan-
cial resources will be needed. There is interest too in the Assembly undertaking more sub-committee studies; however a limit of eight is the maximum that can be adequately serviced from existing secretariat resources at any one time.

Flexibility

Without the constitutional restraints of an official body the Assembly is freer to choose its own course and to select the subjects it wishes to consider. Delegates are at liberty to speak their minds perhaps more openly than in their national Parliaments where they are constrained by party lines.

It is worth noting that since their withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command both France and Greece – which has recently concluded the necessary agreements to permit its return to full participation in NATO – have continued to participate in all the Assembly’s activities. This may simply reflect the desire of French and Greek parliamentarians to make contact with parliamentarians from other countries and to hear views different from those expressed at home. Or, participation in the Assembly may be valued as a means of obtaining information on current policy developments within NATO, particularly in the work of the Military Committee whose reports tend to shadow NATO military developments.

Participation in the Assembly has permitted Greece and Turkey to air mutual grievances in a forum not constrained by official policies. An Icelandic delegation also used the Plenary Session to present its national case during an international fisheries dispute. This led the Assembly to establish a sub-committee to examine the issues involved in the fishing dispute. In this sense the Assembly can be said to have operated as a safety-valve in allowing grievances between member states to be vented in an Alliance forum.

By permitting the frank exchange of views on issues such as the SALT II talks the Assembly also acts as a sounding board for Alliance opinion on the policies of particular member nations and of political parties.

Delegations: Selection and Composition

One of the most controversial aspects of the Assembly’s organization is the method of the selection and composition of its national delegations. Today Assembly delegations are selected in a variety of ways but with the object of reflecting, as far as is practicable, the balance between political parties in each national Parliament. Even Italy, which for a long time chose delegates on a private basis now bases its appointments on prior consultation between several leading parties. This development has resulted in the first official invitation from the Italian Government to the Assembly to hold a meeting in Italy. It is scheduled to take place in Venice in May 1981.

The question of who is selected has proven particularly controversial. At a time when communists in various member states appeared poised to make significant gains in national elections it was felt that the Assembly should decide whether to admit communist parliamentarians. Two surveys produced at the time were critical of the Assembly’s record in this respect. In his study for the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Mr. Sloan concluded that delegations were biased towards centre right parties. Mr. Sloan countered the argument that “transforming the Assembly into a more accurate reflection of the democratically elected legislatures in the member
countries could lead to problems with communist parliamentarians by claiming that since "sooner or later the Assembly will have little choice but to permit communist participation or be open to damaging criticism" it should "make virtue out of necessity by declaring itself as welcoming delegations that are an accurate reflection of the composition of national parliaments before such a situation arises." However there were justifiable fears that communist participation would have an adverse influence upon the relationships between the Assembly and NATO and on the ability of members to speak freely.

The fact that the WEU has functioned for several years with communist parliamentarians is an argument used by both sides to support their case for and against communist members. An official view received from the Federal Republic of Germany during the study undertaken by the Sub-Committee on Relations with Parliaments and Governments on the possible consequences of communist participation stated: "One had to keep in mind that raising the status of the North Atlantic Assembly could lead to an intensification of communist interest in the Assembly which in turn could seriously impair the envisaged political co-operation."

The Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, when questioned also considered it would be a negative step, while former President of the Assembly, Mr. Paul Thyness, though he accepted the idea in principle, felt it would be counter-productive in terms of flexibility if Parliamentarians were forced into defending party policies.

The Assembly is no longer pursuing institutionalization and its paramount concern is not how closely it can approximate to a democratically elected parliamentary body but rather how it can improve and refine those activities which it does best. In that sense it is likely to develop more as a broadly-based pressure group without the need to reflect so closely political reality. What is far more important for delegates is conviction, interest, open-mindedness and a willingness to participate with new ideas and constructive criticism.

In this respect selection methods have also been criticized for promoting a "clubby," old boy atmosphere with nominations for a position on the delegation being regarded as a reward for long and faithful party service. However the pattern has recently changed considerably with often a rapid turnover in the membership of delegations. Younger parliamentarians are being nominated and a broader spectrum of views is emerging. The evidence for this is to be found in the controversial ideas which have recently found expression particularly in the reports and debates of the Military and Political Committees. On several occasions in recent years Committees have agreed simply "to take note" of a report since members could not agree on a compromise formulation - an indication that participants care about the issues discussed and are not prepared to "rubber stamp" a report simply to achieve a convenient consensus.

