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Dear reader,

I am delighted to introduce this first Annual Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).

For the past 62 years, the NATO PA has given legislators from Europe and North America – and through them the millions of citizens they represent – a voice in debates about how our community of nations can best work together to protect and defend our populations.

NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – is founded on the premise that Europe and North America are bound together by our commitment to common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, as two World Wars have shown, the security of Europe and North America is inextricably linked.

NATO’s primary mission remains the collective defence of its members. If one Ally is attacked, all other 28 members will come to its assistance. To monitor threats and plan and prepare our common defence, NATO maintains a permanent network of command headquarters. To respond as one, if needed, forces from all member states constantly train and operate together. No other group of countries has entered into such a strong commitment for so long.

However, the Alliance is much more than a collective defence organisation. It has continued to adapt to new security challenges, and its members are keenly aware that security in today’s world is also about cooperation. The Alliance therefore engages with partners all over the world – to reach a common understanding of today’s threats and to assist them in their response. It also works with partners in responding to natural disasters, combatting terrorism, fighting maritime piracy and dismantling smuggling networks prospering off human misery. In addition, because of its unique military capabilities, NATO has often been called upon by the United Nations to help end conflict and restore peace in troubled areas.

The NATO PA’s first mission is to consolidate and strengthen our unique Alliance by building a community of parliamentarians committed to the aims and values which NATO stands for. Above all, through their regular dialogue and interactions, parliamentarians from Europe and North America help keep our transatlantic bond strong. My predecessor, and head of the United States delegation to the NATO PA, Mike Turner, has been instrumental in this vital effort, and I would like to pay tribute to his leadership.

The NATO PA’s role is also to ensure that members of parliament from the 29 NATO countries not only understand the different roles that NATO plays, but are better prepared to fulfil their responsibilities as national parliamentarians regarding security-related matters. Parliaments have the final say on defence budgets, share the responsibility of sending our soldiers into combat and, ultimately, are accountable to their citizens for these decisions.

As importantly, therefore, our work helps make NATO and NATO policies more transparent for our citizens, and this annual report will enhance our Assembly’s own transparency.

The Assembly further ensures that the priorities and constraints of each nation are better understood by all the others. Only if our legislators understand each other can we maintain the bonds of solidarity and cooperation that have kept us strong.

Finally, members of the Assembly are “parliamentary diplomats”. We maintain dialogue with parliamentarians from Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and beyond. We thus complement government-to-government diplomacy and act as “political ambassadors” for our community of nations. Parliamentary diplomacy helps promote a shared understanding by engaging legislators from around the world in a discussion of security threats and challenges.
For all these reasons, the Assembly’s work is essential to the fabric of the transatlantic Alliance. My goal, as President of this great Assembly for the past year, has been to continue to develop its contribution to our common security, building on the important achievements of my predecessors.

2017 was yet another turbulent year. The turmoil we see in our region and beyond affects our societies in many ways. The challenge for us – as political leaders – is to develop immediate responses for today’s problems, while constantly trying to anticipate the priorities of tomorrow. This Annual Report aims to highlight, through concrete examples, how our Assembly has strived to meet this dual challenge throughout the past year. My hope is that this report will help our citizens better understand the value of our work and the contribution our Assembly and NATO make to our security today and tomorrow.

Paolo Alli (Italy)*  
President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

* Paolo Alli has been a member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies since March 2013 and joined the NATO Parliamentary Assembly immediately following his election to the Italian Parliament. He was elected President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly at the Assembly’s Annual Session in Istanbul in November 2016.
When NATO was founded in 1949, no provision was made for a parliamentary dimension. After all, defence was a strictly national prerogative with each nation making its own provisions for the determination, implementation and oversight of its defence policy.

Even so, by 1955, NATO members’ parliaments themselves had made a strong enough case for some form of parliamentary aspect that the “Conference of NATO Parliamentarians” was born.

From relatively modest beginnings, that first Conference evolved into today’s NATO Parliamentary Assembly, an organisation which – while properly distinct from NATO itself – is nevertheless an invaluable instrument for the community of NATO nations and a symbol of their shared commitment to parliamentary democracy.

NATO was established during the Cold War, but its architects built it on the solid foundations of a common belief in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

This explains how NATO has continued not only to survive but thrive long after the end of the Cold War, and through a series of profound transformations of the international security environment. When anyone asks “What is NATO for?”, they do not realise how well they have phrased the question: because NATO is an Alliance defined by what it stands for, rather than what it stands against. And what it does stand for is a set of principles and values which endure, while threats and challenges change.
Since its inception, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has never lost sight of those values and principles, even when the threats were at their most daunting. This meant that the Assembly was well placed to encourage and assist former adversaries to embrace and implement those same values and principles when the Cold War ended. It launched programmes of outreach and cooperation which continue to this day, building partnerships, and promoting understanding about NATO, both within NATO nations and elsewhere.

The Assembly also serves as a “force multiplier” for its members, ensuring that they are fully conversant with the ideas and concerns of their fellow parliamentarians from other NATO and partner countries, and providing them with a wide array of methods to explore, analyse, and assess issues which they feel are essential to the well-being of the NATO community of nations. They are thus even better equipped to fulfil their national parliamentary responsibilities in areas such as oversight of national defence, approval of defence spending, and – in many nations – authorisation for the use of their armed forces in operations.

This report provides an excellent overview of the scope of the Assembly’s activities, and the many roles it plays. Today’s security challenges are complex and multifaceted, and they are not confined by national borders. No single nation, instrument or institution can adequately address them: nor can they be adequately addressed without NATO’s unique and indispensable capabilities.

As it approaches its 70th year, NATO remains the bedrock of its members’ security, and that foundation is all the more solid due to the efforts of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

David Hobbs*

Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

*David Hobbs (United Kingdom) has served as Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since January 2008. He first joined the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s International Secretariat in 1983 as Director of the Science and Technology Committee.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The inaugural Presidential Annual Report serves as an introduction to the NATO PA, presents its key activities in 2017, and supports institutional transparency.

Russia’s destabilising activism and NATO’s response have been at the centre of many Assembly activities and reports in 2017 (Russia’s Destabilising Global Activism). Since 2014, Russia has illegally occupied Ukraine’s Crimea and provided armed support to separatist militants in Eastern Ukraine. Russia also continues to occupy parts of Georgia. Not just directed at Georgia and Ukraine, these actions are blatant breaches of the basic rules of the international system which Russia helped build. Furthermore, Moscow has made explicit threats against NATO countries, engaged in dangerous military brinkmanship and violated numerous international commitments. It is expanding its military presence from the Arctic to the Middle East and undermines stabilisation efforts from the Western Balkans to Afghanistan. And through cyber-attacks and disinformation, Russia increasingly interferes in other states’ democratic processes.

Terrorism continues to threaten the security of citizens in Europe and North America. In 2017, the Assembly continued to think through this persistent challenge (Instability in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood). Over the past year, several NATO countries experienced deadly terrorist attacks, which were mostly inspired by Daesh’s despicable ideology. The Assembly was thus supportive of NATO’s decision to join the international anti-Daesh coalition. Daesh has lost significant ground in both Iraq and Syria. But it remains a lasting threat, as it seeks new strongholds wherever the fragility of state institutions provides fertile ground, such as in Libya or Afghanistan.

These two challenges have compelled NATO to review its strategies and policies and adapt its structures. But as the security environment continues to evolve, the Alliance must adapt to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. Therefore, NATO adaptation was front and centre in almost all Assembly reports, resolution and activities. Part of this adaptation includes closer cooperation with the European Union (EU). The Assembly has strongly encouraged this positive dynamic, especially at a time when the EU is reshaping its defence and security policies, and the United Kingdom prepares to exit the EU (NATO Adaptation).

The transatlantic bond is at the heart of the Alliance, and its continued strength is the essential guarantee of NATO’s political and military credibility. Successive US administrations and Congress have expressed concern at the growing gap in defence spending and capabilities between Europe and North America. However, the election of President Donald J. Trump has given the issue of burden sharing renewed impetus and urgency. Within the Assembly in 2017, burden sharing was therefore a central topic (The Transatlantic Bond, Burden Sharing and New US Priorities for NATO). While European and Canadian members sought reassurance from their American peers about the continued US commitment to NATO, they also reassured them of their commitment to narrow the defence gap.

