



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUMMARY

of the meeting of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security

*Column Hall, Sejm & Senate of the Republic of Poland
Warsaw, Republic of Poland*

Saturday 26 May 2018

ATTENDANCE LIST

Committee Chairperson	Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM (France)
General Rapporteur	Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany)
Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance Rapporteur	Jane CORDY (Canada)
Special Rapporteur	Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom)
President of the NATO PA	Paolo ALLI (Italy)
Secretary General of the NATO PA	David HOBBS
Member delegations	
Albania	Xhemal QEFALIA
Belgium	Georges DALLEMAGNE Karolien GROSEMANS Brigitte GROUWELS
Bulgaria	Milen MIHOV
Canada	Rachel BLANEY Gwen BONIFACE Jane CORDY Joseph A. DAY Darren FISHER Cheryl GALLANT Pierre PAUL-HUS Vernon WHITE Borys WRZESNEWSKYJ
Czech Republic	Tomas JIRSA
Estonia	Kerstin-Oudekki LOONE
France	Anissa KHEDHER Ronan LE GLEUT Joaquim PUEYO
Germany	Alexander S. NEU
Greece	Panagiota DRITSELI
Hungary	Tamás VARGHA
Italy	Cristina DE PIETRO Franco PANIZZA Bruno CENSORE
Latvia	Artis RASMANIS
Lithuania	Rasa JUKNEVICIENE Mindaugas PUIDOKAS
Luxembourg	Marc ANGEL
Netherlands	Marjolein FABER-VAN DE KLASHORST Salima BELHAJ
Poland	Michal JACH Miroslaw SUCHON
Romania	Angel TILVAR
Slovakia	Martin FEDOR
Spain	Ana Maria BOTELLA Guillermo MARISCAL José Manuel MARMOL

Turkey	Ertan AYDIN Ziya PIR
United Kingdom	Baroness ADAMS OF CRAIGIELEA Mary Helen CREAGH James GRAY Madeleine MOON Bob STEWART
United States	Susan DAVIS James SENSENBRENNER Michael R. TURNER

Associate delegations

Armenia	Zabela GHAZARYAN
Austria	Reinhold LOPATKA Dominik SCHROTT
Azerbaijan	Kamran BAYRAMOV
Georgia	Irakli BERAIA Giorgi KANDELAKI
Republic of Moldova	Mihai GHIMPU
Serbia	Vladimir DJUKANOVIC
Switzerland	Isidor BAUMANN Chantal GALLADÉ
Ukraine	Iryna FRIZ Andrii LEVUS Oleksii SKRYPNYK Oksana YURYNETS

European Parliament

Georgios KYRTSOS

Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegation

Algeria	Abdelkader KEMOUNE
Morocco	Mohammed AZRI

Parliamentary Observers

Palestinian National Council	Mohammed HEGAZI Abdelrahim BARHAM
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Speakers

Ingibjörg Sólrún GÍSLADÓTTIR
Director, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)

Fabrice LEGGERI
Executive Director, Frontex, European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)

Marek MENKISZAK
Head of the Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)

Robert PSZCZEL
Senior Officer for Russia and the Western Balkans, Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), NATO

International Secretariat

Andrius AVIZIUS, Director
Jailee RYCHEN, Coordinator
Greta TUMBRINK, Research Assistant

I. Opening remarks by Joëlle GARRIAUD-MAYLAM (France), Chairperson

1. The Chairperson of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, **Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam** (FR), welcomed the Committee members to Warsaw and thanked the Polish delegation for their hospitality and efforts in preparing the 2018 spring session. She congratulated Poland on the country's 100th anniversary of regaining independence as well as Georgia on the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the first Democratic Republic of Georgia. Finally, she outlined the general procedures for the meeting and pointed to available online resources on the NATO PA website.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [058 CDS 18 E]

2. The Chair asked if there were any comments on the draft agenda. **Marc Angel** (LU) noted copies of the draft reports are usually available in both English and French at the entrance of the meeting room, which he said was not the case today even though they are essential for the Committee's work. The Chair assured she would verify the material was in place and continued with the consideration of the draft agenda. Seeing no more comments or objections, **the draft Agenda [058 CDS 18 E] was adopted.**

III. Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security held in Bucharest, Romania, on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017 [231 CDS 17 E]

3. **The Summary of the Meeting of the CDS held in Bucharest, Romania, on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017 [231 CDS 17 E] was adopted.**

IV. Consideration of the *Comments of the Secretary General of NATO, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, on the Policy Recommendations adopted in 2017 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly* [037 SESP 18 E]

4. The Chair called for consideration of the *Comments of the Secretary General of NATO on the Policy Recommendations adopted in 2017 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly* [037 SESP 18 E]. The members of the CDS had no comments.

V. Presentation by Ingibjörg Sólrún GÍSLADÓTTIR, Director, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), on *Partnership in Election Observation: Contribution to Democracy and Security*, followed by a discussion

5. The Chair introduced the first speaker **Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir**, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

6. Ms Gísladóttir began her presentation by emphasising the long history of close cooperation between ODIHR and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, especially in the area of election monitoring missions. She stated ODIHR aims to work with parliamentarians directly, not only with governments and civil society.