Committees and Sub-Committees

Having argued at the outset that one of the two most significant characteristics of the Assembly are its links with NATO (the other being its role as the focal point for transatlantic parliamentary exchanges) should the Assembly concentrate all its energy on the two or three Committees - Military, Political and perhaps Economic - which are manifestly concerned with issues relating directly to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance? Should the Assembly be spreading its already thin resources by financing studies on genetic manipulation, narcotics or the successor generation?
Opinions differ on the merits of maintaining five Committees. However Professor Goodman points to a simple justification for their being retained: "... it seemed reasonable for the NATO Parliamentarians Conference to ... be multi-dimensional in character. Experience also showed that parliamentarians would talk about what was foremost in their minds at the time and would not be constrained to discuss other topics simply for the sake of some abstract organizational plan."

A more important consideration is that a balanced perspective of the many complex and related problems facing the Alliance can best be achieved by consideration of a broad spectrum of disciplines. To a great extent this reflects the trend towards recognition that international and domestic problems can no longer be separated and that security and economic issues are inter-related. Recognition of this interdependence has, in fact, led to the Assembly creating joint sub-committees on topics such as energy policy.

The contribution made by the Sub-Committees to the work of the Assembly has been substantial. They have permitted parliamentarians of different countries and political beliefs to work closely together in producing often complex and detailed studies in a comparatively short time. Sub-Committees are given only short-term mandates with the express intention that they should not be prolonged indefinitely thus retaining a fresh and flexible approach towards the problem under consideration.

The standard of work produced by the Sub-Committees has been high and their reports have been published as a new series by the Assembly and are attracting wide interest.

Their number is limited to eight for administrative and financial reasons. A number of Special Rapporteurs have also been appointed with similarly brief mandates. While it is often easier to arrange a programme of visits and meetings for one person rather than a group of people the appointment of Special Rapporteurs is limited. This is because national Parliaments will often pay for a parliamentarian to participate in a group but will not finance an individual MP acting alone.

The creation of sub-committees has enhanced the quality of the work produced by the Assembly. Some of the sub-committees have been concerned with monitoring the progress of international negotiations, for example, the Sub-Committee on MBFR and the President's Working Group on Arms Control, and their reports have provided a useful synthesis and continuity. Others have been investigative such as the Sub-Committee on Genetic Manipulation whose members visited and saw for themselves the most advanced research centres in this field. In a different manner the role of the Working Group responsible for co-ordinating the study of the economic problems of Portugal has been that of a catalyst drawing together experts and organizations likely to be able to assist Portugal.

In all these ways sub-committees provide an educative experience for their members and permit a greater dissemination and discussion of information on topics of contemporary importance and problems for which solutions are being sought.

Conduct of the Plenary Session

Among the more obvious changes in the operation of the Assembly during the last three years has been the conduct of the Plenary Session. In November 1978 at the 24th Annual Session held in Lisbon a part of the Plenary Session was devoted to debating three pre-selected "themes", the intention being to invigorate the plenary proceedings which over the years had become perfunctory and rather dull.
The experiment proved very successful with a particularly enthusiastic debate on the merits of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). An interesting aspect of this debate, and one that bodes well for future discussions, was the way opinions were divided, not along national lines but between groups of parliamentarians holding similar views.

Given the difference in parliamentary styles, particularly between European and Anglo-Saxon forms of debate, coupled with the constraints of trying to communicate in different languages, it is difficult to envisage the discussion of themes, during the Assembly’s Plenary Sessions, ever becoming a predominantly off-the-cuff exchange. Any movement towards a more dynamic interchange of views rather than the delivery of pre-drafted position papers is however a development to be welcomed.

As has been said before participants in the Assembly have greater flexibility to express individual views than members of officially constituted Assemblies or in debates in national legislatures when party whips may dictate the line to be taken. The introduction of a debating period has given the Assembly a unique opportunity to support the frank exchange of views between Alliance parliamentarians. It will be interesting to see whether it continues to be regarded with enthusiasm or whether in time it will lose its appeal.

In other areas too the Plenary is continuing to evolve. The amount of time now devoted to the adoption of recommendations and resolutions is considerably shorter than in the past since it has been accepted that there is little to be gained from the Plenary duplicating the discussion which has already taken place in the Committees. Many texts are now adopted without comment or attempt at amendment.

Some attempt is also being made to provide time for parliamentarians from different countries who have similar political views to hold meetings during the Session in order to prepare common positions on certain issues.

**Recommendations and Resolutions**

If the recommendations and resolutions (texts) adopted by the Assembly are to make an impact they must be concise, pithy and above all make a coherent demand rather than a vague exhortation. They must not be watered-down compromises.

