DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

NATO-EU COOPERATION AFTER WARSAW

REPORT

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Efforts to strengthen the breadth and depth of NATO-EU cooperation have a long, relatively unfruitful history. Central issues stalling better cooperation revolve principally around member states’ concerns of duplicated efforts. Such concerns were valid during an era of strained defence budgets and when the EU’s definition of its own Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) often raised more questions than answers.

2. As a result, the EU remained focused on its political and economic integration goals, leaving NATO to focus on the provision of European continental defence. As the EU has continued to hone its strategic vision for the defence and security of its member states, cooperation has settled into an ad hoc, unofficial cooperation in the field – the EU provides more soft power security assistance such as rule of law reforms, while NATO forces defend territory and help build the capacity of local forces.

3. With security in Europe relatively unchallenged for the first decade of the 21st century, such ad hoc cooperation was mutually beneficial and suited to institutional strengths. The rapidly evolving European security environment since 2014, however, is inspiring new momentum to generate efficient and effective NATO-EU cooperation. Several key developments are pushing the two big Brussels institutions to revisit their understanding of their common security interests, and to work harder to find areas for synergistic cooperation.

4. A spate of terrorist attacks, destabilising migration waves, and new hybrid threats (from cyber menacing, political interference, to the startling annexation of Crimea by Russia) rattled NATO and the EU’s conception of European stability and blurred the lines of internal and external security on the continent. As such, a discrete separation of tasks between NATO as the provider of defence and deterrence against external threats and the EU providing a framework for member state’s domestic security no longer seems viable in the 21st century.

5. As such, 2016 witnessed initiatives by NATO and the EU to strengthen their cooperation, kick started by the signing of the Joint Declaration between the two organisations at the NATO Warsaw Summit in July. The EU and NATO identified seven areas for renewed focus on cooperation; from countering hybrid threats to exercises and operations to defence and security capacity building.

6. This report will review the history of NATO-EU cooperation through the Warsaw Summit. It will then discuss the outcomes of the summit with a review of existing and the prospects for future cooperation in the following principal areas: joint capability development, hybrid threats, cyber security, and counterterrorism. It will conclude with a discussion of the road ahead for NATO-EU cooperation, highlighting potential over-the-horizon issues that may complicate it.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF NATO-EU COOPERATION TO DATE

7. NATO and EU cooperation spans well over a decade and covers a wide range of issues, including crisis management, capability development, capacity building, and maritime security. Attempts to establish a political framework for NATO-EU cooperation began in 2002, with both organisations signing the declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which defined the NATO-EU relationship as a strategic partnership. The 2003 “Berlin Plus” arrangements quickly followed, signalling early momentum to enhance inter-organisational cooperation.

8. The “Berlin Plus” initiative strengthened NATO-EU crisis management cooperation, allowing EU-led operations to make use of NATO assets and capabilities – particularly command structures for operations (Umlaufova). Most importantly, “Berlin Plus” arrangements provided a formal framework for future NATO-EU joint missions.
9. *Operation Concordia* in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the first "Berlin Plus" mission, when the EU took command and control of NATO-led *Operation Allied Harmony* in March 2003. The following year, the EU launched its second operation when EUFOR assumed responsibility for the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demonstrating the hybrid nature of the mission, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) commanded the mission, while political control and strategic direction of the operation was within the responsibilities of the Council of the EU (EEAS, January 2016). As a result, the EU established a command cell at SHAPE in Mons, and EU liaison teams were present at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples.

10. Several complicated political barriers to closer EU-NATO cooperation, however, soon presented themselves following the EU enlargement in 2004. Obstacles to the cooperative momentum were the issues of sensitive information sharing between NATO and the EU, as well as the accession of Cyprus into the EU. As a result, any new NATO-EU cooperation within the “Berlin plus” framework was suspended. In the absence of formal agreements, cooperation between NATO and the EU continued ad hoc.

11. Nevertheless, despite the political deadlock, informal NATO and EU cooperation is constructive and mutually beneficial. For example, the EU established Operation European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan in 2007, to support the Afghan Government’s efforts to build institutions for Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice personnel development and practice. EUPOL conducted its activities in parallel with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission; in fact, throughout their seven years of cooperation, EUPOL and ISAF worked without any form of official cooperation agreement at all.

12. In February 2008, the EU launched the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) to support NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in security sector reform efforts. In Kosovo, NATO-EU cooperation continues to coordinate and strengthen the rule of law in the country, particularly against organised criminal networks and institutional corruption (Græger). Thus, despite political deadlock surrounding the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, NATO and EU staff find ways to cooperate at the tactical and operational levels, allowing for effective and beneficial cooperation on the ground in Kosovo. Consequently, field cooperation through ad hoc informal interactions is currently the most effective way for both organisations to cooperate.

13. In December 2008, EU operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta began supporting NATO Operation Ocean Shield to counter increased Somalia-based pirate activity at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. Both EU and NATO officials devised robust informal cooperation frameworks, which allowed for effective information sharing and coordination of maritime operations. In this respect, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Initiative became one of the most important mechanisms strengthening NATO-EU cooperation at the tactical and operational levels.

14. Since 2014, the growing complexity and combination of security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic area increased the momentum for strengthened NATO-EU cooperation. The first arena of cooperation emerged from the increasing flow of refugees and migrants across the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, lending new impetus for stronger NATO-EU coordination efforts.

15. As of 2015, EU-led *Operation Sophia* and NATO *Operation Active Endeavour* have been cooperating in the Mediterranean Sea to tackle the migration crisis. During the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit, *Operation Active Endeavour* was transformed into *Operation Sea Guardian*, a non-Article 5 maritime security operation. This decision extended Sea Guardian’s mandate, including situational awareness activities, capacity building, and highlighted closer cooperation with EU’s *Operation Sophia*. In addition, NATO’s naval assets have

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
been working with a Frontex-led *Joint Operation Poseidon* in the Aegean Sea, which coordinates the deployment of EU member states’ assets, including surveillance aircraft, patrol vessels, and other coast guard assets.

**Current NATO-EU Cooperation Benefits and Shortfalls**

16. NATO-EU maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea demonstrate the nature of the existing cooperation between the two organisations. In this respect, information sharing and intelligence collection influence key dynamics of NATO-EU interactions, while informal agreements and ad hoc cooperation remain the principal modus operandi.

