WHY NATO MATTERS

A parliamentary case for strengthening the transatlantic pillars of the Alliance

Hugh Bayley, MP
President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Hugh Bayley

President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since November 2012

Biography

Following his election as Labour Member of Parliament for York in 1992, from 1992-97 Hugh Bayley was a member of the House of Commons Health Select Committee. In May 1997 he became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Frank Dobson MP, then Secretary of State for Health. He served as a Minister at the Department of Social Security from January 1999 to June 2001.

In July 2001, Mr. Bayley was appointed to the International Development Select Committee and re-appointed following the 2005 and 2010 elections. Mr. Bayley is a member of the Chairman’s Panel, the group of senior MPs who chair Public Bill Committees, the Committee of the whole House and debates in the House of Commons’ Second Chamber. He served as Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons in 2010.

From October 2005 until October 2008 he was Chairman of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Hugh Bayley is the founder of the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group. He was formerly a UK representative at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK Branch and Chairman of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank.

He first joined the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1997 and has held several key positions including General Rapporteur and later Chairman of the Economics and Security Committee, and Assembly Vice-President. He was elected as President of the Assembly in November 2012.

Before he was elected to Parliament, Hugh Bayley worked as a full time trade union official, negotiating pay and conditions of employment for nurses, and other health service workers (1975-82); a television producer and Chief Officer of the International Broadcasting Trust (1982-86); and a lecturer/research fellow in Economics and Social Policy at the University of York (1986-92). He was a Councillor in the London Borough of Camden (1980-86) and a member of York Health Authority (1987-90).
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I am very pleased to support Hugh Bayley’s case for NATO, and the excellent work that he and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are doing in support of our Alliance. As a former parliamentarian, I recognise the Assembly’s vital role as a link between NATO and our publics and I have been determined to keep that link strong.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for us all. Twenty-five years after we overcame the division of Europe, Russia has drawn new dividing lines at the barrel of a gun. Russia’s actions undermine the rules-based, cooperative international order which Russia itself had helped to build, and which is a necessary foundation for peace and prosperity. Europe and North America must continue to stand together to uphold that order and strong parliamentary support and engagement will be critical in this long-term endeavour.

Russian actions have caused deep concern among countries across Europe. They are a stark reminder that we must not take our security for granted and that defence matters. In NATO, we have taken decisive measures to safeguard all Allies and we have made clear that we won’t hesitate to take further steps if needed to ensure their effective protection. Credible defence, however, requires credible capabilities, and obtaining those capabilities requires credible defence investment by all Allies. As parliamentarians, you can play a vital role in reversing the steep decline that we have seen in many of our Allied defence budgets these past few years. This would help to ensure a better balance of defence spending, both between Allies within Europe, and especially between the United States and its European Allies.

As we reinforce our transatlantic security through NATO, we should also reinforce our economic ties. Far-reaching trade and investment agreements between the European Union and the United States, and between the European Union and Canada, will strengthen our competitiveness, generate growth, and reinforce our ability to set international standards for the global economy.

It will also be important to make energy diversification a strategic transatlantic priority and to reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian energy. Strong parliamentary engagement will be critical to help achieve these goals.
The transatlantic bond remains the bedrock of our freedom, our prosperity, and our way of life. It is critical that we all continue to invest in it, politically, militarily and financially, and that we share the responsibilities of security just as we all share the benefits. For this reason, and with a view to our NATO Summit in Wales next September, I have asked the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, together with a group of security experts and a group of young leaders, to propose concrete steps for further strengthening the transatlantic bond. I look forward to receiving your ideas and suggestions, and to your continued support and engagement as we prepare our Alliance for the future.
INTRODUCTION

Judging from the headlines, NATO has been in the eye of the storm – or the centre of events – for its entire history. Now it is Ukraine. 25 years ago it was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet NATO has responded well to all those challenges so that it remains today, as it always has been, the foundation of its members’ security.

This year marks NATO’s 65th anniversary. NATO has endured for two key reasons. The first is its ability to adapt; as security challenges have evolved beyond recognition since the Alliance’s inception, so has NATO. The second reason is that NATO is an alliance founded on enduring values and beliefs, not an expedient arrangement for addressing a particular security problem.

In Ukraine today, Europe and North America face the most serious crisis on the European continent for decades. Russia’s unacceptable annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine has put an abrupt end to 25 years of confidence building and partnership between the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Russian Parliamentarians during an era which has seen the reunification of most of Europe around common objectives and a co-operative approach to European and global security.

For many nations, the crisis in Ukraine provides a vivid reminder of the ongoing importance and relevance of the Alliance. Even if NATO is not involved in Ukraine, it has thrown its weight behind international condemnations of Russia’s actions. By visibly beefing up its presence in the Eastern members of the Alliance, it has also demonstrated it can serve as a strong deterrent against the type of destabilisation that Ukraine – and before it Georgia in 2008 – have been subjected, providing reassurance for its members.

It is clear already that Russia’s new interventionist policies in Eastern Europe will have a serious, far-reaching and lasting impact on the future face of European and global security. NATO needs, once again, to adapt to this new reality. And once again, it should draw its strength and purpose from the enduring values and beliefs which lie at its heart.

This will not be a straightforward or easy process. Indeed, the crisis in Ukraine comes as NATO is about to bring its combat operations in Afghanistan to a close after more than a decade and as member nations are emerging from the most severe financial and economic crisis in living memory.

The combination of these two factors – a particularly high operational tempo and growing pressure to reduce defence budgets – has created strains among Allies. An imbalance in the respective contributions of Allies to our common defence is prompting a renewed debate about “burden-sharing” within the Alliance.

While the crisis in Ukraine is likely to put these debates to rest temporarily, these underlying issues need to be addressed. Allies must seek a renewed consensus about how NATO can help Europe and North America address the security challenges of today and tomorrow, and do so at a cost that its members – and that means citizens – are prepared to bear.
The public in Europe and North America is entitled to ask: what do we get out of NATO? What does it cost and what security does that money buy?

This publication answers that question in clear, non-specialist language and a user-friendly format. It explains why our transatlantic alliance is and remains a unique, irreplaceable partnership which benefits Europeans and North Americans alike and which is worth investing in.

Parliamentarians are uniquely placed to stimulate and feed this discussion. It is our responsibility as elected representatives of the people, to explain to our constituents why we must continue to invest in defence and how NATO can help us address the security challenges of the 21st century. For 60 years now, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has analysed, commented on and promoted greater transparency of NATO policies, and thereby fostered informed public discussion about NATO and our common defence. And it is essential that we continue to do so.

This study starts with an overview of the features and achievements which make NATO a unique alliance (I). It then reviews what Europeans and North Americans each “bring to the table” and gain from their partnership inside NATO (II), before proposing how the Alliance can remain the bedrock of its members’ security. (III). The final chapter examines the vital issue of public support for the Alliance, and the role parliamentarians can play in fostering greater understanding of NATO among our citizens (IV).

What emerges is a clear reaffirmation of the fact that NATO will continue to be an indispensable source of stability in an uncertain and sometimes dangerous world.

I. WHAT MAKES NATO A UNIQUE ALLIANCE

NATO registers in public perceptions mostly – if not exclusively – through the independent media reporting of its military operations. And indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has successfully managed a range of difficult crises and operations. However, what makes the Alliance unique is much more than just its military might. It is the centrality of the transatlantic link and the fact that NATO consists of a community of nations united by a commitment to common values and deep political, socioeconomic and cultural ties.

