The Assembly,

1. *Aware* of the growing challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, particularly emanating from the east and south, but also due to the spread of terrorism and hybrid tactics destabilising domestic security throughout the Alliance;

2. *Believing* that NATO remains the cornerstone of security in Europe, but *understanding* that stronger European security is both necessary and complementary to NATO’s interests and goals;

3. *Understanding* that EU efforts - to bolster attention to member states’ security institutions, transnational security cooperation and the European defence industrial base - overlap with NATO’s focus on burden sharing;

4. *Confident* the environment is ripe for more structured, mutually beneficial, and capable cooperation between NATO and the EU, while at the same time recognising the essential role played by non-EU members within the transatlantic Alliance;

5. *Encouraged* by recent efforts by both the Alliance and the European Union to move their cooperation agenda forward, particularly since the signing of the Joint Declaration by both organisations at the 2016 Warsaw Summit;

6. *Agreeing* with the Joint Declaration’s delineation of seven areas on which to focus for stronger cooperation, including hybrid threats, maritime operations, defence industry and research, cyber security, exercises and capacity building;

7. *Noting* NATO and EU officials also identified a common set of 42 proposals aimed to ensure that both organisations have a shared view of current and future security threats, operate with supplementary strategies and work towards unifying their responses to common security challenges;

8. *Confident* the momentum for building a capable partnership already exists in the areas of joint capability development, counterterrorism, cyber security, and also of mitigating the disruptive effects of hybrid tactics;

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9. **Encouraged** by existing cooperation between NATO and the EU in operational areas, as currently exemplified by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean;

10. **Commending** recently announced initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund, the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation and the joint NATO-EU Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats as well as other centres of excellence and fusion cells addressing the challenges of terrorism and cyber security; and,

11. **Conscious** of the persistent hurdles to closer NATO-EU cooperation, particularly diplomatic differences between NATO and EU member states such as that between Greece and Turkey over the future status of Cyprus, but **still confident** such hurdles can be surmounted in light of broader mutual interests in today’s challenging international security environment;

12. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of NATO and the European Union:
   a. to encourage current efforts to align NATO and EU security priorities in the areas of joint capability development, as well as cooperative efforts in counterterrorism, cyber security and hybrid awareness and defence;
   b. to push forward diplomatic efforts to overcome existing obstacles to enhanced NATO-EU cooperation;
   c. to find ways to encourage increased transatlantic defence industrial cooperation, expanding the breadth and depth of the economic opportunities offered by joint capability development;
   d. to support joint NATO-EU exercising initiatives such as Parallel and Coordinated Exercises; and,
   e. to support the Government of National Unity in Libya and foster all efforts of dialogue to facilitate the stabilisation and unification of the country;

13. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the European Union:
   a. to fully fund the European Defence Fund, thereby allowing it to achieve its goals of enhancing inter-European capability development;
   b. to support the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative allowing for expanded exercising opportunities among EU member states’ forces, thereby allowing for a common set of forces with advanced readiness;
   c. to become contributors to the new momentum to strengthen the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy; and,
   d. to continue to support initiatives to invest in and enhance their own domestic security institutions as a means of continuously strengthening their abilities to be strong contributors to both European and transatlantic security.