17. Effective NATO-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea relies heavily on close interactions between NATO and Frontex. Thanks to liaison arrangements between Allied Maritime Command and Frontex, information sharing now occurs in real time. Moreover, NATO and Frontex have widened the breadth and depth of their cooperation response to the migration and refugee challenges in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas to counter illegal trafficking networks as well. Furthermore, the EU and NATO have been coordinating their activities and sharing information through respective Maritime Operation Centres and SHADE MED meetings.

18. Informal data exchange platforms form the backbone of NATO-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea (EEAS). For example, the adaptation of the SMART platform, designed to enable information sharing between EEAS, NATO, Frontex, national organisations and maritime shipping industries, has significantly improved shared situational awareness and coordination.

19. However, NATO and EU continue to face difficulties in terms of coordinating their Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. This issue was highlighted in the 2016 report of Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities [NATO and the Future Role of Naval Power](https://162.dscfc.16.e.rev.1.fin), which touched upon NATO and the EU's respective roles in coordinating maritime security operations, highlighting significant gaps in maritime surveillance coordination between NATO and the EU. Moreover, the EU currently lacks sufficient ISR assets, exposing important deficiencies in situational awareness. This has become particularly apparent in EU efforts to operate effectively within Libyan territorial waters (EEAS, EUNAVFOR MED Op. Sophia). Consequently, intelligence collection and exchange remains both one of the greatest obstacles to more effective NATO-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, but also an area ripe for future collaboration.

20. NATO also currently benefits greatly from the efforts of the EULEX mission. While NATO provides the peace and security for cooperation and dialogue on the ground in Kosovo today, EULEX complements NATO efforts by working to establish the rule of law, break down the criminal networks plaguing the country, and stymie systemic corruption to allow the country to achieve a degree of lasting stability and economic prosperity. The ad hoc basis on which the two organisations cooperate allows for each to deliver the necessary hard and soft power security sector reform in Kosovo to enable the state to function effectively, efficiently, and for the people.

21. Finding suitable and effective platforms for hard and soft power layering of security sector assistance, whether in operation or in the broader defence and deterrence policies of both organisations, is the only way forward for NATO-EU cooperation.
III. NATO-EU COOPERATION AFTER THE WARSAW SUMMIT

22. The July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw communicated the urgency of establishing concrete initiatives to strengthen the NATO-EU partnership. In this respect, the Warsaw Summit could serve as a critical juncture in terms of finding means for tangible and more effective inter-organisational cooperation. EU and NATO officials acknowledged the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented security challenges, which require stronger cooperation between the two organisations.

23. This Committee has focused on the growing complexity of the eastern and southern flank challenges facing NATO since 2014, paying attention to hybrid warfare and growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and NATO’s subsequent adaptation of its defence and deterrence posture in its principal reports. A key attribute of the complexity of hybrid challenges, terrorism, and cyber threats is their ability to destabilise the internal and external security of states. Answering the challenge of internal/external security threats is testing the Alliance today, as its core mission of collective defence and deterrence is more often thought of within the context of external challenges to Alliance territory and populations.

24. The Warsaw Declarations recognise the complexity of today’s security environment in Europe. Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities coupled with a highly volatile situation in the Middle East were recognised as immediate threats to the stability and unity of both NATO and the EU. The hard and soft power assets needed to defend and deter against these challenges and others like them, it was determined, can be found in combined efforts by both NATO and the European Union in defence of their common interests.

25. In this spirit, NATO’s Secretary General, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission signed the Joint Declaration, reiterating the need for stronger NATO-EU cooperation and proposing specific measures to give new impetus and substance to the NATO-EU partnership. The Joint Declaration outlines seven areas which are expected to strengthen cooperation, including hybrid threats, maritime operations, defence industry and research, cyber security, exercises and capacity building.

26. NATO and EU officials also identified a common set of 42 proposals, aimed at unifying NATO and EU efforts in the above-mentioned areas of cooperation. The main aim of those initiatives is to ensure NATO and the EU have a shared view of the current and future security threats, operate with supplementary strategies and work towards unifying their responses to common security challenges.

27. Joint capability development, hybrid threats, cyber security, and terrorism challenges are surfacing as the main drivers of strengthened NATO-EU cooperation. NATO members agreed the Alliance faces a new combination of threats, which require further strategic adaptation. In this respect, NATO and EU have already begun working together on key issues concerning defensive cyber capabilities, Russian disinformation and propaganda actions, as well as counterterrorism.

The EU Steps Forward

28. On 15 November 2016, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg presented a set of 42 proposals to EU defence ministers for a way forward on NATO-EU defence cooperation. Later in the month the European Commission proposed a European Defence Fund (EDF), along with other instruments, to encourage EU member states to spend more efficiently on joint defence capacity and to work to foster real defence industrial base cooperation and innovation. In the same vein, the European Parliament passed two major resolutions in November: the first encouraging EU member states to reach the 2% GDP defence spending benchmark, and the second for an overhaul of the CSDP to allow for the EU to act independently, in the event NATO is unable or unavailable, for collective security and
defence. The EU Parliament also expressed its support for a permanent EU HQ for command and control of CSDP operations.

IV. PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING NATO-EU COOPERATION POST-WARSAW SUMMIT

The Future of NATO-EU Joint Capability Development

29. Political attention and will is increasingly focused on NATO-EU joint capability development. Driving this new reality is the perception of several substantive benefits that cooperation in this area would provide, not only in the form of the reduction of wasted expenditures on duplicated platforms such as helicopters or troop transporters, but also the prospect of expanded access to a range of equipment that would likely be too costly to construct and maintain for almost any individual member state of either organisation. The potential for joint development and use of a full spectrum of capabilities is the only way forward for NATO and EU member states in the modern security environment which poses challenges at the conventional and non-conventional levels.

30. Complementarity between NATO and the EU is in the interest of both organisations, particularly given the increasingly nebulous distinction between internal and external security in the age of hybrid tactics, cyber menaces, and evolving global terrorist organisations. Real progress is already being made; programmes and initiatives underway since the Warsaw Summit are delivering on promises made, causing even sceptics to pause and pay attention.

31. According to the progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals (endorsed by NATO and the EU Council), both NATO and the EU are working to find ways to have beneficial overlap between the NATO Defence Planning Process and the EU Capability Development Plan. There are already indications things are moving in the right direction, a good example being the progress in the airlift and refuelling sectors.

32. The following seeks to define a coherent framework for NATO and EU member states to plan defence requirements with an understanding of the strategic overlap of the two organisations. As such, this would require a synergistic view of security threats, and would eventually lead to the coordination of shared capabilities and cross-pollinating R&D programmes in order to have the means available to counter these threats.