A. The transatlantic link: the origin and bedrock of the Alliance

After the devastation of the Second World War, much of Europe lay impoverished and the alliance which defeated the Axis powers was riven by tensions. Most of Europe was divided into two, each with a very different ideology. The Soviet Union installed Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, while those in Western Europe retained – or regained – their independence and democratic forms of government.

With fears of yet another conflict in Europe rising, it was thought that involving the United States in Europe’s new security architecture could help avoid a future war in Europe which – in the nuclear age – would have unthinkable consequences.
On 4 April 1949, ten Western European nations, the United States and Canada thus reached a momentous decision; they created a collective defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), based on the fundamental principle that an attack on one would be considered as an attack on them all – the commitment enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO founding treaty.

The “three musketeer” clause – “one for all, and all for one”: NATO’s Article 5

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Today, the transatlantic link remains the essential bedrock and defining feature of the Alliance. Beyond collective defence and the commitment to defend each other against attacks, NATO provides the only forum where North Americans and Europeans can discuss and consult on the whole range of issues of
common interest and relevance for their security on a daily, permanent basis. This is the essence of article 4 of the Washington Treaty.

Article 4 of the Washington Treaty: NATO as a unique transatlantic forum for consultation on security issues

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Indeed, representatives of the 28 Allies consult regularly at all levels – from daily meetings of rank-and-file diplomats to weekly meetings of Ambassadors to biannual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defence to Summit meetings of Heads of State and Government – on all aspects of transatlantic security. These meetings allow them to share their concerns with each other and forge common positions.

If NATO continues to be an unmatched, strong and credible political and defence alliance it is first and foremost thanks to the unique ties that bind Europe and North America together.

B. The ties that bind: common values and economic interdependence

NATO’s founding document makes it very clear that NATO is first and foremost an alliance based on common values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Perhaps more surprisingly, in its Article 2, it also includes a call for closer economic cooperation among Allies. Article 2 in fact acts as a reminder that the commitment by the United States and Canada to Europe’s security was only one – albeit vitally important – aspect of the transatlantic link. Equally important were economic ties and vital economic assistance provided by the United States to Europe, particularly through the “Marshall Plan” which played a key role in Europe’s post-War economic recovery and laid one the first bases for economic
Values and economic cooperation in the Washington Treaty

The NATO Treaty – often referred to as the Washington Treaty – is perhaps best known for Article 5, the commitment to mutual defence. However, the Preamble to the Treaty and Article 2 are also crucial in defining the Alliance because these make it clear that the Alliance is united by a commitment to democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The signatories commit themselves to defending and promoting those principles, promoting cooperation among the allies, including in the economic sphere.

Article 2 – sometimes known as the Canadian Article, championed as it was by Canada – is doubly interesting because it shows not what the Alliance is against, but what it is for.

Preamble
“The Parties to this Treaty (...) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area”

Article 2
“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

Thus, NATO was meant as much more than a partnership of convenience for the defence of Europe and North America against the Soviet threat. Rather, the Alliance was both the expression of, and the ultimate guarantor for, a community of nations bound together by a shared history and unmatched political, economic, social, cultural and human ties. In the words of United States President Harry Truman, at the signing ceremony of the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949:

“The nations represented here are bound together by ties of long standing. We are joined by a common heritage of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. These are the ties of a peaceful way of life. In this pact we are merely giving them formal recognition.”
This explains why the Alliance’s fate was not bound to the specific security environment in which it was born. The end of the Cold War did not take away NATO’s rationale as a defensive alliance of like-minded liberal democracies.

The strength and vitality of the transatlantic bond today is particularly striking when considering the economic interdependence between both shores of the Atlantic. The simple fact is that transatlantic trade and investment is vital for both North America and Europe.

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### The transatlantic economy in figures

**50%**: Taken together, the United States and Europe’s economies represent about 50% of world gross domestic product (GDP)

**1/3**: the United States and Europe’s economies account for nearly a third of world trade flows.

**1/3**: the European Commission estimates that a third of the trade across the Atlantic consists of intra-company transfers. Economic interdependence is thus also reflected in the integration of European and American businesses and workforce. In addition, most foreigners working for American companies outside the United States are Europeans, and most foreigners working for European companies outside the EU are American.¹

**$125 billion**: The United States invests more in Europe than anywhere else in the world and the reverse is also true. Thus, in 2011, Europe invested around $125 billion in the United States – roughly 8 times more than in China.

**$220 billion**: The same year, the United States invested over $220 billion in Europe, while in effect disinvesting in China.²

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### C. The NATO machinery: the Alliance’s permanent political and military command structure at the service of its members

Last but not least, NATO’s strength lies in the permanent political and military command structure put in place to carry out the priorities and tasks which the 28 Allies define for the organisation. For the past 65 years, this structure has allowed the diplomats and armed forces of the Alliance to work alongside each other, and develop common concepts, policies, practices and standards.

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² Ibid.
Indeed, civilian and military officials of the 28 member states of NATO represent their governments on a daily basis at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and throughout NATO’s military command. Their mission is to develop common policies on the key issues affecting the security of Alliance citizens; to anticipate crises; and to prepare to respond to those crises if necessary. They are assisted in this by an international civilian staff headed by the Secretary General and by a standing military command structure.

The schematic below shows NATO’s civilian and military decision-making bodies and how they fit together.

**NATO’s permanent political and military command structure**

![NATO's command structure diagram]

It is important to stress that NATO does not have standing armed forces. It does however have a permanent planning and command capability of some 8,800 personnel – military and civilian – assigned by nations: what is referred to as NATO’s integrated military command structure. This standing command structure ensures that NATO’s civilian authorities – the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary General – have the information they need to be able to anticipate crises, and have the plans in place to respond immediately should a crisis require a military response. This permanent planning and command capability is undoubtedly one of NATO’s greatest strengths, particularly in comparison with other international organisations or coalitions of the willing. Indeed, neither the European Union nor the United Nations have anything similar.

In the event that Allies decide to act militarily, NATO will draw its forces from the militaries of the 28 members. Again, NATO does not have a permanent army. Each of its members determines which elements of their national armed forces they will make available to NATO should the need arise. The armed forces of the 28 have trained together for the past 65 years and been deployed together in
NATO operations. They also have common standards, procedures, and – although there is always room for improvement – equipment which is as compatible as possible with that of other allies. It is this “habit” and practice of working together – what the military calls interoperability – that makes NATO’s forces uniquely reactive, flexible and effective. It is also what makes NATO uniquely effective.

D. NATO in operations: the Alliance’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic and international peace and security

NATO’s unmatched military effectiveness has made it indispensable for its members, and a highly-valued instrument at the service of the international community. With only one exception – Kosovo, NATO has always used military force on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations. The Washington Treaty in fact affirms the Allies’ commitment to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” as well as “the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”.

Generally speaking, nations studiously avoid interference abroad and they are especially reluctant to intervene militarily. Nevertheless, there have been occasions when intervention has been judged necessary in order to prevent widespread loss of life.

The chronology below, which lists some of the Alliance’s most significant operations, illustrates the variety of missions which NATO has been called upon to perform. The following box addresses some of the common misconceptions about NATO and NATO operations.

