



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUMMARY

of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee

*Sejm Plenary Hall
Sejm & Senate of the Republic of Poland
Warsaw, Republic of Poland*

Sunday 27 May 2018

ATTENDANCE LIST

Acting Committee Chairperson	Michael R. Turner (United States)
General Rapporteur	Joseph A. DAY (Canada)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation	Attila MESTERHAZY (Hungary)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities	Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)
Special Rapporteur	Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany)
President of the NATO PA	Paolo ALLI (Italy)
Secretary General of the NATO PA	David HOBBS
Member delegations	
Albania	Mimi KODHELI Xhemal QEFALIA Perparim SPAHIU
Belgium	Georges DALLEMAGNE Karolien GROSEMANS Christophe LACROIX Veli YÜKSEL
Bulgaria	Hristo GADZHEV
Canada	Leona ALLESLEV Rachel BLANEY Gwen BONIFACE Jane CORDY Joseph A. DAY Darren FISHER Cheryl GALLANT Tom KMIEC Pierre PAUL-HUS Vernon WHITE Borys WRZESNEWSKYJ
Croatia	Furio RADIN Nenad STAZIC
Czech Republic	Jan FARSKY Patrik KUNCAR
Denmark	Marie KRARUP
Estonia	Ants LAANEOTS
France	Jean-Noël GUÉRINI Ronan LE GLEUT Jean-Marc TODESCHINI Sonia KRIMI
Germany	Alexander S. NEU Gerold OTTEN
Greece	Andreas LOVERDOS
Hungary	Lorinc NACSA

Italy	Cristina DE PIETRO Franco PANIZZA Domenico SCILIPOTI ISGRO Luciano URAS Vito VATTUONE
Latvia	Artis RASMANIS
Lithuania	Rasa JUKNEVICIENE Juozas OLEKAS
Netherlands	Bastiaan van APELDOORN Franklin van KAPPEN Menno KNIP Raymond de ROON Herman SCHAPER
Norway	Harek ELVENES Trond HELLELAND
Poland	Czeslaw MROCZEK Marek OPIOLA Marek PEK Miroslaw SUCHON
Portugal	Joao REBELO
Romania	Nicu FALCOI
Slovakia	Karol FARKASOVSKY Martin FEDOR Eduard HEGER Anton HRNKO
Spain	Maria José GARCIA-PELAYO José Manuel MARMOL Gabino PUCHE
United Kingdom	Lord CAMPBELL OF PITTENWEEM Michael GAPES Lord HAMILTON OF EPSOM Lord JOPLING Nicholas SOAMES John SPELLAR Bob STEWART
United States	Rob BISHOP Gerald CONNOLLY Rick LARSEN Ted POE Linda SANCHEZ
Associate delegations	
Armenia	Koryun NAHAPETYAN
Austria	Dominik SCHROTT
Azerbaijan	Malahat IBRAHIMGIZI
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Nikola LOVRINOVIC
Finland	Eero HEINALUOMA
Serbia	Vladimir DJUKANOVIC
Sweden	Karin ENSTRÖM Björn von SYDOW
Switzerland	Chantal GALLADÉ
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	Afrim GASHI Katerina KUZMANOVSKA

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Ukraine

Iryna FRIZ
Serhiy LARIN
Oleksii SKRYPNYK
Oksana YURYNETS

European Parliament

Anna FOTYGA
Norica NICOLAI

**Regional Partner and Mediterranean
Associate Member Delegations**

Algeria
Morocco

Abdelkader KEMOUNE
Mohammed AZRI

Parliamentary Observers

Assembly of Kosovo

Khavit HALITI
Slobodan PETROVIC
Nurzhan NURSIPATOV
Mohammed S.M. HEGAZI

Kazakhstan
Palestinian National Council

Parliamentary Guest

Afghanistan

Mohammad Rahim HASSANYAR
Khalid A. PASHTOON

Speakers

Mariusz BLASZCZAK, Minister of National Defence
of the Republic of Poland
Major General Adam JOKS, Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
Brigadier General Stanislaw KACZYNSKI, Deputy
Commander of the 16th Pomeranian
Mechanised Division
Raffaello PANTUCCI, Director of International
Security Studies, Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI)

International Secretariat

Ethan CORBIN, Director
Jailee RYCHEN, Coordinator
Sante FIORELLINI, Research Assistant
Greta TUMBRINK, Research Assistant

I. Opening remarks by Michael R. Turner (US), Acting Chairperson

1. Acting Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee (DSC), **Michael R. Turner** (United States), welcomed the Committee members and thanked the Polish delegation for their efforts in preparing the Assembly's 2018 Spring Session. He recalled that 2018 marks the 100th anniversary of Poland regaining its independence and the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the first Democratic Republic of Georgia. Finally, the Chair outlined the general procedures for the meeting and reminded participants of the time and location of the plenary session on Monday, May 28.

II. Adoption of the draft Agenda [062 DSC 18 E]

2. **The draft Agenda [062 DSC 18 E] was adopted.**

III. Adoption of the Summary of the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee held in Bucharest, Romania on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017 [244 DSC 17 E]

3. **The Summary of the Meeting of the DSC held in Bucharest, Romania on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 October 2017 [244 DSC 17 E] was adopted.**

IV. Consideration of the *Comments of the Secretary General of NATO, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council on the Policy Recommendations Adopted in 2017 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly* [037 SESP 18 E]

4. The Chair called for consideration of the *Comments of the Secretary General of NATO, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council on the Policy Recommendations adopted in 2017 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly* [037 SESP 18 E]. The members of the DSC had no comments.

V. Panel Discussion with Mariusz Blaszczak, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland on *The Role of NATO in Responding to Challenges Faced by the Allies* and Major General Adam Joks, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces on *The Development and Role of the Polish Armed Forces*

5. The Chair introduced the first speaker **Mariusz Blaszczak**, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland.