Opportunities for cooperation

33. Three principal areas stand out as avenues to strengthen joint NATO-EU cooperation on joint capability development – threat perception, defence investment structures, and institutional frameworks for joint command and control of forces for exercises and operations.

34. Threat Perception: Given the overlap of their member states and the commonality of geography on the eastern and southern flanks; NATO and the EU should be able to find a common understanding of the current and future threat environment. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) makes it clear there is convergence, but the EU still sees far more broadly than NATO. The most acute and pressing security threats facing both organisations, however, are in Europe – with the rise of a revisionist Russia engaging in strategic brinkmanship along the eastern flank and meddling in the domestic security of member states using of hybrid tactics, and the advent of an arc of crisis surrounding the southern flank causing civil conflict and pushing unprecedented waves of refugees into Europe.1

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1 It should be noted, however, that the recent escalation of the North Korean ballistic missile threat to the United States is a situation the Alliance will have to follow closely as events develop.
35. A mutual understanding of the threat environment would likely mean a few things – first it would require strategic adjustments. As it continues to attempt to boost its defence sector bona fides, this would mean the grandest strategic adjustment on the part of the EU, but also some adaptation of the NATO strategy as well.\(^2\)

36. Ultimately, convergence of threat perception would see a parallel convergence of NATO and EU member states’ defence plans and consequently defence needs. To move this along, better coordination between the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which is a voluntary initiative aimed at harmonising national defence plans with the Alliance’s defence planning, and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is necessary. Synergistic frameworks established by the NDPP and CSDP could outline a common threat environment, thereby allowing for the identification of the appropriate capabilities to meet those threats. To ensure that NATO and the EU adapt to the changing security environment, the joint “threat outlook” framework would likely be subject to an annual review – as is the new initiative undertaking by NATO in the wake of the May 2017 summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Brussels.

37. **Defence Investment Structures**: It is estimated the lack of defence cooperation between EU member-states costs anywhere from 25 to 100 billion euro annually. Currently, approximately 80% of procurement and over 90% of research and technology projects are managed at national level. It is also estimated that joint equipment acquisition could enable up to 30% savings on annual defence spending (Munich Security Report, 2017).

38. Currently, few European NATO and EU member states articulate their policy toward the defence industry, including defence investment, in a specific document (IRIS, 2016). A clear precondition for NATO-EU defence capability development is consolidation and better formulation of national defence industry plans. As European NATO and EU member states seek or try to maintain autonomous capabilities, a concerted effort to organise the European defence industrial base will allow for the development of an industrial market addressing a broader spectrum of needs, allow for coherent equipment standards, and guarantee the security of supply. Crossing over to common defence investment mechanisms between both NATO and the EU would expand the demand and attention to the diversity of the EDTIB.

39. The foundations for a joint mechanism for NATO-EU defence spending and investment already exist; efforts are in place to build closer cooperation between the NDPP and EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP). The CDP is overseen by the European Defence Agency and identifies future capability needs and priorities for joint action, and makes specific recommendations for national planning. The recent advent of the EDF, established on 7 June 2017, will help further cooperation between the NDPP and the CDP as the new fund seeks to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of EU member states’ defence spending.

40. The EDF has two principal components, one to support research and the other to foster joint capability development. By 2020, the Commission is seeking to dedicate €500 million annually to defence research – which would make the EU the fourth largest defence research funding sponsor in Europe, behind the UK, France, and Germany as measured today. To kick-start the project, the EU has allocated €25 million in 2017, and will allocate another €90 million over the next three years (EDA, 2017).

\(^2\) NATO’s Strategic Concept dates to 2010 and could certainly use a revision given the developments in the European security environment since 2014. The EU’s Five Priorities, as outlined in the EUGS, are more foreign policy guidance than strategy. As such, the EU will need to better define its understanding of the outcomes it wishes to achieve and how it will go about dedicating resources to do so. This will require further consolidation of member states’ understanding of the threat environment and the role they would like the EU to have in protecting member states’ interests that are threatened in this environment.
41. Starting in 2019, the EU will provide €500 million to support joint capability development, it will double this amount the following year. The Commission notes a more substantial programme to be built upon the €1 billion annual commitment post-2020, which is estimated to have a multiplying effect of 5 – thereby generating a total of €5 billion annually post-2020 in EU-sponsored capability funding (EC PR, 2017). Interestingly, the EU pledges to take on 20% of the financial burden during a project’s development phase - the stipulation for EU funding, however, being that eligible projects must involve at least three companies from two member states. Despite this progress, the proposed EDF remains relatively small when compared with the United States, which notes a $71.8 billion allocation to research and development in 2017 alone (Mehta, 2017).

42. Furthermore, as noted above, NATO decided to develop annual national plans to track allies’ on-going commitment to defence investment pledges. The EU’s Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), due to launch in 2018, serves as a clear complement to the NATO annual plans project, as it aims to help Member States deliver on their promises to EU’s Capability Development Plan. CARD will also provide Member States a forum for coordinating and discussing their national defence planning.

43. The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is another recent initiative that will attempt to unify NATO and EU member states’ defence spending and investment. PESCO is a voluntary framework open to all Member States seeking to contribute defence capabilities and share them with other Member States. Any capabilities developed through PESCO, however, will remain owned and operated by Member States. To link its various initiatives, the European Commission is proposing an additional 10% funding bonus on joint capability projects co-financed by the EU to those countries willing to join PESCO (Besch, 2017).

44. To establish a joint NATO-EU defence capability framework, however, European defence cooperation must be streamlined to avoid parallel projects, duplicating or tripling initiatives. As a start, there are several regional “hubs” of political and security cooperation grouping NATO and EU countries, which can help eliminate unnecessary synergies; examples being Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC), and the Visegrad and Weimar Groups. In addition, there are also “hubs” of tactical and operational military cooperation, including the Franco-British Combined Joined Expeditionary Forces (CJEF) and the British-led Joint Expeditionary Forces with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.

Coordinating Joint Defence Capabilities

45. Based on the current existing frameworks for European defence cooperation, there are three principal models of coordinating joint defence capabilities between NATO and EU member states.

46. The first model is based on a core group of countries taking a lead in different sectors of armed forces’ exercising and deployment and teaming up with smaller and less-capable NATO and EU member states. For example, France and the UK could provide the core for a European foreign intervention force, while Germany and Poland could constitute the core of a land force. A third group led by Italy or Spain could lead border security and stabilisation operations. All core groups should support each other in a network, to be developed under the overarching umbrellas of the EU and NATO.