24 years of NATO operations and missions 1990-2014: key milestones

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**: summer 1992 – December 2004
1992: Enforcement of the UN-mandate arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea and no-fly-zone

**Kosovo**: March 1999-present
March-June 1999: Operation Allied Force: end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian crisis;
June 1999-present: Kosovo Force (KFOR): UN mandate; maintain a safe and secure environment and help create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force
**Counter-terrorism**: October 2001-present
mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002: Operation Eagle Assist: air patrols over the United States following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
October 2001-present: Operation Active Endeavour: monitoring of maritime traffic in the Mediterranean to detect and deter terrorist activity. **NATO’s only current Article 5 operation.**

![Image](image1.jpg)

Italy (NATO PA, 2008)

**Afghanistan**: August 2003-present
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): **NATO’s largest ever operation**; UN mandate; prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists; extend the authority of the Afghan central government in order to create an environment conducive to the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law.

![Image](image2.jpg)

Afghanistan (NATO PA / House of Commons, 2012)

**Pakistan earthquake relief assistance**: October 2005-February 2006
**NATO’s largest humanitarian relief mission**. It is – regrettably – a little known fact that NATO regularly helps coordinate its members’ assistance to countries – members or non-members – stricken by natural disasters. Another significant example is NATO’s assistance to the United States in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in September 2005.
Support to the African Union: 2005-present
Logistical support for the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS)
Expert and training support for the establishment of an African Standby Force
Airlift support for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa: October 2008-present
Operation Allied Provider / Operation Allied Protector / Operation Ocean Shield: surveillance and protection of maritime shipping in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

Libya: March - October 2011
Operation Unified Protector: enforcement of the UN-mandated no-fly-zone and arms embargo, and protection of Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas against attack.

Support to Turkey: December 2012-present
Deployment of 6 Patriot missile batteries to augment Turkey's capabilities to protect its population and territory in the context of instability on its border with Syria.

Some common misconceptions about NATO

1. **NATO is just a military organisation**
   False: NATO is a political-military alliance. Decisions at NATO are made by civilians, representatives of the member states of NATO, and a lot of what NATO does is political and diplomatic. The military is there to advise civilian authorities and implement political decisions which have military implications.

2. **NATO was most active militarily during the Cold War**
   False: no bullet was fired in anger by NATO during the Cold War; NATO’s main focus was on deterrence and defence planning.
II. WHAT EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA GET FROM EACH OTHER: BURDEN-SHARING PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE

Discussions about transatlantic burden-sharing in defence have been back in the headlines recently, but the issue is in fact as old as the Alliance itself. The creation of NATO in 1949 was premised on a quid pro quo: after the end of World War II, the United States committed to the continued defence of the European continent on the understanding and with the expectation that Europeans would build up their own defences. This was in fact one of the clear conditions put by the United States Congress for supporting the Washington Treaty – NATO’s founding document.

While, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Europeans took giant leaps to rebuild their economies, develop an unprecedented framework structure for political and economic cooperation – the European Union –, and restore their defences, frustrations with a perceived imbalance in the respective contributions of Europeans and North Americans to NATO re-emerged regularly throughout the Cold War.

The experience from NATO’s recent operations – particularly in Afghanistan – and the impact of the economic and financial crisis have brought the issue of burden-sharing back to NATO’s table. Former

**Burden-sharing in the Alliance: a long-standing debate in the United States**

Below are three historic illustrations of the discussion in the United States on burden-sharing in NATO.

**1948: the Vandenberg resolution**

In introducing his landmark resolution, which sanctioned the signing by the United States government of collective defence arrangements and thus made possible the creation of NATO, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan explicitly rejected the notion of a “unilateral responsibility for the fate of western Europe”; the goal of these arrangements should be “to help others to help themselves”. He saw the United States’ cooperation as “a supplement and not a substitute for the adequate and continuous defensive activities of others”; “self-help and mutual aid [were] prerequisites”, he insisted.

**1988: the special task force on burden-sharing**

In 1988, then US Deputy Secretary of Defence, William H. Taft IV was tasked by then US President Ronald Reagan in response to strong pressure from the US Congress to encourage Europeans to step up their investment in defence. In a September 1988 speech, Mr Taft noted that: “Never in a democracy is it easy to maintain support for defenses built in the hope that, should all go well, they will never be used. For those nations willing to make the politically difficult choice to fund adequate defenses, however, it is hard to avoid thinking that alliance partners who do less have made the choice to let others carry their burden for them. And it is the corrosive effect of this kind of comparison that, over time, saps the confidence in common effort that is the foundation on which every alliance rests”.

**2011: speech by former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in Brussels**

In a speech in Brussels in June 2011, then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned Europeans about the reality and risks of a “two-tiered alliance” and “the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance”. Europeans needed to be aware of the “dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense”.
“Future U.S. political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for [him] – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost”, Mr Gates concluded.

The real wake-up call for Europeans, however, came with the US Defence Strategic Guidance presented in January 2012. One of the key elements in this review of US strategic interests was the call for a geostrategic rebalancing of US defence priorities towards Asia – what became known as the US “pivot to Asia”.

Many in Europe misunderstood this new policy. They saw in the pivot to Asia a signal that the United States was abandoning Europe and the Atlantic region for new alliances and priorities in Asia and the Pacific. In reality, the US “pivot” or “rebalancing” is a simple statement of fact, which comes also with an invitation. The new Defence Strategic Guidance is indeed based on the premise that security challenges lie no longer only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. To deal with these challenges, the United States will continue to rely on its traditional allies, first amongst them Canada and Europe. The Strategic Guidance is therefore not a snub but an invitation to NATO Allies to “rebalance” their strategic priorities alongside the United States to deal with a shifting security landscape.

The crisis in Ukraine has led many to challenge the rationale for the “rebalancing” to Asia. Yet, many of the security threats which Europe and North America face today – terrorism, piracy, cyber-threats, organised crime – are not regionally bound; they are global, and require a global response. This comes at a cost, which Europeans as well must show they are prepared to pay, even if, unlike the United States, they do not have the capacity or ambition to maintain a global security presence.

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At the same time, Americans must recognise what Europeans already bring to the table and the value of a unique transatlantic alliance that has proved its worth for the past 65 years. What Europeans and North Americans need today therefore is a renewed *quid pro quo*, a healthy debate and a new agreement about burden-sharing in an unpredictable and challenging security environment. And NATO should be at the heart of this debate.

Indeed, the Alliance is a unique and efficient political and military tool at the service of its members. And it serves Europe and North America equally well even if in different ways.

**A. What’s in it for North America?**

It is quite easy to see how the transatlantic Alliance has benefited Europe, but the benefits to the United States and Canada are no less real although they might seem less obvious.

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<th>What’s in it for North America?</th>
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<td>➢ Preventing conflict in Europe</td>
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<td>➢ Creating a shared area for stability and prosperity</td>
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<td>➢ 911: transatlantic solidarity in the fight against international terrorism</td>
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<td>➢ Afghanistan: a significant European contribution</td>
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<td>➢ Europeans increasingly taking the lead in their neighbourhood</td>
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<td>➢ A mutually beneficial sharing of the global burden</td>
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**Preventing conflict in Europe**

The First and Second World Wars showed that in the modern, industrial world, regional conflicts can spread and escalate to embroil nations far from the conflict’s origins. Consequently, one of the key concepts underpinning the Alliance was to prevent another European war which sooner or later would be likely to lead to the engagement of the United States and Canada. In a very real sense, therefore, preventing conflict in Europe provides a direct security benefit to North America and Europe alike.

The crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated that, in the face of serious instability on Europe’s borders, NATO provides a pillar of stability and a powerful deterrent against intimidation, destabilisation or attack.

**Creating a shared area for stability and prosperity**

At a more basic level, there are also very sound economic reasons why North America has an interest in European stability. The transatlantic economies are so deeply interdependent that it is clearly in the interests of all our countries to maintain stability in that relationship, and each country has a genuine stake in the others’ prosperity.
911: transatlantic solidarity in the fight against international terrorism

Alliance solidarity was demonstrated unambiguously in the immediate aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. These attacks - which rapidly became referred to as “911” – shocked and appalled the civilized world. Within 24 hours, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. Against all expectations of the preceding 50 years, Article 5 was being invoked not due to an attack against a European ally, but against the United States.

Subsequently, NATO agreed on a package of measures to provide support to the United States. The most visible of these was operation “Eagle Assist”, the sending of seven NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to help patrol the skies over the United States. Shortly afterwards, NATO commenced operation “Active Endeavour” to patrol the eastern Mediterranean to detect and deter terrorist activity, an operation later expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean.

Afghanistan: a significant European contribution

NATO as an organization was not involved in the United States-led coalition which in October 2001 commenced operations to destroy terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and ensure that the country could no longer be a haven for international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. However, the military effectiveness of that coalition benefited enormously because of their NATO preparation, training, and standards and indeed experience alongside each other in earlier operations.

In December 2001, the United Nations mandated an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to create a secure environment around Kabul and support reconstruction in Afghanistan. NATO took over the leadership of ISAF in 2003 and – as mandated by the United Nations – expanded ISAF’s scope to the whole of Afghanistan.

Much has been and will be written about NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, and the issue of burden sharing will certainly feature prominently. While there can be no doubt that the United States has contributed disproportionately, the contributions of NATO’s European Allies and Canada have
nevertheless been highly significant, with over 38,000 troops deployed at the peak of the ISAF “surge” in June 2011. This represented 30% of all troops deployed in Afghanistan at that period, and 90% of non-US troops.

National troop contributions to ISAF – June 2011 – by country

<table>
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<th>Non-US troops (total)</th>
<th>42,381</th>
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<td>Of these:</td>
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<td>NATO Allies (Europe and Canada)</td>
<td>38,061 (90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies and other EU non-NATO members</td>
<td>38,727 (91.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>2,198 (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,456 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO
Europeans increasingly taking the lead in their neighbourhood

Europeans are also increasingly taking the lead in addressing crises in their neighbourhood. This was the case in Libya in 2011 when the United Nations authorized NATO to launch operation “Unified Protector” to enforce an arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and protect Libyan civilians. Most of naval vessels enforcing the arms embargo were European and Canadian, and the vast majority of the strike sorties were conducted by the aircraft of European nations.

Within Europe, KFOR, the NATO-led peace support operation in Kosovo, provides another clear example of European allies taking the lead in NATO-led operations. They currently provide 85% of the 5,000 troops deployed as part of KFOR.

Further afield, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield is part of a broader international effort directed against piracy around the Horn of Africa. That overall effort also includes the European Union’s Operation Atalanta as well as contributions from nations such as China and Japan. Thus, European nations are making a significant contribution to a military effort which in view of the critical nature of shipping in the region, benefits the entire international community.

In sum, it is no secret that the European allies lack certain critical capabilities which currently can only be provided by the United States. Nevertheless, several past and present operations show that Europe can credibly take the lead in NATO operations in and around the European theatre. These come in addition to the increasing number of civilian and military missions deployed by the European Union around the world, including a number of robust operations in Africa.

Europe’s aspiration to lead in its neighbourhood is long overdue and dovetails well with the concerns often expressed by the United States about the European Allies not pulling their weight.
A mutually beneficial sharing of the global burden

The geo-strategic landscape has evolved enormously in the quarter century following the end of the Cold War. New economic powers are emerging all over the world, as are new possible sources of tension. Asia is a case in point. The United States and Canada are Pacific as well as Atlantic powers, and have a variety of security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. In an era of scarce resources and globalization, it is understandable that the United States would want to maintain its capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, while relying more on European allies to deal with security challenges in their neighbourhood.

That does not mean that the United States should withdraw all its military assets from Europe. The crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of a visible presence for effective deterrence. In addition, the United States’ own security interests are well-served by having forces stationed in Europe so that they can support operations from European locations, be they NATO operations or those of any future ad hoc coalitions. Furthermore, their presence in Europe facilitates training, preparation, and exercises, as well as the conduct of operations. And in an uncertain and even dangerous world, there is every reason to believe that North American and European forces will continue to find themselves side-by-side in peacekeeping, peace support, humanitarian, or combat missions.

The United States will continue to turn to Europe first when it looks for allies if only because there is no comparable alliance or collective security architecture in Asia. Europeans may not be the perfect allies, but they are the best the United States has by far.

B. What’s in it for Europe?

The benefits to Europe from NATO and North America’s contribution to NATO are incalculable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What’s in it for Europe?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ From forty years of Cold War to a Europe whole and free</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ The United States’ nuclear umbrella: the ultimate guarantee of Europe’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ North America’s expertise and capabilities contributing to Europe’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ NATO and the European Union: from competition to complementarity</td>
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</table>

From forty years of Cold War to a Europe whole and free: the United States and Canada’s historical contribution

The transatlantic commitment to European security enshrined in NATO’s Founding Treaty in 1949 was made explicit by the stationing of American and Canadian forces in Europe. In military terms, this was necessary because of the sheer impracticality of transporting sufficient forces rapidly across the Atlantic to counter any moves by the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the presence of these forces in Europe
was a material manifestation of Article 5 in that an attack on Europe would inevitably engage the armed forces of the whole Alliance.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, North America provided the guarantee of security which enabled the European allies to focus on economic reconstruction while also shielding them from the Soviet Union’s efforts to intimidate them. The European allies alone would have been economically crippled had they sought to assemble and maintain the forces needed to defend against and deter the military might of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. However, the United States commitment to NATO meant that the military assets – both conventional and nuclear - of a superpower would be engaged in the collective defence of Europe.

Throughout the Cold War, therefore, a key element in NATO’s political and military thinking was to ensure that there could be no doubt about the transatlantic security link, and North America’s commitment to the protection of Europe. The strength of this commitment and the Allies’ political, economic and military might and determination eventually brought the end of the Cold War.

It is no exaggeration to say that NATO was responsible for ushering in an unprecedented era of peace in Europe. Even though that peace was interrupted by dreadful conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the effects were localized compared with the conflicts which had bedevilled Europe for centuries. And again, North America demonstrated its continued commitment to European security by helping bring to an end the bloody conflicts triggered the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to Kosovo.

![Signing of the Dayton Peace Accords putting an end to the war in ex-Yugoslavia](image)

Russia’s new policy of intervention in Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union, its blatant violation of the rules underlying the post-Cold War international system, are now threatening to undermine the achievements of the past 25 years since the fall of the Berlin wall. Faced with this challenge, Europe and North America have responded in concert. The United States, through active diplomatic efforts and the concrete and immediate military reassurance provided to Allied countries in

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4 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Eastern Europe, has provided the clearest demonstration that it intends to continue to play its full part as guarantor of Europe’s security.