6. The Minister underscored the value of the meeting and the role of legislative power in developing defence capabilities; highlighting the valuable role parliaments play in ensuring political will and funding. He said international agreements are always easier if the parliamentary debate at the international level is deeper and noted the importance of the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in this regard.

7. The Minister then spoke about the contemporary security environment. He said conventional state threats have not disappeared. He noted Russia's violations of its neighbour's sovereignty and independence. Unlike the West, Russia has preserved its combined-arms conventional forces, which is now giving the country an advantage over NATO Allies. Despite the Alliance's technological advantage, Russia is better prepared for conventional warfare.

8. The Minister then pointed to NATO's efforts to tackle these challenges. He said the Alliance is increasing its defence posture in the Baltic States and Poland and expressed his hopes the July summit in Brussels will be a further step to solidify the Alliance's defence and deterrence capabilities.

He highlighted the necessity to develop a more efficient command structure and said Poland is willing and ready to contribute to this endeavour. He also called for more high readiness forces, more detailed defence plans, and modified training plans to strengthen Allied territorial defence. The Minister mentioned these endeavours are not just a matter of NATO decisions at the upcoming summit. They also require investment by every member state.

9. The Minister stressed Russia is not the only threat. Challenges in the Alliance's southern and south eastern neighbourhoods are important as well, particularly radical Islamic-inspired terrorism. He mentioned the important role of the Global Coalition Against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, but said a long-term framework is needed to train these countries to become independent and self-sufficient in ensuring their own security. He also mentioned the need to tackle the adverse consequences of terrorism, such as the migration crisis. He welcomed the strengthening of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and said new initiatives such as the Hub for the South in Naples will help coordinate Allied activities in the region.

10. The Minister expressed his hopes the upcoming summit will maintain NATO's open door policy, as long as applicants attain NATO standards. He said Poland hopes the 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration in support of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia will be implemented. Together with the Republic of Moldova, these are the countries most threatened by Russia. He emphasised the role of the NATO PA in strengthening the Alliance's relationship with partner countries and in supporting the reforms necessary to reach NATO standards. He recalled the crucial role of parliamentarian collaboration when Poland was preparing for NATO membership in the 1990s.

11. Poland, the Minister continued, supports closer NATO-EU cooperation. The Minister highlighted the synergy effect in terms of military capabilities, crisis management, and cooperation with partner countries. Stronger NATO-EU cooperation will be able to meet the challenge of the hybrid threats. He also stressed the importance of military mobility and stressed the role NATO-EU cooperation can play in improving it. He said the EU should develop its infrastructure while taking into account NATO requirements. He also noted Poland's support for the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative but stressed it must complement NATO rather than compete with it. He also welcomed the cooperation between the NATO PA and the European Parliament.

12. The Minister then discussed the development of the Polish Armed Forces. While their priority is to defend Polish territory, the Polish Armed Forces are also deployed to defend other Allies and participate in international operations. In 2017, Poland accepted all NATO planning objectives and ensured solid, long-term financing foundations for the country's armed forces. Polish defence expenditures have already reached 2% of GDP and will continue growing. They will reach 2.1% of GDP by 2020 and 2.5% of GDP by 2030. The size of defence spending will be calculated according to NATO standards.

13. The Minister then outlined Poland's contributions to operations. Poland is the host for one of the multinational battlegroups of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and the Headquarters of the Multinational Division North-East. Poland has also provided forces to the eFP multinational battalion in Latvia. He recognised Latvia's excellent host country support. Poland will be the framework country for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2020. He also noted Poland's contributions to the tailored Forward Presence (tFP) in Romania.

14. Poland also supports the Alliance's eastern partners, particularly Ukraine and Georgia. Poland supports defence reforms and advises Ukraine's defence ministry, focusing on logistics, military education, special operations forces and military police. Furthermore, Poland is part of the joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade. Poland also supports the development of Georgia's special operations forces and military police.

15. Finally, the minister drew attention to Poland's involvement in international operations. Polish forces are involved in the *Resolute Support* mission in Afghanistan, the Global Coalition Against Daesh, NATO's operations in the Aegean and Mediterranean, the training mission in Iraq, and the Hub for the South in Naples.

16. The Chairperson introduced the next speaker **Major General Adam Joks**, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

17. Major General Adam Joks noted the positive and negative impacts of rapid globalisation and technological advances on international security. Key threats remain international terrorism, cyber-attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil unrest, and local and regional military crises in the areas adjacent to NATO and EU borders. Regional powers, he continued, such as Russia and China are seeking to build spheres of influence. The General said Russia does not hesitate to use military forces to achieve political goals and pointed to the examples of Georgia, eastern Ukraine and Crimea in this context.

18. He also elaborated on the implication of the changing character of contemporary armed conflict. He pointed to the example of hybrid threats, blurring the line between war and peace as well as between uniformed combatants and the so-called 'little green men', and underscored the scope of non-military measures being used in the political, social and information realms. As a consequence, Poland and the Alliance face the challenge of countering threats designed to exercise pressure without going above the war threshold. The General mentioned some examples of these provocations, such as unannounced inspections of combat readiness and large-scale offensive exercises.

19. The most difficult threat, however, remains direct aggression against a NATO member state. He warned of the challenge of Russia's rapidly advancing military capabilities; these modernised capabilities increase Russia's military reach. Analysis of Russia's recent military exercises reveals the threat to the former Warsaw Pact countries.

20. The General noted that Poland's armed forces are the main tool to counteract these threats. The Polish Constitution underscores the armed forces' duty to protect the state, to remain politically neutral, and to remain subject to civilian democratic control. He said the Polish Armed Forces have three main objectives: first, to guarantee the defence of the state and counteract armed aggression; second, to support defence institutions and provide assistance to citizens; third, to participate in international peace-building and crisis resolution missions. As such, he said, force readiness is essential.