47. The second model is based on a core group of countries (Germany, the UK, France) plus two NATO and EU members on a rotational basis. Germany, the UK and France could create multinational battalions integrating smaller countries’ armed forces, available both to NATO and the EU. In this model, participating NATO and EU states could specialise in different tasks required by the shared defence plan; some states could focus on out-of-area operations, while others could undertake collective defence of Europe. A good example of this concept is a recent decision of the German Bundeswehr to integrate its armed forces with units from the Czech Republic, Romania,
and the Netherlands. According to this plan, the Czech Republic and Romania will integrate one brigade each into the German armed forces. This initiative follows a similar one that integrated two Dutch brigades into the Bundeswehr’s armed forces. A key element of this arrangement is the idea that bigger and more resourceful countries like Germany can share their resources with their smaller counterparts, in exchange for use of their troops.

48. The third model is based on a core group of countries, supported by NATO and EU countries, focusing on geographical sector defence – North, East and South. Accordingly, NATO and EU member states would establish regional command centres (which could be based on the already existing infrastructure, for example the European corps based in Strasbourg, France or the Multinational Corps Northeast based in Szczecin, Poland), using currently existing Command and Control (C2) infrastructure.

49. The abovementioned models could be incorporated into existing strategic-level frameworks, particularly the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which could work together to ensure interoperability and coherence of shared NATO-EU capabilities. NATO and the EU could also look at the integration of European nations’ air forces as a model that would contribute to the creation of a NATO-EU joint capabilities coordination framework.

50. Indeed, European military integration is arguably most advanced among member states’ air forces. The European Air Transport Command (EATC) is a major driver of this integration, as it pools major aspects of air transport and air-to-air refuelling of seven European countries under joint operational control from an operations centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. It was originally set up in September 2010 by Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands, and now also includes Spain, Italy and Luxembourg. In addition, Germany and Norway recently joined the multinational fleet of Airbus tanker transport aircraft initiated by the Netherlands, expanding the fleet to 7 by 2020 (EDD, 2017).

**NATO-EU Cooperation on Hybrid Threats**

51. Addressing hybrid threats is one of the top priorities of both NATO and the EU’s defence strategies. Both organisations are pledged to strengthen current cooperation and create new initiatives to respond to hybrid challenges. The 2015 DSC general report [166 DSC 15 E bis] defined hybrid warfare in its modern manifestation as: The use of asymmetrical tactics to probe for and exploit weaknesses via non-military means (such as political, informational, and economic intimidation and manipulation) and are backed by the threat of conventional and unconventional military means. The tactics can be scaled and tailor fit to the particular situation.

52. Prior to the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU attempted to address hybrid challenges cooperatively. In 2015, officials from both organisations began calling for new measures to intensify NATO-EU partnership to counter hybrid threats.

53. Over the past three years, NATO adopted several strategies and implementation plans in response to hybrid threats. Moreover, in January 2014, NATO established a Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, which is focused, in part, on the use of information in cyberspace as part of the tactics and strategies to counter hybrid threats (Piernik). In addition, NATO has also established Centres of Excellence on Energy Security and Cyber in Vilnius and Tallinn respectively.

54. Since early 2016, both NATO and the EU have directed significant resources to further cooperation on enhancing strategic communication and situational awareness with respect to hybrid threats. Both organisations are implementing and operationalising parallel procedures and playbooks for mutual interactions (NATO, Statement on the implementation of the
Joint Declaration). These initiatives are expected to allow for better coordination of NATO and EU efforts prior to and during crisis situations.

55. In April 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. A key outcome of the Joint Framework is the establishment of an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INT CEN) of the EEAS. The Fusion Cell is responsible for analysing hybrid threats, raising awareness, and sharing relevant information with other EU and national bodies (European Commission, 6 April 2016).

56. During the Warsaw Summit, NATO and EU representatives agreed to many substantive measures to counter and respond to hybrid threats, notably measures to set up information and analysis exchange mechanisms between the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and its relevant NATO counterpart. As such, NATO and the EU decided to enhance strategic communications and strengthen the partnership between the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the EEAS StratCom division. Finally, NATO and the EU confirmed their commitment to synchronise crisis response mechanisms and activities to provide coherent and capable responses to hybrid threats. NATO and the EU also agreed to establish a framework for closer cooperation on joint training platforms and support for partner countries’ StratCom capabilities, which was scheduled for adoption in mid-2017. To further synchronise responses, NATO and the EU will conduct Parallel and Coordinated Exercises in 2017.

57. In November 2016, Finland proposed the establishment of a joint NATO-EU Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in April 2017 and operations are underway as the newly-established team seeks to deliver multidisciplinary analyses of potential hostile influence across a broad spectrum. The Centre will serve as a venue for EU and NATO cooperation.

58. In addition to official cooperation frameworks, NATO and EU officials have confirmed their commitment to enhance informal dialogue at all operational levels. It is believed this will further contribute to developing shared hybrid threat awareness and the methods necessary to counter them. Moreover, strengthened informal collaboration between NATO and EU officials on hybrid threats has the potential to facilitate the development of best practices for communication and information sharing mechanisms, which could be beneficial to other areas of NATO-EU cooperation, particularly in the sphere of joint security operations.

59. The establishment of joint EU-NATO frameworks to counter hybrid threats presents a timely opportunity to further strengthen NATO-EU partnership, particularly in the sphere of data collection and sharing. In this respect, development of stronger bonds between EU Fusion Cells and NATO centres of excellence could potentially serve as a starting platform for an official framework of cooperation between NATO and the EU on intelligence gathering and exchange.

V. NATO-EU CYBER THREAT COOPERATION

60. Cyber network vulnerability, and the expanding costs of cyber insecurity, present one of the most immediate challenges to NATO and EU security, affecting social, political, economic and military issues in the Euro Atlantic Community.

61. Cyber security is currently one of the most robust areas of cooperation between NATO and the EU. As James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, highlighted during the NATO PA 2017 February Joint Committee Meetings, collaborative efforts on cyber defence is a pillar of the NATO-EU partnership due to the marked improvements in recent years.
62. In 2013, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) established a liaison with the European Defence Agency (EDA) aimed at exchanging information on common topics and avoiding research duplication. The liaison agreement laid the groundwork for further development of NATO-EU cyber cooperation. During the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, Allies endorsed and adopted an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, which solidified NATO’s cyber defence framework and stressed the need to develop a stronger partnership with the EU on cyber defence issues.