The lack of continuity in the substance of texts from one year to another is a serious fault since it precludes the Assembly being associated with a particular political stand. The length of a recommendation may also contribute to its loss of impact.

It may be preferable for the Assembly to adopt fewer texts (say two or three from each Committee per Session) and each one should concentrate on a specific issue rather than attempt to cover a whole range of problems as many texts have done in the past. This approach is more likely to produce a positive recommendation since the area for disagreement is limited.

The role of the Drafting Committee is important in ironing out disagreements and it has the capacity to achieve greater authority if the participation of the Committee Chairmen and Rapporteurs can be made more effective in negotiating strong compromise texts which still have “something to say” after the drafting process is complete.

As was mentioned above (see “Relations with Parliaments” page 166) individual parliamentarians can do much to ensure that Assembly texts are brought to the
attention of Parliaments, Committees, interested pressure groups, and particularly Ministers of State, but the quality of the texts must be improved greatly from what is currently being produced.

Reports

It has been a long established practice for each Committee to produce an annual general report surveying the major developments in its field during the past year in member countries. There is a problem in producing such reports in that they tend either to be a boring litany of facts or a massive document which it is impracticable to expect even conscientious parliamentarians to absorb and discuss.

A more satisfactory practice might be for Committees to cease preparing lengthy annual general reports as at present and instead to follow the United States Congressional Research Service practice of issuing information briefs to member parliamentarians on important topics on a regular basis.

This would also give the Assembly a form of continuity and permanence outside of the Spring and Autumn meetings.

The annual general report need only provide a very brief summary of the year’s events in its sphere. More time could be devoted to discussing potential future developments and specific problems which have arisen during the year.

As well as looking forward the report could contribute to continuity by providing a brief preface on the main issues discussed, and conclusions reached, in the previous year and on the results of any follow-up activity.

Participation of Experts

The participation of non-parliamentary experts and of parliamentarians who are not necessarily members of the Assembly but who have particular interest or expertise in a subject has also been considered as a means of bringing fresh insights into Assembly debates.

Such a scheme was proposed in the Dobell Report for the Committee of Nine and by Mr. Eric Blumenfeld (Fed. Rep. of Germany), (see “Efforts at Institutionalization” Chapter Two) and would be worth encouraging. It would bring a new perspective to the work of the Assembly’s Committees and would also bring more parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians into contact with the Assembly and the work it is trying to do.

Administration of the Assembly

Many international assemblies are administered by Clerks whose chief responsibility is to advise the President. The North Atlantic Assembly has a Secretary-General who is the permanent representative of the Standing Committee and who takes responsibility for the day-to-day running of affairs. The Secretary-General derives these powers from the President.

His paramount responsibility is to implement the decisions of the Standing Committee and to give direction to the work of the Secretariat.

It is in this latter capacity that his role is least defined. At present topics are chosen for study largely because they appeal to a particular parliamentarian and are accepted by the Standing Committee. There is very little evaluation of the merits of one project
in comparison with another. Yet with limited financial resources surely it would be more efficient to devise a policy which gives direction to the work of the Assembly and some guidance as to which projects should be given priority. The Secretary-General could be authorized to implement that policy.

A New Beginning?

For over thirty years NATO has represented the commitment of the Atlantic nations to collective security. How, and indeed if, it will continue to fulfil this role and what changes will be necessary to meet the challenges of the future remain to be discovered.

When the Alliance was created international politics conceived of a world essentially divided into two ideological camps, one led by the United States the other by the Soviet Union. At the time the United States had a comfortable monopoly of nuclear capability. Today, something akin to parity has emerged in the strategic balance between the Superpowers. Soviet naval advances are giving cause for concern in the West as are her expansionist activities in Africa and more recently in Afghanistan. The position of Poland appears precarious and the stability of Eastern Europe as a whole is being questioned.

Beyond Europe new power blocs have emerged whose power bases are not primarily military might but economic resources, in particular oil. Securing oil supply routes and guaranteeing a constant supply of basic materials are questions now vital to the security of the Alliance nations.

How the Alliance responds to these developments is surely the most urgent question for the member Governments to resolve in these first years of the 1980's, particularly as the murmurs grow that the Alliance is no longer the appropriate vehicle either for collective, or self defence. The new United States Administration has given every indication that it is seeking a tough and positive response from the allies. There are also indications that the United States-Soviet Union relationship which pertained during the years of detente needs to be redefined.