Partnerships are crucial to the Assembly’s work (Expanding the Assembly’s Network of Partners). Throughout 2017, the Assembly has sought to support closer ties with existing and new partners, from the
Western Balkans to the Middle East and Asia. In addition, the Assembly’s leadership has worked to advance partnerships with multilateral institutions, initiating new relations with the United Nations, the Arab League and the Arab Parliament in particular.

A defining feature of today’s world is the incredibly fast pace of technological change. New technologies offer many opportunities, but they also harbour new risks. To remain relevant and effective, NATO must anticipate these shifts, leverage new technologies to its advantage and maintain its technological edge. The Assembly thus identified technological opportunities and risks as a key priority in 2017 (Technological Risks and Opportunities).

Climate change is another global trend with potentially profound security implications. For years, the Assembly has been at the forefront of discussions on climate change and security, and 2017 was no exception (Climate Change and Security).

In the High North, climate change already has a large impact. As a result, the region has attracted increasing political interest and security dynamics are changing. In 2017, Assembly members therefore continued to reflect upon NATO’s potential role in the region (The High North).

Two further regions of longstanding interest featured centrally in 2017: the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. In the Western Balkans, NATO has supported peace, stability and regional reconciliation for over 20 years. The region has come a long way since then. Regrettably, its prospects are still hampered by a number of political and economic challenges. The Assembly continues to play its part in supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the region, welcoming Montenegro as NATO’s 29th member in 2017 (The Western Balkans).

In Afghanistan, NATO has been engaged in stability efforts for almost 15 years. Much has been achieved. Still, the country faces persistent challenges. As a consequence, NATO stepped up its assistance to Afghanistan in 2017 – a decision fully backed by the Assembly, as members continued their focus on support for Afghanistan (Afghanistan).

The Assembly’s strength lies, first and foremost, in the quality, dedication and diversity of its members. For the coming years, a key objective is to encourage equitable gender diversity in national delegations. In 2017, the Assembly conducted a comprehensive study to develop concrete measures to improve the gender balance and better incorporate a gender perspective in activities and policy documents (Strengthening Women’s Role in Peace and Security).

Members of the Assembly have also set themselves the goal of ensuring that future generations understand the unique and indispensable contribution that the Alliance makes to the security of its citizens. The Assembly therefore created a Working Group on Education and Communication about NATO. The Working Group will develop concrete initiatives to make sure that the youth in member states is better informed about NATO (Communication and Education about NATO).
Partnerships with international institutions are of paramount importance as well. Therefore, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and the European Parliament also send delegates.

Other parliamentary delegations are invited on an ad hoc basis. In the past, these have notably included delegations from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean.

WHAT?
The Assembly's governing body is the Standing Committee. It performs a wide range of political, administrative and financial tasks, and coordinates the overall work of the Assembly. It is composed of the Head of each member delegation; the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer and the Secretary General; and the Chairmen of all the Committees.

The President is elected by his/her peers to represent the Assembly and act as its leading political officer. The five Vice-Presidents, the President, and the Treasurer collectively form the Assembly's Bureau. The Bureau's main function is to ensure the overall guidance and coherence of the Assembly's policies and activities in the interval between meetings of the Standing Committee; it also acts as the “first responder” when internal or external events require a decision or statement by the Assembly.

Five Committees (including their eight Sub-Committees) are charged with examining the security and policy challenges confronting Allied countries and are responsible for most of the Assembly's substantive work:

- the Committee on Civil Dimension of Security (CDS)
- the Defence and Security Committee (DSC)
- the Economics and Security Committee (ESC)
- the Political Committee (PC)
- the Science and Technology Committee (STC)

Other Assembly bodies include:

- the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM)
- the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (UNIC)
- the Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (GNIC)

WHY?

The Assembly brings together 266 members of parliament from the 29 NATO national parliaments. Delegation size is related to its country's population, and each delegation must reflect the political composition of the parliament. The Assembly’s membership, therefore, represents a broad spectrum of political opinion within the Alliance.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly continuously responds to the changing security environment. Partnerships with lawmakers from countries seeking a closer association with NATO are therefore essential. Even before the Cold War ended, the Assembly reached out to members of parliaments from the Warsaw Pact, and today, the Assembly’s partnerships are wide and deep. The NATO PA welcomes delegates from 12 associate countries and 4 Mediterranean associate countries. Observers from 8 other countries take part in its activities. Thus, the Assembly complements and reinforces NATO’s own programme of partnership and cooperation.

1. This includes the Chairman of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group.
At the Annual Session, the Committees also produce policy recommendations. Once adopted in the plenary sitting, these are forwarded to the NATO Secretary General, and to national governments and parliaments. Although these policy recommendations are not binding, NATO’s Secretary General provides a written reaction to them, and they are widely seen as important indications of political sentiment on key topics within the Alliance.

The NATO PA’s activities do not stop here, however:

- **The Rose-Roth Programme** is an outreach effort to assist partner countries in the Euro Atlantic region, mainly in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, as they continue to face challenging transition processes. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principles of democratic control of armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military.
- **The NATO Orientation Programme** is focused primarily on young or newly elected members of parliament from NATO and partner nations, as well as those newly assigned to security or foreign affairs responsibilities. The programme aims at providing an in-depth overview of NATO and its evolving partnerships.
- **The Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum in Washington DC** aims to provide an annual discussion of the state of the transatlantic relationship.
- **The President and the Bureau** regularly represent the Assembly at external events and conferences; they can also hold separate high-level visits as a way to signal the Assembly’s particular interest in a specific topic or location, or in response to significant international events which call for a quick Assembly reaction.

A NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee was discontinued in April 2014 following Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and its decision to annex the Ukrainian province of Crimea in March 2014.

The International Secretariat, under its Secretary General, is responsible for the bulk of research and analysis that supports the Assembly’s Committees, Sub-Committees and other groups, as well as all the practical and administrative arrangements for all its activities and meetings.

**HOW?**

The Assembly organises some 40 activities every year, bringing together between 10 and 350 members of parliament in various formats.

The Committees and Sub-Committees meet several times during the year and organise visits to both NATO and non-NATO countries. In these meetings, they receive briefings from leading government and parliamentary representatives as well as senior academics and experts.

Two particularly large-scale meetings are organised each year: the Spring and Annual Sessions. During the Spring Session, elected Committee and Sub-Committee rapporteurs present draft reports for a first discussion. The reports are then revised and updated for further discussion, amendment and adoption at the Annual Session in the autumn.
2017 AT A GLANCE

THE FIVE BIGGEST ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES

- Participants at the 63rd Annual Session in Bucharest, Romania: 554
- Participants at the Spring Session in Tbilisi, Georgia: 514
- Participants at Joint Committee Meetings in Brussels, Belgium: 235
- Participants at the 95th Rose-Roth Seminar in Kyiv, Ukraine: 179
- Participants at the 94th Rose-Roth/GSM Seminar in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina: 158

SOCIAL MEDIA/COMMUNICATION (AS OF 14/12/2017)

- 3,153 followers on Twitter (@natopapress)
- 5,306 people like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Facebook page
- 229 NATO PA members of Parliament active on Twitter
- 20 photo albums published (on Flickr)
- 68 official press releases published on NATO PA website
PLACES VISITED

1. Belgium  13. Latvia
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina  14. Lithuania
3. Canada  15. Norway
4. Czech Republic  16. Palestinian Territories
5. Egypt  17. Republic of Korea
7. France  19. Serbia
8. Georgia  20. Slovenia
9. Germany  21. Ukraine
10. Israel  22. United Kingdom
11. Italy  23. United States
12. Kuwait  24. Uzbekistan
RUSSIA’S DESTABILISING GLOBAL ACTIVISM

The relationship between NATO and Russia is at its lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Moscow’s provocative stance and actions towards NATO and its Eastern European partners are undermining the stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014, including the illegal annexation of Crimea, put an abrupt end to 25 years of Allied efforts to build a genuine strategic partnership with Russia. These actions are not just a threat for Ukraine; they are blatant violations of the basic rules of our international system. While dialogue continues in the NATO-Russia Council, it has so far been marred by fundamental differences, particularly with regard to Ukraine.