63. Following the Wales Summit, in November 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework with the aim of developing cyber defence capabilities made available by Member States and to protect EEAS communication and information networks. The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework proposed concrete measures to strengthen NATO-EU situational awareness, information sharing, and early warning mechanisms with respect to cyber threats. Consequently, the EU expressed its support for the establishment of a framework for coherent cyber defence capability requirements, NATO-EU training activities, increased utilisation of the EDA liaison agreement with the CCD COE, and reinforced cooperation between the CERT-EU (Computer Emergency Response Team) and the NCIRC (NATO Computer Incident Response Capability) (Council of the European Union, 2014). By February 2016, NATO and the EU had concluded a Technical Agreement on Cyber Defence between NATO NCIRC and CERT-EU, providing a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between the two emergency response teams (NATO, February 2016).

64. On 6 July 2016, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union issued the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, outlining measures to strengthen the security of network and information systems across the European Union. The directive also provides for the establishment of a network of 28 national CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) and the CERT-EU to pursue operational cooperation. This initiative could serve as an opportunity to further enhance joint operations between NATO NCIRC, CERT-EU, and nationally-based cyber security centres. In this respect, national CSIRTs, CERT-EU and NATO NCIRC could establish liaison agreements and create appropriate communication channels through officials delegated from each agency.

65. The NATO summit in Warsaw added further substance to NATO-EU cyber cooperation and provided new opportunities to strengthen the partnership between the two organisations. Consequently, NATO and the EU agreed to integrate cyber defence requirements and standards for their respective missions and operations, strengthen joint training activities, and cooperate on R&T in the cyber domain.

66. In December 2016, NATO appointed its first Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. This is an important step in terms of establishing more effective and robust intelligence sharing between NATO and the EU, which could also include information exchange on developing cyber threats.

67. NATO and the EU have also been successfully organising joint cyber exercises including Cyber Coalition and Cyber Europe, which serve as an important platform for exchanging best practices and developing new tactics and strategies. The immediate nature of cyber threats provides many incentives to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation in terms of predicting and responding to cyber threats. Both organisations face cyber challenges daily, requiring immediate reaction and robust early warning capabilities.
VI. NATO-EU COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

A. NATO’S STRONG COUNTERTERRORISM HISTORY

68. NATO is a strong player in international counterterrorism efforts. Long before the issue returned to the collective conscious in the wake of the recent spate of attacks in France, Belgium, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and beyond, NATO policy planners and implementers instituted a wide spectrum of effective counterterrorism mechanisms and policies.

69. NATO’s first and only invocation of Article 5 was in response to the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States. In the 16 years following this action, perhaps the most visible manifestations of NATO’s CT policy are the various operations from Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat mission in Afghanistan. NATO Counterterrorism (CT) operations in the Mediterranean had the broad mandate of preventing the movement of terrorists or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); the ISAF combat mission sought to create a lasting peace to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups again.

70. As noted above, NATO’s mission in the Mediterranean has transitioned to Operation Sea Guardian, which, as a maritime security awareness operation focuses broadly on counterterrorism and capacity-building – allowing for a broader mandate to include tasks from interdiction, guaranteeing freedom of navigation, and the protection of critical infrastructure. NATO’s Sea Guardian is also mandated to support the EU’s Operation Sophia to assist, when necessary, with the EU’s operation in countering the people smuggling networks throughout the Mediterranean, but principally off the coast of Libya.

71. In addition to the above, NATO is contributing to the ongoing fight against Daesh*. All Allies are contributing to the long fight against the so-called Islamic State via military or financial means. NATO is directly involved by the provision of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the battle theatre, and has engaged in a capacity-building mission with Iraqi forces on the ground as a means of strengthening the country’s hold on re-captured territories.

72. Outside of operations, the Alliance has honed its counterterrorism abilities along three principal lines of effort – awareness, capabilities, and engagement. Past efforts at CT awareness by the Alliance depended on intelligence reporting from Allies’ domestic and foreign intelligence institutions, as well as their respective military forces in operation. Alliance cooperation with various international institutions from the OSCE and the EU, to the Global CT Forum (GCTF) adds an international organisational layer of cooperation. In addition, Brussels has always been a customer of intelligence from political and intelligence experts from partner countries (Jamie Shea, NATO PA briefing, February 2017).

73. Along the way, NATO has developed specific capabilities resulting from the broader efforts of the Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) programme. DAT identifies specific requirements needed for NATO and its operational partners’ forces to counter asymmetric threats; such as counter-IED skills, military equipment hardening, modern biometric identification systems, and training to anticipate and/or mitigate terrorism tactics. In addition, there is the Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Task Force designed to handle and respond to any use of CBRN agents both in (and possibly outside of) NATO forces’ areas of responsibility at any given time.

74. As noted above, NATO CT engagement takes on many different forms today, from operations to partner and international institutional cooperation. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism allows NATO partners to request assistance with domestic counterterrorism capacity. The Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program works with scientists and experts to

* Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria"
engage in R&D projects dedicated to improving methods for protecting everything from critical infrastructure to explosives detection to other forms of technology to assist with the mitigation of human exposure to terrorism violence.

B. EU COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES

75. The European Union’s counterterrorism efforts involve efforts more often outside the hard power NATO-led CT programmes outlined above. More recently the EU has been spurred into action in the CT domain in response to the attacks hitting its capital cities over the past two years. Since 2014, issues such as radicalisation, the dissemination of extremist propaganda, and the alarming numbers of European men and women seeking to join the ranks of extremist groups in the battlefield, such as Daesh, have honed attention to finding ways to close the avenues to terrorism among European citizens, and to block the entry of external actors seeking to import terrorist violence into the EU.

76. The January 2016 creation of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) is a big step forward for the coordination of EU CT efforts. Among many attributes, the ECTC serves as a hub to facilitate inter-EU member state intelligence sharing, works to restrict travel-related to terrorist activities, to block terrorism-related funding of all sorts, and to counter online extremist propaganda and other illicit activities potentially abetting terrorist activities such as illegal arms trafficking. The ECTC will allow for Europol to expand the breadth and depth of its counterterrorism work.

77. In addition, the EU has passed several Directives which will have a direct impact on counterterrorism efforts. Particularly relevant are the Firearms Directive and the Combating Terrorism Directive. The passage of the Firearms Directive improves the traceability of arms flows throughout the EU by allowing for a clearer understanding of the ownership chain, where arms are being acquired, and how they are being networked. The Combating Terrorism Directive will work to establish a uniform understanding and definition throughout the EU of criminal activities such as travelling for terrorist purposes, activities aimed at funding terrorist activities, engaging in training for terrorist activities, and the public incitation or advocacy of terrorism (EP Research Paper, 2017). Parallel anti-money laundering initiatives are allowing the EU to fight financing of terrorism via a range of instruments from cash controls to mutual recognition of asset freezes and seizures.