21. The General then elaborated on the development of the operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces, including procurement, but also doctrines, organisational structures, logistics, infrastructure, training, leadership, interoperability, R&D, and maintenance. The General highlighted technical modernisation as an important component of developing capabilities. He mentioned five priorities for the Polish Armed Forces in this regard: air and missile defence, cyber defence and cyber warfare assets, C4ISR systems, long range/precision guided combat systems, and armoured and mechanised force modernisation.

22. The General underscored financing as a key element in developing these capabilities. He echoed the Minister's remarks that Poland is now spending 2% of its GDP on defence, which will grow to 2.5% by 2030. He also mentioned a new law scaling peacetime armed forces to 200,000. The General noted these developments directly result from the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw and internal threat assessment.

23. Besides the army, aviation, the navy and the Special Forces, Polish territorial defence units constitute the fifth part of the military forces. They have five main tasks: first, territorial military operations in case of armed conflict; second, civil protection against natural disasters; third, civil

protection against destabilisation and disinformation; fourth, support for local defence systems; fifth, promotion of the idea of patriotism. The General noted Poland's new territorial defence plan would be implemented in steps in the coming years. Ultimately, 17 territorial defence units are planned. So far, 6 of them have been established, starting in the eastern provinces.

24. Polish Armed Forces are also active participants in Allied operations. Currently, Polish forces operate outside its border in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. The experience gained during international operations contributes to the development and expertise of the Polish Armed Forces. Polish Armed Forces' involvement in international military exercises, he continued, also contributes to the interoperability of NATO forces. In recent years, the number of international exercises has increased, particularly those taking place in eastern Poland. *Anaconda-18* and *Dragon-18* are the biggest exercises carried out on Polish territory in 2018, involving all Allies and Partnership for Peace member states. He noted Poland will also continue to participate in crisis management exercises in cooperation with the EU, building on last year's coordination with the EU's *PACE17* exercise.

25. Poland has been actively participating in strengthening NATO's eastern flank. The General highlighted the establishment of the eFP and the tFP as one of the most important achievements of the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Four multinational combat groups in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia constitute the main eFP force. These combat groups are led by one of the framework states—the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The Multinational Division North-East in Elblag, Poland, will coordinate all eFP operations in peacetime once it reaches its full operational readiness by the end of the year. The General noted the eFP combat groups are prepared and certified and have the full combat potential to conduct operations in their areas of responsibility. He noted Poland's prominent role in ensuring NATO's deterrence in the east as the host country of one of the eFP battle groups and a troop contributor to the eFP in Latvia and the tFP in Romania.

26. The Chair thanked the speakers, congratulated the Minister on achieving the 2% goal and thanked them both for hosting the US presence as the framework nation for the eFP battlegroup in Poland. He said attaining Allied commitment to reach the 2% goal is part and parcel of the US commitment to the European Deterrence Initiative. The Chair opened a short round of questions with the speakers.

27. **Juozas Olekas** (LT) asked for more information on Russia's operations in Kaliningrad and inquired about additional support—political and military—for Ukraine. He said Ukraine is not only defending its own territory but also the security of the Alliance. **Bob Stewart** (UK) noted Kaliningrad is just 318km from Warsaw. He asked if the decision-making process of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is fast enough to trigger Article 5 in due time. **Andreas Loverdos** (GR) asked the Minister to elaborate on the necessity for NATO enlargement, especially in the case of Ukraine.

28. Mr Blaszczak responded to Mr Olekas' question by stating Poland attaches great value to maintaining as close relations with Lithuania as possible and mentioned specific initiatives such as joint Polish-Lithuanian combat units, meetings at the ministerial level, and cyber-defence collaboration. He specifically drew attention to the Bucharest Nine (B9) Initiative. Answering Mr Stewart's question, the Minister stated Article 5 constitutes the foundation of the Alliance and said Poland is fully prepared to create a favourable environment for joint defence operations. When it comes to NAC decision-making, the Minister highlighted the importance of mutual understanding and joint exercises. He stressed the importance of the ability to deter threats so any potential aggressor understands any violation of the current order will be met with a swift and overwhelming response. In response to the last question, the Minister noted support for Georgia and Ukraine is a priority for Poland and said both countries should be admitted to NATO as soon as possible. He regretted the delay of the process and acknowledged both countries' efforts to deliver on their commitments as fully as possible.

29. **Franklin van Kappen** (NL) asked the Minister how the Polish government is able to agree on long-term defence funding, given the difficulties to reach goals like these in multiparty democracies

with four-year-election cycles. **Artis Rasmanis** (LV) asked to what extent the current military training is addressing the protection of the Suwalki corridor. **Iryna Friz** (UA) noted the Ukrainian military can be compared to the Polish one in terms of military structure. In light of the necessity for interoperability if and when Ukraine joins NATO, she asked how much time it took for Polish forces to prepare for international missions.

30. The Minister responded to Mr van Kappen's question by stating long-term planning is the foundation of his government's efforts to prepare the Polish Armed Forces for the future. Thanks to economic growth, he continued, the state's financial assets are stable. At the same time, the size of the Polish Armed Forces needs to be increased and their equipment modernised. These are long-term measures. In response to the question on preparing the interoperability of forces, he advised not to wait with these decisions. He noted the quality and combat capability of the Polish Armed Forces increases as they participate in international missions.

31. Picking up the issue of interoperability, **Wolfgang Hellmich** (DE) mentioned the need to strengthen political interoperability between decision-makers along with the military interoperability of Allied forces. He asked how the cooperation between Parliaments can and should be increased. He also asked the Minister to comment on how PESCO, (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) feature in Polish policies. **Ants Laaneots** (EE) asked if Poland plans to continue building a professional army or if the country is planning to reintroduce conscription.