The Assembly withdrew Russia’s Associate Membership in 2014, breaking off regular institutional relations with its parliament. The Assembly’s members remain open to resuming dialogue with their Russian counterparts if and when Moscow demonstrates its willingness to revisit its aggressive policies. Regrettably, the Kremlin continues to disregard international norms, prioritise the unilateral use of force, destabilise its neighbours and attempt to weaken the Alliance.

“Make no mistake – the Kremlin is waging a hybrid war against the free world, and Ukraine is the main target. We need to raise awareness, build resilience and help Ukraine become a success story”.

Rasa Juknevičienė (Lithuania), then General Rapporteur of the Political Committee, presenting her report Russia: From Partner to Competitor at the 63rd Annual Session in Bucharest, Romania, on Saturday 7 October 2017
In 2017, the Assembly assessed the evolution of the Russian challenge in *Russia: From Partner to Competitor*. Rasa Juknevičienė (Lithuania) concluded that, in the current security environment, “NATO Allies need to remain committed to a strong deterrence posture and stand up to Russia’s continuing provocations.”

Since 2007, Russia has nearly doubled its defence spending, disregarded its obligations under key international treaties, and boosted its foreign deployments from the Arctic to the Middle East.

Russia has built up its military presence on its western borders and in the Black Sea region in particular. Crimea has become a bastion for its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities – a topic discussed at length at a 2017 *Rose-Roth seminar in Kyiv*. A2/AD activities in the Baltic Sea region were at the centre of a visit to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as well.

The Russian challenge is not limited to the sphere of hard security. Russia is using its political influence to undermine NATO’s efforts towards stability in the Western Balkans and in Afghanistan.

It has also significantly expanded the use of hybrid and information warfare tactics against NATO members and partners. It has used cyber-attacks, engaged in disinformation and online trolling, and supported fringe political forces in other countries.

In *Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications*, Jane Cordy (Canada) noted that “the Kremlin has ‘weaponised’ information turning media into a weapon of mass deception/distraction and a de facto extension of its military and diplomacy”. She also warned that “the explosion in the use of social media provides additional opportunities for Russia to influence populations and politicians in targeted countries”.

In 2017, the Assembly continued its strong support of its Eastern European partners. The Assembly maintains special partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine – two countries in part occupied by Russia. Regular meetings of the Georgia-NATO Interparliamentary Council (GNIC) and the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC) took place in Brussels and Kyiv.

In addition to a GNIC meeting in Brussels, Tbilisi hosted the 2017 Spring Session of the Assembly. This was the first time in 15 years that a non-NATO member had hosted an Assembly Session, and the first-ever Assembly Session held in Georgia. In Tbilisi, the Assembly adopted a *Declaration* stating “its unwavering support to Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration”. Members urged the Alliance “to continue rendering strong political and practical support to Georgia in the process of NATO integration”. They also called “to advance further the political dimension of Georgia’s NATO integration”.

In July, the Assembly commemorated the 20th anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter by holding its 95th *Rose-Roth Seminar in Kyiv*. President Alli reaffirmed the Assembly’s continuing commitment to Ukraine, solidarity with its people and the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. He made clear that “we strongly condemn the continuing Russian occupation of parts of Ukrainian territory, the continuing violations of the Minsk agreements [and] the violations of human rights in the occupied territories”.

Meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council (UNIC) and members of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships (PCNP) at the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv, 5 April 2017
Violent conflict and instability – particularly in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen – continue to destabilise the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Mounting transnational threats across the region also have major negative repercussions for NATO member states.

In 2017, the Assembly continued to examine these multi-dimensional challenges in its reports, resolutions and activities. Importantly, members engaged with parliamentarians and other politicians from the MENA region, where the Assembly maintains relations with some 15 parliaments.

In Tackling the Challenges from the South, Julio Miranda Calha (Portugal) acknowledged that the Alliance is not the primary instrument for addressing the region’s problems. Nevertheless, “NATO can ill afford to stand on the sidelines, especially where NATO has the mandate and military expertise to contribute to international efforts.”

In The War in Syria and Iraq: Humanitarian Aspects, Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam (France) described the six-year conflict as the “worst man-made disaster this century”, with 400,000 lives lost and almost 11 million people driven from their homes. “Europe and North America need to develop a far greater capacity to manage this crisis both within and beyond their borders, alongside their international partners,” Garriaud-Maylam said. “Doing so makes not only humanitarian, but also security sense.”

The main transnational threat remains Daesh. The group suffered crushing defeats on the battlefield last year, but it is still a significant threat to the region and beyond. It seeks new strongholds wherever the fragility of state institutions provides fertile ground, such as in Libya or Afghanistan. In ISIL/DAESH and Al Qaeda threat to Europe, Andrea Manciulli (Italy) examined the challenge in depth. He advocated for greater sharing of legislative experiences and breaking down the walls of national compartmentalisation in information sharing.

INSTABILITY IN NATO’S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

A visit to NATO Strategic Direction South Hub at JFC Naples on 25 November 2017 closed the Joint Seminar of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group and the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation in Rome, Italy
response to terrorism and other security challenges. In particular, he stressed the opportunities offered by NATO’s new Strategic Direction South and the Hub for the South in Naples, which he and other members visited in the Autumn. Mr Alli’s visit to Cairo was also an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with the Arab League and establish new relations with the Arab Parliament (Expanding the Assembly’s Network of Partners).

As tensions have risen to dangerous levels in the Gulf, an Assembly delegation also visited Kuwait – NATO’s key partner in the region – and discussed the country’s goal of being an “honest broker” in the Gulf.

Maria Martens (Netherlands) stepped back and focused on “macro-scale drivers of change” in her Food and Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa. “Projecting stability in NATO’s southern neighbourhood has been a priority for the Alliance,” she argued. “But the truth is that the MENA region is particularly vulnerable, especially under the effects of climate change,” she told her peers. If the macro-scale drivers of change remain unaddressed, they will gravely undermine the region’s long-term stability.

The Assembly’s Resolution on Tackling Challenges from the South listed a number of areas where NATO could do more to help stabilise the region. Members urged Allied nations to improve situational awareness and coordinate efforts and activities on NATO’s southern flank by enhancing dialogue and information sharing between the Alliance and partner countries. Moreover, they should sustain and, where necessary and possible, increase financial and technical support to partners in the Middle East and North Africa to help them modernise their defence establishments and military forces.

The challenges from the south were a main concern in many Assembly activities. In Rome, at the biggest seminar in 2017, over 155 participants discussed how to develop multi-faceted approaches to the highly complex challenges. The Assembly also discussed the impact of instability in the MENA region on the Western Balkans at another seminar in Sarajevo.

During a visit to Egypt, President Alli encouraged Egypt and other regional governments and organisations to take full advantage of NATO’s partnership possibilities in their response to terrorism and other security challenges. In particular, he stressed the opportunities offered by NATO’s new Strategic Direction South and the Hub for the South in Naples, which he and other members visited in the Autumn. Mr Alli’s visit to Cairo was also an opportunity to strengthen cooperation with the Arab League and establish new relations with the Arab Parliament (Expanding the Assembly’s Network of Partners).

As tensions have risen to dangerous levels in the Gulf, an Assembly delegation also visited Kuwait – NATO’s key partner in the region – and discussed the country’s goal of being an “honest broker” in the Gulf.

The Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee as well as the President also visited Israel and the Palestinian Territories. President Alli urged both sides to seize the opportunity offered by renewed US efforts in the peace process.

“Instability in our neighbourhood, from Libya to Iraq and Syria, breeds a persistent terrorist threat that has affected too many of our cities already.”

Paolo Alli (Italy), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Russia’s destabilising global activism and instability in NATO’s southern neighbourhood are the key drivers of NATO’s institutional change. But as the security environment continues to evolve, the Alliance must adapt to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. This was the broad guidance given by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at their Special Meeting in Brussels in May – where President Alli represented the Assembly.

The Assembly pays close attention to NATO adaptation and in 2017 this topic was front and centre in almost all Assembly reports, resolution and activities.

The ability to protect and defend its populations against attack is NATO’s greatest responsibility. The Alliance therefore continues to enhance its deterrence and collective defence posture. The Alliance is also strengthening its support of international efforts to combat terrorism and project stability in the southern neighbourhood. Moreover, it is enhancing international security by working with partners and other international organisations, first among which the EU.