78. The EU is also taking measures to reinforce its borders as well as bolster internal security – an area where the EU has been criticised heavily since the dilemma of foreign fighter flows, the renewed waves of migrants and refugees to the EU, and the marked increase of homegrown terrorist activity. Notable steps forward in this area are being taken by the creation of a new EU Border and Coast Guard Agency to confront security and migration challenges along the Union’s borders. In addition, the EU is working on an integrated European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). The long-debated Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive, finally agreed recently, will oblige airlines to provide EU member states with every flight’s passenger data as a means of preventing terrorism and major crimes.³

C. LOOKING AHEAD AND FINDING WAYS FOR CLOSER NATO-EU COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

79. Despite the above hard and soft power efforts to mitigate the causes and effects of terrorism, efforts to strengthen NATO-EU counterterrorism cooperation have often remained in the rhetorical realm. The NATO Warsaw Summit sought to change this by forcing more concrete steps to be taken between the two organisations to coordinate their respective CT efforts. As such, a coordinated one-two hard power soft power punch of NATO and the EU in CT efforts in Europe

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³ EU member states have until 25 May 2018 to comply with the PNR Directive.
and beyond can have wide-ranging, lasting impact beyond the capacities of either organisation’s individual efforts and better serve their interests.

80. NATO-EU counterterrorism cooperation currently focuses on a wide range of issues, including CBRN weapons proliferation, defence and security capacity building, shared awareness, maritime security and cyber security. The impact of the two organisations’ cooperation efforts, however, could be far greater. Given the Trump Administration’s recent indications, counterterrorism and burden-sharing will be key areas of focus in their dealings with the Alliance. Finding a way to articulate closer and more effective cooperation between NATO and the EU may be a way to address both concerns.

81. The sections below look at the areas for shared capacity strengthening at the functional and geographical levels.

D. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENCE, DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM (DAT), AND SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY (SPS) COOPERATION

82. Daesh’s use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq coupled with its declared intentions to use any form of weapon it can get its hands on, has brought CBRN proliferation concerns to the forefront in the struggle against terrorism. NATO-EU collaboration on CBRN threats and the potential impacts of WMD use is focused through collaboration between the NATO Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence and the EU CBRN Centre of Excellence. The organisations work closely together to integrate crisis response, training capabilities, and threat analyses – still, more can certainly be done.

83. Close interactions between the NATO CBRN Task Force and EU CBRN Centre of Excellence are a good starting point for the establishment of more formal cooperative frameworks for protecting dual-use materials, monitoring terrorist activities, and developing joint threat assessments. NATO and the EU, however, could further enhance cooperation within the framework of the DAT and SPS programmes to coordinate and develop the CT capabilities of EU agencies Europol and Frontex. This partnership could work to integrate and coordinate best practices for countering non-conventional threats. In addition, focus on counter-WMD capabilities, dual-use, or conventional weapons proliferation, criminal networks trafficking, and border and maritime security could help secure European ports, airports, cities, and other critical infrastructure.

84. Shared situational awareness is another key area of NATO-EU cooperation on counterterrorism, which flows directly from the above. Intelligence sharing between the two organisations, however, is currently limited to informal information exchange between specific NATO and EU agencies and centres of excellence. Thus, collaboration between NATO, Europol, Frontex, and the EU cyber and CBRN centres of excellence remains one of the most important means of sharing information concerning terrorist threats between NATO and the EU.

85. The establishment of the post of NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, and the Joint Intelligence and Security Division at NATO is an important opportunity to improve NATO-EU cooperation on information sharing. Both organisations could explore innovative ways of coordinating intelligence exchange and identifying potential opportunities to include input from partner countries affected by terrorist threats. Close NATO-EU maritime cooperation and establishment of robust informal data exchange mechanisms in the Mediterranean Sea serve as an example of how both organisations could adopt informal frameworks for intelligence sharing.

86. Still, the coordination of intelligence sharing platforms and mechanisms to create a clearer picture of the developing security environment inside both organisations, as well as an understanding of the developing external threats, needs to be done, for lack of a better word,
intelligently. More information, for example, does not necessarily mean better information and, therefore, a clearer picture of any developing threat. In fact, an overwhelming amount of intelligence from Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (and beyond) can slow effective response. As such, both NATO and the EU should improve the quality of intelligence gathered, shared, and used via legal channels to counter illicit activities — intelligence qualifying as legitimate evidence should not be drowned in a wash of scattered intelligence gathered from ill-coordinated, disparate channels.

E. CYBER COOPERATION IN CT COORDINATION

87. Cyber security is another platform for NATO-EU counterterrorism cooperation. According to the 2016 Europol report on the changes in Daesh’s modus operandi, individuals and groups involved in terrorist and extremist activities use encryption to conceal their communications from law enforcement and intelligence agencies (Europol). Furthermore, terrorists use various communication platforms, switching quickly between them or using parallel platforms to obfuscate their exchanges (Europol). Moreover, terrorist groups continue to use internet and social media extensively, mainly for dissemination of propaganda material, but also for recruitment and fundraising (Europol). Consequently, counterterrorism activities in the cyber space is a key area for closer NATO-EU cooperation. Both organisations could strengthen their partnership by developing mechanisms to coordinate monitoring activities and integrate data collection capabilities, thereby facilitating NATO-EU joint intelligence efforts. In this respect, cooperative cyber activities, particularly monitoring of terrorist actions in the cyber space, could be used as a shared NATO-EU intelligence collection tool.

F. REGIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING – A SHARED INTEREST

88. As noted above, defence and security capacity building in partner countries is an area where NATO and the EU have most experience in terms of establishing joint operations. The Warsaw Summit highlighted the need to counter terrorist threats through capacity building activities in partner countries facing terrorist threats. NATO and the EU are currently running several capacity building programmes and partnership initiatives focusing on counterterrorism, particularly in the MENA region.