32. The Minister agreed political interoperability is vital and that parliaments make funding decisions. With regard to EU-NATO cooperation, he said PESCO must complement NATO, for example to improve military mobility. Responding to the question by Mr Laaneots, the Minister noted Poland is not planning to introduce conscription in the near future, although the idea has been raised several times. He said the regular professional army will be increased in size and the territorial defence units will provide additional support. The latter know the local conditions and topography very well and can be used in emergency situations, for example in the aftermath of floods or hurricanes.

33. **Alexander S. Neu** (DE) mentioned the demonstrators in one of the buildings of the Sejm who were protesting for increased support of people with disabilities at the time of the meeting. He asked why Poland is able to invest 2% of its GDP in defence but is unable to increase support for these people.

34. The Chairperson commented on the question by stating all governments face the dilemma of prioritising some issues over others. The Minister responded that Poland has already increased spending for people with disabilities, stressing the fact that Poland is a free country, which includes the freedom to demonstrate.

35. Closing the discussion, the Minister thanked the Committee members for their questions and comments as well as for the cooperation within the Assembly. He underscored the importance of parliamentary cooperation in ensuring security in Europe and the world. He expressed his belief the free world will be able to tackle the current security challenges as long as the Alliance remains united.

VI. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation *Burden Sharing: Refocusing the Debate* [065 DSCTC 18 E] by Attila Mesterhazy (Hungary), Rapporteur

36. The Chair introduced **Attila Mesterhazy** (HU) who presented his draft report on burden sharing. Mr Mesterhazy began his presentation by recalling the developments leading up to the 2014 Wales Summit. Between the end of the Cold War and the Wales Summit, NATO, Canada and Europe cut their defence spending significantly, a development that became increasingly visible in a growing

transatlantic spending gap. At the same time, he continued, the Alliance was confronted with a complexity of new threats calling for a new dynamic and mobile defence and deterrence posture. To meet these new challenges and spread the burden of NATO's new ambitions more evenly, the 2014 Wales Summit resulted in the pledge by NATO heads of state and government to invest 2% of GDP in their respective defence institutions.

37. Mr Mesterhazy assessed the progress on this goal as slow and uneven. Overall, he noted Europe is investing in defence again, especially in the East and in the Baltics. However, only 14 of the 29 Allies have concrete plans to reach the 2% target by 2024. Mr Mesterhazy noted the lack of defence cooperation in Europe as a further complicating factor, resulting in duplications and extra subsidisation costs. He also acknowledged the criticism of the 2% benchmark, citing as examples the lack of a shared definition, no calculation of Allies' willingness to accept risk, and a failure to measure output quality.

38. In conclusion, Mr Mesterhazy assured Committee members of the US commitment to European security, which is most visibly demonstrated by increased support for the European Deterrence Initiative. He said it is now up to the European Allies to parallel Washington's investment and stressed the role of national parliaments in identifying ways and means states can bring to the common end of collective security.

39. The Chairman thanked the speaker for his draft report and opened the discussion. A number of Committee members expressed concern over paragraphs 84 and 85. **Lord Campbell of Pittenweem** (UK) noted the paragraphs in question falsely suggest the 2% pledge was imposed rather than agreed upon by all Allies. He also said the language seems to imply the United States is not entitled to voice concern. He raised particular concern over the description of the Trump administration as "myopic", arguing this kind of characterisation is an unusual way to refer to an Ally, and called for the two paragraphs to be stricken. Michael R. Turner and **Ted Poe** (US) echoed these concerns with the latter calling the description of the Trump administration offensive. Mr Turner noted he had been assured these changes would be made. **Anna Fotyga** (European Parliament) shared these concerns and suggested to come forward with some written amendments. She stressed the importance of keeping the NATO targets of spending 2% of GDP on defence, of which 20% should be earmarked for equipment purchases and R&D. In this context, she mentioned the ongoing war in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea. She said Ukraine is defending the Alliance's freedom in its eastern flank, while still not being entitled to benefit from Article 5. Similarly, Georgia is contributing to the Alliance's collective defence.

40. The Rapporteur agreed to edit the paragraphs in question and made specific suggestions. Lord Campbell warned the Committee should not make amendments on the spot but rather have a thorough look at the report before the Annual Session in Halifax. Mr Turner agreed with the previous speaker and expressed his appreciation for the members' commitment on this issue. In response to Mr Poe's comments, the Rapporteur noted the 2% figure is not a perfect one, but it allows at least some measurement of the Allies' progress. In response to the comment by Ms Fotyga, he noted the issue of Ukraine's membership in the Alliance is a complex one. He said, in his opinion, the Alliance cannot accept any kind of aggression: Russia's behaviour has to have some kind of consequence.

41. Referring to paragraph 70, Andreas Loverdos pointed to some errors in the numbers and offered his help in correcting these.

42. **Rick Larsen** (US) also raised concerns over paragraphs 85 and 86. He expressed his hopes for the report to reflect the vital role of the US Congress in shaping US foreign and security policy—not only the role of the administration. To underscore his point, he drew attention to the passing of the most recent bill on defence spending, which demonstrates the United States' strong commitment to the Alliance.

43. Iryna Friz said spending 2% of GDP on defence is the bare minimum. She compared the pledge to Ukraine's expenditures on defence, which amounted to less than 1% of GDP before 2010 but have now reached 5% of GDP and are expected to rise to 7% in the next years.

44. **Sonia Krimi** (FR) requested a clarification of paragraph 72. She noted a new bill on defence planning has just been adopted by the French parliament and is now under review by the Senate. The new bill will bring defence spending to 2% of GDP, meaning EUR 39 billion over the next five years.

45. **Joseph A. Day** (CA) commented on paragraphs 51 and 52, arguing that these sections do not adequately reflect developments in Canada in the past three years. There has been a change in government, resulting in a new defence policy.