The North Atlantic Assembly can make an important contribution in this period of reappraisal by continuing to provide an atmosphere where these issues can be discussed and debated frankly and forthrightly; from where parliamentarians can be encouraged to go home and talk about what they have learned and to which parliamentarians from non-Alliance countries may be invited to observe their discussions. Above all the Assembly should be open and receptive to events in the communist world and in those countries now lining up under the banner of Islam. The problems currently confronting the nations of the Atlantic Alliance are often the same problems faced by other nations from different perspectives and the parliamentarians of the North Atlantic Assembly can do much to ensure wider recognition of this fact and of the degree to which political, economic, environmental and security issues are today interlinked.

To take one example – there has recently been some discussion of the need, in the light of securing vital strategic interests such as oil, to extend the boundaries of the Alliance. Such a step would have serious implications not only for the Alliance nations but for the role of NATO within the international system.
It is in discussing such issues and making their views known both within and outside the Alliance that the NATO Parliamentarians can make a significant contribution to international relations.

Footnotes


2. ibid.

3. ibid., Goodman suggests that the Assembly should be provided with the necessary information to discuss NATO defence expenditures including elements of the common NATO infrastructure such as airfields, missile sites, air warning systems, telecommunications, fuel pipelines etc., and the provision of facilities for the civil agencies and the International Secretariat. For further details see "The Fate of the Atlantic Community," pages 562-565.

4. Mr. A. Glenn Mower Jr., Professor of Political Science, Hanover College, Indiana, USA, see "The Importance of the North Atlantic Assembly" Orbis. Winter 1978, pages 927-945.

5. Report prepared for the Standing Committee in 1972 Annexe 7 — "Comparative evolution of the budgets of the North Atlantic Assembly, the Council of Europe and the Assembly of the Western Europe Union", Annexe 8 — "Comparative budgets of the North Atlantic Assembly, Council of Europe and Assembly of the Western European Union (in Belgian francs)".

Using these tables it is possible to calculate the value expressed as a percentage (of the North Atlantic Assembly budget) of the budgets of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of WEU. The exercise indicates that while the North Atlantic Assembly budget has consistently been 2-3% of the Council of Europe's. It has fluctuated from 51% of the budget of the Assembly of WEU in 1958 to 32% in 1962 and following the grant received from NATO for the first time in 1971 (700,000 BF) to 47%.


See also, "Draft Budget of the North Atlantic Assembly for the Financial Year 1981", International Secretariat 1980 and "Draft Budget of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1981", report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur Twenty-sixth Ordinary Session (second part), Assembly of Western European Union, 18 September 1980 (Document No. 851).

Appendices

Appendix 1: Officers

The officers of the Assembly consist of the President, three Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer.

They are elected by a simple majority vote of the members present at the annual Plenary Session.

Their mandates are renewable. The three Vice-Presidents must be of different nationality and North America is always represented among the officers.

*Presidents and Vice-Presidents*

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Vice-Presidents</th>
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| 1955/56| Mr. W. McL. Robertson (Can) | Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)  
|        |                 | Mr. P. O. Lapie (Fr)      
|        |                 | Mr. Finn Moe (Nor)        
|        |                 | Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)      |
| 1956/57| Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)      | Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)  
|        |                 | Mr. E. Bonnefous (Fr)     
|        |                 | Mr. F. Berendsen (FRG)    |
| 1957/58| Mr. J. J. Fens (Neth)     | Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)  
|        |                 | Mr. E. Bonnefous (Fr)     
|        |                 | Mr. F. Berendsen (FRG)    
|        |                 | Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)      |
| 1958/59| Mr. J. J. Fens (Neth)     | Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)  
|        |                 | Gen. A. Béthouart (Fr)    
|        |                 | Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)      |
| 1959/60| Gen. A. Béthouart (Fr)    | Mr. N. Langhelle (Nor)     
|        |                 | Dr. G. Kliesing (FRG)     
|        |                 | Mr. J. J. Fens (Neth)     
|        |                 | Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)      |
| 1960/61| Mr. N. Langhelle (Nor)    | Mr. P. Micara (It)         
|        |                 | Gen. A. Béthouart (Fr)    
|        |                 | Dr. G. Kliesing (FRG)     
<p>|        |                 | Dr. J. W. Kucherepa (Can) |</p>
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<td>Mr. R. Fandel (Lux)</td>
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<td>Mr. K. Damgaard (Den)</td>
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<td>Mr. F. Storchi (It)</td>
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1975    Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)          Mr. K. Damgaard (Den)
        Mr. F. Storchi (It)
        Mr. M. Boscher (Fr)
1976    Mr. W. L. Hays (USA)          Mr. K. Damgaard (Den)
        Mr. F. Storchi (It)
        Mr. M. Boscher (Fr)
1977    Sir G. de Freitas (UK)        Mr. K. Damgaard (Den)
        Mr. M. Boscher (Fr)
        Mr. J. Brooks (USA)
1978    Sir G. de Freitas (UK)        Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
        Mr. M. Boscher (Fr)
        Mr. J. Brooks (USA)
1979    Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)          Sir G. de Freitas (UK)
        Mr. J. Brooks (USA)
        Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG)
1980    Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)          Mr. J. Brooks (USA)
        Mr. P. Corterier (FRG)
        Mr. C. Gontikas (Greece)