7. The remainder of Ms Gísladóttir's presentation focused on ODIHR's role and activities. She noted the office was established in 1991, initially as the OSCE Office for Free Elections. Today, ODIHR is the main body of the human dimension of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, counting more than 170 professionals from 34 participating states and covering a wide

range of tasks to assist the participating states in their endeavour to strive for democracy and human rights.

8. Ms Gísladóttir then provided an overview of ODIHR's activities before focusing on its involvement in elections observation. She noted ODIHR deployed about 2,000 people in more than 20 election observation missions in 2017, tasked with assessing whether elections respect fundamental freedoms and are characterised by equality, universality, political pluralism, confidence, transparency, and accountability, in line with OSCE commitments. She stressed these observers do not judge but rather reflect on electoral processes. To follow-up on and implement the recommendations made during observation missions, ODIHR also assists states in improving electoral processes with expertise and legal reviews. Lastly, ODIHR provides additional support by enhancing the capacity of citizens and observer groups, training observers, and publishing handbooks to build technical expertise. Ms Gísladóttir emphasised the importance of a strong methodology for long-term as well as election day observation. It is essential, she continued, to use the same methodology in all participating countries in order to stay objective and ensure that the many small observations will form a bigger picture at the end of the mission.

9. To illustrate the connection between electoral integrity and security, Ms Gísladóttir mentioned the example of Afghanistan, where ODIHR worked in close cooperation with NATO during the 2009, 2010 and 2014 elections. There, electoral assistance and observation helped mitigate some problems that were technical and political in nature but could have had significant security implications. She highlighted ODIHR's work on gender equality in Afghanistan, as electoral violence disproportionately affects female candidates and voters.

10. Finally, Ms Gísladóttir stressed election observation is a joint endeavour. She said ODIHR can and should cooperate with parliamentary partners and expressed her hopes to extend this cooperation beyond election day. In conclusion, she urged the Committee members to sharpen the attention of their governments to the importance of prompt and effective follow-up of electoral recommendations, both in the states where they have observed and in their own countries.

11. The Chair thanked the speaker for her insights and opened the discussion.

12. **Jane Cordy** (CA) asked whether ODIHR has conducted any analyses of third country involvement in elections, especially with regards to Russian involvement. She also inquired about a general democratic backsliding, as Freedom House's democracy indicators are at their lowest point in over a decade. Ms Gísladóttir responded they have noticed, but not specifically analysed third party involvement in elections so far. She stressed the importance of protecting ODIHR's integrity against these challenges, for example by retaining a single methodology for all countries. In response to Ms Cordy's second question, she confirmed the impression of a democratic backsliding in the OSCE region – both east and west of Vienna. She expressed concern over the fact that trust in democratic institutions and parliamentarians in many participating states is strikingly low.

13. **Brigitte Grouwels** (BE) highlighted short-term and long-term observations could lead to different views on whether elections are free and fair and inquired about the effectiveness of this twofold model, particularly of the short-term observation. In a second question, she asked about any preliminary assessments of the upcoming elections in Turkey and about the capabilities ODIHR's plans to deploy there. She also asked whether ODIHR has drawn conclusions concerning the 2016 referendum in Turkey and whether the office has engaged in any follow-up activities. Ms Gísladóttir stressed both short-term and long-term observation missions contribute to free and fair elections. While the latter reports on the overall political and legislative context, the former reports on the voting itself. She noted most participating states are now able to administer the voting in a proper manner, but the political and legal environment often remains restricted. As long-term observation is becoming increasingly important, it is also more expensive and requires the participating states to provide staff for longer periods of time. In response to the

question on the Turkish elections, she stated ODIHR will most likely monitor the elections with 28 long-term observers, 300 short-term observers and an expert team. These figures are higher than previously, as the upcoming elections are the first ones after the coup attempt and the changes in the constitution as well as in the electoral law.

14. Marc Angel had three questions. He asked about the chances and risks of e-voting, whether ODIHR analyses election campaigns on social media and if the speaker sees any risks associated to party financing by third countries. The Chair thanked Mr Angel for his questions and mentioned the example of France, where e-voting for French expatriates was cancelled due to security concerns. Ms Gísladóttir also voiced concern over the potential misuse of e-voting systems but said she is not an expert and cannot go into detail on the matter. She pointed to the difficult balance between increasing participation and guaranteeing security in this regard. In response to Mr Angel's second question, she noted profound changes in electoral campaigning. She highlighted indirect advertisement as one element that requires increased attention by long-term observation missions. Responding to the last question, she assured the Committee ODIHR is reflecting on party financing by third parties. She stated many countries have adopted legislation banning party financing by foreign entities but reminded these rules can be bypassed.