46. The Rapporteur reaffirmed his commitment to precise information and assured the Committee the numbers from France and Greece will be corrected. Responding to the comment on France's defence planning, he said he did not have the information at the time and the report will be updated. He also noted the report will be updated to reflect the US congressional efforts and Canada's new policy. He further agreed the Committee should emphasise the fact that 2% is a minimal benchmark.

VII. Consideration of the draft Special Report *Afghanistan: The Nexus of Local and Regional Security* [066 DSC 18 E] by Wolfgang Hellmich (Germany), Special Rapporteur

47. As there was some time left before the next point on the agenda, the Chair decided to move the consideration of the draft Special Report on Afghanistan up on the agenda and introduced Special Rapporteur Wolfgang Hellmich.

48. Mr Hellmich started his presentation of the draft report by warning against topic fatigue after 17 years of war in Afghanistan and called for continued commitment to following developments in the country. He reminded the delegates the country is a different place than at the beginning of the mission by highlighting some of the achievements that were made since then.

49. Mr Hellmich then gave an overview of the progress of security sector reform in Afghanistan and the recent changes in US and NATO policy. He highlighted the increase in force levels of NATO's Resolute Support mission to roughly 16,000 personnel by the end of the year, new provisions for Allied advisors to work alongside Afghan forces at the battalion and brigade levels, and relaxed US rules of engagement. Mr Hellmich then reviewed the progress of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) Road Map, a four-year strategy plan to reform and professionalise the Afghan security forces and was generally positive about the progress of the plan's implementation. In response to more capable Afghan security forces, he continued, both the Taliban and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province (ISIL-K) have stepped up their use of guerrilla-style and terrorist tactics. He emphasised this resurgence of violence not only directly undermines security for many Afghans but also raises the stakes for the upcoming elections.

50. Mr Hellmich then drew attention to the regional variables impacting peace and security in Afghanistan. He highlighted the rivalry between India and Pakistan as a key variable for the latter's lack of willingness to crackdown on Taliban sanctuaries within its borders. He outlined recent efforts by the United States and other coalition nations to increase pressure on Pakistan in an attempt to compel it to change its behaviour. Still, he warned against underestimating the complexities of the interplay of regional powers' interests. In conclusion, he called for continued commitment to NATO's *Resolute Support* mission, but also reminded his colleagues a solution to the conflict ultimately requires an Afghan-led and -owned political settlement.

51. The Chair thanked the Rapporteur and opened the discussion. Bob Stewart remarked the report does not say much about the morale of the ANDSF, which he felt is going to be crucial for the future trajectory of security sector reform in Afghanistan. **Khalid A. Pashtoon** (AF) noted the security

situation has significantly deteriorated since the start of the spring fighting season. He was concerned the financial resources the international community is investing in the upcoming elections will be wasted due to this precarious situation and asked if these concerns can be included in the final report. **Madeleine Moon** (UK) remarked that unless the problem of corruption within the Afghan police is addressed, stability in Afghanistan will remain elusive. She asked if a section addressing this issue could be added to the final report.

52. Mr Hellmich said he would be willing to include a section on the Afghan police. In response to the question on the morale of the Afghan security forces, he noted he is aware of the problems related to deserters and internal perpetrators in the ANDSF. He mentioned a soldier's salary is at the root of the problem—if soldiers cannot feed their families, they are going to desert. He also drew attention to the morale of the population at large and the population's attitude towards the Afghan state and the ANDSF as equally important factors. In response to his Afghan colleague, Mr Hellmich mentioned the German Parliament has decided to expand the mandate of the German armed forces in Afghanistan to support the electoral process, demonstrating that the elections are of central importance for the international community. He said the return on financial investments is not the only concern, but also the protection of the electoral process at large. As parts of the country are still occupied by the Taliban, however, 100% security is unlikely to be achieved prior to the elections.

53. **Joao Rebelo** (PT) referred to the regional dimension of the conflict and asked the Rapporteur to elaborate on the section on Iran, specifically on the kind of equipment and other support mentioned in paragraph 69. **Norica Nicolai** (European Parliament) stated the Afghan economy still depends on drug trafficking, money laundering, foreign support, and is hobbled by corruption. She said the current situation does not allow us to be optimistic and, even if there are some achievements, Afghanistan risks remaining a frozen conflict. Franklin van Kappen asked the Rapporteur to elaborate on the relationship between Daesh and the Taliban.

54. Mr Hellmich said the Taliban receives logistical as well as command and control support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, not only in border areas but also increasingly in central Afghanistan. Iran is also providing the Taliban with light arms and, to a smaller extent, with missiles. He concluded these developments show Iran is able to expand its influence in Afghanistan. In response to the comment from Ms Nicolai, Mr Hellmich stressed that military action against the narcotics trade has not proved useful in the past. Instead, people need new alternatives, such as alternative sources of income. He stressed the question of how to deal with the financial flows that are potentially funding terrorism has to be discussed at the international level and suggested a separate report addressing this issue more generally. He also called for more support for President Ghani's efforts to fight corruption. On the cooperation between the Taliban and Daesh, Mr Hellmich stated that Daesh appears to move closer toward the Taliban. While the two groups have been competing forces in the past, their relationship is changing as Daesh is trying to create a new zone of influence in northern Afghanistan.

55. **Ronan Le Gleut** (FR) remarked France is taking part in civil and cultural cooperation in the framework of the German-Afghan Treaty signed in 2012 and engaged in the fight against terrorism through *Operation Barkhane* in the Sahel. Iryna Friz noted that Ukraine informed the Alliance about ties between the Taliban and Russia in 2017 and asked that Russia's support for Afghan insurgents be added to paragraph 74. **Bastiaan van Apeldoorn** (NL) recalled the war has been going on for 17 years, requiring enormous financial resources and claiming an increasing number of victims without showing much progress. He said he is not convinced increased troop numbers are going to improve conditions for the Afghan people and asked how much more military commitment, financial resources, and human costs are needed to bring NATO closer to achieving its objectives in the country. He continued by asking how further military involvement by the Alliance can bring Afghanistan closer to a political solution. Sonia Krimi mentioned political and religious movements, warning these groups tend to tell their partners what they want to hear as long as it brings them closer to achieving their goal and referred to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as an example. At the

same time, she called on her colleagues to avoid giving lessons and evaluating local developments based on Western standards.

