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Joint Visit to Moldova Brings NATO Legislators Face-to-Face with the Significant Challenges Confronting the Eastern Flank Partner

08 April 2025

For years Moldova has stood at the fault line in Europe’s standoff with Russia. The country’s complicated recent history includes long periods of Russian occupation, and its post-USSR collapse and independence declaration was marred by civil conflict, which resulted in the small strip of the country east of the Dniester River declaring a breakaway Transnistrian proto state, with a contingent of Russian forces remaining in place until today. The security of Moldova has been challenged ever since with a push and pull of public opinion oscillating between East and West, and the majority preferring to find stability under a declaration of neutrality.

Still, Moldovans have steadily been engaging in reforms based on a 2014 EU-Moldova Association Agreement and, after being granted EU candidate status in 2022, the possibility of future prosperity inside the EU common market looks like a closer-term reality. The results of the 2024 presidential elections and the referendum on enshrining EU accession in the Moldovan constitution were vital recent steps forward for Moldova’s European ambitions. The key test, however, lies in the upcoming 2025 parliamentary elections, where Moldova’s pro-European path could be consolidated.

To thwart these ambitions, Russia has been waging an intense hybrid war against Moldova since 2022. The lines of attack involve spreading disinformation, buying influence and votes, corruption, cyberattacks, acts of sabotage, and economic as well as energy blackmail. Russian hybrid attacks aim to sow discord in Moldovan society and scare people from supporting Moldova’s European ambitions. 

Despite their limited resources and institutional capacity, the Moldovan authorities are, however, pushing back on multiple fronts. In a bold political step forward, Moldova’s newly elaborated 2023 National Security Strategy goes so far as to define Russia as the nation’s principal threat – a statement unimaginable a decade ago. The intensity of the campaigns and the pressures from being a state bordering Ukraine drove NATO to work immediately to increase its assistance to the country via a tailored defence capacity building programme. 

Against this backdrop, on 24-25 March 2025, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly organised its first joint Committee visit to Moldova since 2015. In Chișinău, the delegation from the Assembly’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) and the Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTD) met with the members of the Committee on National Security of the Parliament of Moldova, the President of Moldova, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Reintegration as well as the Ministers of Energy and Defence.

Nicola Carè (Italy), Chairman of the DSCTC, led the delegation alongside Tamas Harangozo (Hungary), Chairman of the ESCTD. The delegation consisted of 28 MPs from 13 Allied countries.

Regional Security and Russia’s War against Ukraine

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to have a major destabilising effect on Moldova. Russian missiles and drones enter Moldova’s airspace regularly. The most recent incident being on 13 February 2025, when two Russian drones crashed on Moldovan territory. The event once again highlighted the risks posed to neighbouring countries amid Russian aggression in the region. 

Russia also maintains significant leverage over Moldova through the highly militarised breakaway region of Transnistria, where it keeps around 1,500 Russian troops. When added to Transnistria’s 5,000 standing forces, with nearly 15,000 in reserve forces, Russia undoubtedly holds the balance of military power in the country. Despite the long-standing stalemate over the region’s political future, Moldova maintains a ministry working to have policies for the eventual reintegration of Transnistria. The active mechanism for settlement talks, the 5+2 format, which includes Moldova, Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the United States, was, however, suspended after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Oleg Serebrian told the delegation this would remain the case until a peace settlement in Ukraine is reached. After this, he stressed, Moldovan authorities will concentrate on force demobilisation in Transnistria and on Transnistria’s economic reintegration into Moldova. He noted that the region’s economic transition is already under way, as the region is already sending up to 70% of its exports to the EU, and will soon be more closely linked into a western-dependent energy grid.

More broadly, however, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine impacts Moldova’s stability and economic development. As stressed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihai Popșoi, the war has been a significant drag on investments across the region, with foreign and domestic investment in Moldova being particularly impacted. 

Despite the continued Russian pressure, Moldovan authorities have clearly indicated their intent to continue aligning with Western sanctions against Russia, some of which impact Transnistrian businesses. Moreover, as noted by the Chair of the Committee on National Security and Head of the Delegation of Moldova to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Lilian Carp, Moldova will continue to support Ukrainian refugees, including by granting them access to education and medical care. In fact, since 2022 over 1 million Ukrainian refugees transited over Moldovan territory; over 200,000 of them decided to stay in Moldova. This is the most per capita of any country and, as Carp noted, weighed heavily on a resource-poor country, but, he continued, “we are happy to do this, because it is the right thing to do.”

Russia’s Hybrid War

While Russia wages a kinetic war against Ukraine, it is also waging an intense hybrid war against Moldova. Russia has ramped up a range of grey zone attacks against Moldova since 2022, especially after Chișinău moved decisively to cut ties with Moscow. Russia’s grey zone tactics against Moldova are characterised by their intensity, scale and scope. The ultimate objective of the effort is to remove the reformist government in Chișinău and prevent Moldova from moving closer to the West. In fact, Russia believes that Moldova’s vulnerabilities, if manipulated properly, will constitute a sufficient obstacle to the country’s European integration. 

Moldova is vulnerable to Russia’s grey zone campaign. Firstly, Moldova faces challenges to societal resilience where a sizeable part of the population still supports Russia and opposes closer political ties with the West. Second, Moldova’s state institutions suffer from a deficit of financing and personnel. This allows Russia to exhaust the response capacity of Moldovan government institutions and agencies more easily. Thirdly, Russia continues to fuel secessionist tendencies in Gagauzia and Transnistria, which further complicates Moldova’s position.