As concerns NATO’s approach towards Russia, the Assembly fully supports a course based on deterrence as well as dialogue. At the Annual Session, members voted to actively support NATO’s agreed policy towards Russia, based on strong deterrence and defence [...] and openness to a meaningful and reciprocal dialogue”.

In the eastern part of the Alliance, NATO is enhancing its forward presence, with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, on a rotational basis. In 2017, members had the chance to visit the Multinational Battalion in Rukla, Lithuania, on a visit to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Looking towards the Black Sea, members voted to urge NATO “to continue to promote the Alliance’s presence in the region, re-assuring its regional Allies and supporting partners”. Ulla Schmidt (Germany) added in presenting her Advancing Stability in the Black Sea Region report that the transatlantic approach “should be more comprehensive and include other elements as well”, including measures to increase trade, travel and people-to-people contacts and the reignition of genuine regional co-operation.

NATO’s potential role in the High North was also a key focus in 2017 (The High North).
“NATO is currently engaged in a far-reaching process of adaptation, a process which requires solidarity and resources. Our Assembly plays a key part in broadening and deepening Alliance solidarity, and as national parliamentarians, we are centrally engaged in approving the use of the resources needed for defence.”

Paolo Alli (Italy), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

In 2017, NATO took key steps to improve its efforts to project stability in its southern neighbourhood and to counter international terrorism. It formally joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL in May 2017. At its Headquarters, NATO established a new Hybrid Branch, a terrorism intelligence cell and a coordinator to oversee counterterrorism efforts. NATO also created a new regional Hub for the South, based at Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Naples, which members visited in 2017.

The Assembly continued to think through how the Alliance can take these efforts forward. In the resolution on Tackling Challenges From The South, members urged NATO and its members “to develop a comprehensive strategy for supporting stability in the Alliance’s southern neighbourhood”, “to improve situational awareness and coordinate efforts and activities on NATO’s southern flank” and “continue the fight against Daesh in Iraq and Syria”. Assembly members advocated new and deeper partnerships in the region. In this context, members were able to discuss possible next steps at the NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre in Kuwait.

NATO and the EU have identified efficient and effective cooperation between them as a key priority. Twenty-two countries are members of both organisations. While until recently political obstacles had prevented a genuine strategic partnership, new momentum has been created over the past year. “The drive to encourage more synergistic cooperation between NATO and the European Union is necessary”, wrote Attila Mesterhazy (Hungary) in NATO-EU Cooperation after Warsaw. Faced with Russian hybrid destabilisation, terrorism, and waves of uncontrolled migration from an unstable Middle East and North Africa, “integrated and effective security cooperation is needed to face this suite of internal and external security challenges”.

Closer NATO-EU cooperation is also essential to ensure the most effective and efficient use of increasing defence budgets and the development of new defence capabilities in Europe.

In a resolution, members urged NATO and its members “to encourage current efforts to align NATO and EU security priorities in the areas of joint capability development, as well as iterative efforts in counterterrorism, cyber security and hybrid awareness and defence”.

As NATO is reviewing its military command structure to adapt it to the demands of today’s security environment, President Alli visited three of NATO’s military headquarters: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum and JFC Naples.
The year 2017 opened with anxiety about the state of the transatlantic bond. During the Presidential campaign, Donald J. Trump had called NATO "obsolete". In the beginning of 2017, NATO parliamentarians therefore sought reassurance about the new administration’s commitment to NATO. Members visited Washington during President Trump’s inauguration; President Alli met with US Vice President Mike Pence; and European and Canadian members had numerous exchanges on the subject with their US counterparts. All of this helped clarify the parameters of the Trump administration’s policy on NATO.

President Trump has reaffirmed the US commitment to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty – which states that an attack on one ally would be seen as an attack against all. This put an end to speculation that had lingered even after President Trump’s meeting with other NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels in May.

Nevertheless, the new US administration has made clear that it hopes to see several important evolutions in Alliance policies. First and foremost, it urged Europe and Canada to make rapid and concrete progress towards increased defence spending. US taxpayers, it argues, can no longer accept underwriting 70% of Allied defence spending.

Even before the Trump administration, US calls for more equitable burden sharing had become increasingly persistent. "The United States is committing over 4 billion USD annually for the European Reassurance Initiative. We need an American Reassurance Initiative", noted former Assembly President Michael R. Turner (United States). US members pointed out in Assembly discussions that all NATO leaders had committed in 2014 to move towards spending 2% of their country’s GDP for defence within a decade.

Burden sharing featured on the agenda of all main Assembly meetings in 2017. Members debated whether the 2% target was a fair and sufficient criterion. To help inform the discussions, the Assembly tasked Ojars Eriks Kalnins (Latvia) with producing Burden Sharing Revisited. "Burden sharing is a complex issue", Mr Kalnins noted. “Focusing merely on defence expenditures and using defence outlays per GDP can be misleading.” Yet the rapporteur saw it as an important political symbol. He noted that “To not fulfil the pledge to work towards 2% defence spending would
eventually undermine the trust of those Allies which meet this criterion. Moreover, it would undermine the credibility of the Alliance among partner countries, some of which rely and count on their material and financial support.”

The Assembly adopted three resolutions at its Annual Session, reaffirming the commitment to move towards the 2% goal.

In meetings with President Alli in November 2017 in Washington, top US administration officials welcomed the upward trend in defence spending in Allied nations. They also expressed their appreciation of the role the Assembly plays in facilitating this positive evolution.

Other priorities put forward by the new US administration featured prominently in Assembly discussions, too:

• a more active and direct contribution by NATO to the fight against terrorism (Instability in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood & NATO Adaptation);
• a renewed Alliance effort in Afghanistan (Afghanistan); and
• a united Allied response in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat (Expanding the Assembly’s Network of Partners & Technological Risks and Opportunities).

Appropriately, the Assembly’s final meeting for 2017 was held in Washington.

The annual Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum brought together close to 100 parliamentarians from NATO and EU countries. Leading administration officials and members of the US delegation confirmed the United States’ unwavering commitment to NATO and its Article 5. They also stressed the priority Washington puts on the issues of burden sharing, the fight against terrorism, Afghanistan, and North Korea.

2018 will provide a timely and important opportunity to take stock of the state of the transatlantic bond from the perspective of the other North American pillar of the Alliance: Canada. Following a particularly informative visit to Canada, focusing on its new defence strategy and Arctic policy, the Canadian parliament will host the NATO PA’s Annual Session in Halifax in November 2018.

“The transatlantic bond remains the bedrock of our freedom, prosperity, and way of life. It is critical that we all continue to invest in it, politically, militarily, and financially, and that we share the responsibilities of security just as we all share the benefits”  Ojars Eriks Kalnins (Latvia), Chairperson of the Political Committee
Virtually all of the security challenges described in this report are global in nature. Russia’s renewed assertiveness, the multi-faceted terrorist threat, climate change, migration and nuclear proliferation are all issues of concern to states beyond Europe and North America.

Partnerships with parliaments of non-NATO nations allow Assembly members to exchange views with their counterparts and develop a mutual understanding of common threats and possible responses.

The Assembly maintains formal relations with almost 30 parliaments outside the Alliance and informal relations with around 10. And in 2017, the NATO PA actively worked to expand this network.

The 12 Associate Members are the Assembly’s closest partners. Among these are parliaments from the Western Balkans, a region which received special attention in 2017 (The Western Balkans). The Assembly also maintains special partnerships with two Associate Members, Georgia and Ukraine. Both countries hosted landmark meetings in 2017 (Russia’s Destabilising Global Activism).

With the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in turmoil, the Assembly engaged in vigorous parliamentary outreach in 2017. Members as well as the President visited Israel and the Palestinian Territories, meeting with the Knesset and the Palestinian National Council – both of which regularly participate in Assembly activities. Members also had the opportunity to explore security challenges in the MENA region in a visit to Kuwait and in a large seminar held in Rome in November. To further strengthen cooperation with the region, President Alli visited Cairo where he held discussions with Egyptian authorities, explored with the Secretary General of the Arab League opportunities for a more structured partnership with the Assembly, and held a landmark first meeting with the President of the Arab Parliament (Instability in NATO’s Southern Neighbourhood).
Escalating tensions in Asia were at the heart of the visit by the Defence and Security Committee and the Assembly President to the Republic of Korea – a particularly timely visit held amid growing concern at North Korea’s nuclear threats. Sye Kyun Chung, Speaker of the National Assembly, valued the parliamentary solidarity. “Your presence in Korea today demonstrates the resolve and support of the international community for the Republic of Korea during this time of heightened tensions”.