15. **Marjolein Faber-van de Klashorst (NL)** asked whether the fact that all funding is provided by the participating states risks influencing ODIHR's procedures. In response, Ms Gísladóttir stressed the whole idea behind ODIHR's observation missions is to conduct peer reviews. She mentioned some measures, however, that aim to ensure their objectiveness. For example, no participating state can provide more than 15% of all secondments and a specific fund supports participating states that cannot afford to send any observers.

16. Finally, **Salima Belhaj (NL)** noted parliamentarians sometimes undermine the objectiveness of election observation missions by stating everything is fine while the mission is still ongoing. She asked for advice and inquired about specific examples of what parliamentarians can do to avoid such pitfalls. Ms Gísladóttir advised parliamentarians to refrain from going on missions as individual observers and stressed the importance of going as part of a group with a certain methodology.

VI. Consideration of the draft General Report *Fostering Democracy and Human Rights in the Black Sea Region* [059 CDS 18 E] by Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany), General Rapporteur

17. The Chair introduced General Rapporteur **Ulla Schmidt (DE)** who presented her draft general report on *Fostering Democracy and Human Rights in the Black Sea Region*.

18. Ms Schmidt began by noting that the Alliance was built to preserve democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. However, over the last few years, these values have been in decline globally. To understand why this decline has occurred, the Rapporteur focused her attention on the Black Sea region, viewing it as a case study for a larger phenomenon.

19. The Rapporteur then reviewed human rights in the several states surrounding the Black Sea. She spoke about the difficulties in maintaining democracy in Ukraine amid severe corruption problems and a Russian invasion. Georgia, despite majority-party dominance and the lack of a credible opposition, had evolved from brutal circumstances to one of the region's freest countries. The republic of Moldova faced enormous challenges, including the dominance of oligarchic forces, while Russia had devolved into a largely authoritarian state.

20. Turning her attention to NATO members, Ms Schmidt said that Romania remains a regional leader in democratic norms but is still considered to be one of the EU's most corrupt states. She noted Bulgaria's similar issues with corruption but highlighted its gradual improvements to help

fight organised crime. Turkey, she argued, has undergone a troubling transformation following the coup attempt in 2016. Though she condemned the attempt, the detention of some 50,000 people and dismissal of 150,000 civil servants troubled her. She warned against attacks against journalists.

21. The Rapporteur closed her remarks by arguing that democratic governance, the rule of law, and human rights ought to be larger topics of discussion among NATO members. She expressed her view that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is one of the few bodies where it is possible to have an open and honest conversation about these developments.

22. The Chair thanked the Rapporteur for providing a frank and open summary of the developments in the Black Sea region and opened the discussion.

23. **Joaquim Pueyo** (FR) noted the Black Sea region is the theatre for five frozen conflicts although various initiatives, such as the Minsk Process, aim to resolve them. He asked the Rapporteur if these initiatives can bear fruit in finding political settlements or if they are set to fail because some parties have an interest in maintaining the current status. Ms Schmidt stated she cannot raise the hope these conflicts will be easily solved in the foreseeable future, as long-standing interests are in the way of progress. She noted, however, that the implementation of the Minsk agreements should remain the priority.

24. **Irakli Beraia** (GE) said the report would be more comprehensive if it stated clearly the Russian responsibility for the crimes and human rights violations in the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These territories have become grey zones beyond the control of legitimate authorities or international monitoring and security mechanisms. He also noted Georgia has adopted constitutional amendments to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the executive branch. **Giorgi Kandelaki** (GE) drew attention to a new list of sanctioned lower ranking individuals in the occupied territories who are responsible for or cover up human rights abuses, a list the Georgian government will try to integrate in relevant EU and US sanctions packages. Mr Kandelaki further stressed Georgia's biggest asset is public opinion, which is still pro-European and pro-Western, and assured the Committee members voices like the Assembly's are heard and help the country to avoid or correct mistakes. Lastly, he noted Georgia's Freedom House score has been downgraded in the latest report. Ms Schmidt promised to consider these valuable points made by the Georgian delegates. She also noted the report refers to the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as occupied, thereby acknowledging the illegality of the current situation.

25. With regards to the discussion on Ukraine's legislation on education, **Iryna Friz** (UA) referred to Hungary's veto as a stumbling block in Ukraine's cooperation with NATO. She also called for the final draft to acknowledge the strength of Euro-Atlantic movements in Ukraine as well as the violations of minority rights in Crimea. **Angel Tilvar** (RO) cautioned paragraph 57 does not necessarily reflect the Council of Europe's evaluations for Romania, as the EU Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) review has not been finalised yet. He also suggested some additions to the preliminary conclusions, which he will pass on in writing. Responding to the comment on Ukraine's legislation on education, the Rapporteur pointed to the fine line between strengthening the Ukrainian language and respecting the rights of such a big Russian minority in the country. She warned conflicts will continue to smoulder, if governments fail to reach out to the people affected and do justice to their feelings and perceptions. She also assured relevant updates will be included.