The United States’ nuclear umbrella: the ultimate guarantee of Europe’s security

During the Cold War as now, the United States nuclear arsenal provides the ultimate security guarantee for Europe. Even though the United Kingdom and France developed independent nuclear weapons capabilities which would inevitably cause a potential aggressor pause for thought, their capabilities cannot compare with those of the United States. While NATO and the United States have engaged in a process of reduction of their nuclear arsenals, they have also made clear that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the ultimate guarantee Allies’ nuclear arsenals provide either individually or collectively will remain.

North America’s expertise and capabilities contributing to Europe’s security

Similarly, in conventional weapons, no European country, on its own, can compete with the sheer size and strength of the United States’ military spending or military-industrial capacity. Even when pooled together, Europe’s defence budgets are less than 40% of the US figure. In addition, the “output” from Europe’s defence spending – the capability this buys – is proportionally even smaller because of the inevitable duplication among the independent militaries of NATO’s European members. European armies also lag behind the United States in terms of the share of their forces which can be deployed to theatres on short notice.

![Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, United States (NATO PA, 2013)](image)

The United States security apparatus vs the rest of the world

- **Armed forces of the United States vs Europe and Canada in 2012**
  - US: 1.5 million personnel
  - Europe + Canada: 2 million

- **Defence spending the United States vs Europe and Canada in 2013**
  - The United States’ defence spending represents 73% of defence spending in NATO; Europe and Canada account for 27%. 
The gap between Europe and North America is even more acute when looking at capabilities, particularly high-end deployable assets, as highlighted in the following chapter.

Consequently, the United States has contributed either the majority or a significant share of the troops, as well as indispensable assets, in NATO’s past and current operations. Even certain non-NATO operations, such as France’s intervention in Mali in 2013, have relied on key US assets.

Missile defence is another clear example of the United States’ contribution to European security. In 2010, NATO Allies agreed to develop a capability to protect the entire territory of the Alliance against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles, including from states suspected of also developing a nuclear capability. The NATO Ballistic Missile Defence system would include a network of radars and sea- and ground-based interceptors across the territory of the Alliance. While formally developed in the framework of NATO, however, the system will largely rely on US capabilities and financing. Many therefore see in missile defence a visible and significant demonstration of the United States’ ongoing commitment to Article 5 and the protection of Europe against emerging and future threats.

The United States’ contribution to Europe’s security is about a lot more than military hardware, however. Through NATO, Europeans also benefit from Washington’s unmatched diplomatic, military and economic weight, its political and military expertise, and its unrivalled intelligence capability, etc.

**NATO and the European Union: from competition to complementarity**

Some have argued however that the United States’ overwhelming weight within the Alliance has had the unintended consequence of slowing down the development of a strong and autonomous European defence capability. Mutual suspicions have surfaced regularly ever since Europeans first initiated efforts to build a distinct European framework for defence cooperation in the 1950s, with Europeans suspecting Washington of undermining their efforts in order to preserve the United States’ dominant position within NATO, and Americans suspecting Europeans of wanting to build European defence as an alternative, rather than a complement, to NATO.

These sterile debates are now largely closed. Washington has made clear its support for the development of a strong European defence as a way to address imbalances between North America and Europe in the sharing of the global burden. And Europeans have made clear that the European Union’s defence pillar cannot be an alternative to NATO, and that it must be more robust than it has been.
In fact, both organisations are increasingly used as complementary tools in response to crises. In the Western Balkans, in the early 2000s, the European Union has progressively taken over the lead for security from NATO, first in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, NATO and the EU are present alongside each other with complementary mandates. Off the Horn of Africa, NATO and the EU again work hand-in-hand in combating maritime piracy.

On the African continent, the European Union is increasingly taking the lead with capacity-building missions, as well as more complex and robust military engagements.

Undoubtedly however, European defence benefits greatly from the experience gained by Europeans in NATO. Twenty-two members of the European Union are also members of NATO and five out of the six others (Cyprus is the exception) are close partners of NATO. Members of both NATO and the EU only have one single set of armed forces, which they assign to one or the other organisation depending on circumstances. This means that the experience these troops gain in NATO operations, the common standards they implement, the interoperability between them, also benefit the EU, and the reverse is obviously true as well.
NATO-EU cooperation could be developed even further if the last political obstacles could be lifted. However, the key to these obstacles today are not in Washington, but rather in Ankara, Brussels and Nicosia. Only a breakthrough in resolving the Cyprus dispute and in Turkey’s relations with the EU could bring the current unfortunate and costly status quo to an end. NATO and the EU only have one single set of armed forces, and they also have only one set of taxpayers, who should not be asked to pay for the consequences of this political deadlock.

III. A STRONG TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Recognising what Allies on both sides of the Atlantic gain from each other and from the Alliance does not mean being complacent and eluding problems and shortcomings. There are genuine and well-founded concerns today about the Alliance’s ability to continue to act as an effective guarantor of Allies’ security in the future. The crisis in Ukraine has made addressing these issues even more urgent and important. The Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government in the United Kingdom in September 2014 provides an important opportunity to demonstrate the Allies’ resolve to do so.

For this, NATO governments and parliaments must:

   a) Reaffirm their commitment to a strong Alliance;
   b) Maintain and develop the Alliance’s capabilities by getting better value from the resources we spend and doing more jointly;
   c) Reverse the current downward trend in defence spending and address current imbalances in the respective contributions of Allies to our common defence;
   d) Continue to develop NATO’s network of partners, and integrate those nations that aspire and are ready to join the Alliance.

A. A renewed commitment to a strong Alliance post 2014

In November 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted a roadmap for the adaptation of the Alliance for the 21st century. This document, the new Strategic Concept, was the product of an unprecedented process of wide-ranging consultations, including not only Allied governments, but also representatives of non-member governments, parliamentarians, independent experts, etc. It laid out three main core tasks for the Alliance:
   - Collective defence, i.e. protecting allied territory and populations against attacks;
   - Crisis management, i.e. contributing to the international community’s response to crises with a potential impact on transatlantic security;
   - Cooperative security, i.e. working closely with partner countries and organisations to address common security challenges.
The new Strategic Concept also recognised that today’s security environment includes not just traditional military threats, but also new types of challenges, some of which NATO might help address: terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptions to the free flow of energy supplies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as security issues such as conflict for resources stemming from climate change.

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept

Preamble:
“We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners”

“The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.”

Before the crisis in Ukraine, the main test for the vision laid out in the Strategic Concept was going to come with the planned end of NATO’s active combat operation in Afghanistan on 31 December 2014, after 11 years of a large and complex engagement.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the unfolding crisis in Ukraine add a new layer of complexity. The Strategic Concept did not anticipate such a dramatic development. This crisis has put renewed emphasis on NATO’s role of collective defence, while putting to the test the vision of a strategic partnership with Russia. The balance between the three pillars of the 2010 Strategic Concept – the respective emphasis put on them by Allies – might need revisiting once the full implications of the
crisis in Ukraine become clearer. Partnerships will certainly need to be redefined in the light of Russia’s actions.