56. Mr Hellmich agreed the Alliance should not teach Afghans how to live. In response to Mr van Apeldoorn's question, he asked about the alternative to staying committed to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. He said the goal of the mission is to provide the Afghan people with the conditions that allow them to live without fear and build their own state and stressed that much more needs to be done to reach that point. Finally, he assured his Ukrainian colleague that he would look into the possibilities of including a few points on Russian support for the Taliban.

57. Adding to the response to Mr van Apeldoorn's question, the Chairman recalled that 9/11, the first event triggering Article 5, eventually led to the mission in Afghanistan. He highlighted, however, that the objectives of the mission are not just NATO's goals, but those of the Afghan people as well, who are suffering from these security threats every day.

VIII. Panel discussion with Brigadier General Stanislaw Kaczynski, Deputy Commander of the 16th Pomeranian Mechanised Division on *NATO's Enhanced forward Presence Poland - the NHDF Brigade: Role, Capabilities and Lessons Learned* and consideration of the draft General Report *Reinforcing NATO's Deterrence in the East* [063 DSC 18 E] by Joseph A. Day (Canada), General Rapporteur

58. The Chair introduced the next speaker, **Brigadier General Stanislaw Kaczynski**, Deputy Commander of the 16th Pomeranian Mechanised Division.

59. Mr Kaczynski gave a presentation on the role, possibilities and lessons learned from NATO forces in Poland. After providing a brief overview of the eFP in general he focused on the eFP battlegroup in Poland and its integration in the Polish Armed Forces. The General highlighted the 15th brigade as the military unit supporting the NATO-led battalion in Poland. The unit is deployed in the most northeastern part of Poland, with high combat potential, far-reaching capabilities and the ability to defend Polish territory as well as NATO's eastern flank. He continued to explain the 15th brigade is part of the 16th Pomeranian Mechanized Division, which also includes three other brigades, two support regiments, two air units as well as a logistics unit. The territorial defence units are a further element of the defence system in the east, providing valuable local expertise. The General noted the 15th brigade is a fully deployed unit and able to operate on short notice. He elaborated on the assets of the brigade, which has 3,500 troops and modern military equipment at its disposal. He also gave an overview of the total assets of NATO's eFP battlegroup in Poland.

60. The General then informed the Committee members about the conclusions and lessons learned after 18 months of eFP deployment in Poland. These can be divided into four areas: procedures/command, communication, intelligence, and Strategic Communications (Stratcom). Participation in international exercises and missions as well as intensified combat training in alignment with the NATO interoperability guidelines prepared the brigade to carry out all conventional combat activities, including air operations. The brigade and the eFP also achieved effective communication tools meeting safety and security requirements. Information can now be securely transmitted using the newly created Polish Mission Network as well as the NATO networks. The General mentioned plans to create a unified eFP mission network to ensure the 24/7 exchange of information among all eFP contributing states. The eFP contributing states also agreed to develop a joint reconnaissance database to share information on potential threats and identify gaps. The General further noted the necessity for close cooperation between the logistics elements of the eFP contributors in order to guarantee the safe transport of people and materials. He highlighted Stratcom as one of the central pillars of the eFP.

61. The General emphasised the Alliance is creating the eFP as deterrence without inviting provocation. To spread this message and foster credibility, the quantity as well as the quality of

information provided by the eFP has been improved. He mentioned the example of inviting journalists to exercises and using social media to spread a correct image of what NATO is doing. He stressed the importance of a coordinated media message, both in domestic and foreign news, to achieve Stratcom goals. Achieving these goals requires cooperation with media outlets as well as coordination between the eFP-contributing states.

62. Subsequently, Joseph A. Day presented his draft general report on reinforcing NATO's deterrence in the east. He started his presentation by highlighting Russia's increasingly aggressive behaviour in NATO's eastern flank, which is particularly evident in Ukraine and Georgia. The Alliance, he continued, must respond to these aggressions by strengthening its defence and deterrence posture as well as support for its partners in the region.

63. Mr Day then provided an overview of the steps made by NATO after the 2014 Wales Summit and the 2016 Warsaw Summit; meaning revamped response forces via the Readiness Action Plan, the Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and in the Baltics, and the Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region. The United States also increased its contributions to European defence under the European Deterrence Initiative. Mr Day welcomed these efforts but noted more is required.

64. Subsequently, Mr Day explained in more detail why Russia's behaviour and actions call for reinforcing NATO's eastern flank. He noted the past decade has witnessed Russia escalate its non-conventional interference in Allies' and partners' political, economic, and social affairs – from cyber-attacks to resource bullying to meddling with democratic elections. He then focused on Russia's build-up of conventional military capability by outlining the Kremlin's efforts to assemble increasingly modernised, highly ready, and deployable armed forces. Mr Day presented these developments as particularly challenging for the Baltic region.

65. Finally, the Rapporteur proposed some recommendations for steps forward. He highlighted the need to improve military mobility and defence investments, as important measures to improve the Alliance's defence and deterrence posture. In conclusion, Mr Day called for more contributions by Allies in terms of assets deployed in the east and long-term investments in defence systems. He also stressed the importance of joint EU-NATO initiatives to strengthen infrastructure and reduce legal and bureaucratic hurdles to military mobility.