26. **Lord Jopling** (UK) drew attention to the different attitudes in the occupied territories. While South Ossetia is completely dependent on Russia, Abkhazian *de facto* authorities are more autonomous. He also called for the final report to include Russia's recent ban of the messenger platform Telegram. **Mihai Ghimpu** (MD) drew attention to the precarious security situation in the occupied territory of Transnistria, which is complicating the promotion of human rights and

democracy. He also noted the importance of bringing pressure to bear on local democracy. Finally, **Panagiota Dritseli** (GR) asked the Rapporteur to include the arrest of two Greek soldiers in Turkey to paragraph 68. Ms Schmidt assured the Committee she would carefully consider all comments and encouraged its members to pass on their suggested amendments and additions in writing.

VII. Presentation by Fabrice LEGGERI, Executive Director, Frontex, European Border and Coast Guard Agency, on *Ensuring Border Security in a Rapidly Evolving Environment: Cooperation between Frontex and CSDP Actors*, followed by a discussion

27. The Chairperson introduced the next speaker **Fabrice Leggeri**, Executive Director of Frontex.

28. Mr Leggeri started his presentation by explaining Frontex's new role and operational activities. He explained the European Border and Coastguard Agency was established to guarantee an efficient and homogenous management of the Schengen borders but has evolved significantly since 2015, when the number of irregular arrivals to the EU amounted to 1.2 million and Frontex's budget was multiplied by three. As a supranational rather than an intergovernmental organisation and with 1,500 border guards at its disposal, Frontex is now able to deploy joint operations to all types of borders—land, sea and air. As such, the agency covers a diverse range of missions from fighting organised crime and terrorism to conducting rescue operations and returning undocumented migrants. Mr Leggeri highlighted Frontex assisted with the rescue of more than 34,000 people in 2017 alone and helped save 283,000 lives in total since 2015. To fulfill these tasks, he continued, the agency maintains 25 vessels, six surveillance aircraft, as well as access to satellite images from the European Satellite Centre (SatCEN). It also works in close cooperation with the European Agency for Maritime Security and the EU's Copernicus Programme. Currently, the agency has standing missions in Italy, Greece and Spain, where Frontex border guards screen migrants, take their digital identity, and store the gathered information in relevant EU databases.

29. Mr Leggeri then elaborated on Frontex's cooperation with military actors. He highlighted the operational cooperation between Frontex and Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) in the Aegean Sea as a reflection of the broader political cooperation between the EU and NATO. He assessed the exchange of information as extremely useful for both sides and welcomed ongoing discussions about enhancing interoperability and joint risk analysis. He also pointed to Frontex's operational cooperation with EU military actors, for instance with EUNAVFOR MED *Operation Sophia* in the Central Mediterranean and with the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya. At a broader level, he continued, these missions strengthen cooperation between the EU's justice and home affairs and common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions.

30. Finally, Mr Leggeri explained Frontex's mandate was extended in October 2016 to include operations outside the EU's borders. The agency is now authorised to deploy border management operations in third countries, provided that the concerned third country neighbours at least one EU member state, wishes such an operation, and has agreed to a status agreement similar to a military Status of Forces Agreement. Mr Leggeri also noted the agency will have ten liaison officers in non-EU countries by 2020, the first three of which have already taken up their posts in Turkey, Niger and Serbia. Moreover, Frontex provides third countries with technical assistance, so far in the Eastern Partnership region, the Western Balkans and Turkey, and parts of Africa. A fourth capacity building project is planned to assist Europe's southern neighbourhood. In this context the speaker stressed the importance of a dual approach to address both migration and security issues. Finally, he pointed to the broader international cooperation between actors in the field of border management and security and drew attention to Frontex's agreements with border and coast guards of 18 non-EU countries. In conclusion, Mr Leggeri looked forward to

developing coast guard functions beyond the Mediterranean, namely in the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic and the Black Sea.

31. Marc Angel inquired about Frontex's main challenges for 2018 and 2019, specifically concerning possible new migration routes to Europe. He also asked about the impact of Brexit on Frontex's activities and possible new ways of cooperation with the United Kingdom. Lastly, Mr Angel raised the issue of returning migrants and asked how the EU can negotiate re-admission agreements with countries of origin. In response, Mr Leggeri noted the significant decrease in illegal entries since 2016. While this trend continues in the Central Mediterranean, there has been an increase of sea arrivals from Turkey to Greece since the beginning of the year. He stated the EU needs a coordinated asylum policy to face urgent situations. He also noted the need for sufficient financial and human resources to monitor other security issues, along with proper risk analysis and cooperation with international actors such as NATO. First and foremost, he continued, the EU needs to work with nations in its immediate neighbourhood, for instance to prevent criminal organisations from making money that can be used to finance other criminal activities such as terrorism. On the issue of Brexit, Mr Leggeri reminded the Committee that the United Kingdom and Ireland are not part of Schengen. While they can cooperate in certain activities, they cannot vote at Frontex's board meetings and do not contribute to the agency's budget. He mentioned that the idea of establishing a parallel security union is a political discussion which is still ongoing. Lastly, he admitted that re-admission is a sensitive and challenging topic which requires a comprehensive strategy in terms of economic and political development. As a law enforcement agency, Frontex's task is limited to reinforcing rather than negotiating readmission agreements.