89. As mentioned, NATO is working in Iraq to help bolster the capabilities of local forces to secure and hold territory regained from Daesh – this includes CT tactical and strategic training such as countering IEDs, de-mining, military development, civil-military planning, cyber defence, and civilian-military preparedness. NATO is also supporting Jordan, where the Alliance is enhancing cyber capabilities and conducting arms disposal. In Tunisia, NATO has announced the establishment of an intelligence ‘Fusion Centre’ to provide support for Tunisian Special Operations Forces. NATO is also cooperating with Mauritania on the exchange of intelligence for counterterrorism purposes. Furthermore, NATO is providing support for Egypt with respect to de-mining activities and, in 2016, the Alliance incorporated Morocco into its Interoperability Platform, which provides training support for the Moroccan armed forces. Finally, NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan continues its defence and security capacity building activities with the Afghan law enforcement and military.

90. In parallel with NATO, the EU is pursuing political dialogue and conducting extensive capacity building programmes in MENA countries, focusing on enhancing border security capabilities and improving judicial as well as penal systems. The EU is active in Libya where it has established the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), focusing on support for law enforcement and armed forces in combatting terrorism, illicit trafficking of arms, and people smuggling. In Mali, the EU is conducting a capacity building mission (EUTM) to train, advise, and assist the Malian Armed Forces to enhance domestic security and reduce terrorist threats (EEAS, EU Training Mission in Mali). The EU is also providing extensive support for Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco,
Tunisia, Niger, Sudan, and Jordan by enhancing the rule of law and criminal justice systems to enable local authorities to better address terrorist threats.

91. NATO and the EU have established effective frameworks for cooperation in the capacity building sphere. For example, in Afghanistan, closer Europol-NATO partnership has contributed to the improvement of information sharing and enhanced human network analysis capabilities, including identifying, tracking and connecting data strands. In Kosovo, NATO and EU officials have developed informal frameworks for information exchange and cooperation on the tactical and operational levels.

92. However, NATO and EU capacity building efforts lack sufficient coordination mechanisms. Both organisations conduct their counterterrorist operations and initiatives without a common strategy and shared understanding of potential limitations of respective capabilities. For example, in Libya, the EU mission has been unable to collect all necessary information and conduct a full analysis of the security environment due to insufficient intelligence assets (EEAS, April 2016). In this respect, NATO and the EU could do more to improve communication to identify shortfalls and devise complementary strategies for combating terrorist threats. Moreover, NATO and the EU could focus more efforts on creating appropriate frameworks for cooperation on a case by case basis, which would establish responsibilities, identify common goals, and delegate appropriate assets. In this respect, NATO and the EU could build on experience in Kosovo and use frameworks for cooperation adopted by EULEX and KFOR.

93. As noted above, Maritime cooperation is a principal element of NATO and EU counterterrorism efforts. Both organisations have developed a robust partnership on the tactical and operational levels in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, which contributes to shared awareness of terrorist threats and the activities of criminal networks. Closer cooperation between Operation Sophia and Operation Sea Guardian have been supporting NATO and EU counterterrorism activities in the MENA region, which will extend combined efforts to train the Libyan Coastguard.

94. However, despite active maritime cooperation, NATO and the EU could do more to improve coordination between land and sea-based activities. In this respect, there is a strong need to integrate the land component of NATO-EU counterterrorist activities with sea-based operations, particularly in the case of Libya. It is clear the success of NATO-EU operations in the Mediterranean Sea is heavily dependent on the security situation in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia as well as in the Sahel region, particularly with respect to border security (EEAS, April 2016).

VII. CONCLUSIONS FOR NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS

95. The drive to encourage more synergistic cooperation between NATO and the European Union is necessary in today’s complex international security environment. This cooperation should take place in a spirit of mutual transparency and complementarity, while respecting the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy, and institutional integrity. The spike of asymmetrical threats in Europe is challenging the short and long-term security of both organisations, from Russian hybrid destabilisation to terrorism to waves of uncontrolled migration from an increasingly destabilised Middle East and North Africa. More than ever in the history of either organisation, integrated and effective security cooperation is needed to face this suite of internal and external security challenges.

96. As mentioned in this report, however, many practical and political hurdles remain: the EU still does not have a real common defence budget, it lacks common assets among its members, and the EU Battle Groups concept remains more rooted in theory than practice. The EU has however more recently demonstrated the will to act on security. From the institution of more concrete measures such as the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, to allocating
more resources and instruments to Europol and Frontex, changes are afoot. Further, recent actions to empower common Union-wide legal measures will have a strong impact on counterterrorism efforts – from the ECTC to the Combatting Terrorism and Firearms Directives, the EU is changing the way the individual member states, as well as the EU, act in concert on principal common security challenges.

97. The overlap of 22 common members between the EU and NATO⁴, however, means many political hurdles to closer cooperation remain, largely due to concerns about overlapping initiatives, resulting in more defence spending without the desired outcomes. Key over-the-horizon challenges remain for the way forward for NATO-EU cooperation. The Warsaw Summit, for example, does not outline too much in the way of strategy for NATO-EU cooperation in many common bodies of water from the Arctic to the Black Sea – though it is likely the Mediterranean model is a good starting point to consider. Joint strategies for security cooperation in the MENA region and beyond also lack clarity.

98. Other variables remaining that will impact the way forward for NATO-EU cooperation are the Brexit negotiations and Turkey’s accession to the EU. The United Kingdom is currently the largest defence contributor in the EU – its withdrawal will certainly lead the way for a more French-German combined vision for the way forward on EU defence and security. As UK officials stressed to a delegation from the Defence Committee during a visit to the British Parliament in the fall of 2016, despite the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, it will remain, by geography and core interests, focused on European security. The question of Turkey and the EU remains contested. Turkey remains a solid, long-standing member of NATO, with the second largest number of military forces after the United States. Finding a way to combine Turkish security interests with those of the EU will be a delicate political feat in the short to medium term.

99. In addition, while NATO and the EU have many opportunities to strengthen joint capability development efforts, there are also several challenges remaining. Instead of converging, European members of NATO and the EU appear to be diverging into different clusters of states with potentially profound differences in threat perception along regional lines. This divergence may deepen strategic cleavages across the EU and NATO. This issue could also impact attempts to bring together capability requirements: Capabilities viewed as necessary in Spain or Italy might not be viewed as such by the Baltic States.

100. Moreover, issues related to defence investment and threat perception are closely linked to national interests and national strategies of NATO and EU member states. In most cases, states have different interests and priorities, particularly in the defence realm. This is particularly true when it comes to defence spending. The decision on how funds should be spent will remain an extension of national political agendas of member states for the foreseeable future. This issue might complicate the task of creating shared defence capabilities representing the interests of all involved parties.