In the first official Assembly visit to Uzbekistan in fifteen years, President Alli welcomed the new spirit of cooperation emanating from Central Asia. Addressing a conference under the auspices of the United Nations, President Alli signaled the Assembly’s openness to develop new partnerships with countries in the region – only Kazakhstan currently participates in the Assembly as a parliamentary observer.

Throughout 2017, the Assembly’s President sought to strengthen relations with the European Parliament (EP) as a way to support and complement the remarkable progress in NATO-EU cooperation achieved in the past year (NATO Adaptation). The EP actively participates in the NATO PA with a ten-member delegation.

2017 concluded with a high-level visit by the Assembly’s Bureau to the United Nations Headquarters in New York, where the President and Vice-Presidents discussed the establishment of a structured dialogue between the Assembly and the UN Secretariat as a way to amplify the existing NATO-UN cooperation.

“I have made it a priority of my presidential mandate to expand the breadth and depth of the NATO PA’s multilateral cooperation with new regions, international organisations, as well as individual nations.” Paolo Alli (Italy), President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Members stressed in several resolutions that, as agreed in 2014, Allies must move towards spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence and more than 20% of defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development (R&D).

Structural reforms are necessary too. Many Allies are exploring how to spur defence innovation, but better functioning defence markets are required, found Jean-Marie Bockel (France) in The State of Europe’s Defence Industrial Base. He argued that especially the European market needs reforming. According to him, “Europe needs far greater capabilities to ensure that member states are positioned to credibly defend national and collective security interests.”

The world faces an era of rapid technological change. What is more, technologies are emerging that have the potential to seriously disrupt the strategic balance. The Assembly thus identified technological risks and opportunities as a key priority in 2017. Several Committees thoroughly scanned the technological horizon and examined how to adapt to the new era.

Managing technological change is always challenging, but Tom Marino (United States) worried that the Alliance has come to a junction where its technological edge is eroding, putting its credibility at risk. “Our armed forces often struggle to keep up with the pace of innovation,” he wrote in Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge: Strategic Adaptation and Defence Research & Development.
BMD and other key pillars of defence are highly dependent on space-based systems. But the space domain will become contested in the future. "The 21st century will prove to be the race for space", wrote Madeleine Moon (UK) in The Space Domain and Allied Defence. The Alliance must protect its space infrastructure. Its loss "would significantly hamper any modern military’s ability to respond to not only defend vital assets and populations, but also to respond quickly and efficiently in a crisis,” Ms Moon argued.

Risks in the cyber domain are increasing, too. For one, "social media is penetrating the defence and security domain in a number of ways," concluded Jane Cordy (Canada) in The Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications. "Terrorist and other hostile use of social media has already resulted in the loss of human life, and it threatens to weaken and divide the Western world.” Moreover, the burgeoning Internet of Things “holds enormous potential for good, but challenges and risks are the eternal companions of any disruptive technology”, suggested Matej Tonin (Slovenia) in The Internet of Things: Promises and Perils of a Disruptive Technology. “The number of entry points for cyber attackers will only grow.” As in recent years, members engaged in discussion on strengthening cyber defence and security and critical infrastructure protection, for example when they visited the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia.

Members also focused heavily on technology risks and opportunities on visits to Canada, Germany, Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

“If we want to safeguard our freedom and shared values, we must make strategic defence R&D policy decisions that are now both necessary and urgent.”

Tom Marino (United States), former General Rapporteur of the Science and Technology Committee

“Europe is headed in the right direction but it needs to do far more,” argued Mr Bockel. Mr Marino echoed this sentiment: “Common funding of EU-wide defence R&D and facilitating joint projects and programs could help immensely”. He cautioned, however, that “these efforts must not compete with or duplicate NATO efforts”.

North America and Europe face a particularly dangerous challenge in the proliferation of nuclear technology. The acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme was at the heart of the visit by an Assembly delegation to Seoul in September.

Pyongyang’s challenge to the world is made more serious and urgent by the development of its ballistic missile technology – a capability which would allow it to deliver nuclear weapons to North America or Europe. Iran and other states are also acquiring or developing sophisticated missile capabilities. The proliferation of ballistic missiles “continues to be a global security challenge,” wrote Joseph A. Day (Canada) in Ballistic Missile Defence and NATO. In parallel, the risk of ballistic missile proliferation to non-state actors is rising. Therefore, NATO needs a broad and flexible NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Mr Day argued. BMD is an ongoing issue of contention between NATO and Russia. However, Mr Day stressed that the NATO system under development “is not designed, developed or capable of undermining Russia’s conventional or nuclear deterrent posture”.

Congressman Tom Marino (United States), presenting the STC’s Resolution on Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge during the Assembly’s Plenary Sitting of the 63rd Annual Session in Bucharest, Romania, on Monday 9 October 2017
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY

Over the last decade, the Assembly has built a strong track record of exploring the consequences of climate change. This culminated in a 2015 resolution which recognised that climate-change related risks are significant threat multipliers. Indeed, climate change will shape the security environment in areas of concern to the Alliance and has the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

In 2017, the Assembly focused on two areas of vital concern – the Arctic and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions – and assessed the economic consequences of climate change.

As the Arctic region warms at twice the rate of lower latitudes, it is the canary in the mineshaft for climate change. Indeed, warming at the top of the world has elevated the position of the High North on the Euro-Atlantic agenda (The High North). “Climate change has the potential to be a game changer in the region – with perhaps profound strategic implications”, argued Gerald E. Connolly (United States) in NATO and Security in the Arctic.

During the past year, members deepened their understanding of Arctic climate changes with Assembly activities in Canada and Norway, where the changing Arctic is driving defence and security adaptation.

In the MENA region, climate change already has a profound impact on food and water security. But the long-term prospects are dire indeed, found Maria Martens (Netherlands) in Food and Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa. “Food and water security are an indispensable condition for stability in the MENA region”, but shortages risk triggering more conflict and mass migration. Ms Martens saw an urgent need for action through technological and governance innovations.

“The refugee crisis shaking political stability throughout much of the Middle East and posing serious problems in Europe could be a harbinger of things to come.”

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“Failure to seize such opportunities will have dramatic consequences [...] for regional and Euro-Atlantic stability as a whole.”

Members further explored the issue of water security during a visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories, where the Jordan River is now at one tenth of its historic flow after seven consecutive years of drought.

In Assessing and Mitigating the Cost of Climate Change, Lilja Alfredsdottir (Iceland) explored the economic costs, opportunities and trade-offs of adaptation and mitigation. “We owe our respective constituents the truth about the economic costs and environmental consequences of climate changes.” Technological progress and government action, including strong commitments to the Paris Climate Agreement, are key elements of a response. “We need to wed the idea of reducing our carbon footprint with the notion of laying the foundation for a new energy and industrial revolution that will be both sustainable and ultimately prosperity generating,” Ms Alfredsdottir urged.

During a visit to Germany, Assembly members discussed the country’s energy transition and visited industry to learn from its policy successes and failures.

While a near-consensus exists on climate change and security in the Assembly, it must be noted that not everyone in the Assembly is convinced that the topic should feature on NATO’s agenda. “NATO is a security organisation. And putting the topic of climate change [on the agenda] I think is something that acts as a means to take our eyes off the ball”, argued Jim Sensenbrenner (US). However, Ms Alfredsdottir insisted that “coping with the problem of climate change does not run up against our strategic interests. It actually supports those strategic interests.”
As temperatures increase and the ice melts, the High North and Arctic Ocean are once again at the centre of political and strategic debates. Oil and gas projects could alter energy markets. Ice-free sea routes could revolutionise trade. And economic investment could help Arctic communities develop. But these new opportunities harbour challenges, too. Most importantly perhaps, how do we make sure that the High North remains an area of predictability, stability and cooperation?

All Arctic states desire to cooperate closely to address common challenges and solve disputes by diplomatic means – for example over maritime delimitation around the North Pole. Indeed, the region is one of the few where interaction between Russia and NATO member states is characterised by cooperation.