32. **Tomas Jirsa** (CZ) voiced concern over the lack of a clear objection to illegal migration by EU leaders. Jane Cordy (CA) questioned whether the deployment of maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) assets encourages sea crossings and inquired about Frontex's activities to prevent terrorists or returning fighters from entering EU territory. **Mary Helen Creagh** (UK) asked how the speaker assesses UK participation in Frontex's activities after Brexit. In response to Mr Jirsa's question, Mr Leggeri stated the EU's willingness to address irregular migration is clear. He noted as an EU agency, Frontex is bound by its mandate as well as by the EU treaties, which include the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Member States are further subject to the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. That is why certain operational measures to address illegal migration are not feasible. In response to Ms Cordy, Mr Leggeri stressed the importance of finding a balance between SAR and fighting crimes – while Frontex has a duty to rescue anyone in distress at sea, the agency must not encourage criminal networks seeking to exploit SAR capabilities. He noted Frontex is in the process of developing autonomous aerial capabilities, which will allow the agency to engage in SAR without deploying vessels. To prevent terrorists from entering EU territory, he continued, Frontex assists member states with the security screening of migrants at the hotspots in Greece and Italy. If there are any security concerns, individuals are sent to second line checks for further interrogation. The agency has also developed a set of common risk indicators for border guards of all member states at both legal and illegal entry points. On the issue of Brexit, Mr Leggeri stressed that since Frontex is an operational agency, thus he cannot comment on questions that need to be settled on a political level.

33. **Madeleine Moon** (UK) asked the director if Frontex uses drones for surveillance purposes and if he sees any increase in trafficking and smuggling of drugs and illegal arms along with migrants. She also inquired about the agency's capacity to increase and move its staff as well as to call on additional support in case of a crisis. Brigitte Grouwels inquired about the agency's ways to inform the European population about its activities. She also asked what Frontex assesses to be the most efficient strategy to fight trafficking networks at the borders. Finally, she asked how Frontex assesses the activities of NGOs in the Mediterranean. **Pierre Paul-Hus** (CA) inquired about possible ways to prevent migrants from exploiting third country agreements or

overstaying their tourist visas. In response to Ms Moon, Mr Leggeri referred to drones as valuable assets to contribute to situational awareness. He mentioned two pilot projects Frontex is currently running to test if new capabilities fit border surveillance purposes, one in Greece and a second one in the Central Mediterranean and Portugal. On the issue of drug seizures and criminal activities, the speaker explained most incidents at sea occur in the Central and Western Mediterranean, followed by the waters between Albania and Italy. With regards to land borders, he noted most interceptions of drugs and illegally trafficked weapons take place in the Western Balkans. Subsequently, Mr Leggeri briefly explained Frontex's rapid reaction mechanism: if a member states requests support in times of crisis, Frontex can deploy a rapid reaction pool within 5 days—a pool each member state must contribute to by law. He then listed some of Frontex's ways to engage with the European public: the agency is regularly invited to hearings and committee sessions at the European parliament and reaches out to a broader public through its website and social media channels. It also embeds journalists in its operations, organises study visits for students and academics and participates in fairs such as the Europe Day fair. He called on parliamentarians of national parliaments to help Frontex in this endeavour. In response to Ms Grouwels' question about the most effective strategy to fight criminals, Mr Leggeri highlighted the importance of cooperation among different law enforcement agencies of the EU, member states and third countries, particularly with regards to sharing intelligence data. Referring to the question about NGOs, he highlighted Frontex's consultative forum, which is foreseen by the agency's founding legislation and provides for dialogue with NGOs on a regular basis. Finally, in response to Mr Paul-Hus, the speaker acknowledged changes in the tactics of criminal groups to exploit legal frameworks. He explained that migrants in need of international protection can present themselves to the authorities at official border crossings, which will initiate the asylum process while guaranteeing their rights in the meantime. He noted, however, that migrants moving for economic reasons especially try to avoid registration and work clandestinely.

**VIII. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance
Civil Protection in the High North and the Mediterranean Regions [060 CDS DG 18 E]
by Jane CORDY (Canada), Rapporteur**

34. The Chair introduced the next speaker Jane Cordy who presented her draft report on *Civil Protection in the High North and the Mediterranean Regions*.

35. The first part of Ms Cordy's presentation focused on the challenges for civil protection in the Arctic. She explained human activity in the region is increasing at a rapid pace, while search and rescue capabilities are not keeping up. Vital assets - such as icebreakers, patrol vessels, rescue helicopters, satellite communication technology, ports and airbases - are in short supply and unevenly distributed. Therefore, multilateral cooperation on search and rescue is all the more important. The Rapporteur underscored the role of the Arctic Council in this regard, a consultative forum which involves the governments of all Arctic states and six representatives of indigenous populations. She noted that while peaceful and cooperative approaches to Arctic concerns are increasingly challenged by Russia's military build-up in the region, cooperation on search and rescue is one of the few areas that has been unaffected by the current crisis in the Alliance's relations with Moscow.