66. Juozas Olekas inquired about cooperation of the Alliance's transportation ministers. He noted that providing the technical requirements is as important as reducing bureaucratic barriers. Anna Fotyga expressed her gratitude to the 15th brigade for their work. She also thanked Mr Day for his report as it acknowledges the threat emanating from Russia has not been eliminated. She put particular emphasis on diminishing the threats around the Sulwalki corridor. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem noted paragraph 27, which refers to the RAND corporation study on NATO's posture in the east, adequately sums up the nature of the problem. He warned that if the eFP is supposed to be a tripwire, it is a fragile one. **Pierre Paul-Hus** (CA) suggested to include General Ben Hodges' presentation delivered in Istanbul in 2016 to the report to highlight the importance of military mobility. Iryna Friz drew attention to Russia's efforts to build private military groups, such as the Wagner Group. She noted these groups could move more quickly and create favourable conditions for the subsequent deployment of regular forces. She asked how the Alliance and its partners could respond to these hybrid threats.

67. The General explained the response to activities by the so-called "little green men" can be seen in the newly created territorial defence units, which gather intelligence on foreign nationals and aliens. Intelligence services are also vital to be able to identify, intercept, and expel these people.

68. Mr Day assured the report would be reviewed to make sure the points raised are reflected in the report. He highlighted the importance of military mobility and political will, noting the abstraction of the 2% goal becomes real when looking at the specific cases for investment the report touches upon.

IX. Presentation by Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on *The Challenges of Homegrown Radicalisation to the Alliance*

69. The Chairman introduced the next speaker, **Raffaello Pantucci**, Director of International Security Studies at RUSI.

70. In his presentation Mr Pantucci addressed the problem of homegrown radicalisation and suggested how the Alliance might respond to this problem. He noted the international security debate tends to be focused on external threats while different members of the Alliance also face, to varying degrees, the domestic threat of homegrown radicalisation. The speaker highlighted the clear link between the threat at home and abroad, not only in terms of operational support between domestic and foreign groups but also in terms of inspiration and motivation derived from a global narrative that has resonance in domestic settings.

71. He briefly outlined the roots of homegrown radicalisation. According to his research, the profile of members of the jihadist community in the United Kingdom is fairly constant – disenfranchised and disillusioned young men, mostly second or third generation immigrants, who find meaning in narratives from abroad. He also reported growing participation by converts, women and girls, as well as minors in terrorist attacks or the planning thereof. He attributed this trend to the growing number of parents that bring their children to the battlefield, where children are indoctrinated early on.

72. In-depth analyses, he continued, show there is no single answer to the question of what motivates these people. Research points to a general sense of injustice, which is then framed by the “clash of civilisations” narrative. Other reasons include the thrill of going to the battlefield, family or friendship connections, criminal inclinations, monetary incentives and contact with recruiters. The multiplicity of reasons complicates formulating an adequate response.

73. Mr Pantucci explained that, while people travelled to the battlefields in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia in the past, Syria and Iraq had a much bigger draw. However, numbers are now decreasing. The speaker attributed this downward trend to two factors: authorities are becoming better in intercepting people travelling to battlefields abroad, and groups like Daesh are losing territory and thus also attractiveness. However, radicalisation continues at home as people are still drawn by the same ideologies but unable to travel to foreign battlefields. Mr Pantucci also drew attention to the problem of returnees. He noted, however, that the flow of returning fighters has not emerged in the way it was expected. This raises the question of where these people have gone to—while some are in Syrian or Kurdish detention or hiding in Turkey, others have moved on to other battlefields.

74. The speaker then drew attention to the changing nature of terrorist attacks on Allied territory. Directed plots planned and carried out directly by these groups have decreased due to better security capabilities. Instead, there is a rise in instigated and inspired attacks, and the line between these two is increasingly blurred. The perpetrators of these attacks may have some connection to a network; they may also suffer from mental health issues or social difficulties, causing them to launch what looks like a terrorist attack without actually understanding the ideology or any connections to bigger networks. The speaker also mentioned frustrated travellers - those unable to travel to foreign battlefields—who launch attacks at home instead.

75. Mr Pantucci remarked that Al Qaeda and Daesh are increasingly refocusing their efforts on the battlefield in the Levant. Some regional Daesh- and Al Qaeda-affiliates, however, maintain an online presence, which they might be able to use later to resurge, or to focus on regional conflicts in South Asia, Yemen and North Africa to rebuild their brand on the ground. He advised the Alliance to stay attentive in the battlefields where NATO is already present, especially in Afghanistan. Staying consistent and engaged abroad is contributing to counter homegrown terrorism as well.

76. Mr Pantucci said preventing people from being drawn to radical ideologies is the best way to counter violent extremism and welcomed that much is already being done in this regard. He said NATO is well situated to monitor measures and identify as well as spread best practices, although the causal chain of success is not always evident. He also saw a role for NATO in coordinating member states in countering homegrown radicalisation and improving dissemination of battlefield data to intercept potential perpetrators.

77. In conclusion, the speaker summarised his findings in three points: 1) the threat is much more diffuse today than in the past; 2) the lines between inspired and instigated attacks are increasingly blurred; and, 3) the response to these threats must not overwhelm our societies or create police states.

78. Rick Larsen asked about specific coordination activities countries can employ to decrease the opportunity to travel to the battlefield and inquired about any evaluations of reintegration programmes for returnees.

79. Mr Pantucci mentioned the EU SIS II database as the best example in terms of coordination on countering travel to and from the battlefield. The fact that data is not always entered in the same way remains a problem and allows individuals to slip through sometimes. He also mentioned Europol as a good example of promoting best practices. Although the organisation is still learning, it is in the process of transforming and improving. The speaker mentioned some studies on re-education and re-integration of returnees. He highlighted demobilisation as the most fruitful way in this regard, i.e. persuading returnees to refrain from using violence, instead of trying to change their fundamental ideas. He warned that different approaches come with different price tags, as the reintegration of thousands of people can become an expensive effort.