Treasurers
Sir Geoffrey de Freitas          United Kingdom  1955–1960
Mr. J. Chamant                  France            1960–1967
Mr. P. de Chevigny              France            1967–1975
Mr. Paul Langlois               Canada            1975–1979
Mr. Robert Laucournet           France            1980–

Secretaries-General
Mr. Douglas Robinson (Executive Secretary) United Kingdom  1955–1960
Mr. O. van H. Labberton          Netherlands  1960–1968
Mr. Philippe Deshormes           Belgium          1968–

Appendix 2: Committee Structure

The Standing Committee

The Standing Committee, as the governing body, has the overall responsibility for
directing the activities of the Assembly and consists of one member from each national
delegation. Each member of the Standing Committee has one vote, except on decisions
involving additional expenditure, when the votes are weighted according to national
contributions.

The main responsibilities of the Standing Committee are to represent the interests
of the Assembly between Sessions, prepare the budget and manage the funds accord­
ingly, draw up the proposed agenda for the Assembly’s Plenary Sessions, and take all
possible steps to secure the implementation of the recommendations and resolutions
adopted at the Plenary. The Standing Committee appoints the Secretary-General and
has final authority over the size and functions of the Secretariat. It meets at least three
times a year.
The Five Committees

Five Committees cover the wide range of the Assembly's activities. These are the Economic Committee with 36 members; the Committee on Cultural Affairs, Education and Information with 22 members; the Military Committee with 40 members; the Political Committee with 46 members; and the Scientific and Technical Committee with 28 members. The Committees meet at least twice a year.

The Meetings of the Committee on Cultural Affairs, Education and Information and the Scientific and Technical Committee are open to the public.

National representation on the Committees reflects the same proportional pattern as for membership of the Assembly itself.

Each Committee has a Chairman, one or more Vice-Chairmen and a General Rapporteur. Elections are held annually and an officer may serve for a maximum of four years.

The function of the General Rapporteur is to present his Committee with a report which serves as a basis for debate and as a source of draft resolutions and recommendations which, once they have been discussed and amended by a Committee, are submitted for consideration by the full membership of the Assembly in Plenary Session (see page 173).

If a Committee, in the course of its work, comes across a problem which it considers could benefit from deeper analysis a sub-committee may be appointed for a specified period of time.

Special Rapporteurs may also be elected to prepare reports on topics of current interest. In recent years Special Rapporteurs have been appointed for such varied subjects as NATO's Southern Flank, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, nuclear energy, etc.

Listed below are the Committee Chairmen and Vice Chairmen and the Sub-Committees, Working Parties and Special Rapporteurs created by the Assembly between 1964 and 1980.

Officers of Committees

Economic Committee
Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen

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<td>Sen. A. MacLean (Can)</td>
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<td>Mr. F. Burgbacher (FRG)</td>
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<td>Mr. F. Burgbacher (FRG)</td>
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<td>Sen. J. Javits (USA)</td>
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<td>Mr. A. Kershaw (UK)</td>
<td>Mr. F. Burgbacher (FRG)</td>
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<td>Mr. E. Bishop (UK)</td>
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<td>Mr. A. Dua (Belg)</td>
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<td>Mr. A. Gunnella (It)</td>
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<td>Sen. J. Biden, Jr. (USA)</td>
<td>Mr. E. Lange (FRG)</td>
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<td>Mr. E. Lange (FRG)</td>
<td>Sen. R. Morgan (USA)</td>
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**Rapporteurs**

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Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee
Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen

1956 Chairman  Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)
1957 Chairman  Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)
1958 Chairman  Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)
1959 Chairman  Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. N. Dorion (Can)
1960 Chairman  Mr. F. van Cauwelaert (Belg)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. N. Dorion (Can)
1961 Chairman  Mr. J. Bordeneuve (Fr)
1962 Vice-Chairman  Baroness Elliot of Harwood (UK)
1963 Chairman  Baroness Elliot of Harwood (UK)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1964 Chairman  Baroness Elliot of Harwood (UK)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1965 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1966 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1967 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1968 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1969 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1970 Chairman  Sen. K. Mundt (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
1971 Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. A. Peddle (Can)
1972 Chairman  Mr. H. Pöhler (FRG)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. A. Peddle (Can)
1973 Chairman  Sen. J. Tunney (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. J. Debucquoy (Belg)
1974 Chairman  Sen. J. Tunney (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. A. Gessner (FRG)
1975 Chairman  Sen. J. Tunney (USA)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. A. Gessner (FRG)
1976 Chairman  Sen. J. Tunney (USA)
       Vice-Chairmen  Mr. A. Gessner (FRG)
       Mr. R. Stewart (Can)
1977 Chairman  Mr. R. Stewart (Can)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. A. Gessner (FRG)
1978 Chairman  Mr. R. Stewart (Can)
       Vice-Chairman  Mr. K. de Vries (Neth)
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183
1969 Chairman Sir F. Maclean (UK)
Vice-Chairman Col. W. Wierda (Neth)
1970 Chairman Sir F. Maclean (UK)
Vice-Chairmen Col. W. Wierda (Neth)
Mr. C. Rivers (USA)
1971 Chairman Sir F. Maclean (UK)
Vice-Chairman Sen. E. Kennedy (USA)
1972 Chairman Sir F. Maclean (UK)
Vice-Chairmen Sen. E. Kennedy (USA)
Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
1973 Chairman Sir F. Maclean (UK)
Vice-Chairman Mr. H. Schmidt (FRG)
1974 Chairman Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
Vice-Chairmen Sen. E. Kennedy (USA)
Mr. H. Schmidt (FRG)
1975 Chairman Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
Vice-Chairmen Sen. E. Kennedy (USA)
Mr. H. Schmidt (FRG)
1976 Chairman Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
Vice-Chairmen Sen. S. Nunn (USA)
Mr. K. G. de Vries (Neth)
1977 Chairman Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
Vice-Chairman Sen. S. Nunn (USA)
1978 Chairman Mr. P. Wall (UK)
Vice-Chairman Sen. S. Nunn (USA)
1979 Chairman Mr. P. Wall (UK)
Vice-Chairman Sen. S. Nunn (USA)
1980 Chairman Mr. P. Wall (UK)
Vice-Chairman Mr. C. Damm (FRG)

Rapporteurs
1959 Gen. Couzy (Neth) 1972 Mr. P. Thyness (Nor)
1960 Gen. Couzy (Neth) 1973 Mr. P. Wall (UK)
1961 Gen. Couzy (Neth) 1974 Mr. P. Wall (UK)
1962 Gen. Couzy (Neth) 1975 Mr. P. Wall (UK)
1963 Gen. Couzy (Neth) 1976 Mr. P. Wall (UK)
1964 Capt. D. W. Groos (Can) 1977 Mr. P. Wall (UK)
1965 Capt. D. W. Groos (Can) 1978 Mr. K. G. de Vries (Neth)
1966 Sen. J. S. Cooper (USA) 1979 Mr. K. G. de Vries (Neth)
1967 Sen. J. S. Cooper (USA) 1980 Mr. K. G. de Vries (Neth)
1968 Sen. J. S. Cooper (USA)

Political Committee
Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen
1956 Chairman Mr. H. Fayat (Belg)
1957 Chairman Sen. E. Kefauver (USA)
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Rapporteurs

1956 Sir G. de Freitas (UK) 1969 Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG)
1957 Sir G. de Freitas (UK) 1970 Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG)
1958 Mr. H. Fayat (Belgium) 1971 Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG)
1959 Mr. F. Moe (Norway) 1972 Mr. M. van der Stoel (Netherlands)
1960 Mr. F. Moe (Norway) 1973 Mr. M. van der Stoel (Netherlands)
1961 Mr. F. J. Goedhart (Netherlands) 1974 Mr. P. Dankert (Netherlands)
1962 Mr. J. V. Lindsay (USA) 1975 Mr. P. Dankert (Netherlands)
1963 Mr. J. V. Lindsay (USA) 1976 Mr. P. Dankert (Netherlands)
1964 Mr. M. Boscher (France) 1977 Mr. P. Dankert (Netherlands)
1965 Sen. J. Javits (USA) 1978 Mr. P. Corterier (FRG)
1966 Sen. J. Javits (USA) 1979 Mr. P. Corterier (FRG)
1967 Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG) 1980 Mr. P. Corterier (FRG)
1968 Mr. E. Blumenfeld (FRG)

Scientific and Technical Committee
Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen

1957 Chairman Sen. H. Jackson (USA)
1958 Chairman Sen. H. Jackson (USA)
1959 Chairman Sen. H. Jackson (USA)
1960 Chairman Sen. H. Jackson (USA)
1961 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
1962 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. J. in’t Veld (Netherlands)
1963 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. J. in’t Veld (Netherlands)
1964 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mrs. E. M. Ross (Denmark)
1965 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mrs. E. M. Ross (Denmark)
1966 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1967 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1968 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1969 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1970 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1971 Chairman Prof. G. Portmann (France)
Vice-Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
1972 Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
Vice-Chairman Mr. O. Giscard d’Estaing (France)
1973 Chairman Mr. P. Rodino (USA)
Vice-Chairman Lord Wynne-Jones (UK)
1974 Chairman Lord Wynne-Jones (UK)
Vice-Chairman Mr. J. Jerome (Canada)
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<td>Mr. C. Rose (USA)</td>
<td>Mr. G. Flämig (FRG)</td>
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Rapporteurs

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<tr>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Earl Jellicoe (UK)</td>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Mr. H. de Croo (Belg)</td>
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Working Parties, Sub-Committees and “Special” Rapporteurs

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187
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<tr>
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<td>Sub-Committee on Reserve Forces and Home Guard Units MC</td>
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<td>1972/73</td>
<td>Rapporteur on the Problems of Energy Supplies and Reserves within the Atlantic Alliance EC</td>
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Rapporteur on Questions of Space Co-operation STC
Rapporteur on the Study on setting up a Data Bank for Use by Parliamentarians STC
Rapporteur on the Problem of Fisheries in the North Atlantic STC
Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between NATO Countries STC
Sub-Committee on the Study of the Negotiations on MBFR MC
Sub-Committee on Arms Procurement (Eurogroup) MC
Sub-Committee on the Study of the Annexe to the Interim Report of the Committee of Nine, devoted to the Future Prospects of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) PC
Working Group on the Control of Narcotics STC

1973/74
Rapporteur on the Study on setting up an International Information System on Science and Technology STC
Rapporteur on the Establishment of an International Satellite Surveillance System for the North Atlantic STC
Rapporteur on Scientific and Technical Aspects of Energy Supplies STC
Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between Member Countries of the Atlantic Alliance EC
Sub-Committee on Multinational Corporations EC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Economic, Military and Scientific and Technical Committees on Energy Supplies EC/MC/STC
Sub-Committee on the Study of the Negotiations on MBFR MC
Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation MC
Sub-Committee on the Study of the Institutional Prospects of the North Atlantic Assembly PC
Sub-Committee on the Work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) and the Application of its Recommendations STC
Working Group on the Control of Narcotics STC

1975
Special Rapporteur to Monitor MBFR MC
Rapporteur on the Study on setting up an International Information System on Science and Technology STC
Rapporteur on Scientific and Technical Aspects of Energy Supplies STC
Sub-Committee on Economic Relations between Member Countries of the Atlantic Alliance EC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Economic, Military and Scientific and Technical Committees on Energy Supplies EC/MC/STC
Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information CIC

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<tr>
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<tr>
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Rapporteur on the Work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)  STC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Economic and Scientific and Technical Committees on Energy Supplies  EC/STC
Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information  CIC
Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation  MC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Military and Political Committee on the Northern Region  MC/PC
Sub-Committee on Detente  PC
Sub-Committee on Relations with Governments and Parliaments  SC

1979
Special Rapporteur to Monitor MBFR  MC/PC
Special Rapporteur on the Southern Flank  MC
Rapporteur on the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)  STC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Economic, Political and Scientific and Technical Committees on Energy Policy  EC/PC/STC
Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information and People  CIC
Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation  MC
Joint Sub-Committee of the Military and Political Committee on the Northern Region  MC/PC
Sub-Committee on Detente  PC
Sub-Committee on the Southern Region  PC
Sub-Committee on Genetic Manipulation  STC

1980
Special Rapporteur for Monetary Matters  EC
Special Rapporteur on Energy Policy  EC
Special Rapporteur to Monitor MBFR  MC
Special Rapporteur to Monitor MBFR  PC
Special Rapporteur on the Technical and Social Implications of the Development of Microprocessors  STC
Rapporteur on the Work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS)  STC
Sub-Committee on the Free Flow of Information and People  CIC
Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation  MC
Sub-Committee on Manpower and Personnel  MC
Sub-Committee on the Southern Region  PC
Sub-Committee on Genetic Manipulation  STC
Sub-Committee on Energy Sources and Uses within the Atlantic Community  STC
Working Group on Portugal  EC
Working Group on the Successor Generation  CIC
Working Group on Preparation for the Madrid CSCE Review Conference  PC
Appendix 3: Budget

The Assembly's budget is composed of contributions made by the Parliaments or Governments of the member countries. NATO also makes a contribution towards the organizational costs of the annual sessions. National contributions have been calculated on the same percentage basis as that used to determine the NATO civilian budget and are as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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The total budget for 1982 – including the NATO contribution – amounts to BF 46,986,915.