36. In a second part, Ms Cordy focused on the civil protection challenges associated with the refugee and migrant crisis in the Mediterranean. She explained that, although the number of sea arrivals has significantly decreased since the height of the crisis in 2015, the Mediterranean remains the deadliest migratory sea route in the world. The increase of fatal sea crossings, she continued, has spurred the formation of a proactive emergency response system. Today various actors are involved in rescue operations, including individual states, the EU, NATO, NGOs and merchant vessels. While most of them do not operate under a purely humanitarian mandate, international law requires shipmasters to assist any person in distress at sea. Ms Cordy also

drew attention to the civil protection challenges onshore, in the refugee camps in Greece and Italy as well as in detention centres in Libya.

37. In conclusion, Ms Cordy highlighted multilateral cooperation as the key element to protect people and the environment in both regions and gave some concrete suggestions on how to expand and enhance the contributions of NATO and NATO Allies. The Chair thanked the Rapporteur and opened the discussion.

38. Joaquim Pueyo stated the increased civilian and military activity in the Arctic poses a threat for the local population and environment. Against this background, he noted the cooperation between the United Kingdom, France and Norway to develop the NATO submarine rescue programme and asked the Rapporteur to elaborate on the details of the programme. He also inquired about the potential to cooperate on the development of icebreakers and about proposals to reinforce the Dublin regulation. Ms Cordy said she would provide additional details on the NATO submarine rescue programme and will include these in the final report. She highlighted tourism as a profound challenge to civilian protection in the High North, as the population is too sparse and resources insufficient to conduct large scale rescue operations. Considering possible solutions, she referred to proposals to introduce legislation requiring cruise ships to travel in pairs.

39. **James Gray** (UK) remarked tourism in the Polar regions is not negative in itself, as indigenous populations often depend on its revenue. He then drew attention to the discrepancies between NATO and Arctic Council members—while Canada affirms the peacefulness of the Arctic, Norway raises concern about Russia’s military build-up in the region. Lastly, he called for some minor corrections in the section on Greenland’s uranium mining project. Ms Cordy echoed Mr Gray’s views about the livelihood of indigenous populations and tourism and assured his corrections will be included in the final report.

40. Mary Helen Creagh noted the Committee’s recent visit to Norway and asked the Rapporteur to include some of the insights the participants gained on the latest scientific predictions for the High North, particularly the region’s instability and unpredictability and the impact of the melting permafrost. Referring to paragraph 12, she then asked for the report to include some information on alternative sources of energy such as hybrid, wind, geothermal and solar power. She also told the Committee about the assistance of ten Russian fishing vessels in a search and rescue mission during the Committee visit to Norway, which in her view clearly demonstrated a large amount of cooperation with Russia. Lastly, in light of the ongoing revision process of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, she suggested making some recommendations in the report, in particular with regards to the safety of large cruise vessels. Ms Cordy thanked Ms Creagh for these valuable contributions to the report.

41. Lord Jopling suggested an amendment to paragraph 63, which fails to mention the two UK border force cutters deployed as part of *Operation Themis* and *Operation Poseidon*. He highlighted these vessels have saved more than 16,000 lives since their deployment in May 2015. Ms Cordy said the information in question will be corrected.

IX. Panel discussion on Russia’s Challenge to the Euro-Atlantic Community

42. The Chair introduced the speakers of the roundtable—Special Rapporteur **Lord Jopling**, **Marek Menkiszak** from the Centre for Eastern Studies, and **Robert Pszczel** from NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.

- **Consideration of the draft Special Report *Countering Russia's Hybrid Threats: An Update* [061 CDS 18 E] by Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom), Special Rapporteur**

43. Lord Jopling began by showing two videos released by the United Kingdom Foreign Office on Russian hybrid warfare and the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury. He noted that Russia's actions had Cold War precedents, but that its conduct had become particularly dangerous due to the rise of new technology and Russia's new ideological flexibility.

44. He noted that his report reviewed tactics ranging from cyberwarfare to the use of mercenaries without military insignia. Responding to these threats was a serious challenge because Russia generally denied involvement and sought to impede attribution. However, rising awareness of Russian hybrid threats was helping resolve this issue.

45. He concluded by urging the members to address this problem in their countries. First, he noted parliamentarians need to address domestic grievances before the Kremlin tries to deepen and exploit them. Second, parliamentarians must target Russian money and property in the West to punish Putin and his allies. Last, he argued the Alliance has to update its Strategic Concept to include hybrid threats and other new strategic realities.