Five NATO Allies are Arctic states. But NATO as an organisation does not have a specific policy for the region, as Allies differ on how much it should feature on their common agenda. At its 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO decided to “further strengthen our maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness” in the North Atlantic,
to be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory.

In recent years, members of the Assembly have vigorously debated the question whether NATO should play a role in the High North and the Arctic Ocean and, if yes, what such a role should look like. Central questions include:

- How is Russia’s military posture changing?
- How do we maintain the current level of cooperation given the difficult relationship with Russia?
- What are the security implications of climate change?
- What are the civilian and military infrastructure needs of Allies?
- How should NATO training and exercises adapt?

Some members of the Assembly question Russia’s activities and intentions. As Gerald E. Connolly (United States) argued, “the deployment of long-range air and coastal defences along the coast cannot be attributed to the safety and exploration support”.

Mr Connolly was charged with examining these issues in NATO and Security in the Arctic. He recommended the creation of an ‘Arctic task force’ at NATO Headquarters to identify the security implications of climate change in the Arctic, review Allied infrastructure needs in the region and analyse Russia’s evolving military footprint posture and China’s strategy in the region. “[I]t would be prudent for NATO to engage in an effort, coordinated among member states, to improve its situational awareness in the High North.”

Others do not necessarily see the need for an increased role of NATO. Liv Signe Navarsete (Norway) said that she “truly believe(s) that we, as parliamentarians, must have sound knowledge and awareness about this strategically important region”. However, she was “more hesitant as to whether there is a need for or benefit from NATO generating a consensus on a comprehensive Arctic strategy for the Alliance.” Bearing in mind the good cooperation in the Arctic Ocean, she added, “I am uncertain what the goal of such a strategy should be and whether it would be in the interest of all member states to have such a strategy”.

To raise awareness of the issues, debate competing views and foster consensus, the Assembly tackled these thorny topics in Mr Connolly’s report. In addition, visits to two Arctic Allies – Canada and Norway – allowed members to delve deeper, meeting with politicians, locals and experts as well as seeing the challenges and opportunities first-hand.
The Western Balkans remains an area of special concern for NATO and the Assembly, as NATO has supported peace, stability and regional reconciliation for over 20 years. In the Assembly, a general agreement exists that the future of the region lies in European and Euro Atlantic integration.

Positive movement came in June, when Montenegro became the 29th member of NATO and of the Assembly. President Alii, attending the flag-raising ceremony at NATO Headquarters, called it an historic step for Montenegro but “also an important step for NATO, which has been at the forefront of efforts to integrate the Western Balkans into our common area of peace, stability and prosperity”. He went on to underline that “Montenegro’s accession sends a clear signal to all those other nations that aspire to join NATO that NATO’s door is indeed open. No amount of outside pressure can prevent aspirants from pursuing their membership goal.”

However, the region continues to face a host of problems. In 2017, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s political crisis reached its climax, but it remains to be seen

*Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
if the new government can move the country beyond the many impasses that have blocked reform and EU and NATO accession processes. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains paralysed by a political system which allows each community to veto progress. The essential dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina slowed down during part of 2017 due to elections. And there are concerns about press freedom and populism across the region. In addition to these internal challenges, Russia sees the entire region as fertile ground for driving wedges between NATO nations and partners, and Islamist forces are seeking to recruit from among Muslim communities in the region.

Richard Benyon (UK) warned, in *Economic Transition in the Western Balkans: An Assessment*, that the Euro-Atlantic community seems increasingly remote to the region. “Political stalemate only exacerbates economic problems”, wrote Mr Benyon, “and it makes it all the more difficult to address structural problems including corruption.”

Assembly members thus urged regional stakeholders to counter poisonous politics and de-escalate tensions. They also called on their own governments and Euro-Atlantic structures to boost the resilience of their Western Balkans partners to internal and external pressures. “The EU and NATO provide the kind of institutional support and incentives that will make it possible to give the liberal democratic idea a fighting chance to flourish in the region,” stressed Mr Benyon. “Both institutions need to remain deeply engaged for the region to make possible progress toward political stability, security and prosperity.”

In 2017, Allied legislators visited the Western Balkans in the framework of Rose-Roth seminars in Sarajevo and Ljubljana and a Sub-Committee visit to Belgrade. Mr Ali also visited Belgrade on a Presidential Visit aimed in part at addressing the negative perception of NATO in Serbia.

While members of civil society and the opposition criticised the state of the rule of law and media freedom in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the heads of the Bosnian and Serbian delegations to NATO PA believed the criticism was overly harsh. In particular, Dragan Sormaz, head of the Serbian delegation, argued that the influence of Russia in the region is exaggerated and that the EU is the key partner for Serbia. In 2018, given the stakes for the security of Europe, the Assembly will remain heavily engaged in the region to follow the political developments.
Since 2003, all NATO Allies and their partners have made a significant, long-term investment in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. A stable and secure Afghanistan remains a priority for both NATO and the Assembly.

The Assembly continues to review developments and assess international efforts in the country. Past delegations have visited Afghanistan to meet high-level officials from both the international community as well as the Afghan government and parliament to assess progress on the ground first-hand.

Members of the Afghan parliament are regularly invited to participate in Assembly Sessions, seminars, and training programmes. Parliamentarians from neighbouring states also participate in certain Assembly activities. The contacts and exchanges which take place contribute to mutual understanding and to forging important links between parliamentarians from countries committed to stability and security in Afghanistan.

Regrettably, an increasingly effective and violent Taliban-led insurgency has made gains. As a result, peace negotiations between the government and opposition forces have stalled. These developments have pulled international attention back to the country.

NATO defence ministers have committed to increase the level of international forces in the train, advise, and assist mission Resolute Support. Since the end of NATO’s combat mission in December 2014, international force levels have crept back up to approximately 16,000 at the end of 2017. This is in line with a political decision to let conditions on the ground dictate the timeline for the withdrawal of international forces. New rules of engagement will allow closer cooperation with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to help build a more effective fighting force.

“Allied financial support along with their embedded training, advising, and assisting mission remain as vital as ever.”

Wolfgang Hellmich (Germany), Special Rapporteur of the Defence and Security Committee
The Assembly remains fully committed to the ANDSF and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). In a 2017 Assembly resolution, members urged Allies and RSM partners “to maintain, or consider increasing, their commitments to RSM”. Wolfgang Hellmich (Germany), in his report Afghanistan, also highlighted the need to invest “the resources necessary to install funding and oversight mechanisms of the ANDSF, the [Ministry of Defence], and the [Ministry of Interior] to guarantee the transparent, accountable, and even cost-effective institutions they seek to partner”.

Fighting corruption and improving governance are additional key elements to stabilise Afghanistan. “Political, social and economic institutions remain hobbled by infighting and corruption”, wrote Mr Hellmich. The Assembly resolution thus urged support for “the Afghan government in its efforts to strengthen good governance practices, including by: improving transparency, combatting corruption, implementing electoral reform, and empowering women and girls”.

Spurred by the international pressure, it seems that the Afghan government is boosting anti-corruption efforts. For example, a key element of President Ashraf Ghani’s four-year roadmap for the ANDSF is an increased effort to stem institutional corruption. Mr Hellmich insisted on the role of parliamentarians from NATO member states in the implementation of this plan and in strengthening parliamentary oversight of the armed forces. “Transparent defence institutions will be strong defence institutions”, he argued and called for increased cooperation with Afghan peers.

Given the declining security environment in Afghanistan, Allies cannot afford to neglect the urgency and importance of the longstanding support they have committed to bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. Speaking at the Assembly’s Annual Session in Romania, Mohammad Alam Ezedyar (Afghanistan) told his peers that “the terrorist groups and elements we fight in Afghanistan are not only a challenge to us but they pursue a global agenda – the support of NATO members states and others to Afghanistan is really a support for global peace and security.”
“My hope is that [...] we can chart a ‘self-sustaining’ path forward, one that will ensure that, over time, the gender dimension truly becomes an integral part of our Assembly’s work and practices.”

Angelien Eijsink (Netherlands), former NATO PA Member, former NATO PA Vice-President

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted its landmark Resolution 1325. The Resolution recognised the distinct impact of conflict on women as well as the role that women can play as actors for peace. This dual recognition has wide-ranging implications across the whole spectrum of diplomacy and defence policies. Defence policies and military operations must incorporate the perspectives of both men and women and take into account the specific needs and vulnerabilities of each in conflict.