The financial management of the Assembly is the responsibility of the Treasurer. The Treasurer is responsible for presenting budgets and statements of account to the Standing Committee and to the Plenary.

1955 (July) – 1956 (June) £4,047 1968 BF 12,700,000
1956 (July) – 1957 (June) £7,167 1969 BF 13,262,000
1957 (July – December) £15,000 1970 BF 12,992,000
1958 £40,000 1971 BF 14,772,000
1959 £40,000 1972 BF 15,500,000
1960 £40,000 1973 BF 17,275,000
1961 £40,000 1974 BF 20,588,000
1962 FF 550,000 1975 BF 26,302,000
1963 FF 665,000 1976 BF 29,370,812
1964 FF 700,000 1977 BF 33,612,000
1965 FF 1,000,000 1978 BF 36,066,000
1966 FF 1,100,000 1979 BF 38,000,000
1967 FF 1,200,000 1980 BF 40,259,000
1981 BF 46,986,915

£ British Sterling FF French Franc BF Belgian Franc

Appendix 4: Annual Sessions

The North Atlantic Assembly meets in full Plenary Session once a year in the Autumn. Occasionally a Special Plenary Session is held in the Spring if there is a matter of particular international concern on which it is considered desirable to hold a debate of the full membership of the North Atlantic Assembly.

A Special Plenary Session was held in Luxembourg in June 1980 to discuss the international implications of the invasion of Afghanistan.

During the Plenary Session recommendations and resolutions are adopted which express the Assembly's position on various matters.
Recommendations require a two-thirds majority vote and are directed to the North Atlantic Council in expectation of a reaction from the NATO Secretary-General expressing the Council's view.

Resolutions are formal expressions of opinion on a particular matter and are usually addressed to member Governments and Parliaments of the Alliance, or to international organizations such as OECD. A resolution may be adopted by a simple majority.

In addition the Assembly may express an opinion in response to a formal request from the North Atlantic Council or from some other international organization. This too is adopted by a simple majority.

Delegates normally vote as individuals and by a show of hands. Exceptionally delegates may choose to register their votes by roll-call of national delegations, individual "ayes" and "noes" being recorded within each delegation prior to the roll-call.

The Secretary-General of NATO attends Assembly Sessions and participates in a spontaneous question and answer session with parliamentarians. SACEUR and other senior NATO personnel have frequently addressed the Plenary Session.

In 1978, a new item was introduced into the agenda of the Plenary Session, a period when themes of immediate and critical importance to the Alliance could be freely debated. This debating period, the aim of which was to introduce an element of spontaneity into the proceedings, has been a considerable success.

In 1978, one theme selected for discussion was arms negotiations which provoked a stimulating debate on the projected SALT II Treaty. The practice of debating themes was developed in 1979 and 1980.

Plenary Sessions are open to the public. Since 1969, it has been the practice of the Assembly to hold its Plenary Sessions in different capitals each year. For the most part, these are held in the Parliament of one of the member countries, at the invitation of the country concerned.

The Annual Sessions have been held in the following locations:

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<td>November</td>
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<td>November</td>
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Appendix 6: Membership

The membership of the Assembly is composed of serving parliamentarians from fifteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance who are appointed by their respective Parliaments under nationally determined procedures.

The number of effective members is 172, allocated as follows:— United States (36); United Kingdom; France; Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (18 each); Canada (12); Turkey (10); Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands (7 each); Denmark, Norway and Portugal (5 each); Iceland and Luxembourg (3 each).

Most delegations are multi-party and reflect the political complexion of national legislatures. No serving Minister or Government member can be a delegate to the Assembly. Delegates are normally appointed for a minimum period of one year and where possible for the duration of their current national Parliament.

Delegates 1955–1980

The following list of delegates has been prepared from material contained in the Assembly’s files. While every endeavour has been made to ensure that the list is correct we cannot guarantee its completeness and accuracy in all cases.

Belgium

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**Turkey**

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Appendix 7: The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article III
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article IV
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article V
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI
For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article V applies has been revised by Article II of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote of self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria.

The result was that the 'Algerian Departments of France' no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.

Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

Article VII
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article IX
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

Article X
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party.
to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article XI
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article XII
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article XIII
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article XIV
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.
### Key

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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