- **Presentation by Marek MENKISZAK, Head, Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), on *Putin's Last Term? What to Expect***

46. Mr Menkiszak started his presentation by providing an overview of the domestic and external sources of Russia's current policy towards the West. He stated the main driver of Russia's aggressive behaviour is a narrow ruling group around President Putin, which is dominated by former secret service operatives. The members of this group, he continued, think of themselves as the owners of the country and prioritise regime survival over all other policy goals. He explained Russia is facing domestic challenges, as the country's economic system based on resource extraction is unable to provide for the well-being of society in the long-term. Thus, maintaining conflict with the West has become the government's main source of political legitimacy and an instrument to avoid social tensions at home.

47. Mr Menkiszak then focused on the external sources of Russia's policy. He noted Russia considers the United States as an enemy and the post-Cold War security order as imposed, unfair and non commensurate with Russia's power ambitions. As the country now perceives a form of demise of the West with a multilevel crisis of the Euro-Atlantic community, it sees a window of opportunity for Russia to step up again. He also highlighted the rise in military power as a means to compensate for economic weaknesses vis-à-vis the West.

48. Subsequently, the speaker elaborated on the nature of the Russian challenge. He characterised it as systemic and mentioned four specific goals of Russia's European security policy: first, the re-imposition of Russia's strategic control over the post-Soviet area; second, the creation of a *de facto* security buffer zone in Central Europe; third, minimising US presence and influence in Europe; and fourth, maximising and formalising Russia's influence in Europe. He further called the Russian threat persistent as it will stay at least as long as the country's autocratic power system and elite stay in place.

49. Finally, Mr Menkiszak assessed the mid-term prospects of Russia's development. Concerning Russia's domestic development, he forecasted the extension of Putin's rule using small adjustments rather than a large-scale systemic reform. He also predicted continuing economic stagnation due to sanctions, investment deficits as well as technological underdevelopment. Unless there is an unknown sudden event, he continued, a revolution is unlikely, although social tensions and local protests are expected to increase. Concerning the development of Russia's foreign and security policy, Mr Menkiszak presented different possible scenarios. He noted the most likely is a continuation of targeted aggressive activity accompanied by simultaneous targeted business offers aimed at decoupling the United States and Europe.

- **Presentation by Robert PSZCZEL, Senior Officer for Russia and the Western Balkans, Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), NATO, on *NATO's Response to Russia's Hybrid Tactics*, followed by a discussion**

50. To start his presentation, Mr Pszczel stressed the strategic nature of Russia's aggression towards the West. Reflecting on a longer time frame, he described the early period of Putin's rule as an attempt by the Russian regime to break into the European security system, while its current strategy is to break out of this system. In this context, he continued, hybrid warfare is a sign of weakness rather than strength to compensate for a lack of soft power.

51. Mr Pszczel then focused on NATO's response to Russia's hybrid tactics. He stressed the importance of situational awareness as the first response to any kind of threat. Russia's strategic approach is most strikingly demonstrated by the 1.4 billion dollars the state spends on various propaganda outlets. Building on this awareness, NATO has developed a policy consisting of defence and deterrence, coupled with dialogue. The speaker specifically welcomed the continuation of dialogue in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council as well as support from NATO partners such as the EU and Ukraine but also by civil society and the media in this regard. He said NATO's key advantage is unity and noted the Alliance's level of solidarity in the Skripal case had surprised Moscow. The fact that NATO is more restricted in its response than the Russian regime is in its aggression is both a strength and weakness, as the Alliance cannot engage in measures such as propaganda, fake news or troll farms. He stressed the importance of resilience, including education and media literacy, to counter Russia's hybrid tactics.

52. Finally, Mr Pszczel welcomed the recommendations made by Lord Jopling's draft report. In addition, he also called for more resources for the NATO PDD and more efforts to strengthen NATO's partnerships with other stakeholders such as the EU. He concluded by emphasising the Alliance's strengths - unity, synergy and creativity - and calling for a bold response to Russia's hybrid tactics.

53. The Chair thanked the speakers and opened the debate.

54. **Anissa Khedher** (FR) drew attention to the discussion of a new law in the French parliament, which aims to ban foreign-owned TV channels if their broadcast threatens the fundamental interests of the nation or aims to destabilise the state's institutions. She also stressed the importance of education to foster media literacy. Lord Jopling noted the difficult balance between protecting the freedom of the press and countering fake news. He argued for states to monitor more closely how Russian oligarch money is invested abroad.

55. Iryna Friz underscored the importance of clear prospects for Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members. She also drew attention to research on the development of chemical and nuclear weapons as another potential element of Russia's hybrid warfare. Madeleine Moon highlighted the responsibility of Western lawyers and accountants who have helped Russian citizens with money laundering. She also stressed the Alliance needs a system to timely identify potential tipping points – or a “risk thermometer” – when it comes to hybrid attacks. In response, Mr Pszczel stressed the importance of improving intelligence gathering and analysis to enhance situational awareness and detect threats early on. Mr Menkiszak echoed Ms Moon's view that one of the biggest challenges emanates from within our own societies and communities. In order to limit the windows of opportunity for Russia, he continued, states also need to make their own legal frameworks more resilient, for example by increasing transparency in business and fighting corruption. In response to his Ukrainian delegate, Lord Jopling highlighted the importance of threat awareness to limit the impact of biological attacks. Lastly, he assured Ms Moon he would take note of the points she raised for the final report, particularly those concerned with countering money laundering and developing a risk escalating assessor.