80. Madeleine Moon asked if the speaker sees any differences in the motivations for going to the battlefield between men and women. In light of the drawdown from Afghanistan, she then asked whether it is better to bring back radicalised individuals to our justice systems or to leave them where they were first intercepted to prevent them from radicalising people in our prisons.

81. Joao Rebelo asked the speaker to elaborate on different deradicalisation programmes that target individuals before they go to the battlefield and asked for his opinion on whether programmes should be mandatory for people that start to become radicalised. He also inquired about the role local communities can play such as local Muslim communities in stemming radicalisation.

82. Mr Pantucci stated fewer women are motivated by the thrill of being on the battlefield. Some battlefields such as Afghanistan and Pakistan are also more difficult to access for women. In response to Ms Moon's second question the speaker stressed that individuals who have broken the law in their own countries should face the consequences of their actions. However, he was concerned about certain countries' practice of stripping people of their passports, which raises the dilemma of according due process. Responding to Mr Rebelo, Mr Pantucci noted programmes should be imposed when they are effective, that is before leaving for the battlefield. He reiterated the importance of demobilisation rather than deradicalisation. He underscored the need for a high level of trust between authorities and local communities, so that the latter can play a positive role. The life of a teenager should not be ruined because he or she has read a certain book, nor should local communities hesitate to report real problems.

83. Ted Poe asked the speaker to define a terrorist *vis-à-vis* a radical.

84. Iryna Friz noted that states use terrorism as well. She said Moscow is not only encouraging Islamists to go to Syria but also orthodox radicals to travel to Ukraine and inquired about ways to address the problem of orthodox extremism.

85. Mr Pantucci defined terrorists as using violence to achieve political goals. Unlike a radicalised individual, a terrorist has already engaged in activities clearly going against the law. A radical may have started to think about and express these ideas, but he or she might still be stirred away from acting on them. In response to Ms Friz, Mr Pantucci named foreign fighters going to Ukraine as one of the more overlooked phenomena in Europe. Although they do not equal the numbers in Syria and Iraq, they present problems from a law enforcement perspective, as they gain battlefield experience and have the opportunity to build up extremist networks.

X. Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities *NATO Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment* [064 DSCFC 18 E] by Madeleine Moon (United Kingdom), Rapporteur

86. The Chair introduced Madeleine Moon who presented her draft report on the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Modern Security Environment.

87. Ms Moon started her presentation by thanking the staff and commanders at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters and the Global SOF Foundation for their contributions to the draft report. Subsequently, she explained today's threats from Russia and Jihadi-inspired violent extremism are increasingly taking place in the grey zone between war and peace. As conventional forces are not well suited to combat these grey zone threats, the role of Special Forces is growing. Ms Moon stated Special Forces have also become governments' instruments of choice in the post-9/11 era, as they are smaller in footprint and more cost-effective than conventional operations.

88. Ms Moon highlighted the resulting imbalance in force structure and funding. While 90% of all funding and resourcing is still going toward conventional forces, Special Forces are executing the majority of targeted actions, surveillance efforts, and high-end military assistance. Thus, the Rapporteur assessed most Allies' Special Forces are neither large enough nor sufficiently resourced to cover the increasing number of missions their governments ask of them. In conclusion, she urged her colleagues to do their own research into their country's efforts to develop Special Forces and invited them to the Committee's upcoming visit to Portugal and Spain, which will focus on the role, mission and function of Special Forces.

89. Bob Stewart pointed to a key dilemma of the report: as Special Operations Forces are secret and discreet by nature, it is difficult to discuss their improvement in the NAC and other branches of the NATO headquarters. He called on the Rapporteur to recognise this dilemma in the final report. **Rob Bishop** (US) voiced concern about the characterisation of US oversight of Special Operations Forces as "scarce" in paragraph 57. Finally, **Koryun Nahapetyan** (AM) inquired about the necessary mechanisms and institutions to increase parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, including Special Operations Forces.

90. Ms Moon noted she favoured moving towards a regional operational control structure instead of only relying on the NATO Special Operations Command. A regional command might help to guarantee secrecy, readiness as well as fairer burden sharing in the Alliance. In response to her American colleague, Ms Moon stated she is willing to remove the sentence in question from the draft report. She briefly elaborated on the problems related to accountability of Special Operations Forces in her own country. The British Special Forces are only accountable to the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who are accountable to Parliament. Thus, Special Forces are *de facto* not part of the public debate in the United Kingdom. Responding to the last question on oversight mechanisms, she reiterated the dilemma between secrecy and accountability. To balance these competing principles, she advised to have debates and investigations related to Special Operation Forces in the intelligence and security committees instead of the defence committees.

XI. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities

91. Joao Rebelo presented the summary of the activities of the DSCFC in 2018. He provided positive feedback on the Sub-Committee's recent trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Mr Rebelo then invited those interested to register for the trip to Portugal and Spain from 24-28 September, which will be joined by members of the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM). The visit will focus on defence and security priorities to the south and the role of Special Forces.

XII. Summary of the future activities of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation

92. Lord Campbell of Pittenweem overviewed the future activities of the DSCTC. He noted the Sub-Committee has assembled a robust delegation for the upcoming visit to Finland and Estonia from 11-15 June. He also encouraged those interested to register for the second DSCTC visit to Prague and Budapest in early October, which will be accompanied by a delegation from the CDS.

XIII. Any other business

93. Madeleine Moon thanked the Chairman, Michael R. Turner, for his work throughout the day. Mr Turner also thanked Ethan Corbin for his assistance.

XIV. Date and place of the next meeting

94. The Chair announced the next full meeting of the DSC will be the NATO PA Annual Session in Halifax, Canada, in November.

XV. Closing remarks

95. On behalf of the entire Committee, Mr Turner thanked all those involved in the Session for their efforts before adjourning the meeting.