NATO and NATO governments have been very clear: mainstreaming a gender perspective is both an issue of values and one of military effectiveness. NATO leaders underlined this at their 2016 Warsaw Summit: “Empowerment of women at NATO and in our militaries makes our Alliance stronger.” They went on to say that “Our ongoing efforts and commitment to integrate gender
perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO’s three core tasks will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive Alliance.”

In line with Resolution 1325, Assembly members have recognised that, as decision-makers, parliamentarians have a key role to play. They must promote the incorporation of a gender perspective in national and NATO defence and security policies.

Between 2015 and 2016, former Vice-President Angelien Eijsink (Netherlands) conducted a comprehensive review of gender perspectives in the Assembly. As a result, in 2017, the Assembly adopted a set of important steps along two main lines of effort: enhancing the mainstreaming of gender into its policies and activities; and improving the gender balance within its ranks.

To better incorporate gender-related considerations into its work, references to gender have been included into the terms of reference of all five Assembly Committees and the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group. As a result, in 2017, two Committees examined the impact of the war in Iraq and Syria on women – particularly women refugees. Moreover, another Committee held a special discussion on the specifics of radicalisation among women.

In further measures, the NATO PA will progressively build up a database of women experts who it can draw upon to inform its reports and address its meetings. Members will also continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 1325 by NATO and its member states through regular surveys, reports and exchanges with the NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security.

Equally as important, Ms Eijsink’s report urged the NATO PA to “lead by example”. She advocated for encouraging a greater involvement of women parliamentarians on defence issues. Currently, only 14 % of Assembly members are women, and seven delegations to the Assembly are all-male. Women are better represented among elected officers of the Committees and Sub-Committees, however, with over one in two women in the Assembly holding an elected office. In order to attract more women to the NATO PA, the Assembly included in its rules of procedure an encouragement to delegations to seek gender diversity, and commissioned an annual public review by its Secretary General. The first annual report was published in October 2017.
The Assembly serves as a vital link between NATO and its citizens. A long-standing commitment to help clarify what NATO is and why it matters goes hand in hand with this mission.

Today, the strategic security landscape is evolving rapidly. An urgent need exists to explain to citizens in the Alliance why it is necessary to continue to invest in defence – particularly as Allied nations just went through the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Indeed, the importance of the transatlantic bond or of a strong defence is no longer obvious to younger generations. The members of the Assembly thus felt it necessary to step up their communication efforts.

President Paolo Alli identified strategic communication as one of the top priorities of his presidency. “In some of our nations, NATO is still poorly understood among our fellow parliamentarians, and even more so among our publics. As members of the NATO PA, we play an essential role in explaining what NATO is and why it is crucial for our security.”

Dr. Karl A. Lamers (Germany), Chairman of the Working Group on Education and Communication about NATO, opens the Working Group’s first meeting held on Saturday 7 October 2017 during the 63rd Annual Session in Bucharest, Romania

“Questions are still being asked about the value of NATO. And as believers in the Alliance and in the vital importance of the transatlantic bond, we find ourselves having to make the case again for increased investment in our common defence.”

Dr. Karl A. Lamers (Germany), Chairman of the Working Group on Education and Communication about NATO, former NATO PA President
He raised the need to increase collaboration between NATO and NATO PA with the NATO Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. All have expressed NATO’s full support and cooperation.

In 2017, President Alli tasked Dr Karl A. Lamers, former Assembly President and the Head of the German delegation, with leading a Working Group on Education and Communication about NATO. The President suggested two main target audiences: members of national parliaments who lack a deep knowledge of NATO and the youth of the Transatlantic Alliance. Dr Lamers further specified that the Working Group will need to develop a tailored and decentralised approach and that this effort must be lasting and self-sustaining.

National delegations were asked to nominate one of their members to the Working Group. The inaugural meeting of the Group took place during the Annual Session in October 2017. Members of the Group launched their first project, which will examine how schools in NATO member states teach global security issues and address NATO in particular. This project would complement the work of NATO Public Diplomacy Division, and draw on NATO’s #WeAreNATO Collaboration Platform. This platform allows users to browse and download/upload digital content, for example photos, videos, templates, fonts and other necessary assets. This content can then be used to develop content tailored for specific audiences.

However, NATO’s programmes only engage young people from the university level up. The Assembly’s Working Group therefore adds value. The project will identify positive examples as well as potential inadequacies and shortages of available teaching tools and material. Based on the collected information, the Working Group, in cooperation with NATO, is hoping to facilitate the exchange of the best national practices and teaching materials among member states. In 2018, the Working Group will consider launching additional projects.

The Assembly has also taken steps to better advertise the important work that NATO parliamentarians engage in. During the last two years, the Assembly has launched a new website and expanded the Assembly’s presence on social media. This annual report will also serve to increase the transparency of the Assembly’s work.
THE NATO PA’S BUDGET AND FINANCES FOR 2016-2017

Funding sources

Most of the Assembly’s funding is provided by contributions from the parliaments or governments of member nations. National contributions are determined according to the same budget key used for the NATO civil budget (see the repartition below). The Assembly also receives a subsidy from NATO.

Over the past 20 years special contributions have been made at various points by the United States Agency for International Development, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed forces, the Government of Switzerland, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark and NATO to support the Assembly’s Rose-Roth programme.

The Assembly’s budget

The annual budget presented below is used to cover the International Secretariat’s operating costs. National delegations are responsible for funding the participation of their members in Assembly activities.

In both 2016 and 2017, the Assembly’s budget amounted to 3.8M€. Execution of the budget led to a surplus of 20,000€ at the end of 2016.

Budgetary process and audit

The Assembly’s Treasurer, a parliamentarian who is an elected officer of the Assembly, and who ensures that the budget is consistent with the Assembly’s political objectives, is responsible for drafting the Assembly’s budget. The Treasurer submits the draft budget to the Standing Committee and the full Assembly for consideration and adoption. The Secretary General implements the budget under the oversight of the Treasurer.

The Assembly’s finances are audited by the International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) – the independent, external audit body of NATO composed of representatives of national audit bodies. In its audit, IBAN considers whether, in accordance with the Financial Reporting Framework adopted by the Assembly’s Standing Committee, the information in the financial statements fairly presents the financial position at the year-end, the financial performance and cash flows for the year then ended, and that accounts are properly supported by underlying records and source documentation. In addition, IBAN considers whether transactions are in compliance with the budgetary authorisations and the applicable NATO regulations.

As the audit takes place in the spring of the year following the end of each budgetary cycle, the figures below are from the audited financial statements for 2016. The full financial statements for 2016 are available on the NATO PA website. The 2017 audited finances will be made public on the NATO PA website in June 2018.

Contributions 2016 from member countries

Based on the NATO Civil budget key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member countries</th>
<th>New Key %</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.0837%</td>
<td>€ 3 096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.9336%</td>
<td>€ 71 520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.3262%</td>
<td>€ 12 066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.6092%</td>
<td>€ 244 463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.2893%</td>
<td>€ 10 701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.9389%</td>
<td>€ 34 728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.1829%</td>
<td>€ 43 753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.1085%</td>
<td>€ 4 013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10.639%</td>
<td>€ 393 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.974%</td>
<td>€ 40 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.6911%</td>
<td>€ 25 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.0519%</td>
<td>€ 1 920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8.4109%</td>
<td>€ 311 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.1490%</td>
<td>€ 5 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.2281%</td>
<td>€ 8 437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.1399%</td>
<td>€ 5 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.1804%</td>
<td>€ 117 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.6999%</td>
<td>€ 62 854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.7117%</td>
<td>€ 100 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.9798%</td>
<td>€ 36 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1.0726%</td>
<td>€ 39 674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.4681%</td>
<td>€ 17 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.2122%</td>
<td>€ 7 849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5.7804%</td>
<td>€ 213 807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.3879%</td>
<td>€ 162 301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9.8485%</td>
<td>€ 364 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>22.1446%</td>
<td>€ 819 090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100,000 %</strong></td>
<td><strong>€ 3 698 825</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Statement of Financial Performance at 31st December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNUAL BUDGET</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions from Member Countries</td>
<td>€ 3 698 825,00</td>
<td>Chapter 1 Personnel Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Subsidy</td>
<td>€ 51 600,00</td>
<td>Chapter 2 Operational Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Sessions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 4 Missions, Seminars, External Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Budget for the Year</strong></td>
<td>€ 3 750 425,00</td>
<td><strong>Total Expenditure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financed By Provisions and Prior Year Surplus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update of the budget</td>
<td>€ 19 195,86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of provisions</td>
<td>€ 0,00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding Outreach Programme</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>€ 48 361,06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td>€ 3 814 515,02</td>
<td><strong>Total Expenditure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Income</td>
<td>€ 3 717,22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on Term Deposits</td>
<td>€ 2 105,43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains (Losses) on Exchange</td>
<td>€ -10 002,66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>€ 713,11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excess of Receipts over Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>€ 20 716,90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1: 2017 REPORTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