One clear lesson of the crisis, however, is that, once again, in the face of a new and unexpected challenge, Allies have turned to NATO as an indispensable insurance policy and crisis response tool. To perform these roles effectively, the Alliance must be credible. Before the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, questions were raised ever more frequently about Allies’ commitment and ability to give NATO the resources it needed to implement the vision and tasks laid out in the Strategic Concept. Proving these concerns wrong and demonstrating resolve is even more important today. The twenty eight should therefore renew their commitment to the Alliance, and recommit to muster the resources it needs to provide a credible, strong defence.

B. Address capability shortfalls and future requirements jointly

First, the use of funds must be prioritised towards addressing capability shortfalls and future capability requirements. We must ensure we get the best value for the money our taxpayers put into NATO.

The current picture is indeed worrying, particularly for those capabilities which are critical to operations – the specialised assets which make possible the deployment and sustainment of our forces to often distant theatres of operations, as well as those which provide key “enabling” functions such as surveillance and reconnaissance. Europeans lag far behind the United States in all these critical capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some of Europe’s most critical capability shortfalls: assets owned by the United States as a share of total NATO assets (2012)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Precision guided munitions: 87.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) and Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drones: 87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Airborne early warning assets: 89.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Air to air refuelling assets: 89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Strategic airlift assets (in-service and ordered): 89% (2011 figures)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These shortfalls in European states’ arsenals became particularly evident during NATO’s European-led intervention in Libya. As a result, the United States had to provide most assets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and air to air refuelling, as well as fill the shortfall in precision guided munitions.

Europeans also lack critical strategic and tactical airlift capabilities, and have had to call on US assets to assist with transport of troops and materiel in Libya, as well as during the French-led operation in Mali in 2013 (an operation conducted outside the NATO framework).
All of these assets carry with them a high price tag, which most nations are unable to bear on their own. To address this problem, both NATO and the European Union are encouraging and facilitating the joint development, procurement, maintenance and operation of capabilities. NATO’s Smart Defence and the European Union’s Pooling & Sharing initiatives both aim to help nations identify key shortfalls and regroup into clusters to fill them jointly. As the table below shows, a lot has already been achieved.

**Selected NATO-led joint capability projects (source: NATO)**

**NATO Universal Armaments Interface.** This project will enable fighter jets to use munitions from various sources and nations. It will facilitate the flexible use of available munitions across the Alliance and promote multinational cooperation. The air operation over Libya has demonstrated the importance of such a project.

**Remotely controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs.** Based on experience gained in Afghanistan, the project will identify the best remotely controlled robots for route clearance operations. This equipment avoids exposing military personnel to explosive devices. The project will promote joint procurement of state-of-the-art equipment and facilitate multinational cooperation on deployment.

**Centres of Excellence as Hubs of Education and Training.** NATO nations maintain a number of multinational and national centres of excellence, many of which provide education and training for national and NATO purposes. With this project, specific centres of excellence will be given a lead role in education and training within their areas of expertise for the benefit of all nations with more efficient, effective and affordable training.

**Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development (MNCD2).** This project will facilitate the development of cyber defence capabilities within NATO nations to prepare for, prevent, detect, respond to and recover from attacks that could affect confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

**NATO’s Missile Defence capability.** At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government decided to develop Ballistic Missile Defence as a collective capability for the Alliance. Through multinational cooperation, Allies can achieve more and better protection from ballistic missiles than any one Ally could provide alone. The United States is providing the majority of assets at this stage. Several European Allies have agreed to host elements of the US system. European nations will also provide complementary assets such as Patriot missiles and radar-carrying ships. And NATO as a whole is providing the communication network and the missile defence command within its Air Command in Ramstein, Germany.

**NATO Air Policing.** Building on NATO’s experience including in the Baltic States, Allies will promote air policing on a regional basis. Cooperation in this area offers an example of Alliance solidarity through avoiding additional defence spending on
capabilities already adequately available in the Alliance. It allows economies of scale through the pooling and sharing of existing or future air assets.

This approach is of particular importance for Allies faced with the replacement of aging aircraft in the coming decade.

**The Strategic Airlift Capability.** This initiative has brought together 10 Allied and 2 partner nations (Sweden and Finland) in a consortium to procure and operate C-17 heavy transport aircraft. By doing this together, these nations have acquired an important capability that individual members of the consortium could not obtain individually.

This work must continue, and be taken to the next level by:

- Ensuring that the separate initiatives taken by groups of nations are coordinated so that they actually cover the needs and requirements identified by Allies collectively
- Promoting cooperation across the entire cycle of the development of a new capability: from research and technology/development, to procurement, operation, maintenance and training;
- Encouraging a consolidation of European defence industries to create a larger and rationalised market for defence equipment in Europe;
- Promoting greater transparency in the use of the funds spent on joint projects.

Last but not least, as we develop more joint capabilities, we must also preserve the interoperability that makes it possible for our soldiers to work seamlessly together in operations. With a decreasing number of troops deployed in operations, Allies have already agreed a stepped-up exercise schedule as part of what they called the Connected Forces Initiative. This should ensure that our soldiers have regular opportunities to train together and are prepared to respond to any crisis which might arise in the future. Exercises also provide a visible and valuable form of deterrence, a much needed investment in the light of recent events.

It would be wrong however to believe that doing more jointly will compensate for decreases in defence spending. The gains achieved so far amount at best to only one eighth of the value of the cuts in defence spending since the advent of the financial crisis.

**C. A commitment to reverse downward trends in defence spending and to a fairer sharing of the burden**

As the graphs below show, since 2007, defence spending has dropped in all but five NATO Allies, in some cases significantly, and only six Allies spend – or are very close to spending – 2% of their GDP on defence, the recommended NATO guideline. The same is true for spending on major equipment: six Allies are at or above the recommended NATO guideline of 20% of the defence budget invested in major equipment, while nine Allies actually spend less than 10%.

These uncoordinated cuts are weakening our ability to respond to current crises and to prepare for future ones.
Evolution of Allies’ defence spending and major equipment expenditures

Source: NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report 2013
Many NATO members have implemented painful reforms of their armed forces in the past few years to cut costs. Valuable lessons can be learned from these experiences as to how to move towards more cost-efficient militaries without undermining core functions and future capabilities.

The widest and most visible gap is obviously with the United States. But the graphs above also show a widening gap among Europeans. If these imbalances persist and become permanent features, they risk undermining the fundamental agreement at the heart of NATO: members of NATO benefit from the guarantee of collective defence because they also commit to contributing to collective defence. This is a two-way “deal”. In other words, NATO is about cooperative security, not outsourced security.

To address current imbalances, all NATO’s members must develop a plan to meet the spending targets to which they agreed. As called for by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, we must undertake to reverse the decline in defence spending as economic growth returns. If our defence is to continue to function as an effective insurance policy, it is no use pointing to the premiums paid in the past. They must continue to be paid now and in the future. This will also help us move towards a fairer sharing of the burden among Allies.

Without an adequate information campaign, our citizens will find this difficult to accept. This is why it is also essential to promote greater transparency in defence spending. Greater public scrutiny and parliamentary oversight will help drive efficiency.

D. Sustain cooperation with partners and keep the door open for new members

NATO’s partnerships: a mutually beneficial success story

It is not NATO’s mission or aspiration to deal with all threats no matter where they might be, but it has agreed that it must be able to defend against certain threats wherever they might arise. That capacity frequently gives rise to ill-informed accusations about NATO seeking to become some sort of “global policeman”, but nothing could be further from the truth. The NATO nations are not in the business of looking for new military engagements but are seeking to promote stability as effectively as possible, and that is usually best achieved through cooperation rather than confrontation.