President of Moldova Maia Sandu told the delegation that, in recent months, electoral interference became the primary weapon in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox against Moldova. President Sandu noted that the scale and the level of sophistication of Russian electoral interference were without precedent. According to Moldovan assessments, Russia used up to 200 million EUR to impact the outcome of the 2024 presidential elections as well as the referendum on enshrining EU accession in the Moldovan constitution. 

Russia has also orchestrated a large-scale vote-buying, including by using a network of activists and bots. Russia went so far as to fly Moldovans living in Russia back home to vote and gave them cash to buy votes on the ground when there. At several polling stations in Western countries, voting was disrupted by false bomb threats, and numerous Moldovan journalists and public figures were threatened before elections. 

This electoral interference was coupled with mounting disinformation attacks from Russia, which shifted to social media (e.g., Telegram, TikTok) after the government suspended several Russia-backed television channels in 2022. Russian disinformation campaigns have been centred around several key themes. They involve attacks on the democratic credentials of the government, the legitimacy of state institutions, and accusations that the government is pushing a foreign agenda. Russia has been also spinning the narrative that Moldova’s pro-Western governments will drag the country into an undesirable war. Against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, this threat of war amplified fears in society and aimed to scare off pro-European voters. 

The Moldovan authorities underlined that they are implementing lessons learned from the Russian intensified hybrid warfare campaign to increase Moldova’s resilience before the parliamentary elections, which are scheduled to take place in the second half of 2025. Moldova’s recent actions include legislative steps to minimise the manipulation of the electoral process, increased dialogue with social media companies, and boosting capabilities to counter disinformation, including through the newly established Centre for Strategic Communications and Combating Disinformation.

Energy Security

Until 2022, Moldova was one of Europe’s most dependent countries on Russian energy. Russian gas was delivered through Ukraine via Transnistria. Since 2022, Moldova has taken concrete steps to reshape its energy security landscape to minimise its exposure to Russian energy blackmail. In fact, Moldova managed to achieve full independence from Russian gas and unbundle its energy market to comply with the EU’s Third Energy Package, which aims at creating integrated and competitive energy markets for natural gas and electricity. 

Until the beginning of 2025, however, 80% of Moldova’s electricity demand was supplied from a gas-fired power plant located in Transnistria which, in turn, was supplied with gas free-of-charge by Russia. On 1 January 2025, Gazprom ceased its gas supplies to Transnistria following Ukraine’s decision not to extend the gas transit agreement. The halt in gas supplies triggered a severe crisis in Transnistria, leading to extended blackouts and heating disruptions for its approximately 450,000 residents and a significant increase in electricity prices in Moldova. The crisis was temporarily resolved in January 2025 with the approval of EUR 64 million in non-repayable aid by the European Commission to provide immediate relief and support Moldova's energy independence and resilience. 

The Moldovan authorities underlined that this crisis led them to speed up certain projects to increase diversification of electricity supply. Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu underlined that Moldova’s goal is interconnection with the European market which will increase the security of supply. In this context, the construction of a high-voltage power line Bălți-Suceava remains a priority. The line is the second of three 400 kV power lines to be built to strengthen interconnection with the European continental energy system of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Mr. Junghietu confirmed that the Moldovan government plans to diversify the energy mix with more renewable energy by supporting large renewable energy projects.  The target is to raise the share of renewable energy sources in electricity consumption from around 20% in 2024 to 30% by 2030. As such, Moldova authorised a total of 105 MW of wind farm projects and 60 MW of solar parks by the end of 2025. 

Defence Policy and NATO-Moldova Cooperation

A core message resonating throughout the visit was straightforward: despite its neutrality, Moldova needs to invest more in defence. The country’s vulnerability and proximity to conflict are impossible to ignore and these factors are driving a push to enhance its capabilities. Minister of Defence Anatolie Nosatîi noted that Moldova will increase its defence budget to 1% of GDP by 2030. The budget increase will be primarily spent of equipment renovation as well as training and exercises. 

In parallel, the Moldovan Armed Forces will remain dependent on donations coming from NATO Allies and the EU Members States. In 2024, Moldova celebrated 30 years as a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. In the last decade, it has been the focus of significant ‘tailored’ defence capacity building cooperation with NATO Allies. In addition to working with Allies to cooperate on Moldova’s defence institutional modernisation and resilience, Moldova has worked to be a security exporter as well, contributing to NATO’s KFOR for the last decade. 

Based on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, the Moldovan authorities primarily underlined the need to increase Moldova’s radar and short-range air defence capabilities. Drone and counter-drone trainings are also high on the priority list. Moldova plans to continue to strengthen its practical cooperation with NATO to increase the interoperability of its Armed Forces. At the same time, Moldovan society support for NATO remains relatively low and oscillates around 25-38%.

Minister Nosatîi told the delegation he viewed the NATO PA’s visit as a strategic message – Moldova will continue to work hard to adapt, strengthen, and modernise all its institutions, particularly its defence capabilities. 

The visit was capped with an engaging, and mutually beneficial, discussion with members of Moldova’s civil society to discuss the nature of the visit, and NATO-Moldova security and defence cooperation. 

Photos of the visit, courtesy of ©Ministerul Apărării al Republicii Moldova, © National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, © Pedja Vuckovic.