56. **Ertan Aydin** (TR) inquired about the Russian elite's motivations for their actions, taking into consideration the different backgrounds of Russian and European values. **Oleksii Skrypnyk** (UA) inquired about measures to minimise the threat of conventional war with Russia. He also asked whether Nord Stream 2 has become the central element of Russia's hybrid warfare. **Rasa Juknevičienė** (LT) called for a clear strategy to protect the Alliance's democracies, as they are the main target of Russian aggression. In response, Mr Pszczel drew attention to some of the contradictions in the worldview of Russian decision-makers and citizens. The only consistent element, he said, is their insistence on going their own way instead of looking for connecting factors with European values and societies. Mr Menkiszak clarified that, in most threat scenarios, conventional warfare with Russia does not mean a grand war between Russia and the West but rather the escalation of local crises. To minimise the risk of escalation, he referred to the dual approach of credible deterrence and open communication. With regards to the Nord Stream 2 issue, he voiced concern that the pipeline will reinforce Europe's dependency on Russian energy sources, thus increasing Moscow's economic and political leverage vis-à-vis the Alliance. Lord Jopling added the importance of NATO unity as a key element in defending Western philosophies.

57. Referring to the draft report's note on Russia's support for extreme parties in Europe, **Alexander Neu** (DE) assured the Committee the leftist party in Germany, *Die Linke*, neither receives funding from the Russian state nor from Russian businesses. He expressed his view that the report fails to mention the West's engagement in hybrid warfare and asked whether NATO Allies are not just using a different terminology but essentially the same tools of aggression as Russia, for instance in the case of cyber-attacks. Giorgi Kandelaki noted that, as Russia has moved from being a status quo to a revisionist power since the end of the cold war, it has amplified its tools of aggression. Against this background, he questioned whether NATO's strategy to respond to Russian threats has evolved correspondingly. Salima Belhaj asked about the added value of a Brussels-based EU-NATO cooperation platform suggested in the report. She also asked the Rapporteur to add a note on the importance of transparency of state institutions to counter fake news. Brigitte Grouwels raised concern over the long-term implications of Russia's propaganda efforts vis-à-vis its own population, as entire generations are taught to oppose Europe and the West. Lastly, **Herman Schaper** (NL) inquired about the opportunities for a conventional arms control agreement with Russia. Mr Pszczel responded by underscoring that a stronger NATO also means greater chances for trust and dialogue. In response to Mr Neu, he said the Alliance has bent over backwards to foster dialogue with Russia, for instance by inviting Russian observers to NATO exercises, without much success. He echoed Ms Grouwels' concern about Russian propaganda targeting the country's own population but pointed to the difficulties of finding an adequate response. Mr Menkiszak agreed with the assessment that there is no symmetry between NATO's and Russia's activities. In this regard, he highlighted the lack of a precedence of an annexation of a sovereign state by a Western country. On the issue of propaganda, he drew attention to the difficulties of measuring the effectiveness of such activities, as opinion polls are often contradictory and difficult to interpret even for Russian sociologists. In response to Mr Schaper's question, Lord Jopling noted that the draft report focuses on hybrid warfare, thus the topic of conventional arms control might be picked up by another report in another committee. In conclusion, he underscored the importance of looking behind the façade of Russia's rhetoric and assured the Committee once again that all comments will be taken into consideration while drafting the final report.

X. Summary of the future activities of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and of the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance

58. The Chair then gave an overview of the Committee's activities for 2018. She provided positive reflections on the Committee's visit to Qatar at the beginning of the year as well as on the more recent visit to Norway by the Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CSDSG). She also informed her colleagues about the third and last CSDSG visit to Prague and Budapest

in early October, which will be accompanied by a delegation from the DSC. Lastly, she encouraged those interested to register for the 98th Rose-Roth Seminar in Skopje from 27-29 June.

XI. Any other business

59. Ulla Schmidt highlighted the Assembly's ongoing work to contribute to the implementation of UN Resolution 1325. This work, she continued, includes another questionnaire on the parliamentary contribution to the implementation of the resolution, developed in coordination with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. She urged her colleagues to respond to the survey in order to be able to discuss a comprehensive set of answers in Halifax. Brigitte Grouwels expressed her support for the Assembly's discussion of Resolution 1325 and underscored the importance of women's participation at all levels of peacekeeping and security. Madeleine Moon asked the organisers of the survey to notify the Committee members directly as soon as the questionnaire is sent out. Lastly, she complimented the Committee's Chair and Director on their work throughout the day.

XII. Closing remarks

60. The Chair thanked the speakers as well as all those involved in organising the Session before adjourning the meeting until the Annual Session in Halifax.