REPORTS

COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS)

• General Report
  The War in Syria and Iraq: Humanitarian Aspects
  Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam (France)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance
  Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications
  Jane Cordy (Canada)

• Special Report
  Advancing Stability in the Black Sea Region
  Ulla Schmidt (Germany)

DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (DSC)

• General Report
  Ballistic Missile Defence and NATO
  Joseph A. Day (Canada)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities
  The Space Domain and Allied Defence
  Madeleine Moon (United Kingdom)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation
  NATO-EU Cooperation After Warsaw
  Attila Mesterhazy (Hungary)

• Special Report
  Afghanistan
  Wolfgang Hellmich (Germany)

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (ESC)

• General Report
  The State of Europe’s Defence Industrial Base
  Jean-Marie Bockel (France)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations
  Assessing and Mitigating the Cost of Climate Change
  Lilja Alfredsdottir (Iceland)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Transition and Development
  Economic Transition in the Western Balkans: An Assessment
  Richard Benyon (United Kingdom)

POLITICAL COMMITTEE (PC)

• General Report
  Russia – From Partner to Competitor
  Rasa Juknevičienė (Lithuania)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships
  Tackling the Challenges from the South
  Julio Miranda Calha (Portugal)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations
  NATO and Security in the Arctic
  Gerald E. Connolly (United States)

• Special Report
  Burden Sharing Revisited
  Ojars Eriks Kalnins (Latvia)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC)

• General Report
  Maintaining NATO’s Technological Edge: Strategic Adaptation and Defence Research & Development
  Tom Marino (United States)

• Report of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security
  The Internet of Things: Promises and Perils of a Disruptive Technology
  Matej Tonin (Slovenia)

• Special Report
  Food and Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa
  Maria Martens (Netherlands)

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP (GSM)

• ISIL/Daesh and Al Qaeda threat to Europe
  Andrea Manciulli (Italy)

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Confronting Disinformation and the Weaponisation of Information
  CDS

Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region
  CDS

Supporting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
  DSC

Closer NATO-EU Cooperation
  DSC

The European Defence Industrial Base
  ESC

Tackling Challenges from the South
  PC

Burden sharing – Fulfilling the Promises
  PC

Maintaining NATO’S Technological Edge
  STC

Supporting Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration
  NATO PA Standing Committee

All the Assembly reports and policy recommendations are available on NATO PA’s website www.nato-pa.int
APPENDIX 2: THE ASSEMBLY’S ELECTED OFFICERS

BUREAU OF THE ASSEMBLY

PRESIDENT

Paolo ALLI
(Italy)

VICE-PRESIDENTS

Vitalino CANAS
(Portugal)
Joseph A. DAY
(Canada)
Rasa JUKNEVICIENE
(Lithuania)
Metin Lutfi BAYDAR
(Turkey)
The Rt Hon. Lord
CAMPBELL OF
PITTENWEEM
(United Kingdom)

TREASURER

Marc ANGEL
(Luxembourg)

SECRETARY GENERAL

David HOBBs

1. As of May 2018, following the elections held at the Assembly’s Annual Session in Bucharest, Romania in October 2017.
COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY
Chairperson
• Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM (France)

Vice-Chairpersons
• James SENSENBRENNER (United States)
• Bruno CENSORE (Italy)
• Marc ANGEL (Luxembourg)

General Rapporteur
• Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany)

Special Rapporteur
• The Rt Hon. Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom)

SUB-COMMITTEE ON FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES
Chairperson
• João REBELO (Portugal)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Juozas OLEKAS (Lithuania)
• Lara MARTINHO (Portugal)

Rapporteur
• Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION
Chairperson
• The Rt Hon. Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTMAN (United Kingdom)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Marko MIHAILOVIC (Estonia)
• Lorenzo BATTISTA (Italy)
• Rob BISHOP (United States)

Rapporteur
• Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary)

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
Chairperson
• Ivans KLEMENTJEVS (Latvia)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Menno KNIP (Netherlands)
• Richard BENYON (United Kingdom)
• Joe WILSON (United States)

General Rapporteur
• Jean-Marie BOCKEL (France)

POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Chairperson
• Ojars Eriks KALNINS (Latvia)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Plamen MANUSHEV (Bulgaria)
• Valentino VALENTINI (Italy)
• Paul COOK (United States)

General Rapporteur
• Julio MIRANDA CALHA (Portugal)
SUB-COMMITTEE ON NATO PARTNERSHIPS

Chairperson
• Metin Lutfi BAYDAR (Turkey)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Rasa JUKNEVICIENE (Lithuania)
• Adam BIELAN (Poland)
• Bill JOHNSON (United States)

Rapporteur
• Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada)

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Chairperson
• Karl A. LAMERS (Germany)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Michael GAPES (United Kingdom)
• Vergil CHITAC (Romania)
• Ahmet Berat CONKAR (Turkey)

Rapporteur
• Gerald CONNOLLY (United States)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

Chairperson
• Maria MARTENS (Netherlands)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Domenico SCILIPOTI ISGRO (Italy)
• Ziya PIR (Turkey)
• Bruno VITORINO (Portugal)

General Rapporteur
• Susan DAVIS (United States)

Special Rapporteur
• Leona ALLESLEV (Canada)

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND SECURITY

Chairperson
• Hannes HANSO (Estonia)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Jean-Christophe LAGARDE (France)
• Roberto MORASSUT (Italy)
• Kevan JONES (United Kingdom)

Rapporteur
• Matej TONIN (Slovenia)

MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP

Chairperson
• Andrea MANCIULLI (Italy)

Vice-Chairpersons
• Gilbert ROGER (France)
• Luis RODRIGUEZ-COMENDADOR (Spain)
• Ahmet Berat CONKAR (Turkey)

Rapporteur
• Carlos COSTA NEVES (Portugal)

UKRAINE-NATO INTERPARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL (UNIC)

Co-Chairpersons
• Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada)
• Iryna GERASHCHENKO (Ukraine)

Members of the NATO PA

CDS
• Piotr APEL (Poland)
• Jasna MURGEL (Slovenia)
Alternates
• Brigitte GROUWELS (Belgium)
• Aleksandrs KIRSTEINS (Latvia)

DSC
• Jan FARSKY (Czech Republic)
• Juozas OLEKAS (Lithuania)
Alternates
• Sirin UNAL (Turkey) [ad interim]

ESC
• Richard BENYON (United Kingdom)
• Jean-Marie BOCKEL (France)
Alternates
• Ivans KLEMENTJEVS (Latvia)

PC
• Karl A. LAMERS (Germany)
• Liv Signe NAVARSETE (Norway) [ad interim]
Alternates
• Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada)
• Rasa JUKNEVICIENE (Lithuania) [ad interim]

STC
• Domenico SCILIPOTI ISGRO (Italy)
• Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER (France)
Alternates
• Antonin SEDA (Czech Republic)

Members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
• Iryna GERASHCHENKO
• Iryna FRIZ
• Hanna HOPKO
• Serhiy PASHYNSKYI
• Maria IONOVA
• Yuri BEREZA
• Oleksii SKRYPNYK
• Olga BELKOV
• Serhiy LARIN
• Andrii LEVUS
• Andrii KOZHEMIKIN
• Oksana YURYNETS

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COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS)
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (ESC)
POLITICAL COMMITTEE (PC)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC)
MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP (GSM)
UKRAINE-NATO INTERPARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL (UNIC)
GEORGIA-NATO INTERPARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL (GNIC)