The validity of this approach is underlined by NATO’s extensive network of partner countries and organisations.

Partnerships have been one of the undeniable successes of NATO’s transformation after the end of the Cold War. NATO has benefited from being able to engage partners in addressing global threats and challenges. And partners have benefited from NATO’s experience and expertise.

Allies can draw from a diverse set of partnership tools ranging from political dialogue to military-to-military cooperation to tailor their cooperation in each case. Indeed, in many ways, all of NATO’s 37 partners benefit from a personalised package of cooperation. The depth and breadth of cooperation depends both on Allies and partners’ interests.
One of the most visible aspects of cooperation is the remarkable contribution that partners have made to NATO operations. The operation in Afghanistan holds the record: some 22 non-NATO nations, from Columbia and El Salvador to Australia and South Korea, have contributed troops to the NATO-led ISAF.

To preserve this valuable legacy beyond the end of NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan, and continue to adapt to a changing security environment, Allies should:
- continue to seek more flexible ways to work with partners on the broadest possible range of issues of common interest; and
- develop ways to preserve military interoperability with partners for the future.

**Partnerships after the crisis in Ukraine**

The crisis in Ukraine calls for a reassessment of NATO’s partnership with Russia, however. Very early on after the fall of the Berlin wall, Allies sought to build bridges to their former adversary. The 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation aimed to mark “the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia” and the development of “a strong, stable and enduring partnership”.

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[Map of NATO partner countries (as of 2011)](https://www.nato.int)
Indeed, since then, NATO has developed a deep and far-reaching cooperation with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council, which brings together representatives of the 28 Allies and of Russia on an equal footing, provides a dedicated forum for extensive political dialogue and for practical cooperation on a broad range of issues of common interest from the fight against terrorism to counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, Afghanistan, etc.

Periodically, however, NATO-Russia relations have gone through difficult crises. Most recently, Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and its occupation of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, had led NATO to suspend high-level dialogue for close to a year.

Russia’s actions in Ukraine represent an even greater challenge today. This time, it is not “just” about occupying parts of a neighbour’s territory, but also annexing it in blatant violation of all international rules and principles. This is also not an isolated case anymore. A pattern is being established, and it has become clear that Russia’s objective is to create a buffer zone of satellite states, some through use of force, others through energy dependency or other economic pressures.

In this context, Allies must draw all the lessons from the crisis in Ukraine and revisit their partnership with Russia. While dialogue with Russia remains indispensable on a range of global security issues, business as usual has become unacceptable. There can be no talk of a genuine partnership with a government that has demonstrated complete disregard for the rules and principles which had been the foundation of NATO-Russia cooperation for the past 25 years.

At the same time, Allies should do their utmost to prevent any further Russian aggression. They should reaffirm their support for the territorial integrity and political independence of partners and the right of all nations to choose their security alliances and priorities freely.

Last but not least, NATO Allies and partners in Europe must reduce their dependency on Russian gas and oil by reducing energy consumption, generating more from renewable, nuclear and unconventional energy and importing more from Central Asia, the United States and Canada. Energy is the engine that feeds Russia’s military assertiveness, adventurism, and oppressive political system.

**Building synergies with other global and regional security organisations**

NATO is enhancing its coordination and cooperation with other international organisations, notably the United Nations, the European Union, and other regional organisations such as the African Union. Recent operations have indeed highlighted two important lessons. First lesson: the earlier and the more international stakeholders coordinate their actions, the more effective the international community’s
assistance in crisis situations will be. Second lesson: in the long-term, rather than call on the United Nations, the European Union or NATO to respond to crises around the world, it is in everyone’s interest to promote strong and effective regional mechanisms for crisis prevention and response.

NATO is working towards those two aims by enhancing its coordination with other international actors and empowering and supporting capacity building initiatives for other regional organisations, such as the African Union or the Arab League.

**NATO and partner organisations in Europe**
Past and future enlargements

Last but certainly not least, NATO enlargement is another success story, which must live on. The NATO Treaty only sets very general conditions for accepting new members:
   - first, any new member must be a European State; this means that NATO is geographically bound, and thus excludes candidates from other continents;
   - second, any new members must be in a position to contribute to transatlantic security and defence.

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” (...)

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Georgia have all made clear it is their priority to become a member of NATO, and all are at an advanced stage of preparation for membership. Until the election of Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency in 2010, Ukraine was also actively pursuing NATO membership. It is an obvious sign of the Alliance’s success and vitality that it continues to attract new potential members. Regrettably, NATO does not often get the credit it deserves for its role in integrating countries from the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Western Balkans. In reality, the process of NATO enlargement generally preceded EU enlargements, and the comprehensive reform of the armed forces and the defence sector required to become a NATO member provided invaluable lessons and experience for candidates to EU membership.

NATO enlargements

4 April 1949: signature of the North Atlantic Treaty by 12 founding members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.
NATO Allies have on several occasions reaffirmed their commitment to consider future enlargements. However, none of the current four candidates has been judged to currently fulfil the conditions set in Article 10. Indeed, there is no automatic right to enlargement. Fulfilling the conditions is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Ultimately, the decision to accept a new member is a political one.

Nevertheless, it is important that our commitment to integrate new members is seen to be firm and genuine. Candidates must be reassured regularly that progress will result in concrete steps to bring them closer to full membership. In the current context, as mentioned above, Allies should also reaffirm that all nations have the right to choose their security alliances freely, and that no third country has, or can have, a veto.

IV. TRUSTING THE PUBLIC: LISTENING TO CITIZENS AND GETTING THEM ON BOARD

While all the measures enumerated above are important, the Alliance will only be strong and effective if its citizens continue to support it and see concrete benefits from its actions. Getting citizens on board is therefore essential.

We cannot ignore the important change in public opinion in our countries. Our publics used to defer to political leaders in matters of defence and security. Today, they no longer trust their governments and parliaments to always make the right decisions, and increasingly demand a greater say in public affairs, including on issues of defence and security. We should listen, and we should do more to explain to them why NATO remains fundamental to our security on both sides of the Atlantic.

Making NATO more transparent

To do this, we need NATO to be even more open and transparent. This is the best way to explain the value of the Alliance to our citizens and to retain their confidence.

Our governments and the NATO Secretary General have taken a number of important steps towards greater transparency. For instance, for the past three years, the NATO Secretary General has published an annual report outlining the Alliance’s achievements and priorities for the forthcoming year. This is a
welcome initiative. These reports are available on NATO’s website for interested observers as well as for the general public.

The Secretary General’s monthly press conferences – broadcast on the NATO website – also provide regular updates on the organisation’s activities. The website itself is being constantly developed, along with other communication tools such as the dedicated online NATO TV and a strong presence on social media. The first ten years of NATO’s archives have also just been declassified and are available on the NATO website.

All these initiatives contribute to greater transparency of NATO’s policies and decision-making. Just as important, NATO is moving towards greater financial transparency. Following a review of NATO’s audit procedures, in June 2013, Allies decided to publish all audits of NATO institutions except when there is a compelling security reason not to. This again should be welcomed. Our citizens need to know that the money we put into NATO is well spent. This will help increase confidence and trust in the organisation.

**Demonstrating the concrete benefits of NATO for our citizens**

We must also do better at demonstrating to our citizens the concrete benefits they get from NATO.