101. Another challenge for the establishment of joint NATO-EU defence capabilities is public opinion and economic issues. Increased spending on defence and shared military capabilities will likely face several critical voices among the public in Europe. Delegating the task of defending the country to a multinational corps might be viewed in some countries as a way of undermining national sovereignty. Furthermore, while the political momentum needed to advance NATO-EU joint capability development exists today, it is impossible to estimate how long this trend will last.

102. Another challenge stems from the allocation of funds by the EDF. According to the current plan, EDF grants will be issued to at least three companies in at least two member states working jointly on a defence project. This raises the issue of varying national capabilities and standards,

⁴ Common EU-NATO membership will drop to 21 with the conclusion of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.
which could lead to potential conflicts and delays, or might lead to a situation in which there are only a few dominating players on the market. Furthermore, joint defence projects will also face the difficulty of protecting sensitive information related to R&D – for example, France might view certain technologies developed by French companies as vital to its national security.

103. Finally, most of the initiatives designed to form a core of the future NATO-EU joint capabilities, including PESCO and CARD, are voluntary. This might create a few challenges regarding the enforcement of commonly agreed rules and the scope of NATO-EU cooperation: some countries might simply refuse to take part in those projects.
ANNEXE: EU-NATO COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S PERSPECTIVE

Overall assessment
NATO and the EU share the same strategic interests and face the same challenges in protecting their citizens against any threats. A solid basis exists to enhance our partnership.

The European Parliament views a common European Union defence policy as a means of reinforcing Europe’s capacity to promote security within and beyond its borders, as well as strengthening the partnership with NATO. The EP therefore calls for a closer relationship between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO. Indeed, for the EP, a stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing and complementary as outlined in Article 42 of the EU Treaty (TEU) and consequently further promote a more effective territorial, regional and global security and defence.

NATO is the primary provider of security and defence of European territory. The Alliance is best equipped for deterrence and defence, ready to implement collective defence (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) in the case of aggression against one of its members, while the EU’s CSDP is currently focused on peacekeeping, conflict prevention in unstable regions, and strengthening international security (Article 42 TEU). Moreover, the EU has additional means to deal with challenges to Member States’ internal security, including subversion, which are not covered by Article 5.

While NATO must remain the foundation of collective defence in Europe, the political priorities of NATO and the EU may not always be identical, not least in the context of the mixed messages received from the new US administration. The EU possesses a unique set of security-related instruments, which are not available to NATO, and vice versa.

The basis of close and effective EU-NATO cooperation is provided by the complementarity and compatibility of their missions and, consequently, of the means available. Relations between the two organisations should continue to be cooperative and complementary, not competitive.

There is a need to rebalance and enlarge the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, with the aim of ensuring compatibility, developing joint capabilities and avoiding duplication of actions and structures, thus reducing spending and making it more effective. In this context, to avoid overlaps and duplication, the concepts of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force should be combined. Moreover, the EP takes the view that the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements should be reformulated in depth with a view to adapting them to the current strategic context and to tackling the deficiencies found, such as by enhancing tactical and operational mechanisms in scenarios where both the EU and NATO are present, and enabling also NATO to make use of the EU's capabilities and instruments. In the same vein, the EU and NATO must work more closely to ensure the Alliance’s Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

EU Global Strategy, division of labour and burden-sharing
The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of June 2016 commits to NATO as the cornerstone of Europe’s collective security. The EUGS’s objective is to achieve an appropriate level of EU strategic autonomy, reinforcing Europe’s capacity to promote security within and beyond its borders, as well as strengthen its partnership with NATO specifically and transatlantic relations more broadly. As such, EU Member States should develop deployable capabilities under the CSDP to launch possible independent operations in the instance NATO is not willing to act or where EU action is more appropriate. While NATO’s role is to protect its members against any external attack, the EU should aspire to be able to defend itself and act autonomously if necessary, taking greater responsibility by improving equipment, training and organisation. The EP is convinced such a division of labour between NATO and the EU would not only be productive, but also strengthen NATO’s role in security and defence policy; as well as its collective defence policy through the
reinforcement of NATO’s European pillar by ensuring NATO’s European members meet their defence investment commitments.

To achieve this, both organisations must achieve more effective cooperation and equitable burden-sharing. To this end, the EP has repeatedly called on EU Member States to increase their defence expenditure to meet NATO capacity goals, which require a minimum level of defence spending of 2% of GDP of which 20% is dedicated to major equipment and related research and development.

**Warsaw Joint Declaration and its implementation**

The Joint Declaration signed on 8 July 2016 in Warsaw by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO, recognises the role of NATO and the support the EU can provide for achieving common goals and emphasises the need for cooperation between the EU and NATO in security and defence. The EP welcomed the Joint Declaration and supports the fields of collaboration mentioned therein. The EP stresses the need to deepen cooperation and further complement capacity-building regarding hybrid and cyber threats and research and welcomes the strong political mandate from both Councils (the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council and NATO’s North Atlantic Council) for implementing the common set of proposals agreed in December 2016 between the two organisations, including 42 actions covering all seven areas of cooperation. A speedy implementation of the above declaration is essential; the first progress report is expected by June 2017.

**Areas of cooperation**

EU-NATO cooperation should involve cooperating in the East and the South, countering hybrid and cyber threats, improving maritime security, as well as harmonising and coordinating the development of defence capabilities. A prime example of cooperation is NATO’s contribution to the safekeeping of the EU’s external border during the migration/refugee crisis.

Cooperation on technological, industrial, and military capabilities also offers the prospect of improving compatibility and synergy between both frameworks, thus ensuring greater efficiency of resources. Therefore, cooperation for facilitating a stronger and more efficient defence industry research should represent a strategic priority and its speedy implementation is crucial.

Moreover, the EP has suggested working together on prevention, analysis and early detection by means of efficient information and intelligence sharing would increase the EU’s capacity to counter threats, including hybrid threats.

Cybersecurity is by its very nature a policy area in which cooperation and integration are crucial, not only between EU Member States and NATO, but also between different actors within society, since it is not only a military responsibility.

Finally, the EU-NATO cooperation should also involve building resilience together in the East and the South.

**The role of parliamentarians**

Developing closer relations between the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is of essence to enhance the parliamentary dimension of the EU-NATO cooperation. Joint activities (e.g. seminars) and a possible, more prominent role for the EP delegation for relations with the NATO PA may offer new avenues for cooperation. Parliamentarians may also have a key role in overseeing the implementation of agreed actions, also by providing useful stimulus and public space for discussion on the deepening of the EU-NATO strategic partnership.
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