Some of these are tangible and yet often not very well known. Below are some examples of NATO’s little known achievements.

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### Some of NATO’s little known achievements

#### Preventing other terrorist attacks

At the end of the 1990s, Al Qaeda had established a sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which it planned and launched the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. The main and compelling reason for the United States and later NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan was therefore to deny Al Qaeda its safe haven in Afghanistan, and degrade its capabilities in order to prevent future attacks. No terrorist attack has since been conducted against Europe or North America from Afghanistan. This in itself is a success, and this is why NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan was so important. Terrorist networks are increasingly
complex and decentralised however. So our efforts and cooperation must continue. NATO provides a valuable framework for intelligence cooperation, for sharing best practices in the fight against terrorism, for developing counterterrorism capabilities (e.g. detection of roadside bombs, protection against biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear terrorism), etc. Since 2001, its counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean – Active Endeavour – has also helped deter terrorist activities. All these efforts are aimed to make our societies safer.

**Counter-piracy: bringing down the cost for the shipping industry**

NATO’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden – along with that of the European Union and other navies – has helped bring down the cost incurred by the shipping industry from pirate attacks. Thus, the organisation Oceans Beyond Piracy estimates that ransom payments dropped by 80% between 2011 and 2012; fuel costs connected with higher speed in dangerous waters by 43%; and insurance premiums by 13%. Most importantly, the number of pirate attacks is today at its lowest level in 7 years.

**The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre (EADRCC): NATO’s contribution disaster response**

The mission of NATO’s EADRCC is to coordinate Allies’ assistance to countries stricken by natural or man-made disasters: forest fires, snow storms, earthquakes and tsunamis, humanitarian disasters, etc. In the past 10 years since its creation, the EADRCC has coordinated Allies’ response to over 40 emergencies, including hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 or the devastating earthquake in Pakistan the same year.

**NATO’s Building Integrity Initiative: helping Allies combat corruption in the defence sector**

NATO’s Building Integrity Programme seeks to raise awareness, promote good practice and provide practical tools to help nations reduce the risk of corruption and strengthen transparency and accountability in the defence and security sector.
But the main benefits gained from NATO are more difficult to measure because they are less tangible. As mentioned above, NATO acts first and foremost as an insurance policy. As for any insurance policy, the subscriber tends to focus on the cost of premiums rather than the potential benefits of the policy should a major incident occur. The same is true for NATO.

Opinion polls show that many citizens across the Alliance take peace for granted. They feel safe and secure, and therefore find it difficult to understand why we should continue to invest in defence. Indeed it is one of NATO’s major successes that Europe has been free and at peace for the past 65 years.

But history teaches us that we should never take peace for granted. And indeed, our world remains a very dangerous place. This is why we must continue to explain, day after day, to our citizens and in particular to our young people, what NATO is, and why it remains essential for our security.

The role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

For the past 60 years, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has been an essential link between the Alliance’s citizens and NATO, and a steadfast advocate and instrument for greater NATO transparency.

Who are the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly?

The NATO PA brings together 257 members of parliament from the 28 member states of NATO, as well as some 100 parliamentarians from some 30 partner countries. Its members are national parliamentarians who are designated by their respective parliaments to represent them in the NATO PA. Many are members of the foreign affairs or defence committees in their parliaments, but this is not a requirement.

The size of each delegation varies roughly according to population, from 3 members for the smaller countries to 36 for the United States. Each delegation includes representatives from both majority and opposition.
The Assembly's primary objective is to provide a unique specialised forum for members of parliament from across the Alliance to discuss and influence decisions on Alliance security. Parliamentarians meet at regular intervals throughout the year in large sessions, seminars or smaller fact-findings to discuss and exchange views on the key issues on NATO's agenda. Through meetings with NATO officials, representatives of Allied governments or independent experts, and their exchanges with their counterparts in other national parliaments, they are better informed about NATO's policies, and thus better able to oversee their respective governments' decisions in matters of defence and security. Crucially, they are able to raise their citizens' concerns directly with NATO's top officials, thus providing a direct link between their constituents and NATO's decision-makers.

The role of parliaments in defence

While constitutional arrangements vary from country to country, parliaments traditionally provide oversight of defence budgets and of the armed forces, and authorize expenditure and deployments abroad. As representatives of the people, parliamentarians also play a key role in building consensus, and generating and sustaining public support for decisions affecting national defence.

In an increasingly unpredictable and complex security environment, this task becomes more challenging but also more important. In times of economic and budgetary constraints, parliaments are also increasingly called upon to make difficult choices about the allocation of public funds, and explain them to citizens.

The NATO PA is institutionally separate from NATO. Unlike the European Parliament, it has no formal decision-making authority. Its resolutions are not binding on governments or on NATO. However, they represent the collective opinion of a representative cross-section of parliamentarians from the 28 member states of NATO, a voice that Allied governments would find hard to ignore.
Members of the NATO PA are able to influence decisions on NATO policy both directly – through their regular dialogue with NATO’s leadership – or indirectly – through their oversight of national governments.

**How the NATO PA can influence NATO policy**

**Direct influence**

Members of the NATO PA meet the NATO Secretary General at least three times a year for an extended questions and answers session, in which parliamentarians are able to raise their priorities and concerns directly with him. They also meet in a joint session with NATO’s decision-making body – the North Atlantic Council – once a year. In turn, the NATO PA President is invited to present the Assembly’s views at NATO Summits of Heads of State and Government.

In addition, the Assembly’s resolutions are circulated to all members of the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General provides written replies to each of these resolutions.

What is a concrete example? The *publication of NATO audits*

The Assembly strongly and vocally supported the review of NATO audit procedures conducted in 2012-2013 and the objective of greater financial transparency. On every occasion, it raised with NATO’s highest officials the need to move towards the publication of NATO audit reports. This is now official NATO policy.
Indirect influence

Decisions at NATO are made by representatives of the nations. Through its work and activities, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly better equips legislators for national debates on issues relevant to NATO, thereby helping strengthen the capacity of parliaments to influence governments’ policies on NATO.

What is a concrete example? National caveats in Afghanistan

When a government decides to send troops to a multinational operation, it can set conditions for the use of these troops (conditions which are referred to as "national caveats"). These can include restrictions on the geographic area of deployment, on the type of missions in which these troops can be used, etc. National caveats became a serious challenge for ISAF commanders in 2005-2008. With some 50 nations involved in ISAF, commanders found it increasingly hard to manage an operation in which almost each contingent came with different caveats. As some of these caveats were imposed by national parliaments, discussions within the NATO PA helped raise awareness of the problem and ultimately reduce the number of national caveats.

Crucially, through its work, the NATO PA contributes to the transparency of NATO policies for the benefit of its citizens. Every year, the Assembly adopts sixteen reports and five to eight resolutions. Assembly reports are detailed studies on all key issues on the Alliance’s agenda. They are available for the general public through the NATO PA website. Similarly, the summaries of each and every Assembly meeting are also made public through the website.

National delegations to the NATO PA regularly report back to their parliaments on their activities in the NATO PA. They also conduct public outreach events to inform their constituents about their activities and findings.

The vitality of this three-way dialogue between the Alliance’s governments, parliaments and citizens is what will help maintain public support for defence and for NATO. The NATO PA is determined to play its part. As it has done for the past 60 years, it will continue to provide a unique link between the Alliance’s citizens and NATO decision-makers.